

Kidderminster [Mr. Robert Lowe]; for I feel no regret that Russia should not have terminated hostilities by accepting proposals inadequate in my judgment to secure our object; while I think it scarcely consistent with the prerogative of the Crown, and might furnish a dangerous precedent hereafter, if we were to contest the right of her Majesty to judge for herself whether the means of peace on the basis of the Third Negotiation are exhausted or not.

The amendment of the right honorable member for Portsmouth [Sir F. Baring] would have been more complimentary to the quarter whence he stole it if he had not added the crime of murder to that of theft. He takes an infant from the paternal cradle, cuts it in half, and the head which he presents to us has no longer a leg to stand upon. The original motion of my right honorable friend the member for Buckinghamshire [Mr. Disraeli], in censuring the government for ambiguous language and uncertain conduct, gave a substantial reason for conveying to her Majesty that we, at least, would support her in the conduct of war. Omit that censure, imply by your silence that there is no reason to distrust her Majesty's responsible advisers, and the rest of the resolution becomes an unmeaning platitude.

It is with great satisfaction that I think of the effect produced by the original motion of my right honorable friend; for to my mind that effect atones for its want of success in meeting with the sanction of the House. It has not, it is true, changed the government, but it assuredly has changed its tone. I do not know whether that change will be lasting, but I hope that we are not to take, as a test of the earnestness of a government thus suddenly galvanized into vigor the speech of the noble lord the member for London [Lord John Russell], which, before the division, implied so much,

but which, after the division, was explained away in so remarkable a manner. I rejoice that in wringing direct declarations from the government it leaves us free to discuss that which is before us, not as Englishmen against Englishmen, but as citizens of one common state equally interested in surveying the grounds of a common danger.

Much reference has been made in the course of this debate as to the position of Austria. The mediation of Austria is withdrawn for the present, but Austria is still there, always ready to mediate as long as she hesitates to act. It is well to consider what may be our position with regard to a power with which we have constantly been brought into contact. I cannot too earnestly entreat you to distinguish with Austria and the alliance with Austria. I think it is of the utmost importance, if you would confine this war within compact and definite limits, that you should maintain friendly terms with a power which, as long as it is neutral, if it cannot serve does not harm you, and which you could not seriously injure without casting out of the balance of Europe one of the weights most necessary to the equilibrium of the scales.

It is easy to threaten Austria with the dismemberment of her ill-cemented empire, easy to threaten her with reduction to a fourth-rate power. But she has this answer to the practical sagacity of England and the chivalrous moderation of France: "Is the empire of Austria not less essential as a counterpoise to France than the integrity of Turkey is essential as a barrier against Russia? If the balance of power be not a mere dream, I trust my cause to every statesman by whom the balance of power is respected."

But though, for this and for other reasons, I would desire you to maintain friendly relations with Austria, pardon me if I doubt the wisdom of having so earnestly solicited

her alliance. Supposing you had now gained it, what would you have done? Just what a government here might do if it pressed into its cabinet some able and influential man with views not congenial to its own, and who used his power on your councils to modify the opinions and check the plans upon which you had before been united.

Add Austria now, while she is still timid and reluctant, to the two western powers, give her a third co-equal voice in all the conduct of the war, and it could only introduce into their councils a certain element of vacillation and discord. But if you bide your time, preserving Austria in her present attitude of friendly neutrality, if you do not threaten and affront her into action against you, the natural consequences of continued war, the common inclinations of her statesmen and her people—which I have reason to know are not favorable to Russia—will bring her to you at length with coincidence in your objects, because according to the dictates of her own sense of self-interest.

As far as I can judge, our tone with Austria has been much too supplicating and our mode of arguing with her somewhat ludicrous. It reminds me of the story of an American who saw making up to him in the woods an enormous bear. Upon that he betook himself to his devotions and exclaimed, "O Lord, there is going to be a horrible fight between me and the bear. All I seek is fair play and no favor. If there is justice in heaven, you ought to help me; but if you won't help me, don't help the bear."

But now comes the grave and solemn problem which the withdrawal of all negotiations forces still more upon the mind of every one who thinks deeply, and which the right honorable gentleman the member from Manchester has so properly raised. War being fairly upon us, of what nature shall

be that war? Shall it assume that vast and comprehensive character which excites in the honorable member for Aylesbury [Mr. Layard] hopes for the human race too daring even for him to detail to this sober House?

In plain words, shall it be a war in which, to use the language of Mr. Canning in 1826, you will enlist "all those who, whether justly or unjustly, are dissatisfied with their own countries;" in which you will imitate the spirit of revolutionary France when she swept over Europe and sought to reconcile humanity to slaughter by pointing to a rainbow of freedom on the other side of the deluge? Does history here give to the honorable member an example or a warning? How were these promises fulfilled? Look round Europe! You had the carnage—where is the freedom? The deluge spread, the deluge rolled away—half a century is fled and where is the rainbow visible? Is it on the ruins of Cracow? on the field of Novara? or over the walls of defeated Rome?

No; in a war that invokes liberal opinion against established rules, what I most dread and deprecate is, not that you will fulfil your promises and reap the republics for which you sowed rebellions; what I dread far more is that all such promises would in the end be broken—that the hopes of liberty would be betrayed—that the moment the monarchies of England and France could obtain a peace that realized the objects for which monarchs go to war, they would feel themselves compelled by the exhaustion of their resources, by the instincts of self-conservatism, to abandon the auxiliaries they had lured into revolution—restore to despotism "the right divine to govern wrong," and furnish with it new excuse for vigilance and rigor by the disorders which always distinguish armed revolution from peaceable reforms.

I say nothing here against the fair possibility of reconstructing in some future congress the independence of Poland, or such territorial arrangements as are comprised in the question, "What is to be done in the Crimea, provided we take it?"

But these are not all that is meant by the language we hear, less vaguely out of this House than in it, except when a minister implies what he shrinks from explaining. And woe and shame to the English statesman who, whatever may be his sympathy for oppressed subjects, shall rouse them to rebellion against their native thrones, not foreseeing that in the changes of popular representative government all that his cabinet may promise to-day a new cabinet to-morrow may legally revoke; that he has no power to redeem in freedom the pledges that he writes in blood! And woe still more to brave populations that are taught to rest democracy on the arms of foreign soldiers, the fickle cheers of foreign popular assemblies, or to dream that liberty can never be received as a gift, extorted as a right, maintained as a hereditary heirloom, except the charter be obtained at their own Runnymede and signed under the shadow of their own oaks!

But there is all the difference between rousing nations against their rulers and securing the independence and integrity of a weak nation against a powerful neighbor. The first is a policy that submits the destinies of a country to civil discord, the other relieves those destinies from foreign interference; the one tends to vain and indefinite warfare—the other starts, at the outset, with intelligible conditions of peace.

Therefore in this war let us strictly keep to the object for which it was begun—the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, secured by all the guaranties which states-

men can desire or victory enable us to demand. The more definite the object the more firm you will be in asserting it.

How the object is to be effected, how these securities are to be obtained, is not the affair of the House of Commons. The strategy must be planned by the allied cabinets, and its execution entrusted to councils of war. We in this House can only judge by results; and, however unfair that may seem to governments, it is the sole course left to us, unless we are always dictating to our allies and hampering our generals. But we thus make the end of the war purely protective; we cannot make the means we adopt purely defensive. In order to force Russia into our object we must assail and cripple her wherever she can be crippled and assailed. I say, with the right honorable gentleman the member for the University of Oxford, do not offer to her an idle insult, do not slap her in the face, but paralyze her hands.

"Oh," said a noble friend of mine the other night [Lord Stanley], "it is a wretched policy to humble the foe that you cannot crush; and are you mad enough to suppose that Russia can be crushed?"

Let my noble friend, in the illustrious career which I venture to prophesy lies before him, beware how he ever endeavors to contract the grand science of statesmen into scholastic aphorisms. No, we cannot crush Russia as Russia, but we can crush her attempts to be more than Russia. We can, and we must, crush any means that enable her to storm or to steal across that tangible barrier which now divides Europe from a power that supports the maxims of Machiavelli with the armaments of Britain.

You might as well have said to William of Orange, "You cannot crush Louis XIV; how impolitic you are to humble him!" You might as well have said to the burghers of

Switzerland, "You cannot crush Austria; don't vainly insult her by limiting her privilege to crush yourselves."

William of Orange did not crush France as a kingdom; Switzerland did not crush Austria as an empire; but William did crush the power of France to injure Holland; Switzerland did crush the power of Austria to enslave her people; and in that broad sense of the word, by the blessing of heaven, we will crush the power of Russia to invade her neighbors and convulse the world.

The right honorable gentleman the member for Manchester has sought to frighten us by dwelling on the probable duration of this war; but if you will only be in earnest, and if you will limit yourselves strictly to its legitimate object, I have no fear that the war will be long. I do not presume on our recent successes, important though they are, for Kertch is the *entrepôt* of all the commerce of the Sea of Azof; nor on the exaggerated estimate of the forces which Russia has in Sebastopol or can bring to the Crimea; nor on her difficulty through any long series of campaigns to transport and provision large armies from great distances; nor on many circumstances which, of late especially, tend to show that for exertions at once violent and sustained her sinews are not strong enough to support her bulk.

But I look only to the one fact, that in these days war is money; and that no power on earth can carry on a long war with a short purse. Russia's pecuniary resources are fast failing her. In no country is recruiting so costly or attended with such distress to the proprietors of the soil. Every new levy, in depriving the nobles of their serfs, leaves poverty and discontent behind; while in arresting her commercial intercourse, you exhaust the only springs that can recruit the capital which she robs from the land. In the great "History of

Treaties," now publishing by the Count de Garden, and which must supersede all other authorities on that subject, he speaks thus of Russia in 1810:

"The closing of her ports, which was the result of her war with England, deprived Russia of all outlet for her exportations, which, consisting chiefly of raw materials, such as timber, potash, iron, etc., could only be transported by sea. The balance of commerce thus fixed itself entirely to the detriment of Russia, and producing there a disastrous fall in the course of exchange and a depreciation of the currency, menaced with ruin all the financial resources of the State."

You have therefore always at work for you, not only your fleets and armies, but the vital interests of Russia herself. She cannot resist you long, provided you are thoroughly in earnest. She may boast and dissimulate to the last, but rely on it that peace will come to you suddenly—will, in her proper name, knock loudly at the door which you do not close against peace herself, but against her felonious counterfeit who would creep through the opening disguised in her garments and with the sword concealed under her veil.

The noble lord who has just spoken with so much honesty of conviction [Lord Archibald Hamilton] ventured to anticipate the verdict of history. Let me do the same. Let me suppose that when the future philanthropist shall ask what service on the human race did we in our generation signally confer, some one—trained perhaps in the schools of Oxford, or in the Institute of Manchester—shall answer:

"A power that commanded myriads—as many as those that under Xerxes exhausted rivers in their march—embodied all the forces of barbarism on the outskirts of civilization. Left there to develop its own natural resources, no State molested, though all apprehended, its growth. But, long pent by merciful nature in its own legitimate domains,

this power schemed for the outlet to its instinctive ambition. To that outlet it crept by dissimulating guile, by successive treaties that, promising peace, graduated spoliation to the opportunities of fraud. At length, under pretexts too gross to deceive the common sense of mankind, it prepared to seize that outlet—to storm the feeble gates between itself and the world beyond.”

Then the historian shall say that we in our generation—the united families of England and France—made ourselves the vanguard of alarmed and shrinking Europe, and did not sheathe the sword until we had redeemed the pledge to humanity made on the faith of two Christian sovereigns, and ratified at those distant graves which liberty and justice shall revere forever.