

GREENLEAF
ON
EVIDENCE

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TO THE HONORABLE

JOSEPH STORY, LL. D.,

ONE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
AND DANE PROFESSOR OF LAW IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

SIR,

IN dedicating this work to you, I perform an office both justly due to yourself and delightful to me,—that of adding the evidence of a private and confidential witness, to the abundant public testimonials of your worth. For more than thirty years the jurisprudence of our country has been illustrated by your professional and juridical labors; and with what success, it is now superfluous to speak. Other Jurists have attained distinction in separate departments of the law; it has been reserved for yourself, with singular felicity, to cultivate and administer them all. Looking back to the unsettled state of the law of our national institutions, at the period of your accession to the bench of the Supreme Court of the United States, and consider-

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ing the unlimited variety of subjects within the cognizance of the Federal tribunals, I do but express the consenting opinions of your contemporaries, in congratulating our country that your life and vigor have been spared, until the fabric of her jurisprudence has been advanced to its present state of lofty eminence, attractive beauty and enduring strength.

But many will regard the foundation of the present Law School in Harvard University as the crowning benefit, which, through your instrumentality, has been conferred on our profession and country. Of the multitude of young men, who will have drunk at this fountain of jurisprudence, many will administer the law, in every portion of this wide-spread republic, in the true spirit of the doctrines here inculcated; and succeeding throngs of ingenuous youth will, I trust, be here imbued with the same spirit, as long as our government shall remain a government of law. Your anxiety to perpetuate the benefits of this Institution, and the variety, extent, and untiring constancy of your labors in this cause, as well as the cheerful patience with which they have been borne, are peculiarly known to myself; while at the same time I have witnessed and been instructed by the high moral character, the widely expanded views, and the learned and just expositions of the law, which have alike distinguished your private lectures and your published

Commentaries. With unaffected sincerity I may be permitted to acknowledge, that while my path has been illumined for many years by your personal friendship and animating example, to have been selected as your associate in the arduous and responsible labors of this Institution, I shall ever regard as the peculiar honor and happiness of my professional life. *Beatè vixisse videar, quia cum Scipione vixerim.*

Long may you continue to reap the rich reward of labors so vast, so incessant, and of such surpassing value, in the heartfelt gratitude of our whole country, and in the prosperity of her institutions, which you have done so much to establish and adorn.

I am, with the highest respect,
your obliged friend,


SIMON GREENLEAF.

Cambridge, Massachusetts,
February 23, 1842.





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UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA DE NUEVO LEÓN

DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE BIBLIOTECAS

ADVERTISEMENT TO THE FIRST EDITION.

THE profession being already furnished with the excellent treatises of Mr. Starkie and Mr. Phillips on Evidence, with large bodies of notes, referring to American decisions, perhaps some apology may be deemed necessary for obtruding on their notice another work, on the same subject. But the want of a proper text-book, for the use of the Students under my instruction, urged me to prepare something, to supply this deficiency; and having embarked in the undertaking, I was naturally led to the endeavor to render the work acceptable to the profession, as well as useful to the student. I would not herein be thought to disparage the invaluable works just mentioned; which, for their accuracy of learning, elegance and sound philosophy, are so highly and universally esteemed by the American bar. But many of the topics they contain were never applicable to this country; some others are now obsolete; and the body of notes has become so large, as almost to overwhelm the text, thus greatly embarrassing the student, increasing the labors of the instructor, and rendering it indispensable that the work should be re-written, with

exclusive reference to our own jurisprudence. I have endeavored to state those doctrines and rules of the law of Evidence which are common to all the United States; omitting what is purely local law, and citing only such cases as seemed necessary to illustrate and support the text. Doubtless a happier selection of these might be made, and the work might have been much better executed by another hand; for now it is finished, I find it but an approximation towards what was originally desired. But in the hope, that it still may be found not useless, as the germ of a better treatise, it is submitted to the candor of a liberal profession.

Cambridge, Massachusetts,
February 23, 1842.


ADVERTISEMENT TO THE FOURTH EDITION.

In this edition the work has been again carefully revised and corrected, and all the decisions in England, Ireland and America, published since the last edition, and which seemed to affect the text, have been referred to; and the work has been farther enlarged by matter, which, it is hoped, will increase its usefulness both to the student and to the profession.

Harvard University,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, October 9, 1848.

UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA DE NUEVO LEÓN


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NOTE.

SOME of the citations from Starkie's Reports, in the earlier part of this work, are made from the Exeter edition of 1823, and the residue from the London edition of 1817-20. The editions of the principal elementary writers cited, where they are not otherwise expressed, are the following:—

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
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UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA

DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE

A
TREATISE
ON THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE.

PART I.
OF THE NATURE AND PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE.

CHAPTER I.
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.

§ 1. THE word EVIDENCE, in legal acceptance, includes all the means, by which any alleged matter of fact, the truth of which is submitted to investigation, is established or disproved.¹ This term, and the word *proof*, are often used indifferently, as synonymous with each other; but the latter is applied, by the most accurate logicians, to the *effect* of evidence, and not to the *medium* by which truth is established.² None but mathematical truth is susceptible of that high degree of evidence, called *demonstration*, which excludes all possibility of error, and which, therefore, may reasonably be required in support of every mathematical deduction. Matters of fact are proved by *moral evidence* alone; by which is meant, not

¹ See Wills on Circumstantial Evid. 2; 1 Stark. Evid. 10; 1 Phil. Evid. 1.

² Whately's Logic, B. iv. ch. iii. § 1.

only that kind of evidence which is employed on subjects connected with moral conduct, but all the evidence which is not obtained either from intuition, or from demonstration. In the ordinary affairs of life, we do not require demonstrative evidence, because it is not consistent with the nature of the subject, and to insist upon it would be unreasonable and absurd. The most that can be affirmed of such things, is, that there is no reasonable doubt concerning them.¹ The *true question*, therefore, in trials of fact, is not, whether it is possible that the testimony may be false, but, whether there is *sufficient probability* of its truth; that is, whether the facts are shown by competent and satisfactory evidence. Things established by competent and satisfactory evidence are said to be *proved*.

§ 2. By *competent evidence*, is meant that which the very nature of the thing to be proved requires, as the fit and appropriate proof in the particular case, such as the production of a writing, where its contents are the subject of inquiry. By *satisfactory evidence*, which is sometimes called *sufficient* evidence, is intended that amount of proof, which ordinarily satisfies an unprejudiced mind, beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances which will amount to this degree of proof can never be previously defined; the only legal test of which they are susceptible, is their sufficiency to satisfy the mind and conscience of a common man; and so to convince him, that he would venture to act upon that conviction, in matters of the highest concern and importance to his own interest.²

¹ See Gambier's Guide to the Study of Moral Evidence, p. 121. Even of mathematical truths, this writer justly remarks, that, though capable of demonstration, they are admitted by most men solely on the moral evidence of general notoriety. For most men are neither able themselves to understand mathematical demonstrations, nor have they, ordinarily, for their truth, the testimony of those who do understand them; but, finding them generally believed in the world, they also believe them. Their belief is afterwards confirmed by experience; for whenever there is occasion to apply them, they are found to lead to just conclusions. Ib. 196.

² 1 Stark. Evid. 514.

Questions, respecting the competency and admissibility of evidence, are entirely distinct from those, which respect its sufficiency or effect; the former being exclusively within the province of the Court; the latter belonging exclusively to the Jury.¹ *Cumulative* evidence, is evidence of the same kind, to the same point. Thus, if a fact is attempted to be proved by the verbal admission of the party, evidence of another verbal admission of the same fact is cumulative; but evidence of other circumstances, tending to establish the fact, is not.²

§ 3. This branch of the law may be considered under three general heads, namely, *First*, The Nature and Principles of Evidence; — *Secondly*, The Object of Evidence, and the Rules, which govern in the production of testimony; — And *Thirdly*, The Means of proof, or the Instruments, by which facts are established. This order will be followed in farther treating this subject. But before we proceed, it will be proper first to consider what things Courts will, of themselves, take notice of without proof.

¹ *Columbian Ins. Co. v. Lawrence*, 2 Pet. 25, 44; *Bank U. States v. Corcoran*, Ib. 121, 133; *Van Ness v. Pacard*, Ib. 137, 149.

² *Parker v. Hardy*, 24 Pick. 246, 248.

CHAPTER II.

OF THINGS JUDICIALLY TAKEN NOTICE OF, WITHOUT PROOF.

§ 4. ALL civilized nations, being alike members of the great family of sovereignties, may well be supposed to recognise each other's existence, and general public and external relations. The usual and appropriate symbols of nationality and sovereignty are the national flag and seal. Every sovereign therefore recognises, and, of course, the public tribunals and functionaries of every nation take notice of, the existence and titles of all the other sovereign powers in the civilized world, their respective flags, and their seals of state. Public acts, decrees, and judgments, exemplified under this seal, are received as true and genuine, it being the highest evidence of their character.¹ If, however, upon a civil war in any country, one part of the nation should separate itself from the other, and establish for itself an independent government, the newly formed nation cannot without proof be recognised as such, by the judicial tribunals of other nations, until it has been acknowledged by the sovereign power under which those tribunals are constituted;² the first act of recognition belonging to the executive function. But though the seal of the new power, prior to such acknowledgment, is not permitted to prove itself, yet it may be proved, as a fact, by

¹ *Church v. Hubbard*, 2 Cranch, 187, 238; *Griswold v. Pitcairn*, 2 Conn. 85, 90; *U. States v. Johns*, 4 Dall. 416; *The Santissima Trinidad*, 7 Wheat. 273, 335; *Anon.* 9 Mod. 66; *Lincoln v. Battelle*, 6 Wend. 475. It is held in New York that such seal, to be recognised in the Courts, must be a Common Law seal, that is, an impression upon wax. *Coit v. Milliken*, 1 Denio, R. 376.

² *Grierson v. Eyre*, 9 Ves. 347; *United States v. Palmer*, 3 Wheat. 610, 634.

other competent testimony.¹ And the existence of such unacknowledged government or State may in like manner be proved; the rule being, that if a body of persons assemble together to protect themselves, and support their own independence, make laws, and have Courts of justice, this is evidence of their being a State.²

§ 5. In like manner, the Law of Nations, and the general customs and usages of merchants, as well as the public statutes and general laws and customs of their own country, as well ecclesiastical as civil, are recognised, without proof, by the Courts of all civilized nations.³ The seal of a notary public is also judicially taken notice of by the Courts, he being an officer recognised by the whole commercial world.⁴ Foreign Admiralty and Maritime Courts too, being the Courts of the civilized world, and of coördinate jurisdiction, are judicially recognised every where; and their seals need not be proved.⁵ Neither is it necessary to prove things, which

¹ *United States v. Palmer*, 3 Wheat. 610, 634; *The Estrella*, 4 Wheat. 298. What is sufficient evidence to authenticate, in the Courts of this country, the sentence or decree of the Court of a foreign government, after the destruction of such government, and while the country is possessed by the conqueror, remains undecided. *Hatfield v. Jameson* 2 Munf. 53, 70, 71.

² *Yrissarri v. Clement*, 2 C. & P. 223, per Best, C. J. And see 1 Kent, Comm. 180; 1 Lieber's Political Ethics; Grotius, De Jur. Bel. b. 3, c. 3, § 1.

³ *Ereskine v. Murray*, 2 Ld. Raym. 1542; Heineccius ad Pand. l. 22, tit. 3, sec. 119; 1 Bl. Comm. 75, 76, 85; *Edie v. East India Co.* 2 Burr. 1226, 1228; *Chandler v. Grieves*, 2. H. Bl. 606, n.; *Rex v. Sutton*, 4 M. & S. 542; 6 Vin. Abr. tit. Court, D; 1 Rol. Abr. 526, D. Judges will also take notice of the usual practice and course of conveyancing. 3 Sugd. Vend. & Pur. 28; *Willoughby v. Willoughby*, 17 R. 772, per Ld. Hardwicke; *Doe v. Hilder*, 2 B. & Ald. 793; *Rowe v. Grenfel*, Ry. & Mo. 398, per Abbott, C. J.

⁴ *Anon.* 12 Mod. 345; *Wright v. Barnard*, 2 Esp. 700; *Yeaton v. Fry*, 5 Cranch, 335; *Brown v. Philadelphia Bank*, 6 S. & R. 484; *Chanoine v. Fowler*, 3 Wend. 173, 178; *Bayley on Bills*, 515, (2d Am. Ed. by Phillips & Sewall;) *Hutcheon v. Mannington*, 6 Ves. 823.

⁵ *Croudson v. Leonard*, 4 Cranch, 435; *Rose v. Himely*, Id. 292; *Church v. Hubbard*, 2 Cranch, 187; *Thompson v. Stewart*, 3 Conn. 171, 181; *Green*

must have happened according to the ordinary course of nature;¹ nor to prove the course of time, or of the heavenly bodies; nor, the ordinary public fasts and festivals; nor, the coincidence of days of the week with days of the month;² nor, the meaning of words in the vernacular language;³ nor, the legal weights and measures;⁴ nor, any matters of public history, affecting the whole people;⁵ nor, public matters, affecting the government of the country.⁶

§ 6. Courts also take notice of the territorial extent of the jurisdiction and sovereignty, exercised *de facto* by their own government; and of the local divisions of their country, as into states, provinces, counties, cities, towns, local parishes, or the like, so far as political government is concerned or affected; and of the relative positions of such local divisions; but not of their precise boundaries, farther than they may be described in public statutes.⁷ They will also judicially recognise the political constitution or frame of their own government; its essential political agents or public officers, sharing in its regular administration; and its essential and regular political operations, powers and action. Thus, notice is taken, by all tribunals, of the accession of the Chief Executive of the nation or state, under whose authority they act; his powers and

v. Weller, 2 Ld. Raym. 891, 893; *Anon.* 9 Mod. 66; *Story on the Conflict of Laws*, § 643; *Hughes v. Cornelius*, as stated by Ld. Holt, in 2 Ld. Raym. 893. And see *T. Raym.* 473, 2 Show. 232, S. C.

¹ *Rex v. Luffe*, 8 East, 202; *Fay v. Prentice*, 9 Jur. 876.

² 6 Vin. Abr. 491, pl. 6, 7, 8; *Hoyle v. Cornwallis*, 1 Stra. 387; *Page v. Faucet*, Cro. El. 227; *Harvy v. Broad*, 2 Salk. 626; *Hanson v. Shackleton*, 4 Dowl. 48.

³ *Clementi v. Golding*, 2 Campb. 25; *Commonwealth v. Kneeland*, 20 Pick. 239.

⁴ *Hockin v. Cooke*, 4 T. R. 314.

⁵ *Bank of Augusta v. Earle*, 13 Pet. 519, 590; 1 Stark. Ev. 211, (6th Am. Ed.)

⁶ *Taylor v. Barclay*, 2 Sim. 221.

⁷ *Deybel's case*, 4 B. & Ald. 242; 2 Inst. 557; *Fazakerley v. Wiltshire*, 1 Stra. 469; *Humphreys v. Budd*, 9 Dowl. 1000.

privileges;¹ the genuineness of his signature;² the heads of departments, and principal officers of state, and the public seals;³ the election or resignation of a senator of the United States; the appointment of a cabinet or foreign minister;⁴ marshals and sheriffs,⁵ and the genuineness of their signatures;⁶ but not their deputies; Courts of general jurisdiction, their Judges, their seals, their rules and maxims in the administration of justice, and course of proceeding;⁷ also, of public proclamations of war and peace,⁸ and of days of special public fasts and thanksgivings; stated days of general political elections; the sittings of the legislature, and its established and usual course of proceeding; the privileges of its members, but not the transactions on its journals.⁹ The

¹ *Elderton's case*, 2 Ld. Raym. 980, per Holt, C. J.

² *Jones v. Gale's Ex'r*, 4 Martin, 635. And see *Rex v. Miller*, 2 W. Bl. 797; 1 Leach, Cr. Cas. 74; *Rex v. Gully*, 1 Leach, Cr. Cas. 98.

³ *Rex v. Jones*, 2 Campb. 121; *Bennett v. The State of Tennessee*, Mart. & Yerg. Rep. 133; Ld. Melville's case, 29 How. St. Tr. 707. And see, as to seals, *post*, § 503, and cases there cited.

⁴ *Walden v. Canfield*, 2 Rob. Louis. R. 466.

⁵ *Holman v. Burrow*, 2 Ld. Raym. 794.

⁶ *Alcock v. Whatmore*, 8 Dowl. P. C. 615.

⁷ *Tregany v. Fletcher*, 1 Ld. Raym. 154; *Lane's case*, 2 Co. 16, 3 Com. Dig. 336, Courts, Q.; *Newell v. Newton*, 10 Pick. 470; *Elliott v. Evans*, 3 B. & P. 183, 184, per Ld. Alvanley, C. J.; *Maberley v. Robins*, 5 Taunt. 625; *Tooker v. Duke of Beaufort*, Sayer, 296. Whether Superior Courts are bound to take notice who are justices of the inferior tribunals, is not clearly settled. In *Skipp v. Hooke*, 2 Stra. 1080, it was objected, that they were not; but whether the case was decided on that, or on the other exception taken, does not appear. *Andrews*, 74, reports the same case, "*ex relatione alterius*," and equally doubtful. And see *Van Sandau v. Turner*, 6 Ad. & El. 773, 786, per Ld. Denman. The weight of American authorities seems rather on the affirmative side of the question. *Hawks v. Kennebec*, 7 Mass. 461; *Ripley v. Warren*, 2 Pick. 592; *Despau v. Swindler*, 3 Martin N. S. 705; *Follain v. Lefevre*, 3 Rob. Louis. R. 13. In Louisiana, the Courts take notice of the signatures of executive and judicial officers to all official acts. *Jones v. Gale's Ex'r*, 4 Martin, 635; *Wood v. Fitz*, 10 Martin, 196.

⁸ *Dolder v. Lord Huntingfield*, 11 Ves. 292; *Rex v. De Berenger*, 3 M. & S. 67; *Taylor v. Barclay*, 2 Sim. 213.

⁹ *Lake v. King*, 1 Saund. 131; *Birt v. Rothwell*, 1 Lord Raym. 210, 343;

Courts of the United States, moreover, take judicial notice of the ports and waters of the United States, in which the tide ebbs and flows; of the boundaries of the several States and judicial districts;¹ and in an especial manner of all the laws and jurisprudence of the several States in which they exercise an original or an appellate jurisdiction. The Judges of the Supreme Court of the United States are on this account bound to take judicial notice of the laws of jurisprudence of all the States and Territories.² A Court of Errors will also take notice of the nature and extent of the jurisdiction of the inferior Court whose judgment it revises.³ In fine, Courts will generally take notice of whatever ought to be generally known, within the limits of their jurisdiction. In all these, and the like cases, where the memory of the Judge is at fault, he resorts to such documents of reference, as may be at hand, and he may deem worthy of confidence.⁴

Rex v. Wilde, 1 Lev. 296; Doug. 97, n. 41; Rex v. Arundel, Hob. 109, 110, 111; Rex v. Knollys, 1 Ld. Raym. 10, 15; Stockdale v. Hansard, 7 C. & P. 731; 9 Ad. & El. 1; 11 Ad. & El. 253; Sheriff of Middlesex's case, 1b. 273; Cassidy v. Stewart, 2 M. & G. 437.

¹ Story on Eq. Plead. § 24, cites U. S. v. La Vengeance, 3 Dall. 297; The Appollon, 9 Wheat. 374; The Thomas Jefferson, 10 Wheat. 428; Peyroux v. Howard, 7 Pet. 342.

² Ibid.; Owings v. Hull, 9 Pet. 607, 624, 625.

³ Chitty v. Dendy, 3 Ad. & El. 319.

⁴ Gresley on Evid. 295.

CHAPTER III.

OF THE GROUNDS OF BELIEF.

§ 7. We proceed now to a brief consideration of the *General Nature and Principles of Evidence*. No inquiry is here proposed into the origin of human knowledge; it being assumed, on the authority of approved writers, that all that men know is referable, in a philosophical view, to perception and reflection. But, in fact, the knowledge, acquired by an individual, through his own perception and reflection, is but a small part of what he possesses; much of what we are content to regard and act upon as knowledge, having been acquired through the perception of others.¹ It is not easy to conceive, that the Supreme Being, whose wisdom is so conspicuous in all his works, constituted man to believe only upon his own personal experience; since in that case the world could neither be governed nor improved; and society must remain in the state, in which it was left by the first generation of men. On the contrary, during the period of childhood, we believe implicitly almost all that is told us; and thus are furnished with information, which we could not otherwise obtain, but which is necessary, at the time, for our present protection, or as the means of future improvement. This disposition to believe may be termed instinctive. At an early period, however, we begin to find that, of the things told to us, some are not true; and thus our implicit reliance on the testimony of others is weakened; first, in regard to particular things, in which we have been deceived; then in regard to persons, whose falsehood we have detected; and, as these instances multiply upon us, we gradually become more and more distrustful of such statements, and learn, by experience, the

¹ Abercrombie on the Intellectual Powers, Part 2, sec. 1, p. 45, 46.

Courts of the United States, moreover, take judicial notice of the ports and waters of the United States, in which the tide ebbs and flows; of the boundaries of the several States and judicial districts;¹ and in an especial manner of all the laws and jurisprudence of the several States in which they exercise an original or an appellate jurisdiction. The Judges of the Supreme Court of the United States are on this account bound to take judicial notice of the laws of jurisprudence of all the States and Territories.² A Court of Errors will also take notice of the nature and extent of the jurisdiction of the inferior Court whose judgment it revises.³ In fine, Courts will generally take notice of whatever ought to be generally known, within the limits of their jurisdiction. In all these, and the like cases, where the memory of the Judge is at fault, he resorts to such documents of reference, as may be at hand, and he may deem worthy of confidence.⁴

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¹ Abercrombie on the Intellectual Powers, Part 2, sec. 1, p. 45, 46.

necessity of testing them by certain rules. Thus, as our ability to obtain knowledge by other means increases, our instinctive reliance on testimony diminishes, by yielding to a more rational belief.¹

¹ Gambier's Guide, p. 87; McKinnon's Philosophy of Evidence, p. 40. This subject is treated more largely by Dr. Reid in his profound Inquiry into the Human Mind, ch. 6, sec. 24, p. 428-434, in these words;—"The wise and beneficent Author of Nature, who intended that we should be social creatures, and that we should receive the greatest and most important part of our knowledge by the information of others, hath, for these purposes, implanted in our natures two principles, that tally with each other. The first of these principles is a propensity to speak truth and to use the signs of language, so as to convey our real sentiments. This principle has a powerful operation, even in the greatest liars; for where they lie once they speak truth a hundred times. Truth is always uppermost, and is the natural issue of the mind. It requires no art or training, no inducement or temptation, but only that we yield to a natural impulse. Lying, on the contrary, is doing violence to our nature; and is never practised, even by the worst men, without some temptation. Speaking truth is like using our natural food, which we would do from appetite, although it answered no end; but lying is like taking physic, which is nauseous to the taste, and which no man takes but for some end, which he cannot otherwise attain. If it should be objected, that men may be influenced by moral or political considerations to speak truth, and therefore, that their doing so is no proof of such an original principle as we have mentioned; I answer, first, that moral or political considerations can have no influence, until we arrive at years of understanding and reflection; and it is certain, from experience, that children keep to truth invariably, before they are capable of being influenced by such considerations. Secondly, when we are influenced by moral or political considerations, we must be conscious of that influence, and capable of perceiving it upon reflection. Now, when I reflect upon my actions most attentively, I am not conscious, that in speaking truth I am influenced on ordinary occasions by any motive, moral or political. I find, that truth is always at the door of my lips, and goes forth spontaneously, if not held back. It requires neither good nor bad intention to bring it forth, but only that I be artless and undesigning. There may indeed be temptations to falsehood, which would be too strong for the natural principle of veracity, unaided by principles of honor or virtue; but where there is no such temptation, we speak truth by instinct; and this instinct is the principle I have been explaining. By this instinct, a real connexion is formed between our words and our thoughts, and thereby the former become fit to be signs of the latter, which they could not otherwise be. And although this con-

§ 8. It is true, that in receiving the knowledge of facts from the testimony of others, we are much influenced by their accordance with facts previously known or believed; and this

connexion is broken in every instance of lying and equivocation, yet these instances being comparatively few, the authority of human testimony is only weakened by them, but not destroyed. Another original principle, implanted in us by the Supreme Being, is a disposition to confide in the veracity of others, and to believe what they tell us. This is the counterpart to the former; and as that may be called the principle of veracity, we shall, for want of a more proper name, call this the principle of credulity. It is unlimited in children, until they meet with instances of deceit and falsehood; and it retains a very considerable degree of strength through life. If nature had left the mind of the speaker in equilibrium, without any inclination to the side of truth more than to that of falsehood; children would lie as often as they speak truth, until reason was so far ripened, as to suggest the imprudence of lying, or conscience, as to suggest its immorality. And if nature had left the mind of the hearer in equilibrium, without any inclination to the side of belief more than to that of disbelief, we should take no man's word, until we had positive evidence that he spoke truth. His testimony would, in this case, have no more authority than his dreams, which may be true or false; but no man is disposed to believe them, on this account, that they were dreamed. It is evident, that, in the matter of testimony, the balance of human judgment is by nature inclined to the side of belief; and turns to that side of itself, when there is nothing put into the opposite scale. If it was not so, no proposition that is uttered in discourse would be believed, until it was examined and tried by reason; and most men would be unable to find reasons for believing the thousandth part of what is told them. Such distrust and incredulity would deprive us of the greatest benefits of society, and place us in a worse condition than that of savages. Children, on this supposition, would be absolutely incredulous, and therefore absolutely incapable of instruction; those who had little knowledge of human life, and of the manners and characters of men, would be in the next degree incredulous; and the most credulous men would be those of greatest experience, and of the deepest penetration; because, in many cases, they would be able to find good reasons for believing testimony, which the weak and the ignorant could not discover. In a word, if credulity were the effect of reasoning and experience, it must grow up and gather strength, in the same proportion as reason and experience do. But if it is the gift of nature, it will be strongest in childhood, and limited and restrained by experience; and the most superficial view of human life shows, that the last is really the case, and not the first. It is the intention of nature, that we should be carried in arms before we are able to walk upon our legs; and it is likewise the intention of nature, that our

constitutes what is termed their probability. Statements, thus probable, are received upon evidence much less cogent than we require for the belief of those, which do not accord with our previous knowledge. But while these statements are more readily received, and justly relied upon, we should beware of unduly distrusting all others. While unbounded credulity is the attribute of weak minds, which seldom think or reason at all,—*quo magis nesciunt eo magis admirantur*,—unlimited skepticism belongs only to those, who make their own knowledge and observation the exclusive standard of probability. Thus the king of Siam rejected the testimony of the Dutch ambassador, that, in his country, water was sometimes congealed into a solid mass; for it was utterly contrary to his own experience. Skeptical philosophers, inconsistently enough with their own principles, yet true to the nature of man, continue to receive a large portion of their knowledge upon testimony derived, not from their own experience, but

belief should be guided by the authority and reason of others, before it can be guided by our own reason. The weakness of the infant, and the natural affliction of the mother, plainly indicate the former; and the natural credulity of youth and authority of age as plainly indicate the latter. The infant, by proper nursing and care, acquires strength to walk without support. Reason hath likewise her infancy, when she must be carried in arms; then she leans entirely upon authority, by natural instinct, as if she was conscious of her own weakness; and without this support, she becomes vertiginous. When brought to maturity by proper culture, she begins to feel her own strength, and leans less upon the reason of others; she learns to suspect testimony in some cases, and to disbelieve it in others; and sets bounds to that authority, to which she was at first entirely subject. But still, to the end of life, she finds a necessity of borrowing light from testimony, where she has none within herself, and of leaning, in some degree, upon the reason of others, where she is conscious of her own imbecility. And as, in many instances, Reason, even in her maturity, borrows aid from testimony; so in others she mutually gives aid to it and strengthens its authority. For, as we find good reason to reject testimony in some cases, so in others we find good reason to rely upon it with perfect security, in our most important concerns. The character, the number, and the disinterestedness of witnesses, the impossibility of collusion, and the incredibility of their concurring in their testimony without collusion, may give an irresistible strength to testimony, compared to which its native and intrinsic authority is very inconsiderable."

from that of other men; and this, even when it is at variance with much of their own personal observation. Thus, the testimony of the historian is received with confidence, in regard to the occurrences of ancient times; that of the naturalist and the traveller, in regard to the natural history and civil condition of other countries; and that of the astronomer, respecting the heavenly bodies; facts, which, upon the narrow basis of his own "firm and unalterable experience," upon which Mr. Hume so much relies, he would be bound to reject, as wholly unworthy of belief.

§ 9. The uniform habits, therefore, as well as the necessities of mankind, lead us to consider the disposition to believe, upon the evidence of extraneous testimony, as a fundamental principle of our moral nature, constituting the general basis upon which all evidence may be said to rest.¹

§ 10. Subordinate to this paramount and original principle, it may, in the *second* place, be observed, that evidence rests upon our faith in human testimony, as sanctioned by experience; that is, upon the generally experienced truth of the statements of men of integrity, having capacity and opportunity for observation, and without apparent influence, from passion or interest, to pervert the truth. This belief is strengthened by our previous knowledge of the narrator's reputation for veracity; by the absence of conflicting testimony; and by the presence of that, which is corroborating and cumulative.

§ 11. A *third* basis of evidence is the known and experienced connexion subsisting between collateral facts or circumstances, satisfactorily proved, and the fact in controversy. This is merely the legal application, in other terms, of a process, familiar in natural philosophy, showing the truth of an hypothesis by its coincidence with existing phenomena. The connexions and coincidences, to which we refer, may be

¹ Abercrombie on the Intellectual Powers, Part 2, sec. 3, p. 70-75.

either physical or moral; and the knowledge of them is derived from the known laws of matter and motion, from animal instincts, and from the physical, intellectual, and moral constitution and habits of man. Their force depends on their sufficiency to exclude every other hypothesis, but the one under consideration. Thus, the possession of goods recently stolen, accompanied with personal proximity in point of time and place, and inability in the party charged, to show how he came by them, would seem naturally, though not necessarily, to exclude every other hypothesis, but that of his guilt. But the possession of the same goods, at another time and place, would warrant no such conclusion, as it would leave room for the hypothesis of their having been lawfully purchased in the course of trade. Similar to this, in principle, is the rule of *noscitur a sociis*, according to which the meaning of certain words, in a written instrument, is ascertained by the context.

§ 12. Some writers have mentioned yet another ground of the credibility of evidence, namely, the exercise of our reason upon the effect of coincidences in testimony, which, if collusion be excluded, cannot be accounted for upon any other hypothesis than that it is true.¹ It has been justly remarked, that progress in knowledge is not confined, in its results, to the mere facts which we acquire, but it has also an extensive influence in enlarging the mind for the further reception of truth, and setting it free from many of those prejudices, which influence men, whose minds are limited by a narrow field of observation.² It is also true, that in the actual occurrences of human life nothing is inconsistent. Every event, which actually transpires, has its appropriate relation and place in the vast complication of circumstances, of which the affairs of men consist; it owes its origin to those, which have preceded it; it is intimately connected with all others, which occur at the same time and place, and often with those of remote regions; and, in its turn, it gives birth to a thousand others, which

¹ 1 Stark. Evid. 471, note.

² Abercrombie on the Intellectual Powers, Part 2, sec. 3, p. 71.

succeed.¹ In all this there is perfect harmony; so that it is hardly possible for a man to invent a story, which, if closely compared with all the actual contemporaneous occurrences, may not be shown to be false. From these causes, minds, deeply imbued with science, or enlarged by long and matured experience, and close observation of the conduct and affairs of men, may, with a rapidity and certainty approaching to intuition, perceive the elements of truth or falsehood in the face itself of the narrative, without any regard to the narrator. Thus, Archimedes might have believed an account of the invention and wonderful powers of the steam engine, which his unlearned countrymen would have rejected as incredible; and an experienced Judge may instantly discover the falsehood of a witness, whose story an inexperienced Jury might be inclined to believe. But though the mind, in these cases, seems to have acquired a new power, it is properly to be referred only to experience and observation.

§ 13. In trials of fact, it will generally be found, that the *factum probandum* is either directly attested by those, who speak from their own actual and personal knowledge of its existence, or it is to be inferred from other facts, satisfactorily proved. In the former case, the proof rests upon the *second* ground before mentioned, namely, our faith in human veracity, sanctioned by experience. In the latter case, it rests on the same ground, with the addition of the experienced connexion between the collateral facts, thus proved, and the fact, which is in controversy; constituting the *third* basis of evidence before stated. The facts proved are, in both cases, directly attested. In the former case, the proof applies immediately to the *factum probandum*, without any intervening process, and it is therefore called *direct* or *positive* testimony. In the latter case, as the proof applies immediately to collateral facts, supposed to have a connexion, near or remote, with the fact in controversy, it is termed *circumstantial*; and sometimes, but not with entire accuracy, *presumptive*. Thus, if a

¹ 1 Stark. Evid. 496.

witness testifies, that he saw A. inflict a mortal wound on B., of which he instantly died; this is a case of direct evidence; and giving to the witness the credit, to which men are generally entitled, the crime is satisfactorily proved. If a witness testifies, that a deceased person was shot with a pistol, and the wadding is found to be part of a letter, addressed to the prisoner, the residue of which is discovered in his pocket; here the facts themselves are directly attested; but the evidence they afford is termed *circumstantial*; and from these facts, if unexplained by the prisoner, the Jury may, or may not, *deduce*, or *infer*, or *presume* his guilt, according as they are satisfied, or not, of the natural connexion between similar facts and the guilt of the person thus connected with them. In both cases, the veracity of the witness is presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary; but in the latter case there is an additional presumption of inference, founded on the known usual connexion between the facts proved, and the guilt of the party implicated. This operation of the mind, which is more complex and difficult in the latter case, has caused the evidence, afforded by circumstances, to be termed presumptive evidence; though, in truth, the operation is similar in both cases.

§ 13 a. Circumstantial evidence is of two kinds, namely, *certain*, or that from which the conclusion in question necessarily follows; and *uncertain*, or that from which the conclusion does not necessarily follow, but is *probable* only, and is obtained by a process of reasoning. Thus, if the body of a person of mature age is found dead, with a recent mortal wound, and the mark of a bloody *left* hand is upon the *left* arm, it may well be concluded that the person once lived, and that another person was present at or since the time when the wound was inflicted. So far the conclusion is certain; and the Jury would be bound by their oaths to find accordingly. But whether the death was caused by suicide or by murder, and whether the mark of the bloody hand was that of the assassin, or of a friend who attempted, though too late, to afford relief, or to prevent the crime, is a conclusion which does not necessarily follow from the facts proved, but is obtained from these

and other circumstances, by probable deduction. The conclusion, in the latter case, may be more or less satisfactory or stringent, according to the circumstances. In civil cases, where the mischief of an erroneous conclusion is not deemed remediless, it is not necessary that the minds of the Jurors be freed from all doubt; it is their duty to decide in favor of the party, on whose side the weight of evidence preponderates, and according to the reasonable probability of truth. But in criminal cases, because of the more serious and irreparable nature of the consequences of a wrong decision, the Jurors are required to be satisfied, beyond any reasonable doubt, of the guilt of the accused, or it is their duty to acquit him, the charge not being proved by that higher degree of evidence which the law demands. In civil cases, it is sufficient if the evidence, on the whole, agrees with and supports the hypothesis, which it is adduced to prove; but in criminal cases, it must exclude every other hypothesis but that of the guilt of the party. In both cases, a verdict may well be founded on circumstances alone; and these often lead to a conclusion far more satisfactory than direct evidence can produce.¹

¹ See Bodine's case, in the New York Legal Observer, Vol. 4, p. 89, 95, where the nature and value of this kind of evidence are fully discussed. See post, § 44 to 48.

CHAPTER IV.

OF PRESUMPTIVE EVIDENCE.

§ 14. THE general head of PRESUMPTIVE EVIDENCE is usually divided into two branches, namely, *presumptions of law*, and *presumptions of fact*. PRESUMPTIONS OF LAW consist of those rules, which, in certain cases, either forbid or dispense with any ulterior inquiry. They are founded, either upon the first principles of justice; or the laws of nature; or the experienced course of human conduct and affairs, and the connexion usually found to exist between certain things. The general doctrines of presumptive evidence are not therefore peculiar to municipal law, but are shared by it in common with other departments of science. Thus, the presumption of a malicious intent to kill, from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon, and the presumption of aquatic habits in an animal found with webbed feet, belong to the same philosophy, differing only in the instance, and not in the principle, of its application. The one fact being proved or ascertained, the other, its uniform concomitant, is universally and safely presumed. It is this uniformly experienced connexion, which leads to its recognition by the law without other proof; the presumption, however, having more or less force, in proportion to the universality of the experience. And this has led to the distribution of presumptions of law into two classes, namely, *conclusive* and *disputable*.

§ 15. *Conclusive*, or, as they are elsewhere termed, imperative, or absolute presumptions of law, are rules determining the quantity of evidence, requisite for the support of any particular averment, which is not permitted to be overcome by any proof, that the fact is otherwise. They consist chiefly of those cases, in which the long experienced connexion, before

alluded to, has been found so general and uniform as to render it expedient for the common good, that this connexion should be taken to be inseparable and universal. They have been adopted by common consent, from motives of public policy, for the sake of greater certainty, and the promotion of peace and quiet in the community; and therefore it is, that all corroborating evidence is dispensed with, and all opposing evidence is forbidden.¹

§ 16. Sometimes this common consent is expressly declared, through the medium of the legislature, in *statutes*. Thus, by the statutes of limitation, where a debt has been created by simple contract, and has not been distinctly recognised, within six years, as a subsisting obligation, no action can be maintained to recover it; that is, it is conclusively presumed to have been paid. A trespass, after the lapse of the same period, is in like manner, conclusively presumed to have been satisfied. So, the possession of land, for the length of time mentioned in the statutes of limitation, under a claim of absolute title and ownership, constitutes, against all persons but the sovereign, a conclusive presumption of a valid grant.²

¹ The presumption of the Roman law is defined to be, — “*conjectura, ducta ab eo, quod ut plurimum fit. Ea conjectura vel a lege inducitur, vel a iudice. Quæ ab ipsa lege inducitur, vel ita comparata, ut probationem contrarii haud admittat; vel ut eadem possit elidi. Priorem doctores presumptionem JURIS ET DE JURE, posteriorem presumptionem JURIS, adpellant. Quæ a Iudice inducitur conjectura, presumptio HOMINIS vocari solet; et semper admittit probationem contrarii, quamvis, si alienius momenti sit, probandi onere relevet.*” Hein. ad Pand. Pars iv. § 124. Of the former, answering to our conclusive presumption, Mascardus observes, — “*Super hac presumptione lèx firmum sancit jus, et eam pro veritate habet.*” De Probationibus. Vol. I. Quæst. x. 48. An exception to the general conclusiveness of this class of presumptions is allowed in the case of admissions *in judicio*, which will be hereafter mentioned. See *post*, § 169, 186, 205, 206.

² This period has been limited differently, at different times; but for the last fifty years it has been shortened, at succeeding revisions of the law, both in England and the United States. By Stat. 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 27, all real actions are barred, after twenty years from the time, when the right of action accrued. And this period is adopted in most of the United States. See

§ 17. In other cases, the common consent, by which this class of legal presumptions is established, is declared through the medium of the judicial tribunals, it being the *Common Law* of the land; both being alike respected, as authoritative declarations of an imperative rule of law, against the operation of which no averment or evidence is received. Thus, the uninterrupted enjoyment of an incorporeal hereditament, for a period beyond the memory of man, is held to furnish a conclusive presumption of a prior grant of that, which has been so enjoyed. This is termed a title by prescription.¹ If this enjoyment has been not only uninterrupted, but exclusive and adverse in its character, for the period of twenty years, this also has been held, at Common Law, as a conclusive presumption of title.² There is no difference, in principle, whether

⁴ Kent, Comm. 188, note (a). The same period in regard to the title to real property, or, as some construe it, only to the profits of the land, is adopted in the Hindu Law. See Macnaghten's Elements of Hindu Law, Vol. I. p. 201.

¹ 3 Cruise, Dig. 467, 468. "Prescriptio est titulus, ex usu et tempore substantiam capiens, ab autoritate leges." Co. Litt. 113, a. What length of time constitutes this period of legal memory, has been much discussed among lawyers. In this country the Courts are inclined to adopt the periods mentioned in the statutes of limitation, in all cases analogous in principle. Coolidge v. Learned, 8 Pick. 504; Melvin v. Whiting, 10 Pick. 295; Ricard v. Williams, 7 Wheat. 110. In England it is settled by Stat. 2 & 3 W. 4, c. 71, by which the period of legal memory has been limited, as follows;—in cases of rights of common or other benefits arising out of lands, except tithes, rents, and services, *prima facie* to 30 years; and conclusively to 60 years, unless proved to have been held by consent, expressed by deed or other writing; in cases of aquatic rights, ways, and other easements, *prima facie* to 20 years; and conclusively to 40 years, unless proved in like manner, by written evidence, to have been enjoyed by consent of the owner; and in cases of lights, conclusively to 20 years, unless proved in like manner, to have been enjoyed by consent.

² Tyler v. Wilkinson, 4 Mason, 397, 402; Ingraham v. Hutchinson, 2 Conn. 584; Bealey v. Shaw, 6 East, 208, 215; Wright v. Howard, 1 Sim. & Stu. 190, 203; Strickler v. Todd, 10 Serg. & Raw. 63, 69; Balston v. Bensted, 1 Campb. 463, 465; Daniel v. North, 11 East, 371; Sherwood v. Burr, 4 Day, 244; Tinkham v. Arnold, 3 Greenl. 120; Hill v. Crosby, 2 Pick. 466. See Best on Presumptions, p. 103, note (m); Bolivar Man. Co. v. Neponset Man. Co. 16 Pick. 241.

the subject be a corporeal or an incorporeal hereditament; a grant of land may as well be presumed, as a grant of a fishery, or a common, or a way.¹ But, in regard to the effect of possession alone for a period of time, unaccompanied by other evidence, as affording a presumption of title, a difference is introduced, by reason of the statute of limitations, between corporeal subjects, such as lands and tenements, and things incorporeal; and it has been held, that a grant of lands, conferring an entire title, cannot be presumed from mere possession alone, for any length of time short of that prescribed by the statute of limitations. The reason is, that with respect to corporeal hereditaments, the statute has made all the provisions, which the law deems necessary for quieting possessions; and has thereby taken these cases out of the operation of the Common Law. The possession of lands, however, for a shorter period, when coupled with other circumstances, indicative of ownership, may justify a Jury in finding a grant; but such cases do not fall within this class of presumptions.²

§ 18. Thus, also, a sane man is conclusively presumed to contemplate the natural and probable *consequences* of his own acts; and therefore the intent to murder is conclusively inferred from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon.³ So, the

¹ Ricard v. Williams, 7 Wheat. 109; Prop'rs of Brattle Street Church v. Bullard, 2 Mete. 363.

² Sumner v. Child, 2 Conn. 607, 628-632, per Gould, J.; Clark v. Faunce, 4 Pick. 245.

³ 1 Russ. on Crimes, 658-660; Rex v. Dixon, 3 M. & S. 15; 1 Hale, P. C. 440, 441. But if death does not ensue, till a year and a day, (that is, a full year,) after the stroke, it is conclusively presumed, that the stroke was not the sole cause of the death, and it is not murder. 4 Bl. Comm. 197; Glassford on Evid. 592. The doctrine of presumptive evidence was familiar to the Mosaic Code; even to the letter of the principle stated in the text. Thus, it is laid down in regard to the manslayer, that, "if he smite him with an instrument of iron, so that he die,"—or, "if he smite him with throwing a stone wherewith he may die, and he die,"—"or, if he smite him with a hand-weapon of wood wherewith he may die, and he die; he is a murderer."

deliberate publication of calumny, which the publisher knows to be false, or has no reason to believe to be true, raises a conclusive presumption of malice.¹ So, the neglect of a party to appear and answer to process, legally commenced in a Court of competent jurisdiction, he having been duly served therewith and summoned, is taken conclusively against him, as a confession of the matter charged.²

§ 19. Conclusive presumptions are also made in favor of judicial proceedings. Thus the *records* of a Court of justice are presumed to have been correctly made;³ a party to the record is presumed to have been interested in the suit;⁴ and

See Numb. xxxv. 16, 17, 18. Here, every instrument of *iron* is conclusively taken to be a deadly weapon; and the use of any such weapon raises a conclusive presumption of malice. The same presumption arose from *lying in ambush*, and thence destroying another. *Ib.* v. 20. But, in other cases, the existence of malice was to be proved, as one of the facts in the case; and in the absence of malice, the offence was reduced to the degree of manslaughter, as at the Common Law. *Ib.* v. 22, 23. This very reasonable distinction seems to have been unknown to the Gentoo Code, which demands life for life, in all cases, except where the culprit is a Bramin. "If a man deprives another of life, the magistrate shall deprive that person of life." Halhed's *Gentoo Laws*, Book 16, sec. 1, p. 233. Formerly, if the mother of an illegitimate child, recently born and found dead, concealed the fact of its birth and death, it was conclusively presumed, that she murdered it. Stat. 21, Jac. 1, c. 27; probably copied from a similar edict of Hen. 2, of France, cited by Domat. But this unreasonable and barbarous rule is now rescinded both in England and America.

¹ *Bodwell v. Osgood*, 3 Pick. 379; *Haire v. Wilson*, 9 B. & C. 643; *Rex v. Shipley*, 4 Doug. 73, 177, Per Ashurst, J.

² 2 *Erskine*, Inst. 780. Cases of this sort are generally regulated by statutes, or by the rules of practice established by the Courts; but the principle evidently belongs to general jurisprudence. So is the Roman law. "Contumacia, eorum, qui, jus dicenti non obtemperant, litis damno coercetur." Dig. Lib. 42, tit. 1, l. 53. "Si citatus aliquis non compareat, habetur pro consentiente." Mascard. De Prob. Vol. 3, p. 253, concl. 1159, n. 26. See further on this subject, *post*, § 204-211.

³ *Reed v. Jackson*, 1 East, 355. *Res judicata pro veritate accipitur*. Dig. Lib. 50, tit. 17, l. 207.

⁴ *Stein v. Bowman*, 13 Pet. 209.

after verdict, it will be presumed that those facts, without proof of which the verdict could not have been found, were proved, though they are not expressly and distinctly alleged in the record; provided it contains terms sufficiently general to comprehend them in fair and reasonable intendment.¹ The presumption will also be made, after twenty years, in favor of every judicial tribunal acting within its jurisdiction, that all persons concerned had due notice of its proceedings.² A like presumption is also sometimes drawn from the solemnity of the act done, though not done in Court. Thus a bond, or other specialty, is presumed to have been made upon good *consideration*, as long as the instrument remains unimpeached.³

§ 20. To this class of legal presumptions may be referred one of the applications of the rule, *Ex diuturnitate temporis omnia præsumuntur ritè et solenniter esse acta*; namely, that which relates to transactions, which are not of record, the proper evidence of which, after the lapse of a little time, it is often impossible, or extremely difficult, to produce. The rule itself is nothing more than the principle of the statutes of limitation, expressed in a different form, and applied to other subjects. Thus, where an authority is given by law to executors, administrators, guardians, or other officers, to make sales of lands, upon being duly licensed by the Courts, and they are required to advertise the sales in a particular manner, and to observe other formalities in their proceedings; the lapse of sufficient time, (which in most cases is fixed at thirty

¹ *Jackson v. Pesked*, 1 M. & S. 234, 237, Per Ld. Ellenborough; *Stephen on Pl.* 166, 167; *Spiers v. Parker*, 1 T. R. 141.

² *Brown v. Wood*, 17 Mass. 68. A former judgment, still in force, by a Court of competent jurisdiction, in a suit between the same parties, is conclusive evidence, upon the matter directly in question in such suit, in any subsequent action or proceeding. *Duchess of Kingston's case*, 11 Howell, St. Tr. 261; *Ferrer's case*, 6 Co. 7. The effect of Judgments will be farther considered hereafter, under that title.

³ *Lowe v. Peers*, 4 Burr. 2225.

years,) ¹ raises a conclusive presumption that all the legal formalities of the sale were observed. The license to sell, as well as the official character of the party, being provable by record or judicial registration, must in general be so proved; and the deed is also to be proved, in the usual manner; it is only the intermediate proceedings, that are presumed. *Probatis extremis, præsuntur media.* ² The reason of this rule is found in the great probability, that the necessary intermediate proceedings were all regularly had, resulting from the lapse of so long a period of time, and the acquiescence of the parties adversely interested; and in the great uncertainty of titles, as well as the other public mischiefs, which would result, if strict proof were required of facts so transitory in their nature, and the evidence of which is so seldom preserved with care. Hence it does not extend to records and public documents, which are supposed always to remain in the custody of the officers charged with their preservation, and which, therefore, must be proved, or their loss accounted for, and supplied by secondary evidence. ³ Neither does the rule apply to cases of prescription. ⁴

§ 21. The same principle applies to the proof of the execution of *ancient deeds and wills*. Where these instruments are more than thirty years old, and are unblemished by any

¹ See *Pejepscot Prop's v. Ransom*, 14 Mass. 145; *Blossom v. Cannon*, ib. 177; *Colman v. Anderson*, 10 Mass. 105. In some cases, twenty years has been held sufficient. As, in favor of the acts of sheriffs. *Drouet v. Rice*, 2 Rob. Louis. R. 374. So, after partition of lands by an incorporated land-company, and a several possession, accordingly, for twenty years, it was presumed, that its meetings were duly notified. *Society, &c. v. Wheeler*, 1 New Hamp. R. 310.

² 2 *Erskine*, Inst. 782; *Earl v. Baxter*, 2 W. Bl. 1228. Proof that one's ancestor sat in the House of Lords, and that no patent can be discovered, affords a presumption that he sat by summons. *The Braye Peerage*, 6 Cl. & Fin. 657. See also, as to presuming the authority of an executor, *Piatt v. McCullough*, 1 McLean, 73.

³ *Brunswick v. McKean*, 4 Greenl. 508; *Hathaway v. Clark*, 5 Pick. 490.

⁴ *Eldridge v. Knott*, Cowp. 215; *Mayor of Kingston v. Horner*, ib. 102.

alterations, they are said to prove themselves; the bare production thereof is sufficient; the subscribing witnesses being presumed to be dead. This presumption, so far as this rule of evidence is concerned, is not affected by proof, that the witnesses are living. ¹ But it must appear that the instrument comes from such custody, as to afford a reasonable presumption in favor of its genuineness; and that it is otherwise free from just grounds of suspicion; ² and in the case of a bond for the payment of money, there must be some indorsement of interest, or other mark of genuineness, within the thirty years, to entitle it to be read. ³ Whether, if the deed be a conveyance of real estate, the party is bound first to show some acts of possession under it, is a point not perfectly clear upon the authorities; but the weight of opinion seems in the negative, as will hereafter be more fully explained. ⁴ But after an undisturbed possession, for thirty years, of any property, real or personal, it is too late to question the authority of the agent, who has undertaken to convey it, ⁵ unless his authority was by matter of record.

¹ *Rex v. Farrington*, 2 T. R. 471, Per Buller, J.; *Doe v. Wolley*, 8 B. & C. 22; Bull. N. P. 255; 12 Vin. Abr. 84; *Gov. &c. of Chelsea Water Works v. Cowper*, 1 Esp. 275; *Rex v. Ryton*, 5 T. R. 259; *Rex v. Long Buckby*, 7 East, 45; *McKenire v. Fraser*, 9 Ves. 5; *Oldnall v. Deakin*, 3 C. & P. 462; *Jackson v. Blanshan*, 3 Johns. 292; *Winn v. Patterson*, 9 Peters, 674, 675; *Bank U. States v. Dandridge*, 12 Wheat. 70, 71; *Henthorne v. Doe*, 1 Blackf. 157; *Bennet v. Runyon*, 4 Dana, R. 422, 424; *Cook v. Totton*, 6 Dana, 110; *Thruston v. Masterson*, 9 Dana, 233; *Hinde v. Vattier*, 1 McLean, 115; *Walton v. Coulson*, ib. 124; *Northrop v. Wright*, 24 Wend. 221.

² *Roe v. Rawlings*, 7 East, 279, 291; 12 Vin. Abr. 84, Evid. A. b. 5; Post, § 142, 570; *Swinnerton v. Marquis of Stafford*, 3 Taunt. 91; *Jackson v. Davis*, 5 Cowen, 123; *Jackson v. Luquere*, ib. 221; *Doe v. Benyon*, 4 P. & D. 193; *Doe v. Samples*, 3 Nev. & P. 254.

³ *Forbes v. Wale*, 1 W. Bl. 532; 1 Esp. 278, S. C.; Post, § 121, 122.

⁴ Post, § 144, note (1.)

⁵ *Stockbridge v. West Stockbridge*, 14 Mass. 257. Where there had been a possession of thirty-five years, under a legislative grant, it was held conclusive evidence of a good title, though the grant was unconstitutional. *Trustees of the Episcopal Church in Newbern v. Trustees of Newbern Academy*, 2 Hawks, 233.

§ 22. *Estoppels* may be ranked in this class of presumptions. A man is said to be estopped, when he has done some act, which the policy of the law will not permit him to gain-say or deny. "The law of estoppel is not so unjust or absurd, as it has been too much the custom to represent."¹ Its foundation is laid in the obligation, which every man is under, to speak and act according to the truth of the case, and in the policy of the law, to prevent the great mischiefs resulting from uncertainty, confusion, and want of confidence, in the intercourse of men, if they were permitted to deny that, which they have deliberately and solemnly asserted and received as true. If it be a recital of facts in a deed, there is implied a solemn engagement, that the facts are so, as they are recited. The doctrine of estoppels has, however, been guarded with great strictness: not because the party enforcing it necessarily wishes to exclude the truth; for it is rather to be supposed, that that is true, which the opposite party has already solemnly recited; but because the estoppel *may* exclude the truth. Hence, estoppels must be certain to every intent; for no one shall be denied setting up the truth, unless it is in plain and clear contradiction to his former allegations and acts.²

§ 23. In regard to *recitals in deeds*, the general rule is, that all parties to a deed are bound by the recitals therein.³

¹ Per Taunton, J., 2 Ad. & El. 291.

² *Bowman v. Taylor*, 2 Ad. & El. 278, 289, Per Ld. C. J. Denman; *Ib.* 291, Per Taunton, J.; *Lainson v. Tremere*, 1 Ad. & El. 792; *Pelletreau v. Jackson*, 11 Wend. 117; 4 Kent, Comm. 261, note; *Carver v. Jackson*, 4 Peters, 83.

³ But it is not true, as a general proposition, that one, claiming land under a deed, to which he was not a party, adopts the recitals of facts in an anterior deed, which go to make up his title. Therefore, where, by a deed made in January, 1796, it was recited that S. became bankrupt in 1781; and that by virtue of the proceedings under the commission certain lands had been conveyed to W., and thereupon W. conveyed the same lands to B., for the purpose of enabling him to make a tenant to the præcipe; to which deed B. was not a party; and afterwards, in February, 1796, B., by a deed, not referring to the deed last mentioned, nor to the bankruptcy, conveyed the premises to a

which operate as an estoppel, working on the interest in the land, if it be a deed of conveyance, and binding both parties and privies; privies in blood, privies in estate, and privies in law. Between such parties and privies, the deed or other matter recited need not at any time be otherwise proved, the recital of it in the subsequent deed being conclusive. It is not offered as secondary, but as primary evidence, which cannot be averred against, and which forms a muniment of title. Thus, the recital of a lease, in a deed of release, is conclusive evidence of the existence of the lease against the parties, and all others, claiming under them in privity of estate.¹

tenant to the præcipe, and declared the uses of the recovery to be to his mother for life, remainder to himself in fee; it was held that B., in a suit respecting other land, was not estopped from disputing S.'s bankruptcy. *Doe v. Shelton*, 3 Ad. & El. 265, 283. — If the deed recite that the consideration was paid by a husband and wife, parol evidence is admissible to show that the money consisted of a legacy given to the wife. *Doe v. Statham*, 7 D. & Ry. 141.

¹ *Shelley v. Wright*, Willes, 9; *Crane v. Morris*, 6 Peters, 611; *Carver v. Jackson*, 4 Peters, 1, 83; *Cossens v. Cossens*, Willes, 25. But such recital does not bind strangers, or those, who claim by title paramount to the deed. It does not bind persons claiming by an adverse title, or persons claiming from the parties by a title anterior to the date of the reciting deed. See *Carver v. Jackson*, *ub. sup.* In this case the doctrine of estoppel is very fully expounded by Mr. Justice Story, where, after stating the general principle, as in the text, with the qualification just mentioned, he proceeds (p. 83) as follows. — "Such is the general rule. But there are cases, in which such a recital may be used as evidence even against strangers. If, for instance, there be the recital of a lease in a deed of release, and in a suit against a stranger the title under the release comes in question, there the recital of the lease in such a release is not *per se* evidence of the existence of the lease. But, if the existence and loss of the lease be established by other evidence, there the recital is admissible, as secondary proof, in the absence of more perfect evidence, to establish the contents of the lease; and if the transaction be an ancient one, and the possession has been long held under such release, and is not otherwise to be accounted for, there the recital will of itself, under such circumstances, materially fortify the presumption, from lapse of time and length of possession, of the original existence of the lease. Leases, like other deeds and grants, may be presumed from long possession, which cannot otherwise be explained; and under such circumstances, a recital of the fact of such a lease, in an old deed, is certainly far stronger presumptive proof in

§ 24. Thus also, a grantor is, in general, estopped by his deed, from denying, that he had any title in the thing granted. But this rule does not apply to a grantor, acting officially, as

favor of such possession under title, than the naked presumption arising from a mere unexplained possession. Such is the general result of the doctrine to be found in the best elementary writers on the subject of evidence. It may not, however, be unimportant to examine a few of the authorities in support of the doctrine, on which we rely. The cases of *Marchioness of Anandale v. Harris*, 2 P. Wms. 432, and *Shelley v. Wright*, Willes, 9, are sufficiently direct, as to the operation of recitals by way of estoppel between the parties. In *Ford v. Gray*, 1 Salk. 285, one of the points ruled was, 'that a recital of a lease in a deed of release is good evidence of such lease against the releasor, and those who claim under him; but as to others it is not, without proving, that there was such a deed, and it was lost or destroyed.' The same case is reported in 6 Mod. 44, where it is said that it was ruled, 'that the recital of a lease in a deed of release is good evidence against the releasor, and those that claim under him.' It is then stated, that 'a fine was produced, but no deed declaring the uses, but a deed was offered in evidence, which did recite a deed of limitation of the uses, and the question was, whether that (recital) was evidence; and the Court said, that the bare recital was not evidence; but that, if it could be proved, that such a deed had been, and lost, it would do, if it were recited in another.' This was doubtless the same point asserted in the latter clause of the report in Salkeld; and, thus explained, it is perfectly consistent with the statement in Salkeld, and must be referred to a case, where the recital was offered as evidence against a stranger. In any other point of view, it would be inconsistent with the preceding propositions, as well as with the cases in 2 P. Williams and Willes. In *Trevivan v. Lawrence*, 1 Salk. 276, the Court held, that the parties and all claiming under them were estopped from asserting that a judgment sued against the party as of Trinity term, was not of that term, but of another term; that very point having arisen and been decided against the party upon a scire facias on the judgment. But the Court there held, (what is very material to the present purpose,) that 'if a man makes a lease by indenture of D. in which he hath nothing, and afterwards purchases D. in fee, and afterwards bargains and sells it to A. and his heirs, A. shall be bound by this estoppel; and, that where an estoppel works on the interest of the lands, it runs with the land into whose hands soever the land comes; and an ejectment is maintainable upon the mere estoppel.' This decision is important in several respects. In the first place, it shows that an estoppel may arise by implication from a grant, that the party hath an estate in the land, which he may convey, and he shall be estopped to deny it. In the next place, it shows that such estoppel binds all persons claiming the same land, not only under

a public agent or trustee.¹ A covenant of warranty also estops the grantor from setting up an after acquired title against the grantee, for it is a perpetually operating cove-

the same deed, but under any subsequent conveyance from the same party; that is to say, it binds not merely privies in blood, but privies in estate, as subsequent grantees and alienees. In the next place, it shows that an estoppel, which (as the phrase is) works on the interest of the land, runs with it into whosever hands the land comes. The same doctrine is recognised by Lord Chief Baron Comyn in his Digest, Estoppel B. & E. 10. In the latter place (E. 10) he puts the case more strongly; for he asserts, that the estoppel binds, even though all the facts are found in a special verdict. 'But,' says he, and he relies on his own authority, 'where an estoppel binds the estate, and converts it to an interest, the Court will adjudge accordingly. As if A. leases lands to B. for six years, in which he has nothing, and then purchases a lease of the same land for twenty-one years, and afterwards leases to C. for ten years, and all this is found by verdict; the Court will adjudge the lease to B. good, though it be so only by conclusion.' A doctrine similar in principle was asserted in this Court in *Terrett v. Taylor*, 9 Cranch, 52. The distinction, then, which was urged at the bar, that an estoppel of this sort binds those claiming under the same deed, but not those claiming by a subsequent deed under the same party, is not well founded. All privies in estate by a subsequent deed are bound in the same manner as privies in blood; and so indeed is the doctrine in Comyn's Digest, Estoppel B. and in Co. Litt. 352, a. We may now pass to a short review of some of the American cases on this subject. *Denn v. Cornell*, 3 Johns. Cas. 174, is strongly in point. There, Lieutenant Governor Colden, in 1775, made his will, and in it recited that he had conveyed to his son David his lands in the township of Flushing, and he then devised his other estate to his sons and daughters, &c. &c. Afterwards David's estate was confiscated under the act of attainder, and the defendant in ejectment claimed under that confiscation, and deduced his title from the state. No deed of the Flushing estate (the land in controversy) was proved from the father; and the heir at law sought to recover on that ground. But the Court held, that the recital in the will, that the testator had conveyed the estate to David, was an estoppel of the heir to deny that fact, and bound the estate. In this case the estoppel was set up by the tenant claiming under the state, as an estoppel running with the land. If the state or its grantee might set up the estoppel, in favor of their title, then, as estoppels are reciprocal, and bind both parties, it might have been set up against the state or its grantee. It has been said at the bar, that the state is not bound by estoppel by any

¹ *Fairtitle v. Gilbert*, 2 T. R. 171; Co. Lit. 363, b.

nant;¹ but he is not thus estopped by a covenant, that he is seised in fee and has good right to convey;² for any seisin in fact, though by wrong, is sufficient to satisfy this covenant, its import being merely this, that he has the seisin in fact, at the time of conveyance, and thereby is qualified to transfer the estate to the grantee.³ Nor is a feme covert estopped, by her deed of conveyance, from claiming the land by a title subsequently acquired; for she cannot bind herself personally, by

recital in a deed. That may be so, where the recital is in its own grants or patents, for they are deemed to be made upon suggestion of the grantee. (But see *Commonwealth v. Pejepscot Proprietors*, 10 Mass. 155.) But where the state claims title under the deed, or other solemn acts of third persons, it takes it cum onere, and subject to all the estoppels running with the title and estate, in the same way as other privies in estate. In *Penrose v. Griffith*, 4 Binn. 231, it was held, that recitals in a patent of the Commonwealth were evidence against it, but not against persons claiming by title paramount from the Commonwealth. The Court there said, that the rule of law is, that a deed, containing a recital of another deed, is evidence of the recited deed against the grantor, and all persons claiming by title, derived from him subsequently. The reason of the rule is, that the recital amounts to the confession of the party; and that confession is evidence against himself, and those who stand in his place. But such confession can be no evidence against strangers. The same doctrine was acted upon and confirmed by the same Court, in *Garwood v. Dennis*, 4 Binn. 314. In that case the Court further held, that a recital in another deed was evidence against strangers, where the deed was ancient, and the possession was consistent with the deed. That case also had the peculiarity belonging to the present, that the possession was of a middle nature, that is, it might not have been held solely in consequence of the deed, for the party had another title; but there never was any possession against it. There was a double title, and the question was, to which the possession might be attributable. The Court thought, that a suitable foundation of the original existence and loss of the recited deed being laid in the evidence, the recital in the deed was good corroborative evidence, even against strangers. And other authorities certainly warrant this decision.⁴

¹ *Terrett v. Taylor*, 9 Cranch, 43; *Jackson v. Matsdorf*, 11 Johns. 97; *Jackson v. Wright*, 14 John. 183; *McWilliams v. Nisby*, 2 Serg. & Rawl. 515; *Somes v. Skinner*, 3 Pick. 52.

² *Allen v. Sayward*, 5 Greenl. 227.

³ *Marston v. Hobbs*, 2 Mass. 433; *Bearce v. Jackson*, 4 Mass. 408; *Twombly v. Henley*, 1b. 441; *Chapell v. Bull*, 17 Mass. 213.

any covenant.¹ Neither is one, who has purchased land in his own name, for the benefit of another, which he has afterwards conveyed by deed to his employer, estopped by such deed, from claiming the land by an elder and after acquired title.² Nor is the heir estopped from questioning the validity of his ancestor's deed, as a fraud against an express statute.³ The grantee, or lessee, in a deed poll, is not, in general, estopped from gainsaying anything mentioned in the deed; for it is the deed of the grantor or lessor only; yet if such grantee or lessee claims title under the deed, he is thereby estopped to deny the title of the grantor.⁴

§ 25. It was an early rule of feudal policy, that the tenant should not be permitted to deny the title of the lord, from whom he had received investiture, and whose liege man he had become; but as long as that relation existed, the title of the lord was conclusively presumed, against the tenant, to be perfect and valid. And though the feudal reasons of the rule have long since ceased, yet other reasons of public policy have arisen in their place, thereby preserving the rule in its original vigor. A tenant, therefore, by indenture, is not permitted, at this day, to deny the title of his lessor, while the relation thus created subsists. It is of the essence of the contract, under which he claims, that the paramount ownership of the lessor shall be acknowledged during the continuance of the lease, and that possession shall be surrendered at its expiration. He could not controvert this title, without breaking the faith, which he had pledged.⁵ But this doctrine does not apply with the same force, and to the same extent, between other parties, such as releasor and releasee, where the latter has not received possession from the former. In such cases, where the

¹ *Jackson v. Vanderheyden*, 17 Johns. 167.

² *Jackson v. Mills*, 13 Johns. 463; 4 Kent, Comm. 260, 261, note.

³ *Doe v. Lloyd*, 8 Scott, 93.

⁴ Co. Lit. 363, b.; *Goddard's case*, 4 Co. 4. But he is not always concluded by recitals in anterior title deeds. See Ante, § 23, note.

⁵ Com. Dig. Estoppel A. 2; Craig. Jus Feud. lib. 3, tit. 5, § 1, 2; *Blight's lessee v. Rochester*, 7 Wheat. 535, 547.

party already in possession of land, under a claim of title by deed, purchases peace and quietness and enjoyment, by the mere extinction of a hostile claim by a release, without covenants of title, he is not estopped from denying the validity of the title, which he has thus far extinguished.¹ Neither is this rule applied in the case of a lease already expired; provided the tenant has either quitted the possession, or has submitted to the title of a new landlord;² nor is it applied to the case of a tenant, who has been ousted or evicted by a title paramount; or, who has been drawn into the contract by the fraud or misrepresentation of the lessor, and has, in fact, derived no benefit from the possession of the land.³ Nor is a defendant in ejectment estopped from showing that the party, under whom the lessor claims, had no title when he conveyed to the lessor, although the defendant himself claims from the same party, if it be by a subsequent conveyance.⁴

§ 26. This rule, in regard to the conclusive effect of recitals in deeds, is *restricted* to the recital of things in particular, as being in existence at the time of the execution of the deed; and does not extend to the mention of things in general terms. Therefore, if one be bound in a bond, conditioned to perform the covenants in a certain indenture, or to pay the money mentioned in a certain recognisance, he shall not be permitted to say, that there was no such indenture, or recognisance. But if the bond be conditioned, that the obligor shall perform all the agreements set down by A., or carry away all the marle in

¹ Fox v. Widgery, 4 Greenl. 214; Blight's lessee v. Rochester, 7 Wheat. 535, 547; Ham v. Ham, 2 Shepl. 351. Thus, where a stranger set up a title to the premises, to which the lessor submitted, directing his lessee in future to pay the rent to the stranger; it was held, that the lessor was estopped from afterwards treating the lessee as his tenant; and that the tenant, upon the lessor afterwards distraining for rent, was not estopped to allege, that the right of the latter had expired. Downs v. Cooper, 2 Ad. & El. 252, N. S.

² England v. Slade, 4 T. R. 681; Balls v. Westwood, 2 Campb. 11.

³ Hayne v. Maltby, 3 T. R. 438; Hearn v. Tomlin, Peake's Cas. 191.

⁴ Doe v. Payne, 1 Ad. & El. 538.

a certain close, he is not estopped by this general condition from saying, that no agreement was set down by A., or that there was no marle in the close. Neither does this doctrine apply to that, which is mere description in the deed, and not an essential averment; such as, the quantity of land; its nature, whether arable or meadow; the number of tons, in a vessel chartered by the ton; or the like; for these are but incidental and collateral to the principal thing, and may be supposed not to have received the deliberate attention of the parties.¹

¹ 4 Com. Dig. Estoppel A. 2; Yelv. 227, (by Metcalf,) note (1); Dodding's case, 2 Co. 33; Skipworth v. Green, 8 Mod. 311; 1 Stra. 610, S. C. Whether the recital of the payment of the consideration money, in a deed of conveyance, falls within the rule, by which the party is estopped to deny it, or belongs to the exceptions, and therefore is open to opposing proof, is a point not clearly agreed. In England, the recital is regarded as conclusive evidence of payment, binding the parties by estoppel. Shelley v. Wright, Willes, 9; Cossens v. Cossens, ib. 25; Rowntree v. Jacob, 2 Taunt. 141; Lampon v. Corke, 5 B. & Ald. 606; Baker v. Dewey, 1 B. & C. 704; Hill v. Manchester and Salford Waterworks, 2 B. & Ad. 544. See, also, Powell v. Monson, 3 Mason, 347, 351, 356. But the American Courts have been disposed to treat the recital of the *amount* of the money paid, like the mention of the date of the deed, the quantity of land, the amount of tonnage of a vessel, and other recitals of quantity and value, to which the attention of the parties is supposed to have been but slightly directed, and to which, therefore, the principle of estoppels does not apply. Hence, though the party is estopped from denying the conveyance, and that it was for a valuable consideration, yet the weight of American authority is in favor of treating the recital as only *prima facie* evidence of the amount paid, in an action of covenant by the grantee to recover back the consideration, or, in an action of *assumpsit* by the grantor, to recover the price which is yet unpaid. The principal cases are,—in Massachusetts, Wilkinson v. Scott, 17 Mass. 249; Clapp v. Tirrell, 20 Pick. 247;—in Maine, Schilenger v. McCann, 6 Greenl. 364; Tyler v. Carlton, 7 Greenl. 175; Emmons v. Littlefield, 1 Shepl. 233; Burbank v. Gould, 3 Shepl. 118;—in New Hampshire, Morse v. Shattuck, 4 New Hamp. 229; Pritchard v. Brown, ib. 397;—in Connecticut, Belden v. Seymour, 8 Conn. 304;—in New York, Shepherd v. Little, 14 Johns. 210; Bowen v. Bell, 20 Johns. 338; Whitbeck v. Whitbeck, 9 Cowen, 266; McCrea v. Purmort, 16 Wend. 460;—in Pennsylvania, Weigley v. Weir, 7 Serg. & Raw. 311; Watson v. Blaine, 12 Serg. & Raw. 131; Jack v. Dougherty, 3 Watts, 151;—in Maryland, Higdon v.

§ 27. In addition to estoppels by deed, there are two classes of admissions, which fall under this head of conclusive presumptions of law; namely, *solemn admissions*, or admissions *in judicio*, which have been solemnly made in the course of judicial proceedings, either expressly, and as a substitute for proof of the fact, or tacitly, by pleading; and *unsolemn admissions*, *extra judicium*, which have been acted upon, or have been made to influence the conduct of others, or to derive some advantage to the party, and which cannot afterwards be denied, without a breach of good faith. Of the former class are all agreements of counsel, dispensing with legal proof of facts.¹ So if a material averment, well pleaded, is passed over, by the adverse party, without denial, whether it be by confession, or by pleading some other matter, or by demurring in law, it is thereby conclusively admitted.² So also, the payment of money into Court, under a rule for that purpose, in satisfaction of so much of the claim, as the party admits to be due, is a conclusive admission of the character, in which the plaintiff sues, and of his claim to the amount paid.³

Thomas, 1 Har. & Gill, 139; Ligan v. Henderson, 1 Bland, Ch. 236, 249; — in Virginia, Duval v. Bibb, 4 Hen. & Munf. 113; Harvey v. Alexander, 1 Randolph, 219; — in South Carolina, Curry v. Lyles, 2 Hill, 404; Garret v. Stuart, 1 McCord, 514; — in Alabama, Mead v. Steger, 5 Porter, 498, 507; — in Tennessee, Jones v. Ward, 10 Yerger, 160, 166; — in Kentucky, Hutchinson v. Sinclair, 7 Monroe, 291, 293; Gully v. Grubbs, 1 J. J. Marsh. 389. The Courts in North Carolina seem still to hold the recital of payment as conclusive. Brocket v. Foscue, 1 Hawks, 64; Spiers v. Clay, 4 Hawks, 22; Jones v. Sasser, 1 Dever. & Batt. 452. And in Louisiana, it is made so by legislative enactment. Civil Code of Louisiana, Art. 2234; Forest v. Shores, 11 Louis. 416. The earlier cases, to the contrary, together with a farther examination of the subject, may be found in Cowen & Hill's notes to 1 Phil. Evid. p. 108, note 194, and p. 549, note 964. See also Steele v. Worthington, 2 Ohio R. 350.

¹ See post, § 169, 170, 186, 204, 205; Kohn v. Marsh, 3 Rob. Louis. R. 48.

² Young v. Wright, 1 Campb. 139; Wilson v. Turner, 1 Taunt. 398. But if a deed is admitted in pleading, there must still be proof of its identity. Johnston v. Cottingham, 1 Armstr. Macartn. & Ogle, R. 11.

³ Cox v. Parry, 1 T. R. 464; Watkins v. Towers, 2 T. R. 275; Griffiths v. Williams, 1 T. R. 710.

The latter class comprehends, not only all those declarations, but also that line of conduct, by which the party has induced others to act, or has acquired any advantage to himself.¹ Thus a woman, cohabited with, and openly recognised by a man, as his wife, is conclusively presumed to be such, when he is sued as her husband, for goods furnished to her, or for other civil liabilities, growing out of that relation.² So where the sheriff returns anything as fact, done in the course of his duty in the service of a precept, it is conclusively presumed to be true against him.³ And if one party refers the other to a third person for information concerning a matter of mutual interest, in controversy between them, the answer given is conclusively taken as true, against the party referring.⁴ This subject will hereafter be more fully considered, under its appropriate title.⁵

§ 28. Conclusive presumptions of law are also made in respect to *infants*, and *married women*. Thus, an infant, under the age of seven years, is conclusively presumed to be incapable of committing any felony, for want of discretion;⁶ and under fourteen, a male infant is presumed incapable of committing a rape.⁷ A female under the age of ten years is presumed incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse.⁸ Where the husband and wife have cohabited together, as such, and no impotency is proved, the issue is conclusively presumed to be *legitimate*, though the wife is proved to have

¹ See post, § 184, 195, 196, 207, 208.

² Watson v. Threlkeld, 2 Esp. 637; Munro v. De Chemant, 4 Campb. 215; Robinson v. Nahon, 1 Campb. 245; Post, § 207.

³ Simmons v. Bradford, 15 Mass. 82.

⁴ Lloyd v. Willan, 1 Esp. 178; Delesline v. Greenland, 1 Bay, 458; Williams v. Innes, 1 Campb. 364; Burt v. Palmer, 5 Esp. 145.

⁵ See post, § 169 to 212.

⁶ 4 Bl. Comm. 23.

⁷ 1 Hal. P. C. 630; 1 Russell on Crimes, 801; Rex v. Phillips, 8 C. & P. 736; Rex v. Jordan, 9 C. & P. 118.

⁸ 1 Russell on Crimes, 810.

been at the same time guilty of infidelity.¹ And if a wife act in company with her husband, in the commission of a felony, other than treason or homicide, it is conclusively presumed, that she acted under his coercion, and consequently without any guilty intent.²

§ 29. Where the succession to estates is concerned, the question, which of two persons is to be presumed the survivor, where both *perished in the same calamity*, but the circumstances of their deaths are unknown, has been considered in the Roman Law, and in several other codes, but in the Common Law, no rule on the subject has been laid down. By the Roman Law, if it were the case of father and son, perishing together in the same shipwreck or battle, and the son was under the age of puberty, it was presumed that he died first, but if above that age, that he was the survivor; upon the principle, that in the former case the elder is generally the more robust, and in the latter, the younger.³ The French code has regard to the ages of fifteen and sixty; presuming that of those under the former age, the eldest survived; and that of those above the latter age, the youngest survived. If the parties were between those ages, but of different sexes, the male is presumed to have survived; if they were of the same sex, the presumption is in favor of the survivorship of the

¹ *Cope v. Cope*, 1 Mood. & Rob. 269, 276; *Morris v. Davies*, 3 C. & P. 215; *St. George v. St. Margaret*, 1 Salk. 123; *Banbury Peerage case*, 2 Selw. N. P. (by Wheaton) 558; 1 Sim. & Stu. 153; *S. C. Rex v. Luffe*, 8 East, 193. But if they lived apart, though within such distance as afforded an opportunity for intercourse, the presumption of legitimacy of the issue may be rebutted. *Morris v. Davis*, 5 C. & Fin. 163. Non-access is not presumed from the fact, that the wife lived in adultery with another; it must be proved *aliunde*. *Regina v. Mansfield*, 1 G. & Dav. 7.

² 4 Bl. Comm. 28, 29; Anon. 2 East, P. C. 559.

³ Dig. Lib. 34, tit. 5; De rebus dubiis, l. 9, § 1, 3; Ib. l. 16, 22, 23; Menochius de Præsumpt. lib. 1, Quæst. x n. 8, 9. This rule, however, was subject to some exceptions for the benefit of mothers, patrons, and beneficiaries.

younger, as opening the succession in the order of nature.¹ The same rules were in force in the territory of Orleans at the time of its cession to the United States, and have since been incorporated into the code of Louisiana.²

§ 30. This question first arose, in Common Law Courts, upon a motion for a *mandamus*, in the case of Gen. Stanwix, who perished, together with his second wife, and his daughter by a former marriage, on the passage from Dublin to England; the vessel in which they sailed having never been heard from. Hereupon his nephew applied for letters of administration, as next of kin; which was resisted by the maternal uncle of the daughter, who claimed the effects, upon the presumption of the Roman Law, that she was the survivor. But this point was not decided, the Court decreeing for the nephew upon another ground, namely, that the question could properly be raised only upon the statute of distributions, and not upon an application for administration by one clearly entitled to administer by consanguinity.³ The point was afterwards raised in Chancery, where the case was, that the father had bequeathed legacies to such of his children as should be living at the time of his death; and he having perished, together with one of the legatees, by the foundering

¹ Code Civil, § 720, 721, 722; Duranton, Cours de Droit Français, tom. 6, p. 39, 42, 43, 48, 67, 69; Rogron, Code Civil Expli. 411, 412; Toullier, Droit Civil Français, tom. 4, p. 70, 72, 73. By the Mahometan Law of India, when relatives thus perish together, "it is to be presumed, that they all died at the same moment; and the property of each shall pass to his living heirs, without any portion of it vesting in his companions in misfortune." See Baillie's Moohummudan Law of Inheritance, 172. Such also was the rule of the ancient Danish Law. "Filius in communione cum patre et matre denatus, pro non nato habetur." Ancher, Lex Cimbrica, lib. 1, c. 9, p. 21.

² Civil Code of Louisiana, art. 930 - 933; Digest of the Civil Laws of the Territory of Orleans, art. 60 - 63.

³ *Rex v. Dr. Hay*, 1 W. Bl. 640. The matter was afterwards compromised, upon the recommendation of Lord Mansfield, who said he knew of no legal principle, on which he could decide it. See 2 Phillim. 268, in note; Fearn's Posth. Works, 38.

of a vessel on a voyage from India to England, the question was, whether the legacy was lapsed by the death of the son in the lifetime of the father. The Master of the Rolls refused to decide the question by presumption, and directed an issue, to try the fact by a Jury.¹ But the Prerogative Courts adopt the presumption, that both perished together, and that therefore neither could transmit rights to the other.² In the absence of all evidence of the particular circumstances of the calamity, probably this rule will be found the safest and most convenient;³ but if any circumstances of the death of either party can be proved, there can be no inconvenience in submitting the question to a Jury, to whose province it peculiarly belongs.

§ 31. Conclusive presumptions of law are not unknown to the *law of nations*. Thus, if a neutral vessel be found carrying dispatches of the enemy between different parts of the enemy's dominions, their effect is presumed to be hostile.⁴ The *spoliation of papers*, by the captured party, has been

¹ *Mason v. Mason*, 1 Meriv. 308.

² *Wright v. Netherwood*, 2 Salk. 593, note (a) by Evans; more fully reported under the name of *Wright v. Sarmuda*, 2 Phillim. 266-277, note (c); *Taylor v. Diplock*, 2 Phillim. 261, 278, 280; *Selwyn's case*, 3 Hagg. Eccl. R. 748. In the goods of *Murray*, 1 Curt. 596; *Satterthwaite v. Powell*, 1 Curt. 705. See also 2 Kent's Comm. 435, 436, (4th ed.), note (b). In the brief note of *Colvin v. H. M. Procurator Gen.* 1 Hagg. Eccl. R. 92, where the husband, wife, and infant child (if any) perished together, the Court seem to have held, that the *prima facie* presumption of law was, that the husband survived. But the point was not much moved. The subject of presumed survivorship is fully treated by Mr. Burge, in his Commentaries on Colonial and Foreign Laws, Vol. 4, p. 11-29. In Chancery it has recently been held, that a presumption of priority of death might be raised from the comparative age, health, and strength of the parties; and therefore, where two brothers perished by shipwreck, the circumstances being wholly unknown, the elder being the master, and the younger the second mate of the ship, it was presumed that the latter died first. *Sillick v. Booth*, 1 Y. & C. New Cas. 117.

³ It was so held in *Coye v. Leach*, 8 Mete. 371.

⁴ *The Atalanta*, 6 Rob. Adm. 440.

regarded, in all the States of Continental Europe, as conclusive proof of guilt; but in England and America it is open to explanation, unless the cause labors under heavy suspicions, or there is a vehement presumption of bad faith or gross prevarication.¹

§ 32. In these cases of conclusive presumption, the rule of law merely attaches itself to the circumstances, when proved; it is not deduced from them. It is not a rule of inference from testimony; but a rule of protection, as expedient, and for the general good. It does not, for example, assume that all landlords have good titles; but that it will be a public and general inconvenience to suffer tenants to dispute them. Neither does it assume, that all averments and recitals in deeds and records are true; but, that it will be mischievous, if parties are permitted to deny them. It does not assume, that all simple contract debts, of six years' standing, are paid, nor that every man, quietly occupying land twenty years as his own, has a valid title by grant; but it deems it expedient that claims, opposed by such evidence as the lapse of those periods affords, should not be countenanced; and that society is more benefitted by a refusal to entertain such claims, than by suffering them to be made good by proof. In fine, it does not assume the impossibility of things, which are possible; on the contrary, it is founded, not only on the possibility of their existence, but on their occasional occurrence; and it is against the mischiefs of their occurrence, that it interposes its protecting prohibition.²

§ 33. The SECOND CLASS of presumptions of law, answering to the *presumptiones juris* of the Roman Law, which may always be overcome by opposing proof,³ consists of those termed *disputable presumptions*. These, as well as the for-

¹ *The Pizarro*, 2 Wheat. 227, 241, 242, note (c); *The Hunter*, 1 Dods. Adm. 480, 486.

² See 6 Law Mag. 348, 355, 356.

³ *Heinnec. ad Pand. Pars. iv. § 124.*

mer, are the result of the general experience of a connexion between certain facts or things, the one being usually found to be the companion, or the effect, of the other. The connexion, however, in this class, is not so intimate, nor so nearly universal, as to render it expedient, that it should be absolutely and imperatively presumed to exist in every case, all evidence to the contrary being rejected; but yet it is so general, and so nearly universal, that the law itself, without the aid of a Jury, infers the one fact from the proved existence of the other, in the absence of all opposing evidence. In this mode, the law defines the nature and amount of the evidence, which it deems sufficient to establish a *prima facie* case, and to throw the burden of proof on the other party; and if no opposing evidence is offered, the Jury are bound to find in favor of the presumption. A contrary verdict would be liable to be set aside, as being against evidence.

§ 34. The rules in this class of presumptions, as in the former, have been adopted by common consent, from motives of public policy, and for the promotion of the general good; yet not, as in the former class, forbidding all farther evidence; but only excusing or dispensing with it, till some proof is given, on the other side, to rebut the presumption thus raised. Thus, as men do not generally violate the penal code, the law presumes every man *innocent*; but some men do transgress it, and therefore evidence is received to repel this presumption. This legal presumption of innocence is to be regarded by the Jury, in every case, as matter of evidence, to the benefit of which the party is entitled. And where a criminal charge is to be proved by circumstantial evidence, the proof ought to be not only consistent with the prisoner's guilt, but inconsistent with any other rational conclusion.¹ On the other hand, as men seldom do unlawful acts with innocent intentions, the law presumes every act, in itself unlawful, to have been criminally intended, until the contrary appears. Thus on a charge

¹ Hodge's case, 2 Lewin, Cr. Cas. 227, per Alderson, B.

of murder, malice is presumed from the fact of killing, unaccompanied with circumstances of extenuation; and the burden of disproving the malice is thrown upon the accused.¹ The same presumption arises in civil actions, where the act complained of was unlawful.² So also, as men generally own the personal property they possess, proof of possession is presumptive proof of *ownership*. But possession of the fruits of

¹ Foster's Crown Law, 255; Rex v. Farrington, Rus. & Ry. 207.

² In Bromage v. Prosser, 4 B. & C. 247, 255, 256, which was an action for words spoken of the plaintiffs, in their business and trade of bankers, the law of implied or legal malice, as distinguished from malice in fact, was clearly expounded by Mr. Justice Bayley, in the following terms. — "Malice, in the common acceptation, means ill will against a person, but in its legal sense it means a wrongful act, done intentionally, without just cause or excuse. If I give a perfect stranger a blow likely to produce death, I do it of malice, because I do it intentionally and without just cause or excuse. If I maim cattle, without knowing whose they are, if I poison a fishery, without knowing the owner, I do it of malice, because it is a wrongful act, and done intentionally. If I am arraigned of felony, and wilfully stand mute, I am said to do it of malice, because it is intentional and without just cause or excuse. Russell on Crimes, 614, n. 1. And if I traduce a man, whether I know him or not, and whether I intend to do him an injury or not, I apprehend the law considers it as done of malice, because it is wrongful and intentional. It equally works an injury, whether I meant to produce an injury or not, and if I had no legal excuse for the slander, why is he not to have a remedy against me for the injury it produces? And I apprehend the law recognises the distinction between these two descriptions of malice, malice in fact and malice in law, in action of slander. In an ordinary action for words, it is sufficient to charge, that the defendant spoke them falsely; it is not necessary to state, that they were spoken maliciously. This is so laid down in Styles, 392, and was adjudged upon error in Mercer v. Sparks, Owen, 51; Noy, 35. The objection there was, that the words were not charged to have been spoken maliciously, but the Court answered, that the words were themselves malicious and slanderous, and therefore the judgment was affirmed. But in actions for such slander, as is *prima facie* excusable on account of the cause of speaking or writing it, as in the case of servants' characters, confidential advice, or communication to persons who ask it, or have a right to expect it, malice in fact must be proved by the plaintiff; and in Edmonson v. Stevenson, Bull. N. P. 8, Lord Mansfield takes the distinction between these and ordinary actions of slander."

crime, recently after its commission, is *prima facie*, evidence of *guilty possession*; and, if unexplained, either by direct evidence, or by the attending circumstances, or by the character and habits of life of the possessor, or otherwise, it is taken as conclusive.¹ This rule of presumption is not confined to the case of theft, but is applied to all cases of crime, even the highest and most penal. Thus, upon an indictment for arson, proof that property, which was in the house at the time it was burnt, was soon afterwards found in the possession of the prisoner, was held to raise a probable presumption, that he was present and concerned in the offence.² The like presumption is raised in the case of murder, accompanied by robbery;³ and in the case of the possession of an unusual quantity of counterfeit money.⁴

§ 35. This presumption of *innocence* is so strong, that even where the guilt can be established only by proving a negative, that negative must, in most cases, be proved by the party alleging the guilt; though the general rule of law devolves the burden of proof on the party holding the affirmative. Thus, where the plaintiff complained, that the defendants, who had chartered his ship, had put on board an article highly inflammable and dangerous, without giving notice of its nature to the master or others in charge of the ship, whereby the vessel was burnt; he was held bound to prove this negative

¹ Rex v. —, 2 C. & P. 459; Regina v. Coote, 1 Armst. Macartn. & Ogle, R. 337; The State v. Adams, 1 Hayw. 463; Wills on Circumstantial Evidence, 67. Where the things stolen are such as do not pass from hand to hand, (e.g. the ends of unfinished woollen clothes,) their being found in the prisoner's possession, two months after they were stolen, is sufficient to call for an explanation from him how he came by them, and to be considered by the Jury. Rex v. Partridge, 7 C. & P. 551. *Furtum præsuntur commissum ab illo, penes quem res furata inventa fuerit, adeo ut si non docuerit à quo rem habuerit, justè, ex illa inventione, poterit subijci tormentis.* Mascard. De Probat. Vol. 2, Concl. 834; Menoch. De Præsumpt. Lib. 5, Præsumpt. 31.

² Rickman's case, 2 East, P. C. 1035.

³ Wills on Circumst. Evid. 72.

⁴ Rex v. Fuller et al. Russ. & Ry. 308.

averment.¹ In some cases, the presumption of innocence has been deemed sufficiently strong to overthrow the presumption of life. Thus, where a woman, twelve months after her husband was last heard of, married a second husband, by whom she had children; it was held, that the Sessions, in a question upon their settlement, rightly presumed that the first husband was dead at the time of the second marriage.²

§ 36. An *exception* to this rule, respecting the presumption of innocence, is admitted in the case of a libel. For where a libel is sold in a bookseller's shop, by his servant, in the ordinary course of his employment, this is evidence of a guilty publication by the master; though, in general, an authority to commit a breach of the law is not to be presumed. This exception is founded upon public policy, lest irresponsible persons should be put forward, and the principal and real offender should escape. Whether such evidence is conclusive against the master, or not, the books are not perfectly agreed; but it seems conceded, that the want of privity in fact by the master is not sufficient to excuse him; and that the presumption of his guilt is so strong as to fall but little short of conclusive evidence.³ Proof, that the libel was sold in violation of express orders from the master, would clearly take the case

¹ Williams v. E. Ind. Co. 3 East, 192; Bull. N. P. 298. So of allegations, that a party had not taken the sacrament; Rex v. Hawkins, 10 East, 211; had not complied with the act of uniformity, &c.; Powell v. Milburn, 3 Wills. 355, 366; that goods were not legally imported; Sissons v. Dixon, 5 B. & C. 758; that a theatre was not duly licensed; Rodwell v. Redge, 1 C. & P. 220.

² Rex v. Twynning, 2 B. & Ald. 385. But in another case, where, in a question upon the derivative settlement of the second wife, it was proved, that a letter had been written by the first wife, from Van Diemen's Land, bearing date only twenty-five days prior to the second marriage, it was held, that the Sessions did right in presuming that the first wife was living at the time of the second marriage. Rex v. Harborne, 2 Ad. & El. 540.

³ Rex v. Gutch et al. 1 M. & M. 433; Harding v. Greening, 8 Taunt. 42; Rex v. Almon, 5 Burr. 2686; Rex v. Walter, 3 Esp. 21; 1 Russ. on Crimes, 341, (3d ed. p. 251); Ph. & Am. on Evid. 466; 1 Phil. Evid. 446.

out of this exception, by showing that it was not sold in the ordinary course of the servant's duty. The same law is applied to the publishers of newspapers.¹

§ 37. The presumption of innocence may be overthrown, and a *presumption of guilt* be raised, by the misconduct of the party in suppressing or *destroying evidence*, which he ought to produce, or to which the other party is entitled. Thus, the spoliation of papers, material to show the neutral character of a vessel, furnishes a strong presumption, *in odium spoliatoris*, against the ship's neutrality.² A similar presumption is raised against a party, who has obtained possession of papers from a witness, after the service of a *subpœna duces tecum* upon the latter for their production, which is withheld.³ The general rule is, *Omnia, præsumuntur contra spoliatores*.⁴ His conduct is attributed to his supposed knowledge that the truth would have operated against him. Thus, also, where the finder of a lost jewel would not produce it, it was presumed against him, that it was of the highest value of its kind.⁵ But if the defendant has been guilty of no fraud, or

¹ 1 Russ. on Crimes, 341; Rex v. Nutt, Bull. N. P. 6; (3d ed. p. 251); Southwick v. Stevens, 10 Johns. 443.

² The Hunter, 1 Dods. 480; The Pizarro, 2 Wheat. 227; 1 Kent, Comm. 157; Ante, § 31.

³ Leeds v. Cook, 4 Esp. 256. But a refusal to produce books and papers, under a notice, though it lays a foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence of their contents, has been held to afford no evidence of the fact sought to be proved by them; such, for example, as the existence of a deed of conveyance from one mercantile partner to another. Hanson v. Eustace, 2 Howard, S. C. Rep. 653.

⁴ 2 Poth. Obl. (by Evans,) 292; Dalston v. Coatsworth, 1 P. Wms. 731; Cowper v. Earl Cowper, 2 P. Wms. 720, 748-752; Rex v. Arundel, Hob. 109, explained in 2 P. Wms. 748, 749; D. of Newcastle v. Kinderley, 8 Ves. 363, 375; Annesley v. E. of Anglesea, 17 Howell's St. Tr. 1430. See also Sir Samuel Romilly's argument in Lord Melville's case, 29 Howell's St. Tr. 1194, 1195; Anon. 1 Ld. Raym. 731. In Barker v. Ray, 2 Russ. 73, the Lord Chancellor thought that this rule had in some cases been pressed a little too far. See also Harwood v. Goodright, Cowp. 86.

⁵ Armory v. Delamirie, 1 Stra. 505.

improper conduct, and the only evidence against him is of the delivery to him of the plaintiff's goods, of unknown quality, the presumption is, that they were goods of the cheapest quality.¹ The *fabrication of evidence*, however, does not of itself furnish any presumption of law against the innocence of the party, but is a matter to be dealt with by the Jury. Innocent persons, under the influence of terror from the danger of their situation, have been sometimes led to the simulation of exculpatory facts; of which several instances are stated in the books.² Neither has the mere nonproduction of books, upon notice, any other *legal* effect, than to admit the other party to prove their contents by parol, unless under special circumstances.³

§ 38. Other presumptions, of this class, are founded upon the experience of human *conduct in the course of trade*; men being usually vigilant in guarding their property, and prompt in asserting their rights, and orderly in conducting their affairs, and diligent in claiming and collecting their dues. Thus where a bill of exchange, or an order for the payment of money, or delivery of goods, is found in the hands of the drawee, or a promissory note is in the possession of the maker, a legal presumption is raised, that he has paid the money due upon it, and delivered the goods ordered.⁴ A bank note will be presumed to have been signed before it was issued, though the signature be torn off.⁵ So, if a deed is found in the hands of the grantee, having on its face the evidence of its regular execution, it will be presumed to have been delivered by the grantor.⁶ So, a receipt for the last year's or quarter's rent is

¹ Clunnes v. Pezzey, 1 Campb. 8.

² See 3 Inst. 104; Wills on Circumst. Evid. 113.

³ Cooper v. Gibbons, 3 Campb. 363.

⁴ Gibbon v. Featherstonhaugh, 1 Stark. R. 225; Egg v. Barnett, 3 Esp. 196; Garlock v. Geortner, 7 Wend. 198; Alvord v. Baker, 9 Wend. 323; Weidner v. Schweigart, 9 Serg. & R. 385; Shepherd v. Currie, 1 Stark. R. 454; Brembridge v. Osborne, Ib. 374.

⁵ Murdock v. Union Bank Louis. 2 Rob. Louis. R. 112.

⁶ Ward v. Lewis, 4 Pick. 518.

prima facie evidence of the payment of all the rent previously accrued.¹ But the mere delivery of money by one to another, or of a bank check, or the transfer of stock, unexplained, is presumptive evidence of the payment of an antecedent debt, and not of a loan.² The same presumption arises upon the payment of an order or draft for money, namely, that it was drawn upon funds of the drawer, in the hands of the drawee. But in the case of an order for the delivery of goods it is otherwise, they being presumed to have been sold by the drawee to the drawer.³ Thus also, where the proprietors of adjoining parcels of land agree upon a line of division, it is presumed to be a recognition of the true original line between their lots.⁴

§ 38 *a*. Of a similar character is the presumption in favor of the due execution of deeds and wills. Thus, if the subscribing witnesses to a will are dead, or if, being present, they are forgetful of all the facts, or of any fact material to its due execution, the law will in such cases supply the defect of proof, by presuming that the requisites of the statute were duly observed.⁵ The same principle, in effect, seems to have been applied in the case of deeds.⁶

§ 39. On the same general principle, where a debt due by *specialty* has been unclaimed, and without recognition, for *twenty years*, in the absence of any explanatory evidence, it is presumed to have been paid. The *Jury* may infer the fact

¹ 1 Gilb. Evid. (by Lofft.) 309; *Brewer v. Knapp*, 1 Pick. 337.

² *Welch v. Seaborn*, 1 Stark. R. 474; *Patton v. Ash*, 7 Serg. & R. 116, 125; *Breton v. Cope*, Peake's Cas. 30; *Lloyd v. Sandiland*, Gow, R. 13, 16; *Cary v. Gerrish*, 4 Esp. 9; *Aubert v. Walsh*, 4 Taunt. 293; *Boswell v. Smith*, 6 C. & P. 60.

³ *Alvord v. Baker*, 9 Wend. 323, 324.

⁴ *Sparhawk v. Bullard*, 1 Mete. 95.

⁵ *Burgoyne v. Showler*, 1 Roberts, Eccl. R. 10; *In re Leach*, 12 Jur. 381.

⁶ *Burling v. Paterson*, 9 C. & P. 570; *Dewey v. Dewey*, 1 Met. 349; *Quimby v. Buzzell*, 4 Shepl. 470; *New Haven Co. Bank v. Mitchell*, 15 Conn. 206; *Post*, § 372, n.

of payment, from the circumstances of the case, within that period; but the presumption of *law* does not attach, till the twenty years are expired.¹ This rule, with its limitation of twenty years, was first introduced into the Courts of Law by Sir Matthew Hale, and has since been generally recognised, both in the Courts of Law, and of Equity.² It is applied not only to bonds for the payment of money, but to mortgages, judgments, warrants to confess judgment, decrees, statutes, recognisances, and other matters of record, when not affected by statutes; but with respect to all other claims not under seal nor of record, and not otherwise limited, whether for the payment of money, or the performance of specific duties, the general analogies are followed, as to the application of the lapse of time, which prevail on kindred subjects.³ But in all these cases, the presumption of payment may be repelled by any evidence of the situation of the parties, or other circumstance tending to satisfy the Jury, that the debt is still due.⁴

¹ *Oswald v. Leigh*, 1 T. R. 270; *Hillary v. Waller*, 12 Ves. 264; *Colsell v. Budd*, 1 Campb. 27; *Boltz v. Ballman*, 1 Yeates, 584; *Cottle v. Payne*, 3 Day, 289. In some cases, the presumption of payment has been made by the Court, after eighteen years; *Rex v. Stephens*, 1 Burr. 434; *Clark v. Hopkins*, 7 Johns. 556; but these seem to be exceptions to the general rule.

² *Mathews on Presumpt.* Evid. 379; *Haworth v. Bostock*, 4 Y. & C. 1; *Grenfell v. Girdlestone*, 2 Y. & C. 662.

³ This presumption of the Common Law is now made absolute in the case of debts due by specialty, by Stat. 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 42, § 3. See also Stat. 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 27, and 7 W. 4 & 1 V. c. 28. It is also adopted in New York, by Rev. Stat. Part 3, ch. 4, tit. 2, art. 5, and is repellable only by written acknowledgment, made within twenty years, or proof of part payment within that period. In Maryland, the lapse of twelve years is made a conclusive presumption of payment, in all cases of bonds, judgments, recognisances, and other specialties, by Stat. 1715, ch. 23, § 6; 1 Dorsey's Laws of Maryl. p. 11; *Carroll v. Waring*, 3 Gill & Johns. 491. A like provision exists in Massachusetts, as to judgments and decrees, after the lapse of twenty years. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, § 24.

⁴ A more extended consideration of this subject being foreign from the plan of this work, the reader is referred to the treatise of Mr. Mathews on Presumptive Evidence, ch. 19, 20; *Best on Presumptions*, Part I. ch. ii, iii; and to Cowen & Hill's elaborate note to 1 Phil. on Evid. p. 160, note 307, where the American authorities are collected.



§ 40. Under this head of presumptions from the course of trade, may be ranked the presumptions frequently made from the regular course of business in a *public office*. Thus post-marks on letters are *primâ facie* evidence, that the letters were in the post office at the time and place therein specified.¹ If a letter is sent by the post, it is presumed, from the known course in that department of the public service, that it reached its destination at the regular time, and was received by the person, to whom it was addressed, if living place at the and usually receiving letters there.² So, where a letter was put into a box in an attorney's office, and the course of business was, that a bell-man of the post-office invariably called to take the letters from the box; this was held sufficient to presume that it reached its destination.³ So, the time of clearance of a vessel, sailing under a license, was presumed to have been indorsed upon the license, which was lost, upon its being shown, that without such indorsement, the custom-house would not have permitted the goods to be entered.⁴ So, on proof that goods, which cannot be exported without license, were entered, at the custom-house, for exportation, it will be presumed, that there was a license to export them.⁵ The return of a sheriff, also, which is conclusively presumed to be true, between third persons, is taken *primâ facie* as true, even in his own favor; and the burden of proving it false, in an action against him for a false return, is devolved on the plaintiff, notwithstanding it is a negative allegation.⁶ In fine, it is presumed, until the contrary is proved, that every man obeys the mandates of the law, and performs all his official and

¹ Fletcher v. Braddyl, 3 Stark. R. 64; Rex v. Johnson, 7 East, 65; Rex v. Watson, 1 Campb. 215; Rex v. Plumer, Rus. & Ry. 264.

² Saunderson v. Judge, 2 H. Bl. 509; Bussard v. Levering, 6 Wheat. 102; Lindenberg v. Beal, ib. 104; Bayley on Bills, (by Phillips & Sewall,) 275, 276, 277; Walter v. Haynes, Ry. & M. 149; Warren v. Warren, 1 Cr. M. & R. 250.

³ Skillbeck v. Garbett, 9 Jur. 339; 7 Ad. & El. N. S. 846, S. C.

⁴ Butler v. Allnutt, 1 Stark. R. 222.

⁵ Van Omeron v. Dowick, 2 Campb. 44.

⁶ Clark v. Lyman, 10 Pick. 47; Boynton v. Willard, ib. 169.

social duties.¹ The like presumption is also drawn from the usual course of men's private offices and business, where the primary evidence of the fact is wanting.²

§ 41. Other presumptions are founded on the experienced *continuance* or permanency, of longer or shorter duration, in human affairs. When, therefore, the existence of a person, a personal relation, or a state of things, is once established by proof, the law presumes that the person, relation, or state of things continues to exist as before, until the contrary is shown, or until a different presumption is raised, from the nature of the subject in question. Thus, where the issue is upon the *life* or death of a person, once shown to have been living, the burden of proof lies upon the party, who asserts the death.³ But after the lapse of seven years, without intelligence concerning the person, the presumption of life ceases, and the burden of proof is devolved on the other party.⁴ This

¹ *Ld. Halifax's case*, Bull. N. P. [298]; *Bank U. States v. Dandridge*, 12 Wheat. 69, 70; *Williams v. E. Ind. Co.* 3 East, 192; *Hartwell v. Root*, 19 Johns. 345; *The Mary Stewart*, 2 W. Rob. Adm. R. 244. Hence, children born during the separation of husband and wife, by a decree of divorce *a mensa et thoro*, are, *primâ facie*, illegitimate. *St George v. St. Margaret*, 1 Salk. 123.

² *Doe v. Turford*, 3 B. & Ad. 890, 895; *Champneys v. Peck*, 1 Stark. R. 404; *Pritt v. Fairclough*, 3 Campb. 305.

³ *Throgmorton v. Walton*, 2 Roll. R. 461; *Wilson v. Hodges*, 2 East, 313; *Battin v. Bigelow*, 1 Pet. C. C. R. 452. *Vivere etiam usque ad centum annos quilibet presumitur, nisi probetur mortuus.* Corpus Juris Glossatum, tom. 2, p. 718, note (q) Mascard. De Prob. Vol. 1, Concl. 103, n. 5.

⁴ *Hopewell v. De Pinna*, 2 Campb. 113; *Loring v. Steineman*, 1 Mete. 204. This presumption of death, from seven years' absence, was questioned by the Vice-Chancellor of England, who said it was "daily becoming more and more untenable;" in *Watson v. England*, 14 Sim. 28; and again in *Dowley v. Winfield*, ib. 277. But the correctness of his remark is doubted in 5 Law Mag. N. S. 338, 339; and the rule was subsequently adhered to by the Lord Chancellor in *Cuthbert v. Purrier*, 2 Phill. 199, in regard to the capital of a fund, the income of which was bequeathed to an absent legatee; though he seems to have somewhat relaxed the rule in regard to the accumulated dividends. See 7 Law Rev. 201. The presumption in such cases is, that the person is dead; but not that he died at the end of the seven years, nor at

period was inserted, upon great deliberation, in the statute of bigamy,¹ and the statute concerning leases for lives,² and has since been adopted, from analogy, in other cases.³ But where the presumption of life conflicts with that of innocence, the latter is generally allowed to prevail.⁴ Upon an issue of the life or death of a party, as we have seen in the like case of the presumed payment of a debt, the Jury may find the fact of death from the lapse of a shorter period than seven years, if other circumstances concur; as, if the party sailed on a voyage, which should long since have been accomplished, and the vessel has not been heard from.⁵ But the presumption of the Common Law, independent of the finding of the Jury, does not attach to the mere lapse of time, short of seven years,⁶ unless letters of administration have been granted on his estate within that period, which, in such case, are conclusive proof of his death.⁷

any other particular time. *Doe v. Nepean*, 5 B. & Ad. 86. The time of the death is to be inferred from the circumstances. *Rust v. Baker*, 8 Sim. 443; *Smith v. Knowlton*, 11 N. Hamp. 191; *Doe v. Flanagan*, 1 Kelly, R. 543.

¹ 1 Jac. 1, c. 11.

² 19 Car. 2, c. 6.

³ *Doe v. Jesson*, 6 East, 85; *Doe v. Deakin*, 4 B. & Ald. 433; *King v. Paddock*, 18 Johns. 141. It is not necessary that the party be proved to be absent from the United States; it is sufficient, if it appears that he has been absent, for seven years, from the particular State of his residence, without having been heard from. *Newman v. Jenkins*, 10 Pick. 515; *Innis v. Campbell*, 1 Rawle, 373; *Spurr v. Trimble*, 1 A. K. Marsh. 278; *Wambough v. Shenk*, 1 Penningt. 167; *Woods v. Woods*, 2 Bay, 476; 1 N. York Rev. Stat. 749, § 6.

⁴ *Rex v. Twynning*, 2 B. & Ald. 385; Ante, § 35.

⁵ In the case of a missing ship, bound from Manilla to London, on which the underwriters had voluntarily paid the amount insured, the death of those on board was presumed by the Prerogative Court, after an absence of only two years, and administration was granted accordingly. *In re Hutton*, 1 Curt. 595. See also *Sillick v. Booth*, 1 Y. & Col. N. C. 117.

⁶ *Watson v. King*, 1 Stark. R. 121; *Green v. Brown*, 2 Stra. 1199; *Park on Ins.* 433.

⁷ *Newman v. Jenkins*, 10 Pick. 515. The production of a will, with proof of payment of a legacy under it, and of an entry in the register of burials, were held sufficient evidence of the party's death. *Doe v. Penfold*, 8 C. & P. 536.

§ 42. On the same ground, a *partnership*, or other similar *relation*, once shown to exist, is presumed to continue, until it is presumed to have been dissolved.¹ And a *seisin*, once proved or admitted, is presumed to continue, until a disseisin is proved.² The *opinions*, also, of individuals, once entertained and expressed, and the *state of mind*, once proved to exist, are presumed to remain unchanged, until the contrary appears. Thus, all the members of a Christian community being presumed to entertain the common faith, no man is supposed to disbelieve the existence and moral government of God, until it is shown from his own declarations. In like manner, every man is presumed to be of sane mind, until the contrary is shown; but if derangement or imbecility be proved or admitted at any particular period, it is presumed to continue, until disproved, unless the derangement was accidental, being caused by the violence of a disease.³

§ 43. A spirit of *comity*, and a disposition to friendly intercourse, are also presumed to exist among nations, as well as among individuals. And in the absence of any positive rule, affirming, or denying, or restraining the operation of foreign laws, Courts of Justice presume the adoption of them by their own government, unless they are repugnant to its policy, or prejudicial to its interest.⁴ The instances, here given, it is believed, will sufficiently illustrate this head of presumptive evidence. Numerous other examples and cases may be found in the treatises already cited, to which the reader is referred.⁵

¹ *Alderson v. Clay*, 1 Stark. R. 405; 2 Stark. Evid. 590, 688.

² *Brown v. King*, 5 Mete. 173.

³ *Attorney Gen. v. Parnter*, 3 Bro. Ch. Ca. 443; *Peaslee v. Robbins*, 3 Metcalf's R. 164; *Hix v. Whittemore*, 4 Mete. 545; 1 Collinson on Lunacy, 55; *Shelford on Lunatics*, 275; 1 Hal. P. C. 30; *Swinb. on Wills*, Part II. § iii. 6, 7.

⁴ *Bank of Augusta v. Earle*, 13 Peters, 519; *Story on Conf. of Laws*, § 36, 37.

⁵ See Cowen & Hill's note, 293, to 1 Phil. on Evid. 156; Mathews on Presumptive Evid. ch. 11 to ch. 22; Best on Presumptions, *passim*.

§ 44. PRESUMPTIONS OF FACT, usually treated as composing the *second general head* of presumptive evidence, can hardly be said, with propriety, to belong to this branch of the law. They are in truth but mere arguments, of which the major premise is not a rule of law; they belong equally to any and every subject-matter; and are to be judged by the common and received tests of the truth of propositions, and the validity of arguments. They depend upon their own natural force and efficacy in generating belief or conviction in the mind, as derived from those connexions, which are shown by experience, irrespective of any legal relations. They differ from presumptions of law in this essential respect, that while those are reduced to fixed rules, and constitute a branch of the particular system of jurisprudence to which they belong, these merely natural presumptions are derived wholly and directly from the circumstances of the particular case, by means of the common experience of mankind, without the aid or control of any rules of law whatever. Such, for example, is the inference of guilt, drawn from the discovery of a broken knife in the pocket of the prisoner, the other part of the blade being found sticking in the window of a house, which, by means of such an instrument, had been burglariously entered. These presumptions remain the same in their nature and operation, under whatever code the legal effect or quality of the facts, when found, is to be decided.¹

§ 45. There are, however, some few general propositions in regard to matters of fact, and the weight of testimony by the Jury, which are universally taken for granted in the administration of justice, and sanctioned by the usage of the bench, and which, therefore, may with propriety be mentioned under this head. Such, for instance, is the caution, generally given to Juries, to place little reliance on the testimony of an accomplice, unless it is confirmed, in some material point, by other

¹ See 2 Stark. Evid. 684; 6 Law Mag. 370. This subject has been very successfully illustrated by Mr. Wills, in his Essay on the Rationale of Circumstantial Evidence, *passim*.

evidence. There is no presumption of the Common Law against the testimony of an *accomplice*; yet experience has shown, that persons capable of being accomplices in crime, are but little worthy of credit; and on this experience the usage is founded.¹ A similar caution is to be used in regard to mere *verbal admissions* of a party, this kind of evidence being subject to much imperfection and mistake.² Thus, also, though lapse of time does not, of itself, furnish a conclusive legal bar to the title of the sovereign, agreeably to the maxim, *Nullum tempus occurrit regi*; yet, if the adverse claim could have had a legal commencement, Juries are instructed or advised to presume such commencement, after many years of uninterrupted adverse possession or enjoyment. Accordingly, royal grants have been thus found by the Jury, after an indefinitely long continued peaceable enjoyment, accompanied by the usual acts of ownership.³ So, after less than forty years' possession of a tract of land, and proof of a prior order of council for the survey of the lot, and of an actual survey thereof accordingly, it was held, that the Jury were properly instructed to presume that a patent had been duly issued.⁴ In regard, however, to crown or public grants, a longer lapse of time has generally been deemed necessary, in order to justify this presumption, than is considered sufficient to authorize the like presumption in the case of grants from private persons.

¹ See *post*, § 380, 381.

² *Earle v. Picken*, 5 C. & P. 542, note; *Rex v. Simons*, 6 C. & P. 540; *Williams v. Williams*, 1 Hagg. Consist. R. 304. See *post*, under the head of *Admissions*, § 200.

³ *Rex v. Brown*, cited Cowp. 110; *Mayor of Kingston v. Horner*, Cowp. 102; *Eldridge v. Knott*, Cowp. 215; *Mather v. Trinity Church*, 3 S. & R. 509; *Roe v. Ireland*, 11 East, 280; *Read v. Brookman*, 3 T. R. 159; *Goodtitle v. Baldwin*, 11 East, 488; 2 Stark. Evid. 672.

⁴ *Jackson v. McCall*, 10 Johns. 377. — “Si probet possessionem excedentem memoriam hominum, habet vim tituli et privilegii, etiam à Principe. Et hæc est differentia inter possessionem xxx. vel xl. annorum, et non memorabilis temporis; quia per illam acquiritur non directum, sed utile dominium; per istam autem directum.” *Mascard. De Probat. Vol. 1, p. 239, Concl. 199, n. 11, 12.*

§ 46. Juries are also often instructed or advised, in more or less forcible terms, to presume *conveyances between private individuals*, in favor of the party, who has proved a right to the beneficial enjoyment of the property, and whose possession is consistent with the existence of such conveyance as is to be presumed; especially if the possession, without such conveyance, would have been unlawful, or cannot be satisfactorily explained.¹ This is done in order to prevent an apparently just title from being defeated by matter of mere form. Thus, Lord Mansfield declared, that he and some of the other Judges had resolved never to suffer a plaintiff in ejectment to be non-suited by a term, outstanding in his own trustees, nor a satisfied term to be set up by a mortgagor against a mortgagee; but that they would direct the Jury to presume it surrendered.² Lord Kenyon also said, that in all cases where trustees ought to convey to the beneficial owner, he would leave it to the Jury to presume, where such presumption could reasonably be made, that they had conveyed accordingly.³ After the lapse of seventy years, the Jury have been instructed to presume a grant of a share in a proprietary of lands, from acts done by the supposed grantee, in that capacity, as one of the proprietors.⁴ The same presumption has been advised in regard to the reconveyance of mortgages, conveyances from old to new trustees, mesne assignments of leases; and any other species of documentary evidence, and act *in pais*, which is necessary for the support of a title in all other respects evidently just.⁵

¹ Phil. & Am. on Evid. 475, 477; 1 Phil. Evid. 455, 457.

² Lade v. Holford, Bull. N. P. 110.

³ Doe v. Sybourn, 7 T. R. 2; Doe v. Staples, 2 T. R. 696. The subject of the presumed surrender of terms is treated at large in Mathews on Presumpt. Evid. ch. 13, p. 226-259, and is ably expounded by Sir Edw. Sugden, in his Treatise on Vendors & Purchasers, ch. xv. sec. 3, vol. 3, p. 24-67, 10th ed.

⁴ Farrar v. Merrill, 1 Greenl. 17. A by-law may, in like manner, be presumed. Bull. N. P. 211. The case of Corporations, 4 Co. 78; Cowp. 110.

⁵ Emery v. Grocock, 6 Madd. 54; Cooke v. Soltan, 2 Sim. & Stu. 154; Wilson v. Allen, 1 Jac. & W. 611, 620; Roe v. Reade, 8 T. R. 118, 122; White v. Foljambe, 11 Ves. 350; Keene v. Deardon, 8 East, 248, 266;

It is sufficient, that the party, who asks for the aid of this presumption, has proved a title to the beneficial ownership, and a long possession, not inconsistent therewith; and has made it not unreasonable to believe that the deed of conveyance, or other act essential to the title, was duly executed. Where these merits are wanting, the Jury are not advised to make the presumption.¹

§ 47. The same principle is applied to matters belonging to the *personalty*. Thus, where one town, after being set off from another, had continued for fifty years to contribute annually to the expense of maintaining a bridge in the parent town, this was held sufficient to justify the presumption of an agreement to that effect.² And, in general, it may be said, that long acquiescence in any adverse claim of right is good ground, on which a Jury may presume that the claim had a legal commencement; since it is contrary to general experience for one man long to continue to pay money to another, or to perform any onerous duty, or to submit to any incon-

Tenny v. Jones, 3 M. & Scott, 472; Roe v. Lowe, 1 H. Bl. 446, 459; Van Dyck v. Van Buren, 1 Caines, 84; Jackson v. Murray, 7 Johns. 5; 4 Kent, Comm. 90, 91; Gray v. Gardiner, 3 Mass. 399; Knox v. Jenks, 7 Mass. 488; Society, &c. v. Young, 2 N. Hamp. R. 310; Colman v. Anderson, 10 Mass. 105; Pejepscot Proprietors v. Ransom, 14 Mass. 145; Bergen v. Bennet, 1 Caines, 1; Blossom v. Cannon, 14 Mass. 177. See cases cited in Cowen & Hill's notes to 1 Phil. on Evid. p. 162, note 311. Battles v. Holley, 6 Greenl. 145; Lady Dartmouth v. Roberts, 16 East, 334, 339; Livingston v. Livingston, 4 Johns. Ch. 287. Whether deeds of conveyance can be presumed, in cases where the law has made provision for their registration, has been doubted. The point was argued, but not decided, in Doe v. Hirst, 11 Price, 475. The better opinion seems to be, that though the Court will not, in such case, presume the existence of a deed, as a mere inference of law, yet the fact is open for the Jury to find, as in other cases. See Rex v. Long Buckby, 7 East, 45; Trials per Pais, 237; Finch, 400.

¹ Doe v. Cooke, 6 Bing. 173, per Tindal, C. J.; Doe v. Reed, 5 B. & A. 232; Livett v. Wilson, 3 Bing. 115; Schaubert v. Jackson, 2 Wend. 14, 37; Hepburn v. Auld, 5 Cranch, 262.

² Cambridge v. Lexington, 17 Pick. 222. See also Grote v. Grote, 10 Johns. 402; Schaubert v. Jackson, 2 Wend. 36, 37.

venient claim, unless in pursuance of some contract, or other legal obligation.


§ 48. In fine, this class of presumptions embraces all the connexions and relations between the facts proved, and the hypothesis stated and defended, whether they are mechanical and physical, or of a purely moral nature. It is that which prevails in the ordinary affairs of life, namely, the process of ascertaining one fact, from the existence of another, without the aid of any rule of law; and therefore it falls within the exclusive province of the Jury, who are bound to find according to the truth, even in cases where the parties and the Court would be precluded by an estoppel, if the matter were so pleaded. They are usually aided in their labors by the advice and instructions of the Judge, more or less strongly urged, at his discretion; but the whole matter is free before them, unembarrassed by any considerations of policy or convenience, and unlimited by any boundaries but those of truth; to be decided by themselves, according to the convictions of their own understanding.

PART II.

OF THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE PRODUCTION OF TESTIMONY.

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PART II.

OF THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE PRODUCTION OF
TESTIMONY.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE RELEVANCY OF EVIDENCE.

§ 49. In trials of fact, without the aid of a Jury, the question of the admissibility of evidence, strictly speaking, can seldom be raised; since, whatever be the ground of objection, the evidence objected to must, of necessity, be read or heard by the Judge, in order to determine its character and value. In such cases, the only question, in effect, is upon the sufficiency and weight of the evidence. But in trials by Jury, it is the province of the presiding Judge to determine all questions on the admissibility of evidence to the Jury; as well as to instruct them in the rules of law, by which it is to be weighed. Whether there be any evidence or not, is a question for the Judge; whether it is sufficient evidence, is a question for the Jury.¹ If the decision of the question of admissibility depends

¹ Per Buller, J. in *Carpenters v. Hayward*, Doug. 374. The notion that the Jury have the right, in any case, to determine questions of law, was strongly denied, and their province defined by Story, J., in the *United States v. Battiste*, 2 Sumn. 243. "Before I proceed," said he, "to the merits of this case, I wish to say a few words upon a point, suggested by the argument of the learned counsel for the prisoner, upon which I have had a decided opinion during my whole professional life. It is, that in criminal cases, and especially in capital cases, the Jury are the judges of the law, as well as of

on the decision of other questions of fact, such as the fact of interest, for example, or of the execution of a deed, these pre-

the fact. My opinion is, that the Jury are no more judges of the law in a capital or other criminal case, upon the plea of not guilty, than they are in every civil case tried upon the general issue. In each of these cases, their verdict, when general, is necessarily compounded of law and of fact, and includes both. In each they must necessarily determine the law, as well as the fact. In each, they have the physical power to disregard the law, as laid down to them by the Court. But I deny, that, in any case, civil or criminal, they have the moral right to decide the law according to their own notions or pleasure. On the contrary, I hold it the most sacred constitutional right of every party accused of a crime, that the Jury should respond as to the facts, and the Court as to the law. It is the duty of the Court to instruct the Jury as to the law; and it is the duty of the Jury to follow the law, as it is laid down by the Court. This is the right of every citizen; and it is his only protection. If the Jury were at liberty to settle the law for themselves, the effect would be, not only that the law itself would be most uncertain, from the different views which different Juries might take of it; but in case of error, there would be no remedy or redress by the injured party; for the Court would not have any right to review the law, as it had been settled by the Jury. Indeed, it would be almost impracticable to ascertain, what the law, as settled by the Jury, actually was. On the contrary, if the Court should err, in laying down the law to the Jury, there is an adequate remedy for the injured party, by a motion for a new trial, or a writ of error, as the nature of the jurisdiction of the particular Court may require. Every person accused as a criminal has a right to be tried according to the law of the land, the fixed law of the land, and not by the law as a Jury may understand it, or choose, from wantonness or ignorance, or accidental mistake, to interpret it. If I thought that the Jury were the proper judges of the law in criminal cases, I should hold it my duty to abstain from the responsibility of stating the law to them upon any such trial. But believing, as I do, that every citizen has a right to be tried by the law, and according to the law; that it is his privilege and truest shield against oppression and wrong; I feel it my duty to state my views fully and openly on the present occasion." The same opinion, as to the province of the Jury, was strongly expressed by Lord C. J. Best, in *Levi v. Mylne*, 4 Bing. 195.

The same subject was more fully considered, in *The Commonwealth v. Porter*, 10 Metc. 263, which was an indictment for selling intoxicating liquors without license. At the trial, the defendant's counsel, being about to argue the questions of law to the Jury, was stopped by the Judge, who ruled, and so instructed the Jury, that it was their duty to receive the law from the Court, and implicitly to follow its direction upon matters of law. Exceptions being taken to this ruling of the Judge, the point was elaborately argued in

liminary questions of fact are, in the first instance, to be tried by the Judge; though he may, at his discretion, take the

bank, and fully considered by the Court, whose judgment, delivered by Shaw, C. J., concluded as follows:—"On the whole subject, the views of the Court may be summarily expressed in the following propositions: That in all criminal cases, it is competent for the Jury, if they see fit, to decide upon all questions of fact embraced in the issue, and to refer the law arising thereon to the Court, in the form of a special verdict. But it is optional with the Jury thus to return a special verdict or not, and it is within their legitimate province and power to return a general verdict, if they see fit. In thus rendering a general verdict, the Jury must necessarily pass upon the whole issue, compounded of the law and of the fact, and they may thus incidentally pass on questions of law. In forming and returning such general verdict, it is within the legitimate authority and power of the Jury to decide definitively upon all questions of fact involved in the issue, according to their judgment, upon the force and effect of the competent evidence laid before them; and if in the progress of the trial, or in the summing up and charge to the Jury, the Court should express or intimate any opinion upon any such question of fact, it is within the legitimate province of the Jury to revise, reconsider, and decide contrary to such opinion, if, in their judgment, it is not correct, and warranted by the evidence. But it is the duty of the Court to instruct the Jury on all questions of law which appear to arise in the cause, and also upon all questions pertinent to the issue, upon which either party may request the direction of the Court, upon matters of law. And it is the duty of the Jury to receive the law from the Court, and to conform their judgment and decision to such instructions, as far as they understand them, in applying the law to the facts to be found by them; and it is not within the legitimate province of the Jury to revise, reconsider, or decide contrary to such opinion or direction of the Court in matter of law. To this duty jurors are bound by a strong social and moral obligation, enforced by the sanction of an oath, to the same extent and in the same manner, as they are conscientiously bound to decide all questions of fact according to the evidence. It is no valid objection to this view of the duties of jurors, that they are not amenable to any legal prosecution for a wrong decision in any matter of law; it may arise from an honest mistake of judgment, in their apprehension of the rules and principles of law, as laid down by the Court, especially in perplexed and complicated cases, or from a mistake of judgment in applying them honestly to the facts proved. The same reason applies to the decisions of Juries upon questions of fact, clearly within their legitimate powers; they are not punishable for deciding wrong. The law vests in them the power to judge, and it will presume that they judge honestly, even though there may be reason to apprehend that they judge erroneously; they cannot, therefore, be held responsible for any such decision, unless upon evidence

opinion of the Jury upon them. But where the question is mixed, consisting of law and fact, so intimately blended, as

which clearly establishes proof of corruption, or other wilful violation of duty. It is within the legitimate power, and is the duty of the Court, to superintend the course of the trial; to decide upon the admission and rejection of evidence; to decide upon the use of any books, papers, documents, cases or works of supposed authority, which may be offered upon either side; to decide upon all collateral and incidental proceedings; and to confine parties and counsel to the matters within the issue. As the Jury have a legitimate power to return a general verdict, and in that case must pass upon the whole issue, this Court are of opinion that the defendant has a right, by himself or his counsel, to address the Jury, under the general superintendence of the Court, upon all the material questions involved in the issue, and to this extent, and in this connexion, to address the Jury upon such questions of law as come within the issue to be tried. Such address to the Jury, upon questions of law embraced in the issue, by the defendant or his counsel, is warranted by the long practice of the Courts in this Commonwealth in criminal cases, in which it is within the established authority of a Jury, if they see fit, to return a general verdict, embracing the entire issue of law and fact." 10 Mete. 285-287. See, also, the opinion of Lord Mansfield to the same effect, in *Rex v. The Dean of St. Asaph*, 21 How. St. Tr. 1039, 1040; and of Mr. Hargrave in his note, 276 to Co. Lit. 155, where the earlier authorities are cited.

The application of this doctrine to particular cases, though generally uniform, is not perfectly so where the question is a mixed one of law and fact. Thus, the question of *probable cause* belongs to the Court; but where it is a mixed question of law and fact intimately blended, it has been held right to leave it to the Jury, with proper instructions as to the law. *McDonald v. Rooke*, 2 Bing. N. C. 217. And see *Taylor v. Willans*, 2 B. & Ad. 845; 6 Bing. 183; Post, Vol. 2, § 454. The Judge has a right to act upon all the uncontradicted facts of the case; but where the credibility of witnesses is in question, or some material fact is in doubt, or some inference is attempted to be drawn from some fact not distinctly sworn to, the Judge ought to submit the question to the Jury. *Michell v. Williams*, 11 M. & W. 216, 217, per Alderson, B.

In trespass *de bonis asportatis*, the *bona fides* of the defendant in taking the goods, and the reasonableness of his belief that he was executing his duty, and of his suspicion of the plaintiff, are questions for the Jury. *Wedge v. Berkeley*, 6 Ad. & El. 663; *Hazeldine v. Grove*, 3 Ad. & El. 997, N. S.; *Hughes v. Buckland*, 15 M. & W. 346. In a question of *pedigree*, it is for the Judge to decide whether the person, whose declarations are offered in evidence, was a member of the family, or so related as to be entitled to be heard on such a question. *Doe v. Davies*, 11 Jur. 607.

The question, what are the *usual covenants* in a deed, is a question for the

not to be easily susceptible of separate decision, it is submitted to the Jury, who are first instructed by the Judge in the principles and rules of law, by which they are to be governed in finding a verdict; and these instructions they are bound to follow.¹ If the genuineness of a deed is the fact in question,

Jury, and not a matter of construction, for the Court. *Bennett v. Womack*, 3 C. & P. 96.

In regard to *reasonableness of time, care, skill*, and the like, there seems to have been some diversity in the application of the principle; but it is conceded that "whether there has been, in any particular case, reasonable diligence used, or whether unreasonable delay has occurred, is a mixed question of law and fact, to be decided by the Jury, acting under the direction of the Judge, upon the particular circumstances of each case." *Mellish v. Rawdon*, 9 Bing. 416, per Tindal, C. J. The Judge is to inform the Jury as to the degree of diligence, or care, or skill which the law demands of the party, and what duty it devolves on him, and the Jury are to find whether that duty has been done. *Hunter v. Caldwell*, 11 Jur. 770; *Burton v. Griffiths*, 11 M. & W. 817; *Facey v. Hurdom*, 3 B. & C. 213; *Stewart v. Cauty*, 8 M. & W. 160; *Parker v. Palmer*, 4 B. & Ald. 387; *Pitt v. Shew*, ib. 206; *Mount v. Larkins*, 8 Bing. 108; *Phillips v. Irving*, 7 M. & Gr. 325; *Reece v. Rigby*, 4 B. & Ald. 202. But where the duty in regard to time is established by uniform usage, and the rule is well known; as in the case of notice of the dishonor of a bill or note, where the parties live in the same town; or, of the duty of sending such notice by the *next* post, packet, or other ship; or of the reasonable hours or business hours of the day, within which a bill is to be presented, or goods to be delivered, or the like; in such cases, the time of the fact being proved, its reasonableness is settled by the rule, and is declared by the Judge. See *Story on Bills*, § 231-234, 328, 349; *Post*, Vol. 2, § 178, 179, 186-188.

Whether by the word "month," in a contract, is meant a calendar or a lunar month, is a question of law; but whether parties, in the particular case, intended to use it in the one sense or the other, is a question for the Jury, upon the evidence of circumstances in the case. *Simpson v. Margitson*, 12 Jur. 155; *Lang v. Gale*, 1 M. & S. 111; *Hutchinson v. Bowker*, 5 M. & W. 535; *Smith v. Wilson*, 3 B. & Ad. 728; *Jolly v. Young*, 1 Esp. 186; *Walker v. Hunter*, 2 M. Gr. & Sc. 324.

¹ 1 Stark. Evid. 510, 519-526; *Hutchinson v. Bowker*, 5 M. & W. 535; *Williams v. Byrne*, 2 N. & P. 139; *McDonald v. Rooke*, 2 Bing. N. C. 217; *James v. Phelps*, 11 Ad. & El. 483; 3 P. & D. 231, S. C.; *Panton v. Williams*, 2 Ad. & El. 169, N. S.; *Townsend v. The State*, 2 Blackf. 151; *Montgomery v. Ohio*, 11 Ohio R. 424. Questions of interpretation, as well as of construction of written instruments, are for the Court alone. *Post*, § 277, note (1).

the preliminary proof of its execution, given before the Judge, does not relieve the party offering it, from the necessity of proving it to the Jury.¹ The Judge only decides, whether there is, *primâ facie*, any reason for sending it at all to the Jury.²

§ 50. The production of evidence to the Jury is governed by certain principles, which may be treated under four general heads or rules. The *first* of these is, that the evidence must correspond with the allegations, and be confined to the point in issue. The *second* is, that it is sufficient, if the *substance* only of the issue be proved. The *third* is, that the burden of proving a proposition, or issue, lies on the party holding the affirmative. And the *fourth* is, that the best evidence, of which the case, in its nature, is susceptible, must always be produced. These we shall now consider in their order.

§ 51. *First.* The pleadings at Common Law, are composed of the written allegations of the parties, terminating in a single proposition, distinctly affirmed on one side, and denied on the other, called the *issue*. If it is a proposition of fact, it is to be tried by the Jury, upon the evidence adduced. And it is an established rule, which we state as the FIRST RULE, governing in the production of evidence, that the *evidence offered must correspond with the allegations, and be confined to the point in issue*. This rule supposes the allegations to be material and necessary. Surplusage, therefore, need not be proved; and the proof, if offered, is to be rejected. The term, *surplusage*, comprehends whatever may be stricken from the record, without destroying the plaintiff's right of action; as if, for example, in suing the defendant for breach of warranty upon the sale of goods, he should set forth, not only, that the goods were not such as the defendant warranted them to be, but that

¹ Ross v. Gould, 5 Greenl. 204.

² The subject of the functions of the Judge, as distinguished from those of the Jury, is fully and ably treated in an article in the Law Review, No. 3, for May, 1845, p. 27-44.

the defendant well knew that they were not.¹ But it is not every immaterial or unnecessary allegation that is surplusage; for if the party, in stating his title, should state it with unnecessary particularity, he must prove it as alleged. Thus, if, in justifying the taking of cattle damage feasant, in which case it is sufficient to allege, that they were doing damage in his *freehold*, he should state a seisin *in fee*, which is traversed, he must prove the seisin in fee;² for if this were stricken from the declaration, the plaintiff's entire title would be destroyed. And it appears, that, in determining the question, whether a particular averment can be rejected, regard is to be had to the nature of the averment itself, and its connexion with the substance of the charge, or claim, rather than to its grammatical collocation or structure.³

§ 52. This rule excludes all evidence of *collateral facts*, or those, which are incapable of affording any reasonable presumption or inference, as to the principal fact or matter in dispute; and the reason is, that such evidence tends to draw away the minds of the Jurors from the point in issue, and to excite prejudice, and mislead them; and, moreover, the adverse party, having had no notice of such a course of evidence, is not prepared to rebut it.⁴ Thus, where the question between landlord and tenant was, whether the rent was payable quarterly, or half-yearly, evidence of the mode in which other tenants of the same landlord paid their rent was held inadmissible.⁵ And where, in covenant, the issue was, whether the

¹ Williamson v. Allison, 2 East, 446; Peppin v. Solomons, 5 T. R. 496; Bromfield v. Jones, 4 B. & C. 380.

² Sir Francis Leke's case, Dyer, 365; 2 Saund. 206 a, note 22; Stephen on Pleading, 261, 262; Bristow v. Wright, Doug. 665; Miles v. Sheward, 8 East, 7, 8, 9; 1 Smith's Leading Cases, 328, note.

³ 1 Stark. Evid. 386.

⁴ Post, § 448. But counsel may, on cross examination, inquire as to a fact apparently irrelevant, if he will undertake afterwards to show its relevancy, by other evidence. Haigh v. Belcher, 7 C. & P. 339.

⁵ Carter v. Pryke, Peake's Cas. 95.

defendant, who was a tenant of the plaintiff, had committed waste, evidence of bad husbandry, not amounting to waste, was rejected.¹ So, where the issue was, whether the tenant had *permitted* the premises to be out of repair, evidence of *voluntary* waste was held irrelevant.² This rule was adhered to, even in the cross-examination of witnesses; the party not being permitted, as will be shown hereafter,³ to ask the witness a question in regard to a matter not relevant to the issue, for the purpose of afterwards contradicting him.⁴

§ 53. In some cases, however, evidence has been received of facts which happened before or after the principal transaction, and which had no direct or apparent connexion with it; and therefore their admission might seem, at first view, to constitute an exception to this rule. But those will be found to have been cases, in which the *knowledge* or *intent* of the party was a material fact, on which the evidence, apparently collateral, and foreign to the main subject, had a direct bearing, and was therefore admitted. Thus, when the question was, whether the defendant, being the acceptor of a bill of exchange, either knew that the name of the payee was fictitious, or else had given a general authority to the drawer, to draw bills on him payable to fictitious persons, evidence was admitted to show, that he had accepted other bills, drawn in like manner, before it was possible to have transmitted them from the place, at which they bore date.⁵ So, in an indict-

¹ *Harris v. Mantle*, 3 T. R. 397. See also *Balcetti v. Serani*, Peake's Cas. 142; *Furneaux v. Hutchins*, Cowp. 807; *Doe v. Sisson*, 12 East, 61; *Holcombe v. Hewson*, 2 Campb. 391; *Viney v. Barss*, 1 Esp. 292; *Clothier v. Chapman*, 14 East, 331, note.

² *Edge v. Pemberton*, 12 M. & W. 187.

³ See *post*, § 448, 449, 450.

⁴ *Crowley v. Page*, 7 Car. & P. 789; *Harris v. Tippet*, 2 Campb. 637; *Rex v. Watson*, 2 Stark. R. 116; *Commonwealth v. Buzzell*, 16 Pick. 157, 158; *Ware v. Ware*, 8 Greenl. 42. A further reason may be, that the evidence, not being to a material point, cannot be the subject of an indictment for perjury. *Odiome v. Winkley*, 2 Gall. 51, 53.

⁵ *Gibson v. Hunter*, 2 H. Bl. 288; *Minet v. Gibson*, 3 T. R. 481; 1 H. Bl. 569.

ment for knowingly uttering a forged document, or a counterfeit bank note, proof of the possession, or of the prior or subsequent utterance of other false documents or notes, though of a different description, is admitted, as material to the question of guilty knowledge or intent.¹ So, in actions for defamation, evidence of other language spoken or written by the defendant at other times, is admissible under the general issue, in proof of the spirit and intention of the party, in uttering the words or publishing the libel charged; and this, whether the language thus proved be in itself actionable or not.² Cases of this sort, therefore, instead of being exceptions to the rule, fall strictly within it.

§ 53 a. In proof of the *ownership of lands*, by acts of possession, the same latitude is allowed. It is impossible, as has been observed, to confine the evidence to the precise spot on which a supposed trespass was committed; evidence may be given of acts done on other parts, provided there is such a common character of locality between those parts and the spot in question, as would raise a reasonable inference in the minds of the Jury that the place in dispute belonged to the party, if the other parts did. The evidence of such acts is admissible *proprio vigore*, as tending to prove that he who did them is the owner of the soil; though if they were done in the absence of all persons interested to dispute them, they are of less weight.³

¹ *Rex v. Wylie*, 1 New Rep. 92, 94. See other examples in *McKenney v. Dingley*, 4 Greenl. 172; *Bridge v. Eggleston*, 14 Mass. 245; *Rex v. Ball*, 1 Campb. 324; *Rex v. Roberts*, 1 Campb. 399; *Rex v. Houghton*, Russ. & Ry. 130; *Rex v. Smith*, 4 C. & P. 411; *Rickman's case*, 2 East, P. C. 1035; *Robinson's case*, ib. 1110, 1112; *Rex v. Northampton*, 2 M. & S. 262; *Commonwealth v. Turner*, 3 Mete. R. 19.

² *Pearson v. Le Maitre*, 5 M. & Gr. 700, 6 Scott, N. R. 607, S. C.; *Rustell v. Macquister*, 1 Campb. 49, n.; *Saunders v. Mills*, 6 Bing. 213; *Warwick v. Foulkes*, 12 M. & W. 507; *Long v. Barrett*, 7 Ir. Law R. 439; 8 Ir. Law R. 331, S. C. on error.

³ *Jones v. Williams*, 2 M. & W. 326, per Parke, B. And see *Doe v. Kemp*, 7 Bing. 332; 2 Bing. N. C. 102.

§ 54. To this rule may be referred the admissibility of evidence of the *general character* of the parties. In civil cases, such evidence is not admitted, unless the nature of the action involves the general character of the party, or goes directly to affect it.¹ Thus, evidence impeaching the previous general character of the wife or daughter in regard to chastity, is admissible, in an action by the husband or father for seduction; and this, again, may be rebutted by counter proof.² But such evidence, referring to a time subsequent to the act complained of, is rejected.³ And generally in actions of tort, wherever the defendant is charged with fraud from mere circumstances, evidence of his general good character is admissible to repel it.⁴ So also, in criminal prosecutions, the charge of a rape, or of an assault with intent to commit a rape, is considered as involving not only the general character of the prosecutrix for chastity, but the particular fact of her previous criminal connexion with the prisoner; though not with other persons.⁵ And in all cases, where evidence is admitted touch-

¹ *Att'y Gen. v. Bowman*, 2 B. & P. 532, expressly adopted in *Fowler v. Etna Fire Ins. Co.* 6 Cowen, 673, 675; *Anderson v. Long*, 10 S. & R. 55; *Humphrey v. Humphrey*, 7 Conn. 116; *Nash v. Gilkeson*, 5 S. & R. 352; *Jeffries v. Harris*, 3 Hawks, 105.

² *Bate v. Hill*, 1 C. & P. 100; *Verry v. Watkins*, 7 C. & P. 308; *Carpenter v. Wahl*, 11 Ad. & El. 803; 3 P. & D. 457, S. C.; *Elsam v. Faucett*, 2 Esp. 562; *Dodd v. Norris*, 3 Campb. 519. See contra, *M'Rea v. Lilly*, 1 Iredell, R. 118.

³ *Elsam v. Faucett*, 2 Esp. 562; *Coote v. Berty*, 12 Mod. 232. The rule is the same in an action by a woman, for a breach of a promise of marriage. See *Johnson v. Caulkins*, 1 Johns. Ca. 116; *Boynston v. Kellogg*, 3 Mass. 189; *Foulkes v. Sellway*, 3 Esp. 236; *Bamfield v. Massey*, 1 Campb. 460; *Dodd v. Norris*, 3 Campb. 519.

⁴ *Ruan v. Perry*, 3 Caines, 120, reviewed and approved in 6 Cowen, 675. See also *Walker v. Stephenson*, 3 Esp. 284.

⁵ *Rex v. Clarke*, 2 Stark. 241; 1 Phil. & Am. on Evid. 490; *Low v. Mitchell*, 6 Shepl. 372; *Commonwealth v. Murphy*, 14 Mass. 387; 2 Stark Evid. (by Metcalf,) 369, note (1); *Rex v. Martin*, 6 C. & P. 562; *Rex v. Hodgson*, Russ. & Ry. 211. But in an action on the case for seduction, evidence of particular acts of unchastity with other persons is admissible. *Verry v. Watkins*, 7 C. & P. 308.

ing the general character of the party, it ought manifestly to bear reference to the nature of the charge against him.¹

§ 55. It is not every allegation of fraud, that may be said to put the character in issue; for if it were so, the defendant's character would be put in issue in the ordinary form of declaring in *assumpsit*. This expression is technical, and confined to certain actions, from the nature of which, as in the preceding instances, the character of the parties, or some of them, is of particular importance. This kind of evidence is therefore rejected, wherever the general character is involved by the plea only, and not by the nature of the action.² Nor is it received in actions of assault and battery,³ nor in *assumpsit*;⁴ nor in trespass on the case for malicious prosecution;⁵ nor in an information for a penalty for violation of the civil police or revenue laws;⁶ nor in ejectment, brought in order to set aside a will, for fraud committed by the defendant.⁷ Whether evidence, impeaching the plaintiff's previous general character, is admissible in an action of slander, as affecting the question of damages, is a point, which has been much controverted; but the weight of authority is in favor of admitting such evidence.⁸

¹ *Douglass v. Tousey*, 2 Wend. 352.

² *Anderson v. Long*, 10 S. & R. 55; *Potter v. Webb & al.* 6 Greenl. 14; *Gregory v. Thomas*, 2 Bibb, 286.

³ *Givens v. Bradley*, 3 Bibb, 192.

⁴ *Nash v. Gilkeson*, 5 S. & R. 352.

⁵ *Gregory v. Thomas*, 2 Bibb, 286.

⁶ *Attorney Gen. v. Bowman*, 2 B. & P. 532, note.

⁷ *Goodright v. Hicks*, Bull. N. P. 296.

⁸ 2 Starkie on Slander, 88, 89-95, note; *Root v. King*, 7 Cowen, 613; *Bailey v. Hyde*, 3 Conn. 463; *Bennett v. Hyde*, 6 Conn. 24; *Douglass v. Tousey*, 2 Wend. 352; *Inman v. Foster*, 8 Wend. 602; *Larned v. Buffington*, 3 Mass. 552; *Wolcott v. Hall*, 6 Mass. 514; *Ross v. Lapham*, 14 Mass. 275; *Bodwell v. Swan*, 3 Pick. 378; *Buford v. McLuny*, 1 Nott & McCord, 268; *Sawyer v. Eifert*, 2 Nott & McCord, 511; *King v. Waring & ux.* 5 Esp. 14; *Rodriguez v. Tadmire*, 2 Esp. 721; — *v. Moore*, 1 M. & S. 284; *Earl of Leicester v. Walter*, 2 Campb. 251; *Williams v. Callender*, Holt's Cas. 307; 2 Stark. Evid. 216. In *Foot v. Tracy*, 1 Johns. 45, the Supreme Court of New York was equally divided upon this

But it seems that the character of the party, in regard to any particular trait, is not in issue, unless it be the trait, which is involved in the matter charged against him; and of this it is only evidence of general *reputation*, which is to be admitted, and not positive evidence of general bad *conduct*.¹

question; Kent and Thomson, Js., being in favor of admitting the evidence, and Livingston and Tompkins, Js., against it. In England, according to the later authorities, evidence of the general bad character of the plaintiff seems to be regarded as irrelevant, and therefore inadmissible. Phil. & Am. on Evid. 488, 489; Cornwall v. Richardson, Ry. & Mood. 305; Jones v. Stevens, 11 Price, 235. In this last case, it is observable, that though the reasoning of the learned Judges, and especially of Wood, B., goes against the admission of the evidence, even though it be of the most general nature, in any case, yet the record before the Court contained a plea of justification aspersing the professional character of the plaintiff in general averments, without stating any particular acts of bad conduct; and the point was, whether, in support of this plea, as well as in contradiction of the declaration, the defendant should give evidence, that the plaintiff was of general bad character and repute in his practice and business of an attorney. The Court strongly condemned the pleading, as reprehensible, and said, that it ought to have been demurred to, as due to the Court, and to the Judge, who tried the cause. See J'Anson v. Stuart, 1 T. R. 747; 2 Smith's Leading Cases, 37. See also Rhodes v. Bunch, 3 McCord, 66.

¹ Swift's Evid. 140; Ross v. Lapham, 14 Mass. 275; Douglass v. Tousey, 2 Wend. 352; Andrews v. Vanduzer, 11 Johns. 38; Roof v. King, 7 Cowen, 613; Newsam v. Carr, 2 Stark. R. 69; Sawyer v. Eifert, 2 Nott & McCord, 511.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUE.

§ 56. A SECOND RULE, which governs in the production of evidence, is, that *it is sufficient, if the substance of the issue be proved*. In the application of this rule, a distinction is made between allegations of matter of *substance*, and allegations of matter of *essential description*. The former may be substantially proved; but the latter must be proved with a degree of strictness, extending in some cases, even to literal precision. No allegation, descriptive of the identity of that, which is legally essential to the claim or charge, can ever be rejected.¹ Thus, if, in an action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff alleges, that he was acquitted of the charge on a certain day; here the substance of the allegation is the acquittal, and it is sufficient, if this fact be proved on any day, the time not being material. But if the allegation be, that the defendant drew a bill of exchange of a certain date and tenor, here every allegation, even to the precise day of the date, is descriptive of the bill, and essential to its identity, and must be literally proved.² So also, as we have already seen, in justifying the taking of cattle damage feasant, because it was upon the close of the defendant, the allegation of a general freehold title is sufficient; but if the party states, that he was seised of the close in fee, and it be traversed, the precise estate, which he has set forth, becomes an essentially descriptive allegation, and must be proved as alleged. In this case the essential and non-essential

¹ 1 Stark. Evid. 373; Purcell v. Macnamara, 9 East, 160; Stoddard v. Palmer, 3 B. & C. 4; Turner v. Eyles, 3 B. & P. 456; Ferguson v. Harwood, 7 Cranch, 408, 413.

² 3 B. & C. 4, 5; Glassford on Evid. 309.

But it seems that the character of the party, in regard to any particular trait, is not in issue, unless it be the trait, which is involved in the matter charged against him; and of this it is only evidence of general *reputation*, which is to be admitted, and not positive evidence of general bad *conduct*.¹

question; Kent and Thomson, Js., being in favor of admitting the evidence, and Livingston and Tompkins, Js., against it. In England, according to the later authorities, evidence of the general bad character of the plaintiff seems to be regarded as irrelevant, and therefore inadmissible. Phil. & Am. on Evid. 488, 489; Cornwall v. Richardson, Ry. & Mood. 305; Jones v. Stevens, 11 Price, 235. In this last case, it is observable, that though the reasoning of the learned Judges, and especially of Wood, B., goes against the admission of the evidence, even though it be of the most general nature, in any case, yet the record before the Court contained a plea of justification aspersing the professional character of the plaintiff in general averments, without stating any particular acts of bad conduct; and the point was, whether, in support of this plea, as well as in contradiction of the declaration, the defendant should give evidence, that the plaintiff was of general bad character and repute in his practice and business of an attorney. The Court strongly condemned the pleading, as reprehensible, and said, that it ought to have been demurred to, as due to the Court, and to the Judge, who tried the cause. See J'Anson v. Stuart, 1 T. R. 747; 2 Smith's Leading Cases, 37. See also Rhodes v. Bunch, 3 McCord, 66.

¹ Swift's Evid. 140; Ross v. Lapham, 14 Mass. 275; Douglass v. Tousey, 2 Wend. 352; Andrews v. Vanduzer, 11 Johns. 38; Roof v. King, 7 Cowen, 613; Newsam v. Carr, 2 Stark. R. 69; Sawyer v. Eifert, 2 Nott & McCord, 511.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUE.

§ 56. A SECOND RULE, which governs in the production of evidence, is, that *it is sufficient, if the substance of the issue be proved*. In the application of this rule, a distinction is made between allegations of matter of *substance*, and allegations of matter of *essential description*. The former may be substantially proved; but the latter must be proved with a degree of strictness, extending in some cases, even to literal precision. No allegation, descriptive of the identity of that, which is legally essential to the claim or charge, can ever be rejected.¹ Thus, if, in an action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff alleges, that he was acquitted of the charge on a certain day; here the substance of the allegation is the acquittal, and it is sufficient, if this fact be proved on any day, the time not being material. But if the allegation be, that the defendant drew a bill of exchange of a certain date and tenor, here every allegation, even to the precise day of the date, is descriptive of the bill, and essential to its identity, and must be literally proved.² So also, as we have already seen, in justifying the taking of cattle damage feasant, because it was upon the close of the defendant, the allegation of a general freehold title is sufficient; but if the party states, that he was seised of the close in fee, and it be traversed, the precise estate, which he has set forth, becomes an essentially descriptive allegation, and must be proved as alleged. In this case the essential and non-essential

¹ 1 Stark. Evid. 373; Purcell v. Macnamara, 9 East, 160; Stoddard v. Palmer, 3 B. & C. 4; Turner v. Eyles, 3 B. & P. 456; Ferguson v. Harwood, 7 Cranch, 408, 413.

² 3 B. & C. 4, 5; Glassford on Evid. 309.

parts of the statement are so connected, as to be incapable of separation, and therefore both are alike material.¹

§ 57. Whether an allegation is or is not so essentially descriptive, is a point to be determined by the Judge in the case before him; and it depends so much on the particular circumstances, that it is difficult to lay down any precise rules, by which it can in all cases be determined. It may depend, in the *first* place, on the nature of the averment itself, and the subject, to which it is applied. But *secondly*, some averments the law pronounces formal, which, otherwise, would, on general principles, be descriptive. And *thirdly*, the question, whether others are descriptive or not, will often depend on the technical manner in which they are framed.

§ 58. In the *first* place, it may be observed, that any allegation, which narrows and limits that, which is essential, is necessarily *descriptive*. Thus, in contracts, libels in writing, and written instruments in general, every part operates by way of description of the whole. In these cases, therefore, allegations of names, sums, magnitudes, dates, durations, terms, and the like, being essential to the identity of the writing set forth, must, in general, be precisely proved.² Nor is it material whether the action be founded in contract or in tort; for in either case, if a contract be set forth, every allegation is descriptive. Thus, in an action on the case for deceit in the sale of lambs by two defendants, jointly, proof of sale and warranty by one only, as his separate property, was held to

¹ Stephen on Pleading, 419, 261, 262; Turner v. Eyles, 3 B. & P. 456; 2 Saund. 206 a, n. 22; Sir Francis Leke's case, Dyer, 364, b. Perhaps the distinction taken by Lord Ellenborough, in Purcell v. Macnamara, and recognised in Stoddart v. Palmer, 3 B. & C. 4, will, on closer examination, result merely in this, that matters of description are matters of substance, when they go to the identity of anything material to the action. Thus the rule will stand, as originally stated, that the substance, and this alone, must be proved.

² Bristow v. Wright, Doug. 665, 667; Churchill v. Wilkins, 1 T. R. 447; 1 Stark. Evid. 386, 388.

be a fatal variance.¹ So also, if the contract described be absolute, but the contract proved be conditional, or in the alternative, it is fatal.² The consideration is equally descriptive and material, and must be strictly proved as alleged.³ Prescriptions also, being founded in grants presumed to be lost from lapse of time, must be strictly proved as laid; for every allegation, as it is supposed to set forth that which was originally contained in a deed, is of course descriptive of the instrument, and essential to the identity of the grant.⁴ An allegation of the character in which the plaintiff sues, or of his title to damages, though sometimes superfluous, is generally descriptive in its nature, and requires proof.⁵

§ 59. *Secondly*, as to those averments which the law pronounces *formal*, though, on general principles, they seem to be descriptive and essential; these are rather to be regarded as exceptions to the rule already stated, and are allowed for the sake of convenience. Therefore, though it is the nature of a traverse, to deny the allegation in the *manner and form* in which it is made, and, consequently, to put the party to prove

¹ Weall v. King et al., 12 East, 452.

² Penny v. Porter, 2 East, 2; Lopes v. De Tastet, 1 B. & B. 538; Higgins v. Dixon, 10 Jur. 376; Hilt v. Campbell, 6 Greenl. 109; Stone v. Knowlton, 3 Wend. 374. See also Saxton v. Johnson, 10 Johns. 581; Snell v. Moses, 1 Johns. 96; Crawford v. Morrell, 8 Johns. 153; Baylies v. Fettyplace, 7 Mass. 325; Robbins v. Otis, 1 Pick. 368; Harris v. Rayner, 8 Pick. 541; White v. Wilson, 2 Bos. and Pul. 116; Whitaker v. Smith, 4 Pick. 83; Lower v. Winters, 7 Cowen, 263; Alexander v. Harris, 4 Cranch, 299. See other cases in Cowen & Hill's notes, 401, 402, to 1 Phil. Evid. 208, 217.

³ Sallow v. Beaumont, 2 B. & Ald. 765; Robertson v. Lynch, 18 Johns. 451.

⁴ Morewood v. Wood, 4 T. R. 157; Rogers v. Allen, 1 Campb. 309, 314, 315, note (a). But proof of a more ample right than is alleged will be regarded as mere redundancy. Johnson v. Thoroughgood, Hob. 64; Bushwood v. Pond, Cro. El. 722; Bailiffs of Tewksbury v. Bricknell, 1 Taunt. 142; Burges v. Steer, 1 Show. 347; 4 Mod. 89, S. C.

⁵ 1 Stark. Evid. 390; Moises v. Thornton, 8 T. R. 303, 308; Berryman v. Wise, 4 T. R. 366.

it to be true in the manner and form, as well as in general effect;¹ yet, where the issue goes to the *point of the action*, these words, *modo et formâ*, are but words of form.² Thus, in trover, for example, the allegation, that the plaintiff lost the goods, and that the defendant found them, is regarded as purely formal, requiring no proof; for the *gist* of the action is the conversion. So, in indictments for homicide, though the death is alleged to have been caused by a particular instrument, this averment is but formal; and it is sufficient, if the manner of death agree in substance with that which is charged, though the instrument be different; as, if a wound alleged to have been given with a sword, be proved to have been inflicted with an axe.³ But, where the traverse is of a *collateral point in pleading*, there the words, *modo et formâ*, go to the substance of the issue, and are descriptive, and strict proof is required; as, if a feoffment is alleged by deed, which is traversed *modo et formâ*, evidence of a feoffment without deed will not suffice.⁴ Yet, if in issues upon a collateral point, where the affirmative is on the defendant, partial and defective proof, on his part, should show that the plaintiff had no cause of action, as clearly as strict and full proof would do, it is sufficient.⁵

§ 60. *Thirdly*, as to those averments, whose character, as being descriptive or not, depends on the *manner in which they are stated*. Every allegation, essential to the issue, must, as we have seen, be proved, in whatever form it be stated; and things immaterial in their nature to the question at issue may be omitted in the proof, though alleged with the utmost explicitness and formality. There is, however, a middle class of

¹ Stephen on Plead. 213.

² Trials per Pais, 308, 9th Ed.; Co. Lit. 281, b.

³ 2 Russell on Crimes, 711; 1 East, P. C. 341.

⁴ Bull. N. P. 301; Co. Lit. 281, b. Whether *virtute cuius*, in a sheriff's plea in justification, is traversable, and in what cases, is discussed in Lucas v. Nockells, 7 Bligh, N. S. 140.

⁵ Ibid.; 2 Stark. Ev. 394.

circumstances, not essential in their nature, which may become so by being inseparably connected with the essential allegations. These must be proved as laid, unless they are stated under a *videlicet*; the office of which is to mark, that the party does not undertake to prove the precise circumstances alleged; and in such cases he is ordinarily not holden to prove them.¹ Thus in a declaration upon a bill of exchange, the date is in its nature essential to the identity of the bill, and must be precisely proved, though the form of allegation were, "of a certain date, to wit," such a date. On the other hand, in the case before cited, of an action for maliciously prosecuting the plaintiff for a crime, whereof he was acquitted on a certain day; the time of acquittal is not essential to the charge, and need not be proved, though it be directly and expressly alleged.² But where, in an action for breach of warranty upon the sale of personal chattels, the plaintiff set forth the price paid for the goods, without a *videlicet*, he was held bound to prove the exact sum alleged, it being rendered material by the form of allegation;³ though, had the averment been, that the sale was for a valuable consideration, *to wit*, for so much, it would have been otherwise. A *videlicet* will not avoid a variance, or dispense with exact proof, in an allegation of material matter; nor will the omission of it always create the necessity of proving, precisely as stated, matter, which would not otherwise require exact proof. But, a party may, in certain cases, impose upon himself the necessity of proving precisely what is stated, if not stated under a *videlicet*.⁴

¹ Stephen on Pleading, 309; 1 Chitty on Pl. 261, 262, 348, (6th Ed.); Stukeley v. Butler, Hob. 168, 172; 2 Saund. 291, note (1); Gleason v. McVickar, 7 Cowen, 42.

² Ante, § 56; Purcell v. Macnamara, 9 East, 160; Gwinnett v. Phillips, 3 T. R. 643; Vail v. Lewis, 4 Johns. 450.

³ Durston v. Tuthan, cited in 3 T. R. 67; Symmons v. Knox, 3 T. R. 65; Arnfield v. Bates, 3 M. & S. 173; Sir Francis Leke's case, Dyer, 364, b; Stephen on Plead. 419, 420; 1 Chitty on Pl. 348, (6th Ed.).

⁴ Crispin v. Williamson, 8 Taunt. 107, 112; Attorney Gen. v. Jeffreys, M'Clell. R. 277; 2 B. & C. 3, 4; 1 Chitty on Pl. 348, a.; Grimwood v. Bar-

§ 61. But, in general, the allegations of *time, place, quantity, quality, and value*, when not descriptive of the identity of the subject of the action, will be found immaterial, and need not be proved strictly as alleged. Thus, in trespass to the person, the material fact is the assault and battery; the time and place not being material, unless made so by the nature of the justification, and the manner of pleading. And, in an action on a policy of insurance, the material allegation is the loss; but whether total or partial is not material; and if the former be alleged, proof of the latter is sufficient. So in assumpsit, an allegation, that a bill of exchange was *made* on a certain day, is not descriptive, and therefore strict proof, according to the precise day laid, is not necessary; though, if

rett, 6 T. R. 460, 463; Bristow v. Wright, Doug. 667, 668. These terms "immaterial," and "impertinent," though formerly applied to two classes of averments, are now treated as synonymous; 3 D. & R. 209; the more accurate distinction being between these, and *unnecessary* allegations. Immaterial, or impertinent averments are those, which need neither be alleged, nor proved, if alleged. Unnecessary averments consist of matters, which need not be alleged; but, being alleged, must be proved. Thus, in an action of assumpsit upon a warranty on the sale of goods, an allegation of deceit on the part of the seller is impertinent, and need not be proved. *Williamson v. Allison*, 2 East, 446; *Panton v. Holland*, 17 Johns. 92; *Twiss v. Baldwin*, 9 Conn. 292. So, where the action was for an injury to the plaintiff's reversionary interest in land, and it was alleged, that the close at the time of the injury was, and "continually from thence hitherto hath been, and still is," in the possession of one J. V., this latter part of the averment was held superfluous, and not necessary to be proved. *Vowles v. Miller*, 3 Taunt. 137. But if, in an action by a lessor against his tenant, for negligently keeping his fire, a demise for *seven years* be alleged, and the proof be of a lease at will only, it will be a fatal variance; for though it would have sufficed, to have alleged the tenancy generally, yet having unnecessarily qualified it, by stating the precise term, it must be proved as laid. *Cudlip v. Rundle*, Carth. 202. So, in debt against an officer for extorting illegal fees on a *feri facias*, though it is sufficient to allege the issuing of the writ of *feri facias*, yet if the plaintiff also unnecessarily allege the judgment, on which it was founded, he must prove it, having made it descriptive of the principal thing. *Savage v. Smith*, 2 W. Bl. 1101; *Bristow v. Wright*, Doug. 668; *Gould's Plead.* 160-165; *Draper v. Garratt*, 2 B. & C. 2.

it were stated that the bill *bore date* on that day, it would be otherwise.¹ Thus, also, proof of cutting the precise number of trees alleged to have been cut, in trespass; or, of the exact amount of rent alleged to be in arrear, in replevin; or the precise value of the goods taken, in trespass, or trover, is not necessary.² Neither is matter of aggravation, namely, that which only tends to increase the damages, and does not concern the right of action itself, of the substance of the issue. But if the matter, alleged by way of aggravation, is essential to the support of the charge or claim, it must be proved as laid.

§ 62. But in *local actions*, the allegation of place is material, and must strictly be proved, if put in issue. In *real actions*, also, the statement of quality, as arable or pasture lands, is generally descriptive, if not controlled by some other and more specific designation. And in these actions, as well as in those for injuries to real property, the abutments of the close in question must be proved as laid; for if one may be rejected, all may be equally disregarded, and the identity of the subject be lost.³

§ 63. It being necessary to prove the substance of the issue, it follows, that any departure from the substance, in the evidence adduced, must be fatal; constituting what is termed in the law a *variance*. This may be defined to be a disagreement between the allegation and the proof, in some matter, which, in point of law, is essential to the charge or claim.⁴ It is the legal, and not the natural identity, which is regarded; consisting of those particulars only, which are in

¹ *Gardiner v. Croadales*, 2 Burr. 904; *Coxon v. Lyon*, 307, n.

² *Harrison v. Barnby*, 5 T. R. 248; *Co. Lit.* 282, a; *Stephen on Pleading*, 318; *Hutchins v. Adams*, 3 Greenl. 174.

³ *Mersey & Irwell Nav. Co. v. Douglas*, 2 East, 497, 502; *Bull. N. P.* 89; *Vowles v. Miller*, 3 Taunt. 139, per Lawrence, J.; *Regina v. Cranage*, 1 Salk. 385.

⁴ *Stephen on Pl.* 107, 108.

their nature essential to the action, or to the justification, or have become so by being inseparably connected, by the mode of statement, with that which is essential; of which an example has already been given,¹ in the allegation of an estate in fee, when a general averment of freehold would suffice. It is necessary, therefore, in these cases, first to ascertain, what are the essential elements of the legal proposition in controversy, taking care to include all, which is indispensable to show the right of the plaintiff, or party affirming. The rule is, that whatever cannot be stricken out without getting rid of a part essential to the cause of action, must be retained, and of course must be proved, even though it be described with unnecessary particularity.² The defendant is entitled to the benefit of this rule, to protect himself by the verdict and judgment, if the same rights should come again in controversy. The rule, as before remarked, does not generally apply to allegations of number, magnitude, quantity, value, time, sums of money, and the like, provided the proof in regard to these is sufficient to constitute the offence charged, or to substantiate the claim set up; except in those cases, where they operate by way of limitation, or description of other matters, in themselves essential to the offence or claim.³

§ 64. A few examples will suffice to illustrate this subject. Thus, in tort, for removing earth from the defendant's land,

¹ Ante, § 51-56.

² *Bristow v. Wright*, Doug. 668; *Peppin v. Solomons*, 5 T. R. 496; *Williamson v. Allison*, 2 East, 446, 452.

³ Ante, § 61; *Rickets v. Salwey*, 2 B. & Ald. 363; *May v. Brown*, 3 B. & C. 113, 122. It has been said, that allegations, which are merely matters of inducement, do not require such strict proof, as those which are precisely put in issue between the parties. *Smith v. Taylor*, 1 New Rep. 210, per Chambre, J. But this distinction, as Mr. Starkie justly observes, between that which is the gist of the action, and that which is inducement, is not always clear in principle. 1 Stark. Evid. 391, note (b); 3 Stark. Evid. 1551, note (x), Metcalf's Ed. Certainly, that which may be traversed, must be proved, if it is not admitted; and some facts, even though stated in the form of inducement, may be traversed, because they are material;

whereby the foundation of the plaintiff's house was injured, the allegation of bad intent in the defendant is not necessary to be proved, for the cause of action is perfect, independent of the intention.¹ So, in trespass, for driving against the plaintiff's cart, the allegation, that he was in the cart, need not be proved.² But, if the allegation contains matter of description, and is not proved as laid, it is a variance, and is fatal. Thus, in an action for malicious prosecution of the plaintiff, upon a charge of felony, before Baron Waterpark of *Waterfork*, proof of such a prosecution before Baron Waterpark of *Waterpark* was held to be fatally variant from the declaration.³ So, in an action of tort founded on a contract, every particular of the contract is descriptive, and a variance in the proof is fatal. As, in an action on the case for deceit in a contract of sale, made by the two defendants, proof of a sale by one of them only, as his separate property, was held insufficient; for the joint contract of sale was the foundation of the joint warranty laid in the declaration, and essential to its legal existence and validity.⁴

§ 65. In *criminal prosecutions*, it has been thought that greater strictness of proof was required than in civil cases, and that the defendant might be allowed to take advantage

as, for example, in action for slander, upon a charge for perjury, where the plaintiff alleged, by way of inducement, that he was sworn before the Lord Mayor. *Stephen on Plead.* 258. The question, whether an allegation must be proved, or not, turns upon its materiality to the case, and not upon the form, in which it is stated, or its place in the declaration. In general, every allegation in an inducement, which is material, and not impertinent and foreign to the cause, and which consequently cannot be rejected as surplusage, must be proved as alleged. 1 Chitty on Pl. 262, 320. It is true, that those matters, which need not be alleged with particularity, need not be proved with particularity, but still, all allegations, if material, must be proved substantially as alleged.

¹ *Panton v. Holland*, 17 Johns. 92; *Twiss v. Baldwin*, 9 Conn. 291.

² *Howard v. Peete*, Chitty, R. 315.

³ *Walters v. Mace*, 2 B. & Ald. 756.

⁴ *Weall v. King et al.* 12 East, 452; *Lopes v. De Tastet*, 1 B. & B. 538.

of nicer exceptions.¹ But whatever indulgence the humanity and tenderness of Judges may have allowed in practice, in favor of life or liberty, the better opinion seems to be, that the rules of evidence are in both cases the same.² If the averment is divisible, and enough is proved to constitute the offence charged, it is no variance, though the remaining allegations are not proved. Thus, an indictment for embezzling two bank notes, of equal value, is supported by proof of the embezzlement of one only.³ And in an indictment for obtaining money upon several false pretences, it is sufficient to prove any material portion of them.⁴ But where a person or thing, necessary to be mentioned in an indictment, is described with unnecessary particularity, all the circumstances of the description must be proved; for they are all made essential to the identity. Thus, in an indictment for stealing a *black* horse, the animal is necessarily mentioned, but the color need not be stated; yet, if it is stated, it is made descriptive of the particular animal stolen, and a variance in the proof of the color is fatal.⁵ So, in an indictment for stealing a bank note, though it would be sufficient to describe it generally as a bank note of such a denomination or value, yet, if the name of the officer who signed it be also stated, it must be strictly proved.⁶ So, also, in an indictment for murder, malicious shooting, or other offence to the person, or for an offence against the habitation, or goods, the name of the person, who was the subject of the crime, and of the owner of the house or goods, are

¹ Beech's case, 1 Leach's Cas. 158; United States v. Porter, 3 Day, 283, 286.

² Roscoe's Crim. Evid. 73; 1 Deacon's Dig. Crim. Law, 459, 460; 2 P. C. 785, 1021; 1 Phil. Evid. 506; Rex v. Watson, 2 Stark. R. 116, 155, per Abbott, J.; Lord Melville's case, 29 Howell's State Tr. 763; 2 Russell on Crimes, 588; United States v. Britton, 2 Mason, 464, 468.

³ Carson's case, Rus. & Ry. 303; Furneaux's case, ib. 335; Tyers's case, ib. 402.

⁴ Hill's case, Rus. & Ry. 190.

⁵ 1 Stark. Evid. 374.

⁶ Craven's case, Rus. & Ry. 14.

material to be proved as alleged.¹ But where the time, place, person, or other circumstances are not descriptive of the fact, or degree of the crime, nor material to the jurisdiction, a discrepancy between the allegation and the proof is not a variance. Such, are statements of the house or field, where a robbery was committed, the time of the day, the day of the term in which a false answer in chancery was filed, and the like.² In an indictment for murder, the substance of the charge is, that the prisoner feloniously killed the deceased by means of shooting, poisoning, cutting, blows, or bruises, or the like; it is, therefore, sufficient, if the proof agree with the allegation in its substance and general character, without precise conformity in every particular. In other words, an indictment describing a thing by its generic term, is supported by proof of a species which is clearly comprehended within such description. Thus, if the charge be of poisoning by a certain drug, and the proof be of poisoning by another drug; or the charge be of felonious assault with a staff, and the proof be of such assault with a stone; or the charge be of a wound with a sword, and the proof be of a wound with an axe; yet, the charge is substantially proved, and there is no variance.³ But, where the matter, whether introductory or

¹ Clark's case, Rus. & Ry. 358; White's case, 1 Leach's Cas. 286; Jenks's case, 2 East, P. C. 514; Durore's case, 1 Leach's Cas. 390. But a mistake in spelling of the name is no variance, if it be *idem sonans* with the name proved. Williams v. Ogle, 2 Stra. 889; Foster's case, Rus. & Ry. 412. Tannet's case, ib. 351; Bingham v. Dickie, 5 Taunt. 814. So, if one be indicted for an assault upon A. B., a deputy sheriff, and in the officer's commission he is styled A. B. junior, it is no variance, if the person is proved to be the same. Commonwealth v. Beckley, 3 Metcalf, R. 330.

² Wardle's case, 2 East, P. C. 785; Pye's case, ib.; Johnstone's case, ib. 786; Minton's case, ib. 1021; Rex v. Waller, 2 Stark. Evid. 623; Rex v. Hucks, 1 Stark. R. 521.

³ 1 East, P. C. 341; Martin's case, 5 Car. & P. 128; Culkin's case, ib. 121; Ante, § 58. An indictment for stealing a "sheep" is supported by proof of the stealing of any sex or variety of that animal, for the term is *nomen generalissimum*. McCully's case, 2 Lew. C. C. 272; Regina v.

otherwise, is descriptive, it must be proved as laid, or the variance will be fatal. As, in an indictment for perjury in open Court, the term of the Court must be truly stated and strictly proved.¹ So, in an indictment for perjury before a select committee of the House of Commons, in a contested election, it was stated that an election was holden by virtue of a precept duly issued to the bailiff of the borough of New Malton, and that A. and B. were returned to serve as members for the said borough of New Malton; but the writ appeared to be directed to the bailiff of Malton. Lord Ellenborough held this not matter of description; and the precept having been actually issued to the bailiff of the borough of New Malton, it was sufficient. But, the return itself was deemed descriptive; and the proof being that the members were in fact returned as members for the borough of Malton, it was adjudged a fatal variance.² So, a written contract, when set out in an indictment, must be strictly proved.³

§ 66. Thus, also, in *actions upon contract*, if any part of the contract proved should vary materially from that, which is stated in the pleadings, it will be fatal; for a contract is an entire thing, and indivisible. It will not be necessary to state all the parts of a contract, which consists of several distinct and collateral provisions: the *gravamen* is, that a certain act, which the defendant engaged to do, has not been done; and the legal proposition to be maintained is, that, for such a consideration, he became bound to do such an act, including the

Spicer, 1 Dennis. C. C. 82. So, if the charge be of death by suffocation, by the hand over the mouth, and the proof be that respiration was stopped, though by some other violent mode of strangulation, it is sufficient. *Rex v. Waters*, 7 C. & P. 250.

¹ Where the term is designated by the day of the month, as in the Circuit Courts of the United States, the precise day is material. *United States v. McNeal*, 1 Gall. 387.

² *Rex v. Leefe*, 2 Campb. 134, 140.

³ 2 East, P. C. 977, 978, 981, 982; *Commonwealth v. Parmenter*, 5 Pick. 279; *The People v. Franklin*, 3 Johns. 299.

time, manner, and other circumstances of its performance. The entire consideration must be stated, and the entire act to be done, in virtue of such consideration, together with the time, manner and circumstances; and with all the parts of the proposition, as thus stated, the proof must agree.¹ If the allegation be of an absolute contract, and the proof be of a contract in the alternative, at the option of the defendant; or a promise be stated to deliver merchantable goods, and the proof be of a promise to deliver goods of a second quality; or the contract stated be to pay or perform in a reasonable time, and the proof be to pay or perform on a day certain, or on the happening of a certain event; or the consideration stated be one horse, bought by the plaintiff of the defendant, and the proof be of two horses; in these, and the like cases, the variance will be fatal.²

§ 67. There is, however, a material distinction to be observed between redundancy in the allegation, and *redundancy only in the proof*. In the former case, a variance between the allegations and the proof will be fatal, if the redundant allegations are descriptive of that which is essential. But in the latter case, redundancy cannot vitiate, merely because more is proved than is alleged; unless the matter superflously proved, goes to contradict some essential part of the allegation. Thus, if the allegation were, that in consideration of £100, the defendant promised to go to Rome, and also to deliver a certain horse to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff should fail in proving the latter branch of the promise, the variance would be fatal, though he sought to recover for the breach of the former only, and the latter allegation was unnecessary. But, if he had alleged only the former branch of the promise, the proof of

¹ *Clarke v. Gray*, 6 East, 564, 567, 568; *Gwinnett v. Phillips*, 3 T. R. 643, 646; *Thornton v. Jones*, 2 Marsh. 287; *Parker v. Palmer*, 4 B. & A. 387; *Swallow v. Beaumont*, 2 B. & A. 765.

² *Penny v. Porter*, 2 East, 2; *Bristow v. Wright*, 2 Doug. 665; *Hilt v. Campbell*, 6 Greenl. 109; *Symonds v. Carr*, 1 Campb. 361; *King v. Robinson*, Cro. El. 79. See Post, Vol. 2, § 11, d.

the latter along with it would be immaterial. In the first case, he described an undertaking which he has not proved; but in the latter he has merely alleged one promise, and proved that, and also another.¹

§ 68. But where the subject is entire, as, for example, the consideration of a contract,² a variance in the proof, as we have just seen, shows the allegation to be defective, and is, therefore, material. Thus, if it were alleged, that the defendant promised to pay £100, in consideration of the plaintiff's going to Rome, and also delivering a horse to the defendant, an omission to prove the whole consideration alleged would be fatal. And if the consideration had been alleged to consist of the going to Rome only, yet if the agreement to deliver the horse were also proved, as forming part of the consideration, it would be equally fatal; the entire thing alleged, and the entire thing proved, not being identical.³ Upon the same principle, if the consideration alleged be a contract of the plaintiff to build a ship, and the proof be of one to finish a ship partly built;⁴ or the consideration alleged be the delivery of pine timber, and the proof be of spruce timber;⁵ or the consideration alleged be, that the plaintiff would indorse a note, and the proof be of a promise in consideration that he had indorsed a note;⁶ the variance is equally fatal. But,

¹ 1 Stark. Evid. 401. Where the agreement, as in this case, contains several distinct promises, and for the breach of one only the action is brought, the consequences of a variance may be avoided by alleging the promise, as made *inter alia*. And no good reason, in principle, is perceived, why the case mentioned in the following section might not be treated in a similar manner; but the authorities are otherwise. In the example given in the text, the allegation is supposed to import, that the undertaking consisted of neither more nor less than is alleged.

² Swallow v. Beaumont, 2 B. & A. 765; White v. Wilson, 2 B. & P. 116; Ante, § 58.

³ 1 Stark. Evid. 401; Lansing v. McKillip, 3 Caines, 286; Stone v. Knowlton, 3 Wend. 374.

⁴ Smith v. Barker, 3 Day, 312.

⁵ Robbins v. Otis, 1 Pick. 368.

⁶ Bulkley v. Landon, 2 Conn. 404.

though no part of a valid consideration may be safely omitted, yet that which is merely frivolous need not be stated;¹ and, if stated, need not be proved; for the Court will give the same construction to the declaration, as to the contract itself, rejecting that which is nonsensical or repugnant.²

§ 69. In the case of *deeds*, the same general principles are applied. If the deed is declared upon, every part stated in the pleadings, as *descriptive* of the deed, must be exactly proved, or it will be a variance; and this, whether the parts set out at length were necessary to be stated, or not.³ If a qualified covenant be set out in the declaration as a general covenant, omitting the exception or limitation, the variance between the allegation and the deed will be fatal. If the condition, proviso, or limitation affects the original cause of action itself, it constitutes an essential element in the original proposition to be maintained by the plaintiff; and, therefore, must be stated, and proved as laid; but, if it merely affects the amount of damages to be recovered, or the liability of the defendant as affected by circumstances occurring after the cause of action, it need not be alleged by the plaintiff, but properly comes out in the defence.⁴ And where the deed is not described according to its tenor, but according to its legal effect, if the deed agrees in legal effect with the allegation, any verbal discrepancy is not a variance. As, in covenant against a tenant for not repairing, the lease being stated to have been made by the plaintiff, and the proof being of a lease by the plaintiff and his wife, she having but a chattel interest; or, if debt be brought by the husband alone, on a bond as given to himself, the bond appearing to have been

¹ Brooks v. Lowrie, 1 Nott & McCord, 342.

² Ferguson v. Harwood, 8 Cranch, 408, 414.

³ Bowditch v. Mawley, 2 Campb. 195; Dundas v. Ld. Weymouth, Cowp. 665; Ante, § 55; Ferguson v. Harwood, 7 Cranch, 408, 413; Sheehy v. Mandeville, ib. 208, 217.

⁴ 1 Chitty, Pl. 268, 269, (5th Am. ed.); Howell v. Richards, 11 East, 633; Clarke v. Gray, 6 East, 564, 570.

given to the husband and wife; yet, the evidence is sufficient proof of the allegation.¹ But, where the deed is set out,

¹ *Beaver v. Lane*, 2 Mod. 217; *Arnold v. Rivoult*, 1 Br. & B. 442; *Whitlock v. Ramsey*, 2 Munf. 510; *Ankerstein v. Clarke*, 4 T. R. 616. It is said that an allegation, that J. S. otherwise R. S. made a deed, is not supported by evidence, that J. S. made a deed by the name of R. S. 1 Stark. Evid. 413, cites *Hyckman v. Shotbolt*, Dyer, 279, pl. 9. The doctrine of that case is very clearly expounded by Parke, B. in *Williams v. Bryant*, 5 Mees. & Welsb. 447. In regard to a discrepancy between the name of the obligor in the body of a deed, and in the signature, a distinction is to be observed between transactions which derive their efficacy wholly from the deed, and those which do not. Thus in a feoffment at the Common Law, or a sale of personal property by deed, or the like, livery being made in the one case, and possession delivered in the other, the transfer of title is perfect, notwithstanding any mistake in the name of the grantor; for it takes effect by delivery, and not by the deed. Perk. sec. 38-42. But where the efficacy of the transaction depends on the instrument itself, as in the case of a bond for the payment of money, or any other executory contract by deed, if the name of the obligor in the bond is different from the signature, as, if it were written John, and signed William, it is said to be void at law for uncertainty, unless helped by proper averments on the record. A mistake in this matter, as in any other, in drawing up the contract, may be reformed by bill in Equity. At law, where the obligor has been sued by his true name, signed to the bond, and not by that written in the body of it, and the naked fact of the discrepancy, unexplained, is all which is presented by the record, it has always been held bad. This rule was originally founded in this, that a man cannot have two names of baptism at the same time; for whatever name was imposed at his baptism, whether single, or compounded of several names, he being baptized but once, that and that alone was his baptismal name; and by that name he declared himself bound. So it was held in *Serchor v. Talbot*, 3 Hen. 6, 25, pl. 6, and subsequently in *Thornton v. Wikes*, 34 Hen. 6, 19, pl. 36; *Field v. Winslow*, Cro. El. 897; *Oliver v. Watkins*, Cro. Jac. 558; *Maby v. Shepherd*, Cro. Jac. 640; *Evans v. King*, Willes, 554; *Clerke v. Isted*, Lutw. 275; *Gould v. Barnes*, 3 Taunt. 504. "It appears from these cases to be a settled point," said Parke, B. in *Williams v. Bryant*, "that if a declaration against a defendant by one christian name, as, for instance, Joseph, state, that he executed a bond by the name of Thomas, and there be no averment to explain the difference, such as that he was known by the latter name at the time of the execution, such a declaration would be bad on demurrer, or in arrest of judgment, even after issue joined on a plea of *non est factum*. And the reason appears to be, that in bonds and deeds, the efficacy of which depends on the instrument itself, and not on matter in pais,

on oyer, the rule is otherwise; for, to have oyer, is, in modern practice, to be furnished with an exact and literal copy of the

there must be a certain *designatio personæ* of the party, which regularly ought to be by the true first name or name of baptism, and surname; of which the first is the most important." "But on the other hand," he adds, "it is certain, that a person may at this time sue or be sued, not merely by his true name of baptism, but by any first name, which he has acquired by usage or reputation." "If a party is called and known by any proper name, by that name he may be sued, and the misnomer could not be pleaded in abatement; and not only is this the established practice, but the doctrine is promulgated in very ancient times. In Bracton, 188, b. it is said—'Item, si quis binominis fuerit, sive in nomine proprio sive in cognomine, illud nomen tenendum erit, quo solet frequentius appellari, quia adeo imposita sunt, ut demonstrent voluntatem dicentis, et utimur notis in vocis ministerio.' And if a party may sue or be sued by the proper name, by which he is known, it must be a sufficient designation of him, if he enter into a bond by that name. It by no means follows, therefore, that the decisions in the case of *Gould v. Barnes*, and others before referred to, in which the question arose on the record, would have been the same, if there had been an averment on the face of the declaration, that the party was known by the proper name in which the bond was made, at the time of making it. We find no authorities for saying, that the declaration would have been bad with such an averment, even if there had been a total variance of the first names; still less, where a man, having two proper names, or names of baptism, has bound himself by the name of one. And on the plea of *non est factum*, where the difference of name does not appear on the record, and there is evidence of the party having been known, at the time of the execution, by the name on the instrument, there is no case, that we are aware of, which decides that the instrument is void." The name written in the body of the instrument is that which the party, by the act of execution and delivery, declares to be his own, and by which he acknowledges himself bound. By this name, therefore, he should regularly be sued; and if sued with an *alias dictus* of his true name, by which the instrument was signed, and an averment in the declaration, that at the time of executing the instrument he was known as well by the one name as the other, it is conceived, that he can take no advantage of the discrepancy; being estopped, by the deed, to deny this allegation. *Evans v. King*, Willes, 555, note (b); *Reeves v. Slater*, 7 Barnw. & Cressw. 486, 490; Cro. El. 897, note (a). See also *Regina v. Wooldale*, 6 Ad. & El. 549, N. S.; *Wooster v. Lyons*, 5 Blackf. 60. If sued by the name written in the body of the deed, without any explanatory averment, and he pleads a misnomer in abatement, the plaintiff in his replication may estop him by the deed. Dyer, 279, b. pl. 9, note; *Story's Pleadings*, 43; Willes, 555, note. And if he should be sued by his

deed declared on, every word and part of which is thereby made descriptive of the deed to be offered in evidence. In such case, if the plaintiff does not produce in evidence a deed literally corresponding with the copy, the defendant may well say it is not the deed in issue, and it will be rejected.¹

§ 70. Where a *record* is mentioned in the pleadings, the same distinction is now admitted in the proof, between allegations of matter of substance, and allegations of matter of description. The former require only substantial proof; the latter must be *literally* proved. Thus, in an action for malicious prosecution, the day of the plaintiff's acquittal is not material. Neither is the term, in which the judgment was recovered, a material allegation, in an action against the sheriff for a false return on the writ of execution. For in both cases the record is alleged by way of inducement only, and not as the foundation of the action; and therefore literal proof is not required.² So, in an indictment for perjury in a

true name, and plead *non est factum*, wherever this plea, as is now the case in England, since the rule of Hilary Term, 4 W. 4, R. 21, "operates as a denial of the deed in point of fact only," all other defences against it being required to be specially pleaded, the difficulty occasioned by the old decisions may now be avoided by proof, that the party, at the time of the execution, was known by the name on the face of the deed. In those American States, which have abolished special pleading, substituting the general issue in all cases, with a brief statement of the special matter of defence, probably the new course of practice, thus introduced, would lead to a similar result.

¹ *Waugh v. Bussell*, 5 Taunt. 707, 709, per Gibbs, C. J.; *James v. Walruth*, 8 Johns. 410; *Henry v. Cleland*, 14 Johns. 400; *Jansen v. Ostrander*, 1 Cowen, 670, acc. In *Henry v. Brown*, 19 Johns. 49, where the condition of the bond was "without fraud or other delay," and in the oyer the word "other" was omitted, the defendant moved to set aside a verdict for the plaintiff, because the bond was admitted in evidence without regard to the variance; but the Court refused the motion, partly on the ground, that the variance was immaterial, and partly, that the oyer was clearly amendable. See also *Dorr v. Fenno*, 12 Pick. 521.

² *Purcell v. Macnamara*, 9 East, 157; *Stoddart v. Palmer*, 4 B. & B. 2; *Phillips v. Shaw*, 4 B. & A. 435; 5 B. & A. 964.

case in Chancery, where the allegation was, that the bill was addressed to Robert, Lord Henley, and the proof was of a bill addressed to Sir Robert Henley Kt., it was held no variance; the substance being, that it was addressed to the person holding the great seal.¹ But where the record is the foundation of the action, the term, in which the judgment was rendered, and the number and names of the parties, are descriptive, and must be strictly proved.²

§ 71. In regard to *prescriptions*, it has been already remarked, that the same rules apply to them, which are applied to contracts; a prescription being founded on a grant, supposed to be lost by lapse of time.³ If, therefore, a prescriptive right be set forth as the foundation of the action, or be pleaded in bar and put in issue, it must be proved to the full extent to which it is claimed; for every fact alleged is descriptive of the supposed grant. Thus, if in trespass for breaking and entering a several fishery, the plaintiff, in his replication, prescribes for a sole and exclusive right of fishing in four places, upon which issue is taken, and the proof be of such right in only three of the places, it is a fatal variance. Or if, in trespass, the defendant justify under a prescriptive right of common on five hundred acres, and the proof be, that his ancestor had released five of them, it is fatal. Or if, in replevin of cattle, the defendant avow the taking damage feasant, and the plaintiff plead in bar a prescriptive right of common for all the cattle, on which issue is taken, and the proof be of such right for only a part of the cattle, it is fatal.⁴

¹ Per Buller, J. in *Rex v. Pippett*, 1 T. R. 240; *Rodman v. Forman*, 8 Johns. 26; *Brooks v. Bemiss*, ib. 455; *The State v. Caffey*, 2 Murphy, 320.

² *Rastall v. Stratton*, 1 H. BL. 49; *Woodford v. Ashley*, 11 East, 508; *Black v. Braybrook*, 2 Stark. R. 7; *Baynes v. Forrest*, 2 Str. 892; *United States v. McNeal*, 1 Gall. 387.

³ Ante, § 58.

⁴ *Rogers v. Allen*, 1 Campb. 313, 315; *Rotherham v. Green*, Noy, 67; *Conyers v. Jackson*, Clayt. 19; Bull. N. P. 299.

§ 72. But a *distinction* is to be observed between cases, where the prescription is the foundation of the claim, and is put in issue, and cases, where the action is founded in tort, for a disturbance of the plaintiff in his enjoyment of a prescriptive right. For in the latter cases it is sufficient for the plaintiff to prove a right of the same nature with that alleged, though not to the same extent; the gist of the action being the wrongful act of the defendant, in disturbing the plaintiff in his right; and not the extent of that right. Therefore, where the action was for disturbance of the plaintiff in his right of common, by opening stone quarries there, the allegation being of common, by reason both of a messuage and of land, whereof the plaintiff was possessed, and the proof, in a trial upon a general issue, being of common by reason of the land only, it was held no variance; the Court observing, that the proof was not of a different allegation, but of the same allegation in part, which was sufficient, and that the damages might be given accordingly.¹ Yet, in the former class of cases, where the prescription is expressly in issue, proof of a more ample right than is claimed will not be a variance; as, if the allegation be of a right of common for sheep, and the proof be of such right, and also of common for cows.²

§ 73. But the party may now, in almost every case, *avoid the consequences of a variance* between the allegation in the pleadings, and the state of facts proved, *by amendment* of the record. This power was given to the Courts in England by Lord Tenterden's act,³ in regard to variances between matters in writing or in print, produced in evidence, and the recital thereof upon the record; and it was afterwards extended⁴ to all other matters, in the judgment of the Court or Judge not

¹ *Rickets v. Salwey*, 2 B. & A. 360; *Yarly v. Turnock*, Cro. Jac. 629; *Manifold v. Pennington*, 4 B. & C. 161.

² *Bushwood v. Pond*, Cro. El. 722; *Tewksbury v. Bricknell*, 1 Taunt. 142; *Ante*, § 58, 67, 68.

³ 9 G. 4, c. 15.

⁴ By St. 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 42, § 23.


material to the merits of the case, upon such terms, as to costs and postponement, as the Court or Judge may deem reasonable. The same power, so essential to the administration of substantial justice, has been given by statutes to the Courts of most of the United States, as well as of the nation; and in both England and America these statutes have, with great propriety, been liberally expounded, in furtherance of their beneficial design.¹ The Judge's discretion, in allowing or refusing amendments, like the exercise of judicial discretion in other cases, cannot, in general, be reviewed by any other tribunal.² It is only in the cases and in the manner

¹ See *Hanbury v. Ella*, 1 Ad. & El. 61; *Parry v. Fairhurst*, 2 Cr. M. & R. 190, 196; *Doe v. Edwards*, 1 M. & Rob. 319; 6 C. & P. 208, S. C.; *Hemming v. Parry*, 6 C. & P. 580; *Mash v. Densham*, 1 M. & Rob. 442; *Ivey v. Young*, ib. 545; *Howell v. Thomas*, 7 C. & P. 342; *Mayor, &c. of Carmarthen v. Lewis*, 6 C. & P. 608; *Hill v. Salt*, 2 C. & M. 420; *Cox v. Painter*, 1 Nev. & P. 581; *Doe v. Long*, 9 C. & P. 777; *Ernest v. Brown*, 2 M. & Rob. 13; *Story v. Watson*, 2 Scott, 842; *Smith v. Brandram*, 9 Dowl. 430; *Whitwell v. Scheer*, 8 Ad. & El. 301; *Read v. Dunsmore*, 9 C. & P. 588; *Smith v. Knowelden*, 9 Dowl. 40; *Noreutt v. Mottram*, 7 Scott, 176; *Legge v. Boyd*, 5 Bing. N. C. 240. Amendments were refused in *Doe v. Errington*, 1 Ad. & El. 750; *Cooper v. Whitehouse*, 1 C. & P. 545; *John v. Currie*, ib. 618; *Watkins v. Morgan*, ib. 661; *Adams v. Power*, 7 C. & P. 76; *Brashier v. Jackson*, 6 M. & W. 549; *Doe v. Roe*, 8 Dowl. 444; *Empson v. Griffin*, 3 P. & D. 168. The following are cases of variance, arising under Lord Tenterden's act. *Bentzing v. Scott*, 4 C. & P. 24; *Moilliet v. Powell*, 6 C. & P. 223; *Lamey v. Bishop*, 4 B. & Ad. 479; *Briant v. Eicke*, Mood. & Malk. 359; *Parks v. Edge*, 1 C. & M. 429; *Masterman v. Judson*, 8 Bing. 224; *Brooks v. Blanshard*, 1 C. & M. 779; *Jelf v. Oriel*, 4 C. & P. 22. The American cases, which are very numerous, are stated in 1 Metcalf & Perkins's Digest, p. 145-162.

² *Doe v. Errington*, 1 M. & Rob. 344, note; *Mellish v. Richardson*, 9 Bing. 125; *Parks v. Edge*, 1 C. & M. 429; *Jenkins v. Phillips*, 9 C. & P. 766; *Merriam v. Langdon*, 10 Conn. 460, 473; *Clapp v. Balch*, 3 Greenl. 216, 219; *Mandeville v. Wilson*, 5 Cranch, 15; *Marine Ins. Co. v. Hodgson*, 6 Cranch, 206; *Walden v. Craig*, 9 Wheat. 576; *Chirac v. Reinicker*, 11 Wheat. 302; *United States v. Buford*, 3 Peters, 12, 32; *Benner v. Frey*, 1 Binn. 366; *Bailey v. Musgrave*, 2 S. & R. 219; *Bright v. Sugg*, 4 Dever.

mentioned in statutes, that the propriety of its exercise can be called in question.

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UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA

DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE B

CHAPTER III.

OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF.

§ 74. A THIRD RULE, which governs in the production of evidence, is, that *the obligation of proving any fact lies upon the party who substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue*. This is a rule of convenience, adopted not because it is impossible to prove a negative, but because the negative does not admit of the direct and simple proof of which the affirmative is capable.¹ It is, therefore, generally deemed sufficient, where the allegation is affirmative, to oppose it with a bare denial, until it is established by evidence. Such is the rule of the Roman Law. *Ei incumbit probatio, qui dicit, non qui negat*.² As a consequence of this rule, the party who asserts the affirmative of the issue is entitled to begin, and to reply; and having begun, he is not permitted to go into half of his case, and reserve the remainder; but is generally obliged to develop the whole.³ Regard is had, in this matter, to the substance and effect of the issue, rather than to the form of it; for in many cases the party, by making a slight change in his pleading, may give the issue a negative or an affirmative form, at his pleasure. Therefore, in an action of covenant for not repairing, where the breach assigned was that the defendant did not repair, but suffered the premises to be ruinous, and the defendant pleaded that he did repair, and did not suffer the premises to be ruinous, it was held, that on this


¹ *Dranguet v. Prudhomme*, 3 Louis. R. 83, 86.

² Dig. lib. 22, tit. 3, l. 2; Mascard. de Prob. Concl. 70, tot; Concl. 1128, n. 10. See also Tait on Evid. p. 1.

³ *Rees v. Smith*, 2 Stark. R. 31; 3 Chitty, Gen. Pract. 872-877; Swift's Law of Evid. p. 152; Bull. N. P. 298; *Browne v. Murray*, Ry. & Mood. 254; *Jones v. Kennedy*, 11 Pick. 125, 132.

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issue the plaintiff should begin.¹ If the record contains several issues, and the plaintiff holds the affirmative in any one of them, he is entitled to begin; as, if in an action of slander for charging the plaintiff with a crime, the defendant should plead not guilty, and a justification. For wherever the plaintiff is obliged to produce any proof in order to establish his right to recover, he is generally required to go into his whole case, according to the rule above stated, and therefore is entitled to reply. How far he shall proceed in his proof, in anticipation of the defence on that or the other issues, is regulated by the discretion of the Judge, according to the circumstances of the case; regard being generally had to the question, whether the whole defence is indicated by the plea, with sufficient particularity to render the plaintiff's evidence intelligible.²

§ 75. Whether the necessity of proving *damages*, on the part of the plaintiff, is such an affirmative as entitles him to begin and reply, is not perfectly clear by the authorities. Where such evidence forms part of the proof necessary to sustain the action, it may well be supposed to fall within the general rule; as, in an action of slander, for words actionable only in respect of the special damage thereby occasioned; or, in an action of the case, by a master for the beating of his servant, *per quod servitium amisit*. It would seem, however, that where it appears by the record, or by the admission of counsel, that the damages to be recovered are only nominal,

¹ Soward v. Leggatt, 7 C. & P. 613.

² Rees v. Smith, 2 Stark. R. 31; Jackson v. Hesketh, ib. 518; James v. Salter, 1 M. & Rob. 501; Rawlins v. Desborough, 2 M. & Rob. 328; Comstock v. Hadlyme, 8 Conn. 261; Curtis v. Wheeler, 4 C. & P. 196; 1 M. & M. 493, S. C.; Williams v. Thomas, 4 C. & P. 234; 7 Pick. 100, per Parker, C. J. In Browne v. Murray, Ry. & Mood. 254, Lord C. J. Abbott gave the plaintiff his election, after proving the general issue, either to proceed immediately with all his proof to rebut the anticipated defence, or to reserve such proof till the defendant had closed his own evidence; only refusing him the privilege of dividing his case into halves, giving part in the first instance, and the residue after the defendant's case was proved.

or are mere matter of computation, and there is no dispute about them, the formal proof of them will not take away the defendant's right to begin and reply, whatever be the form of the pleadings, provided the residue of the case is affirmatively justified by the defendant.¹ And if the general issue alone is pleaded, and the defendant will, at the trial, admit the whole of the plaintiff's case, he may still have the advantage of the beginning and reply.² So also in trespass *quare clausum fregit*, where the defendant pleads not guilty as to the force and arms and whatever is against the peace, and justifies as to the residue, and the damages are laid only in the usual *formula* of treading down the grass, and subverting the soil, the defendant is permitted to begin and reply; there being no necessity for any proof on the part of the plaintiff.³

§ 76. The difficulty, in determining this point, exists chiefly in those cases, where the action is for *unliquidated damages*, and the defendant has met the whole case with an affirmative plea. In these actions the practice has been various in England; but it has at length been settled by a rule, by the fifteen Judges, that the plaintiff shall begin in all actions for personal injuries, libel, and slander, though the general issue may not be pleaded, and the affirmative be on

¹ Fowler v. Coster, 1 Mood. & M. 243, per Lord Tenterden. And see the reporter's note on that case, in 1 Mood. & M. 278-281. The dictum of the learned Judge, in Brooks v. Barrett, 7 Pick. 100, is not supposed to militate with this rule; but is conceived to apply to cases, where proof of the note is required of the plaintiff. Sanford v. Hunt, 1 C. & P. 118; Goodtitle v. Braham, 4 T. R. 497.

² Tucker v. Tucker, 1 Mood. & M. 536; Fowler v. Coster, ib. 241; Doe v. Barnes, 1 M. & Rob. 386; Doe v. Smart, ib. 476; Fish v. Travers, 3 C. & P. 578; Comstock v. Hadlyme, 8 Conn. 261; Lacon v. Higgins, 3 Stark. R. 178; Corbett v. Corbett, 3 Campb. 368; Homan v. Thompson, 6 C. & P. 717; Smart v. Rayner, ib. 721; Mills v. Oddy, ib. 728; Scott v. Hull, 8 Conn. 296. But see Post, § 76, n. 4.

³ Hodges v. Holden, 3 Campb. 366; Jackson v. Hesketh, 2 Stark. R. 518; Pearson v. Coles, 1 Mood. & Rob. 206; Davis v. Mason, 4 Pick. 156; Leech v. Armitage, 2 Dall. 125.

the defendant.¹ In actions upon contract, it was, until recently, an open question of practice; having been sometimes treated as a matter of right in the party, and at other times regarded as resting in the discretion of the Judge, under all the circumstances of the case.² But it is now settled, in accordance with the rule adopted in other actions.³ In this country it is generally deemed a matter of discretion, to be ordered by the Judge, at the trial, as he may think most conducive to the administration of justice; but the weight of authority, as well as the analogies of the law, seem to be in favor of giving the opening and closing of the cause to the plaintiff, wherever the damages are in dispute, unliquidated, and to be settled by the Jury upon such evidence as may be adduced, and not by computation alone.⁴

¹ *Carter v. Jones*, 6 C. & P. 64.

² *Bedell v. Russell*, Ry. & M. 293; *Fowler v. Coster*, 1 M. & M. 241; *Revett v. Braham*, 4 T. R. 497; *Hare v. Munn*, 1 M. & M. 241, note; *Scott v. Hull*, 8 Conn. 296; *Burrell v. Nicholson*, 6 C. & P. 202; 1 M. & R. 304, 306; *Hoggett v. Exley*, 9 C. & P. 324. See also *Cowen & Hill's* note, 370, to 1 Phil. Evid. 195; 3 Chitty, Gen. Practice, 872-877.

³ *Mercer v. Whall*, 9 Jur. 576.

⁴ Such was the course in *Young v. Bairner*, 1 Esp. 103, which was assumpsit for work, and a plea in abatement for the non-joinder of other defendants; *Robey v. Howard*, 2 Stark R. 555, S. P.; *Stansfield v. Levy*, 3 Stark. R. 8, S. P.; *Lacon v. Higgins*, 3 Stark. R. 178, where, in assumpsit for goods, coverture of the defendant was the sole plea; — *Hare v. Munn*, 1 M. & M. 241, note, which was assumpsit for money lent, with a plea in abatement for the non-joinder of other defendants; — *Morris v. Lotan*, 1 M. & Rob. 233, S. P.; *Wood v. Pringle*, ib. 277, which was an action for a libel, with several special pleas of justification as to part, but no general issue; and as to the parts not justified, judgment was suffered by default. See acc. *Comstock v. Hadlyme*, 8 Conn. 261; 1 Phil. Evid. 195, *Cowen & Hill's* Ed. note 370; *Ayer v. Austin*, 6 Pick. 225; *Hoggett v. Exley*, 9 C. & P. 324; 2 M. & Rob. 251, S. C. On the other hand are *Cooper v. Wakley*, 3 Car. & P. 474; 1 M. & M. 248, S. C., which was case for a libel, with pleas in justification, and no general issue; but this is plainly contradicted by the subsequent case of *Wood v. Pringle*, and has since been overruled, in *Mercer v. Whall*; — *Cotton v. James*, 1 M. & M. 273; 3 Car. & P. 505, S. C., which was trespass for entering the plaintiff's house, and taking his goods, with a plea of justification under a commission

§ 77. Where the proceedings are not according to the course of the Common Law, and where, consequently, the

of bankruptcy; but this also is expressly contradicted in *Morris v. Lotan*; — *Bedell v. Russell*, Ry. & M. 293, which was trespass of assault and battery, and for shooting the plaintiff, to which a justification was pleaded; where Best, J. reluctantly yielded to the supposed authority of *Hodges v. Holden*, 3 Campb. 366, and *Jackson v. Hesketh*, 2 Stark. R. 518; in neither of which, however, were the damages controverted; — *Fish v. Travers*, 3 Car. & P. 578, decided by Best, J. on the authority of *Cooper v. Wakley*, and *Cotton v. James*; — *Burrell v. Nicholson*, 6 Car. & P. 202, which was trespass for taking the plaintiff's goods in his house, and detaining them one hour; which the defendant justified as a distress for parish rates; and the only issue was, whether the house was within the parish or not. But here, also, the damages were not in dispute, and seem to have been regarded as merely nominal. See also *Scott v. Hull*, 8 Conn. 296. In *Norris v. Ins. Co. of N. America*, 3 Yeates, 84, which was covenant on a policy of insurance, to which performance was pleaded, the damages were not then in dispute, the parties having provisionally agreed upon a mode of liquidation. But in England, the entire subject has recently undergone a review, and the rule has been established, as applicable to all personal actions, that the plaintiff shall begin, wherever he goes for substantial damages not already ascertained. *Mercer v. Whall*, 9 Jur. 576. In this case, Lord Denman, C. J., in delivering the judgment of the Court, expressed his opinion as follows: — "The natural course would seem to be, that plaintiff should bring his own cause of complaint before the Court and Jury, in every case where he has anything to prove either as to the facts necessary for his obtaining a verdict, or as to the amount of damage to which he conceives the proof of such facts may entitle him. The law, however, has by some been supposed to differ from this course, and to require that defendant, by admitting the cause of action stated on the record, and pleading only some affirmative fact, which if proved will defeat the plaintiff's action, may entitle himself to open the proceeding at the trial, anticipating the plaintiff's statement of his injury, disparaging him and his ground of complaint, offering or not offering, at his own option, any proof of his defensive allegation, and, if he offers that proof, adapting it not to plaintiff's case as established, but to that which he chooses to represent that plaintiff's case will be. It appears expedient that plaintiff should begin, in order that the Judge, the Jury, and the defendant himself should know precisely how the claim is shaped. This disclosure may convince defendant that the defence which he has pleaded cannot be established. On hearing the extent of the demand, defendant may be induced at once to submit to it rather than persevere. Thus the affair reaches its natural and best con-

onus probandi is not technically presented, the Courts adopt the same principles which govern in proceedings at Common Law. Thus, in the *probate of a will*, as the real question is, whether there is a valid will or not, the executor is considered as holding the affirmative; and, therefore, he opens and closes the case, in whatever state or condition it may be, and whether the question of sanity is or is not raised.¹

clusion. If this does not occur, plaintiff by bringing forward his case points his attention to the proper object of the trial, and enables defendant to meet it with a full understanding of its nature and character. If it were a presumption of law, or if experience proved, that plaintiff's evidence must always occupy many hours, and that defendant's could not last more than as many minutes, some advantage would be secured by postponing plaintiff's case to that of defendant. But, first, the direct contrary in both instances may be true, and, secondly, the time would only be saved by stopping the cause for the purpose of taking the verdict at the close of defendant's proofs, if that verdict were in favor of defendant. This has never been done or proposed: if it were suggested, the Jury would be likely to say, on most occasions, that they could not form a satisfactory opinion on the effect of defendant's proofs till they had heard the grievance on which plaintiff founds his action. In no other case can any practical advantage be suggested as arising from this method of proceeding. Of the disadvantages that may result from it, one is the strong temptation to a defendant to abuse the privilege. If he well knows that the case can be proved against him, there may be skilful management in confessing it by his plea, and affirming something by way of defence which he knows to be untrue, for the mere purpose of beginning." See 9 Jur. 578. Ordinarily speaking, the decision of the Judge at *nisi prius*, on a matter resting in his discretion, is not subject to revision in any other Court. But in *Hackman v. Fernie*, 5 M. & W. 505, the Court observed, that though they might not interfere in a very doubtful case, yet if the decision of the Judge "were clearly and manifestly wrong," they would interfere to set it right. In a subsequent case, however, it is said that instead of "were clearly and manifestly wrong," the language actually used by the Court was, "did clear and manifest wrong;" meaning that it was not sufficient to show merely that the wrong party had begun, but, that some injustice had been done in consequence. See *Edwards v. Matthews*, 11 Jur. 398. See also *Geach v. Ingall*, 9 Jur. 691.

¹ *Buckminster v. Perry*, 4 Mass. 593; *Brooks v. Barrett*, 7 Pick. 94; *Comstock v. Hadlyme*, 8 Conn. 254; *Ware v. Ware*, 8 Greenl. 42; *Hubbard v. Hubbard*, 6 Mass. 397.

§ 78. To this general rule, that the burden of proof is on the party holding the affirmative, there are some *exceptions*, in which the proposition, though negative in its terms, must be proved by the party who states it. One class of these exceptions will be found to include those cases, in which the plaintiff *grounds his right of action upon a negative allegation*, and where, of course, the establishment of this negative is an essential element in his case;¹ as, for example, in an action for having prosecuted the plaintiff maliciously and without probable cause. Here, the want of probable cause must be made out by the plaintiff, by some affirmative proof, though the proposition be negative in its terms.² So, in an action by husband and wife, on a promissory note made to the wife after marriage, if the defendant denies that she is the meritorious cause of action, the burden of proving this negative is on him.³ So, in a prosecution for a penalty given by statute, if the statute, in describing the offence, contains negative matter, the count must contain such negative allegation, and it must be supported by *prima facie* proof. Such is the case in prosecutions for penalties given by statutes, for coursing deer in inclosed grounds, not having the consent of the owner;⁴ or, for cutting trees on lands not the party's own, or, taking other property, not having the consent of the owner;⁵ or, for selling, as a pedler, goods not of the produce or manufacture of the country;⁶ or, for neglecting to prove a will, without just excuse made and accepted by the Judge of Probate therefor.⁷ In these, and the like cases, it is obvious, that

¹ *Chitty on Pl.* 206; *Spiers v. Parker*, 1 T. R. 141; *Rex v. Pratten*, 6 T. R. 559; *Holmes v. Love*, 3 B. & C. 242; *Lane v. Crombie*, 12 Pick. 177.

² *Purcell v. Macnamara*, 1 Campb. 199; 9 East, 361, S. C.; *Ulmer v. Leland*, 1 Greenl. 134; *Gibson v. Waterhouse*, 4 Greenl. 226.

³ *Philliskirk v. Pluckwell*, 2 M. & S. 395, per Bayley, J.

⁴ *Rex v. Rogers*, 2 Campb. 654; *Rex v. Jarvis*, 1 East, 643, note.

⁵ *Little v. Thompson*, 2 Greenl. 128; *Rex v. Hazy & al.* 2 C. & P. 458.

⁶ *Commonwealth v. Samuel*, 2 Pick. 103.

⁷ *Smith v. Moore*, 6 Greenl. 274. See other examples in *Commonwealth v. Maxwell*, 2 Pick. 139; 1 East, P. C. 166, § 15; *Williams v. Hingham*

plenary proof on the part of the affirmant can hardly be expected; and, therefore, it is considered sufficient if he offer such evidence as, in the absence of counter testimony, would afford ground for presuming that the allegation is true. Thus, in an action on an agreement to pay £100, if the plaintiff would not send herrings for one year to the London market, and, in particular, to the house of J. & A. Millar, proof that he sent none to that house was held sufficient to entitle him to recover, in the absence of opposing testimony.¹ And generally, where a party seeks, from extrinsic circumstances, to give effect to an instrument which, on the face of it, it would not have, it is incumbent on him to prove those circumstances, though involving the proof of a negative; for, in the absence of extrinsic proof, the instrument must have its natural operation, and no other. Therefore, where real estate was devised for life with power of appointment by will, and the devisee made his will devising *all his lands*, but without mention of or reference to the power, it was held no execution of the power, unless it should appear that he had no other lands; and that the burden of showing this negative was upon the party claiming under the will as an appointment.²

§ 79. But where the subject-matter of a negative averment lies *peculiarly within the knowledge* of the other party, the averment is taken as true, unless disproved by that party. Such is the case in civil or criminal prosecutions for a penalty for doing an act, which the statutes do not permit to be done by any persons, except those, who are duly licensed therefor; as, for selling liquors, exercising a trade or profession, and the like. Here the party, if licensed, can immediately show it, without the least inconvenience; whereas, if proof of the negative were required, the inconvenience would be very great.³

and Quincy Turnpike Co. 4 Pick. 341; Rex v. Stone, 1 East, 637; Rex v. Burditt, 4 B. & Ald. 95, 140; Rex v. Turner, 5 M. & S. 206.

¹ Calder v. Rutherford, 3 B. & B. 302; 7 Moore, 158, S. C.

² Doe v. Johnson, 7 Man. & Gr. 1047.

³ Rex v. Turner, 5 M. & S. 206; Smith v. Jeffries, 9 Price, 257; Sheldon

§ 80. So, where the negative allegation involves a charge of *criminal neglect of duty*, whether official or otherwise; or fraud; or the wrongful violation of actual lawful possession of property; the party making the allegation must prove it; for in these cases the presumption of law, which is always in favor of innocence, and quiet possession, is in favor of the party charged. Thus, in an information against Lord Halifax for refusing to deliver up the rolls of the auditor of the Exchequer, in violation of his duty, the prosecutor was required to prove the negative. So, where one in office was charged with not having taken the sacrament within a year; and where a seaman was charged with having quitted the ship, without the leave in writing, required by statute; and where a shipper was charged with having shipped goods dangerously combustible on board the plaintiff's ship, without giving notice of their nature to any officer on board, whereby the ship was burned and lost; in each of these cases, the party alleging the negative was required to prove it.¹ So, where the defence to an action on a policy of insurance was, that the plaintiff improperly concealed from the underwriter certain facts and information which he then already knew and had received, it was held that the defendant was bound to give *some* evidence of the non-communication.² So, where the goods of the plaintiff are seized and taken out of his possession, though for an alleged forfeiture under the revenue laws, the seizure is presumed unlawful, until proved otherwise.³

v. Clark, 1 Johns. 513; United States v. Hayward, 2 Gall. 485; Gening v. The State, 1 McCord, 573; Commonwealth v. Kimball, 7 Met. 304; Harrison's case, Paley on Conv. 45, n.; Apothecaries Co. v. Bentley, Ry. & Mood. 159. By a statute of Massachusetts, 1844, ch. 102, the burden of proving a license for the sale of liquors, is expressly devolved on the person selling.

¹ United States v. Hayward, 2 Gall. 498; Hartwell v. Root, 19 Johns. 345; Bull. N. P. [298]; Rex v. Hawkins, 10 East, 211; Frontine v. Frost, 3 B. & P. 302; Williams v. E. Ind. Co. 3 East, 192. See also Commonwealth v. Stow, 1 Mass. 54; Evans v. Birch, 3 Campb. 10.

² Elkin v. Janson, 13 M. & W. 655.

³ Aitcheson v. Maddock, Peake's Cas. 162. An exception to this rule is

§ 81. So, where *infancy* is alleged;¹ or, where one born in lawful wedlock is alleged to be *illegitimate*, the parents not being separated by a sentence of divorce;² or, where *insanity* is alleged;³ or, a person once living is alleged to be *dead*, the presumption of life not being yet worn out by lapse of time;⁴ or, where nonfeasance or negligence is alleged, in an action on contract;⁵ or, where the want of a due stamp is alleged, there being faint traces of a stamp of some kind;⁶ the burden of proof is on the party making the allegation, notwithstanding its negative character.

admitted in Chancery, in the case of attorney and client; it being a rule there, that if the attorney, retaining the connexion, contracts with his client, he is subject to the burden of proving that no advantage has been taken of the situation of the latter. 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 311; Gibson v. Jeyes, 6 Ves. 278; Cane v. Ld. Allen, 2 Dow, 289, 294, 299.

¹ Borthwick v. Carruthers, 1 T. R. 648.

² Case of the Banbury Peerage, 2 Selw. N. P. (by Wheaton) 558; Morris v. Davies, 3 Car. & P. 513.

³ Attorney Gen. v. Parther, 3 Bro. C. C. 441, 443, per Lord Thurlow; cited with approbation in White v. Wilson, 13 Ves. 87, 88; Hoge v. Fisher, 1 Pet. C. C. R. 163.

⁴ Throgmorton v. Walton, 2 Roll. R. 461; Wilson v. Hodges, 2 East, 313; Ante, § 41.

⁵ Crowley v. Page, 7 C. & P. 790; Smith v. Davies, Ib. 307; Clarke v. Spence, 10 Watts, R. 335; Story on Bailm. § 454, 457, note (3d ed.); Brind v. Dale, 8 C. & P. 207. See further, as to the right to begin, and, of course, the burden of proof, Pontifex v. Jolly, 9 C. & P. 202; Harnett v. Johnson, Ib. 206; Aston v. Perkes, Ib. 231; Osborn v. Thompson, Ib. 337; Bingham v. Stanley, Ib. 374; Lambert v. Hale, Ib. 506; Lees v. Hoffstadt, Ib. 599; Chapman v. Emden, Ib. 712; Doe v. Rowlands, Ib. 734; Ridgway v. Ewbank, 2 M. & Rob. 217; Hudson v. Brown, 8 C. & P. 774; Soward v. Leggatt, 7 C. & P. 613; Bowles v. Neale, Ib. 262; Richardson v. Fell, 4 Dowl. 10; Silk v. Humphery, 7 C. & P. 14.

⁶ Doe v. Coombs, 3 Ad. & El. N. S. 687.

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE BEST EVIDENCE.

§ 82. A FOURTH RULE, which governs in the production of evidence, is that which requires *the best evidence of which the case, in its nature, is susceptible*. This rule does not demand the greatest amount of evidence, which can possibly be given of any fact; but its design is to prevent the introduction of any, which, from the nature of the case, supposes that better evidence is in the possession of the party. It is adopted for the prevention of fraud; for when it is apparent that better evidence is withheld, it is fair to presume that the party had some sinister motive for not producing it, and that, if offered, his design would be frustrated. The rule thus becomes essential to the pure administration of justice. In requiring the production of the best evidence applicable to each particular fact, it is meant, that no evidence shall be received which is merely substitutionary in its nature, so long as the original evidence can be had. The rule excludes only that evidence, which itself indicates the existence of more original sources of information. But where there is no substitution of evidence, but only a selection of weaker, instead of stronger proofs, or an omission to supply all the proofs capable of being produced, the rule is not infringed.¹ Thus a title by deed must be proved by the production of the deed itself, if it is within the power of the party; for this is the best evidence, of which the case is susceptible; and its nonproduction would raise a presumption, that it contained

¹ Phil. & Am. on Evid. 438; 1 Phil. Evid. 418; 1 Stark. Evid. 437; Glassford on Evid. 266-278; Tayloe v. Riggs, 1 Peters, 591, 596; United States v. Reyburn, 6 Peters, 352, 367; Minor v. Tillotson, 7 Peters, 100, 101.

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¹ Phil. & Am. on Evid. 438; 1 Phil. Evid. 418; 1 Stark. Evid. 437; Glassford on Evid. 266-278; Tayloe v. Riggs, 1 Peters, 591, 596; United States v. Reyburn, 6 Peters, 352, 367; Minor v. Tillotson, 7 Peters, 100, 101.

some matter of apparent defeasance. But being produced, the execution of the deed itself may be proved by only one of the subscribing witnesses, though the other also is at hand. And even the previous examination of a deceased subscribing witness, if admissible on other grounds, may supersede the necessity of calling the survivor.¹ So, in proof or disproof of handwriting, it is not necessary to call the supposed writer himself.² And even where it is necessary to prove negatively, that an act was done without the consent, or against the will of another, it is not in general necessary to call the person, whose will or consent is denied.³

§ 83. All rules of evidence, however, are adopted for practical purposes in the administration of justice; and must be so applied as to promote the ends for which they were designed. Thus, the rule under consideration is subject to exceptions, where the *general convenience* requires it. Proof, for example, that an individual has acted notoriously as a public officer, is *prima facie* evidence of his official character, without producing his commission or appointment.⁴

§ 84. This rule naturally leads to the division of evidence

¹ Wright v. Tatham, 1 Ad. & El. 3.

² Hughes's case, 2 East, P. C. 1002; McGuire's case, ib.; Rex v. Benson, 2 Campb. 508.

³ Ante, § 77; Rex v. Hazy & Collins, 2 C. & P. 458.

⁴ United States v. Reyburn, 6 Peters, 352, 367; Rex v. Gordon, 2 Leach, Cr. C. 581, 585, 586; Rex v. Shelley, ib. 381, n.; Jacob v. United States, 1 Brockenb. 520; Milnor v. Tillotson, 7 Peters, 100, 101; Berryman v. Wise, 4 T. R. 366; Bank of U. States v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 70; Doe v. Brawn, 5 B. & A. 243; Cannell v. Curtis, 2 Bing. N. C. 228, 234; Rex v. Verelst, 3 Campb. 432; Rex v. Howard, 1 M. & Rob. 187; McGahey v. Alston, 2 M. & W. 206, 211; Post, § 92. But there must be some color of right to the office, or an acquiescence on the part of the public, for such length of time as will authorize the presumption of at least a colorable election or appointment. Wilcox v. Smith, 5 Wend. 231, 234. This rule is applied only to public offices. Where the office is private, some proof must be offered of its existence, and of the appointment of the agent or incumbent. Short v. Lee, 1 Jac. & W. 464, 468.

into PRIMARY and SECONDARY. *Primary evidence* is that which we have just mentioned, as the best evidence, or that kind of proof which, under any possible circumstances, affords the greatest certainty of the fact in question; and it is illustrated by the case of a written document; the instrument itself being always regarded as the primary, or best possible evidence of its existence and contents. If the execution of an instrument is to be proved, the primary evidence is the testimony of the subscribing witness, if there be one. Until it is shown that the production of the primary evidence is out of the party's power, no other proof of the fact is in general admitted.¹ All evidence falling short of this in its degree, is termed *secondary*. The question, whether evidence is primary or secondary, has reference to the nature of the case, in the abstract, and not to the peculiar circumstances under which the party, in the particular cause on trial, may be placed. It is a distinction of law, and not of fact; referring only to the quality, and not to the strength of the proof. Evidence, which carries on its face no indication that better remains behind, is not secondary, but primary. And though all information must be traced to its source, if possible, yet if there are several distinct sources of information of the same fact, it is not ordinarily necessary to show that they have all been exhausted, before secondary evidence can be resorted to.²

¹ Sebree v. Dorr, 9 Wheat. 558, 563; Hart v. Yunt, 1 Watts, 253.

² Cutbush v. Gilbert, 4 S. & R. 555; United States v. Gilbert, 2 Sumn. 19, 80, 81; Phil. & Am. on Evid. 440, 441; 1 Phil. Evid. 421. Whether the law recognises any degrees in the various kinds of secondary evidence, and requires the party, offering that which is deemed less certain and satisfactory, first to show, that nothing better is in his power, is a question which is not yet perfectly settled. On the one hand, the affirmative is urged as an equitable extension of the principle, which postpones all secondary evidence, until the absence of the primary is accounted for; and it is said that the same reason, which requires the production of a writing, if within the power of the party, also requires, that if the writing is lost, its contents shall be proved by a copy, if in existence, rather than by the memory of a witness, who has read it; and that the secondary proof of a lost deed ought to be marshalled into, first the counterpart; secondly, a

§ 85. The cases which most frequently call for the application of the rule now under consideration, are those, which

copy; thirdly, the abstract, &c.; and last of all, the memory of a witness. *Ludlam, ex dem. Hunt, Lofft, R. 362.* On the other hand, it is said, that this argument for the extension of the rule confounds all distinction between the weight of evidence, and its legal admissibility; that the rule is founded upon the nature of the evidence offered, and not upon its strength or weakness; and that, to carry it to the length of establishing degrees in secondary evidence, as fixed rules of law, would often tend to the subversion of justice, and always be productive of inconvenience. If, for example, proof of the existence of an abstract of a deed will exclude oral evidence of its contents, this proof may be withheld by the adverse party until the moment of trial, and the other side be defeated, or the cause be greatly delayed; and the same mischief may be repeated, through all the different degrees of the evidence. It is therefore insisted, that the rule of exclusion ought to be restricted to such evidence only as, upon its face, discloses the existence of better proof; and that where the evidence is not of this nature, it is to be received, notwithstanding it may be shown from other sources, that the party might have offered that which was more satisfactory; leaving the weight of the evidence to be judged of by the Jury, under all the circumstances of the case. See 4 Monthly Law Mag. 265-279. Among the cases cited in support of the affirmative side of the question, there is no one, in which this particular point appears to have been expressly adjudged, though in several of them, as in *Sir E. Seymour's case*, 10 Mod. 8; *Villiers v. Villiers*, 2 Atk. 71; *Rowlandson v. Wainwright*, 1 Nev. & Per. 8; and others, it has been passingly adverted to, as a familiar doctrine of the law. On the other hand, the existence of any degrees in secondary evidence was doubted by *Patteson J.* in *Rowlandson v. Wainwright*; tacitly denied by the same Judge, in *Coyle v. Cole*, 6 C. & P. 359, and by *Parke J.* in *Rex v. Fursey*, 6 C. & P. 81; and by the Court, in *Rex v. Hunt & al.* 3 B. & Ald. 566; and expressly denied by *Parke J.* in *Brown v. Woodman*, 6 C. & P. 206. See also *Hall v. Ball*, 3 Scott, N. R. 577. And in the more recent case of *Doe d. Gilbert v. Ross*, in the Exchequer, where proper notice to produce an original document had been given without success, it was held, that the party giving the notice was not afterwards restricted as to the nature of the secondary evidence he would produce of the contents of the document; and, therefore, having offered an attested copy of the deed in that case, which was inadmissible in itself for want of a stamp, it was held, that it was competent for him to abandon that mode of proof, and to resort to parol testimony, there being no degrees in secondary evidence; for when once the original is accounted for, any secondary evidence whatever may be resorted to, by the party seeking to use the same. See *Doe v. Ross*,

relate to the *substitution of oral for written evidence*; and they may be arranged into three classes; including in the

8 Dowl. 389; 7 M. & W. 102, S. C. The American doctrine, as deduced from various authorities, seems to be this; that if, from the nature of the case itself, it is manifest, that a more satisfactory kind of secondary evidence exists, the party will be required to produce it; but that where the nature of the case does not of itself disclose the existence of such better evidence, the objector must not only prove its existence, but also must prove, that it was known to the other party in season to have been produced at the trial. Thus, where the record of a conviction was destroyed, oral proof of its existence was rejected, because the law required a transcript to be sent to the Court of Exchequer, which was better evidence. *Hilts v. Colvin*, 14 Johns. 182; a grant of letters of administration was presumed, after proof from the records of various Courts, of the administrator's recognition there, and his acts in that capacity; *Battles v. Holley*, 6 Greenl. 145;—and where the record books were burnt and mutilated, or lost, the clerk's docket and the journals of the Judges have been deemed the next best evidence of the contents of the record. *Cook v. Wood*, 1 McCord, 139; *Lyons v. Gregory*, 3 Hen. & Munf. 237; *Lowry v. Cady*, 4 Verm. 504; *Doe v. Greenlee*, 3 Hawks, 281. In all these, and the like cases, the nature of the fact to be proved, plainly discloses the existence of some evidence in writing, of an official character, more satisfactory than mere oral proof; and therefore the production of such evidence is demanded. Such, also, is the view taken by *Ch. B. Gilbert*. See *Gilb. Evid.* by *Lofft*, p. 5. See also *Collins v. Maule*, 8 C. & P. 502; *Everingham v. Roundell*, 2 M. & Rob. 138; *Harvey v. Thomas*, 10 Watts, 63. But where there is no ground for legal presumption that better secondary evidence exists, any proof is received, which is not inadmissible by other rules of law; unless the objecting party can show that better evidence was previously known to the other, and might have been produced; thus subjecting him, by positive proof, to the same imputation of fraud, which the law itself presumes, when primary evidence is withheld. Thus, where a notarial copy was called for, as the best evidence of the contents of a lost note, the Court held, that it was sufficient for the party to prove the note by the best evidence actually in his power; and that to require a notarial copy, would be to demand that, of the existence of which there was no evidence, and which the law would not presume was in the power of the party, it not being necessary that a promissory note should be protested. *Renner v. The Bank of Columbia*, 9 Wheat. 582, 587; *Denn v. McAllister*, 2 Halst. 46, 53; *United States v. Britton*, 2 Mason, 464, 468. But where it was proved, that a copy existed of a note, he was held bound to prove it, by the copy. 2 Mason, 468. But if the party has voluntarily destroyed the instrument, he is not allowed to prove its contents by secondary evidence, until he has

first class those instruments, which the law requires should be in writing;—in the *second*, those contracts, which the parties have put in writing;—and in the *third*, all other writings, the existence of which is disputed, and which are material to the issue.

§ 86. In the *first* place, oral evidence cannot be substituted for any *instrument which the law requires to be in writing*; such as records, public documents, official examinations, deeds of conveyance of lands, wills, other than nuncupative, promises to pay the debt of another, and other writings mentioned in the statute of frauds. In all these cases, the law having required that the evidence of the transaction should be in writing, no other proof can be substituted for that, as long as the writing exists, and is in the power of the party. And where oaths are required to be taken in open Court, where a record of the oath is made, or before a particular officer, whose duty it is to certify it; or where an appointment to an additional office is required to be made and certified on the back of the party's former commission; the written evidence must be produced.¹ Even the admission of the fact, by a party, unless solemnly made, as a substitute for other proof,² does

repelled every inference of a fraudulent design in its destruction. *Blade v. Noland*, 12 Wend. 173. So, where the subscribing witness to a deed is dead, and his handwriting cannot be proved, the next best evidence is proof of the handwriting of the grantor, and this is therefore required. *Clark v. Courtney*, 5 Peters, 319. But in New York, proof of the handwriting of the witness himself is next demanded. *Jackson v. Waldron*, 13 Wend. 178. See *post*, § 575. But where a deed was lost, the party claiming under it was not held bound to call the subscribing witnesses, unless it could be shown, that he previously knew who they were. *Jackson v. Vail*, 7 Wend. 125. So it was ruled by Lord Kenyon, in *Kneeling v. Ball*, Peake's Evid. App. lxxviii. In *Gillies v. Smither*, 2 Stark. R. 528, this point does not seem to have been considered; but the case turned on the state of the pleadings, and the want of any proof whatever, that the bond in question was ever executed by the intestate.

¹ *Rex v. Hube*, Peake's Cas. 132; *Bassett v. Marshall*, 9 Mass. 312; *Tripp v. Garey*, 7 Greenl. 266; 2 Stark. Evid. 570, 571; *Dole v. Allen*, 4 Greenl. 527.

² See *Ante*, § 27; *Post*, § 169, 170, 186, 204, 205.

not supersede direct proof of matter of record, by which it is sought to affect him; for the record, being produced, may be found irregular and void, and the party might be mistaken.¹ Where, however, the record or document appointed by law, is not part of the fact to be proved, but is merely a collateral or subsequent memorial of the fact, such as the registry of marriages and births, and the like, it has not this exclusive character, but any other legal proof is admitted.²

§ 87. In the *second* place, oral proof cannot be substituted for the *written evidence of any contract, which the parties have put in writing*. Here, the written instrument may be regarded, in some measure, as the ultimate fact to be proved, especially in the cases of negotiable securities; and in all cases of written contracts, the writing is tacitly agreed upon, by the parties themselves, as the only repository and the appropriate evidence of their agreement. The written contract is not collateral, but is of the very essence of the transaction.³

¹ *Scott v. Clare*, 3 Campb. 236; *Jenner v. Jolliffe*, 6 Johns. 9; *Welland Canal Co. v. Hathaway*, 8 Wend. 480; 1 Leach, Cr. C. 349; 2 Id. 625, 635.

² *Commonwealth v. Norcross*, 9 Mass. 492; *Ellis v. Ellis*, 11 Mass. 93; *Owings v. Wyant*, 3 Har. & McH. 393; 2 Stark. Evid. 571; *Rex v. Allison, R. & R.* 109; *Read v. Passer*, Peake's Cas. 231.

³ The principles on which a writing is deemed part of the essence of any transaction, and consequently the best or primary proof of it, are thus explained by Domat.—"The force of written proof consists in this; men agree to preserve by writing the remembrance of past events, of which they wish to create a memorial, either with the view of laying down a rule for their own guidance, or in order to have, in the instrument, a lasting proof of the truth of what is written. Thus contracts are written, in order to preserve the memorial of what the contracting parties have prescribed for each other to do, and to make for themselves a fixed and immutable law, as to what has been agreed on. So, testaments are written, in order to preserve the remembrance of what the party, who has a right to dispose of his property, has ordained concerning it, and thereby lay down a rule for the guidance of his heir and legatees. On the same principle are reduced into writing all sentences, judgments, edicts, ordonnances, and other matters, which either confer title, or have the force of law. The writing preserves, unchanged, the matters intrusted to it, and expresses the intention of the parties by their

If, for example, an action is brought for use and occupation of real estate, and it appears by the plaintiff's own showing that there was a written contract of tenancy, he must produce it, or account for its absence; though, if he were to make out a *prima facie* case, without any appearance of a written contract, the burden of producing it, or at least of proving its existence, would be devolved on the defendant.¹ But, if the fact of the occupation of land is alone in issue without respect to the terms of the tenancy, this fact may be proved by any competent oral testimony, such as payment of rent, or declarations of the tenant, notwithstanding it appears that the occupancy was under an agreement in writing; for here the writing is only collateral to the fact in question.² The same rule applies to every other species of written contract. Thus, where, in a suit for the price of labor performed, it appears that the work was commenced under an agreement in writing, the agreement must be produced; and, even if the claim be for extra work, the plaintiff must still produce the written agreement; for it may furnish evidence, not only that the work was over and beyond the original contract, but also of the rate at which it was to be paid for. So, in an indictment for feloniously setting fire to a house, to defraud the insurers, the policy itself is the appropriate evidence of the fact of insurance, and must be produced.³ And the recorded resolution of a charitable society, under which the plaintiff earned the salary sued for, was on the same principle held indispensably necessary to be produced.⁴ The fact, that in

own testimony. The truth of written acts is established by the acts themselves, that is, by the inspection of the originals."—See Domat's Civil Law, Liv. 3, tit. 6, § 2, as translated in 7 Monthly Law Mag. p. 73.

¹ *Brewer v. Palmer*, 3 Esp. 213; confirmed in *Ramsbottom v. Tunbridge*, 2 M. & S. 424; *Rex v. Rawden*, 8 B. & C. 708; *Strother v. Barr*, 5 Bing. 136, per Park, J.

² *Rex v. Inhabitants of Holy Trinity*, 7 B. & C. 611; *Doe v. Harvey*, 8 Bing. 239, 241; *Spiers v. Willison*, 4 Cranch, 398; *Dennett v. Crocker*, 8 Greenl. 239, 244.

³ *Rex v. Doran*, 1 Esp. 127; *Rex v. Gilson*, Rus. & Ry. 138.

⁴ *Whitford v. Tutin & al.* 10 Bing. 395; *Molton v. Harris*, 2 Esp. 549.

such cases the writing is in the possession of the adverse party, does not change its character; it is still the primary evidence of the contract; and its absence must be accounted for, by notice to the other party to produce it, or in some other legal mode, before secondary evidence of its contents can be received.¹

§ 88. In the *third* place, oral evidence cannot be substituted for *any writing, the existence of which is disputed*, and which is *material either to the issue between the parties, or to the credit of witnesses*, and is not merely the memorandum of some other fact. For, by applying the rule to such cases, the Court acquires a knowledge of the whole contents of the instrument, which may have a different effect from the statement of a part.² "I have always," said Lord Tenterden, "acted most strictly on the rule, that what is in writing, shall only be proved by the writing itself. My experience has taught me the extreme danger of relying on the recollection of witnesses, however honest, as to the contents of written instruments; they may be so easily mistaken, that I think the purposes of justice require the strict enforcement of the rule."³ Thus, it is not allowed, on cross examination, in the statement of a question to a witness, to represent the contents of a letter, and to ask the witness whether he wrote a letter to any person with such contents, or contents to the like effect; without having first shown the letter to the witness, and having asked him whether he wrote that letter; because, if it were otherwise, the cross examining counsel might put the Court in possession of only a part of the contents of a

¹ See further, *Rex v. Rawden*, 8 B. & C. 708; *Sebree v. Dorr*, 9 Wheat. 558; *Bullock v. Koon*, 9 Cowen, 30; *Mather v. Goddard*, 7 Conn. 304; *Rank v. Shewey*, 4 Watts, 218; *Northus v. Jackson*, 13 Wend. 86; *Vinal v. Burrill*, 16 Pick. 401, 407, 408; Cowen & Hill's note 860 to 1 Phil. Evid. 452; *Lanauze v. Palmer*, 1 M. & M. 31.

² So held by all the Judges in the Queen's case, 2 Brod. & Bing. 287. See also Phil. & Am. on Evid. 441; 1 Phil. Evid. 422.

³ *Vincent v. Cole*, 1 M. & M. 258.

paper, when a knowledge of the whole was essential to a right judgment in the cause. If the witness acknowledges the writing of the letter, yet he cannot be questioned as to its contents, but the letter itself must be read.¹ And if a witness being examined in a foreign country, upon interrogatories sent out with a commission for that purpose, should in one of his answers state the contents of a letter which is not produced; that part of the deposition will be suppressed; notwithstanding, he being out of the jurisdiction, there may be no means of compelling him to produce the letter.²

§ 89. In cases, however, where the written communication or agreement between the parties is *collateral* to the question in issue, it need not be produced; as, where the writing is a mere proposal, which has not been acted upon;³ or, where a written memorandum was made of the terms of the contract, which was read in the presence of the parties, but never signed, or proposed to be signed;⁴ or, where, during an employment under a written contract, a separate verbal order is given;⁵ or, where the action is not directly upon the agreement, for non-performance of it, but is in tort, for the conversion or detention of the document itself;⁶ or, where the action is for the plaintiff's share of money had and received by the defendant, under a written security for a debt due to them both.⁷

¹ The Queen's case, 2 B. & B. 287; Post, § 463.

² Steinkeller v. Newton, 9 C. & P. 313.

³ Ingram v. Lea, 2 Campb. 521; Ramsbottom v. Tunbridge, 2 M. & S. 434; Stephens v. Pinney, 8 Taunt. 327; Doe v. Cartwright, 3 B. & A. 326; Wilson v. Bowie, 1 C. & P. 8; Hawkins v. Warre, 3 B. & C. 690.

⁴ Truwhitt v. Lambert, 10 Ad. & El. 470.

⁵ Reid v. Battie, M. & M. 413.

⁶ Jolley v. Taylor, 1 Campb. 143; Scott v. Jones, 8 Taunt. 865; How v. Hall, 14 East, 274; Bucher v. Jarratt, 3 B. & P. 143; Whitehead v. Scott, 1 M. & Rob. 2; Ross v. Bruce, 1 Day, 100; The People v. Holbrook, 13 Johns. 90; McLean v. Hertzog, 6 S. & R. 154.

⁷ Bayne v. Stone, 4 Esp. 13. Ree Tucker v. Welsh, 17 Mass. 165; McFadden v. Kingsbury, 11 Wend. 667; Cowen & Hill's note 860 to 1 Phil. Evid. 452; Southwick v. Stephens, 10 Johns. 443.

§ 90. But, where the writing does not fall within either of the three classes already described, there is no ground for its excluding oral evidence. As, for example, if a written communication be *accompanied* by a verbal one, to the same effect, the latter may be received as independent evidence, though not to prove the contents of the writing, nor as a substitute for it. Thus, also, the payment of money may be proved by oral testimony, though a receipt be taken;¹ in trover, a verbal demand of the goods is admissible, though a demand in writing was made at the same time;² the admission of indebtedness is provable by oral testimony, though a written promise to pay was simultaneously given, if the paper be inadmissible for want of a stamp.³ Such, also, is the case of the examination and confession of a prisoner, taken down in writing by the magistrate, but not signed and certified pursuant to the statutes.⁴ And any writing, inadmissible for the want of a *stamp*, or other irregularity, may still be used by the witness who wrote it, or was present at the time, as a memorandum to refresh his own memory, from which alone he is supposed to testify, independently of the written paper.⁵ In like manner, in prosecutions for political offences, such as treason, conspiracy, and sedition, the *inscription* on flags and banners paraded in public, and the contents of *resolutions* read at a public meeting, may be proved, as of the nature of speeches, by oral testimony;⁶ and in the case of *printed papers*, all the impressions are regarded as originals,

¹ Rambert v. Cohen, 4 Esp. 213; Jacob v. Lindsay, 1 East, 460; Doe v. Cartwright, 3 B. & A. 326.

² Smith v. Young, 4 Campb. 439.

³ Singleton v. Barrett, 2 Cr. & Jer. 368.

⁴ Lambe's case, 2 Leach, 625; Rex v. Chappel, 1 M. & Rob. 395, 396, n.; 2 Phil. Evid. 81, 82; Roscoe's Crim. Evid. 46, 47.

⁵ Dalison v. Stark, 4 Esp. 163; Jacob v. Lindsay, 1 East, 460; Maugham v. Hubbard, 8 B. & C. 14; Rex v. Tarrant, 6 C. & P. 182; Rex v. Pressly, lb. 183; Laver's case, 16 Howell's St. Tr. 223; Post, § 228, 436.

⁶ Rex v. Hunt, 3 B. & A. 566; Sheridan & Kirwan's case, 31 Howell's St. Tr. 672.

and are evidence against the person who adopts the printing, by taking away copies.¹

§ 91. The rule rejecting secondary evidence, is subject to some *exceptions*; grounded either on public convenience, or on the nature of the facts to be proved. Thus, the contents of any record of a judicial Court, and of entries in any other *public books or registers*, may be proved by an *examined copy*. This exception extends to all records and entries of a public nature, in books required by law to be kept; and is admitted because of the inconvenience to the public, which the removal of such documents might occasion, especially if they were wanted in two places at the same time; and, also, because of the public character of the facts they contain, and the consequent facility of detection of any fraud or error in the copy.²

§ 92. For the same reasons, and from the strong presumption arising from the undisturbed exercise of a public office, that the appointment to it is valid, it is not, in general, necessary to prove the written *appointments of public officers*. All, who are proved to have acted as such, are presumed to have been duly appointed to the office, until the contrary appears; and it is not material how the question arises, whether in a civil or criminal case, nor whether the officer is or is not a party to the record;³ unless, being plaintiff, he unnecessarily

¹ *Rex v. Watson*, 2 Stark. R. 129, 130.

² *Bull. N. P.* 226; 1 Stark. Evid. 189, 191. But this exception does not extend to an answer in chancery, where the party is indicted for perjury therein; for there the original must be produced, in order to identify the party, by proof of his handwriting. The same reason applies to depositions and affidavits. *Rex v. Howard*, 1 M. & Rob. 189.

³ *Rex v. Gordon*, 2 Leach's C. C. 581; *Berryman v. Wise*, 4 T. R. 366; *McGahey v. Alston*, 2 Mees. & Welsb. 206, 211; *Radford v. McIntosh*, 3 T. R. 632; *Cross v. Kaye*, 6 T. R. 663; *James v. Brawn*, 5 B. & A. 243; *Rex v. Jones*, 2 Campb. 131; *Rex v. Verelst*, 3 Campb. 432. A commissioner appointed to take affidavits is a public officer, within this exception. *Rex v. Howard*, 1 M. & Rob. 187. See Ante, § 83; *United States v. Reyburn*, 6 Peters, 352, 367; *Regina v. Newton*, 1 Car. & Kir. 469; *Doe*

avers his title to the office, or the mode of his appointment; in which case, as has been already shown, the proof must support the entire allegation.¹ These, and similar exceptions are also admitted, as not being within the reason of the rule, which calls for primary evidence, namely, the presumption of fraud, arising from its non-production.

§ 93. A further relaxation of the rule has been admitted, where the evidence is the result of *voluminous facts*, or of the inspection of *many books and papers*, the examination of which could not conveniently take place in Court.² Thus, if there be one invariable mode, in which bills of exchange have been drawn between particular parties, this may be proved by the testimony of a witness conversant with their habit of business, and speaking generally of the fact, without producing the bills. But, if the mode of dealing has not been uniform, the case does not fall within this exception, but is governed by the rule requiring the production of the writings.³ So, also, a witness who has inspected the accounts of the parties, though he may not give evidence of their particular contents, may be allowed to speak to the general balance,

v. Barnes, 10 Jur. 520; *Plumer v. Briscoe*, 12 Jur. 351; *Doe v. Young*, 8 Ad. & El. 63, N. S.

¹ Ante, § 56; *Cannell v. Curtis*, 2 Bing. N. C. 228; *Moises v. Thornton*, 8 T. R. 303; *The People v. Hopson*, 1 Denio, R. 574. In an action by the sheriff for his poundage, proof that he has acted as sheriff has been held sufficient *prima facie* evidence that he is so, without proof of his appointment. *Bunbury v. Matthews*, 1 Car. & Kir. 380. But in New York it has been held otherwise. *The People v. Hopson*, *supra*.

² *Phil. & Am. on Evid.* 454; 1 *Phil. Evid.* 433, 434. The rules of pleading have, for a similar reason, been made to yield to public convenience in the administration of justice; and a general allegation is frequently allowed, "when the matters to be pleaded tend to infiniteness and multiplicity, whereby the rolls shall be incumbered with the length thereof." *Mints v. Bethil*, Cro. El. 749; *Stephen on Pl.* 359, 360. Courts of Equity admit the same exception in regard to parties to bills, where they are numerous, on the like grounds of convenience. *Story on Equity*, Pl. 94, 95, *et seq.*

³ *Spencer v. Billing*, 3 Campb. 310.

without producing the accounts.¹ And, where the question is upon the solvency of a party at a particular time, the general result of an examination of his books and securities may be stated in like manner.²

§ 94. Under this head may be mentioned the case of inscriptions on walls and fixed tables, mural monuments, gravestones, surveyors' marks on boundary trees, &c., which, as they cannot conveniently be produced in Court, may be proved by secondary evidence.³

§ 95. Another exception is made, in the examination of a witness on the *voir dire*, and in preliminary inquiries of the same nature. If, upon such examination, the witness discloses the existence of a written instrument affecting his competency, he may also be interrogated as to its contents. To a case of this kind, the general rule requiring the production of the instrument, or notice to produce it, does not apply; for the objecting party may have been ignorant of its existence, until it was disclosed by the witness; nor could he be supposed to know that such a witness would be produced. So, for the like reason, if the witness, on the *voir dire*, admits any other fact going to render him incompetent, the effect of which has been subsequently removed by a written document, or even a record, he may speak to the contents of such writing, without producing it; the rule being, that where the objection arises on the *voir dire*, it may be removed on the

¹ Roberts v. Daxon, Peake's Cas. 83. But not as to particular facts appearing on the books, or deducible from the entries. Dupuy v. Truman, 2 Y. & C. 341.

² Meyer v. Sefton, 2 Stark. R. 274.

³ Doe v. Coyle, 6 C. & P. 360; Rex v. Fursey, Id. 81. But if they can conveniently be brought into Court, their actual production is required. Thus, where it was proposed to show the contents of a printed notice, hung up in the office of the party, who was a carrier, parol evidence of its contents was rejected, it not being affixed to the freehold. Jones v. Tarleton, 1 D. P. C. (N. S.) 625.

voir dire.¹ If, however, the witness produces the writing, it must be read, being the best evidence.²

§ 96. It may be proper, in this place, to consider the question, whether a verbal admission of the contents of a writing, by the party himself, will supersede the necessity of giving notice to produce it; or, in other words, whether such admission, being made against the party's own interest, can be used as primary evidence of the contents of the writing, against him and those claiming under him. Upon this question, there appears some discrepancy in the authorities at *nisi prius*.³ But it is to be observed, that there is a material difference between proving the execution of an attested instrument, when produced, and proving the party's admission, that by a written instrument, which is not produced, a certain act was done. In the former case, the law is well settled, as we shall hereafter show, that when an attested instrument is in Court, and its execution is to be proved against a hostile party, an admission on his part, unless made with a view to the trial of that cause, is not sufficient. This rule is founded on reasons peculiar to the class of cases to which it is applied. A distinction is also to be observed between a *confessio juris*, and a

¹ Phil. & Am. on Evid. 149; 1 Phil. Evid. 154, 155; Butcher's Co. v. Jones, 1 Esp. 160; Botham v. Swingle, Ib. 164; Rex v. Gisburn, 15 East, 57; Carlisle v. Eady, 1 C. & P. 234, note; Miller v. Mariner's Church, 7 Greenl. 51; Sewell v. Stubbs, 1 C. & P. 73.

² Butler v. Carver, 2 Stark. R. 433. A distinction has been taken between cases, where the incompetency appears from the examination of the witness, and those where it is already apparent from the record, without his examination; and it has been held, that the latter case falls within the rule, and not within the exception, and that the writing which restores the competency must be produced. See *acc.* Goodhay v. Hendry, 1 M. & M. 319, per Best, C. J., and Id. 321, n., per Tindal, C. J. But see Carlisle v. Eady, 1 C. & P. 234, per Park, J.; Wandless v. Cawthorne, 1 M. & M. 321, n. per Parke, J. *contra*. See 1 Phil. Evid. 154, 155.

³ Phil. & Am. on Evid. 363, 364; 1 Phil. Evid. 346, 347. See the Monthly Law Magazine, Vol. 5, p. 175-187, where this point is distinctly treated.

confessio facti. If the admission is of the former nature, it falls within the rule already considered, and is not received;¹ for the party may not know the legal effect of the instrument, and his admission of its nature and effect may be exceedingly erroneous. But where the existence, and not the formal execution of a writing is the subject of inquiry, or where the writing is collateral to the principal facts, and it is on these facts that the claim is founded, the better opinion seems to be, that the confession of the party, precisely identified, is admissible, as primary evidence of the facts recited in the writing; though it is less satisfactory than the writing itself.² Very great weight ought not to be attached to evidence of what a party has been supposed to have said; as it frequently happens, not only that the witness has misunderstood what the party said, but that, by unintentionally altering a few of the expressions really used, he gives an effect to the statement, completely at variance with what the party actually did say.³ Upon this distinction the adjudged cases seem chiefly to turn. Thus, where, in an action by the assignees of a bankrupt, for infringing a patent right standing in his name, the defendant proposed to prove the oral declaration of the bankrupt, that by certain deeds an interest in the patent right had been conveyed by him to a stranger, the evidence was properly rejected; for it involved an opinion of the party upon the legal effect of the deeds.⁴ On the other hand, it has been held, that the fact of the tenancy of an estate, or that one person, at a certain time, occupied it as the tenant of a certain

¹ Ante, § 86; *Moore v. Hitchcock*, 4 Wend. 262, 298, 299; *Paine v. Tucker*, 8 Shepl. 138.

² *Howard v. Smith*, 3 Scott, N. R. 574.

³ Per Parke, J. in *Earle v. Picken*, 5 C. & P. 542, note. See also 1 Stark. Evid. 35, 36; 2 Stark. Evid. 17; Post, § 200, 203; Ph. & Am. on Evid. 391, 392; 1 Phil. Evid. 372.

⁴ *Bloxam v. Elsee*, 1 C. & P. 558; Ry. & M. 187, S. C. See to the same point, *Rex v. Hube*, Peake's Cas. 132; *Thomas v. Ansley*, 6 Esp. 80; *Scott v. Clare*, 3 Campb. 236; *Rex v. Careinion*, 8 East, 77; *Harrison v. More*, Phil. & Am. on Evid. 365, n.; 1 Phil. Evid. 347, n.; *Rex v. Inhabitants of Castle Morton*, 3 B. & A. 588.

other person, may be proved by oral testimony. But if the terms of the contract are in controversy, and they are contained in a writing, the instrument itself must be produced.¹

§ 97. There is a class of cases, which seem to be *exceptions* to this rule, and to favor the doctrine, that oral declarations of a party to an instrument, as to its contents or effect, may be shown as a substitute for direct proof by the writing itself. But these cases stand on a different principle, namely, that where the admission *involves the material fact in pais, as well as a matter of law*, the latter shall not operate to exclude evidence of the fact from the Jury. It is merely placed in the same predicament with mixed questions of law and fact, which are always left to the Jury, under the advice and instructions of the Court.² Thus, where the plaintiff, in ejectment, had verbally declared that he had "sold the lease," under which he claimed title, to a stranger, evidence of this declaration was admitted against him.³ It involved the fact of the making of an instrument called an assignment of the lease, and of the delivery of it to the assignee, as well as the legal effect of the writing. So, also, similar proof has been received, that the party was "possessed of a leasehold,"⁴ — "held a note,"⁵ — "had dissolved a partnership," which was created by deed,⁶ — and, that the indorser of a dishonored bill of exchange admitted, that it has been "duly protested."⁷ What the party has stated in his answer in Chancery, is

¹ *Brewer v. Palmer*, 3 Esp. 213; *Rex v. Inhabitants of Holy Trinity*, 7 B. & C. 611; 1 Man. & Ry. 444, S. C.; *Strother v. Barr et al.* 5 Bing. 136; *Ramsbottom v. Tunbridge*, 2 M. & S. 434.

² *United States v. Battiste*, 2 Sumn. 240.

³ *Doe d. Lowden v. Watson*, 2 Stark. R. 230.

⁴ *Digby v. Steele*, 3 Campb. 115.

⁵ *Sewell v. Stubbs*, 1 C. & P. 73.

⁶ *Doe d. Waithman v. Miles*, 1 Stark. R. 181; 4 Campb. 375.

⁷ *Gibbons v. Coggon*, 2 Campb. 188. Whether an admission of the counterfeit character of a bank note which the party had passed, is sufficient evidence of the fact, without producing the note, *quare*; and see *Commonwealth v. Bigelow*, 8 Met. 235.

admissible on other grounds, namely, that it is a solemn declaration under oath in a judicial proceeding, and that the legal effect of the instrument is stated under the advice of counsel learned in the law. So, also, where both the existence and the legal effect of one deed are recited in another, the solemnity of the act, and the usual aid of counsel, take the case out of the reason of the general rule, and justify the admission of such recital, as satisfactory evidence of the legal effect of the instrument, as well as conclusive proof of its execution.¹ There are other cases, which may seem, at first view, to constitute exceptions to the present rule, but in which the declarations of the party were admissible, either as contemporaneous with an act done, and expounding its character, thus being part of the *res gestæ*; or, as establishing a collateral fact, independent of the written instrument. Of this sort, was the declaration of a bankrupt, upon his return to his house, that he had been absent in order to avoid a writ issued against him;² the oral acknowledgment of a debt, for which an unstamped note had been given;³ and the oral admission of the party, that he was in fact a member of a society created by deed, and had done certain acts in that capacity.⁴

¹ *Ashmore v. Hardy*, 7 C. & P. 501; *Digby v. Steele*, 3 Campb. 115; *Burleigh v. Stibbs*, 4 T. R. 465; *West v. Davis*, 7 East, 363; *Paul v. Meek*, 2 Y. & J. 116; *Breton v. Cope*, Peake's Cas. 30.

² *Newman v. Stretch*, 1 M. & M. 338.

³ *Singleton v. Barrett*, 2 C. & J. 368.

⁴ *Alderson v. Clay*, 1 Stark. R. 405; *Harvey v. Kay*, 9 B. & C. 356.

CHAPTER V.

OF HEARSAY.

§ 98. THE first degree of moral evidence, and that which is most satisfactory to the mind, is afforded by our own senses; this being direct evidence, of the highest nature. Where this cannot be had, as is generally the case in the proof of facts by oral testimony, the law requires the next best evidence, namely, the testimony of those who can speak from their own personal knowledge. It is not requisite that the witness should have personal knowledge of the main fact in controversy; for this may not be provable by direct testimony, but only by inference from other facts shown to exist. But it is requisite that, whatever facts the witness may speak to, he should be confined to those lying in his own knowledge, whether they be things said or done, and should not testify from information given by others, however worthy of credit they may be. For it is found indispensable, as a test of truth, and to the proper administration of justice, that every living witness should, if possible, be subjected to the ordeal of a cross examination, that it may appear, what were his powers of perception, his opportunities for observation, his attentiveness in observing, the strength of his recollection, and his disposition to speak the truth. But testimony from the relation of third persons, even where the informant is known, cannot be subjected to this test; nor is it often possible to ascertain through whom, or how many persons, the narrative has been transmitted, from the original witness of the fact. It is this, which constitutes that sort of second-hand evidence, termed hearsay.

§ 99. The term *hearsay*, is used with reference to that which is written, as well as to that which is spoken; and, in its legal sense, it denotes that kind of evidence, which does

admissible on other grounds, namely, that it is a solemn declaration under oath in a judicial proceeding, and that the legal effect of the instrument is stated under the advice of counsel learned in the law. So, also, where both the existence and the legal effect of one deed are recited in another, the solemnity of the act, and the usual aid of counsel, take the case out of the reason of the general rule, and justify the admission of such recital, as satisfactory evidence of the legal effect of the instrument, as well as conclusive proof of its execution.¹ There are other cases, which may seem, at first view, to constitute exceptions to the present rule, but in which the declarations of the party were admissible, either as contemporaneous with an act done, and expounding its character, thus being part of the *res gestæ*; or, as establishing a collateral fact, independent of the written instrument. Of this sort, was the declaration of a bankrupt, upon his return to his house, that he had been absent in order to avoid a writ issued against him;² the oral acknowledgment of a debt, for which an unstamped note had been given;³ and the oral admission of the party, that he was in fact a member of a society created by deed, and had done certain acts in that capacity.⁴

¹ Ashmore v. Hardy, 7 C. & P. 501; Digby v. Steele, 3 Campb. 115; Burleigh v. Stibbs, 4 T. R. 465; West v. Davis, 7 East, 363; Paul v. Meek, 2 Y. & J. 116; Breton v. Cope, Peake's Cas. 30.

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§ 99. The term *hearsay*, is used with reference to that which is written, as well as to that which is spoken; and, in its legal sense, it denotes that kind of evidence, which does

not derive its value solely from the credit to be given to the witness himself, but rests also, in part, on the veracity and competency of some other person.¹ Hearsay evidence, as thus described, is uniformly held incompetent to establish any *specific fact*, which, in its nature, is susceptible of being proved by witnesses, who can speak from their own knowledge. That this species of testimony supposes something better, which might be adduced in the particular case, is not the sole ground of its exclusion. Its intrinsic weakness, its incompetency to satisfy the mind as to the existence of the fact, and the frauds which may be practised under its cover, combine to support the rule, that hearsay evidence is totally inadmissible.²

§ 100. Before we proceed any farther in the discussion of this branch of evidence, it will be proper to *distinguish* more clearly between *hearsay evidence*, and that which is deemed *original*. For it does not follow, because the writing or words in question are those of a third person, not under oath, that therefore they are to be considered as hearsay. On the contrary, it happens in many cases, that the very fact in controversy is, whether such things were written, or spoken, and not whether they were true; and in other cases, such language or statements, whether written or spoken, may be the natural or inseparable concomitants of the principal fact in controversy.³ In such cases, it is obvious, that the writings or words are not within the meaning of hearsay, but are original and independent facts, admissible in proof of the issue.

§ 101. Thus, where the question is, whether the party acted prudently, wisely, or in good faith, the *information*, on which he acted, whether true or false, is original and material

¹ 1 Phil. Evid. 185.

² Per Marshall, C. J. in *Mima Queen v. Hepburn*, 7 Cranch, 290, 295, 296; *Davis v. Wood*, 1 Wheat. 6, 8; *Rex v. Eriswell*, 3 T. R. 707.

³ *Bartlett v. Delprat*, 4 Mass. 702, 708; *Du Bost v. Beresford*, 2 Campb. 511, 512.

evidence. This is often illustrated in actions for malicious prosecution;¹ and, also, in cases of agency and of trusts. So, also, *letters* and *conversation* addressed to a person, whose sanity is the fact in the question, being connected in evidence with some act done by him, are original evidence to show whether he was insane, or not.² The *replies* given to inquiries made at the residence of an absent witness, or at the dwelling-house of a bankrupt, denying that he was at home, are also original evidence.³ In these, and the like cases, it is not

¹ *Taylor v. Willans*, 2 B. & Ad. 845. So, to reduce the damages, in an action for libel. *Coleman v. Southwick*, 9 Johns. 45.

² *Wheeler v. Alderson*, 3 Hagg. Eccl. R. 574, 608; *Wright v. Tatham*, 1 Ad. & El. 3, 8; 7 Ad. & El. 313, S. C.; 4 Bing. N. C. 489, S. C. Whether letters addressed to the person, whose sanity is in issue, are admissible evidence to prove how he was treated by those who knew him, without showing any reply on his part, or any other act connected with the letters or their contents, was a question much discussed in *Wright v. Tatham*. Their admissibility was strongly urged, as evidence of the manner in which the person was in fact treated by those who knew him; but it was replied, that the effect of the letters, alone considered, was only to show what were the *opinions* of the writers; and that mere opinions, upon a distinct fact, were in general inadmissible; but, whenever admissible, they must be proved, like other facts, by the witness himself under oath. The letters in this case were admitted by Gurney, B., who held the assizes; and upon error in the Exchequer Chamber, four of the learned Judges deemed them rightly admitted, and three thought otherwise; but the point was not decided, a *venire de novo* being awarded on another ground. (See 2 Ad. & El. 3; and 7 Ad. & El. 329.) Upon the new trial before the same Judge, the letters were again received; and for this cause, on motion, a new trial was granted by Lord Denman, C. J., and Littleale and Coleridge, Js. The cause was then again tried before Coleridge, J., who rejected the letters; and exceptions being taken, a writ of error was again brought in the Exchequer Chamber; where the six learned Judges present, being divided equally upon the question, the judgment of the King's Bench was affirmed; (see 7 Ad. & El. 313, 408,) and this judgment was afterwards affirmed in the House of Lords; (see 4 Bing. N. C. 489,) a large majority of the learned Judges concurring in opinion, that letters addressed to the party were not admissible in evidence, unless connected by proof, with some act of his own in regard to the letters themselves or their contents.

³ *Crosby v. Percy*, 1 Taunt. 364; *Morgan v. Morgan*, 9 Bing. 359; *Sumner v. Williams*, 5 Mass. 444; *Pelletreau v. Jackson*, 11 Wend. 110, 123, 124; *Key v. Shaw*, 8 Bing. 320; *Phelps v. Foot*, 1 Conn. 387.

necessary to call the persons, to whom the inquiries were addressed, since their testimony could add nothing to the credibility of the fact of the denial, which is the only fact, that is material. This doctrine applies to all other communications, wherever the fact that such communication was made, and not its truth or falsity, is the point in controversy.¹ Upon the same principle it is considered, that evidence of *general reputation, reputed ownership, public rumor, general notoriety*, and the like, though composed of the speech of third persons not under oath, is original evidence and not hearsay; the subject of inquiry being the concurrence of many voices to the same fact.²

§ 102. Wherever the *bodily or mental feelings* of an individual are material to be proved, the usual expressions of such feelings, made at the time in question, are also original evidence. If they were the natural language of the affection, whether of body or mind, they furnish satisfactory evidence, and often the only proof, of its existence. And whether they were real or feigned, is for the Jury to determine. Thus, in actions for criminal conversation, it being material to ascertain upon what terms the husband and wife lived together before the seduction, their language and deportment towards each other, their correspondence together, and their conversations and correspondence with third persons, are original evidence.³

¹ *Whitehead v. Scott*, 1 M. & Rob. 2; *Shott v. Strealfeld*, ib. 8; 1 Ph. Evid. 188.

² *Foulkes v. Sellway*, 3 Esp. 236; *Jones v. Perry*, 2 Esp. 482; *Rex v. Watson*, 2 Stark. R. 116; Bull. N. P. 296, 297. Evidence of reputed ownership is seldom admissible, except in cases of bankruptcy, by virtue of the statute of 21 Jac. 1, c. 19, § 11; *Gurr v. Rutton*, Holt's N. P. Cas. 327; *Oliver v. Bartlett*, 1 Brod. & Bing. 269. Upon the question, whether a libellous painting was meant to represent a certain individual, Lord Ellenborough permitted the declarations of the spectators, while looking at the picture in the exhibition room, to be given in evidence. *Du Bost v. Beresford*, 2 Campb. 512.

³ *Trelawney v. Coleman*, 2 Stark. R. 191; 1 Barn. & Ald. 90, S. C.; *Willis v. Barnard*, 8 Bing. 376; *Elsam v. Faucett*, 2 Esp. 562; *Winter v.*

But, to guard against the abuse of this rule, it has been held, that before the letters of the wife can be received, it must be proved that they were written prior to any misconduct on her part, and when there existed no ground for imputing collusion.¹ If written after an attempt of the defendant to accomplish the crime, the letters are inadmissible.² Nor are the dates of the wife's letters to the husband received as sufficient evidence of the time when they were written, in order to rebut a charge of cruelty on his part; because of the danger of collusion.³ So, also, the representation, by a *sick person*, of the nature, symptoms, and effects of the *malady*, under which he is laboring at the time, are received as original evidence. If made to a medical attendant, they are of greater weight as evidence; but, if made to any other person, they are not on that account rejected.⁴ In prosecutions for *rape*, too, where the party injured is a witness, it is material to show that she made complaint of the injury while it was yet recent. Proof of such complaint, therefore, is original evidence; but the statement of details and circumstances is excluded, it being no legal proof of their truth.⁵

§ 103. To this head may be referred much of the evidence sometimes termed hearsay, which is admitted in cases of

Wroot, 1 M. & Rob. 404; *Gilchrist v. Bale*, 8 Watts, 355; *Thompson v. Freeman*, Skin. 402.

¹ *Edwards v. Crock*, 4 Esp. 39; *Trelawney v. Coleman*, 1 Barn. & Ald. 90; 1 Ph. Evid. 190.

² *Wilton v. Webster*, 7 Car. & P. 198.

³ *Houlston v. Smyth*, 2 Car. & P. 22; *Trelawney v. Coleman*, 1 Barn. & Ald. 90.

⁴ *Aveson v. Lord Kinnaird*, 6 East, 188; 1 Ph. Evid. 191; *Grey v. Young*, 4 McCord, 38; *Gilchrist v. Bale*, 8 Watts, 355.

⁵ 1 East, P. C. 444, 445; 1 Hale, P. C. 633; 1 Russell on Crimes, 565; *Rex v. Clarke*, 2 Stark. R. 241. In a prosecution for conspiring to assemble a large meeting, for the purpose of exciting terror in the community, the complaints of terror, made by persons professing to be alarmed, were permitted to be proved by a witness, who heard them, without calling the persons themselves. *Regina v. Vincent et al.* 9 C. & P. 275.

pedigree. The principal question, in these cases, is that of the parentage, or descent of the individual; and in order to ascertain this fact, it is material to know how he was acknowledged and treated by those who were interested in him, or sustained towards him any relations of blood or of affinity. It was long unsettled, whether any and what kind of relation must have subsisted between the person speaking and the person whose pedigree was in question; and there are reported cases in which the declarations of servants, and even of neighbors and friends, have been admitted. But it is now settled, that the law resorts to hearsay evidence in cases of pedigree, upon the ground of the interest of the declarants in the person, from whom the descent is made out, and their consequent interest in knowing the connexions of the family. The rule of admission is, therefore, restricted to the declarations of deceased persons, who were related by blood or marriage to the person, and, therefore, interested in the succession in question.¹ And, *general repute in the family*, proved by the testimony of a surviving member of it, has been considered as falling within the rule.²

¹ *Vowles v. Young*, 13 Ves. 140, 147; *Goodright v. Moss*, Cowp. 591, 594, as expounded by Lord Eldon in *Whitelocke v. Baker*, 13 Ves. 514; *Johnson v. Lawson*, 2 Bing. 86; *Monkton v. Attorney General*, 3 Russ. & My. 147, 156; *Crease v. Barrett*, 1 Crompt. Mees. & Ros. 919, 928; *Casey v. O'Shaunessy*, 7 Jur. 1140; *Gregory v. Baugh*, 4 Rand. 607; *Jewell v. Jewell*, 1 How. S. C. Rep. 231; 17 Peters, 213, S. C.; *Jackson v. Browner*, 18 Johns. 37; *Chapman v. Chapman*, 2 Conn. 347; *Waldron v. Tuttle*, 4 N. Hamp. 371; Cowen & Hill's note 466, to 1 Ph. Evid. 240.

² *Doe v. Griffin*, 15 East, 293. There is no valid objection to such evidence, because it is hearsay upon hearsay, provided all the declarations are within the family. Thus, the declarations of a deceased lady, as to what had been stated to her by her husband in his lifetime, were admitted. *Doe v. Randall*, 2 M. & P. 20; *Monkton v. Attorney Gen.* 2 Russ. & My. 165; Bull. N. P. 295; *Elliot v. Piersol*, 1 Peters, 328, 337; *Doe v. Davies*, 11 Jur. 607. In regard to the value and weight to be given to this kind of evidence, the following observations of Lord Langdale, M. R. are entitled to great consideration. "In cases," said he, "where the whole evidence is traditionary, when it consists entirely of family reputation or of statements of declarations made by

§ 104. The term, *pedigree*, however, embraces not only descent and relationship, but also the facts of *birth*, *marriage*, and *death*, and the times when these events happened. These facts, therefore, may be proved in the manner above mentioned, in all cases where they occur incidentally, and in relation to pedigree. Thus, an entry by a deceased parent, or other relative, made in a bible, family missal, or any other book, or in any document or paper, stating the fact and date of the birth, marriage, or death of a child, or other relative, is regarded as the declaration of such parent or relative, in a matter of pedigree.¹ So, also, the correspondence of deceased members of the family, recitals in family deeds, such as marriage settlements, descriptions in wills, and other solemn acts,

persons who died long ago, it must be taken with such allowances and also with such suspicions, as ought reasonably to be attached to it. When family reputation, or declarations of kindred made in a family, are the subject of evidence, and the reputation is of long standing, or the declarations are of old date, the memory as to the source of the reputation, or as to the persons who made the declarations, can rarely be characterized by perfect accuracy. What is true may become blended with, and scarcely distinguishable from something that is erroneous; the detection of error in any part of the statement necessarily throws doubt upon the whole statement, and yet all that is material to the case may be perfectly true; and if the whole be rejected as false, because error in some part is proved, the greatest injustice may be done. All testimony is subject to such errors, and testimony of this kind is more particularly so; and however difficult it may be to discover the truth, in cases where there can be no demonstration, and where every conclusion which may be drawn, is subject to some doubt or uncertainty, or to some opposing probabilities, the Courts are bound to adopt the conclusion which appears to rest on the most solid foundation." See *Johnston v. Todd*, 5 Beav. 599, 600.

¹ The *Berkley Peerage* case, 4 Campb. 401, 418; *Doe v. Bray*, 8 B. & C. 813; *Monkton v. The Attor. Gen.* 2 Russ. & My. 147; *Jackson v. Cooley*, 8 Johns. 128, 131, per Thompson, J.; *Douglas v. Saunderson*, 2 Dall. 116; The *Slane Peerage* case, 5 Clark & Fin. 24; *Carskadden v. Poorman*, 10 Watts, 82; The *Sussex Peerage* case, 11 Clark & Fin. 85; *Watson v. Brewster*, 1 Barr, Pennsylv. R. 381. And in a recent case this doctrine has been thought to warrant the admission of declarations, made by a deceased person, as to where his family came from, where he came from, and of what place his father was designated. *Shields v. Boucher*, 1 De Gex & Smale, 40.

are original evidence in all cases, where the oral declarations of the parties are admissible.¹ In regard to recitals of pedigree in bills and answers in Chancery, a distinction has been taken between those facts which are not in dispute, and those which are in controversy; the former being admitted, and the latter excluded.² Recitals in deeds, other than family deeds, are also admitted, when corroborated by long and peaceable possession according to the deed.³

§ 105. *Inscriptions on tombstones, and other funereal monuments, engravings on rings, inscriptions on family portraits, charts of pedigree, and the like, are also admissible, as original evidence of the same facts.* Those which are proved to have been made by, or under the direction of a deceased relative, are admitted as his declarations. But, if they have been publicly exhibited and were well known to the family, the publicity of them supplies the defect of proof in not showing that they were declarations of deceased members of the family; and they are admitted on the ground of tacit and common assent. It is presumed, that the relatives of the family would not permit an inscription without foundation to remain; and that a person would not wear a ring with an error on

¹ Ph. & Am. on Evid. 229, 230, 1 Ph. Evid. 216, 217, and cases there cited. In two recent cases, the recitals in the deeds were held admissible only against the parties to the deeds; but in neither of those cases was the party proved to have been related to those whose pedigree was recited. In *Fort v. Clarke*, 1 Russ. 601, the grantors recited the death of the sons of John Cormick, tenants in tail male, and declared themselves heirs of the bodies of his daughters, who were devisees in remainder; and in *Slaney v. Wade*, 1 Mylne & Craig, 338, the grantor was a mere trustee of the estate, not related to the parties. See also *Jackson v. Cooley*, 8 Johns. 128; *Jackson v. Russell*, 4 Wend. 543; *Keller v. Nutz*, 5 S. & R. 261. If the recital in a will is made after the fact recited is in controversy, the will is not admissible as evidence of that fact. The *Sussex Peerage case*, 11 Clark & Fin. 85.

² Phil. & Am. on Evid. 231, 232, and the authorities there cited. As to the effect of a *lis mota* upon the admissibility of declarations and reputation, see Post, § 134-131.

³ *Stokes v. Dawes*, 4 Mason, 268.

it.¹ Mural and other funereal inscriptions are provable by copies, or other secondary evidence, as has been already shown.² Their value, as evidence, depends much on the authority under which they were set up, and the distance of time between their erection and the events they commemorate.³

§ 106. Under this head, may be mentioned *family conduct*, such as the tacit recognition of relationship, and the disposition and devolution of property, as admissible evidence, from which the opinion and belief of the family may be inferred, resting ultimately on the same basis as evidence of family tradition. Thus, it was remarked by Mansfield, C. J. in the *Berkley Peerage case*,⁴ that "if the father is proved to have brought up the party as his legitimate son, this amounts to a daily assertion that the son is legitimate." And Mr. Justice Ashhurst, in another case, remarked that the circumstance of the son's taking the name of the person with whom his mother at the time of his birth lived in a state of adultery, which name he and his descendants ever afterwards retained, "was a very strong family recognition of his illegitimacy."⁵ So, the declarations of a person, since deceased, that he was going

¹ Per Lord Erskine in *Vowles v. Young*, 13 Ves. 144; *Monkton v. The Attorney Gen.* 2 Russ. & Mylne, 147; *Kidney v. Cockburn*, lb. 167. The *Camoy's Peerage*, 6 Cl. & Fin. 789. An ancient pedigree, purporting to have been collected from *history*, as well as from other sources, was held admissible at least to show the relationship of persons described by the framer as living, and therefore to be presumed as known to him. *Davies v. Lowndes*, 7 Scott, N. R. 141. Armorial bearings, proved to have existed while the Heralds had the power to punish usurpations, possessed an official weight and credit. But this authority is thought to have ceased with the last Herald's visitation, in 1686. See Phil. & Am. on Evid. 235, 236; 1 Phil. Evid. 224. At present they amount to no more than family declarations.

² Ante, § 94.

³ Some remarkable mistakes of fact in such inscriptions are mentioned in Phil. & Am. on Evid. 234, note (4); 1 Phil. Evid. 222.

⁴ 4 Campb. 416.

⁵ *Goodright v. Saul*, 4 T. R. 356.

to visit his relatives at such a place, have been held admissible to show that the family had relatives there.¹

§ 107. It is frequently said, that *general reputation* is admissible, to prove the fact of the *marriage* of the parties alluded to, even in ordinary cases, where pedigree is not in question. In one case, indeed, such evidence was, after verdict, held sufficient, *prima facie*, to warrant the Jury in finding the fact of marriage, the adverse party not having cross examined the witness, nor controverted the fact by proof.² But the evidence, produced in the other cases cited in support of this position, cannot be properly called hearsay evidence, but was strictly and truly original evidence of facts, from which the marriage might well be inferred; such as evidence of the parties being received into society as man and wife, and being visited by respectable families in the neighborhood, and of their attending church and public places together as such, and otherwise demeaning themselves in public and addressing each other, as persons actually married.³

§ 108. There are *other declarations*, which are admitted as original evidence, being distinguished from hearsay by their connexion with the principal fact under investigation. The affairs of men consist of a complication of circumstances, so intimately interwoven, as to be hardly separable from each other. Each owes its birth to some preceding circumstances, and in its turn becomes the prolific parent of others; and each, during its existence, has its inseparable attributes, and its kindred facts, materially affecting its character, and essential to be known, in order to a right understanding of its

¹ *Rishton v. Nesbitt*, 2 M. & Rob. 252.

² *Evans v. Morgan*, 2 C. & J. 453.

³ Phil. & Am. on Evid. 247; 1 Phil. Evid. 234, 235; *Hervey v. Hervey*, 2 W. Bl. 877; *Birt v. Barlow*, Doug. 171, 174; *Read v. Passer*, 1 Esp. 213; *Leader v. Barry*, ib. 353; *Doe v. Fleming*, 4 Bing. 266; *Smith v. Smith*, 1 Phillim. 294; *Hammick v. Bronson*, 5 Day, 290, 293; *In re Taylor*, 9 Paige, 611.

nature. These surrounding circumstances, constituting parts of the *res gestæ*, may always be shown to the Jury, along with the principal fact; and their admissibility is determined by the Judge, according to the degree of their relation to that fact, and in the exercise of his sound discretion; it being extremely difficult, if not impossible, to bring this class of cases within the limits of a more particular description.¹ The principal points of attention are, whether the circumstances and declarations offered in proof were contemporaneous with the main fact under consideration, and whether they were so connected with it as to illustrate its character.² Thus, in the trial of Lord George Gordon for treason, the cry of the mob, who accompanied the prisoner on his enterprise, was received in evidence, as forming part of the *res gestæ*, and showing the character of the principal fact.³ So, also, where a person enters into land in order to take advantage of a forfeiture, to foreclose a mortgage, to defeat a disseisin,⁴ or the like; or changes his actual residence, or domicile, or is upon a journey, or leaves his home, or returns thither, or remains abroad, or

¹ Per Park, J. in *Rawson v. Haigh*, 2 Bing. 104; *Ridley v. Gyde*, 9 Bing. 349, 352; *Pool v. Bridges*, 4 Pick. 379; *Allen v. Duncan*, 11 Pick. 309.

² Declarations to become part of the *res gestæ*, "must have been made at the time of the act done, which they are supposed to characterize; and have been well calculated to unfold the nature and quality of the facts they were intended to explain, and so to harmonize with them, as obviously to constitute one transaction." Per Hosmer, C. J. in *Enos v. Tuttle*, 3 Conn. R. 250; *In re Taylor*, Paige, 611; *Carter v. Buchannon*, 3 Kelly, R. 513. But declarations explanatory of a previous fact, e. g. how the party's hands became bloody, are inadmissible. *Scrags v. The State*, 8 Smed. & Marsh. 722. In an action by a bailor against the bailee for loss by his negligence, the declarations of the bailee, contemporaneous with the loss, are admissible in his favor, to show the nature of the loss. *Story on Bailm.* § 339; cites *Tompkins v. Saltmarsh*, 14 S. & R. 275; *Beardslee v. Richardson*, 11 Wend. 25; *Doorman v. Jenkins*, 2 Ad. & El. 80. So, in a suit for enticing away a servant, his declarations at the time of leaving his master are admissible, as part of the *res gestæ*, to show the motive of his departure. *Hadley v. Carter*, 8 N. Hamp. 40.

³ 21 Howell's St. Tr. 542.

⁴ Co. Litt. 49 b. 245 b.; *Robison v. Sweet*, 3 Greenl. 316; 3 Bl. Comm. 174, 175.

secretes himself; or, in fine, does any other act, material to be understood; his declarations, made at the time of the transaction, and expressive of its character, motive, or object, are regarded as "verbal acts, indicating a present purpose and intention," and are therefore admitted in proof, like any other material facts.¹ So, upon an inquiry as to the state of mind, sentiments, or dispositions of a person at any particular period, his declarations and conversations are admissible.² They are parts of the *res gestæ*.

§ 109. In regard to the declarations of persons in possession of land, explanatory of the character of their possession, there has been some difference of opinion; but it is now well settled, that *declarations in disparagement of the title of the declarant* are admissible, as original evidence. Possession is *prima facie* evidence of seisin in fee simple; and the declaration of the possessor, that he is tenant to another, it is said, makes most strongly against his own interest, and therefore is admissible.³ But no reason is perceived, why every declaration accompanying the act of possession, whether in disparagement of the declarant's title, or otherwise qualifying his possession, if made in good faith, should not be received as part of the *res gestæ*; leaving its effect to be governed by other rules of evidence.⁴

¹ Bateman v. Bailey, 5 T. R. 512, and the observations of Mr. Evans upon it, in 2 Poth. Obl. App. No. xvi. § 11; Rawson v. Haigh, 2 Bing. 99; Newman v. Stretch, 1 M. & M. 338; Ridley v. Gyde, 9 Bing. 349, 352; Smith v. Cramer, 1 Bing. N. C. 585; Gorham v. Canton, 5 Greenl. 266; Fellowes v. Williamson, 1 M. & M. 306; Vacher v. Coeks, ib. 353; 1 B. & Ad. 135; Thorndike v. City of Boston, 1 Metc. 242; Carroll v. The State, 3 Humph. 315.

² Barthelemy v. The People, &c., 2 Hill, N. Y. Rep. 248, 257.

³ Peaceable v. Watson, 4 Taunt. 16, 17, per Mansfield, C. J.; West Cambridge v. Lexington, 2 Pick. 536, per Putnam, J.; Little v. Libby, 2 Greenl. 242; Doe v. Pettett, 5 B. & Ald. 223; Carne v. Nicoll, 1 Bing. N. C. 430; Per Lyndhurst, C. B. in Chambers v. Bernasconi, 1 Crompt. & Jer. 457.

⁴ Davies v. Pierce, 2 T. R. 53; Doe v. Rickarby, 5 Esp. 4; Doe v. Payne, 1 Stark. R. 69; 2 Poth. on Obl. 254; App. No. xvi. § 11; Rankin

§ 110. It is to be observed, that where declarations, offered in evidence, are merely *narrative of a past occurrence*, they cannot be received as proof of the existence of such occurrence. They must be *concomitant* with the principal act, and so connected with it, as to be regarded as the mere result and consequence of the co-existing motives, in order to form a proper criterion for directing the judgment, which is to be formed upon the whole conduct.¹ On this ground, it has been holden, the letters written during absence from home, are admissible as original evidence, explanatory of the motive of departure and absence, the departure and absence being regarded as one continuing act.²

v. Tenbrook, 6 Watts, 388, 390, per Huston, J.; Doe v. Pettett, 5 B. & Ald. 223; Reed v. Dickey, 1 Watts, 152; Walker v. Broadstock, 1 Esp. 458; Doe v. Austin, 9 Bing. 41; Doe v. Jones, 1 Camph. 367; Jackson v. Bard, 4 Johns. 230, 234; Weidman v. Kohr, 4 S. & R. 174; Giblehouse v. Strong, 3 Rawle, R. 437; Norton v. Pettibone, 7 Conn. R. 319; Snelgrove v. Martin, 2 McCord, 241, 243; Doe d. Majoribanks v. Green, 1 Gow, R. 227; Carne v. Nicoll, 1 Bing. N. C. 430; Davis v. Campbell, 1 Iredell, R. 482; Crane v. Marshall, 4 Shepl. 27; Adams v. French, 2 N. Hamp. R. 287; Treat v. Strickland, 10 Shepl. 234; Blake v. White, 13 N. Hamp. R. 267; Doe v. Langfield, 16 M. & W. 497; Baron De Bode's case, 8 Ad. & El. 243, 244, N. S.; Abney v. Kingsland, 10 Alab. R. 355; Daggett v. Shaw, 5 Metc. 223; Stark v. Boswell, 6 Hill, N. Y. Rep. 405. Where a party, after a post-nuptial settlement, mortgaged the same premises, it was held that, as his declarations could bind him only while the interest remained in him, his declarations, as to the consideration paid by the subsequent purchaser, were not admissible against the claimants under the settlement; for this would enable him to cut down his own previous acts. Doe v. Webber, 3 Nev. & Man. 586.

¹ 2 Poth. on Obl. by Evans, p. 248, 249; App. No. xvi. § 11; Ambrose v. Clendon, Cas. temp. Hardw. 267; Doe v. Webber, 1 Ad. & Ell. 733. In Ridley v. Gyde, 9 Bing. 349, where the point was, to establish an act of bankruptcy, a conversation of the bankrupt on the 20th of November, being a resumption and continuation of one which had been begun, but broken off on the 25th of October preceding, was admitted in evidence. See also Boyden v. Moore, 11 Pick. 362; Walton v. Green, 1 C. & P. 621; Reed v. Dick, 8 Watts, 479; O'Kelly v. O'Kelly, 8 Metc. 436; Stiles v. Western Railroad Corp. Ib. 44.

² Rawson v. Haigh, 2 Bing. 99, 104.

§ 111. The same principles apply to the acts and declarations of one of a company of *conspirators*, in regard to the common design, as affecting his fellows. Here a foundation must first be laid, by proof, sufficient in the opinion of the Judge, to establish *prima facie*, the fact of conspiracy between the parties, or proper to be laid before the Jury, as tending to establish such fact. The connexion of the individuals in the unlawful enterprise being thus shown, every act and declaration of each member of the confederacy, in pursuance of the original concerted plan, and with reference to the common object, is, in contemplation of law, the act and declaration of them all; and is therefore original evidence against each of them. It makes no difference at what time any one entered into the conspiracy. Every one, who does enter into a common purpose or design, is generally deemed, in law, a party to every act, which had before been done by the others, and a party to every act, which may afterwards be done by any of the others, in furtherance of such common design.¹ Sometimes, for the sake of convenience, the acts or declarations of one are admitted in evidence, before sufficient proof is given of the conspiracy; the prosecutor undertaking to furnish such proof in a subsequent stage of the cause. But this rests in the discretion of the Judge, and is not permitted, except under particular and urgent circumstances; lest the Jury should be misled to infer the fact itself of the conspiracy from the declarations of strangers. And here, also, care must be taken that the acts and declarations, thus admitted, be those only which were made and done during the pendency of the criminal enterprise, and in furtherance of its objects. If they took place at a subsequent period, and are, therefore, merely narrative of past occurrences, they are, as we have just seen, to be

¹ *Rex v. Watson*, 32 Howell's State Tr. 7, per Bayley, J.; *Rex v. Brandreth*, ib. 857, 858; *Rex v. Hardy*, 24 Howell's State Tr. 451, 452, 453, 475; *American Fur Co. v. The United States*, 2 Peters, 358, 365; *Crowninshield's case*, 10 Pick. 497; *Rex v. Hunt*, 3 B. & Ald. 566; 1 East's P. C. 97, § 38; *Nichols v. Dowding*, 1 Stark. R. 81.

rejected.¹ The term, *acts*, includes written correspondence, and other papers relative to the main design; but whether it includes unpublished writings upon abstract questions, though of a kindred nature, has been doubted.² Where conversations are proved, the effect of the evidence will depend on other circumstances, such as the fact and degree of the prisoner's attention to it, and his assent or disapproval.³

§ 112. This doctrine extends to all cases of *partnership*. Wherever any number of persons associate themselves, in the joint prosecution of a common enterprise or design, conferring on the collective body the attribute of individuality by mutual compact, as in commercial partnerships, and similar cases, the act or declaration of each member, in furtherance of the common object of the association, is the act of all. By the very act of association, each one is constituted the agent of all.⁴ While the being thus created exists, it speaks and acts only by the several members; and of course, when that existence ceases by the dissolution of the firm, the act of an individual member ceases to have that effect; binding himself alone, except so far as by the articles of association or of dissolution

¹ Phil. & Am. on Evid. p. 215, and note (4). The declarations of one co-trespasser, where several are jointly sued, may be given in evidence against himself, at whatever time it was made; but, if it was not part of the *res geste*, its effect is to be restricted to the party making it. Yet, in *Wright v. Court*, 2 C. & P. 232, which was an action for false imprisonment, the declaration of a co-defendant, showing personal malice, though made in the absence of the others, and several weeks after the fact, was admitted by Garrow, B. without such restriction. Where no common object or motive is imputed, as in actions for negligence, the declaration or admission of one defendant is not admitted against any but himself. *Daniels v. Potter*, 1 M. & M. 501.

² Foster's Rep. 198; *Rex v. Watson*, 2 Stark. R. 116, 141-147.

³ *Rex v. Hardy*, 24 Howell, State Tr. 703, per Eyre, C. J.

⁴ *Sandilands v. Marsh*, 2 B. & Ald. 673, 678, 679; *Wood v. Braddick*, 1 Taunt. 104, and *Petherick v. Turner et al.* there cited; *Rex v. Hardwick*, 11 East, 578, 589; *Van Reimsdyk v. Kane*, 1 Gall. 630, 635; *Nichols v. Dowding*, 1 Stark. R. 81; *Hodempyl v. Vingerhoed*, Chitty on Bills, 618, note (2); *Coit v. Tracy*, 8 Conn. R. 268.

it may have been otherwise agreed.¹ An admission, however, by one partner, made after the dissolution, in regard to business of the firm previously transacted, has been held to be binding on the firm.²

¹ Bell v. Morrison, 1 Peters, 371; Burton v. Issitt, 5 B. & Ald. 267.

² This doctrine was extended by Lord Brougham, to the admission of payment to the partner after the dissolution. Prichard v. Draper, 1 Rus. & M. 191, 199, 200. See Wood v. Braddick, 1 Taunt. 104; Whitcomb v. Whiting, 2 Doug. 652; approved in McIntire v. Oliver, 2 Hawks, 209; Beitz v. Fuller, 1 McCord, 541; Cady v. Shepherd, 11 Pick. 400; Van Reimsdyk v. Kane, 1 Gall. 635, 636. See also Parker v. Merrill, 6 Greenl. 41; Martin v. Root, 17 Mass. 223, 227; Vinal v. Burrell, 16 Pick. 401; Lefavour v. Yandes, 2 Blackf. 240; Bridge v. Gray, 14 Pick. 55; Gay v. Bowen, 8 Met. 100; Mann v. Locke, 11 N. Hamp. R. 246, to the same point. In New York, a different doctrine is established. Walden v. Sherburne, 15 Johns. 409; Hopkins v. Banks, 7 Cowen, 650; Clark v. Gleason, 9 Cowen, 57; Baker v. Stackpoole, 1b. 420. So, in Louisiana. Lambeth v. Vawter, 6 Rob. La. R. 127. See also, in support of the text, Lacy v. McNeil, 4 Dowl. & Ry. 7. Whether the acknowledgment of a debt by a partner, after dissolution of the partnership, will be sufficient to take the case out of the statute of limitations, and revive the remedy against the others, has been very much controverted in this country; and the authorities to the point are conflicting. In England, it is now settled by Lord Tenterden's act, (9 Geo. 4, c. 14,) that such acknowledgment or new promise, independent of the fact of part payment, shall not have such effect, except against the party making it. This provision has been adopted in the laws of some of the United States. See Massachusetts Rev. Stat. ch. 120, § 14-17; Vermont Rev. Stat. ch. 58, § 23, 27. And it has since been holden in England, where a debt was originally contracted with a partnership, and more than six years afterwards, but within six years before action brought, the partnership having been dissolved, one partner made a partial payment in respect of the debt, — that this barred the operation of the statute of limitations; although the Jury found that he made the payment by concert with the plaintiffs, in the jaws of bankruptcy, and in fraud of his late partners. Goddard v. Ingram, 3 Ad. & El. 839, N. S. The American cases seem to have turned mainly on the question, whether the admission of the existing indebtedness amounted to the making of a new contract, or not. The Courts, which have viewed it as virtually a new contract, have held, that the acknowledgment of the debt by one partner, after the dissolution of partnership, was not admissible against his co-partner. This side of the question was argued by Mr. Justice Story, with his accustomed ability, in delivering the judgment of the Court in Bell v. Morrison, 1 Peters, 367, et seq.; where, after stating

§ 113. A kindred principle governs in regard to the *declarations of agents*. The principal constitutes the agent his

the point, he proceeds as follows:—"In the case of Bland v. Haselrig, 2 Vent. 151, where the action was against four, upon a joint promise, and the plea of the statute of limitations was put in, and the Jury found that one of the defendants did promise within six years, and that the others did not; three Judges, against Ventris, J. held, that the plaintiff could not have judgment against the defendant, who had made the promise. This case has been explained upon the ground, that the verdict did not conform to the pleadings, and establish a joint promise. It is very doubtful, upon a critical examination of the report, whether the opinion of the Court, or of any of the Judges, proceeded solely upon such a ground. In Whitcomb v. Whiting, 2 Doug. 652, decided in 1781, in an action on a joint and several note brought against one of the makers, it was held, that proof of payment, by one of the others, of interest on the note and of part of the principal, within six years, took the case out of the statute, as against the defendant who was sued. Lord Mansfield said, 'payment by one is payment for all, the one acting virtually for all the rest; and in the same manner, an admission by one is an admission by all, and the law raises the promise to pay, when the debt is admitted to be due.' This is the whole reasoning reported in the case, and is certainly not very satisfactory. It assumes that one party, who has authority to discharge, has necessarily, also, authority to charge the others; that a virtual agency exists in each joint debtor to pay for the whole; and that a virtual agency exists, by analogy, to charge the whole. Now, this very position constitutes the matter in controversy. It is true, that a payment by one does inure for the benefit of the whole; but this arises not so much from any virtual agency for the whole, as by operation of law; for the payment extinguishes the debt; if such payment were made after a positive refusal or prohibition of the other joint debtors, it would still operate as an extinguishment of the debt, and the creditor could no longer sue them. In truth, he who pays a joint debt, pays to discharge himself; and so far from binding the others conclusively by his act, as virtually theirs also, he cannot recover over against them, in contribution, without such payment has been rightfully made, and ought to charge them. When the statute has run against a joint debt, the reasonable presumption is, that it is no longer a subsisting debt; and therefore, there is no ground on which to raise a virtual agency to pay that which is not admitted to exist. But if this were not so, still there is a great difference between creating a virtual agency, which is for the benefit of all, and one which is onerous and prejudicial to all. The one is not a natural or necessary consequence from the other. A person may well authorize the payment of a debt for which he is now liable; and yet refuse to authorize a charge, where there at present exists no legal liability to pay. Yet, if the principle of Lord

representative, in the transaction of certain business; whatever, therefore, the agent does, in the lawful prosecution of

Mansfield be correct, the acknowledgment of one joint debtor will bind all the rest, even though they should have utterly denied the debt at the time when such acknowledgment was made. The doctrine of *Whitcomb v. Whiting* has been followed in England in subsequent cases, and was resorted to in a strong manner, in *Jackson v. Fairbank*, 2 H. Bl. 340, where the admission of a creditor to prove a debt, on a joint and several note under a bankruptcy, and to receive a dividend, was held sufficient to charge a solvent joint debtor, in a several action against him, in which he pleaded the statute, as an acknowledgment of a subsisting debt. It has not, however, been received without hesitation. In *Clark v. Bradshaw*, 3 Esp. 155, Lord Kenyon, at Nisi Prius, expressed some doubts upon it; and the cause went off on another ground. And in *Brandram v. Wharton*, 1 Barn. & Ald. 463, the case was very much shaken, if not overturned. Lord Ellenborough, upon that occasion used language, from which his dissatisfaction with the whole doctrine may be clearly inferred. 'This doctrine,' said he, 'of rebutting the statute of limitations, by an acknowledgment other than that of the party himself, begun with the case of *Whitcomb v. Whiting*. By that decision, where, however, there was an express acknowledgment, by an actual payment of a part of the debt by one of the parties, I am bound. But that case was full of hardships; for this inconvenience may follow from it. Suppose a person liable jointly with thirty or forty others, to a debt, he may have actually paid it, he may have had in his possession the document, by which that payment was proved, but may have lost his receipt. Then, though this was one of the very cases which this statute was passed to protect, he may still be bound and his liability be renewed, by a random acknowledgment made by some one of the thirty or forty others, who may be careless of what mischief he is doing, and who may even not know of the payment which has been made. Beyond that case, therefore, I am not prepared to go, so as to deprive a party of the advantage given him by the statute, by means of an implied acknowledgment.' In the American Courts, so far as our researches have extended, few cases have been litigated upon this question. In *Smith v. Ludlow*, 6 Johns. 268, the suit was brought against both partners, and one of them pleaded the statute. Upon the dissolution of the partnership, public notice was given, that the other partner was authorized to adjust all accounts; and an account signed by him, after such advertisement, and within six years, was introduced. It was also proved, that the plaintiff called on the partner, who pleaded the statute, before the commencement of the suit, and requested a settlement, and that he then admitted an account, dated in 1797, to have been made out by him; that he thought the account had been settled by the other defendant, in whose hands the books of partnership were; and

that business, is the act of the principal, whom he represents. And "where the acts of the agent will bind the principal,

that he would see the other defendant on the subject, and communicate the result to the plaintiff. The Court held that this was sufficient to take the case out of the statute; and said, that without any express authority, the confession of one partner, after the dissolution, will take a debt out of the statute. The acknowledgment will not, of itself, be evidence of an original debt; for that would enable one party to bind the other in new contracts. But the original debt being proved or admitted, the confession of one will bind the other, so as to prevent him from availing himself of the statute. This is evident, from the cases of *Whitcomb v. Whiting*, and *Jackson v. Fairbank*; and it results necessarily from the power given to adjust accounts. The Court also thought the acknowledgment of the partner, setting up the statute, was sufficient of itself to sustain the action. This case has the peculiarity of an acknowledgment made by both partners, and a formal acknowledgment by the partner, who was authorized to adjust the accounts after the dissolution of the partnership. There was not, therefore, a virtual, but an express, and notorious agency, devolved on him, to settle the account. The correctness of the decision cannot, upon the general view taken by the Court, be questioned. In *Roosevelt v. Marks*, 6 Johns. Ch. 266, 291, Mr. Chancellor Kent admitted the authority of *Whitcomb v. Whiting*; but denied that of *Jackson v. Fairbank*, for reasons which appear to us solid and satisfactory. Upon some other cases in New York, we shall have occasion hereafter to comment. In *Hunt v. Bridgham*, 2 Pick. 581, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, upon the authority of the cases in Douglas, H. Blackstone, and Johnson, held that a partial payment by the principal debtor on a note, took the case out of the statute of limitations, as against a surety. The Court do not proceed to any reasoning to establish the principle, considering it as the result of the authorities. *Shelton v. Cocke*, 3 Munford, 191, is to the same effect; and contains a mere annunciation of the rule, without any discussion of its principle. *Simpson v. Morrison*, 2 Bay, 533, proceeded upon a broader ground, and assumes the doctrine of the case in 1 Taunt. 104, hereinafter noticed, to be correct. Whatever may be the just influence of such recognitions of the principles of the English cases, in other States; as the doctrine is not so settled in Kentucky, we must resort to such recognition only, as furnishing illustrations, to assist our reasoning; and decide the case now as if it had never been decided before. By the general law of partnership, the act of each partner, during the continuance of the partnership, and within the scope of its objects, binds all the others. It is considered the act of each and of all, resulting from a general and mutual delegation of authority. Each partner may, therefore, bind the partnership by his contracts in the partnership business; but he cannot bind it by any contracts beyond those

there, his representations, declarations, and admissions, respecting the subject-matter, will also bind him, if made at the

limits. A dissolution, however, puts an end to the authority. By the force of its terms it operates as a revocation of all power to create new contracts; and the right of partners as such, can extend no further than to settle the partnership concerns already existing, and to distribute the remaining funds. Even this right may be qualified, and restrained, by the express delegation of the whole authority to one of the partners. The question is not, however, as to the authority of a partner after the dissolution to adjust an admitted and subsisting debt; we mean, admitted by the whole partnership or unbarred by the statute; but whether he can, by his sole act, after the action is barred by lapse of time, revive it against all the partners, without any new authority communicated to him for this purpose. We think the proper resolution of this point depends upon another, that is, whether the acknowledgment or promise is to be deemed a mere continuation of the original promise, or a new contract, springing out of, and supported by, the original consideration. We think it is the latter, both upon principle and authority; and if so, as after the dissolution no one partner can create a new contract, binding upon the others, his acknowledgment is inoperative and void, as to them. There is some confusion in the language of the books, resulting from a want of strict attention to the distinction here indicated. It is often said, that an acknowledgment revives the promise, when it is meant, that it revives the debt or cause of action. The revival of a debt supposes that it has been once extinct and gone; that there has been a period, in which it had lost its legal use and validity. The act, which revives it, is what essentially constitutes its new being, and is inseparable from it. It stands not by its original force, but by the new promise, which imparts vitality to it. Proof of the latter is indispensable to raise the assumpsit, on which an action can be maintained. It was this view of the matter, which first created a doubt, whether it was not necessary that a new consideration should be proved to support the promise, since the old consideration was gone. That doubt has been overcome; and it is now held, that the original consideration is sufficient, if recognised, to uphold the new promise, although the statute cuts it off, as a support for the old. What, indeed, would seem to be decisive on this subject, is, that the new promise, if qualified or conditional, restrains the rights of the party to its own terms; and if he cannot recover by those terms, he cannot recover at all. If a person promise to pay, upon condition that the other do an act, performance must be shown, before any title accrues. If the declaration lays a promise by or to an intestate, proof of the acknowledgment of the debt by or to his personal representative will not maintain the writ. Why not, since it establishes the continued existence of the debt? The plain reason is, that the promise is a new one, by or to the administrator himself, upon the origi-

same time, and constituting part of the *res gestæ*.¹ They are of the nature of original evidence, and not of hearsay;

nal consideration; and not a revival of the original promise. So, if a man promises to pay a preëxisting debt, barred by the statute, when he is able, or at a future day, his ability must be shown, or the time must be passed before the action can be maintained. Why? Because it rests on the new promise, and its terms must be complied with. We do not here speak of the form of alleging the promise in the declaration; upon which, perhaps, there has been a diversity of opinion and judgment; but of the fact itself, whether the promise ought to be laid in one way or another, as an absolute, or as a conditional promise; which may depend upon the rules of pleading. This very point came before the twelve Judges, in the case of *Heyling v. Hastings*, 1 *Ld. Raym.* 389, 421, in the time of Lord Holt. There, one of the points was, 'whether the acknowledgment of a debt within six years would amount to a new promise, to bring it out of the statute; and they were all of opinion, that it would not, but that it was evidence of a promise.' Here, then, the Judges manifestly contemplated the acknowledgment, not as a continuation of the old promise, but as evidence of a new promise; and that it is the new promise which takes the case out of the statute. Now, what is a new promise, but a new contract; a contract to pay, upon a preëxisting consideration, which does not of itself bind the party to pay independently of the contract! So, in *Boydell v. Drummond*, 2 *Campb.* 157, Lord Ellenborough, with his characteristic precision, said; 'if a man acknowledges the existence of a debt, barred by the statute, the law has been supposed to raise a new promise to pay it, and thus the remedy is revived.' And it may be affirmed, that the general current of the English, as well as the American authorities, conforms to this view of the operation of an acknowledgment. In *Jones v. Moore*, 5 *Binney*, 573, Mr. Chief Justice Tilghman went into an elaborate examination of this very point; and came to the conclusion, from a review of all the cases, that an acknowledgment of the debt can only be considered as evidence of a new promise; and he added, 'I cannot comprehend the meaning of reviving the old debt, in any other manner, than by a new promise.' There is a class of cases, not yet adverted to, which materially illustrates the right and powers of partners, after the dissolution of the partnership, and bears directly on the point under consideration. In *Hackley v. Patrick*, 3 *Johns.* 536, it was said by the Court, that 'after a dissolution of the partnership, the power of one party to bind the others wholly ceases. There is no reason why this acknowledgment of an account should bind his co-partners, any more than his giving a promissory note, in the name of the firm, or any other act.' And it was therefore held, that the plaintiff must produce further

¹ Story on Agency, § 134-137.

the representation or statement of the agent, in such cases, being the ultimate fact to be proved, and not an admission of

evidence of the existence of an antecedent debt, before he could recover; even though the acknowledgment was by a partner, authorized to settle all the accounts of the firm. This doctrine was again recognised by the same Court, in *Walden v. Sherburne*, 15 Johns. 409, 424, although it was admitted, that in *Wood v. Braddick*, 1 Taunt. 104, a different decision had been had in England. If this doctrine be well founded, as we think it is, it furnishes a strong ground to question the efficacy of an acknowledgment to bind the partnership for any purpose. If it does not establish the existence of a debt against the partnership, why should it be evidence against it at all? If evidence, *aliunde*, of facts within the reach of the statute, as the existence of a debt, be necessary before the acknowledgment binds, is not this letting in all the mischiefs, against which the statute intended to guard the parties, viz. the introduction of stale and dormant demands, of long standing, and of uncertain proof? If the acknowledgment, *per se*, does not bind the other partners, where is the propriety of admitting proof of an antecedent debt, extinguished by the statute as to them, to be revived without their consent? It seems difficult to find a satisfactory reason, why an acknowledgment should raise a new promise, when the consideration, upon which alone it rests, as a legal obligation, is not coupled with it in such a shape as to bind the parties; that the parties are not bound by the admission of the debt, as a debt, but are bound by the acknowledgment of the debt, as a promise, upon extrinsic proof. The doctrine in 1 Taunt. 104, stands upon a clear, if it be a legal ground; that as to the things past, the partnership continues and always must continue, notwithstanding the dissolution. That, however, is a matter which we are not prepared to admit, and constitutes the very ground now in controversy. The light in which we are disposed to consider this question is, that after a dissolution of a partnership, no partner can create a cause of action against the other partners, except by a new authority communicated to him for that purpose. It is wholly immaterial, what is the consideration which is to raise such cause of action; whether it be a supposed preëxisting debt of the partnership, or any auxiliary consideration, which might prove beneficial to them. Unless adopted by them, they are not bound by it. When the statute of limitations has once run against a debt, the cause of action against the partnership is gone. The acknowledgment, if it is to operate at all, is to create a new cause of action; to revive a debt which is extinct; and thus to give an action, which has its life from the new promise implied by law from such an acknowledgment, and operating and limited by its purport. It is then, in its essence, the creation of a new right, and not the enforcement of an old one. We think, that the power to create such a right does not exist after a dissolution of the partnership in any partner." It is to be observed, that in this

some other fact.¹ But, it must be remembered, that the admission of the agent cannot always be assimilated to the

opinion the Court were not unanimous; and that the learned Judge declares that the majority were "principally, though not exclusively, influenced by the course of decisions in Kentucky," where the action arose. A similar view of the question has been taken by the Courts of Pennsylvania, both before and since the decision of *Bell v. Morrison*; *Levy v. Cadet*, 17 Serg. & Raw. 127; *Searight v. Craighead*, 1 Penns. 135; and it has been followed by the Courts of Indiana. *Yandes v. Lefavour*, 2 Blackf. 371. Other Judges have viewed such admissions not as going to create a new contract, but as mere acknowledgments of the continued existence of a debt previously created, thereby repelling the presumption of payment, resulting from lapse of time, and thus taking the case out of the operation of the statute of limitations. To this effect are *White v. Hale*, 3 Pick. 291; *Martin v. Root*, 17 Mass. 222, 227; *Cady v. Shepherd*, 11 Pick. 400; *Vinal v. Burrill*, 16 Pick. 401; *Bridge v. Gray*, 14 Pick. 61; *Patterson v. Choate*, 7 Wend. 441; *Hopkins v. Banks*, 7 Cowen, 650; *Austin v. Bostwick*, 9 Conn. 496; *Greenleaf v. Quincy*, 3 Fairf. 11; *McIntire v. Oliver*, 2 Hawks, 209; *Ward v. Howell*, 5 Har. & Johns. 60; *Fisher v. Tucker*, 1 McCord, Ch. R. 175; *Wheelock v. Doolittle*, 3 Washb. Vt. R. 440. In some of the cases a distinction is strongly taken between admissions, which go to establish the original existence of the debt, and those which only show that it has never been paid, but still remains in its original force; and it is held, that before the admission of a partner, made after the dissolution, can be received, the debt must first be proved, *aliunde*. See *Owings v. Low*, 5 Gill & Johns. 134, 144; *Smith v. Ludlow*, 6 Johns. 267; *Patterson v. Choate*, 7 Wend. 441, 445; *Ward v. Howell*; *Fisher v. Tucker*; *Hopkins v. Banks*; *Vinal v. Burrill*, *ubi supra*; *Shelton v. Cocke*, 3 Munf. 197. In *Austin v. Bostwick*, the partner making the admission had become insolvent; but this was held to make no difference, as to the admissibility of his declaration. A distinction has also been taken between admissions by a partner after the dissolution, but before the statute of limitations has attached to the debt, and those made afterwards; the former being held receivable, and the latter not. *Fisher v. Tucker*, 1 McCord, Ch. R. 175. And see *Scales v. Jacob*, 3 Bing. 638; *Gardiner v. McMahon*, 3 Ad. & El. 566, N. S. See further on the general doctrine, post, § 174, note. In all cases, where the admission, whether of a partner or other joint contractor, is received against his companions, it must have been made in good faith. *Coit v. Tracy*, 8 Conn. 268. See also *Chardon v. Oliphant*, 2 Const. R. 685, cited in *Collyer on Partn.* 236, n. (2d Am. Ed.) It may not be useless to observe, that *Bell v. Morrison* was cited and distinguished, partly as founded on the local law of Kentucky, in *Parker v. Merrill*, 6 Greenl. 47,

¹ Phil. & Am. on Evid. 402; 1 Phil. Evid. 381.

admission of the principal. The party's own admission, whenever made, may be given in evidence against him; but the admission or declaration of his agent binds him only when it is made during the continuance of the agency, in regard to a transaction then depending, *et dum fervet opus*. It is because it is a verbal act, and part of the *res gestæ*, that it is admissible at all; and, therefore, it is not necessary to call the agent himself to prove it;¹ but wherever what he did is admissible in evidence, there it is competent to prove what he said about the act while he was doing it;² and it follows,

48; and in *Greenleaf v. Quincy*, 3 Fairf. 11; and that it was not cited in the cases of *Patterson v. Choate*, *Austin v. Bostwick*, *Cady v. Shepherd*, *Vinal v. Burrill*, and *Yandes v. Lefavour*, though these were decided subsequent to its publication.

¹ *Doe v. Hawkins*, 2 Ad. & El. 212, N. S.; *Sauniere v. Wode*, 3 Harrison's R. 299.

² *Garth v. Howard*, 8 Bing. 451; *Fairlie v. Hastings*, 10 Ves. 123, 127; *The Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria v. The Bank of Columbia*, 5 Wheat. 336, 337; *Langhorn v. Allnutt*, 4 Taunt. 519, per Gibbs, J.; *Hannay v. Stewart*, 6 Watts, 487, 489; *Stockton v. Demuth*, 8 Watts, 39; *Story on Agency*, 126, 129, note (2). In a case of libel for damages, occasioned by collision of ships, it was held that the admission of the master of the ship proceeded against, might well be articulated in the libel. *The Manchester*, 1 W. Rob. 62. But it does not appear, in the report, whether the admission was made at the time of the occurrence or not. The question has been discussed, whether there is any substantial distinction between a written entry and an oral declaration by an agent, of the fact of his having received a particular rent for his employer. The case was one of a sub-agent, employed by a steward to collect rents, and this declaration offered in evidence was, "M. N. paid me the half year's rent, and here it is." Its admissibility was argued, both as a declaration against interest, and also as made in the course of discharging a duty; and the Court inclined to admit it, but took time for advisement. *Furdson v. Clogg*, 10 M. & W. 572; Post, § 149. See also *Regina v. Hall*, 8 C. & P. 358; *Allen v. Denstone*, Ib. 760; *Lawrence v. Thatcher*, 6 C. & P. 669; *Bank of Monroe v. Field*, 2 Hill, R. 445; *Doe v. Hawkins*, 2 Ad. & El. 212, N. S. Whether the declaration or admission of the agent, made in regard to a transaction already past, but while his agency for similar objects still continues, will bind the principal, does not appear to have been expressly decided; but the weight of authority is in the negative. See the observations of Tindal, C. J. in *Garth v. Howard*, supra. See also *Mortimer v. McCallan*, 6 M. & W. 58, 69, 73; *Haven v. Brown*, 7 Greenl.

that where his right to act in the particular matter in question has ceased, the principal can no longer be affected by his declarations, they being mere hearsay.¹

§ 114. It is to be observed, that the rule, admitting the declarations of the agent, is founded upon the legal identity of the agent and the principal; and therefore they bind only so far as there is authority to make them. Where this authority is derived by implication from authority to do a certain act, the declarations of the agent, to be admissible, must be part of the *res gestæ*. An authority to make an admission is not necessarily to be implied from an authority previously given in respect to the thing, to which the admission relates.² Thus, it has been held,³ that the declarations of the bailee of a bond, intrusted to him by the defendant, were not admissible in proof of the execution of the bond by the bailor, nor of any other agreements between the plaintiff and defendant respecting the subject. The *res gestæ* consisted in the fact of the bailment, and its nature; and on these points only were the declarations of the agent identified with those of the principal. As to any other facts, in the knowledge of the agent, he must be called to testify, like any other witness.⁴

§ 115. It is upon the same ground that certain entries, made by third persons, are treated as original evidence. Entries by third persons are divisible into two classes; first, those which

421, 424; *Thalhimer v. Brinckerhoff*, 4 Wend. 394; *City Bank of Baltimore v. Bateman*, 7 Har. & Johns. 104; *Stewartson v. Watts*, 8 Watts, 392; *Betham v. Benson*, Gow, R. 45, 48, n.; *Baring v. Clark*, 19 Pick. 220; *Parker v. Green*, 8 Metc. 142, 143; *Plumer v. Briscoe*, 12 Jur. 351.

¹ *Reynolds v. Rowley*, 3 Rob. Louis. R. 201; *Stiles v. The Western Rail Road Co.* 8 Met. 44.

² Phil. & Am. on Evid. 402. As to the evidence of authority inferred from circumstances, see *Story on Agency*, § 87-106, 259, 260; Phil. & Am. on Evid. 404, n. (5).

³ *Fairlie v. Hastings*, 10 Ves. 123.

⁴ *Masters v. Abraham*, 1 Esp. 375, (Day's Ed.) and note (1); *Story on Agency*, § 135-143; *Johnson v. Ward*, 6 Esp. 47.

are made in the discharge of official duty, and in the course of professional employment; and *secondly*, mere private entries. Of these latter, we shall hereafter speak. In regard to the former class, the entry, to be admissible, must be one which it was the person's duty to make, or which belonged to the transaction as part thereof, or which was its usual and proper concomitant.¹ It must speak only to that which it was his duty or business to do; and not to extraneous and foreign circumstances.² The party making it must also have had competent knowledge of the fact, or it must have been part of his duty to have known it; there must have been no particular motive to enter that transaction falsely, more than any other; and the entry must have been made at or about the time of the transaction recorded. In such cases, the entry itself is admitted as original evidence, being part of the *res gestæ*. The general interest of the party, in making the entry, to show that he has done his official duty, has nothing to do with the question of its admissibility;³ nor is it material, whether he was or was not competent to testify personally in the case.⁴ If he is living, and competent to testify,

¹ The doctrine on the subject of contemporaneous entries is briefly but lucidly expounded, by Mr. Justice Parke, in *Doe, d. Patteshall v. Turford*, 3 B. & Ad. 890. See also *Poole v. Dicus*, 1 Bing. N. C. 654; *Pickering v. Bp. of Ely*, 2 Y. & C. 249; *Regina v. Worth*, 4 Ad. & El. N. S. 132.

² *Chambers v. Bernasconi*, 1 C. & J. 451; 1 Tyrwh. 355, S. C.; 1 C. Mees. & R. 347, S. C. In Error. This limitation has not been applied to private entries against the interest of the party. Thus, where the payee of a note against A., B. and C. indorsed a partial payment as received from B., adding that the whole sum was originally advanced to A. only; in an action by B. against A. to recover the money thus paid for his use, the indorsement made by the payee, who was dead, was held admissible to prove not only the payment of the money, but the other fact as to the advancement to A. *Davies v. Humphreys*, 6 Mees. & Welsb. 153; *Marks v. Lahee*, 3 Bing. N. C. 408.

³ Per Tindal, C. J. in *Poole v. Dicus*, 1 Bing. N. C. 654; *Dixon v. Cooper*, 3 Wils. 40; *Benjamin v. Porteous*, 2 H. Bl. 590; *Williams v. Geaves*, 8 C. & P. 592; *Augusta v. Windsor*, 1 Appleton, R. 317.

⁴ *Gleadow v. Atkin*, 1 Cromp. & Mees. 423, 424; 3 Tyrw. 302, 303, S. C.; *Short v. Lee*, 2 Jac. & Walk. 489.

it is deemed necessary to produce him.¹ But if he is called as a witness to the fact, the entry of it is not thereby excluded. It is still an independent and original circumstance, to be weighed with others; whether it goes to corroborate, or to impeach the testimony of the witness who made it. If the party who made the entry is dead, or, being called, has no recollection of the transaction, but testifies to his uniform practice to make all his entries truly and at the time of each transaction, and has no doubt of the accuracy of the one in question; the entry, unimpeached, is considered sufficient, as original evidence, and not hearsay, to establish the fact in question.²

§ 116. One of the earliest reported cases, illustrative of this subject, was an action of *assumpsit* for beer sold and delivered, the plaintiff being a brewer. The evidence given to charge the defendant was, that in the usual course of the plaintiff's business, the draymen came every night to the clerk of the brewhouse, and gave him an account of the beer delivered during the day, which he entered in a book kept for that purpose, to which the draymen set their hands; and this entry, with proof of the drayman's handwriting, and of his death, was held sufficient to maintain the action.³ In another

¹ *Nichols v. Webb*, 8 Wheat. 326; *Welch v. Barrett*, 15 Mass. 380; *Wilbur v. Selden*, 6 Cowen, 162; *Farmers Bank v. Whitehill*, 16 S. & R. 89, 90; *Stokes v. Stokes*, 6 Martin, N. S. 351; *Herring v. Levy*, 4 Martin, N. S. 383; *Brewster v. Doan*, 2 Hill, N. Y. Rep. 537; *Davis v. Fuller*, 12 Verm. 178.

² *Bank of Monroe v. Culver*, 2 Hill, 531; *New Haven County Bank v. Mitchell*, 15 Conn. R. 206; *Bank of Tennessee v. Cowen*, 7 Humphr. 70. See Post, § 436, 437, note (4). But upon a question of the infancy of a Jew, where the time of his circumcision, which by custom is on the eighth day after his birth, was proposed to be shown by an entry of the fact, made by a deceased Rabbi whose duty it was to perform the office and to make the entry; the entry was held not receivable; *Davis v. Lloyd*, 1 Car. & Kir. 275; perhaps, because it was not made against the pecuniary interest of the Rabbi. See Post, § 147.

³ *Price v. Lord Torrington*, 1 Salk. 285; 2 Ld. Raym. 873, S. C.; 1 Smith's Leading Cases, 139. But the Courts are not disposed to carry

case,¹ before Lord Kenyon, which was an action of trover for a watch, where the question was, whether the defendant had delivered it to a third person, as the plaintiff had directed; an entry of the fact by the defendant himself in his shop-book, kept for that purpose, with proof that such was the usual mode, was held admissible in evidence. One of the shopmen had sworn to the delivery, and his entry was offered to corroborate his testimony; but it was admitted as competent original evidence in the cause. So, in another case, where the question was upon the precise day of a person's birth, the account book of the surgeon, who attended his mother upon that occasion, and in which his professional services and fees were charged, was held admissible, in proof of the day of the birth.² So, where the question was, whether a notice to quit had been served upon the tenant, the indorsement of service upon a copy of the notice, by the attorney, who served it, it being shown to be the course of business in his office to preserve copies of such notices, and to indorse the service thereon, was held admissible in proof of the fact

the doctrine of this case any farther. 11 M. & W. 775, 776. Therefore, where the coals, sold at a mine, were reported daily by one of the workmen, to the foreman, who, not being able to write, employed another person to enter the sales in a book; it was held, the foreman and the workman who reported the sale, being both dead, that the book was not admissible in evidence, in an action for the price of the coals. Brain v. Preece, 11 M. & W. 773.

¹ Digby v. Stedman, 1 Esp. 328.

² Higham v. Ridgway, 10 East, 109. See also 2 Smith's Leading Cases, 183-197, note, and the comments of Bayley, B. and of Vaughan, B. on this case, in Gleadow v. Atkin, 1 Crompt. & Mees. 410, 423, 424, 427, and of Professor Parke, in the London Legal Observer for June, 1832, p. 229. It will be seen in that case, that the fact of the surgeon's performance of the service charged was abundantly proved by other testimony in the cause; and that nothing remained but to prove the precise time of performance; a fact in which the surgeon had no sort of interest. But if it were not so, it is not perceived what difference it could have made, the principle of admissibility being the contemporaneous character of the entry, as part of the *res gestæ*. See also Herbert v. Tuckal, T. Raym. 84; Augusta v. Windsor, 1 Appleton, R. 317.

of service.¹ Upon the same ground of the contemporaneous character of an entry made in the ordinary course of business, the books of the messenger of a bank, and of a notary public, to prove demand of payment from the maker, and notice to the indorser of a promissory note, have also been held admissible.² The letter-book of a merchant, party in the cause, is also admitted as *prima facie* evidence of the contents of a letter addressed by him to the other party, after notice to such party to produce the original; it being the habit of merchants to keep such a book.³ And generally, contemporaneous entries, made by third persons, in their own books, in the ordinary course of business, the matter being within the peculiar knowledge of the party making the entry, and there being no apparent and particular motive to pervert the fact, are received as original evidence;⁴ though the person who made the entry has no recollection of the fact at the time of testifying; provided he swears that he should not have made it, if it were

¹ Doe v. Turford, 3 Barnw. & Ad. 890; Champneys v. Peck, 1 Stark. R. 326; Rex v. Cope, 7 C. & P. 720.

² Nichols v. Webb, 8 Wheat. 326; Welch v. Barrett, 15 Mass. Rep. 380; Poole v. Dicus, 1 Bing. N. C. 649; Halliday v. Martinett, 20 Johns. 168; Butler v. Wright, 2 Wend. 369; Hart v. Williams, Ib. 513; Nichols v. Goldsmith, 7 Wend. 160; New Haven Co. Bank v. Mitchell, 15 Conn. 206; Sheldon v. Benham, 4 Hill, N. Y. Rep. 123.

³ Pritt v. Fairclough, 3 Campb. 305; Hagedorn v. Reid, Ib. 377. The letter-book is also evidence that the letters copied into it have been sent. But it is not evidence of any other letters in it, than those which the adverse party has been required to produce. Sturge v. Buchanan, 2 P. & D. 573.

⁴ Doe v. Turford, 3 B. & Ad. 890, per Parke, J.; Doe v. Robson, 15 East, 32; Goss v. Watlington, 3 Br. & B. 132; Middleton v. Melton, 10 B. & Cr. 317; Marks v. Lahee, 3 Bing. N. C. 408, 420, per Park, J.; Poole v. Dicus, 1 Bing. N. C. 649, 653, 654. In Doe v. Vowles, 1 M. & Ro. 216, the tradesman's bill, which was rejected, was not contemporaneous with the fact done. Haddow v. Parry, 3 Taunt. 303; Whitnash v. George, 8 B. & Cr. 556; Barker v. Ray, 2 Russ. 63, 76; Patton v. Craig, 7 S. & R. 116, 126; Farmers Bank v. Whitehill, 16 S. & R. 89; Nourse v. McCay, 2 Rawle, 70; Clark v. Magruder, 2 H. & J. 77; Richardson v. Carey, 2 Rand. 87; Clark v. Wilmot, 1 Y. & Col. N. S. 53.

not true.¹ The same principle has also been applied to receipts, and other acts contemporaneous with the payment, or fact attested.²

§ 117. The admission of the party's own *shop-books*, in proof of the delivery of goods therein charged, the entries having been made by his clerk, stands upon the same principle, which we are now considering. The books must have been kept for the purpose; and the entries must have been made contemporaneous with the delivery of the goods, and by the person, whose duty it was, for the time being, to make them. In such cases the books are held admissible, as evidence of the delivery of the goods therein charged, where the nature of the subject is such as not to render better evidence attainable.³

¹ Bunker v. Shed, 8 Met. 150.

² Sherman v. Crosby, 11 Johns. 70; Holladay v. Littlepage, 2 Munf. 316; Prather v. Johnson, 3 H. & J. 487; Sherman v. Atkins, 4 Pick. 283; Carroll v. Tyler, 2 H. & G. 54; Cluggage v. Swan, 4 Binn. 150, 154. But the letter of a third person, acknowledging the receipt of merchandise of the plaintiff, was rejected, in an action against the party, who had recommended him as trustworthy, in Longenecker v. Hyde, 6 Binn. 1; and the receipts of living persons were rejected, in Warner v. Price, 3 Wend. 397; Cutbush v. Gilbert, 4 S. & R. 551; Spargo v. Brown, 9 B. & C. 935. See post, § 120.

³ Pitman v. Maddox, 2 Salk. 690; Ld. Raym. 732, S. C.; Lefebure v. Worden, 2 Ves. sen. 54, 55; Glynn v. The Bank of England, Ib. 40; Sterrett v. Bull, 1 Binn. 234. See also Tait on Evid. p. 276. An interval of one day, between the transaction and the entry of it in the book, has been deemed a valid objection to the admissibility of the book in evidence. Walter v. Bollman, 8 Watts, 544. But the law fixes no precise rule as to the moment when the entry ought to be made. It is enough if it be made "at or near the time of the transaction." Curren v. Crawford, 4 S. & R. 3, 5. Therefore, where the goods were delivered by a servant during the day, and the entries were made by the master at night, or on the following morning, from the memorandums made by the servant, it was held sufficient. Ingraham v. Bockius, 9 S. & R. 285. But such entries, made later than the succeeding day, have been rejected. Cook v. Ashmead, 2 Miles, R. 268. Whether entries transcribed from a slate, or card, into the book, are to be deemed original entries, is not universally agreed. In Massachusetts they are ad-

§ 118. In the *United States*, this principle has been carried farther, and extended to *entries made by the party himself*, in his own shop-books.¹ Though this evidence has sometimes been said to be admitted contrary to the rules of the Common Law, yet in general its admission will be found in perfect harmony with those rules, the entry being admitted only where it was evidently contemporaneous with the fact, and part of the *res gestæ*. Being the act of the party himself, it is received with greater caution; but still it may be seen and weighed by the Jury.²

mitted. Faxon v. Hollis, 13 Mass. 427. In Pennsylvania they were rejected, in Ogden v. Miller, 1 Browne, 147; but have since been admitted, where they were transcribed forthwith into the book; Ingraham v. Bockius, 9 S. & R. 285; Patton v. Ryan, 4 Rawle, 408; Jones v. Long, 3 Watts, 325; and not later, in the case of a mechanic's charges for his work, than the evening of the second day. Hartley v. Brooks, 6 Whart. 189. But where several intermediate days elapsed before they were thus transcribed, the entries have been rejected. Forsythe v. Norcross, 5 Watts, 432.

¹ In the following States the admission of the party's own books, and his own entries, has been either expressly permitted, or recognised and regulated, by Statute; viz. *Vermont*, (1 Tolman's Dig. 185); *Connecticut*, (Rev. Code, 1821, § 9, Tit. 9, § 1); *Delaware*, (St. 25 Geo. 2, Rev. Code, 1829, p. 89); *Maryland*, as to sums under ten pounds in a year, (1 Dorsey's Laws of Maryland, 73, 203); *Virginia*, (Stat. 1819, 1 Rev. Code, ch. 128, § 7, 8, 9); *North Carolina*, (Stat. 1756, ch. 57, § 2, 1 Rev. Code, 1836, ch. 15); *South Carolina*, (Stat. 1721, Sept. 20. See Statutes at Large, Vol. 3, p. 799, Cooper's ed. 1 Bay, 43); *Tennessee*, (Statutes of Tennessee, by Caruthers and Nicholson, p. 131). In *Louisiana*, and in *Maryland*, (except as above,) entries made by the party himself are not admitted. Civil Code of Louisiana, Art. 2244, 2245; Johnson v. Breedlove, 2 Martin, N. S. 508; Herring v. Levy, 4 Martin, N. S. 383; Cavelier v. Collins, 3 Martin, 188; Martinstein v. Creditors, 8 Rob. 6; Owings v. Henderson, 5 Gill & Johns. 134, 142. In all the other States they are admitted at Common Law, under various degrees of restriction. See Cogswell v. Dolliver, 2 Mass. 217; Poulney v. Ross, 1 Dall. 239; Lynch v. McHugo, 1 Bay, 33; Foster v. Sinkler, Ib. 40; Slade v. Teasdale, 2 Bay, 173; Lamb v. Hart, Ib. 362; Thomas v. Dyott, 1 Nott & McC. 186; Burnham v. Adams, 5 Verm. 313; Story on Conf. Laws, 526, 527; Cowen & Hill's note, 491, to 1 Phil. Evid. 266.

² The rules of the several States in regard to the admission of this evidence are not perfectly uniform; but in what is about to be stated, it is believed

§ 119. But, if the American rule of admitting the party's own entries in evidence for him, under the limitations men-

that they concur. Before the books of the party can be admitted in evidence, they are to be submitted to the inspection of the Court, and if they do not appear to be a register of the daily business of the party, and to have been honestly and fairly kept, they are excluded. If they appear manifestly erased and altered, in a material part, they will not be admitted until the alteration is explained. *Churchman v. Smith*, 6 Whart. 106. The form of keeping them, whether it be that of a journal or ledger, does not affect their admissibility, however it may go to their credit with the Jury. *Cogswell v. Dolliver*, 2 Mass. 217; *Prince v. Smith*, 4 Mass. 455, 457; *Faxon v. Hollis*, 13 Mass. 427; *Rodman v. Hoops*, 1 Dall. 85; *Lynch v. McHugo*, 1 Bay, 33; *Foster v. Sinkler*, ib. 40; *Slade v. Teasdale*, 2 Bay, 173; *Thomas v. Dyott*, 1 Nott & McC. 186; *Wilson v. Wilson*, 1 Halst. 95; *Swing v. Sparks*, 2 Halst. 59; *Jones v. DeKay*, Pennington, R. 695; *Cole v. Anderson*, 3 Halst. 68; *Mathes v. Robinson*, 8 Met. 269. If the books appear free from fraudulent practices, and proper to be laid before the Jury, the party himself is then required to make oath, in open Court, that they are the books in which the accounts of his ordinary business transactions are usually kept. *Frye v. Barker*, 2 Pick. 65; *Taylor v. Tucker*, 1 Kelly, R. 233. An affidavit to an account or bill of particulars is not admissible. *Waggoner v. Richmond*, Wright, R. 173. Whether, if the party is abroad, or is unable to attend, the Court will take his oath under a commission, is not perfectly clear. The opinion of Parker, C. J. in *Pick*, 67, was against it; and so is *Nicholson v. Withers*, 2 McCord, 428; but in *Spence v. Saunders*, 1 Bay, 119, even his affidavit was deemed sufficient, upon a writ of inquiry, the defendant having suffered judgment by default. See also *Douglas v. Hart*, 4 McCord, 257; *Furman v. Peay*, 2 Bail. 394. He must also swear that the articles therein charged were actually delivered, and the labor and services actually performed; that the entries were made at or about the time of the transactions, and are the original entries thereof; and that the sums charged and claimed have not been paid. 3 *Dane's Abr.* ch. 81, art. 4, § 1, 2; *Cogswell v. Dolliver*, 2 Mass. 217; *Ives v. Niles*, 5 Watts, 324. If the party is dead, his books, though rendered of much less weight as evidence, may still be offered by the executor or administrator, he making oath that they came to his hands as the genuine and only books of account of the deceased; that to the best of his knowledge and belief the entries are original and contemporaneous with the fact, and the debt unpaid; with proof of the party's handwriting. *Bentley v. Hollenback*, Wright, Rep. 169; *McLellan v. Crofton*, 6 Greenl. 307; *Prince v. Smith*, 4 Mass. 455; *Odell v. Culbert*, 9 W. & S. 66. The book itself must be the registry of business actually done, and not of orders, executory contracts, and things to be done subsequent to the entry.

tioned below, were not in accordance with the principles of the Common Law, yet it is in conformity with those of other

Fairchild v. Dennison, 4 Watts, 258; *Wilson v. Wilson*, 1 Halst. 95; *Bradley v. Goodyear*, 1 Day, 104, 106; *Terill v. Beecher*, 9 Conn. 344, 348, 349; and the entry must have been made for the purpose of charging the debtor with the debt; a mere memorandum, for any other purpose, not being sufficient. Thus, an invoice book, and the memorandums in the margin of a blank check-book, showing the date and tenor of the checks drawn and cut from the book, have been rejected. *Cooper v. Morrell*, 4 Yeates, 341; *Wilson v. Goodin*, Wright, Rep. 219. But the time-book of a day laborer, though kept in a tabular form, is admissible; the entries being made for the apparent purpose of charging the person for whom the work was done. *Mathes v. Robinson*, 8 Met. 269. If the book contains marks, showing that the items have been transferred to a journal or ledger, these books also must be produced. *Prince v. Swett*, 2 Mass. 569. The entries also must be made contemporaneously with the fact entered, as has been already stated in regard to entries made by a clerk. Ante, § 117, and note (1). Entries thus made are not, however, received in all cases as satisfactory proof of the charges; but only as proof of things which, from their nature, are not generally susceptible of better evidence. *Watts v. Howard*, 7 Met. 478. They are satisfactory proof of goods sold and delivered from a shop, and of labor and services personally performed; *Case v. Potter*, 8 Johns. 211; *Vosburg v. Thayer*, 12 Johns. 261; *Wilmer v. Israel*, 1 Browne, 257; *Ducoign v. Schreppel*, 1 Yeates, 347; *Spence v. Saunders*, 1 Bay, 119; *Charlton v. Lawry*, Marti, N. Car. Rep. 26; *Mitchell v. Clark*, ib. 25; *Eashy v. Aiken*, Cooke, R. 388; and, in some States, of small sums of money. *Cogswell v. Dolliver*, 2 Mass. 217; *Prince v. Smith*, 4 Mass. 455; 3 *Dane's Abr.* ch. 81, art. 4, § 1, 2; *Craven v. Shaird*, 2 Halst. 345. The amount, in Massachusetts and Maine, is restricted to forty shillings. *Dunn v. Whitney*, 1 Fairf. 9; *Burns v. Fay*, 14 Pick. 8; *Union Bank v. Knapp*, 3 Pick. 109. But they have been refused admission to prove the fact of advertising in a newspaper; *Richards v. Howard*, 2 Nott & McC. 474; *Thomas v. Dyott*, 1 Nott & McC. 186; of a charge of dockage of a vessel; *Wilmer v. Israel*, 1 Browne, 257; commissions on the sale of a vessel; *Winsor v. Dillaway*, 4 Met. 221; labor of servants; *Wright v. Sharp*, 1 Browne, 344; goods delivered to a third person; *Kerr v. Love*, 1 Wash. 172; *Tenbrook v. Johnson*, Cox, 288; *Townley v. Woolley*, ib. 377; or, to the party, if under a previous contract for their delivery at different periods; *Loneragan v. Whitehead*, 10 Watts, 249; general damages or value; *Swing v. Sparks*, 2 Halst. 59; *Terill v. Beecher*, 9 Conn. 348, 349; settlement of accounts; *Prest v. Mercereau*, 4 Halst. 268; money paid and not applied to the purpose directed; *Bradley v. Goodyear*, 1 Day, 104; a special agreement; *Pritchard*

systems of jurisprudence. In the administration of the Roman Law, the production of a merchant's or tradesman's book of accounts, regularly and fairly kept, in the usual manner, has been deemed presumptive evidence (*semiplena probatio*¹) of

v. McOwen, 1 Nott & McC. 131, note; *Dunn v. Whitney*, 1 Fairf. 9; *Green v. Pratt*, 11 Conn. 205; or, a delivery of goods under such agreement; *Nickle v. Baldwin*, 4 Watts & Serg. 290; an article omitted by mistake in a prior settlement; *Punderson v. Shaw*, Kirby, 150; the use and occupation of real estate; and the like. *Beach v. Mills*, 5 Conn. 493. See also *Newton v. Higgins*, 2 Verm. 366; *Dunn v. Whitney*, 1 Fairf. 9. But after the order to deliver goods to a third person is proved by competent evidence *aliunde* the delivery itself may be proved by the books and suppletory oath of the plaintiff, in any case where such delivery to the defendant in person might be so proved. *Mitchell v. Belknap*, 10 Shepl. 475. The charges, moreover, must be specific and particular; a general charge for professional services, or for work and labor by a mechanic, without any specification but that of time, cannot be supported by this kind of evidence. *Lynch v. Petrie*, 1 Nott & McC. 130; *Hughes v. Hampton*, 2 Const. Rep. 476. And regularly the prices ought to be specified; in which case the entry is *prima facie* evidence of the value. *Hagaman v. Case*, 1 South. 370; *Ducoign v. Schreppel*, 1 Yeates, 347. But whatever be the nature of the subject, the transaction, to be susceptible of this kind of proof, must have been directly between the original debtor and the creditor; the book not being admissible to establish a collateral fact. *Mifflin v. Bingham*, 1 Dall. 276, per McKean, C. J.; *Kerr v. Love*, 1 Wash. 172; *Deas v. Darby*, 1 Nott & McC. 436; *Poulteney v. Ross*, 1 Dall. 238. Though books, such as have been described, are admitted to be given in evidence, with the suppletory oath of the party; yet his testimony is still to be weighed by the Jury, like that of any other witness in the cause; and his reputation for truth is equally open to be questioned. *Kitchen v. Tyson*, 2 Murph. 314; *Elder v. Warfield*, 7 Harr. & Johns. 391. In some States, the books, thus admitted, are only those of shopkeepers, mechanics, and tradesmen; those of other persons, such as planters, scribes, schoolmasters, &c., being rejected. *Geter v. Martin*, 2 Bay, 173; *Pelzer v. Cranston*, 2 McC. 328; *Boyd v. Ladson*, 4 McC. 76. The subject of the admission of the party's own entries, with his suppletory oath, in the several American States, is very elaborately and fully treated in a note to the American edition of Smith's Leading Cases, Vol. 1, p. 142, in 43 Law Lib. p. 223-245.

¹ This degree of proof is thus defined by Mascardus;—"Non est ignorandum, probationem semiplenam eam esse, per quam rei gestæ fides aliqua fit iudici; non tamen tanta ut jure debeat in pronuntianda sententia eam sequi." De Prob. Vol. 1, Quæst. 11, n. 1, 4.

the justice of his claim; and in such cases, the suppletory oath of the party (*juramentum suppletivum*) was admitted to make up the *plena probatio* necessary to a decree in his favor.¹ By the law of *France*, too, the books of merchants and tradesmen, regularly kept, and written from day to day, without any blank, when the tradesman has the reputation of probity, constitute a semi-proof, and with his suppletory oath, are received as full proof to establish his demand.² The same doctrine is familiar in the law of *Scotland*, by which the books of merchants and others, kept with a certain reasonable degree of regularity, satisfactory to the Court, may be received in evidence, the party being allowed to give his own "oath in supplement" of such imperfect proof. It seems, however, that a course of dealing, or other "pregnant circumstances," must in

¹ "Juramentum (suppletivum) defertur ubicunque actor habet pro se aliquas conjecturas, per quas iudex inducatur ad suspicionem vel ad opinandum pro parte actoris." Mascardus, De Prob. Vol. 3, Concl. 1230, n. 17. The civilians, however they may differ as to the degree of credit to be given to books of account, concur in opinion, that they are entitled to consideration at the discretion of the Judge. They furnish at least the conjecture mentioned by Mascardus; and their admission in evidence, with the suppletory oath of the party, is thus defended by Paul Voet, De Statutis, § 5, cap. 2, n. 9. "An ut credatur libris rationem, seu registris uti loquantur, mercatorum et artificum, licet probationibus testium non juventur? Respondeo, quamvis exemplo peritiosum esse videatur, quemque sibi privata testatione, sive adnotatione facere debitorem. Quia tamen hæc est mercatorum cura et opera, ut debiti et crediti rationes diligenter conficiant. Etiam in eorum foro et causis, ex æquo et bono est judicandum. Insuper non admissio aliquo litium accelerandarum remedio, commerciorum ordo et usus evertitur. Neque enim omnes præsentis pecunia merces sibi comparant, neque cujusque rei venditioni testes adhiberi, qui pretia mercium noverint, aut expedit, aut congruum est. Non iniquum videbitur illud statutum, quo domesticis talibus instrumentis additur fides, modo aliquibus adminiculis juventur." See also Hertius, De Collisione Legum, § 4, n. 68; Strykius, Tom. 7, Semiplena Probat. Disp. 1, Cap. 4, § 5; Menochius, De Presump. lib. 2, Presump. 57, n. 20, and lib. 3, Presump. 63, n. 12.

² 1 Pothier on Obl. Part iv. ch. 1, art. 2, § 4. By the Code Napoleon, merchants' books are required to be kept in a particular manner therein prescribed, and none others are admitted in evidence. Code de Commerce, Liv. 1, tit. 2, art. 8-12.

general be first shown by evidence *aliunde*, before the proof can be regarded as amounting to the degree of *sempilena probatio*, to be rendered complete by the oath of the party.¹

§ 120. Returning now to the admission of entries made by clerks and third persons, it may be remarked, that in most, if not all the reported cases, the clerk or person who made the entries was *dead*; and the entries were received upon proof of his handwriting. But it is conceived, that the fact of his death is not material to the admissibility of this kind of evidence. There are two classes of admissible entries, between which there is a clear distinction, in regard to the principle on which they are received in evidence. The one class consists of entries made against the interests of the party making them; and these derive their admissibility from this circumstance alone. It is, therefore, not material when they were made. The testimony of the party who made them, would be the best evidence of the fact; but, if he is dead, the entry of the fact, made by him in the ordinary course of his business, and against his interest, is received as secondary evidence, in a controversy between third persons.² The other class of entries consists of those, which constitute parts of a chain or combination of transactions between the parties, the proof of one raising a presumption, that another has taken place. Here, the value of the entry, as evidence, lies in this, that it was *contemporaneous with the principal fact done*, forming a link in the chain of events, and being *part of the res gestæ*. It is not merely the declaration of the party, but it is a verbal contemporaneous act, belonging, not necessarily,

¹ Tait on Evidence, p. 273-277. This degree of proof is there defined as "not merely a suspicion, — but such evidence as produces a reasonable belief, though not complete evidence." See also Glassford on Evid. p. 550; Bell's Digest of Laws of Scotland, p. 378, 898.

² Warren v. Greenville, 2 Str. 1129; Middleton v. Melton, 10 B. & C. 317; Thompson v. Stevens, 2 Nott & McC. 493; Chase v. Smith, 5 Verm. 556; Spiers v. Morris, 9 Bing. 687; Alston v. Taylor, 1 Hayw. 381, 395.

indeed, but ordinarily and naturally to the principal thing. It is on this ground, that this latter class of entries is admitted; and therefore it can make no difference, as to the admissibility, whether the party who made them be living or dead, nor whether he was or was not interested in making them; his interest going only to affect the credibility, or weight of the evidence when received.¹

§ 121. The evidence of indebtedment, afforded by the *indorsement* of the payment of interest, or a *partial payment* of the principal, on the back of a bond or other security, seems to fall within the principle we are now considering, more naturally than any other; though it is generally classed with entries made against the interest of the party. The main fact to be proved in the cases, where this evidence has been admitted, was the continued existence of the debt, notwithstanding the lapse of time since its creation was such as either to raise the presumption of payment, or to bring the case within the operation of the statute of limitations. This fact was sought to be proved by the acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor himself; and this acknowledgment was proved, by his having actually paid part of the money due. It is the usual, ordinary, and well known course of business, that partial payments are forthwith indorsed on the back of the security, the indorsement thus becoming part of the *res gestæ*. Wherever, therefore, an indorsement is shown to have been made at the time it bears date, (which will be

¹ This distinction was taken, and clearly expounded by Mr. Justice Parke, in Doe, d. Patteshall v. Turford, 3 B. & Ad. 890; cited and approved in Poole v. Dicus, 1 Bing. N. C. 654. See also Ante, § 115, 116; Cluggage v. Swan, 4 Binn. 154; Sherman v. Crosby, 11 Johns. 70; Holladay v. Littlepage, 2 Munf. 316; Prather v. Johnson, 3 H. & J. 487; Sherman v. Atkins, 4 Pick. 283; Carroll v. Tyler, 2 H. & G. 54; James v. Wharton, 3 McLean, 492. In several cases, however, letters and receipts of third persons living, and within the reach of process, have been rejected. Longenecker v. Hyde, 6 Binn. 1; Spargo v. Brown, 9 B. & C. 935; Warner v. Price, 3 Wend. 397; Cutbush v. Gilbert, 4 S. & R. 551.

inferred from its face, in the absence of opposing circumstances,¹) the presumption naturally arising is, that the money mentioned in it was paid at that time. If the date is at a period after the demand became stale, or affected by the statute of limitations, the interest of the creditor to fabricate it would be so strong, as to countervail the presumption of payment, and require the aid of some other proof; and the case would be the same, if the indorsement bore a date within that period, the instrument itself being otherwise subject to the bar arising from lapse of time.² Hence the inquiry, which is usually made in such cases, namely, whether the indorsement, when made, was against the interest of the party making it, that is, of the creditor; which, in other language, is only inquiring, whether it was made while his remedy was not yet impaired by lapse of time. The time when the indorsement was made is a fact to be settled by the Jury; and to this end the writing must be laid before them. If there is no evidence to the contrary, the presumption is, that the indorsement was made at the time it purports to bear date; and the burden of proving the date to be false lies on the other party.³ If the indorsement does not purport to be made contemporaneously with the receipt of the money, it is inadmissible, as part of the *res gestæ*.

§ 122. This doctrine has been very much considered in the discussions, which have repeatedly been had upon the case of *Searle v. Lord Barrington*.⁴ In that case the bond was given

¹ *Smith v. Battens*, 1 M. & Rob. 341. See also *Nichols v. Webb*, 8 Wheat 326; 12 S. & R. 49, 87; 16 S. & R. 89, 91.

² *Turner v. Crisp*, 2 Stra. 827; *Rose v. Bryant*, 2 Campb. 321; *Glynn v. The Bank of England*, 2 Ves. sen. 38, 43. See also *Whitney v. Bigelow*, 4 Pick. 110; *Roseboom v. Billington*, 17 Johns. 182; *Gibson v. Peebles*, 2 McCord, 418.

³ Per Taunton, J. in *Smith v. Battens*, 1 M. & Rob. 343. See also *Hunt v. Massey*, 5 B. & Adolph. 902; *Baker v. Milburn*, 2 Mees. & W. 853; *Sinclair v. Baggaley*, 4 Mees. & W. 312; *Anderson v. Weston*, 6 Bing. N. C. 296.

⁴ There were two successive actions on the same bond, between these par-

in 1697, and was not sued until after the death of the obligee, upon whose estate administration was granted in 1723. The obligor died in 1710; the obligee probably survived him, but it did not appear how long. To repel the presumption of payment, arising from lapse of time, the plaintiff offered in evidence two indorsements, made upon the bond by the obligee himself, bearing date in 1699, and in 1707, and purporting that the interest due at those respective dates had been then paid by the obligor. And it appears that other evidence was also offered, showing the time when the indorsements were actually made.¹ The indorsements, thus proved to have been made at the times they purported to have been made, were, upon solemn argument, held admissible evidence both by the Judges in the Exchequer Chamber and by the House of Lords. The grounds of these decisions are not stated in any

ties. The first is reported in 2 Stra. 826, 8 Mod. 278, and 2 Ld. Raym. 1370; and was tried before Pratt, C. J., who refused to admit the indorsement, and nonsuited the plaintiff; but on a motion to set the nonsuit aside, the three other Judges were of opinion, that the evidence ought to have been left to the Jury, the indorsement in such cases being according to the usual course of business, and perhaps in this case made with the privity of the obligor; but on another ground the motion was denied. Afterwards another action was brought, which was tried before Lord Raymond, C. J., who admitted the evidence of the indorsement; to which the defendant filed a bill of exceptions. This judgment was affirmed, on error in the Exchequer Chamber, and again in the House of Lords. See 2 Stra. 827; 3 Bro. P. C. 593. The first case is most fully reported in 8 Mod. 278.

¹ This fact was stated by Bayley, B. as the result of his own research. See 1 Crompt. & Mees. 421. So it was understood to be, and so stated, by Lord Hardwicke, in 2 Ves. sen. 43. It may have constituted the "other circumstantial evidence," mentioned in Mr. Brown's report, 3 Bro. P. C. 594; which he literally transcribed from the case as drawn up by Messrs. Lutwyche and Fazakerley, of counsel for the original plaintiff, for argument in the House of Lords. See a folio volume of original printed briefs, marked Cases in Parliament, 1728 to 1731, p. 529, in the Law Library of Harvard University, in which this case is stated more at large than in any book of Reports. By Stat. 9, Geo. 4, c. 14, it is enacted, that no indorsement of partial payment, made by or on behalf of the creditor, shall be deemed sufficient proof to take the case out of the statute of limitations. The same enactment is found in the Laws of some of the United States.

of the reports; but it may be presumed, that the reasoning on the side of the prevailing party was approved, namely, that the indorsement being made at the time it purported to bear date, and being according to the usual and ordinary course of business in such cases, and which it was not for the interest of the obligee at that time to make, was entitled to be considered by the Jury; and that from it, in the absence of opposing proof, the fact of actual payment of the interest might be inferred. This doctrine has been recognised and confirmed by subsequent decisions.¹

§ 123. Thus, we have seen, that there are *four classes of declarations*, which, though usually treated under the head of hearsay, are in truth *original evidence*; the *first* class consisting of cases, where the fact that the declaration was made, and not its truth or falsity, is the point in question; the *second*, including expressions of bodily or mental feelings, where the existence, or nature of such feelings is the subject of inquiry; the *third*, consisting of cases of pedigree, and including the declarations of those nearly related to the party whose pedigree is in question; and the *fourth*, embracing all other cases, where the declaration offered in evidence may be regarded as part of the *res gestæ*. All these classes are involved in the principle of the last; and have been separately treated, merely for the sake of greater distinctness.

§ 124. Subject to these qualifications and seeming exceptions, the *general rule of law rejects all hearsay reports of transactions*, whether verbal or written, given by persons not produced as witnesses.² The principle of this rule is, that

¹ *Bosworth v. Cotchett*, Dom. Proc. May 6, 1824; Phil. & Am. on Evid. 348; *Gleadow v. Atkin*, 1 Crompt. & Mees. 410; *Anderson v. Weston*, 6 Bing. N. C. 296; 2 Smith's Leading Cases, 197; *Addams v. Seitzinger*, 1 Watts & Serg. 243.

² "If," says Mr. Justice Buller, "the first speech were without oath, another oath, that there was such speech, makes it no more than a bare speaking, and so of no value in a Court of Justice." Bull. N. P. 294.

such evidence requires credit to be given to a statement, made by a person who is not subjected to the ordinary tests, enjoined by the law, for ascertaining the correctness and completeness of his testimony; namely, that oral testimony should be delivered in the presence of the Court or a Magistrate, under the moral and legal sanctions of an oath, and where the moral and intellectual character, the motives and deportment of the witness can be examined, and his capacity and opportunities for observation, and his memory, can be tested by a cross examination. Such evidence, moreover, as to oral declarations, is very liable to be fallacious, and its value is, therefore, greatly lessened by the probability that the declaration was imperfectly heard, or was misunderstood, or is not accurately remembered, or has been perverted. It is also to be observed, that the persons communicating such evidence are not exposed to the danger of a prosecution for perjury, in which something more than the testimony of one witness is necessary, in order to a conviction; for where the declaration, or statement, is sworn to have been made when no third person was present, or by a person who is since dead, it is hardly possible to punish the witness, even if his testimony is an entire fabrication.¹ To these reasons may be added considerations of public interest and convenience for rejecting hearsay evidence. The greatly increased expense and the vexation which the adverse party must incur, in order to rebut or explain it, the vast consumption of public time thereby occasioned, the multiplication of collateral issues, for decision by the Jury, and the danger of losing sight of the main question, and of the justice of the case, if this sort of proof were admitted, are considerations of too grave a character to be

¹ Phil. & Am. on Evid. 217; 1 Phil. Evid. 205, 206. See, as to the liability of words to misconstruction, the remarks of Mr. Justice Foster, in his Discourse on High Treason, ch 1, § 7. The rule excluding hearsay is not of great antiquity. One of the earliest cases, in which it was administered, was that of *Samson v. Yardly and Tothill*, 2 Keb. 223, pl. 74, 19 Car. 2.

overlooked by the Court or the Legislature, in determining the question of changing the rule.¹

§ 125. This rule applies, though the declaration offered in evidence was made upon oath, and in the course of a judicial proceeding, if the *litigating parties are not the same*. Thus, the deposition of a pauper, as to the place of his settlement, taken *ex parte* before a magistrate, was rejected, though the pauper himself had since absconded, and was not to be found.² The rule also applies, notwithstanding no better evidence is to be found, and though it is certain that, if the declaration offered is rejected, no other evidence can possibly be obtained; as, for example, if it purports to be the declaration of the only eye-witness of the transaction, and he is since dead.³

§ 126. An *exception* to this rule has been contended for, in the admission of the *declarations of a deceased attesting witness* to a deed or will, in disparagement of the evidence afforded by his signature. This exception has been asserted, on two

¹ *Mima Queen v. Hepburn*, 7 Cranch, 290, 296, per Marshall, C. J.

² *Rex v. Nuneham Courtney*, 1 East, 373; *Rex v. Ferry Frystone*, 2 East, 54; *Rex v. Eriswell*, 3 T. R. 707-725, per Ld. Kenyon, C. J., and Grose, J., whose opinions are approved and adopted in *Mima Queen v. Hepburn*, 7 Cranch, 296. The American Cases on the admission and rejection of hearsay are collected in Cowen & Hill's note 432, to 1 Phil. Evid. 229.

³ Phil. & Am. on Evid. 220, 221; 1 Phil. Evid. 209, 210. In Scotland the rule is otherwise; evidence on the relation of others being admitted, where the relator is since dead, and would, if living, have been a competent witness. And if the relation has been handed down to the witness at second hand, and through several successive relators, each only stating what he received from an intermediate relator, it is still admissible, if the original and intermediate relators are all dead, and would have been competent witnesses if living. Tait on Evid. p. 430, 431. But the reason for receiving hearsay evidence in cases where, as is generally the case in Scotland, the Judges determine upon the facts in dispute, as well as upon the law, is stated and vindicated by Sir James Mansfield, in the Berkley Peerage case, 4 Campb. 415.

grounds; *first*, that as the party, offering the deed, used the declaration of the witness, evidenced by his signature, to prove the execution, the other party might well be permitted to use any other declaration of the same witness, to disprove it;—and *secondly*, that such declaration was in the nature of a substitute for the loss of the benefit of a cross examination of the attesting witness; by which, either the fact confessed would have been proved, or the witness might have been contradicted, and his credit impeached. Both these grounds were fully considered in a case in the Exchequer, and were overruled by the Court; the first, because the evidence of the handwriting, in the attestation, is not used as a declaration by the witness, but is offered merely to show the fact that he put his name there, in the manner in which attestations are usually placed to genuine signatures; and the second, chiefly because of the mischiefs which would ensue, if the general rule excluding hearsay were thus broken in upon. For the security of solemn instruments would thereby become much impaired, and the rights of parties under them would be liable to be affected at remote periods, by loose declarations of the attesting witnesses, which could neither be explained nor contradicted, by the testimony of the witnesses themselves. In admitting such declarations, too, there would be no reciprocity; for though the party impeaching the instrument would thereby have an equivalent for the loss of his power of cross examination of the living witness, the other party would have none for the loss of his power of re-examination.¹

¹ *Stobart v. Dryden*, 1 Mees. & W. 615.

CHAPTER VI.

OF MATTERS OF PUBLIC AND GENERAL INTEREST.

§ 127. HAVING thus illustrated the nature of hearsay evidence, and shown the reasons on which it is generally excluded, we are now to consider the *cases, in which this rule has been relaxed*, and hearsay admitted. The exceptions, thus allowed, will be found to embrace most of the points of inconvenience, resulting from a stern and universal application of the rule, and to remove the principal objections which have been urged against it. These exceptions may be conveniently divided into four classes;—*first*, those relating to matters of public and general interest;—*secondly*, those relating to ancient possession;—*thirdly*, declarations against interest;—*fourthly*, dying declarations, and some others of a miscellaneous nature; and in this order it is proposed to consider them. It is, however, to be observed, that these exceptions are allowed only on the ground of the absence of better evidence, and from the nature and necessity of the case.

§ 128. And *first*, as to matters of *public and general interest*. The terms, *public* and *general*, are sometimes used as synonymous, meaning merely that which concerns a multitude of persons.¹ But in regard to the admissibility of hearsay testimony, a distinction has been taken between them; the term, *public*, being strictly applied to that which concerns all the citizens, and every member of the State; and the term, *general*, being referred to a lesser, though still a large portion, of the community. In matters of public interest, all persons must be presumed conversant, on the principle, that individuals

¹ Weeks v. Sparke, 1 M. & S. 690, per Bayley, J.

are presumed to be conversant in their own affairs; and, as common rights are naturally talked of in the community, what is thus dropped in conversation may be presumed to be true.¹ It is the prevailing current of assertion, that is resorted to as evidence, for it is to this that every member of the community is supposed to be privy, and to contribute his share. Evidence of common reputation is, therefore, received, in regard to public facts, (a claim of highway, or a right of ferry, for example,) on ground somewhat similar to that on which public documents, not judicial, are admitted, namely, the interest which all have in their truth, and the consequent probability that they are true.² In these matters, in which all are concerned, reputation from any one appears to be receivable; but of course it is almost worthless, unless it comes from persons who are shown to have some means of knowledge, such as, in the case of a highway, by living in the neighborhood; but the want of such proof of their connexion with the subject in question, affects the value only, and not the admissibility of the evidence. On the contrary, where the fact in controversy is one, in which all the members of the community have not an interest, but those only who live in a particular district, or adventure in a particular enterprise, or the like, hearsay from persons wholly unconnected with the place or business, would not only be of no value, but altogether inadmissible.³

¹ Morewood v. Wood, 14 East, 329, n., per Ld. Kenyon; Weeks v. Sparke, 1 M. & S. 686, per Ld. Ellenborough; The Berkley Peerage case, 4 Campb. 416, per Mansfield, C. J.

² 1 Stark. Evid. 195; Price v. Currell, 6 M. & W. 234.

³ Crease v. Barrett, 1 Crompt. Mees. & Rosc. 929, per Parke, B. By the Roman Law, reputation or common fame, seems to have been admissible in evidence, in all cases; but it was not generally deemed sufficient proof, and, in some cases, not even *sempierna probatio*, unless corroborated; *nisi aliis adminiculis adjuvetur*. Mascardus, De Prob. Vol. 1, Concl. 171, n. 1; Concl. 183, n. 2; Concl. 547, n. 19. It was held sufficient, *plena probatio*, wherever, from the nature of the case, better evidence was not attainable; *ubi à communiter accidentibus, probatio difficilis est, fama plenam solet probationem facere; ut in probatione filiationis*. But Mascardus deems it not sufficient,

§ 129. Thus, in an action of trespass *quare clausum fregit*, where the defendant pleaded in bar a prescriptive right of common in the *locus in quo*, and the plaintiff replied, prescribing the right of his messuage to use the same ground for tillage with corn, until the harvest was ended, traversing the defendant's prescription; it appearing that many persons, beside the defendant, had a right of common there, evidence of reputation as to the plaintiff's right was held admissible, provided it were derived from persons conversant with the neighborhood.¹ But where the question was, whether the city of Chester anciently formed part of the county Palatine, an ancient document, purporting to be a decree of certain law officers and dignitaries of the crown, not having authority as a Court, was held inadmissible evidence on the ground of reputation, they having, from their situations, no peculiar knowledge of the fact.² And, on the other hand, where the question was, whether Nottingham castle was within the hundred of Broxtowe, certain ancient orders, made by the Justices at the Quarter Sessions for the county, in which the castle was described as being within that hundred, were held admissible evidence of reputation; the Justices, though not proved to be residents within the county or hundred, being presumed, from the nature and character of their offices alone, to have sufficient acquaintance with the subject, to which

in cases of pedigree within the memory of man, which he limits to fifty-six years, unless aided by other evidence — *tunc nempe non sufficeret publica vox et fama, sed una cum ipsa deberet tractatus et nominatio probari vel alia adminicula urgentia adhiberi.* Mascard. De Prob. Vol. 1, Concl. 411, n. 1, 2, 6, 7.

¹ Weeks v. Sparke, 1 M. & S. 679, 688, per Le Blanc, J. The actual discussion of the subject, in the neighborhood, was a fact also relied on, in the Roman Law, in cases of proof by common fame. "Quando testis vult probare aliquem scivisse, non videtur sufficere, quod dicat ille scivit quia erat vicinus; sed debet addere, in vicinia hoc erat cognitum per famam, vel alio modo; et ideo iste, qui erat vicinus, potuit id scire." J. Menochius, De Præsump. Tom. 2, lib. 6, Præs. 24, n. 17, p. 772.

² Rogers v. Wood, 2 Barn. & Ad. 245.

their declarations related.¹ Thus it appears that competent knowledge in the declarant is, in all cases, an essential prerequisite to the admission of his testimony; and that though all the citizens are presumed to have that knowledge, in some degree, where the matter is of public concernment; yet, in other matters, of interest to many persons, some particular evidence of such knowledge is required.

§ 130. It is to be observed, that the exception we are now considering is admitted *only in the case of ancient rights*, and in respect to the declarations of *persons supposed to be dead*.² It is required by the nature of the rights in question; their origin being generally antecedent to the time of legal memory, and incapable of direct proof by living witnesses, both from this fact, and also from the undefined generality of their nature. It has been held, that where the nature of the case admits it, a foundation for the reception of hearsay evidence, in matters of public and general interest, should first be laid, by proving acts of enjoyment, within the period of living memory.³ But this doctrine has since been overruled; and it is now held, that such proof is not an essential condition of the reception of evidence of reputation, but is only material as it affects its value when received.⁴ Where the nature of the subject does not admit of proof of acts of enjoyment, it is obvious that proof of reputation alone is sufficient. So, where a right or custom is established by documentary evidence, no proof is necessary of any particular instance of its exercise; for, if it were otherwise, and no

¹ Duke of Newcastle v. Broxtowe, 4 Barn. & Ad. 273.

² Moseley v. Davies, 11 Price, 162; Regina v. Milton, 1 Car. & Kir. 58; Davis v. Fuller, 12 Verm. R. 178.

³ Per Buller, J. in Morewood v. Wood, 14 East, 330, note; Per Le Blanc, J. in Weeks v. Sparke, 1 M. & S. 688, 689.

⁴ Crease v. Barrett, 1 Crompt. Mees. & Ros. 919, 930. See also acc. Curzon v. Lomax, 5 Esp. 90, per Ld. Ellenborough; Steel v. Prickett, 2 Stark. 463, 466, per Abbott, C. J.; Ratcliff v. Chapman, 4 Leon. 242, as explained by Grose, J. in Bebee v. Parker, 5 T. R. 32.

instance were to happen within the memory of man, the right or custom would be totally destroyed.¹ In the case of a private right, however, where proof of particular instances of its exercise has first been given, evidence of reputation has sometimes been admitted in confirmation of the actual enjoyment; but it is never allowed against it.²

§ 131. Another important qualification of the exception we have been considering, by which evidence of reputation or common fame is admitted, is, that the declaration so received must have been *made before any controversy* arose, touching the matter, to which they relate; or, as it is usually expressed, *ante litem motam*. The ground, on which such evidence is admitted at all, is, that the declarations "are the natural effusions of a party, who must know the truth, and who speaks upon an occasion, when his mind stands in an even position, without any temptation to exceed or fall short of the truth."³ But no man is presumed to be thus indifferent in regard to matters in actual controversy; for when the contest has begun, people generally take part on the one side or the

¹ *Beebe v. Parker*, 5 T. R. 26, 32; *Doe v. Sisson*, 12 East, 62; *Steel v. Prickett*, 2 Stark. R. 463, 466. A single act, undisturbed, has been held sufficient evidence of a custom, the Court refusing to set aside a verdict finding a custom, upon such evidence alone. *Roe v. Jeffery*, 2 M. & S. 92; *Doe v. Mason*, 3 Wils. 63.

² *White v. Lisle*, 4 Mad. R. 214, 225. See *Morewood v. Wood*, 14 East, 330, n., per Buller, J.; *Weeks v. Sparke*, 1 M. & S. 690, per Bayley, J.; *Rogers v. Allen*, 1 Campb. 309; *Richards v. Bassett*, 10 B. & C. 662, 663, per Littleale, J. A doctrine nearly similar is held by the civilians, in cases of ancient private rights. Thus, Mascardus, after stating, upon the authority of many jurists, that *Dominium in antiquis probari per famam, traditum est, — veluti si fama sit, hanc domum fuisse Dantis Poetæ, vel alterius, qui decessit, jam sunt centum anni, et nemo vidit, qui viderit, quem refert, &c.*, subsequently qualifies this general proposition in these words; — *Primo limita principalem conclusionem, ut non procedat, nisi cum fama concurrant alia adminicula, saltem presentis possessionis, &c.* Mascard. De Prob. Vol. 2, Concl. 547, n. 1, 14.

³ Per Ld. Eldon, in *Whitlocke v. Baker*, 13 Ves. 514; *Rex v. Cotton*, 3 Campb. 444, 446, per Dampier, J.

other; their minds are in a ferment; and, if they are disposed to speak the truth, facts are seen by them through a false medium. To avoid, therefore, the mischiefs which would otherwise result, all *ex parte* declarations, even though made upon oath, referring to a date subsequent to the beginning of the controversy, are rejected.¹ This rule of evidence was familiar in the Roman law; but the term *lis mota* was there applied strictly to the commencement of the action, and was not referred to any earlier period of the controversy.² But in our law, the term *lis* is taken in the classical and larger sense of *controversy*; and by *lis mota* is understood the commencement of the controversy, and not the commencement of the suit.³ The commencement of the controversy has been further defined by Mr. Baron Alderson, in a case of pedigree, to be "the arising of that state of facts, on which the claim is founded, without any thing more."⁴

§ 132. The *lis mota*, in the sense of our law, carries with it the further idea of a *controversy upon the same particular subject in issue*. For, if the matter under discussion at the time of trial was not in controversy at the time, to which the declarations offered in evidence relate, they are admissible, notwithstanding a controversy did then exist upon some other branch of the same general subject. The value of general reputation, as evidence of the true state of facts, depends upon

¹ The Berkley Peerage case, 4 Campb. 401, 409, 412, 413; *Monkton v. The Attorney General*, 2 Russ. & My. 160, 161; *Richards v. Bassett*, 10 B. & C. 657.

² *Lis est, ut primum in jus, vel in judicium ventum est; antequam in judicium veniatur, controversia est, non lis.* Cujac. Opera Posth. Tom. 5, col. 193, B. and col. 162, D. *Lis inchoata est ordinata per libellum, est satisdationem, licet non sit lis contestata.* Corpis Juris Glossatum, Tom. 1, col. 553, ad Dig. lib. iv. tit. 6, l. 12. *Lis mota censetur, etiamsi solus actor egerit.* Calv. Lex. Verb. Lis mota.

³ Per Mansfield, C. J. in the Berkley Peerage case, 4 Campb. 417; *Monkton v. The Attor. Gen.* 2 Russ. & My. 161.

⁴ *Walker v. Countess of Beauchamp*, 6 C. & P. 552, 561. But see *Reilly v. Fitzgerald*, 1 Drury, (Ir.) R. 122, where this is questioned.

its being the concurrent belief of minds unbiassed, and in a situation favorable to a knowledge of the truth; and referring to a period when this fountain of evidence was not rendered turbid by agitation. But the discussion of other topics, however similar in their general nature, at the time referred to, does not necessarily lead to the inference, that the particular point in issue was also controverted, and, therefore, is not deemed sufficient to exclude the sort of proof we are now considering. Thus, where, in a suit between a copyholder and the lord of the manor, the point in controversy was, whether the customary fine, payable upon the renewal of a life-lease, was to be assessed by the jury of the lord's court, or by the reasonable discretion of the lord himself; depositions taken for the plaintiff, in an ancient suit by a copyholder against a former lord of the manor, where the controversy was upon the copyholder's right to be admitted at all, and not upon the terms of admission, in which depositions the customary fine was mentioned as to be assessed by the lord or his steward, were held admissible evidence of what was then understood to be the undisputed custom.¹ In this case it was observed by one of the learned Judges, that "the distinction had been correctly taken, that where the *lis mota* was on the very point, the declarations of persons would not be evidence; because you cannot be sure, that in admitting the depositions of witnesses, selected and brought forward on a particular side of the question, who embark, to a certain degree, with the feelings and prejudices belonging to that particular side, you are drawing evidence from perfectly unpolluted sources. But where the point in controversy is foreign to that which was before controverted, there never has been a *lis mota*, and consequently the objection does not apply."

§ 133. Declarations made after the controversy has originated, are excluded, even though proof is offered that the

¹ Freeman v. Phillips, 4 M. & S. 486, 497; Elliott v. Piersol, 1 Peters, 328, 337.

existence of the controversy was not known to the declarant. The question of his ignorance or knowledge of this fact is one which the Courts will not try; partly because of the danger of an erroneous decision of the principal fact by the Jury, from the raising of too many collateral issues, thereby introducing great confusion into the cause; and partly from the fruitlessness of the inquiry, it being from its very nature impossible, in most cases, to prove that the existence of the controversy was not known. The declarant, in these cases, is always absent, and generally dead. The light afforded by his declarations is at best extremely feeble, and far from being certain; and, if introduced, with the proof on both sides, in regard to his knowledge of the controversy, it would induce darkness and confusion, perilling the decision without the probability of any compensating good to the parties. It is therefore excluded, as more likely to prove injurious than beneficial.¹

§ 134. It has sometimes been laid down, as an exception to the rule, excluding declarations made *post litem motam*, that declarations concerning *pedigree* will not be invalidated by the circumstance, that they were made during family discussions, and for the purpose of preventing future controversy; and the instance given, by way of illustration, is that of a solemn act of parents, under their hands, declaring the legiti-

¹ The Berkley Peerage case, 4 Campb. 417, per Mansfield, C. J.; Ante, § 124. This distinction, and the reasons of it, were recognised in the Roman law; but there the rule was to admit the declarations, though made *post litem motam*, if they were made at a place so very far remote from the scene of the controversy, as to remove all suspicion that the declarant had heard of its existence. Thus it is stated by *Mascardus*;—"Istud autem quod diximus, debere testes deponere ante litem motam, sic est accipiendum, ut verum sit, si ibidem, ubi res agitur, audierit; at si alibi, in loco qui longissimè distaret, sic intellexerit, etiam post litem motam testes de auditu admittuntur. Longinquitas enim loci in causa est, ut omnis suspicio abesse videatur, quæ quidem suspicio adesse potest, quando testis de auditu post litem motam ibidem, ubi res agitur, deponit." Mascard. De Probat. Vol. 1, p. 401 [429], Concl. 410, n. 5, 6.

macy of a child. But it is conceived, that evidence of this sort is admissible, not by way of exception to any rule, but because it is, in its own nature, original evidence; constituting part of the fact of the recognition of existing relations of consanguinity or affinity; and falling naturally under the head of the expression of existing sentiments and affections, or of declarations against the interest, and peculiarly within the knowledge of the party making them, or of verbal acts, part of the *res gestæ*.¹

§ 135. Where evidence of reputation is admitted, in cases of public or general interest, it is not necessary that the witness should be able to *specify from whom he heard the declarations*. For that, in much the greater number of cases, would be impossible; as the names of persons long since dead, by whom declarations upon topics of common repute have at some time or other been made, are mostly forgotten.² And, if the declarant is known, and appears to have stood *in pari casu* with the party offering his declarations in evidence, so that he could not, if living, have been personally examined as a witness to the fact, of which he speaks, this is no valid objection to the admissibility of his declarations. The reason is, the absence of opportunity and motive to consult his interest, at the time of speaking. Whatever secret wish or bias he may have had in the matter, there was, at that time, no excited interest called forth in his breast, or, at least, no means were afforded of promoting, nor danger incurred of injuring any interest of his own; nor could any such be the necessary result of his declarations. Whereas, on a trial, in itself and of necessity directly affecting his interest, there is a double objection to admitting his evidence, in the concurrence

¹ Ante, § 102-108, 131; Goodright v. Moss, Cowp. 591; Monkton v. The Attor. Gen. 2 Russ. & My. 147, 160, 161, 164; Slaney v. Wade, 1 My. & Cr. 338; The Berkley Peerage case, 4 Campb. 418, per Mansfield, C. J.

² Moseley v. Davies, 11 Price, 162, 174, per Richards, C. B.; Harwood v. Sims, Wightw. 112.

both of the temptation of interest, and the excitement of the *lis mota*.¹

§ 136. Indeed the rejection of the evidence of reputation, in cases of public or general interest, because it may have come from persons *in pari casu* with the party offering it, would be inconsistent with the qualification of the rule, which has already been mentioned, namely, that the statement thus admitted must appear to have been made by persons having competent knowledge of the subject.² Without such knowledge, the testimony is worthless. In matters of public right, all persons are presumed to possess that degree of knowledge, which serves to give some weight to their declarations respecting them, because all have a common interest. But in subjects interesting to a comparatively small portion of the community, as a city, or parish, a foundation for admitting evidence of reputation, or the declarations of ancient and deceased persons, must first be laid, by showing that from their situation, they probably were conversant with the matter of which they were speaking.³

¹ Moseley v. Davies, 11 Price, 179, per Graham, B.; Deacle v. Hancock, 13 Price, 236, 237; Nichols v. Parker, 14 East, 331, note; Harwood v. Sims, Wightw. 112; Freeman v. Phillips, 4 M. & S. 486, 491, cited and approved by Lyndhurst, C. B. in Davies v. Morgan, 1 C. & J. 593, 594; Monkton v. Attorney General, 2 Russ. & My. 159, 160, per Ld. Ch. Brougham; Reed v. Jackson, 1 East, 355, 357; Chapman v. Cowlan, 13 East, 10.

² Ante, § 128, 129.

³ Weeks v. Sparke, 1 M. & S. 679, 686, 690; Doe d. Molesworth v. Sleeman, 1 New Pr. Cas. 170; Morewood v. Wood, 14 East, 327, note; Crease v. Barrett, 1 Cr. M. & Ros. 929; Duke of Newcastle v. Broxtowe, 4 B. & Ad. 273; Rogers v. Wood, 2 B. & Ad. 245. The Roman law, as stated by Mascardus, agrees with the doctrine in the text. "*Confines probantur per testes. Verum scias velim, testes in hac materia, qui vicini, et circum ibi habitant, esse magis idoneos quam alios. Si testes non sentiant commodum vel incommodum immediatum, possint pro sua communitate deponere. Licet hujusmodi testes sint de universitate, et deponant super confinibus suæ universitatis, probant, dummodum præcipuum ipsi commodum non sentiant, licet inferant commodum in universum.*" Mascard. De Probat. Vol. 1, p. 389, 390, Concl. 395, n. 1, 2, 19, 9.

§ 137. The probable *want of competent knowledge* in the declarant is the reason generally assigned for rejecting evidence of reputation or common fame, in matters of mere *private right*. "Evidence of reputation, upon general points, is receivable," said Lord Kenyon, "because, all mankind being interested therein, it is natural to suppose that they may be conversant with the subjects, and that they should discourse together about them, having all the same means of information. But how can this apply to private titles, either with regard to particular customs, or private prescriptions? How is it possible for strangers to know any thing of what concerns only private titles?"¹ The case of prescriptive rights has sometimes been mentioned as an exception; but it is believed that where evidence of reputation has been admitted in such cases, it will be found that the right was one in which many persons were equally interested. The weight of authority, as well as the reason of the rule, seem alike to forbid the admission of this kind of evidence, except in cases of a public or *quasi public nature*.²

¹ *Morewood v. Wood*, 14 East, 329, note, per Ld. Kenyon; 1 Stark. Evid. 30, 31; *Clothier v. Chapman*, 14 East, 331, note; *Reed v. Jackson*, 1 East, 357; *Outram v. Morewood*, 5 T. R. 121, 123; *Weeks v. Sparke*, 1 M. & S. 679.

² *Elliott v. Pearl*, 10 Peters, 412; *Richards v. Bassett*, 10 B. & C. 657, 662, 663, per Littledale, J.; Ante, § 130. The following are cases of a *quasi public nature*; though they are usually, but, on the foregoing principles, erroneously cited in favor of the admissibility of evidence of reputation in cases of mere private right. *Bp. of Meath v. Ld. Belfield*, Bull. N. P. 295, where the question was, who presented a former incumbent of a parish; a fact interesting to all the parishioners; — *Price v. Littlewood*, 3 Campb. 268, where an old entry in the vestry book, by the churchwardens, showing by what persons certain parts of the church were repaired, in consideration of their occupancy of pews, was admitted, to show title to a pew, in one under whom the plaintiff claimed; — *Barnes v. Mawson*, 1 M. & S. 77, which was a question of boundary between two large districts of a manor, called the Old and New Lands; — *Auscomb v. Shore*, 1 Taunt. 261, where the right of common prescribed for was claimed by all the inhabitants of Hampton; — *Blackett v. Lowes*, 2 M. & S. 494, 500, where the question was as to the general usage of all the tenants of a manor, the defendant being one, to cut

§ 138. This principle may serve to explain and reconcile what is said in the books, respecting the admissibility of *reputation* in regard to *particular facts*. Upon general points, as we have seen, such evidence is receivable, because of the general interest which the community have in them; but particular facts of a private nature not being notorious, may be misrepresented or misunderstood, and may have been connected with other facts, by which, if known, their effect might be limited or explained. Reputation as to the existence of such particular facts is therefore rejected. But, if the particular fact is proved *aliunde*, evidence of general reputation may be received, to qualify and explain it. Thus, in a suit for tithes, where a parochial modus of six pence per acre was set up, it was conceded, that evidence of reputation of the payment of that sum for one piece of land would not be admissible; but it was held, that such evidence would be admissible to the fact that it had always been customary to pay that sum for all the lands in the parish.¹ And where the question on the record was, whether a turnpike was within the limits of a certain town, evidence of general reputation was admitted to show that the bounds of the town extended as far as a certain close; but not that formerly there were houses, where none then stood; the latter being a particular fact, in which the public had no interest.² So where, upon

certain woods; — *Brett v. Beales*, 1 Mood. & Malk. 416, which was a claim of ancient tolls belonging to the corporation of Cambridge; — *White v. Lisle*, 4 Madd. Ch. R. 214, 224, 225, where evidence of reputation, in regard to a *parochial modus*, was held admissible, because "a class or district of persons was concerned;" but denied in regard to a *farm modus*, because none but the occupant of the farm was concerned. In *Davies v. Lewis*, 2 Chitty, R. 535, the declarations offered in evidence were clearly admissible, as being those of tenants in possession, stating under whom they held. See Ante, § 108.

¹ *Harwood v. Sims*, Wightw. 112, more fully reported and explained in *Moseley v. Davies*, 11 Price, 162, 169-172; *Chatfield v. Fryer*, 1 Price, 253; *Wells v. Jesus College*, 7 C. & P. 284; *Leathes v. Newith*, 4 Price, 355.

² *Ireland v. Powell*, Salop. Spr. Ass. 1802, per Chambre, J.; *Peake's Evid.* 13, 14, (Norris's Ed. p. 27.)

an information against the sheriff of the county of Chester, for not executing a death-warrant, the question was, whether the sheriff of the county, or the sheriffs of the city, were to execute sentence of death, traditionary evidence that the sheriffs of the county had always been exempted from the performance of that duty was rejected, it being a private question between two individuals; the public having an interest only that execution be done, and not in the person by whom it was performed.¹ The question, of the admissibility of this sort of evidence seems, therefore, to turn upon the nature of the reputed fact, whether it was interesting to one party only, or to many. If it were of a public or general nature, it falls within the exception we are now considering, by which hearsay evidence, under the restrictions already mentioned, is admitted. But if it had no connexion with the exercise of any public right, nor with the discharge of any public duty, nor with any other matter of general interest, it falls within the general rule, by which hearsay evidence is excluded.²

§ 139. Hitherto we have mentioned oral declarations, as the medium of proving traditionary reputation, in matters of public and general interest. *The principle*, however, upon which these are admitted, *applies to documentary and all other kinds of proof denominated hearsay*. If the matter in controversy is ancient, and not susceptible of better evidence, any proof in the nature of traditionary declarations is receivable, whether it be oral or written; subject to the qualifica-

¹ *Rex v. Antrobus*, 2 Ad. & El. 788, 794.

² *White v. Lisle*, 4 Madd. Ch. R. 214, 224, 225; *Bp. of Meath v. Ld. Belfield*, 1 Wils. 215; *Bull. N. P.* 295; *Weeks v. Sparke*, 1 M. & S. 679; *Withnell v. Gartham*, 1 Esp. 322; *Doe v. Thomas*, 14 East, 323; *Ph. & Am. on Evid.* 258; 1 Stark. Evid. 34, 35; *Outram v. Morewood*, 5 T. R. 121, 123; *Rex v. Eriswell*, 3 T. R. 709, per Grose, J. Where particular knowledge of a fact is sought to be brought home to a party, evidence of the general reputation and belief of the existence of that fact, among his neighbors, is admissible to the Jury, as tending to show that he also had knowledge of it, as well as they. *Brander v. Ferridy*, 16 Louisiana R. 296.

tions we have stated. Thus, deeds, leases, and other private documents, have been admitted, as declaratory of the public matters recited in them.¹ Maps, also, showing the boundaries of towns and parishes, are admissible, if it appear that they have been made by persons having adequate knowledge.² Verdicts, also, are receivable evidence of reputation, in questions of public or general interest.³ Thus, for example, where a public right of way was in question, the plaintiff was allowed to show a verdict rendered in his own favor, against a defendant in another suit, in which the same right of way was in issue; but Lord Kenyon observed, that such evidence was perhaps not entitled to much weight, and certainly was not conclusive. The circumstance, that the verdict was *post litem motam*, does not affect its admissibility.⁴

¹ *Curzon v. Lomax*, 5 Esp. 60; *Brett v. Beales*, 1 M. & M. 416; *Claxton v. Dare*, 10 B. & C. 17; *Clarkson v. Woodhouse*, 5 T. R. 412, n.; 3 Doug. 189, S. C.; *Barnes v. Mawson*, 1 M. & S. 77, 78; *Coombs v. Coether*, 1 M. & M. 398; *Beebe v. Parker*, 5 T. R. 26; *Freeman v. Phillips*, 4 M. & S. 486; *Crease v. Barrett*, 1 Cr. Mees. & Ros. 923; *Denn v. Spray*, 1 T. R. 466; *Bullen v. Michel*, 4 Dow, 298; *Taylor v. Cook*, 8 Price, 650.

² 1 Phil. Evid. 251, 252; *Alcock v. Cooke*, 2 Moore & Payne, 625; 5 Bing. 340, S. C. Upon a question of boundary between two farms, it being proved that the boundary of one of them was identical with that of a hamlet, evidence of reputation as to the bounds of the hamlet was held admissible. *Thomas v. Jenkins*, 1 N. & P. 588. But an old map of a parish, produced from the parish chest, and which was made under a private inclosure act, was held inadmissible evidence of boundary, without proof of the inclosure act. *Reg. v. Milton*, 1 C. & K. 58.

³ But an interlocutory decree for preserving the *status quo*, until a final decision upon the right should be had, no final decree ever having been made, is inadmissible as evidence of reputation. *Pim v. Curell*, 6 M. & W. 234.

⁴ *Reed v. Jackson*, 1 East, 355, 357; *Bull. N. P.* 233; *City of London v. Clarke*, Carth. 181; *Rhodes v. Ainsworth*, 1 B. & Ald. 87, 89, per Holroyd, J.; *Lancum v. Lovell*, 9 Bing. 465, 469; *Cort v. Birkbeck*, 1 Doug. 218, 222, per Ld. Mansfield; *Case of the Manchester Mills*, 1 Doug. 221, n.; *Berry v. Banner*, Peake's Cas. 156; *Biddulph v. Ather*, 2 Wils. 23; *Brisco v. Lomax*, 3 N. & P. 388; *Evans v. Rees*, 2 P. & D. 627; 10 Ad. & El. 151, S. C.

§ 140. It is further to be observed, that reputation is evidence as well *against a public right*, as in its favor. Accordingly, where the question was, whether a landing place was public or private property, reputation, from the declarations of ancient deceased persons, that it was the private landing place of the party and his ancestors, was held admissible; the learned Judge remarking, that there was no distinction between the evidence of reputation to establish, and to disparage, a public right.¹

¹ Drinkwater v. Porter, 7 C. & P. 181; R. v. Sutton, 3 N. & P. 569.

CHAPTER VII.

OF ANCIENT POSSESSIONS.

§ 141. A *second exception* to the rule, rejecting hearsay evidence, is allowed in cases of *ancient possession*, and in favor of the admission of ancient documents in support of it. In matters of private right, not affecting any public or general interest, hearsay is generally inadmissible. But the admission of ancient documents, purporting to constitute *part of the transactions* themselves, to which, as acts of ownership or of the exercise of right, the party against whom they are produced is not privy, stands on a different principle. It is true, on the one hand, that the documents in question consist of evidence which is not *proved* to be part of any *res gesta*, because the only proof the transaction consists in the documents themselves; and these may have been fabricated, or, if genuine, may never have been acted upon. And their effect, if admitted in evidence, is to benefit persons connected in interest with the original parties to the documents, and from whose custody they have been produced. But, on the other hand, such documents always accompany, and form a part of every legal transfer of title and possession by act of the parties; and there is, also, some presumption against their fabrication, where they refer to coexisting subjects by which their truth might be examined.¹ On this ground, therefore, as well as because such is generally the only attainable evidence of ancient possession, this proof is admitted, under the qualifications, which will be stated.

§ 142. As the value of these documents depends mainly on

¹ 1 Phil. Evid. 273; 1 Stark. Evid. 66, 67; Clarkson v. Woodhouse, 5 T. R. 413, n., per Ld. Mansfield.

their having been contemporaneous, at least, with the act of transfer, if not part of it, care is *first* taken to *ascertain their genuineness*; and this may be shown *primâ facie*, by proof that the document comes from the *proper custody*; or by otherwise accounting for it. Documents found in a place, in which, and under the care of persons, with whom such papers might naturally and reasonably be expected to be found, are in precisely the custody which gives authenticity to documents found within it.¹ "For it is not necessary," observed Tindal, C. J., "that they should be found in the best and most proper place of deposit. If documents continue in such custody, there never would be any question, as to their authenticity; but it is when documents are found in other than their proper place of deposit, that the investigation commences, whether it is reasonable and natural, under the circumstances in the particular case, to expect that they should have been in the place where they are actually found; for it is obvious, that, while there can be only one place of deposit strictly and absolutely proper, there may be many and various that are reasonable and probable, though differing in degree; some being more so, some less; and in those cases the

¹ Per Tindal, C. J. in *Bishop of Meath v. Marq. of Winchester*, 2 Bing. N. C. 163, 200, 201, expounded and confirmed by Parke, B. in *Croughton v. Blake*, 12 M. & W. 205, 208; and in *Doe d. Jacobs v. Phillips*, 10 Jur. 34; 8 Ad. & El. 158, N. S. See also *Lygon v. Strutt*, 2 Anstr. 601; *Swinerton v. Marq. of Stafford*, 3 Taunt. 91; *Bullen v. Michel*, 4 Dow, 297; *Earl v. Lewis*, 4 Esp. 1; *Randolph v. Gordon*, 5 Price, 312; *Manby v. Curtis*, 1 Price, 225, 232, per Wood, B.; *Bertie v. Beaumont*, 2 Price, 303, 307; *Barr v. Gratz*, 4 Wheat. 213, 221; *Winn v. Patterson*, 9 Peters, 663-675; *Clarke v. Courtney*, 5 Peters, 319, 344; *Jackson v. Laroway*, 3 Johns. Cas. 383, approved in *Jackson v. Luquere*, 5 Cowen, 221, 225; *Hewlett v. Cock*, 7 Wend. 371, 374; *Duncan v. Beard*, 2 Nott & McC. 400; *Middleton v. Mass*, 2 Nott & McC. 55; *Doe v. Beynon*, 4 P. & D. 193; Post, § 570; *Doe v. Pearce*, 2 M. & Rob. 240. An ancient extent of Crown lands, found in the office of the Land Revenue Records, it being the proper repository, and purporting to have been made by the proper officer, has been held good evidence of the title of the Crown to lands therein stated to have been purchased by the Crown from a subject. *Doe d. Wm.* 4, v. *Roberts*, 13 M. & W. 520.

proposition to be determined is, whether the actual custody is so reasonably and probably accounted for, that it impresses the mind with the conviction that the instrument found in such custody must be genuine. That such is the character and description of the custody, which is held sufficiently genuine to render a document admissible, appears from all the cases."

§ 143. It is further requisite, where the nature of the case will admit it, that proof be given of *some act done* in reference to the documents offered in evidence, as a further assurance of their genuineness, and of the claiming of title under them. If the document bears date *post litem motam*, however ancient, some evidence of correspondent acting is always scrupulously required, even in cases where traditionary evidence is receivable.¹ But, in other cases, where the transaction is very ancient, so that proof of contemporaneous acting, such as possession, or the like, is not probably to be obtained, its production is not required.² But where unexceptionable evidence of enjoyment, referable to the document, may reasonably be expected to be found, it must be produced.³ If such evidence, referable to the document, is not to be expected, still it is requisite to prove some acts of modern enjoyment, with reference to similar documents, or that modern possession or user should be shown, corroborative of the ancient documents.⁴

§ 144. Under these qualifications, *ancient documents*, purporting to be a *part of the transactions, to which they relate*, and not a mere narrative of them, are receivable as evidence, that those transactions actually occurred. And though they

¹ 1 Phil. Evid. 277; *Brett v. Beales*, 1 Mood. & M. 416.

² *Clarkson v. Woodhouse*, 5 T. R. 412, 413, n., per Ld. Mansfield; Ante, § 130, and cases there cited.

³ 1 Phil. Evid. 277; *Plaxton v. Dare*, 10 B. & C. 17.

⁴ *Rogers v. Allen*, 1 Campb. 309, 311; *Clarkson v. Woodhouse*, 5 T. R. 412, n. See the cases collected in note to § 144, post.

are spoken of, as hearsay evidence of ancient possession, and as such are said to be admitted in exception to the general rule; yet they seem rather to be parts of the *res gestæ*, and therefore admissible as original evidence, on the principle already discussed. An ancient deed, by which is meant one more than thirty years old, having nothing suspicious about it, is presumed to be genuine without express proof, the witnesses being presumed dead; and, if it is found in the proper custody, and is corroborated by evidence of ancient or modern corresponding enjoyment,¹ or by other equivalent or explana-

¹ It has been made a question, whether the document may be read in evidence, before the proof of possession or other equivalent corroborative proof is offered; but it is now settled that the document, if otherwise apparently genuine, may be first read; for the question, whether there has been a corresponding possession, can hardly be raised till the Court is made acquainted with the tenor of the instrument. *Doe v. Passingham*, 2 C. & P. 440. A graver question has been, whether the proof of possession is indispensable; or whether its absence may be supplied by other satisfactory corroborative evidence. In *Jackson d. Lewis v. Laroway*, 3 Johns. Cas. 283, it was held by Kent, J. against the opinion of the other Judges, that it was indispensable; on the authority of *Fleta*, lib. 6, cap. 34; *Co. Lit.* 6, b.; *Isack v. Clarke*, 1 Roll. R. 132; *James v. Trollop*, *Skin.* 239; 2 *Mod.* 323; *Forbes v. Wale*, 1 W. Bl. R. 532; and the same doctrine was again asserted by him, in delivering the judgment of the Court, in *Jackson d. Burnhams v. Blanshan*, 3 Johns. 292, 298. See also *Thompson v. Bullock*, 1 Bay, 364; *Middleton v. Mass*, 2 Nott & McC. 55; *Carroll v. Norwood*, 1 Har. & J. 174, 175; *Shaller v. Brand*, 6 Binn. 439; *Doe v. Phelps*, 9 Johns. 169, 171. But the weight of authority at present seems clearly the other way; and it is now agreed that, where proof of possession cannot be had, the deed may be read, if its genuineness is satisfactorily established by other circumstances. See *Ld. Raneliffe v. Parkins*, 6 Dow, 202, per *Ld. Eldon*; *McKenire v. Frazer*, 9 Ves. 5; *Doe v. Passingham*, 2 C. & P. 440; *Barr v. Gratz*, 4 Wheat. 213, 221; *Jackson d. Lewis v. Laroway*, 3 Johns. Cas. 283, 287; *Jackson d. Hunt v. Luquere*, 5 Cowen, 221, 225; *Jackson d. Wilkins v. Lamb*, 7 Cowen, 431; *Hewlett v. Cock*, 7 Wend. 371, 373, 374. See also the cases collected in *Cowen & Hill's note* 903, to 1 *Phil. Evid.* 477. Where an ancient document, purporting to be an exemplification, is produced from the proper place of deposit, having the usual slip of parchment to which the great seal is appended, but no appearance that any seal was ever affixed, it is still to be presumed, that the seal was once there and has been accidentally removed, and it may be read in evidence as an exemplification. *Mayor, &c. of Beverley v. Craven*, 2 M. & Rob. 140.

tory proof, it is to be presumed that the deed constituted part of the actual transfer of property therein mentioned; because this is the usual and ordinary course of such transactions among men. The residue of the transaction may be as unerringly inferred from the existence of genuine ancient documents, as the remainder of a statue may be made out from an existing *torso*, or a perfect skeleton from the fossil remains of a part.

§ 145. Under this head may be mentioned the case of *ancient boundaries*; in proof of which, it has sometimes been said, that traditionary evidence is admissible from the nature and necessity of the case. But, if the principles already discussed in regard to the admission of hearsay are sound, it will be difficult to sustain an exception in favor of such evidence merely as applying to boundary, where the fact is particular, and not of public or general interest. Accordingly, though evidence of reputation is received, in regard to the boundaries of parishes, manors, and the like, which are of public interest, and generally of remote antiquity, yet, by the weight of authority and upon better reason, such evidence is held to be inadmissible for the purpose of proving the boundary of a private estate, when such boundary is not identical with another of a public or *quasi* public nature.¹

¹ *Ph. & Am. on Evid.* 255, 256; *Ante*, § 139, note (2); *Thomas v. Jenkins*, 1 N. & P. 588; *Reed v. Jackson*, 1 East, 355, 357, per *Ld. Kenyon*; *Doe v. Thomas*, 14 East, 323; *Morewood v. Wood*, *Id.* 327, note; *Outram v. Morewood*, 5 T. R. 121, 123, per *Ld. Kenyon*; *Nichols v. Parker*, and *Clothier v. Chapman*, in 14 East, 331, note; *Weeks v. Sparke*, 1 M. & S. 688, 689; *Cherry v. Boyd*, *Littell's Selected Cases*, 8, 9; 1 *Phil. Evid.* 182, (3d Lond. Ed.), cited and approved by *Tilghman, C. J.* in *Buchanan v. Moore*, 10 S. & R. 281. In the passage thus cited, the learned author limits the admissibility of this kind of evidence to questions of a public or general nature; including a right of common by custom; which, he observes, "is, strictly speaking, a private right; but it is a *general* right, and therefore, (so far as regards the admissibility of this species of evidence,) has been considered as public, because it affects a large number of occupiers within a district." *Ante*, § 128, 138; *Gresley on Evid.* 220, 221. The

Where the question is of such general nature, whether it be of boundary, or right of common by custom, or the like,

admission of traditionary evidence, in cases of boundary, occurs more frequently in the United States than in England. By far the greatest portion of our territory was originally surveyed in large masses or tracts, owned either by the State, or by the United States, or by one or a company of proprietors; under whose authority these tracts were again surveyed and divided into lots suitable for single farms, by lines crossing the whole tract, and serving as the common boundary of very many farm lots, lying on each side of it. So that it is hardly possible, in such cases, to prove the original boundaries of one farm, without affecting the common boundary of many; and thus, in trials of this sort, the question is similar, in principle, to that of the boundaries of a manor, and therefore traditionary evidence is freely admitted. Such was the case of *Boardman v. Reed*, 6 Peters, 328, where the premises in question, being a tract of eight thousand acres, were part of a large connexion of surveys, made together, and containing between fifty and one hundred thousand acres of land; and it is to such tracts, interesting to very many persons, that the remarks of Mr. Justice M'Lean, in that case, (p. 341,) are to be applied. In *Conn et al. v. Penn et al.* 1 Pet. C. C. Rep. 496, the tract whose boundaries were in controversy, was called the manor of Springetsbury, and contained seventy thousand acres; in which a great number of individuals had severally become interested. In *Doe d. Taylor v. Roe et al.*, 4 Hawks, 116, traditionary evidence was admitted in regard to Earl Granville's line, which was of many miles in extent, and afterwards constituted the boundary between counties, as well as private estates. In *Ralston v. Miller*, 3 Randolph, 44, the question was upon the boundaries of a street in the city of Richmond; concerning which kind of boundaries it was said, that ancient reputation and possession were entitled to infinitely more respect, in deciding upon the boundaries of the lots, than any experimental surveys. In several American cases, which have sometimes been cited in favor of the admissibility of traditionary evidence of boundary, even though it consisted of particular facts, and in cases of merely private concern, the evidence was clearly admissible on other grounds, either as part of the original *res gesta*, or as the declaration of a party in possession, explanatory of the nature and extent of his claim. In this class may be ranked the cases of *Caufman v. The Congregation of Cedar Spring*, 6 Binn. 59; *Sturgeon v. Waugh*, 2 Yeates, 476; *Jackson d. McDonald v. McCall*, 10 Johns. 377; *Hamilton v. Menor*, 2 S. & R. 70; *Higley v. Bidwell*, 9 Conn. 447; *Hall v. Gittings*, 2 Harr. & Johns. 112; *Redding v. McCubbin*, 1 Harr. & McHen. 84. In *Wooster v. Butler*, 13 Conn. R. 309, it was said by Church, J. that traditionary evidence was receivable, in Connecticut, to prove the boundaries of land between individual proprietors. But this dictum was not called for in

evidence of reputation is admitted only under the qualifications already stated, requiring competent knowledge in the

the case; for the question was, whether there had anciently been a *highway* over a certain tract of upland; which, being a subject of common and general interest, was clearly within the rule. In *Den d. Tate v. Southard*, 1 Hawks, 45, the question was, whether the lines of the surrounding tracts of land, if made for those tracts alone, and not for the tract in dispute, might be shown, *by reputation*, to be the "*known and visible boundaries*" of the latter tract, within the fair meaning of those words in the statute of North Carolina, of 1791, ch. 15. It was objected, that the boundaries mentioned in the act were those only, which had been expressly recognised as the bounds of the particular tract in question, by some grant or mesne conveyance thereof; but the objection was overruled. But in a subsequent case, (*Den d. Sasser v. Herring*, 3 Dever. Law Rep. 340,) the learned Chief Justice admits, that, in that State, the rules of the Common Law, in questions of private boundary, have been broken in upon. "We have," he remarks, "in questions of boundary, given to the single declarations of a deceased individual, as to a line or corner, the weight of common reputation, and permitted such declarations to be proven; under the rule, that, in questions of boundary, hearsay is evidence. Whether this is within the spirit and reason of the rule, it is now too late to inquire. It is the well established law of this State. And if the propriety of the rule was now *res integra*, perhaps the necessity of the case, arising from the situation of our country, and the want of self-evident *termini* of our lands, would require its adoption. For although it sometimes leads to falsehood, it more often tends to the establishment of truth. From necessity, we have, in this instance, sacrificed the principles upon which the rules of evidence are founded." A similar course has been adopted in Tennessee. *Beard v. Talbot*, 1 Cooke, 142. In South Carolina, the declarations of a deceased surveyor, who originally surveyed the land, are admissible, on a question as to its location. *Speer v. Coate*, 3 McCord, 227; *Blythe v. Sutherland*, Id. 258. In Kentucky, the latter practice seems similar to that in North Carolina. *Smith v. Nowells*, 2 Littel, Rep. 159; *Smith v. Prewitt*, 2 A. K. Marsh. 155, 158. In New Hampshire, the like evidence has in one case been held admissible, upon the alleged authority of the rule of the Common Law, in 1 Phil. Evid. 182; but in the citation of the passage by the learned Chief Justice, it is plain, from the omission of part of the text, that the restriction of the rule to subjects of public or general interest was not under his consideration. *Shepherd v. Thompson*, 4 N. Hamp. Rep. 213, 214. Subject to these exceptions, the general practice in this country, in the admission of traditionary evidence as to boundaries, seems to agree with the doctrine of the Common Law, as stated in the text. In *Weems v. Disney*, 4 Harr. & McHen. 156, the depositions admitted were annexed to a return of

declarants, or persons from whom the information is derived, and that they be persons free from particular and direct interest at the time, and are since deceased.¹

§ 146. In this connexion may be mentioned the subject of *perambulations*. The writ *de perambulatione faciendâ* lies at Common Law, when two lords are in doubt as to the limits of their lordships, vills, &c., and by consent appear in chancery, and agree that a perambulation be made between them. Their consent being enrolled in chancery, a writ is directed to the sheriff to make the perambulation, by the oaths of a Jury of twelve knights, and to set up the bounds and limits, in certainty, between the parties.² These proceedings and the return are evidence against the parties and all others in privity with them, on grounds hereafter to be considered. But the perambulation consists not only of this higher written evidence, but also of the acts of the persons making it, and their assistants, such as marking boundaries, setting up monuments, and the like, including their declarations respecting such acts, made during the transactions. Evidence of what these persons were heard to say upon such occasions, is always received; not, however, as hearsay, and under any supposed exception in favor of questions of ancient boundary, but as part of the *res gestæ*, and explanatory of the acts themselves, done in the course of the ambit.³ Indeed, in the

commissioners, appointed under a statute of Maryland "for marking and bounding lands," and would seem therefore to have been admissible as part of the return, which expressly referred to them; but no final decision was had upon the point, the suit having been compromised. In *Buchanan v. Moore*, 10 S. & R. 275, the point was, whether traditionary evidence was admissible while the declarant was *living*. By the Roman law, traditionary evidence of common fame seems to have been deemed admissible, even in matters of private boundary. Mascard. De Probat. Vol. 1, p. 391, Concl. 396.

¹ Ante, § 128, 129, 130, 135, 136, 137.

² 5 Com. Dig. 732, Pleader, 3 G; F. N. B. [133] D; 1 Story on Eq. Jurisp. § 611. See also St. 13 G. 3, c. 81, § 14; St. 41 G. 3, c. 81, § 14; St. 58 G. 3, c. 45, § 16.

³ *Weeks v. Sparke*, 1 M. & S. 687, per Ld. Ellenborough; Ante, § 108; *Elliott v. Pearl*, 1 McLean, 211.

case of such extensive domains as lordships, they being matters of general interest, traditionary evidence of common fame seems also admissible, on the other grounds, which have been previously discussed.¹

¹ Ante, § 128-137. The writ *de perambulatione faciendâ* is not known to have been adopted, in practice, in the United States; but in several of the States, remedies somewhat similar in principle have been provided by statutes. In some of the States, provision is only made for a periodical perambulation of the boundaries of towns, by the selectmen; LL. Maine, Rev. 1840, ch. 5; LL. N. Hamp. 1830, Tit. 95; Mass. Rev. Statutes, ch. 15; LL. Connecticut, Rev. 1821, Tit. 10;—or, for a definite settlement of controversies respecting them, by the public surveyor, as in New York, Rev. Code, Part 1, ch. 8, T. 6. In others, the remedy is extended to the boundaries of private estates. See Elmer's Digest, LL. New Jersey, p. 98, 99, 315, 316; Virginia Rev. Code, 1819, Vol. 1, p. 358, 359. A very complete summary remedy, in all cases of disputed boundary, is provided in the statutes of Delaware, Revision of 1819, p. 80, 81, Tit. Boundaries, III. To perambulations made under any of these statutes, the principles stated in the text, it is conceived, will apply.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST.

§ 147. A third exception to the rule, rejecting hearsay evidence, is allowed in the case of *declarations and entries made by persons since deceased and against the interest of the persons making them*, at the time when they were made. We have already seen,¹ that declarations of third persons, admitted in evidence, are of two classes; one of which consists of written entries, made in the course of official duty, or of professional employment; where the entry is one of a number of facts, which are ordinarily and usually connected with each other, so that the proof of one affords a presumption, that the others have taken place; and therefore a fair and regular entry, such as usually accompanies facts similar to those of which it speaks, and apparently contemporaneous with them, is received as original presumptive evidence of those facts. And the entry itself being original evidence, it is of no importance, as regards its admissibility, whether the person making it be yet living or dead. But declarations of the other class, of which we are now to speak, are *secondary* evidence, and are received only in consequence of the death of the person making them. This class embraces not only entries in books, but all other declarations, or statements of facts, whether verbal or in writing, and whether they were made at the time of the fact declared, or at a subsequent day.² But

¹ Ante, § 115, 116, and cases there cited.

² *Ivatt v. Finch*, 1 Taunt. 141; *Doe v. Jones*, 1 Campb. 367; *Davies v. Pierce*, 2 T. R. 53, and *Hollaway v. Raikes*, there cited; *Doe v. Williams*, Cowp. 621; *Peaceable v. Watson*, 4 Taunt. 16; *Stanley v. White*, 14 East, 332, 341, per *Ld. Ellenborough*; *Haddow v. Parry*, 3 Taunt. 303; *Goss v. Watlington*, 3 Brod. & Bing. 132; *Strode v. Winchester*, 1 Dick. 397; *Barker v. Ray*, 2 Russ. 63, 76, and cases in p. 67, note; *Warren v. Green-*

to render them admissible, it must appear that the declarant is deceased; that he possessed competent knowledge of the facts, or that it was his duty to know them; and that the declarations were at variance with his interest.¹ When these circumstances concur, the evidence is received, leaving its weight and value to be determined by other considerations.

§ 148. The ground upon which this evidence is received, is the *extreme improbability of its falsehood*. The regard which men usually pay to their own interest, is deemed a sufficient security, both that the declarations were not made under any

ville, 2 Stra. 1129; 2 Burr. 1071, 1072, S. C.; *Doe v. Turford*, 3 B. & Ad. 898, per *Parke, J.*; *Harrison v. Blades*, 3 Campb. 457; *Manning v. Lechmere*, 1 Atk. 453.

¹ *Short v. Lee*, 2 Jac. & Walk. 464, 488, per *Sir Thomas Plumer, M. R.*; *Doe v. Robson*, 15 East, 32, 34; *Higham v. Ridgway*, 10 East, 109, per *Ld. Ellenborough*; *Middleton v. Melton*, 10 B. & C. 317, 327, per *Parke, J.*; *Regina v. Worth*, 4 Ad. & El. N. S. 137, per *Ld. Denman*; 2 *Smith's Leading Cases*, 193, note, and cases there cited; *Spargo v. Brown*, 9 B. & C. 935. The interest, with which the declarations were at variance, must be of a *pecuniary* nature. *Davis v. Lloyd*, 1 Car. & P. 276. The apprehension of possible danger of a prosecution is not sufficient. The *Sussex Peerage case*, 11 Clark & Fin. 85. In *Holladay v. Littlepage*, 2 Munf. 316, the joint declarations of a deceased shipmaster and the living owner, that the defendant's passage-money had been paid by the plaintiff, were held admissible as parts of the *res gestæ*, being contemporaneous with the time of sailing. This case, therefore, is not opposed to the others cited. Neither is *Sherman v. Crosby*, 11 Johns. 70, where a receipt of payment of a judgment, recovered by a third person against the defendant, was held admissible in an action for the money so paid, by the party paying it, he having had authority to *adjust* the demand, and the receipt being a documentary fact in the adjustment; though the attorney who signed the receipt was not produced, nor proved to be dead. In auditing the accounts of guardians, administrators, &c., the course is to admit receipts as *prima facie* sufficient vouchers. *Shearman v. Akins*, 4 Pick. 283; *Nichols v. Webb*, 8 Wheat. 326; *Welsh v. Barrett*, 15 Mass. 380; *Wilbur v. Selden*, 6 Cowen, 162; *Farmers' Bank v. Whitehill*, 16 S. & R. 89, 90; *Stokes v. Stokes*, 6 Martin, N. S. 351; *Cowen & Hill's notes* 479, 480, 489, to 1 Phil. Evid. 256, 257, 265.

mistake of fact, or want of information on the part of the declarant, if he had the requisite means of knowledge, and that the matter declared is true. The apprehension of fraud in the statement is rendered still more improbable, from the circumstance, that it is not receivable in evidence until after the death of the declarant; and that it is always competent for the party, against whom such declarations are adduced, to point out any sinister motive for making them. It is true, that the ordinary and highest tests of the fidelity, accuracy, and completeness of judicial evidence, are here wanting; but their place is, in some measure, supplied by the circumstances of the declarant; and the inconveniences resulting from the exclusion of evidence, having such guaranties for its accuracy in fact, and from its freedom from fraud, are deemed much greater, in general, than any which would probably be experienced from its admission.¹

§ 149. In some cases, the Courts seem to have admitted this evidence, without requiring *proof of adverse interest in the declarant*; while in others, stress is laid on the fact that such interest had already appeared, *aliunde*, in the course of the trial. In one case it was argued, upon the authorities cited, that it was not material that the declarant ever had any actual interest, contrary to his declaration; but this position was not sustained by the Court.² In many other cases, where

¹ Phil. & Am. on Evid. 307, 308; 1 Phil. Evid. 293, 294; Gresley on Evid. 221.

² *Barker v. Ray*, 2 Russ. 63, 67, 68, cases cited in note; *Id.* p. 76. Upon this point, Eldon Lord Chancellor, said:—"The cases satisfy me, that evidence is admissible of declarations made by persons, who have a competent knowledge of the subject, to which such declarations refer, and where their interest is concerned; and the only doubt I have entertained was as to the position, that you are to receive evidence of declarations where there is no interest. At a certain period of my professional life, I should have said, that this doctrine was quite new to me. I do not mean to say more than that I still doubt concerning it. When I have occasion to express my opinion judicially upon it, I will do so; but I desire not to be considered as bound by that, as a rule of evidence." The objection arising from the rejection of such evidence, in the case, was disposed of in another manner.

the evidence consisted of entries in books of account, and the like, they seem to have been clearly admissible as entries made in the ordinary course of business or duty, or parts of the *res gestæ*, and therefore as original, and not secondary evidence; though the fact, that they were made against the interest of the person making them was also adverted to.¹ But in regard to declarations in general, not being entries or acts of the last mentioned character, and which are admissible only on the ground of having been made contrary to the interest of the declarant, the weight of authority, as well as the principle of the exception we are considering, seem plainly to require that such adverse interest should appear, either in the nature of the case, or from extraneous proof.² And it seems not to be sufficient, that, in one or more points of view, a declaration may be against interest, if it appears, upon the whole, that the interest of the declarant would be rather promoted than impaired by the declaration.³

§ 150. Though the exception we are now considering is, as we have just seen, extended to declarations of any kind, yet it is much more frequently exemplified in documentary evidence, and particularly in entries in books of account. Where these are books of collectors of taxes, stewards, bailiffs, or receivers, subject to the inspection of others, and in which the first entry is generally of money received, charging the party making it, they are doubtless within the principle of the

¹ It has been questioned, whether there is any difference, in the principle of admissibility, between a written entry and an oral declaration of an agent, concerning his having received money for his principal. See *Ante*, § 113, note; *Furdson v. Clogg*, 10 M. & W. 572; *Post*, § 152, note.

² *Higham v. Ridgway*, 10 East, 109; *Warren v. Greenville*, 2 Stra. 1129, expounded by *Ld. Mansfield*, in 2 Burr. 1071, 1072; *Gleadow v. Atkin*, 3 Tyrwh. 302, 303; 1 *Crompt. & Mees*. 423, 424; *Short v. Lee*, 2 Jac. & W. 489; *Marks v. Lahee*, 3 Bing. N. C. 408, 420, per *Park, J.*; *Barker v. Ray*, 2 Russ. 63, 76; *Ante*, § 147, and cases in notes.

³ *Phil. & Am. on Evid.* 320; 1 *Phil. Evid.* 305, 306; *Short v. Lee*, 2 Jac. & W. 464.

exception.¹ But it has been extended still farther, to include entries in private books, also, though retained within the custody of their owners; their liability to be produced, on notice, in trials, being deemed sufficient security against fraud; and the entry not being admissible, unless it charges the party making it with the receipt of money on account of a third person, or acknowledges the payment of money due to himself; in either of which cases it would be evidence against him, and therefore is considered as sufficiently against his interest to bring it within this exception.² The entry of a mere memorandum of an agreement, is not sufficient. Thus, where the settlement of a pauper was attempted to be proved, by showing a contract of hiring and service; the books of his deceased master, containing minutes of his contracts with his servants, entered at the time of contracting with them, and of subsequent payments of their wages, were held inadmissible; for the entries were not made against the writer's interest, for he would not be liable unless the service were performed, nor were they made in the course of his duty or employment.³

¹ Barry v. Bebbington, 4 T. R. 514; Goss v. Watlington, 3 Brod. & Bing. 132; Middleton v. Melton, 10 B. & C. 317; Stead v. Heaton, 4 T. R. 669; Short v. Lee, 2 Jac. & W. 464; Whitnash v. George, 8 B. & C. 556; Dean, &c. of Ely v. Caldecott, 7 Bing. 433; Marks v. Lahee, 3 Bing. 408; Wynne v. Tyrwhitt, 4 B. & Ald. 376; De Rutzen v. Farr, 4 Ad. & El. 53; 2 Smith's Leading Cas. 193, note; Plaxton v. Dare, 10 B. & C. 17, 19; Doe v. Cartwright, Ry. & M. 62. An entry by a steward in his books, in his own favor, unconnected with other entries against him, is held not admissible to prove the facts stated in such entry. Knight v. Marq. of Waterford, 4 Y. & C. 284. But where the entry goes to show a general balance in his own favor, it has been ruled not to affect the admissibility of a particular entry charging himself. Williams v. Geaves, 8 C. & P. 592.

² Warren v. Greenville, 2 Stra. 1029; 2 Burr. 1071, 1072, S. C.; Higham v. Ridgway, 10 East, 109; Middleton v. Melton, 10 Barn. & Cres. 317. In those States of the Union, in which the original entries of the party, in his own account books, may be evidence for him; and where, therefore, a false entry may sometimes amount to the crime of forgery, there is much stronger reason for admitting the entries in evidence against third persons. See also Hoare v. Coryton, 4 Taunt. 560.

³ Regina v. Worth, 4 Ad. & El. N. S. 132.

§ 151. Where the entry is itself the only evidence of the charge, of which it shows the subsequent liquidation, its admission has been strongly opposed, on the ground, that, taken together, it is no longer a declaration of the party against his interest, and may be a declaration ultimately in his own favor. This point was raised in the cases of *Higham v. Ridgway*, where an entry was simply marked as paid, in the margin; and of *Rowe v. Brenton*, which was a debtor and creditor account, in a tollor's books, of the money received for tolls, and paid over. But in neither of these cases was the objection sustained. In the former, indeed, there was evidence *aliunde*, that the service charged had been performed; but Lord Ellenborough, though he afterwards adverted to this fact, as a corroborating circumstance, first laid down the general doctrine, that "the evidence was properly admitted, upon the broad principle on which receivers' books have been admitted." But in the latter case there was no such proof; and Lord Tenterden observed, that almost all the accounts which were produced, were accounts on both sides; and that the objection would go to the very root of that sort of evidence. Upon these authorities, the admissibility of such entries may perhaps be considered as established.¹ And it is observable, in corroboration of their admissibility, that in most, if not all the cases, they appear to have been made in the ordinary course of business or of duty, and therefore were parts of the *res gesta*.²

¹ *Higham v. Ridgway*, 10 East, 109; *Rowe v. Brenton*, 3 Man. & R. 267; 2 Smith's Leading Cas. 196, note. In *Williams v. Geaves*, 8 C. & P. 592, the entries in a deceased steward's account were admitted, though the balance of the account was in his favor. See also *Doe v. Tyler*, 4 M. & P. 377, there cited.

² In *Doe v. Vowles*, 1 M. & Rob. 261, the evidence offered was merely a tradesman's bill, receipted in full; which was properly rejected by Littleton, J., as it had not the merit of an original entry; for though the receipt of payment was against the party's interest, yet the main fact to be established was the performance of the services charged in the bill, the appearance of which denoted that better evidence existed, in the original entry in the tradesman's book. The same objection, indeed, was taken here, by the learned counsel

§ 152. It has also been questioned, whether the entry is to be received in evidence of *matters*, which, though forming part of the declaration, were not in themselves against the interest of the declarant. This objection goes not only to collateral and independent facts, but to the class of entries mentioned in the preceding section; and would seem to be overruled by those decisions. But the point was solemnly argued in a later case, where it was adjudged, that though, if the point were now for the first time to be decided, it would seem more reasonable to hold, that the memorandum of a receipt of payment was admissible only to the extent of proving, that a payment had been made, and the account on which it had been made, giving it the effect only of verbal proof of the same payment; yet, that the authorities had gone beyond that limit, and the entry of a payment, against the interest of the party making it, had been held to have the effect of proving the truth of other statements contained in the same entry, and connected with it. Accordingly, in that case, where three persons made a joint and several promissory note, and a partial payment was made by one, which was indorsed upon the note in these terms, — "Received of W. D. the sum of £280, on account of the within note, the £300" (which was the amount of the note) "*having been originally advanced to E. H.*," — for which payment an action was brought by the party paying, as surety, against E. H., as the principal debtor; it was held, upon the authority of *Higham v. Ridgway*, and of *Doe v. Robson*, that the indorsement, the creditor being dead, was admissible in evidence of the whole statement contained in it; and consequently, that it was *prima facie* proof not only of the payment of the

for the defendant, as in the cases of *Higham v. Ridgway*, and of *Rowe v. Brenton*, namely, that the proof, as to interest, was on both sides, and neutralized itself; but the objection was not particularly noticed by Littledale, J., before whom it was tried; though the same learned Judge afterwards intimated his opinion, by observing, in reply to an objection similar in principle, in *Rowe v. Brenton*, that "a man is not likely to charge himself, for the purpose of getting a discharge." See also § 152.

money, but of the person who was the principal debtor, for whose account it was paid; leaving its effect to be determined by the Jury.¹

§ 153. In order to render *declarations against interest* admissible, it is *not necessary that the declarant should have been competent*, if living, to testify to the facts contained in the declaration; the evidence being admitted on the broad ground, that the declaration was against the interest of the party making it, in the nature of a confession, and, on that account so probably true as to justify its reception.² For the

¹ *Davies v. Humphreys*, 6 Mees. & Welsb. 153, 166. See also *Stead v. Heaton*, 4 T. R. 669; *Roe v. Rawlings*, 7 East, 279; *Marks v. Lahee*, 3 Bing. N. C. 408. The case of *Chambers v. Bernasconi*, 1 Cr. & Jer. 451, 1 Tyrwh. 335, which may seem opposed to these decisions, turned on a different principle. That case involved the effect of an under sheriff's return, and the extent of the circumstances which the sheriff's return ought to include, and as to which it would be conclusive evidence. It seems to have been considered, that the return could properly narrate only those things, which it was the officer's duty to do; and therefore, though evidence of the fact of the arrest, it was held to be no evidence of the place where the arrest was made, though this was stated in the return. The learned counsel also endeavored to maintain the admissibility of the under sheriff's return, in proof of the place of arrest, as a written declaration, by a deceased person, of a fact against his interest; but the Court held, that it did not belong to that class of cases. 1 Tyrwh. 333, per Bayley, B. Afterwards this judgment was affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber, 4 Tyrwh. 531; 1 Cr. Mees. & Ros. 347, 368; the Court being "all of opinion, that whatever effect may be due to an entry, made in the course of any office, reporting facts necessary to the performance of a duty, the statement of other circumstances, however naturally they may be thought to find a place in the narrative, is no proof of those circumstances." See also *Thompson v. Stevens*, 2 Nott & McC. 493; *Sherman v. Crosby*, 11 Johns. 70. Whether a verbal declaration of a deceased agent or officer, made while he was paying over money to his principal or superior, and designating the person from whom he received a particular sum entered by him in his books, is admissible in evidence against that person; *quære*; and see *Fardson v. Clogg*, 10 M. & W. 572.

² *Doe v. Robson*, 15 East, 32; *Short v. Lee*, 2 Jac. & W. 464, 489; *Gleadow v. Atkin*, 1 Cr. & Mees. 410; *Middleton v. Melton*, 10 B. & C. 317, 326; *Bosworth v. Crotchett*, Ph. & Am. on Evid. 348, n.

same reason it does not seem necessary that the fact should have been stated on the personal knowledge of the declarant.¹ Neither is it material whether the same fact is or is not provable by other witnesses who are still living.² Whether their testimony, if produced, might be more satisfactory, or its nonproduction, if attainable, might go to diminish the weight of the declarations, are considerations for the Jury, and do not affect the rule of law.

§ 154. But where the evidence consists of entries made by persons acting for others, in the capacity of *agents*, *stewards*, or *receivers*, some proof of such agency is generally required, previous to their admission. The handwriting after thirty years need not be proved.³ In regard to the proof of official character, a distinction has been taken between public and private offices, to the effect, that, where the office is public, and must exist, it may always be presumed that a person who acts in it has been regularly appointed; but that where it is merely private, some preliminary evidence must be adduced of the existence of the office and of the appointment of the agent or incumbent.⁴ Where the entry by an agent charges himself, in the first instance, that fact has been deemed sufficient proof of his agency;⁵ but where it was made by one styling himself clerk to a steward, that alone was considered not sufficient to prove the receipt, by either of them, of the money therein mentioned.⁶ Yet where ancient books contain strong internal evidence of their actually being receivers' or agents' books, they may on that ground alone be submitted to the Jury.⁷ Upon the general question, how far mere antiquity

¹ Crease v. Barrett, 1 Cr. Mees. & R. 919.

² Middleton v. Melton, 10 B. & C. 327, per Parke, J.; Barry v. Bebbington, 4 T. R. 514.

³ Wynne v. Tyrwhitt, 4 B. & Ald. 376.

⁴ Short v. Lee, 2 Jac. & W. 464, 468.

⁵ Doe v. Stacy, 6 Car. & P. 139.

⁶ De Rutzen v. Farr, 4 Ad. & El. 53.

⁷ Doe v. Ld. Geo. Thynne, 10 East, 206, 210.

in the entry will avail, as preliminary proof of the character of the declarant, or party making the entry; and how far the circumstances, which are necessary to make a document evidence, must be proved *aliunde*, and cannot be gathered from the document itself, the law does not seem perfectly settled.¹ But where the transaction is ancient, and the document charging the party with the receipt of money is apparently genuine and fair, and comes from the proper repository, it seems admissible, upon the general principles already discussed in treating of this exception.²

§ 155. There is another class of entries, admissible in evidence, which sometimes has been regarded as anomalous, and at others has been deemed to fall within the principle of the present exception to the general rule; namely, the private *books of a deceased rector or vicar*, or of an ecclesiastical corporation aggregate, containing entries of the receipt of ecclesiastical dues, when admitted in favor of their successors, or

¹ In one case, where the point in issue was the existence of a custom for the exclusion of foreign cordwainers from a certain town; an entry in the corporation books, signed by one acknowledging himself not a freeman, or free of the corporation, and promising to pay a fine assessed on him for breach of the custom; and another entry, signed by two others, stating that they had distrained and appraised nine pairs of shoes, from another person for a similar offence, were severally held inadmissible, without previously offering some evidence to show by whom the entries were subscribed, and in what situation the several parties actually stood; although the latest of the entries was more than a hundred years old. *Davies v. Morgan*, 1 Cr. & Jer. 587, 590, 593, per Lord Lyndhurst, C. B. In another case, which was a bill for tithes, against which a *modus* was alleged in defence, a receipt of more than fifty years old was offered to prove a money payment therein mentioned to have been received for a prescription rent in lieu of tithes; but it was held inadmissible, without also showing who the parties were, and in what character they stood. *Manby v. Curtis*, 1 Price, 225, per Thompson, C. B.; *Graham, B.*, and *Richards, B.*; *Wood, B.* dissentiente.

² See *Phil. & Am. on Evid.* 331, n. (2); 1 *Phil. Evid.* 316, n. (6), and cases there cited; *Fenwick v. Read*, 6 Madd. 8, per Sir J. Leach, Vice Ch.; *Bertie v. Beaumont*, 2 Price, 307; *Bp. of Meath v. Marquis of Winchester*, 3 Bing. N. C. 183, 203.

of parties claiming the same interest as the maker of the entries. Sir Thomas Plumer, in a case before him,¹ said; — "It is admitted, that the entries of a rector or vicar are evidence for or against his successors. It is too late to argue upon that rule, or upon what gave rise to it; whether it was the *cursus Scaccarii*, the protection of the clergy, or the peculiar nature of property in tithes. It is now the settled law of the land. *It is not to be presumed that a person, having a temporary interest only, will insert a falsehood in his book, from which he can derive no advantage.* Lord Kenyon has said, that the rule is an exception; and it is so; for no other proprietor can make evidence for those who claim under him, or for those who claim in the same right and stand in the same predicament. But it has been the settled law as to tithes, as far back as our research can reach. We must, therefore, set out from this as a datum; and we must not make comparisons between this and other corporations. No corporation sole, except a rector or vicar, can make evidence for his successor." But the strong presumption that a person, having a temporary interest only, will not insert in his books a falsehood, from which he can derive no advantage, which evidently and justly had so much weight in the mind of that learned Judge, would seem to bring these books within the principle on which entries, made either in the course of duty, or against interest, are admitted. And it has been accordingly remarked, by a writer of the first authority in this branch of the law, that after it has been determined that evidence may be admitted of receipts of payment, entered in private books, by persons who are neither obliged to keep such books, nor to account to others for the money received, it does not seem any infringement of principle to admit these books of rectors and vicars. For the entries cannot be used by those who made them; and there is no legal privity between them and their successors. The strong leaning on their part in favor of the church is nothing more, in legal consideration, than the leaning of every declarant in favor of his own interest, affecting the weight of

¹ *Short v. Lee*, 2 Jac. & W. 177, 178.

the evidence, but not its admissibility. General observations have occasionally been made respecting these books, which may seem to authorize the admission of any kind of statement contained in them. But such books are not admissible, except where the entries contain receipts of money or ecclesiastical dues, or are otherwise apparently prejudicial to the interests of the makers, in the manner in which entries are so considered in analogous cases.¹ And proof will be required, as in other cases, that the writer had authority to receive the money stated, and is actually dead; and that the document came out of the proper custody.²

¹ Phil. & Am. on Evid. 322, 323, and cases in notes (2) and (3); 1 Phil. Evid. 308, n. (1), (2); *Ward v. Pomfret*, 5 Sim. 475.

² *Gresley on Evid.* 223, 224; *Carrington v. Jones*, 2 Sim. & Stu. 135, 140; *Perigal v. Nicholson*, 1 Wightw. 63.

CHAPTER IX.

OF DYING DECLARATIONS.

§ 156. A *fourth exception* to the rule, rejecting hearsay evidence, is allowed in the case of *dying declarations*. The general principle, on which this species of evidence is admitted, was stated by Lord Chief Baron Eyre to be this, — that they are declarations made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death, and when every hope of this world is gone; when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced, by the most powerful considerations, to speak the truth. A situation so solemn and so awful is considered by the law, as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by a positive oath in a Court of Justice.¹ It was at one time held, by respectable authorities, that this general principle warranted the admission of dying declarations in all cases, civil and criminal; but it is now well settled that they are admissible, as such, only in cases of homicide, "where the death of the deceased is the subject of the charge, and the circumstances of the death are the subject of the dying declarations."² The reasons for thus restricting it may be, that

¹ *Rex v. Woodcock*, 2 Leach's Cr. Cas. 556, 267; *Drummond's case*, 1 Leach's Cr. Cas. 378. In the earliest reported case on this subject, the evidence was admitted without objection, and apparently on this general ground. *Rex v. Reason et al.* 6 State Tr. 195, 201.

² *Rex v. Mead*, 2 B. & C. 605. In this case the prisoner had been convicted of perjury, and moved for a new trial, because convicted against the weight of evidence; after which he shot the prosecutor. Upon showing cause against the rule, the counsel for the prosecution offered the dying declarations of the prosecutor, relative to the fact of perjury; but the evidence was adjudged inadmissible. The same point was ruled by Bayley, J. in *Rex v. Hutchinson*, who was indicted for administering poison to a woman pregnant, but not quick with child, in order to procure abortion. 2 B. & C.

credit is not in all cases due to the declarations of a dying person; for his body may have survived the powers of his mind; or his recollection, if his senses are not impaired, may not be perfect; or, for the sake of ease, and to be rid of the importunity and annoyance of those around him, he may say, or seem to say, whatever they may choose to suggest.¹ These, or the like considerations, have been regarded as counterbalancing the force of the general principle above stated; leaving this exception to stand only upon the ground of the public necessity of preserving the lives of the community, by bringing manslaughterers to justice. For it often happens, that there is no third person present to be an eye-witness to the fact; and the usual witness in other cases of felony, namely, the party injured, is himself destroyed.² But in thus restricting the evidence of dying declarations to cases of trial for homicide of the declarant, it should be observed, that this applies only to declarations offered on the sole ground, that they were made *in extremis*; for where they constitute part of the *res gesta*, or come within the exception of declarations against interest, or the like, they are admissible as in other cases; irrespective of the fact, that the declarant was under apprehension of death.³

608, note. This doctrine was well considered, and approved in *Wilson v. Boerem*, 15 Johns. 286. In *Rex v. Lloyd et al.* 4 C. & P. 233, such declarations were rejected on a trial for robbery. Upon an indictment for the murder of A. by poison, which was also taken by B., who died in consequence, it was held that the dying declarations of B. were admissible, though the prisoner was not indicted for murdering her. *Rex v. Baker*, 2 M. & Rob. 53.

¹ *Jackson v. Kniffen*, 2 Johns. 31, 35, per Livingston, J.

² 1 East, P. C. 353.

³ Ante, § 102, 108, 109, 110, 147, 148, 149. To some of these classes may be referred the cases of *Wright v. Littler*, 3 Burr. 1244; *Aveson v. Ld. Kinnaird*, 6 East, 188; and some others. It was once thought that the dying declarations of the subscribing witness to a forged instrument were admissible to impeach it; but such evidence is now rejected, for the reasons already stated. Ante, § 126. See *Stobart v. Dryden*, 1 Mees. & W. 615, 627. In *Regina v. Megson et al.*, 9 C. & P. 418, 420, the prisoners were tried on two indictments, one for the murder of Ann Stewart, and the other

§ 157. The persons, whose declarations are thus admitted, are considered as standing in the same situation as if they were sworn; the danger of impending death being equivalent to the sanction of an oath. It follows, therefore, that where the declarant, if living, would have been incompetent to testify, by reason of infamy, or the like, his dying declarations are inadmissible.¹ And, as an oath derives the value of its sanction from the religious sense of the party's accountability to his Maker, and the deep impression that he is soon to render to Him the final account; wherever it appears that the declarant was incapable of this religious sense of accountability, whether from infidelity, imbecility of mind, or tender age, the declarations are alike inadmissible.² On the other hand, as the testimony of an accomplice is admissible against his fellows, the dying declarations of a *particeps criminis* in an act, which resulted in his own death, are admissible against one indicted for the same murder.³

§ 158. It is essential to the admissibility of these declarations, and is a preliminary fact, to be proved by the party offering them in evidence, that they were *made under a sense of impending death*; but it is not necessary that they should be stated, at the time, to be so made. It is enough, if it satisfactorily appears, in any mode, that they were made under that sanction; whether it be directly proved by the express language of the declarant, or be inferred from his evident danger, or the opinions of the medical or other attendants, stated to him, or from his conduct, or other circumstances

for a rape upon her. In the former case, her declarations were rejected, because not made *in extremis*; and in the latter so much of them as showed that a dreadful outrage had been perpetrated upon her, was received as part of the outrage itself, being, in contemplation of law, contemporaneous; but so much as related to the identity of the perpetrators was rejected. See also *Regina v. Hewett*, 1 Car. & Marshm. 534.

¹ *Rex v. Drummond*, 1 Leach's Cr. Cas. 378.

² *Rex v. Pike*, 3 C. & P. 598; *Phil. & Am. on Evid.* 296; 1 *Phil. Evid.* 289; 2 *Russell on Crimes*, 688.

³ *Tinckler's case*, 1 East, P. C. 354.

of the case, all of which are resorted to, in order to ascertain the state of the declarant's mind.¹ The length of time which elapsed between the declaration and the death of the declarant, furnishes no rule for the admission or rejection of the evidence; though, in the absence of better testimony, it may serve as one of the exponents of the deceased's belief, that his dissolution was or was not impending. It is the *impression* of almost immediate dissolution and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact, that renders the testimony admissible.² Therefore, where it appears that the deceased, at the time of the declaration, had any expectation or hope of recovery, however slight it may have been, and though death actually ensued in an hour afterwards, the declaration is inadmissible.³ On the other hand, a belief that he will not recover, is not in itself sufficient, unless there be also the prospect of "almost immediate dissolution."⁴

¹ *Rex v. Woodcock*, 2 Leach's Cr. Cas. 567; *John's case*, 1 East, P. C. 357, 358; *Rex v. Bonner*, 6 C. & P. 386; *Rex v. Van Butchell*, Id. 631; *Rex v. Mosley*, 1 Moody's Cr. Cas. 97; *Rex v. Spilsbury*, 7 C. & P. 187, per Coleridge, J.; *Reg. v. Perkins*, 2 Mood. Cr. Cas. 135.

² In *Woodcock's case*, 2 Leach's Cr. Cas. 563, the declarations were made forty-eight hours before death; in *Tinckler's case*, 1 East, P. C. 354, some of them were made ten days before death; and in *Rex v. Mosley*, 1 Mood. Cr. Cas. 97, they were made eleven days before death; and were all received. In this last instance it appeared that the surgeon did not think the case hopeless, and told the patient so; but that the patient thought otherwise. See also *Regina v. Howell*, 1 Dennis. Cr. Cas. 1. In *Rex v. Bonner*, 6 C. & P. 386, they were made three days before death.

³ So ruled in *Welborn's case*, 1 East, P. C. 358, 359; *Rex v. Christie*, 2 Russ. on Crimes, 685; *Rex v. Hayward*, 6 C. & P. 157, 160; *Rex v. Crockett*, 4 C. & P. 544; *Rex v. Fagent*, 7 C. & P. 238.

⁴ Such was the language of Hullock, B. in *Rex v. Van Butchell*, 3 C. & P. 629, 631. See acc. *Woodcock's case*, 2 Leach's Cr. Cas. 567, per Ld. C. B. Eyre; *Rex v. Bonner*, 6 C. & P. 386; *Commonwealth v. King*, 2 Virg. Cases, 78; *Commonwealth v. Gibson*, Id. 111; *Commonwealth v. Vass*, 3 Leigh, R. 786; *The State v. Poll et al.*, 1 Hawks, 442; *Regina v. Perkins*, 9 C. & P. 395; 2 Mood. Cr. Cas. 135, S. C.; *Rex v. Ashton*, 2 Lewin's Cr. Cas. 147.

§ 159. The declarations of the deceased are admissible *only to those things, to which he would have been competent to testify*, if sworn in the cause. They must therefore in general speak to facts only, and not to mere matters of opinion; and must be confined to what is relevant to the issue. But the right to offer them in evidence is not restricted to the side of the prosecutor; they are equally admissible in favor of the party charged with the death.¹ It is not necessary, however, that the examination of the deceased should be conducted after the manner of interrogating a witness in the cause; though any departure from this mode may affect the value and credibility of the declarations. Therefore it is no objection to their admissibility, that they were made in answer to leading questions, or obtained by pressing and earnest solicitation.² But whatever the statement may be, it must be complete in itself; for, if the declarations appear to have been intended by the dying man to be connected with and qualified by other statements, which he is prevented by any cause from making, they will not be received.³

§ 160. The *circumstances* under which the declarations were made are to be *shown to the Judge*; it being his province, and not that of the Jury, to determine whether they are admissible. In *Woodcock's* case, the whole subject seems to have been left to the Jury, under the direction of the Court, as a mixed question of law and fact; but subsequently it has always been held a question exclusively for the consideration of the Court; being placed on the same ground with the preliminary proof of documents, and of the competency of witnesses, which is always addressed to the Court.⁴ But after

¹ *Rex v. Scaife*, 1 Mood. & Ro. 551; 2 Lewin's Cr. Cas. 150, S. C.

² *Rex v. Fagent*, 7 C. & P. 238; *Commonwealth v. Vass*, 3 Leigh, R. 786; *Rex v. Reason et al.* 1 Stra. 499; *Rex v. Woodcock*, 2 Leach, Cr. Cas. 563.

³ 3 Leigh, R. 797.

⁴ Said per *Ld. Ellenborough*, in *Rex v. Hucks*, 1 Stark. R. 521, 523, to

the evidence is admitted, its credibility is entirely within the province of the Jury, who of course are at liberty to weigh all the circumstances under which the declarations were made, including those already proved to the Judge, and to give the testimony only such credit as, upon the whole, they may think it deserves.¹

§ 161. If the statement of the deceased was *committed to writing, and signed by him*, at the time it was made, it has been held essential, that the writing should be produced, if existing; and that neither a copy, nor parol evidence of the declarations, could be admitted to supply the omission.² But where the declarations had been repeated at different times, at one of which they were made under oath, and informally reduced to writing by a witness, and at the others they were not, it was held, that the latter might be proved by parol, if the other could not be produced.³ If the deposition of the deceased has been taken, under any of the statutes on that subject, and is inadmissible, as such, for want of compliance

have been so resolved by all the Judges, in a case proposed to them. *Welborn's* case, 1 East, P. C. 360; *John's* case, *Ib.* 358; *Rex v. Van Butchell*, 3 C. & P. 629; *Rex v. Bonner*, 6 C. & P. 386; *Rex v. Spilsbury*, 7 C. & P. 187, 190; *The State v. Poll et al.*, 1 Hawks, 444.

¹ 2 Stark. Evid. 263; *Phil. & Am. on Evid.* 304; *Ross v. Gould*, 5 Greenl. 204; *Vass's* case, 3 Leigh, R. 794. See also the remarks of Mr. Evans, 2 Poth. on Oblig. 256, (294), App. No. 16, who thinks that the Jury should be directed, previous to considering the effect of the evidence, to determine,—1st, whether the deceased was really in such circumstances, or used such expressions, from which the apprehension in question was inferred;—2d, whether the inference, deduced from such circumstances or expressions, is correct;—3d, whether the deceased did make the declarations alleged against the accused;—and 4th, whether those declarations are to be admitted as sincere and accurate. *Trant's* case, *McNally's* Evid. 385.

² *Rex v. Gay*, 7 C. & P. 230; *Trowter's* case, P. 8 Geo. 1, B. R. 12 Vin. Abr. 118, 119; *Leach v. Simpson et al.* In Seac. Pasch. 1839, 1 Law & Eq. R. 58.

³ *Rex v. Reason et al.* 1 Str. 499, 500.

with some of the legal formalities, it seems it may still be treated as a dying declaration, if made *in extremis*.¹

§ 162. Though these declarations, when deliberately made, under a solemn and religious sense of impending dissolution, and concerning circumstances, in respect of which the deceased was not likely to have been mistaken, are entitled to great weight, if precisely identified; yet it is always to be recollected, that the accused has not the *power of cross-examination*, — a power quite as essential, to the eliciting of all the truth, as the obligation of an oath can be; — and that where the witness has not a deep and strong sense of accountability to his Maker, and an enlightened conscience, the passion of anger, and feelings of revenge may, as they have not unfrequently been found to do, affect the truth and accuracy of his statements; especially as the salutary and restraining fear of punishment for perjury is in such cases withdrawn. And it is further to be considered, that the particulars of the violence, to which the deceased has spoken, were in general likely to have occurred under circumstances of confusion and surprise, calculated to prevent their being accurately observed; and leading both to mistakes as to the identity of persons, and to the omission of facts essentially important to the completeness and truth of the narrative.²

¹ *Rex v. Woodcock*, 2 Leach, Cr. Cas. 563; *Rex v. Callaghan*, McNally's Evid. 385.

² Phil. & Am. on Evid. 305, 306; 1 Phil. Evid. 292; 2 Johns. 35, 36, per Livingston, J. See also Mr. Evans's observations on the great caution to be observed in the use of this kind of evidence, in 2 Poth. Obl. 255, (293); 2 Stark. Ev. 263. See also *Rex v. Ashton*, 2 Lewin's Cr. Cas. 147, per Alderson, B.

CHAPTER X.

OF THE TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES SUBSEQUENTLY DEAD, ABSENT, OR DISQUALIFIED.

§ 163. In the *fifth class* of exceptions to the rule rejecting hearsay evidence, may be included *the testimony of deceased witnesses, given in a former action, between the same parties*; though this might, perhaps, with equal propriety, be considered under the rule itself. This testimony may have been given either orally, in Court, or in written depositions, taken out of Court. The latter will be more particularly considered hereafter, among the Instruments of Evidence. But at present we shall state some principles applicable to the testimony, however given. The chief reasons for the exclusion of hearsay evidence, are the want of the sanction of an oath, and of any opportunity to cross-examine the witness. But where the testimony was given under oath, in a judicial proceeding, in which the adverse litigant was a party, and where he had the power to cross-examine, and was legally called upon so to do, the great and ordinary test of truth being no longer wanting, the testimony so given is admitted, after the decease of the witness, in any subsequent suit between the same parties.¹ It is also received, if the witness, though not dead, is out of the jurisdiction, or cannot be found after diligent search, or is insane, or sick and unable to testify, or has been summoned, but appears to have been kept away by the adverse party.² But testimony thus offered is open to all the

¹ Bull. N. P. 239, 242: *Mayor of Doncaster v. Day*, 3 Taunt. 262; *Glass v. Beach*, 5 Verm. 172; *Lightner v. Wike*, 4 S. & R. 203.

² Bull. N. P. 239, 243; 1 Stark. Evid. 264; 12 Vin. Abr. 107, A. b. 31; Godb. 326; *Rex v. Eriswell*, 3 T. R. 707, 721, per Ld. Kenyon. As to the effect of interest subsequently acquired, see post, § 167. Upon the question, whether this kind of evidence is admissible in any other contingency, except the death of the witness, there is some discrepancy among the

with some of the legal formalities, it seems it may still be treated as a dying declaration, if made *in extremis*.¹

§ 162. Though these declarations, when deliberately made, under a solemn and religious sense of impending dissolution, and concerning circumstances, in respect of which the deceased was not likely to have been mistaken, are entitled to great weight, if precisely identified; yet it is always to be recollected, that the accused has not the *power of cross-examination*, — a power quite as essential, to the eliciting of all the truth, as the obligation of an oath can be; — and that where the witness has not a deep and strong sense of accountability to his Maker, and an enlightened conscience, the passion of anger, and feelings of revenge may, as they have not unfrequently been found to do, affect the truth and accuracy of his statements; especially as the salutary and restraining fear of punishment for perjury is in such cases withdrawn. And it is further to be considered, that the particulars of the violence, to which the deceased has spoken, were in general likely to have occurred under circumstances of confusion and surprise, calculated to prevent their being accurately observed; and leading both to mistakes as to the identity of persons, and to the omission of facts essentially important to the completeness and truth of the narrative.²

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objections which might be taken, if the witness were personally present.¹ And if the witness gave a written deposition

American authorities. It has been refused, where the witness had subsequently become interested, but was living and within reach; *Chess v. Chess*, 17 S. & R. 409; *Irwin v. Reed*, 4 Yeates, 512; — where he was not to be found within the jurisdiction, but was reported to have gone to an adjoining State; *Wilbur v. Selden*, 6 Cowen, 162; — where, since the former trial, he had become incompetent by being convicted of an infamous crime; *Le Baron v. Crombie*, 14 Mass. 234; — where, though present, he had forgotten the facts to which he had formerly testified; *Drayton v. Wells*, 1 Nott & McCord, 409; — and where he was proved to have left the State, after being summoned to attend at the trial; *Finn's case*, 5 Rand. 701. In this last case it was held, that this sort of testimony was not admissible in any criminal case whatever. In the cases of *Le Baron v. Crombie*, *Wilbur v. Selden*, and also in *Crary v. Sprague*, 12 Wend. 41, it was said, that such testimony was not admissible in any case, except where the witness was shown to be dead; but this point was not in either of those cases directly in judgment; and in some of them it does not appear to have been fully considered. On the other hand, in *Drayton v. Wells*, it was held by Cheves, J. to be admissible in four cases; — 1st, where the witness is dead, — 2d, insane, — 3d, beyond seas, — and 4th, where he has been kept away by contrivance of the other party. See also *Moore v. Pearson*, 6 Watts & Serg. 51. In *Magill v. Kauffman*, 4 S. & R. 317, and in *Carpenter v. Groff*, 5 S. & R. 162, it was admitted on proof that the witness had removed from Pennsylvania to Ohio; — it was also admitted, where the witness was unable to testify, by reason of sickness, in *Miller v. Russell*, 7 Martin, 266, N. S.; — and even where he, being a sheriff, was absent on official duty. *Noble v. Martin*, 7 Martin, 282, N. S. See 1 Phil. Ev. 231, note 441, by Cowen & Hill. But if it appears that the witness was not fully examined at the former trial, his testimony cannot be given in evidence. *Noble v. McClintock*, 6 Watts & Serg. 58. If the witness is gone, no one knows whither, and his place of abode cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, the case can hardly be distinguished in principle from that of his death; and it would seem that his former testimony ought to be admitted. If he is merely out of the jurisdiction, but the place is known, and his testimony can be taken under a commission, it is a proper case for the Judge to decide, in his discretion, and upon all the circumstances, whether the purposes of justice will be best served by issuing such commission, or by admitting the proof of what he formerly testified.

¹ *Wright v. Tatham*, 2 Ad. & El. 3, 21. Thus, where the witness at the former trial was called by the defendant, but was interested on the side of the plaintiff, and the latter, at the second trial, offers to prove his former testimony, the defendant may object to the competency of the evidence, on the ground of interest. *Crary v. Sprague*, 12 Wend. 41.

in the cause, but afterwards testified orally in Court, parol evidence may be given of what he testified *vivâ voce*, notwithstanding the existence of the deposition.¹

§ 164. The admissibility of this evidence seems to turn rather on the right to cross-examine, than upon the precise nominal identity of all the parties. Therefore, where the witness testified in a suit, in which A. and several others were plaintiffs, against B. alone, his testimony was held admissible, after his death, in a subsequent suit relating to the same matter, brought by B. against A. alone.² And though the two trials were not between the same parties, yet if the second trial is between those who represent the parties to the first, by privity in blood, in law, or in estate, the evidence is admissible. And if, in a dispute respecting lands, any fact comes directly in issue, the testimony given to that fact is admissible to prove the same point or fact in another action between the same parties or their privies, though the last suit be for other lands.³ The principle on which, chiefly, this evidence is admitted, namely, the right of cross-examination, requires that its admission be carefully restricted to the extent of that right; and that where the witness incidentally stated matter, as to which the party was not permitted by the law of trials to cross-examine him, his statement as to that matter ought not afterwards to be received in evidence against such party. Where, therefore, the point in issue in both actions was not the same, the issue in the former action having been upon a common or free fishery, and in the latter, it being upon a

¹ *Tod v. E. of Winchelsea*, 3 C. & P. 387.

² *Wright v. Tatham*, 1 Ad. & El. 3.

³ *Outram v. Morewood*, 3 East, 346, 354, 355, per Ld. Ellenborough; *Peake's Evid.* (3d Ed.) p. 37; *Bull. N. P.* 232; *Doe v. Derby*, 1 Ad. & El. 783; *Doe v. Foster*, Ib. 791, note; *Lewis v. Clerges*, 3 Bac. Abr. 614; *Shelton v. Barbour*, 2 Wash. 64; *Rushford v. Countess of Pembroke*, Hard. 472; *Jackson v. Lawson*, 15 Johns. 544; *Jackson v. Baily*, 2 Johns. 17; *Powell v. Waters*, 17 Johns. 176.

several fishery, evidence of what a witness, since deceased, swore upon the former trial, was held inadmissible.¹

§ 165. It was formerly held that the person, called to prove what a deceased witness testified on a former trial must be required to repeat his *precise words*, and that testimony merely to the effect of them was inadmissible.² But this strictness

¹ *Melvin v. Whiting*, 7 Pick. 79. See also *Jackson v. Winchester*, 4 Dall. 206.

² 4 T. R. 290, said per *Ld. Kenyon*, to have been so "agreed on all hands," upon an offer to prove what *Ld. Palmerston* had testified. So held, also, by *Washington, J.* in *United States v. Wood*, 3 Wash. 440; 1 Phil. Evid. 200, [215] 3d ed.; *Foster v. Shaw*, 7 Serg. & R. 163, per *Duncan, J.*; *Wilbur v. Selden*, 6 Cowen, 165. The same rule is applied to the proof of dying declarations. *Montgomery v. Ohio*, 11 Ohio R. 424. In New Jersey it has been held, that if a witness testifies that he has a distinct recollection, independent of his notes, of the fact that the deceased was sworn as a witness at the former trial, of what he was produced to prove, and of the substance of what he then stated; he may rely on his notes for the language, if he believes them to be correct. *Sloan v. Somers*, 1 Spencer, R. 66. In Massachusetts, in *The Commonwealth v. Richards*, 18 Pick. 434, the witnesses did not state the exact words used by the deceased witness, but only the substance of them, from recollection, aided by notes taken at the time; and one of the witnesses testified that he was confident that he stated substantives and verbs correctly, but was not certain as to the prepositions and conjunctions. Yet the Court held this insufficient, and required that the testimony of the deceased witness be stated in his own language, *ipsissimis verbis*. The point was afterwards raised in *Warren v. Nichols*, 6 Mete. 261; where the witness stated that he could give the substance of the testimony of the deceased witness, but not the precise language; and the Court held it insufficient; *Hubbard, J. dissentiente*. The rule, however, as laid down by the Court in the latter case, seems to recognise a distinction between giving the substance of the deceased witness's testimony, and the substance of his language; and to require only that his language be stated substantially, and in all material particulars, and not *ipsissimis verbis*. The learned Chief Justice stated the doctrine as follows:—"The rule upon which evidence may be given of what a deceased witness testified on a former trial between the same parties, in a case where the same question was in issue, seems now well established in this Commonwealth by authorities. It was fully considered in the case of *Commonwealth v. Richards*, 18 Pick. 434. The principle on which this rule rests was accurately stated, the cases in support of it were referred to, and with the decision of

is not now insisted upon, in proof of the crime of perjury;¹ and it has been well remarked, that to insist upon it in other

which we see no cause to be dissatisfied. The general rule is, that one person cannot be heard to testify as to what another person has declared, in relation to a fact within his knowledge, and bearing upon the issue. It is the familiar rule which excludes hearsay. The reasons are obvious, and they are two. First, because the averment of fact does not come to the Jury sanctioned by the oath of the party on whose knowledge it is supposed to rest; and secondly, because the party upon whose interests it is brought to bear, has no opportunity to cross-examine him on whose supposed knowledge and veracity the truth of the fact depends. Now the rule, which admits evidence of what another said on a former trial, must effectually exclude both of these reasons. It must have been *testimony*, that is, the affirmation of some matter of fact, under oath, it must have been in a suit between the same parties in interest, so as to make it sure that the party, against whom it is now offered, had an opportunity to cross-examine; and it must have been upon the same subject matter, to show that his attention was drawn to points now deemed important. It must be the same testimony which the former witness gave, because it comes to the Jury under the sanction of his oath, and the Jury are to weigh the testimony and judge of it, as he gave it. The witness, therefore, must be able to state the language in which the testimony was given, substantially and in all material particulars, because that is the vehicle, by which the testimony of the witness is transmitted, of which the Jury are to judge. If it were otherwise, the statement of the witness, which is offered, would not be of the testimony of the former witness; that is, of the ideas conveyed by the former witness in the language in which he embodied them; but it would be a statement of the present witness's understanding and comprehension of those ideas, expressed in language of his own. Those ideas may have been misunderstood, modified, perverted, or colored, by passing through the mind of the witness, by his knowledge or ignorance of the subject, or the language in which the testimony was given, or by his own prejudices, predilections, or habits of thought or reasoning. To illustrate this distinction, as we understand it to be fixed by the cases: If a witness, remarkable for his knowledge of law, and his intelligence on all other subjects, of great quickness of apprehension and power of discrimination, should declare that he could give the substance and effect of a former witness's testimony, but could not recollect his language, we suppose he would be excluded by the rule. But if one of those remarkable men should happen to have been present, of great stolidity of mind, upon most subjects, but of extraordinary tenacity of memory for language, and who would say that he recollected and could repeat all the

¹ *Rex v. Rowley*, 1 Mood. Cr. Cas. 111.

cases, goes in effect to exclude this sort of evidence altogether; or to admit it only where, in most cases, the particularity and minuteness of the witness's narrative, and the exactness with which he undertakes to repeat every word of the deceased's testimony, ought to excite just doubts of his own honesty, and of the truth of his evidence. It seems, therefore, to be generally considered sufficient, if the witness is able to state the substance of what was sworn on the former trial.¹ But he must state, in substance the whole of what

words uttered by the witness; although it should be very manifest that he himself did not understand them, yet his testimony would be admissible. The witness called to prove former testimony must be able to satisfy one other condition, namely, that he is able to state all that the witness testified on the former trial, as well upon the direct as the cross-examination. The reason is obvious. One part of his statement may be qualified, softened, or colored by another. And it would be of no avail to the party against whom the witness is called to state the testimony of the former witness, that he has had the right and opportunity to cross-examine that former witness with a view of diminishing the weight or impairing the force of that testimony against him, if the whole and entire result of that cross-examination does not accompany the testimony. It may perhaps be said, that, with these restrictions, the rule is of little value. It is no doubt true, that in most cases of complicated and extended testimony, the loss of evidence by the decease of a witness cannot be avoided. But the same result follows, in most cases, from the decease of a witness, whose testimony has not been preserved in some of the modes provided by law. But there are some cases, in which the rule can be usefully applied, as in case of testimony embraced in a few words—such as proof of demand or notice on notes or bills—cases in which large amounts are often involved. If it can be used in a few cases, consistently with the true and sound principles of the law of evidence, there is no reason for rejecting it altogether. At the same time, care should be taken so to apply and restrain it, that it may not, under a plea of necessity, and in order to avoid hard cases, be so used as to violate those principles. It is to be recollected, that it is an exception to a general rule of evidence supposed to be extremely important and necessary; and unless a case is brought fully within the reasons of such exception, the general rule must prevail." See 6 Metc. 264-266.

¹ See *Cornell v. Green*, 10 Serg. & R. 14, 16, where this point is briefly but powerfully discussed, by Mr. Justice Gibson. See also *Miles v. O'Hara*, 4 Binn. 108; *Caton v. Lenox*, 5 Randolph, 31, 36; 1 Phil. Evid. 338; *Rex v. Rowley*, 1 Mood. Cr. C. 111; *Chess v. Chess*, 17 Serg. & R. 409, 411,

was said on the particular subject which he is called to prove. If he can state only what was said on that subject by the deceased on his examination in chief, without also giving the substance of what he said upon it in his cross-examination, it is inadmissible.¹

§ 166. What the deceased witness testified may be *proved by any person*, who will swear from his own memory; or by notes taken by any person, who will swear to their accuracy;² or, perhaps, from the necessity of the case, by the *Judge's own notes*, where both actions are tried before the same Judge; for in such case, it seems, the Judge, from his position, as well as from other considerations, cannot be a witness.³ But, except in this case of necessity, if it be admitted as such, the better opinion is, that the Judge's notes are not legal evidence of what a witness testified before him; for they are no part of the record, nor is it his official duty to take them, nor have they the sanction of his oath to their accuracy or completeness.⁴ But in chancery, when a new trial is ordered of an

412; *Jackson v. Bailey*, 2 Johns. 17; 2 Russ. on Crimes, 638, [683] (3d Am. ed.); *Cowen & Hill's note* 441, to 1 Phil. Evid. 231; *Sloan v. Somers*, 1 Spencer's R. 66; *Garrott v. Johnson*, 11 G. & J. 28; *Canney's case*, 9 Law Reporter, 408; *The State v. Hooker*, 2 Washb. 658; *Gildersleeve v. Caraway*, 10 Alab. R. 260.

¹ *Wolf v. Wyeth*, 11 Serg. & R. 149; *Gildersleeve v. Caraway*, 10 Alab. R. 260.

² *Mayor of Doncaster v. Day*, 3 Taunt. 267; *Chess v. Chess*, 17 Serg. & R. 409. The witness, as has been stated in a preceding note, must be able to testify, from his recollection alone, that the deceased was sworn as a witness, the matter or thing which he was called to prove, and the substance of what he stated; after which his notes may be admitted. *Sloan v. Somers*, 1 Spencer, N. J. R. 66; Ante, § 165, note (2).

³ *Glassford on Evid.* 602; *Tait on Evid.* 432; *Regina v. Garard*, 8 C. & P. 595; Post, § 249.

⁴ *Miles v. O'Hara*, 4 Binn. 108; *Foster v. Shaw*, 7 Serg. & R. 156; *Ex parte Learmouth*, 6 Madd. R. 113; *Reg. v. Plummer*, 8 Jur. 922, per Gurney, B.; *Livingston v. Cox*, 8 Watts & Serg. 61. Courts expressly disclaim any power to compel the production of a Judge's notes. *Scougill v. Campbell*, 1 Chitty, R. 283; *Graham v. Bowham*, lb. 284, note. And

issue sent out of Chancery to a Court of Common Law, and it is suggested that some of the witnesses in the former trial are of advanced age, an order may be made that, in the event of their death or inability to attend, their testimony may be read from the Judge's notes.¹

§ 167. The effect of an *interest, subsequently acquired* by the witness, as laying a foundation for the admission of proof of his former testimony, remains to be considered. It is in general true, that if a person, who has knowledge of any fact, but is under no obligation to become a witness to testify to it, should afterwards become interested in the subject-matter, in which that fact is involved, and his interest should be on the side of the party calling him, he would not be a competent witness, until the interest is removed. If it is releasable by the party, he must release it. If not, the objection remains; for neither is the witness, nor a third person, compellable to give a release; though the witness may be compelled to receive one. And the rule is the same in regard to a subscribing witness, if his interest was created by the act of the party calling him. Thus, if the charterer of a ship should afterwards communicate to the subscribing witness of the charter-party an interest in the adventure, he cannot call the witness to prove the execution of the charter-party; nor will proof of his handwriting be received; for it was the party's

if an application is made to amend a verdict by the Judge's notes, it can be made only to the Judge himself, before whom the trial was had. *Ibid.* 2 Tidd's Pr. 770, 933. Where a party, on a new trial being granted, procured, at great expense, copies of a shorthand writer's notes of the evidence given at the former trial, for the amount of which he claimed allowance in the final taxation of costs; the claim was disallowed, except for so much as would have been the expense of waiting on the Judge, or his clerk, for a copy of his notes; on the ground that the latter would have sufficed. *Crease v. Barrett*, 1 Tyrw. & Grang. 112. But this decision is not conceived to affect the question, whether the Judge's notes would have been admissible before another Judge, if objected to.

¹ *Hargrave v. Hargrave*, 10 Jur. 957.

own act, to destroy the evidence.¹ It is, however, laid down, that a witness cannot, by the subsequent voluntary creation of an interest, without the concurrence or assent of the party, deprive him of the benefit of his testimony.² But this rule admits of a qualification, turning upon the manner in which the interest was acquired. If it were acquired wantonly, as by a wager, or fraudulently, for the purpose of taking off his testimony, of which the participation of the adverse party would generally be proof, it would not disqualify him. But "the pendency of a suit cannot prevent third persons from transacting business, *bonâ fide*, with one of the parties; and, if an interest in the event of the suit is thereby acquired, the common consequence of law must follow, that the person so interested cannot be examined as a witness for that party, from whose success he will necessarily derive an advantage."³ Therefore, where, in an action against one of several underwriters on policy of insurance, it appeared that a subsequent underwriter had paid, upon the plaintiff's promise to refund the money, if the defendant in the suit should prevail; it was held, that he was not a competent witness for the defendant to prove a fraudulent concealment of facts by the plaintiff, it

¹ *Hovill v. Stephenson*, 5 Bing. 493; *Hamilton v. Williams*, 1 Hayw. 139; *Johnson v. Knight*, 1 N. Car. Law Rep. 93; 1 Murph. 293; *Bennett v. Robinson*, 3 Stew. & Port. 227, 237; *Schall v. Miller*, 5 Whart. 156.

² 1 Stark. Evid. 118; *Barlow v. Vowell*, Skin. 586; *George v. Pierce*, cited by Buller, J. in 3 T. R. 37; *Rex v. Fox*, 1 Str. 652; *Long v. Baillie*, 4 Serg. & R. 222; *Burgess v. Lane*, 3 Greenl. 165; *Jackson v. Rumsey*, 3 Johns. Cas. 234, 237; Post, § 418.

³ 3 Campb. 381, per Lord Ellenborough. The case of *Bent v. Baker*, 3 T. R. 27, seems to have been determined on a similar principle, as applied to the opposite state of facts; the subsequent interest acquired by the broker, being regarded as affected with bad faith on the part of the assured, who objected to his admission. The distinction taken by Lord Ellenborough was before the Supreme Court of the United States in *Winship v. The Bank of the U. States*, 5 Peters, 529, 541, 542, 545, 546, 552, but no decision was had upon the question, the Court being equally divided. But the same doctrine was afterwards discussed and recognised, as "founded on the plainest reasons," in *Eastman v. Winship*, 14 Pick. 44; 10 Wend. 162, 164, acc.

being merely a payment by anticipation, of his own debt, in good faith, upon a reasonable condition of repayment.¹ And as the interest which one party acquires in the testimony of another, is liable to the contingency of being defeated by a subsequent interest of the witness in the subject-matter, created *bonâ fide*, in the usual and lawful course of business; the same principle would seem to apply to an interest arising by operation of law, upon the happening of an uncertain event, such as the death of an ancestor, or the like. But though the interest which a party thus acquires in the testimony of another, is liable to be affected by the ordinary course of human affairs, and of natural events, the witness being under no obligation, on that account, either to change the course of his business, or to abstain from any ordinary and lawful act or employment; yet it is a right of which neither the witness, nor any other person, can, by voluntary act and design, deprive him. Wherever, therefore, the subsequent interest of the witness has been created either wantonly, or in bad faith, it does not exclude him; and doubtless the participation of the adverse party in the creation of such interest would, if not explained by other circumstances, be very strong *primâ facie* evidence of bad faith; as an act of the witness, uncalled for, and out of the ordinary course of business, would be regarded as wanton.²

§ 168. If, in cases of disqualifying interest, the witness has

¹ Forrester v. Pigou, 3 Campb. 380; 1 M. & S. 9, S. C.; Phelps v. Riley, 6 Conn. 266. In Burgess v. Lane, 3 Greenl. 165, the witness had voluntarily entered into an agreement with the defendant, against whom he had an action pending in another Court, that that action should abide the event of the other, in which he was now called as a witness for the plaintiff; and the Court held, that it did not lie with the defendant, who was party to that agreement, to object to his admissibility. But it is observable, that that agreement was not made in discharge of any real or supposed obligation, as in Forrester v. Pigou; but was on a new subject, was uncalled for, and purely voluntary; and therefore subjected the adverse party to the imputation of bad faith in making it.

² See post, § 418, where this subject is again considered.

previously given a deposition in the cause, the deposition may be read in Chancery, as if he were since deceased, or insane, or otherwise incapacitated. It may also be read in the trial, at law, of an issue out of Chancery. In other trials at law, no express authority has been found for reading the deposition; and it has been said, that the course of practice is otherwise; but no reason is given, and the analogies of the law are altogether in favor of admitting the evidence.¹ And as it is hardly possible to conceive a reason for the admission of prior testimony given in one form, which does not apply to the same testimony given in any other form, it would seem clearly to result, that, where the witness is subsequently rendered incompetent by interest, lawfully acquired, in good faith, evidence may be given of what he formerly testified orally, in the same manner as if he were dead; and the same principle will lead us farther to conclude that, in all cases where the party has, without his own fault or concurrence, irrecoverably lost the power of producing the witness again, whether from physical or legal causes, he may offer the secondary evidence of what he testified in the former trial. If the lips of the witness are sealed, it can make no difference in principle, whether it be by the finger of death, or the finger of the law. The interest of the witness, however, is no excuse for not producing him in Court; for perhaps the adverse party will waive any objection on that account. It is only when the objection is taken and allowed, that a case is made for the introduction of secondary evidence.

¹ This is now the established practice in Chancery; Gresley on Evid. 267; — and in Chess v. Chess, 17 Serg. & R. 412, it was conceded by Tod, J., that the reason and principle of the rule applied with equal force, in trials at law; though it was deemed in that case to have been settled otherwise, by the course of decisions in Pennsylvania. See also 1 Stark. Evid. 264, 265; 1 Smith's Chan. Pr. 344; Gosse v. Tracy, 1 P. W. 287; 2 Vern. 699, S. C.; Andrews v. Palmer, 1 Ves. & B. 21; Luttrell v. Reynell, 1 Mod. 284; Jones v. Jones v. Jones, 1 Cox, 184; Union Bank v. Knapp, 3 Pick. 108, 109, per Putnam, J.; Wafer v. Hemken, 9 Rob. 203.

CHAPTER XI.

OF ADMISSIONS.

§ 169. UNDER the head of exceptions to the rule rejecting hearsay evidence, it has been usual to treat of *admissions and confessions* by the party; considering them as declarations against his interest, and therefore probably true. But in regard to many admissions, and especially those implied from conduct and assumed character, it cannot be supposed that the party, at the time of the principal declaration or act done, believed himself to be speaking or acting against his own interest; but often the contrary. Such evidence seems, therefore, more properly admissible as a *substitute* for the ordinary and legal proof; either in virtue of the direct consent and waiver of the party, as in the case of explicit and solemn admissions, or on grounds of public policy and convenience, as in the case of those implied from assumed character, acquiescence, or conduct.¹ It is in this light that confessions and admissions are regarded by the Roman law, as is stated by Mascardus. *Illud igitur in primis, ut hinc potissimum exordiar, non est ignorandum, quod etsi confessioni inter probationum species locum in præsentia tribuerimus; cuncti tamen fere Dd. unanimes sunt arbitrati, ipsam potius esse ab onere probandi relevationem, quam proprie probationem.*² Many admissions, however, being made by third persons, are

¹ See Ante, § 27.

² Mascard. De Probat. Vol. 1, Quæst. 7, n. 1, 10, 11; Menochius, De Præsump. lib. 1, Quæst. 61, n. 6; Alciatus, De Præsump. Pars. 2, n. 4. The Roman law distinguishes, with great clearness and precision, between confessions *extra judicium*, and confessions *in judicio*; treating the former as of very little and often of no weight, unless corroborated, and the latter as generally, if not always, conclusive, even to the overthrow of the *præsumptio juris et de jure*; thus constituting an exception to the conclusiveness

receivable on mixed grounds; partly as belonging to the *res gesta*, partly as made against the interest of the person making them, and partly because of some privity with him against whom they are offered in evidence. The whole subject, therefore, properly falls under consideration in this connexion.

§ 170. In our law, the term *admission* is usually applied to *civil transactions*, and to those matters of fact, in criminal cases, which do not involve criminal intent; the term *confession* being generally restricted to *acknowledgments of guilt*. We shall therefore treat them separately, beginning with admissions. The rules of evidence are in both cases the same. Thus, in the trial of Lord Melville, charged, among other things, with criminal misapplication of moneys received from the Exchequer, the admission of his agent and authorized receiver was held sufficient proof of the fact of his receiving the public money; but not admissible to establish the charge of any criminal misapplication of it. The law was thus stated by Lord Chancellor Erskine. "This first step in the proof," (namely, the receipt of the money,) "must advance by evidence applicable alike to civil, as to criminal cases; for a fact must be established by the same evidence, whether it is to be followed by a criminal or civil consequence; but it is a totally different question, in the consideration of criminal, as distinguished from civil justice, how the noble person now on trial may be affected by the fact, when so established. The receipt by the paymaster would in itself involve him civilly, but could by no possibility convict him of a crime."¹

of this class of presumptions. But to give a confession this effect, certain things are essential, which Mascardus cites, out of Tancred;—

Major, spontè, sciens, contra se, ubi jus fit;

Nec natura, favor, lis, jusve repugnet, et hostis.

Mascard. ub. supr. n. 15. Vid. Dig. lib. 42, tit. 2, de confessis. Cod. lib. 7, tit. 59; Van Leeuwen's Comm. Book v. ch. 21.

¹ 29 Howell's State Trials, col. 764.

§ 171. We shall first consider the person, whose admissions may be received. And here the general doctrine is, that the declarations of a *party to the record*, or of one *identified in interest with him*, are, as against such party, admissible in evidence.¹ If they proceed from a stranger, and cannot be brought home to the party, they are inadmissible, unless upon some of the other grounds already considered.² Thus, the admissions of a payee of a negotiable promissory note, not over due when negotiated, cannot be received in an action by the indorsee against the maker, to impeach the consideration, there being no identity of interest between him and the plaintiff.³

§ 172. This general rule, admitting the declarations of a party to the record in evidence, applies to all cases where the party has *any interest* in the suit, whether others are *joint parties* on the same side with him, or not, and howsoever the interest may appear, and whatever may be its relative amount.⁴ But where the party sues alone, and has no

¹ *Spargo v. Brown*, 9 B. & C. 935, per Bayley, J.; Post, § 180, 203. In the Court of Chancery in England, evidence is not received of admissions or declarations of the parties, which are not put in issue by the pleadings, and which there was not, therefore, any opportunity of explaining or disproving. *Copland v. Toulmin*, 7 Clark & Fin. 350, 373; *Austin v. Chambers*, 6 Clark & Fin. 1; *Atwood v. Small*, Ib. 234. But in the United States this rule has not been adopted; and it is deemed sufficient if the proposition to be established is stated in the bill, without stating the particular kind of evidence by which it is to be proved. See *Smith v. Burnham*, 2 Sumn. 612; *Brandon v. Cabiness*, 10 Alab. R. 156; Story, Equity Plead. § 265 a, and note (1), where this subject is fully discussed. And in England, the rule has recently been qualified, so far as to admit a written admission by the defendant of his liability to the plaintiff, in the matter of the pending suit. *Malcolm v. Scott*, 3 Hare, 63; *McMahon v. Burchell*, 1 Coop. Cas. temp. Cottenham, 475; 7 Law Rev. 209. See the cases collected by Mr. Cooper in his note appended to that case.

² Ante, § 128, 141, 147, 156.

³ *Barough v. White*, 4 B. & C. 325; *Bristol v. Dan*, 12 Wend. 142.

⁴ *Bauerman v. Radenius*, 7 T. R. 663; 2 Esp. 653, S. C. In this case the consignees brought an action in the name of the consignor, against the

interest in the matter, his name being used of necessity, by one, to whom he has assigned all his interest in the subject of the suit, though it is agreed that he cannot be permitted, by his acts or admissions, to disparage the title of his innocent assignee or vendee, yet the books are not so clearly agreed in the mode of restraining him. That Chancery will always protect the assignee, either by injunction or otherwise, is very certain; and formerly this was the course uniformly pursued; the admissions of a party to the record, at Common Law, being received against him in all cases. But in later times, the interests of an assignee, suing in the name of his assignor, have also, to a considerable extent, been protected in the Courts of Common Law, against the effect of any acts or admissions of the latter to his prejudice. A familiar example of this sort is that of a receipt in full, given by the assignor, being nominal plaintiff, to the debtor, after the assignment; which the assignee is permitted to impeach and avoid, in an suit at law, by showing the previous assignment.¹

§ 173. But a *distinction* has been taken between such admissions as these, which are given in evidence to the Jury, under the general issue, and are, therefore, open to explanation, and controlling proof; and those in *more solemn form*, such as releases, which are specially pleaded, and operate by way of estoppel; in which latter cases it has been held, that, if the release of the nominal plaintiff is pleaded in bar, the

shipmaster, for damage to the goods, occasioned by his negligence; and without supposing some interest to remain in the consignor, the action could not be maintained. It was on this ground that Lawrence, J. placed the decision. See also *Norden v. Williamson*, 1 Taunt. 378; *Mandeville v. Welch*, 5 Wheat. 283, 286; *Dan et al. v. Brown*, 4 Cowen, 483, 492.

¹ *Henderson et al. v. Wild*, 2 Campb. 561. Lord Ellenborough, in a previous case of the same kind, thought himself not at liberty, sitting at *nisi prius*, to overrule the defence. *Alner v. George*, 1 Campb. 392; *Frear v. Evertson*, 20 Johns. 142. See also *Payne v. Rogers*, Doug. 407; *Winch v. Keeley*, 1 T. R. 619; *Cockshott v. Bennett*, 2 T. R. 763; *Lane v. Chandler*, 3 Smith, R. 77, 83; *Skaife v. Jackson*, 3 B. & C. 421; *Appleton v. Boyd*, 7 Mass. 131; *Tiernan v. Jackson*, 5 Peters, 580.

Courts of law, sitting in bank, will administer equitable relief by setting aside the plea, on motion; but that, if issue is taken on the matter pleaded, such act or admission of the nominal plaintiff must be allowed its effect at law, to the same extent as if he were the real plaintiff in the suit.¹ The American Courts however, do not recognise this distinction; but where a release from the nominal plaintiff is pleaded in bar, a prior assignment of the cause of action, with notice thereof to the defendant, and an averment that the suit is prosecuted by the assignee for his own benefit, is held a good replication.² Nor is the nominal plaintiff permitted, by the entry of a *retraxit*, or in any other manner, injuriously to affect the rights of his assignee, in a suit at law.³

¹ *Alner v. George*, 1 Campb. 392, per Ld. Ellenborough; *Gibson v. Winter*, 5 B. & A. 96; *Craib v. D'Aeth*, 7 T. R. 670, note (b); *Legh v. Legh*, 1 B. & P. 447; *Anon.* 1 Salk. 260; *Payne v. Rogers*, Doug. 407; *Skaife v. Jackson*, 3 B. & C. 421.

² *Mandeville v. Welch*, 5 Wheat. 277, 283; *Andrews v. Beecker*, 1 Johns. Cas. 411; *Raymond v. Squire*, 11 Johns. 47; *Littlefield v. Story*, 3 Johns. 425; *Dawson v. Coles*, 16 Johns. 51; *Kimball v. Huntington*, 10 Wend. 675; *Owings v. Low*, 5 Gill & Johns. 134.

³ *Welch v. Mandeville*, 1 Wheat. 233. "By the Common Law, *choses in action* were not assignable, except to the crown. The civil law considers them as, strictly speaking, not assignable; but, by the invention of a fiction, the Roman jurists contrived to attain this object. The creditor, who wished to transfer his right of action to another person, constituted him his attorney, or *procurator in rem suam*, as it was called; and it was stipulated, that the action should be brought in the name of the assignor, but for the benefit and at the expense of the assignee. Pothier de Vente, No. 550. After notice to the debtor, this assignment operated a complete cession of the debt, and invalidated a payment to any other person than the assignee, or a release from any other person than him. *Ib.* 110, 554; Code Napoleon, liv. 3, tit. 6; De la Vente, c. 8, s. 1690. The Court of Chancery, imitating, in its usual spirit, the civil law in this particular, disregarded the rigid strictness of the Common Law, and protected the rights of the assignee of choses in action. This liberality was at last adopted by the Courts of Common Law, who now consider an assignment of a chose in action as substantially valid, only preserving, in certain cases, the form of an action commenced in the name of the assignor, the beneficial interest and control of the suit being, however, considered as completely vested in the assignee as *procurator in*

§ 174. Though the admissions of a party to the record are generally receivable in evidence against him, yet where there are *several parties on the same side*, the admissions of one are not permitted to affect the others, who may happen to be joined with him, unless there is some joint interest, or privity in design between them;¹ although the admissions may, in proper cases, be received against the person who made them. Thus, in an action against joint makers of a note, if one suffers judgment by default, his signature must still be proved, against the other.² And even where there is a joint interest, a release executed by one of several plaintiffs will, in a clear case of fraud, be set aside in a Court of law.³

rem suam. See *Master v. Miller*, 4 T. R. 340; *Andrews v. Beecker*, 1 Johns. Cas. 411; *Bates v. New York Insurance Company*, 3 Johns. Cas. 242; *Wardell v. Eden*, 1 Johns. 532, in notis; *Carver v. Tracy*, 3 Johns. 426; *Raymond v. Squire*, 11 Johns. 47; *Van Vechten v. Greves*, 4 Johns. 406; *Weston v. Barker*, 12 Johns. 276." See the Reporter's note to 1 Wheat. 237. The American cases on the subject of the text are collected in Cowen & Hill's note 172, to 1 Phil. Evid. 90. But where the nominal plaintiff was constituted, by the party in interest, his agent for negotiating the contract, and it is expressly made with him alone, he is treated, in an action upon such contract, in all respects as a party to the cause; and any defence against him is a defence, in that action, against the *cestui que trust*, suing in his name. Therefore, where a broker, in whose name a policy of insurance under seal was effected, brought an action of covenant thereon, to which payment was pleaded; it was held that payment of the amount of loss to the broker, by allowing him credit in account for that sum, against a balance for premiums due from him to the defendants, was a good payment, as between the plaintiff on the record and the defendants, and, therefore, an answer to the action. *Gibson v. Winter et al.* 5 B. & Ad. 96. This case, however, may, with equal and perhaps greater propriety, be referred to the law of agency. See *Richardson v. Anderson*, 1 Campb. 43, note; *Story on Agency*, § 413, 429-434.

¹ See Ante, § 111, 112; *Dan et al. v. Brown*, 4 Cowen, 483, 492; *Rex v. Hardwick*, 11 East, 578, 589, per Le Blanc, J.; *Whitcomb v. Whiting*, 2 Doug. 652.

² *Gray v. Palmer*, 1 Esp. 135. See also *Sheriff v. Wilks*, 1 East, 48.

³ *Jones et al. v. Herbert*, 7 Taunt. 421; *Loring et al. v. Brackett*, 3 Pick. 403; *Skaife et al. v. Jackson*, 3 B. & C. 421; *Henderson et al. v. Wild*, 2 Campb. 561.

But in the absence of fraud, if the parties have a joint interest in the matter in suit, whether as plaintiffs or defendants, an admission made by one is, in general, evidence against all.¹ They stand to each other, in this respect, in a relation similar to that of existing copartners. Thus, also,

¹ Such was the doctrine laid down by Ld. Mansfield in *Whitcomb v. Whiting*, 2 Doug. 652. Its propriety, and the extent of its application, have been much discussed, and sometimes questioned; but it seems now to be clearly established. See *Perham v. Laynal*, 2 Bing. 306; *Burleigh v. Stott*, 8 B. & C. 36; *Wyatt v. Hodson*, 8 Bing. 309; *Brandram v. Wharton*, 1 B. & A. 467; *Holme v. Green*, 1 Stark. R. 488. See also, accordingly, *White v. Hale*, 3 Pick. 291; *Martin v. Root*, 17 Mass. 222; *Hunt v. Brigham*, 2 Pick. 581; *Frye v. Barker*, 4 Pick. 382; *Beitz v. Fuller*, 1 McCord, 541; *Johnson v. Beardslee*, 1 Johns. 3; *Bound v. Lathrop*, 4 Conn. 336; *Coit v. Tracy*, 8 Conn. 268, 276, 277; *Getchell v. Heald*, 7 Greenl. 26; *Owings v. Low*, 5 Gill & Johns. 144; *Patterson v. Choate*, 7 Wend. 441; *McIntire v. Oliver*, 2 Hawks, 209; *Cady v. Shepherd*, 11 Pick. 400; *Van Reimsdyk v. Kane*, 1 Gall. 635, 636. But see *Bell v. Morrison*, 1 Peters, 351. But the admission must be distinctly made by a party still liable upon the note; otherwise, it will not be binding against the others. Therefore, a payment, appropriated, by the election of the creditor only, to the debt in question, is not a sufficient admission of that debt, for this purpose. *Holme v. Green*, ub. sup. Neither is a payment, received under a dividend of the effects of a bankrupt promissor. *Brandram v. Wharton*, ub. sup. In this last case, the opposing decision in *Jackson v. Fairbank*, 2 H. Bl. 340, was considered and strongly disapproved; but it was afterwards cited by *Holroyd, J.* as a valid decision, in *Burleigh v. Stott*, 8 B. & C. 36. The admission where one of the promissors is dead, to take the case out of the statute of limitations against him, must have been made in his lifetime; *Burleigh v. Stott*, supra; *Slater v. Lawson*, 1 B. & Ad. 396; and by a party originally liable; *Atkins v. Tredgold*, 2 B. & C. 23. This effect of the admission of indebtedness by one of several joint promissors, as to cases barred by the statute of limitations, when it is merely a verbal admission, without part payment, is now restricted, in England, to the party making the admission; by stat. 9 Geo. 4, c. 14, (Lord Tenterden's act.) So in Massachusetts, by Rev. Stat. ch. 120, § 14; and in Vermont, Rev. Stat. ch. 58, § 23, 27. The application of this doctrine to partners, after the dissolution of the partnership, has already been considered. Ante, § 112, note. Whether a written acknowledgment made by one of several partners, stands upon different ground from that of a similar admission by one of several joint contractors, is an open question. *Clark v. Alexander*, 8 Jur. 496, 498. See Post, Vol. 2, § 441, 444.

the act of making a partial payment within six years, by one of several joint makers of a promissory note, takes it out of the statute of limitations.¹ And where several were both legatees and executors in a will, and also appellees, in a question upon the probate of the will, the admission of one of them, as to facts which took place at the time of making the will, showing that the testatrix was imposed upon, was held receivable in evidence against the validity of the will.² And where two were bound in a single bill, the admission of one was held good against both defendants.³

§ 175. In settlement cases, it has long been held that declarations by *rated parishioners* are evidence against the parish; for they are parties to the cause, though the nominal parties to the appeal be the churchwardens and overseers of the poor of the parish.⁴ The same principle is now applied in England to all other prosecutions against towns and parishes, in respect to the declarations of *rateable inhabitants*, they being substantially parties to the record.⁵ Nor is it necessary first to call the inhabitant, and show that he refuses to be examined, in order to admit his declarations.⁶ And the same principle would seem to apply to the inhabitants of towns, counties, or other territorial political divisions of this country, who sue and are prosecuted as inhabitants, *ex nomine*, and are termed *quasi corporations*. Being parties,

¹ *Burleigh v. Stott*, 8 B. & C. 36; *Munderson v. Reeve*, 2 Stark. Ev. 484; *Wyatt v. Hodson*, 8 Bing. 309; *Chippendale v. Thurston*, 4 C. & P. 98; 1 M. & M. 411, S. C.; *Pease v. Hirst*, 10 B. & C. 122. But it must be distinctly shown to be a payment on account of the particular debt. *Holme v. Green*, 1 Stark. R. 488.

² *Atkins v. Sanger et al.* 1 Pick. 192. See also *Jackson v. Vail*, 7 Wend. 125; *Osgood v. the Manhattan Co.* 3 Cowen, 612.

³ *Lowe v. Boteler et al.* 4 Har. & McHen. 346; *Vicary's case*, 1 Gilbert's Evid. by Lofft, p. 59, note.

⁴ *Rex v. Inhabitants of Hardwick*, 11 East, 579. See Ante, § 128, 129.

⁵ *Regina v. Adderbury*, 5 Ad. & El. 187, N. S.

⁶ *Rex v. Inhabitants of Whitley Lower*, 1 M. & S. 637; *Rex v. Inhabitants of Woburn*, 10 East, 395.

personally liable, their declarations are admissible, though the value of the evidence may, from circumstances, be exceedingly light.¹

§ 176. It is a *joint interest*, and not a mere community of interest, that renders such admissions receivable. Therefore the admissions of one executor are not received, to take a case out of the statute of limitations, as against his co-executor.² Nor is an acknowledgment of indebtedness by one executor, admissible against his co-executor, to establish the original demand.³ The admission of the receipt of money, by one of several trustees, is not received to charge the other trustees.⁴ Nor is there such joint interest between a surviving promisor and the executor of his co-promisor, as to make the act or admission of the one sufficient to bind the other.⁵ Neither

¹ 11 East, 586, per Ld. Ellenborough; 2 Stark. Evid. 580. The statutes rendering quasi corporators competent witnesses, (see 54 Geo. 3, c. 170; 3 & 4 Vict. c. 25,) are not understood as interfering with the rule of evidence respecting admissions. Phil. & Am. on Evid. 395, and n. (2); 1 Phil. Evid. 375, n. (2). In some of the United States, similar statutes have been enacted. LL. Vermont, (Rev. Code, 1824,) vol. 1, ch. 7, n. 26; Massachusetts, Rev. Stat. ch. 94, § 54; Delaware, (Rev. Code, 1829,) p. 444; New Jersey, Elmer's Dig. p. 604; Louisiana, 3 Martin's Dig. 482. In other States, the interest of inhabitants, merely as such, has been deemed too remote and contingent, as well as too minute, to disqualify them, and they have been held competent at Common Law. *Eustis v. Parker*, 1 New Hamp. 273; *Cornwell v. Isham*, 1 Day, 35; *Fuller v. Hampton*, 5 Conn. 416; *Falls v. Belknap*, 1 Johns. 486; *Bloodgood v. Jamaica*, 12 Johns. 285; *Watertown v. Cowen*, 4 Paige, 510; *Ex parte Kip*, 1 Paige, 613; *Corwein v. Hames*, 11 Johns. 76; *Orange v. Springfield*, 1 Southard, 186; *State v. Davidson*, 1 Bayley, 35; *Jonesborough v. McKee*, 2 Yerger, 167; *Gass v. Gass*, 3 Humphr. 278, 285. See post, § 331.

² *Tullock v. Dunn*, R. & M. 416. Qu. and see *Hammon v. Huntley*, 4 Cowen, 493.

³ *Hammon v. Huntley*, 4 Cowen, 493; *James v. Hackley*, 16 Johns. 277; *Forsyth v. Ganson*, 5 Wend. 558.

⁴ *Davies v. Ridge et al.* 3 Esp. 101.

⁵ *Atkins v. Tredgold et al.* 2 B. & C. 23; *Slater v. Lawson*, 1 B. & Ad. 396; *Slaymaker v. Gundacker's Ex'r*, 10 Serg. & Raw. 75; *Hathaway v. Haskell*, 9 Pick. 42.

will the admission of one, who was joint promisor with a *feme sole*, be received to charge her husband, after the marriage, in an action against them all, upon a plea of the statute of limitations.¹ For the same reason, namely, the absence of a joint interest, the admissions of one tenant in common are not receivable against his co-tenant, though both are parties on the same side in the suit.² Nor are the admissions of one of several devisees or legatees, admissible to impeach the validity of the will, where they may affect others not in privity with him.³ Neither are the admissions of one defendant evidence against the other, in an action on the case for the mere negligence of both.⁴

§ 177. It is obvious, that an *apparent joint interest* is not sufficient to render the admissions of one party receivable against his companions, where the reality of that interest is the point in controversy. A foundation must first be laid, by showing, *prima facie*, that a joint interest exists. Therefore, in an action against several joint makers of a promissory note, the execution of which was the point in issue, the admission of his signature only by one defendant, was held not sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover against him and the others, though theirs had been proved; the point to be proved against all being a joint promise by all.⁵ And where it is sought to charge several as partners, an admission of the fact of partnership by one is not receivable in evidence against any of the others, to prove the partnership. It is only

¹ *Pittam v. Foster et al.* 1 B. & C. 248.

² *Dan et al. v. Brown et al.* 4 Cowen, 483, 492. And see *Smith v. Vincent*, 15 Conn. R. 1.

³ *Hauberger v. Root*, 6 Watts & Serg. 431.

⁴ *Daniels v. Potter*, 1 M. & M. 501; Ante, § 111. Neither is there such privity among the members of a board of public officers, as to make the admissions of one binding on all. *Lockwood v. Smith et al.* 5 Day, 309. Nor among several indorsers of a promissory note. *Slaymaker v. Gundacker's Ex'r*, 10 Serg. & Raw. 75. Nor between executors and heirs or devisees. *Osgood v. Manhattan Co.* 3 Cowen, 611.

⁵ *Gray v. Palmer et al.* 1 Esp. 135.

after the partnership is shown to exist, by proof satisfactory to the Judge, that the admissions of one of the parties is received, in order to affect the others.¹ If they sue upon a promise to them as partners, the admission of one is evidence against all, even though it goes to a denial of the joint right of action, the partnership being conclusively admitted by the form of action.²

§ 178. In general, the *answer* of one defendant in *Chancery* cannot be read in evidence against his co-defendant; the reason being, that, as there is no issue between them, there can have been no opportunity for cross-examination.³ But this rule does not apply to cases where the other defendant claims through him, whose answer is offered in evidence; nor to cases where they have a joint interest, either as partners, or otherwise, in the transaction.⁴ Wherever the confession of any party would be good evidence against another, in such case, his answer, *a fortiori*, may be read against the latter.⁵

§ 179. The admissions, which are thus receivable in evidence, must, as we have seen, be those of a person having at

¹ *Nicholls v. Dowding et al.* 1 Stark. R. 81; *Grant v. Jackson et al.* Peake's Cas. 204; *Burgess v. Lane et al.* 3 Greenl. 165; *Grafton Bank v. Moore*, 13 N. Hamp. 99. See Ante, § 112; Post, Vol. 2, § 484; *Latham v. Kenniston*, 13 N. Hamp. 203; *Whitney v. Ferris*, 10 Johns. 66; *Wood v. Braddick*, 1 Taunt. 104; *Sangster v. Mazarredo et al.* 1 Stark. R. 161; *Van Reimsdyk v. Kane*, 1 Gall. 635; *Harris v. Wilson*, 7 Wend. 57; *Bucknam v. Barnum*, 15 Conn. R. 68.

² *Lucas et al. v. De La Cour*, 1 M. & S. 249.

³ *Jones v. Turberville*, 2 Ves. 11; *Morse v. Royall*, 12 Ves. 355, 360; *Leeds v. The Marine Ins. Co. of Alexandria*, 2 Wheat. 380; *Gresley on Eq. Ev.* 24; *Field v. Holland*, 6 Cranch, 8; *Clark's Exrs. v. Van Reimsdyk*, 9 Cranch, 153; *Van Reimsdyk v. Kane*, 1 Gall. 630; *Parker v. Morrell*, 12 Jur. 253.

⁴ *Field v. Holland*, 6 Cranch, 8, 24; *Clark's Exrs. v. Van Reimsdyk*, 9 Cranch, 153, 156; *Orborne v. United States Bank*, 9 Wheat. 332; *Christie v. Bishop*, 1 Barb. Ch. R. 105, 116.

⁵ *Van Reimsdyk v. Kane*, 1 Gall. 630, 635.

the time some interest in the matter, afterwards in controversy in the suit to which he is a party. The admissions, therefore, of a *guardian*, or of an *executor* or *administrator*, made before he was completely clothed with that trust, or of a *prochein ami*, made before the commencement of the suit, cannot be received, either against the ward or infant in the one case, or against himself, as the representative of heirs, devisees, and creditors, in the other;¹ though it may bind the person himself, when he is afterwards a party *suo jure*, in another action. A solemn admission, however, made in good faith, in a pending suit, for the purpose of that trial only, is governed by other considerations. Thus, the plea of *nolo contendere*, in a criminal case, is an admission for that trial only. One object of it is, to prevent the proceedings being used in any other place; and therefore it is held inadmissible in a civil action against the same party.² So, the answer of the guardian of an infant defendant in *Chancery* can never be read against the infant in another suit; for its office was only to bring the infant into Court, and make him a party.³ But it may be used against the guardian, when he afterwards is a party in his private capacity, for it is his own admission upon oath.⁴ Neither can the admission of a *married woman*, answering jointly with her husband, be after-

¹ *Webb v. Smith*, R. & M. 106; *Fraser v. Marsh*, 2 Stark. R. 41; *Cowling v. Ely*, Ib. 366; *Plant v. McEwen*, 4 Conn. 544. So the admissions of one, before he became assignee of a bankrupt, are not receivable against him, where suing as assignee. *Fenwick v. Thornton*, 1 M. & M. 51. But see *Smith v. Morgan*, 2 M. & Rob. 257. Nor is the statement of one partner admissible against the others, in regard to matters which were transacted before he became a partner in the house, and in which he had no interest prior to that time. *Catt v. Howard*, 3 Stark. R. 3.

² *Guild v. Lee*, 3 Law Reporter, p. 433. So, an admission in one plea cannot be called in aid of the issue in another. *Stracy v. Blake*, 3 C. M. & R. 168; *Jones v. Flint*, 2 P. & D. 594; *Gould on Pleading*, 432, 433; Mr. Rand's note to *Jackson v. Stetson*, 15 Mass. 58.

³ *Eggleston v. Speke*, alias *Petit*, 3 Mod. 258, 259; *Hawkins v. Luscombe*, 2 Swanst. 392, cases cited in note (a); *Story on Equity Pl.* 668; *Gresley on Eq. Evid.* 24, 323; *Mills v. Dennis*, 3 Johns. Ch. 367.

⁴ *Beasley v. Magrath*, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 34; *Gresley on Eq. Evid.* 323.

wards read against her, it being considered as the answer of the husband alone.¹

§ 180. We are next to consider the admissions of persons who are not parties to the record, but yet are *interested in the subject-matter of the suit*. The law, in regard to this source of evidence, looks chiefly to the real parties in interest, and gives to their admissions the same weight, as though they were parties to the record. Thus, the admissions of the *cestui que trust* of a bond;² those of the persons interested in a policy effected in another's name for their benefit;³ those of the ship-owners, in an action by the master for freight;⁴ those of the indemnifying creditor, in an action against the sheriff;⁵ those of the deputy sheriff, in an action against the high sheriff for the misconduct of the deputy;⁶ are all re-

¹ *Hodgson v. Merest*, 9 Price, 563; *Elston v. Wood*, 2 My. & K. 678.

² *Hanson v. Parker*, 1 Wils. 257. See also *Harrison v. Vallance*, 1 Bing. 45. But the declarations of the *cestui que trust* are admissible, only so far as his interest and that of the trustee are identical. *Doe v. Wainwright* 3 Nev. & P. 598. And the nature of his interest must be shown, even though it be admitted that he is a *cestui que trust*. *May v. Taylor*, 6 M. & Gr. 261.

³ *Bell v. Ansley*, 16 East, 141, 143.

⁴ *Smith v. Lyon*, 3 Campb. 465.

⁵ *Dowdon v. Fowle*, 4 Campb. 38; *Dyke v. Alridge*, cited 7 T. R. 665; 11 East, 584; *Young v. Smith*, 6 Esp. 121; *Harwood v. Keys*, 1 M. & Rob. 204; *Procter v. Lainson*, 7 C. & P. 629.

⁶ The admissions of an under-sheriff are not receivable in evidence against the sheriff, unless they tend to charge himself, he being the real party in the cause. He is not regarded as the general officer of the sheriff, to all intents; *Snowball v. Goodricke*, 4 B. & Ad. 541; though the admissibility of his declarations has sometimes been placed on that ground. *Drake v. Sykes*, 7 T. R. 113. At other times they have been received on the ground, that, being liable over to the sheriff, he is the real party to the suit. *Yabsley v. Doble*, 1 Ld. Raym. 190. And where the sheriff has taken a general bond of indemnity from the under officer, and has given him notice of the pendency of the suit, and required him to defend it, the latter is in fact the real party in interest, whenever the sheriff is sued for his default; and his admissions are clearly receivable, on principle, when made against himself. It has elsewhere been said, that the declarations of an under-sheriff are evidence to charge the sheriff, only where his acts might be given in evidence to charge him; and

ceivable against the party making them. And in general, the admissions of any party, represented by another, are receivable in evidence against his representative.¹ But here, also, it is to be observed, that the declarations or admissions must have been made, while the party making them had some interest in the matter; and they are receivable in evidence only so far as his own interests are concerned. Thus, the declaration of a bankrupt, made before his bankruptcy, is good evidence to charge his estate with a debt; but not so, if it was made afterwards.² While the declarant is the only party in interest, no harm can possibly result from giving full effect to his admissions. He may be supposed best to know the extent of his own rights, and to be least of all disposed to concede away any that actually belonged to him. But admissions, made after other persons have acquired separate rights in the same subject-matter, cannot be received to disparage their title, however it may affect that of the declarant himself. This most just and equitable doctrine will be found to apply not only to admissions made by bankrupts and insolvents, but to the cases of vendor and vendee, payee and indorsee, grantor

then, rather as acts, than as declarations, the declarations being considered as part of the *res gestæ*. *Wheeler v. Hambricht*, 9 Serg. & R. 396, 397. See *Scott v. Marshall*, 2 Cr. & Jer. 238; *Jacobs v. Humphrey*, 2 Cr. & Mees. 413; 2 Tyrwh. 272, S. C. But wherever a person is bound by the record, he is, for all purposes of evidence, the party in interest, and as such, his admissions are receivable against him, both of the facts it recites, and of the amount of damages, in all cases where, being liable over to the nominal defendant, he has been notified of the suit, and required to defend it. *Clark's Exrs. v. Carrington*, 7 Cranch, 322; *Hamilton v. Cutts*, 4 Mass. 349; *Tyler v. Ulmer*, 12 Mass. 166; *Duffield v. Scott*, 3 T. R. 374; *Kip v. Brigham*, 6 Johns. 158; 7 Johns. 168; *Bender v. Fromberger*, 4 Dall. 436. See also *Carlisle v. Garland*, 7 Bing. 298; *North v. Miles*, 1 Campb. 389; *Bowsher v. Calley*, 1 Campb. 391, note; *Underhill v. Wilson*, 6 Bing. 697; *Bond v. Ward*, 1 Nott & McCord, 201; *Carmack v. The Commonwealth*, 5 Binn. 184; *Sloman v. Herne*, 2 Esp. 695; *Williams v. Bridges*, 2 Stark. R. 42; *Savage v. Balch*, 8 Greenl. 27.

¹ Stark. Evid. 26; *North v. Miles*, 1 Campb. 390.

² *Bateman v. Bailey*, 5 T. R. 513; *Smith v. Simmes*, 1 Esp. 330; *Deady v. Harrison*, 1 Stark. R. 60.

and grantee, and generally, to be the pervading doctrine, in all cases of rights acquired in good faith, previous to the time of making the admissions in question.¹

§ 181. In some cases, the admissions of *third persons, strangers to the suit*, are receivable. This arises, when the issue is substantially upon the mutual rights of such persons at a particular time; in which case the practice is to let in such evidence in general, as would be legally admissible in an action between the parties themselves. Thus, in an action against the sheriff for an escape, the debtor's acknowledgment of the debt, being sufficient to charge him, in the original action, is sufficient, as against the sheriff, to support the averment in the declaration, that the party escaping was so indebted.² So, an admission of joint liability by a third person has been held sufficient evidence, on the part of the defendant, to support a plea in abatement for the nonjoinder of such person as defendant in the suit; it being admissible in an action against him for the same cause.³ And the admissions of a bankrupt, made before the act of bankruptcy, are receivable in proof of the petitioning creditor's debt. His declarations made after the act of bankruptcy, though admissible against himself, form an exception to this rule, because of the intervening rights of creditors, and the danger of fraud.⁴

¹ Bartlett v. Delprat, 4 Mass. 702, 708; Clark v. Waite, 12 Mass. 439; Bridge v. Eggleston, 14 Mass. 245, 250, 251; Phenix v. Ingraham, 5 Johns. 412; Packer v. Gonsalus, 1 Serg. & R. 526; Patton v. Goldsborough, 9 Serg. & R. 47; Babb v. Clemson, 12 Serg. & R. 328.

² Sloman v. Herne, 2 Esp. 695; Williams v. Bridges, 2 Stark. R. 42; Kempland v. Macauley, Peake's Cas. 65.

³ Clay v. Langslow, 1 M. & M. 45. *Sed quare*, and see post, § 395.

⁴ Hoare v. Coryton, 4 Taunt. 560; 2 Rose, 158; Robson v. Kemp, 4 Esp. 234; Watts v. Thorpe, 1 Campb. 376; Smallcombe v. Bruges, McClell. R. 45; 13 Price, 136, S. C.; Taylor v. Kinloch, 1 Stark. R. 175; 2 Stark. R. 594; Jarrett v. Leonard, 2 M. & S. 265. The dictum of Lord Kenyon, in Downton v. Cross, 1 Esp. 168, that the admissions of the bankrupt made after the act of bankruptcy, but before the commission issued, are receivable, is contradicted in 13 Price, 153, 154, and overruled by that and the other cases above cited. See also Bernasconi v. Farebrother, 3 B. & Ad. 372.

§ 182. The admissions of a third person are also receivable in evidence, against the party, who has *expressly referred another to him* for information in regard to an uncertain or disputed matter. In such cases the party is bound by the declarations of the person referred to, in the same manner, and to the same extent, as if they were made by himself. Thus, upon a plea of *plene administravit*, where the executors wrote to the plaintiff, that if she wished for further information in regard to the assets, she should apply to a certain merchant in the city, they were held bound by the replies of the merchant to her inquiries upon that subject.¹ So, in *assumpsit* for goods sold, where the fact of the delivery of them by the carman was disputed, and the defendant said, "If he will say, that he did deliver the goods, I will pay for them;" he was held bound by the affirmative reply of the carman.²

§ 183. This principle extends to the case of an *interpreter*, whose statements of what the party says are treated as identical with those of the party himself; and therefore may be proved by any person who heard them, without calling the interpreter.³

§ 184. Whether the answer of a person, thus referred to, is *conclusive* against the party, does not seem to have been

¹ Williams v. Innes, 1 Campb. 364.

² Daniel v. Pitt, 1 Campb. 366, note; 6 Esp. 74, S. C.; Brock v. Kent, Ib.; Burt v. Palmer, 5 Esp. 145; Hood v. Reeve, 3 C. & P. 532.

³ Fabrigas v. Mostyn, 11 St. Tr. 171. The cases of the reference of a disputed liability, to the opinion of legal counsel; and of a disputed fact regarding a mine, to a miner's jury, have been treated as falling under this head; the decisions being held binding, as the answers of persons referred to. How far the circumstance, that if treated as awards, being in writing, they would have been void for want of a stamp, may have led the learned Judges to consider them in another light, does not appear. Sybray v. White, 1 M. & W. 435. But in this country, where no stamp is required, they would more naturally be regarded as awards upon parol submissions, and therefore conclusive, unless impeached for causes recognised in the law of awards.

settled. Where the plaintiff had offered to rest his claim upon the defendant's affidavit, which was accordingly taken, Lord Kenyon held, that he was conclusively bound, even though the affidavit had been false; and he added, that, to make such a proposition and afterwards to recede from it, was *mala fides*; but that, besides that, it might be turned to very improper purposes, such as to entrap the witness, or to find out how far the party's evidence would go in support of his case.¹ But in a later case, where the question was upon the identity of a horse, in the defendant's possession, with one lost by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff had said, that if the defendant would take his oath that the horse was his, he should keep him, and he made oath accordingly; Lord Tenterden observed, that, considering the loose manner in which the evidence had been given, he would not receive it as conclusive; but that it was a circumstance on which he should not fail to remark to the Jury.² And certainly the opinion of Lord Tenterden, indicated by what fell from him in this case, more perfectly harmonizes with other parts of the law, especially as it is opposed to any farther extension of the doctrine of estoppels, which sometimes precludes the investigation of truth. The purposes of justice and policy are sufficiently answered, by throwing the burden of proof on the opposing party, as in the case of an award, and holding him bound, unless he impeaches the test referred to by clear proof of fraud or mistake.³

§ 185. The *admissions of the wife* will bind the husband, only where she has authority to make them.⁴ This authority

¹ *Stevens v. Thacker*, Peake's Cas. 187; *Lloyd v. Willan*, 1 Esp. 178; *Delesline v. Greenland*, 1 Bay, 458, acc., where the oath of a third person was referred to. See *Reg. v. Moreau*, 36 Leg. Obs. 69, as to the admissibility of an award as an admission of the party. Post, § 537, n. (1).

² *Garnett v. Ball*, 3 Stark. R. 160.

³ *Whitehead v. Tattersall*, 1 Ad. & El. 491.

⁴ *Emerson v. Blonden*, 1 Esp. 142; *Anderson v. Sanderson*, 2 Stark. R. 204; *Carey v. Adkins*, 4 Campb. 92. In *Walton v. Green*, 1 C. & P. 621; which was an action for necessaries furnished to the wife, the defence being

does not result, by mere operation of law, from the relation of husband and wife; but is a question of fact, to be found by the Jury, as in other cases of agency; for though this relation is peculiar in its circumstances, from its close intimacy and its very nature, yet it is not peculiar in its principles. As the wife is seldom expressly constituted the agent of the husband, the cases on this subject are almost universally those of implied authority, turning upon the degree in which the husband permitted the wife to participate, either in the transaction of his affairs in general, or in the particular matter in question. Where he sues for her wages, the fact that she earned them, does not authorize her to bind him by her admissions of payment;¹ nor can her declarations affect him, where he sues with her in her right; for in these, and similar cases, the right is his own, though acquired through her instrumentality.² But in regard to the inference of her agency from circumstances, the question has been left to the Jury with great latitude, both as to the fact of agency, and the time of the admissions. Thus, it has been held competent for them to infer authority in her to accept a notice and direction, in regard to a particular transaction in her husband's trade, from the circumstance of her being seen twice in his counting room, appearing to conduct his business relating to that transaction, and once giving orders to the foreman.³ And an action against

that she was turned out of doors for adultery, the husband was permitted to prove her confessions of the fact, just previous to his turning her away; but this was contemporary with the transaction, of which it formed a part.

¹ *Hall v. Hill*, 2 Str. 1094. An authority to the wife to conduct the ordinary business of the shop in her husband's absence, does not authorize her to bind him by an admission, in regard to the tenancy or the rent of the shop. *Meredith v. Footner*, 11 M. & W. 202.

² *Alban v. Pritchett*, 6 T. R. 680; *Kelley v. Small*, 2 Esp. 716; *Denn v. White*, 7 T. R. 112, as to her admission of a trespass. *Hodgkinson v. Fletcher*, 4 Camp. 70. Neither are his admissions as to facts respecting her property, which happened before the marriage, receivable, after his death, to affect the rights of the surviving wife. *Smith v. Scudder*, 11 Serg. & R. 325.

³ *Plimmer v. Sells*, 3 Nev. & M. 422.

the husband, for goods furnished to the wife while in the country, where she was occasionally visited by him, her letter to the plaintiff, admitting the debt, and apologizing for the nonpayment, though written several years after the transaction, was held by Lord Ellenborough sufficient to take the case out of the statute of limitations.¹

§ 186. The admissions of *Attorneys of record* bind their clients, in all matters relating to the progress and trial of the cause. But to this end they must be distinct and formal, or such as are termed solemn admissions, made for the express purpose of alleviating the stringency of some rule of practice, or of dispensing with the formal proof of some fact at the trial. In such cases they are in general conclusive; and may be given in evidence even upon a new trial.² But other admissions, which are mere matters of conversation with an attorney, though they relate to the facts in controversy, cannot be received in evidence against his client. The reason of the distinction is found in the nature and extent of the authority given; the attorney being constituted for the management of the cause in Court, and for nothing more.³ If the admission is made before suit, it is equally binding, provided it appear that the attorney was already retained to appear in the cause.⁴ But in the absence of any evidence of retainer at that time in the cause, there must be some other proof of authority to make the admission.⁵ Where the attorney is already constituted in the cause, admissions made by his managing clerk or his agent are received as his own.⁶

¹ Gregory v. Parker, 1 Campb. 394; Palethorp v. Furnish, 2 Esp. 511, note. See also Clifford v. Burton, 1 Bing. 199; 8 Moore, 16, S. C.; Petty v. Anderson, 3 Bing. 170; Cotes v. Davis, 1 Campb. 485.

² Doe v. Bird, 7 C. & P. 6; Langley v. Ld. Oxford, 1 M. & W. 508.

³ Young v. Wright, 1 Campb. 139, 141; Parkins v. Hawkshaw, 2 Stark. R. 239; Elton v. Larkins, 1 M. & Ro. 196; Doe v. Bird, 7 C. & P. 6; Doe v. Richards, 2 C. & K. 216; Watson v. King, 3 C. B. 608.

⁴ Marshall v. Cliff, 4 Campb. 133.

⁵ Wagstaff v. Wilson, 4 B. & Ad. 339.

⁶ Taylor v. Willans, 2 B. & Ad. 845, 856; Standage v. Creighton, 5 C.

§ 187. We are next to consider the admissions of a *principal*, as evidence in an action *against the surety*, upon his collateral undertaking. In the cases on this subject the main inquiry has been, whether the declarations of the principal were made during the transaction of the business for which the surety was bound, so as to become part of the *res gestæ*. If so, they have been held admissible; otherwise, not. The surety is considered as bound only for the actual conduct of the party, and not for whatever he might say he had done; and therefore is entitled to proof of his conduct by original evidence, where it can be had; excluding all declarations of the principal, made subsequent to the act, to which they relate, and out of the course of his official duty. Thus, where one guarantied the payment for such goods as the plaintiffs should send to another, in the way of their trade; it was held, that the admissions of the principal debtor, that he had received goods, made after the time of their supposed delivery, were not receivable in evidence against the surety.¹ So, if one becomes surety in a bond, conditioned for the faithful conduct of another as clerk, or collector, it is held, that, in an action on the bond against the surety, confessions of embezzlement, made by the principal after his dismissal, are not admissible in evidence;² though with regard to entries made in the

& P. 406; Taylor v. Forster, 2 C. & P. 195; Griffiths v. Williams, 1 T. R. 710; Truslove v. Burton, 9 Moore, 64. As to the extent of certain admissions, see Holt v. Squire, Ry. & M. 282; Marshall v. Cliff, 4 Campb. 133. The admission of the due execution of a deed does not preclude the party from taking advantage of a variance. Goldie v. Shuttleworth, 1 Campb. 70.

¹ Evans v. Beattie, 5 Esp. 26; Bacon v. Chesney, 1 Stark. R. 192; Longenecker v. Hyde, 6 Binn. 1.

² Smith v. Whittingham, 6 C. & P. 78. See also Goss v. Watlington, 3 B. & B. 132; Cutler v. Newlin, Manning's Digest, N. P. 137, per Holroyd, J. in 1819; Dawes v. Shed, 15 Mass. 6, 9; Foxcroft v. Nevins, 4 Greenl. 72; Hayes v. Seaver, 7 Greenl. 237; Respublica v. Davies, 3 Yeates, 128; Hotchkiss v. Lyon, 2 Blackf. 222; Shelby v. The Governor, &c. Ib. 289; Beall v. Beck, 3 Har. & McHen. 242.

course of his duty, it is otherwise.¹ A judgment, also, rendered against the principal, may be admitted as evidence of that fact, in an action against the surety.² On the other hand, upon the same general ground it has been held, that, where the surety confides to the principal the power of making a contract, he confides to him the power of furnishing evidence of the contract; and that, if the contract is made by parol, subsequent declarations of the principal are admissible in evidence, though not conclusive. Thus, where a husband and wife agreed, by articles, to live separate, and C., as trustee and surety for the wife, covenanted to pay the husband a sum of money, upon his delivering to the wife a carriage and horses for her separate use; it was held, in an action by the husband for the money, that the wife's admissions of the receipt by her of the carriage and horses were admissible.³ So, where A. guaranteed the performance of any contract that B. might make with C., the admissions and declarations of B. were held admissible against A., to prove the contract.⁴

§ 188. But where the surety, being sued for the default of the principal, gives him *notice of the pendency of the suit*, and requests him to defend it; if judgment goes against the surety, the record is conclusive evidence for him, in a subsequent action against the principal for indemnity; for the principal has thus *virtually become party* to it. It would seem, therefore, that in such case the declarations of the principal, as we have heretofore seen, become admissible, even though they operate against the surety.⁵

§ 189. The admissions of one person are also evidence against another, in respect of privity between them. The

¹ *Whitnash v. George*, 8 B. & C. 556; *Middleton v. Melton*, 10 B. & C. 317; *McGahey v. Alston*, 2 M. & W. 213, 214.

² *Drummond v. Prestman*, 12 Wheat. 515.

³ *Fenner v. Lewis*, 10 Johns. 38.

⁴ *Meade v. McDowell*, 5 Binn. 195.

⁵ See Ante, § 180, note (6), and cases there cited.

term, *privity*, denotes mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property; and privies are distributed into several classes, according to the manner of this relationship. Thus, there are privies in estate, as, donor and donee, lessor and lessee, and joint-tenants; privies in blood, as, heir and ancestor, and coparceners; privies in representation, as, executors and testator, administrators and intestate; privies in law, where the law, without privity of blood or estate, casts the land upon another, as, by escheat. All these are more generally classed into privies in estate, privies in blood, and privies in law.¹ The ground, upon which admissions bind those in privity with the party making them, is, that they are identified in interest; and of course the rule extends no farther than this identity. The cases of coparceners and joint-tenants are assimilated to those of joint promissors, partners, and others having a joint interest, which have already been considered.² In other cases, where the party by his admissions has qualified his own right, and another claims to succeed him, as heir, executor, or the like, he succeeds only to the right, as thus qualified, at the time when his title commenced; and the admissions are receivable in evidence against the representative, in the same manner as they would have been against the party represented. Thus, the declarations of the ancestor, that he held the land as the tenant of a third person, are admissible to show the seisin of that person, in an action

¹ Co. Lit. 271 a; *Carver v. Jackson*, 4 Peters, 1, 83; Wood's Inst. LL. Eng. 236; Tomlin's Law Dict. in Verb. *Privies*. Other divisions have been recognised; viz. privity in tenure, between landlord and tenant; privity in contract alone, or the relation between lessor and lessee, or heir and tenant in dower, or by the curtesy, by the covenants of the latter, after he has assigned his term to a stranger; privity in estate alone, between the lessee and the grantee of the reversion; and privity in both estate and contract, as between lessor and lessee, &c.; but these are foreign from our present purpose. See Walker's case, 3 Co. 23; Beverley's case, 4 Co. 123, 124; Ante, § 19, 20, 23, 24.

² Ante, § 174, 180.

brought by him against the heir for the land.¹ Thus, also, where the defendant in a real action relied on a long possession, he has been permitted, in proof of the adverse character of the possession, to give in evidence the declarations of one under whom the plaintiff claimed, that he had sold the land to the person under whom the defendant claimed.² And the declarations of an intestate are admissible against his administrator, or any other claiming in his right.³ The declarations also of the former occupant of a messuage, in respect of which the present occupant claimed a right of common because of vicinage, are admissible evidence in disparagement of the right, they being made during his occupancy; and on the same principle, other contemporaneous declarations of occupiers have been admitted, as evidence of the nature and extent of their title, against those claiming in privity of estate.⁴ Any admission by a landlord in a prior lease, which is relative to the matter in issue, and concerns the estate, has also been held admissible in evidence against a lessee who claims by a subsequent title.⁵

¹ Doe v. Pettett, 5 B. & Ad. 223; 2 Poth. on Obl. by Evans, p. 254; Ante, § 108, 109, and cases there cited.

² Brattle Street Church v. Hubbard, 2 Mete. 363.

³ Smith v. Smith, 3 Bing. N. C. 29; Ivat v. Finch, 1 Taunt. 141.

⁴ Walker v. Broadstock, 1 Esp. 458; Doe v. Austin, 9 Bing. 41; Davies v. Pierce, 2 T. R. 53; Doe v. Rickaby, 5 Esp. 4; Doe v. Jones, 1 Campb. 367. Ancient maps, books of survey, &c., though mere private documents, are frequently admissible on this ground, where there is a privity in estate between the former proprietor, under whose direction they were made, and the present claimant, against whom they are offered. Bull. N. P. 283; Bridgman v. Jennings, 1 Ld. Raym. 734. So, as to receipts for rent, by a former grantor, under whom both parties claimed. Doe v. Seaton, 2 Ad. & Ell. 171.

⁵ Crease v. Barrett, 1 Crompt. Mees. & R. 919, 932. See also Doe v. Cole, 6 C. & P. 339, that a letter written by a former vicar, respecting the property of the vicarage, is evidence against his successor, in an ejectment for the same property, in right of his vicarage. The receipts, also, of a vicar's lessee, it seems, are admissible against the vicar, in proof of a *modus*, by reason of the privity between them. Jones v. Carrington, 1 C. & P. 329, 330, n.; Maddison v. Nuttal, 6 Bing. 226. So, the answer of a former

§ 190. The same principle holds in regard to *admissions made by the assignor* of a personal contract or chattel, previous to the assignment, while he remained the sole proprietor, and where the assignee must recover through the title of the assignor, and succeeds only to that title, as it stood at the time of its transfer. In such case he is bound by the previous admissions of the assignor, in disparagement of his own apparent title. But this is true only where there is an identity of interest between the assignor and assignee; and such identity is deemed to exist not only where the latter is expressly the mere agent and representative of the former, but also where the assignee has acquired a title with actual notice of the true state of that of the assignor, as qualified by the admissions in question, or where he has purchased a demand already stale, or otherwise infected with circumstances of suspicion.¹ Thus, the declarations of a former holder of a promissory note, negotiated before it was over due, showing that it was given without consideration, though made while he held the note, are not admissible against the indorsee; for, as was subsequently observed by Parke, J., "the right of a person, holding by a good title, is not to be cut down by the acknowledgment of a former holder, that he had no title."²

rector. De Whelpdale v. Milburn, 5 Price, 485. An answer in Chancery is also admissible in evidence against any person actually claiming under the party who put it in; and it has been held *prima facie* evidence against persons generally reputed to claim under him, at least so far as to call upon them to show another title from a stranger. Earl of Sussex v. Temple, 1 Ld. Raym. 310; Countess of Dartmouth v. Roberts, 16 East, 334, 339, 340. So of other declarations of the former party in possession, which would have been good against himself, and were made while he was in possession. Jackson v. Bard, 4 Johns. 230, 234; Norton v. Pettibone, 7 Conn. 319; Weidman v. Kohr, 4 Serg. & R. 174; Ante, § 23, 24.

¹ Harrison v. Vallance, 1 Bing. 38; Bayley on Bills, by Phillips and Sewall, p. 502, 503, and notes, (2d Am. Ed.); Giblehouse v. Strong, 3 Rawle, 437; Hatch v. Dennis, 1 Fairf. 244; Snelgrove v. Martin, 2 McCord, 241, 243.

² Barough v. White, 4 B. & C. 325, explained in Woolway v. Rowe, 1 Ad. & El. 114, 116; Shaw v. Broom, 4 D. & R. 730; Smith v. De Wruitz,

But in an action by the indorsee of a bill or note dishonored before it was negotiated, the declarations of the indorser, made while the interest was in him, are admissible in evidence for the defendant.¹

§ 191. These admissions by third persons, as they derive their value and legal force from the relation of the party making them to the property in question, and are taken as parts of the *res gestæ*, may be *proved by any competent witness* who heard them, without calling the party by whom they were made. The question is, whether he made the admission, and not merely, whether the fact is as he admitted it to be. Its truth, where the admission is not conclusive, (and it seldom is so,) may be controverted by other testimony; even by calling the party himself, when competent; but it is not necessary to produce him, his declarations, when admissible at all, being admissible as original evidence and not as hearsay.²

§ 192. We are next to consider the *time and circumstances of the admission*. And here it is to be observed, that confidential overtures of pacification, and any other offers or propositions between litigating parties, expressly stated to be made without prejudice, are excluded on grounds of public

Ry. & M. 212; Beauchamp v. Parry, 1 B. & Ad. 89; Hackett v. Martin, 8 Greenl. 77; Parker v. Grout, 11 Mass. 157, n.; Jones v. Witter, 13 Mass. 304; Dunn v. Snell, 15 Mass. 481; Paige v. Cagwin, 7 Hill, N. Y. R. 361. In Connecticut, it seems to have been held otherwise. Johnson v. Blackman, 11 Conn. 342; Woodruff v. Westcott, 12 Conn. 134. So, in Vermont. Sargeant v. Sargeant, 3 Washb. 371.

¹ Bayley on Bills, 502, 503, and notes, (2d Am. Ed. by Phillips & Sewall); Pocock v. Billings, Ry. & M. 127. See also Story on Bills, § 220; Chitty on Bills, 650, (8th Ed.); Hatch v. Dennis, 1 Fairf. 249; Shirley v. Todd, 9 Greenl. 83.

² Ante, § 101, 113, 114, and cases there cited; Clark v. Hougham, 2 B. & C. 149; Mountstephen v. Brooke, 3 B. & Ald. 141; Woolway v. Rowe, 1 Ad. & El. 114.

policy.¹ For without this protective rule, it would often be difficult to take any step towards an amicable compromise or adjustment. A distinction is taken between the admission of particular facts, and an offer of a sum of money to buy peace. For, as Lord Mansfield observed, it must be permitted to men to buy their peace without prejudice to them, if the offer should not succeed; and such offers are made to stop litigation, without regard to the question whether any thing is due or not. If, therefore, the defendant, being sued for £100, should offer the plaintiff £20, this is not admissible in evidence, for it is irrelevant to the issue; it neither admits nor ascertains any debt; and is no more than saying, he would give £20 to be rid of the action.² But in order to exclude distinct admissions of facts, it must appear, either that they were expressly made without prejudice, or at least, that they were made under the faith of a pending treaty, and into which the party might have been led by the confidence of a compromise taking place. But if the admission be of a collateral or indifferent fact, such as the handwriting of the party, capable of easy proof by other means, and not connected with the merits of the cause, it is receivable, though made under a pending treaty.³ It is the condition, tacit or express, that no advantage shall be taken of the admission, it

¹ Cory v. Bretton, 4 C. & P. 462; Healey v. Thatcher, 8 C. & P. 388. Communications between the clerk of the plaintiff's attorney, and the attorney of the defendant, with a view to a compromise, have been held privileged, under this rule. Jardine v. Sheridan, 2 C. & K. 24.

² Bull. N. P. 236; Gregory v. Howard, 3 Esp. 113, per Ld. Kenyon; Marsh v. Gold, 2 Pick. 290; Gerrish v. Sweetser, 4 Pick. 374, 377; Wayman v. Hilliard, 7 Bing. 101; Cumming v. French, 2 Campb. 106, n.; Glassford on Evid. p. 336.

³ Waldrige v. Kenison, 1 Esp. 143, per Ld. Kenyon. The American Courts have gone farther, and held that evidence of the admission of any independent fact is receivable, though made during a treaty of compromise. See Mount v. Bogert, Anthon's Rep. 190, per Thompson, C. J.; Murray v. Coster, 4 Cowen, 635; Fuller v. Hampton, 5 Conn. 416, 426; Sanborn v. Neilson, 4 New Hamp. R. 501, 508, 509; Delogny v. Rentoul, 1 Martin, 175. Lord Kenyon afterwards relaxed his own rule, saying that in future he should receive evidence of all admissions, such as the party would be obliged

being made with a view to and in furtherance of an amicable adjustment, that operates to exclude it. But if it is an independent admission of a fact, merely because it is a fact, it will be received; and even an offer of a sum, by way of compromise of a claim tacitly admitted, is receivable, unless accompanied with a caution that the offer is confidential.¹

§ 193. In regard to *admissions made under circumstances of constraint*, a distinction is taken between civil and criminal cases; and it has been considered, that, on the trial of civil actions, admissions are receivable in evidence, provided the compulsion under which they are given is legal, and the party was not imposed upon, or under duress. Thus in the trial of *Collett v. Ld. Keith*, for taking the plaintiff's ship, the testimony of the defendant, given as a witness in an action between other parties, in which he admitted the taking of the ship, was allowed to be proved against him; though it appeared, that, in giving his evidence, when he was proceeding to state his reasons for taking the ship, Lord Kenyon had stopped him by saying, it was unnecessary for him to vindicate his conduct.² The rule extends also to answers volun-

to make in answer to a bill in equity; rejecting none but such as are merely concessions for the sake of making peace and getting rid of a suit. *Slack v. Buchanan*, Peake's Cas. 5, 6; Tait on Evid. p. 293. A letter written by the adverse party "without prejudice" is inadmissible. *Healey v. Thatcher*, 8 C. & P. 388.

¹ *Wallace v. Small*, 1 M. & M. 446; *Watts v. Lawson*, Ib. 447, n.; *Dickinson v. Dickinson*, 9 Metc. 471; *Thompson v. Austen*, 2 Dowl. & Ry. 358. In this case Bayley, J. remarked that the essence of an offer to compromise was, that the party making it was willing to submit to a sacrifice, and to make a concession. *Hartford Bridge Co. v. Granger*, 4 Conn. 148; *Gerrish v. Sweetser*, 4 Pick. 374, 377; *Murray v. Coster*, 4 Cowen, 617, 635. Admissions made before an arbitrator are receivable in a subsequent trial of the cause, the reference having proved ineffectual. *Slack v. Buchanan*, Peake's Cas. 5. See also *Gregory v. Howard*, 3 Esp. 113.

² *Collett v. Ld. Keith*, 4 Esp. 212, per Le Blanc, J.; who remarked, that the manner in which the evidence had been obtained might be matter of observation to the Jury; but that, if what was said bore in any way on the issue, he was bound to receive it as evidence of the fact itself. See also *Milward v. Forbes*, 4 Esp. 171.

tarily given to questions improperly asked, and to which the witness might successfully have objected. So, the voluntary answers of a bankrupt before the commissioners, are evidence in a subsequent action against the party himself, though he might have demurred to the questions, or the whole examination was irregular;¹ unless it was obtained by imposition or duress.²

§ 194. There is no difference, in regard to the admissibility of this sort of evidence, between *direct admissions*, and those which are *incidental*, or made in some other connexion, or involved in the admission of some other fact. Thus, where in an action against the acceptor of a bill, his attorney gave notice to the plaintiff to produce at the trial all papers, &c., which had been received by him relating to a certain bill of exchange, (describing it,) which "was accepted by the said defendant;" this was held *prima facie* evidence, by admission, that he accepted the bill.³ So, in an action by the assignees of a bankrupt, against an auctioneer, to recover the proceeds of sales of the bankrupt's goods, the defendant's advertisement of the sale, in which he described the goods as "the property of D., a bankrupt," was held a conclusive admission of the fact of bankruptcy, and that the defendant

¹ *Stockfleth v. De Tastet*, 4 Campb. 10; *Smith v. Beadnell*, 1 Campb. 30. If the commission has been perverted to improper purposes, the remedy is by an application to have the examination taken from the files and cancelled. 4 Campb. 11, per Ld. Ellenborough; *Milward v. Forbes*, 4 Esp. 171; 2 Stark. Ev. 22.

² *Robson v. Alexander*, 1 Moore & P. 448; *Tucker v. Barrow*, 7 B. & C. 623. But a legal necessity to answer the questions, under peril of punishment for contempt, it seems, is a valid objection to the admission of the answers in evidence, in a criminal prosecution. *Rex v. Britton*, 1 M. & Rob. 297. The case of *Rex v. Mercer*, 2 Stark. R. 366, which seems to the contrary, is questioned and explained by Lord Tenterden, in *Rex v. Gilham*, 1 Mood. Cr. Cas. 203. See post, § 225, 451; *Regina v. Garbett*, 1 Denis, C. C. 236.

³ *Holt v. Squire*, Ry. & M. 282.

was acting under his assignees.¹ So also, an undertaking by an attorney, "to appear for T. and R., joint owners of the sloop Arundel," was held sufficient *prima facie* evidence of ownership.²

§ 195. Other admissions are implied from assumed character, language, and conduct, which, though heretofore adverted to,³ may deserve further consideration in this place. Where the existence of any domestic, social or official relation is in issue, it is quite clear that any recognition, in fact, of that relation, is *prima facie* evidence, against the person making such recognition, that the relation exists.⁴ This general rule is more frequently applied against a person who has thus recognised the character or office of another; but it is conceived to embrace, in its principle, any representations or language in regard to himself. Thus, where one has assumed to act in an official character, this is an admission of his appointment or title to the office, so far as to render him liable, even criminally, for misconduct or neglect in such office.⁵ So, where one has recognised the official character of another, by treating with him in such character, or otherwise, this is at least *prima facie* evidence of his title against the party thus

¹ Maltby v. Christie, 1 Esp. 342, as expounded by Lord Ellenborough in Rankin v. Horner, 16 East, 193.

² Marshall v. Cliff, 4 Campb. 133, per Ld. Ellenborough.

³ Ante, § 27.

⁴ Dickinson v. Coward, 1 B. & A. 677, 679, per Ld. Ellenborough; Radford, q. t. v. McIntosh, 3 T. R. 632.

⁵ Bevan v. Williams, 3 T. R. 635, per Ld. Mansfield in an action against a clergyman for non-residence; Rex v. Gardner, 2 Campb. 513, against a military officer, for returning false musters; Rex v. Kerne, 2 St. Tr. 957, 960; Rex v. Brommick, Ib. 961, 962; Rex v. Atkins, Ib. 964, which were indictments for high treason, being popish priests, and remaining forty days within the kingdom; Rex v. Borrett, 6 C. & P. 124, an indictment against a letter-carrier for embezzlement; Trowbridge v. Baker, 1 Cowen, 251, against a toll-gatherer, for penalties; Lister v. Priestley, Wightw. 67, against a collector, for penalties. See also Cross v. Kaye, 6 T. R. 663; Lipscombe v. Holmes, 2 Campb. 441; Radford v. McIntosh, 3 T. R. 632.

recognising it.¹ So, the allegations in the declaration or pleadings in a suit at law, have been held receivable in evidence against the party, in a subsequent suit between him and a stranger, as his solemn admission of the truth of the facts recited, or, of his understanding of the meaning of an instrument; though the judgment could not be made available as an estoppel, unless between the same parties, or others in privity with them.²

§ 196. Admissions implied from the conduct of the party are governed by the same principles. Thus, the suppression of documents is an admission that their contents are deemed unfavorable to the party suppressing them.³ The entry of a charge to a particular person, in a tradesman's book, or the

¹ Peacock v. Harris, 10 East, 104, by a renter of turnpike tolls, for arrearages of tolls due; Radford v. McIntosh, 3 T. R. 632, by a farmer general of the post-horse duties, against a letter of horses, for certain statute-penalties; Pritchard v. Walker, 3 C. & P. 212, by the clerk of the trustees of a turnpike road, against one of the trustees; Dickinson v. Coward, 1 B. & A. 677, by the assignee of a bankrupt, against a debtor, who had made the assignee a partial payment. In Berryman v. Wise, 4 T. R. 366, which was an action by an attorney for slander, in charging him with swindling, and threatening to have him struck off the roll of attorneys, the Court held that this threat imported an admission that the plaintiff was an attorney. Cummin v. Smith, 2 Serg. & R. 440. But see Smith v. Taylor, 1 New R. 196, in which the learned Judges were equally divided upon a point somewhat similar, in the case of a physician; but in the former case the roll of attorneys was expressly mentioned, while in the latter the plaintiff was merely spoken of as "Doctor S.," and the defendant had been employed as his apothecary. If, however, the slander relates to the want of qualification, it was held by Mansfield, C. J., that the plaintiff must prove it; but not where it was confined to mere misconduct. 1 New R. 207. See to this point Moises v. Thornton, 8 T. R. 303; Wilson v. Carnegie, 1 Ad. & El. 695, 703, per Ld. Denman, C. J. See further, Divoll v. Leadbetter, 4 Pick. 220; Crofton v. Poole, 1 B. & Ad. 568; Rex v. Barnes, 1 Stark. R. 243; Phil. & Am. on Evid. 369, 370, 371; 1 Phil. Evid. 351, 352.

² Tiley v. Cowling, 1 Ld. Raym. 744; Bull. N. P. 243, S. C. See Ante, § 171, 194; Post, § 205, 210, 527 a, 555; Robison v. Swett, 3 Greenl. 316; Wells v. Compton, 3 Rob. Louis. R. 171.

³ James v. Biou, 2 Sim. & St. 600, 606; Owen v. Flack, Ib. 606.

making out of a bill of parcels in his name, is an admission that they were furnished on his credit.¹ The omission of a claim by an insolvent, in a schedule of the debts due to him, is an admission that it is not due.² Payment of money is an admission against the payer, that the receiver is the proper person to receive it; but not against the receiver, that the payer was the person who was bound to pay it; for the party receiving payment of a just demand may well assume, without inquiry, that the person tendering the money was the person legally bound to pay it.³ Acting as a bankrupt, under a commission of bankruptcy, is an admission that it was duly issued.⁴ Asking time for the payment of a note or bill is an admission of the holder's title, and of the signature of the party requesting the favor; and the indorsement or acceptance of a note or bill is an admission of the truth of all the facts which are recited in it.⁵

§ 197. Admissions may also be implied from the *acquiescence* of the party. But acquiescence, to have the effect of an admission, must exhibit some act of the mind, and amount to voluntary demeanor or conduct of the party.⁶ And whether it is acquiescence in the conduct or in the language of others, it must plainly appear that such conduct was fully known, or the language fully understood by the party, before any inference can be drawn from his passiveness or silence. The circumstances, too, must be not only such as afforded him an

¹ *Storr et al. v. Scott*, 6 C. & P. 241; *Thompson v. Davenport*, 9 B. & C. 78, 86, 90, 91.

² *Nicholls v. Downes*, 1 M. & Rob. 13; *Hart v. Newman*, 3 Campb. 13. See also *Tilghman v. Fisher*, 9 Watts, 441.

³ *James v. Biou*, 2 Sim. & St. 600, 606; *Chapman v. Beard*, 3 Anstr. 942.

⁴ *Like v. Howe*, 6 Esp. 20; *Clarke v. Clarke*, Ib. 61.

⁵ *Helmley v. Loader*, 2 Campb. 450; *Critchlow v. Parry*, Ib. 182; *Wilkinson v. Ludwidge*, 1 Stra. 648; *Robinson v. Yarrow*, 7 Taunt. 455; *Taylor v. Croker*, 4 Esp. 187; *Bass v. Clive*, 4 M. & S. 13. See further, *Bayley on Bills*, by Phillips & Sewall, p. 496-506; *Phil. & Am. on Evid.* 383, n. (2); 1 *Phil. Evid.* 364, n. (1), and cases there cited.

⁶ *Allen v. McKeen*, 1 Sumn. 314.

opportunity to act or to speak, but such also as would properly and naturally call for some action or reply, from men similarly situated.¹ Thus, where a landlord quietly suffers a tenant to expend money in making alterations and improvements on the premises, it is evidence of his consent to the alterations.² If the tenant personally receives notice to quit at a particular day, without objection, it is an admission that his tenancy expires on that day.³ Thus, also, among merchants, it is regarded as the allowance of an account rendered, if it is not objected to, without unnecessary delay.⁴ A trader being in-

¹ To affect a party with the statements of others, on the ground of his implied admission of their truth by silent acquiescence, it is not enough that they were made in his presence; for if they were given in evidence, in a judicial proceeding, he is not at liberty to interpose, when and how he pleases, though a party; and therefore is not concluded. *Melen v. Andrews*, 1 M. & M. 336. See also *Allen v. McKeen*, 1 Sumn. 217, 313, 314; *Jones v. Morrell*, 1 Car. & Kir. 266; *Peele v. Merch. Ins. Co.* 3 Mason, R. 81; *Hudson v. Harrison*, 3 B. & B. 97; *Post*, § 201, 215, 287. If letters are offered against a party, it seems he may read his immediate replies. *Roe v. Day*, 7 C. & P. 705. So, it seems, he may prove a previous conversation with the party, to show the motive and intention in writing them. *Reay v. Richardson*, 2 C. M. & R. 422.

² *Doe v. Allen*, 3 Taunt. 78, 80; *Doe v. Pye*, 1 Esp. 366; *Neale v. Parkin*, 1 Esp. 229. See also *Stanley v. White*, 14 East, 332.

³ *Doe v. Biggs*, 2 Taunt. 109; *Thomas v. Thomas*, 2 Campb. 647; *Doe v. Foster*, 13 East, 405; *Oakapple v. Copous*, 4 T. R. 361; *Doe v. Woombwell*, 2 Campb. 559.

⁴ *Sherman v. Sherman*, 2 Vern. 276. *Hutchins, Ld. Com.*, mentioned "a second or third post," as the ultimate period of objection. But *Ld. Hardwicke* said, that if the person to whom it was sent kept the account "for any length of time, without making any objection," it became a stated account. *Willis v. Jernegan*, 2 Atk. 252. See also *Freeland v. Heron*, 7 Cranch, 147, 151; *Murray v. Toland*, 3 Johns. Ch. 575; *Tickel v. Short*, 2 Ves. sen. 239. Daily entries in a book, constantly open to the party's inspection, are admissions against him of the matters therein stated. *Alderson v. Clay*, 1 Stark. R. 405; *Wiltzie v. Adamson*, 1 Phil. Evid. 357. See further, *Coe v. Hutton*, 1 Serg. & R. 398; *McBride v. Watts*, 1 McCord, 384; *Corps v. Robinson*, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 388. So, the members of a company are chargeable with knowledge of the entries in their books, made by their agent in the course of his business, and with their true meaning, as understood by the agent. *Allen v. Coit*, 6 Hill, N. Y. R. 318.

quired for and hearing himself denied, may thereby commit an act of bankruptcy.¹ And, generally, where one knowingly avails himself of another's acts, done for his benefit, this will be held an admission of his obligation to pay a reasonable compensation.²

§ 198. The possession of documents, also, or the fact of constant access to them, sometimes affords ground for affecting parties with an implied admission of the statements contained in them. Thus, the rules of a club, contained in a book kept by the proper officer, and accessible to the members;³ charges against a club, entered by the servants of the house, in a book kept for that purpose open in the club-room;⁴ the possession of letters,⁵ and the like; are circumstances from which admissions by acquiescence may be inferred. Upon the same ground, the shipping list at Lloyd's, stating the time of a vessel's sailing, is held to be *prima facie* evidence against an underwriter, as to what it contains.⁶

§ 199. But in regard to admissions inferred from acquiescence in the verbal statements of others, the maxim, *Qui tacet, consentire videtur*, is to be applied with careful discrim-

¹ *Key v. Shaw*, 8 Bing. 320.

² *Morris v. Burdett*, 1 Campb. 218, where a candidate made use of the hustings erected for an election; *Abbot v. Inhabitants of Hermon*, 7 Greenl. 118, where a school house was used by the school district; *Hayden v. Inhabitants of Madison*, Ib. 76, a case of partial payment for making a road.

³ *Raggett v. Musgrave*, 2 C. & P. 556.

⁴ *Alderson v. Clay*, 1 Stark. R. 405; *Wiltzie v. Adamson*, 1 Phil. Evid. 357.

⁵ *Hewitt v. Piggott*, 5 C. & P. 75; *Rex v. Watson*, 2 Stark. R. 140; *Horne Tooke's case*, 25 St. Tr. 120. But the possession of unanswered letters seems not to be, of itself, evidence of acquiescence in their contents; and therefore a notice to produce such letters will not entitle the adverse party to give evidence of their entire contents, but only of so much as on other grounds would be admissible. *Fairlee v. Denton*, 3 C. & P. 103. And a letter found on the prisoner was held to be no evidence against him of the facts stated in it; in *Rex v. Plumer*, Rus. & Ry. C. C. 264.

⁶ *Mackintosh v. Marshall*, 11 M. & W. 116.

ination. "Nothing," it is said, "can be more dangerous, than this kind of evidence. It should always be received with caution; and never ought to be received at all, unless the evidence is of direct declarations of that kind, which naturally calls for contradiction; some assertion made to the party with respect to his right, which by his silence he acquiesces in."¹ A distinction has accordingly been taken between declarations made by a party interested, and a stranger; and it has been held, that, while what one party declares to the other without contradiction, is admissible evidence, what is said by a third person may not be so. It may be impertinent, and best rebuked by silence; but if it receives a reply, the reply is evidence. Therefore, what the magistrate, before whom an assault and battery was investigated, said to the parties, was held inadmissible, in a subsequent civil action for the same assault.² If the declarations are those of third persons, the circumstances must be such as called on the party to interfere, or at least such as would not render it impertinent in him to do so. Therefore, where, in a real action, upon a view of the premises by a Jury, one of the chain-bearers was the owner of a neighboring close, respecting the bounds of which the litigating parties had much altercation, their declarations in his presence were held not to be admissible against him, in a subsequent action respecting his own close.³ But the silence of the party, even where the declarations are

¹ 14 Serg. & R. 393, per Duncan, C. J.; 2 C. & P. 193, per Best, C. J.

² *Child v. Grace*, 2 C. & P. 193.

³ *Moore v. Smith*, 14 Serg. & R. 388. Where A. and B. were charged with a joint felony, what A. stated before the examining magistrate, respecting B.'s participation in the crime, is not admissible evidence against B. *Rex v. Appleby*, 3 Stark. R. 33. Nor is a deposition, given in the person's presence, in a cause to which he was not a party, admissible against him. *Melen v. Andrews*, 1 M. & M. 336. See also *Fairlie v. Denton*, 3 C. & P. 103, per Lord Tenterden; *Tait on Evidence*, p. 293. So, in the Roman law, "*Confessio facta, seu presumpta ex taciturnitate, in aliquo judicio, non nocebit in alio.*" *Mascardus, De Probat. Vol. 1, Concl. 348, n. 31.*

addressed to himself, is worth very little as evidence, where he has no means of knowing the truth or falsehood of the statement.¹

§ 200. With respect to all *verbal admissions*, it may be observed, that they ought to be *received with great caution*. The evidence, consisting as it does in the mere repetition of oral statements, is subject to much imperfection and mistake; the party himself either being misinformed, or not having clearly expressed his own meaning, or the witness having misunderstood him. It frequently happens, also, that the witness, by unintentionally altering a few of the expressions really used, gives an effect to the statement completely at variance with what the party actually did say.² But where the admission is deliberately made, and precisely identified, the evidence it affords is often of the most satisfactory nature.³

¹ *Hayslep v. Gymer*, 1 Ad. & El. 162, 165, per Parke, J. See further on the subject of tacit admissions, *The State v. Rawls*, 2 Nott & McCord, 301; *Batturs v. Sellers*, 5 Har. & J. 117, 119.

² *Earle v. Picken*, 5 C. & P. 542, note, per Parke, J.; *Rex v. Simons*, 6 C. & P. 510, per Alderson, B.; *Williams v. Williams*, 1 Hagg. Consist. R. 304, per Sir Wm. Scott. Alciatus expresses the sense of the civilians, to the same effect, where, after speaking of the weight of judicial admission, "propter majorem certitudinem, quam in se habet," he adds — "Quæ ratio non habet locum, quando ista confessio probaretur per testes; imo est minus certa ceteris probationibus," &c. Alciat de Præsump. Pars Secund. Col. 682, n. 6. See Ante, § 96, 97; 2 Poth. on Obl. by Evans, App. No. 16, § 13; *Malin v. Malin*, 1 Wend. 625, 652; *Lench v. Lench*, 10 Ves. 517, 518, cited with approbation, in 6 Johns. Ch. 412, and in *Smith v. Burnham*, 3 Sumn. 438; *Stone v. Ramsey*, 4 Monroe, 236, 239; *Myers v. Baker*, Hardin, 544, 549; *Perry v. Gerbeau*, 5 Martin, N. S. 18, 19; *Law v. Merrills*, 6 Wend. 268, 277. It is also well settled, that verbal admissions, hastily and inadvertently made without investigation, are not binding. *Salem Bank v. Gloucester Bank*, 17 Mass. 27; *Barber v. Gingell*, 3 Esp. 60. See also *Smith v. Burnham*, 3 Sumn. 435, 438, 439; *Cleaveland v. Burton*, 11 Vermont R. 138.

³ *Rigg v. Curgenvan*, 2 Wils. 395, 399; *Glassford on Evid.* 326; *Commonwealth v. Knapp*, 9 Pick. 507, 508, per Putnam, J.

§ 201. We are next to consider the effect of admissions, when proved. And here it is first to be observed, that the *whole admission is to be taken together*; for though some part of it may contain matter favorable to the party, and the object is only to ascertain that which he has conceded against himself, for it is to this only that the reason for admitting his own declarations applies, namely, the great probability that they are true; yet unless the whole is received and considered, the true meaning and import of the part, which is good evidence against him, cannot be ascertained. But though the whole of what he said at the same time, and relating to the same subject, must be given in evidence, yet it does not follow that all the parts of the statement are to be regarded as equally worthy of credit; but it is for the Jury to consider, under all the circumstances, how much of the whole statement they deem worthy of belief, including as well the facts asserted by the party in his own favor, as those making against him.¹

§ 202. Where the admission, whether oral or in writing, contains matters *stated as mere hearsay*, it has been made a question, whether such matters of hearsay are to be received

¹ *Smith v. Blandy*, Ry. & M. 257, per Best, J.; *Cray v. Halls*, ib. cit. per Abbott, C. J.; *Bermon v. Woodbridge*, 2 Doug. 788; *Rex v. Clewes*, 4 C. & P. 221, per Littledale, J. See Ante, § 152. A similar rule prevails in Chancery; *Gresley on Evid.* 13. See also *The Queen's case*. 2 Brod. & Bing. 298, per Abbott, C. J.; *Randle v. Blackburn*, 5 Taunt. 245; *Thompson v. Austen*, 2 D. & R. 358; *Fletcher v. Froggatt*, 3 C. & P. 569; *Yates v. Carnsew*, 3 C. & P. 99, per Lord Tenterden; *Cooper v. Smith*, 15 East, 103, 107; *Whitwell v. Wyer*, 11 Mass. 6, 10; *Garey v. Nicholson*, 24 Wend. 350; *Kelsey v. Bush*, 2 Hill, R. 440; Post, § 218, and cases there cited. Where letters in correspondence between the plaintiff and defendant were offered in evidence by the former, it was held that the latter might read his answer to the plaintiff's last letter, dated the day previous. *Roe v. Day*, 7 C. & P. 705. And where one party produces the letter of another, purporting to be in reply to a previous letter from himself, he is bound to call for and put in the letter to which it was an answer, as part of his own evidence. *Walson v. Moore*, 1 C. & Kir. 626.

in evidence. Mr. Justice Chambre, in the case of an answer in Chancery, read against the party in a subsequent suit at law, thought that portion of it not admissible; "for," he added, "it appears to me, that where one party reads a part of the answer of the other party in evidence, he makes the whole admissible only so far as to waive any objection to the competency of the testimony of the party making the answer, and that he does not thereby admit as evidence all the facts, which may happen to have been stated by way of hearsay only, in the course of the answer to a bill filed for a discovery."¹ But where the answer is offered as the admission of the party against whom it is read, it seems reasonable that the whole admission should be read to the Jury, for the purpose of showing under what impressions that admission was made, though some parts of it be only stated upon hearsay and belief. And what may or may not be read, as the context of the admission, depends not upon the grammatical structure, but upon the sense and connexion in fact. But whether the party, against whom the answer is read, is entitled to have such parts of it as are not expressly sworn to left to the Jury as evidence, however slight, of any fact, does not yet appear to have been expressly decided.²

§ 203. It is further to be observed, on this head, that the *parol admission* of a party, made *in pais*, is *competent evidence* only of those facts which may lawfully be established by parol evidence; it cannot be received either to contradict documentary proof, or to supply the place of existing evidence by matter of record. Thus, a written receipt of money from one as the agent of a corporation, or even an express admission of indebtedness to the corporation itself, is not competent proof of the legal authority and capacity of the corporation to act as such.³ Nor is a parol admission of having been discharged

¹ *Roe v. Ferras*, 2 Bos. & Pul. 548.

² 2 Bos. & Pul. 548, note; *Gresley on Evid.* p. 13.

³ *Welland Canal Co. v. Hathaway*, 8 Wend. 480; *National Bank of St. Charles v. De Bernales*, 1 C. & P. 569; *Jenner v. Jolliffe*, 6 Johns. 9.

under an insolvent act sufficient proof of that fact, without the production of the record.¹ The reasons on which this rule is founded having been already stated, it is unnecessary to consider them farther in this place.² The rule, however, does not go to the utter exclusion of parol admissions of this nature, but only to their effect; for in general, as was observed by Mr. Justice Parke,³ what a party says, is evidence against himself, whether it relate to the contents of a written instrument, or any thing else. Therefore, in replevin of goods distrained, the admissions of the plaintiff have been received, to show the terms upon which he held the premises, though he held under an agreement in writing, which was not produced.⁴ Nor does the rule affect the admissibility of such evidence as secondary proof, after showing the loss of the instrument in question.

§ 204. With regard, then, to the *conclusiveness* of admissions, it is first to be considered, that the genius and policy of the law favor the investigation of truth by all expedient and convenient methods; and that the doctrine of estoppels, by which farther investigation is precluded, being an exception to the general rule, founded on convenience, and for the prevention of fraud, is not to be extended beyond the reasons on which it is founded.⁵ It is also to be observed, that estoppels bind only parties and privies, and not strangers. Hence it follows, that though a stranger may often show matters in evidence, which parties or privies might have specially pleaded by way of estoppel, yet, in his case, it is only matter of evidence, to be considered by the Jury.⁶ It

¹ *Scott v. Clare*, 3 Campb. 236; *Summersett v. Adamson*, 1 Bing. 73, per Park, J.

² See Ante, § 96, 97.

³ In *Earle v. Picken*, 5 C. & P. 542; *Newhall v. Holt*, Ib. 662; *Slat-terie v. Pooley*, 6 M. & W. 664.

⁴ *Howard v. Smith*, 3 Scott, N. R. 574.

⁵ See Ante, § 22-26.

⁶ This subject was very clearly illustrated by Mr. Justice Bayley, in delivering the judgment of the Court, in *Heane v. Rogers*, 9 B. & C. 577,

is, however, in such cases, material to consider, whether the admission is made independently, and because it is true, or is merely conventional, entered into between the parties from other causes than a conviction of its truth, and only as a convenient assumption, for the particular purpose in hand. For

586. It was an action of trover, brought by a person, against whom a commission of bankruptcy had issued, against his assignees, to recover the value of goods which, as assignees, they had sold; and it appeared that he had assisted the assignees, by giving directions as to the sale of the goods; and that, after the issuing of the commission, he gave notice to the lessors of a farm which he held, that he had become bankrupt, and was willing to give up the lease, which the lessors thereupon accepted, and took possession of the premises. And the question was, whether he was precluded, by this surrender, from disputing the commission, in the present suit. On this point the language of the learned Judge was as follows. "There is no doubt but that the express admissions of a party to the suit, or admissions implied from his conduct, are evidence, and strong evidence, against him; but we think that he is at liberty to prove that such admissions were mistaken or were untrue, and is not estopped or concluded by them, unless another person has been induced by them to alter his condition; in such a case, the party is estopped from disputing their truth with respect to that person (and those claiming under him), and that transaction; but as to third persons he is not bound. It is a well established rule of law, that estoppels bind parties and privies, not strangers. (Co. Lit. 352 a.; Com. Dig. Estoppel (C). The offer of surrender made in this case was to a stranger to this suit; and though the bankrupt may have been bound by his representation that he was a bankrupt, and his acting as such, as between him and that stranger, to whom that representation was made, and who acted upon it, he is not bound as between him and the defendant, who did not act on the faith of that representation at all. The bankrupt would probably not have been permitted, as against his landlords, — whom he had induced to accept the lease, without a formal surrender in writing, and to take possession, upon the supposition that he was a bankrupt, and entitled under 6 G. 4, c. 16, s. 75, to give it up, — to say afterwards that he was not a bankrupt, and bring an action of trover for the lease, or an ejectment for the estate. To that extent he would have been bound, probably no further, and certainly not as to any other persons than those landlords. This appears to us to be the rule of law, and we are of opinion that the bankrupt was not by law, by his notice and offer to surrender, estopped; and indeed it would be a great hardship if he were precluded by such an act. It is admitted that his surrender to his commissioners is no estoppel, because it would be very perilous

in the latter case, it may be doubtful whether a stranger can give it in evidence at all.¹ Verbal admissions, as such, do not seem capable, in general, of being pleaded as estoppels even between parties or privies; but if, being unexplained or avoided in evidence, the Jury should wholly disregard them, the remedy would be by setting aside the verdict. And when they are held conclusive, they are rendered effectually so by not permitting the party to give any evidence against them. Parol or verbal admissions, which have been held conclusive against the party, seem for the most part to be those on the faith of which a Court of Justice has been led to adopt a particular course of proceeding, or on which another person

to a bankrupt to dispute it, and try its validity by refusing to do so. (See *Flower v. Herbert*, 2 Ves. 326.) A similar observation, though not to the same extent, applies to this act; for whilst his commission disables him from carrying on his business, and deprives him, for the present, of the means of occupying his farm with advantage, it would be a great loss to the bankrupt to continue to do so; paying a rent and remaining liable to the covenants of the lease, and deriving no adequate benefit; and it cannot be expected that he should incur such a loss, in order to be enabled to dispute his commission with effect. It is reasonable that he should do the best for himself, in the unfortunate situation in which he is placed. It is not necessary to refer particularly to the cases in which a bankrupt has been precluded from disputing his commission, and which were cited in argument. The earlier cases fall within the principle above laid down. In *Clarke v. Clarke*, 6 Esp. 61, the bankrupt was not permitted to call that sale a conversion, which he himself had procured and sanctioned; in *Like v. Howe*, 6 Esp. 20, he was precluded from contesting the title of persons to be assignees, whom he, by his conduct had procured to become so; and the last case on this subject, *Watson v. Wace*, 5 B. & C. 153, is distinguishable from the present, because Wace, one of the defendants, was the person from whose suit the plaintiff had been discharged, and therefore, perhaps he might be estopped with respect to that person by his conduct towards him." See also *Welland Canal Co. v. Hathaway*, 8 Wend. 483; *Jennings v. Whittaker*, 4 Monroe, 50; *Grant v. Jackson*, Peake's Cas. 203; *Ashmore v. Hardy*, 7 C. & P. 501.

¹ Phil. & Am. on Evid. 388; 1 Phil. Evid. 368. In *Slaney v. Wade*, 1 Mylne & Craig, 388, and *Fort v. Clark*, 1 Russ. 601, 604, the recitals in certain deeds were held inadmissible, in favor of strangers, as evidence of pedigree. But it is to be noted that the parties to those deeds were strangers to the persons whose pedigree they undertook to recite.

has been induced to alter his condition.¹ To these may be added a few cases of fraud and crime, and some admissions on oath, which will be considered hereafter, where the party is estopped on other grounds.

§ 205. *Judicial admissions*, or those made in Court by the party's attorney, generally appear either of record, as in *pleading*, or in the solemn admission of the attorney made for the purpose of being used as a *substitute for the regular legal evidence* of the fact at the trial, or in a *case stated* for the opinion of the Court. Both these have been already considered in the preceding pages.² There is still another class of judicial admissions, made by the *payment of money into Court*, upon a rule granted for that purpose. Here, it is obvious, the defendant conclusively admits that he owes the amount thus tendered in payment;³ that it is due for the cause mentioned in the declaration;⁴ that the plaintiff is entitled to claim it in the character in which he sues;⁵ that the Court has jurisdiction of the matter;⁶ that the contract described is rightly set forth, and was duly executed;⁷ that it

¹ Phil. & Am. on Evid. 378; 1 Phil. Evid. 360. The general doctrine of estoppels is thus stated by Ld. Denman. "Where one, by his words or conduct, wilfully causes another to believe the existence of a certain state of things, and induces him to act on that belief, so as to alter his own previous position, the former is concluded from averring against the latter a different state of things as existing at the same time." *Pickard v. Sears*, 6 Ad. & El. 469, 475. The whole doctrine is ably discussed by Mr. Smith and by Messrs. Hare and Wallace in their notes to the case of *Trevivan v. Lawrence*. See 2 Smith's Leading Cases, p. 430-479, (Am. ed.)

² See Ante, § 22-26, 186.

³ *Blackburn v. Scholes*, 2 Campb. 341; *Rucker v. Palsgrave*, 1 Campb. 558; 1 Taunt. 419, S. C.; *Boyden v. Moore*, 5 Mass. 365, 369.

⁴ *Seaton v. Benedict*, 5 Bing. 28, 32; *Bennett v. Francis*, 2 B. & P. 550; *Jones v. Hoar*, 5 Pick. 285; *Huntington v. The American Bank*, 6 Pick. 340.

⁵ *Lipscombe v. Holmes*, 2 Campb. 441.

⁶ *Miller v. Williams*, 5 Esp. 19, 21.

⁷ *Gutteridge v. Smith*, 2 H. Bl. 374; *Israel v. Benjamin*, 3 Campb. 40; *Middleton v. Brewer*, Peake's Cas. 15; *Randall v. Lynch*, 2 Campb. 352, 357; *Cox v. Brain*, 3 Taunt. 95.

has been broken, in the manner and to the extent declared;¹ and, if it was a case of goods sold by sample, that they agreed with the sample.² In other words, the payment of money into Court admits conclusively every fact which the plaintiff would be obliged to prove in order to recover that money.³ But it admits nothing beyond that. If therefore the contract is illegal, or invalid, the payment of money into Court gives it no validity; and if the payment is general, and there are several counts, or contracts, some of which are legal and others not, the Court will apply it to the former.⁴ So, if there are two inconsistent counts, on the latter of which the money is paid into Court, which is taken out by the plaintiff, the defendant is not entitled to show this to the Jury, in order to negative any allegation in the first count.⁵ The service of a summons to show cause why the party should not be permitted to pay a certain sum into Court, and *à fortiori*, the entry of a rule or order for that purpose, is also an admission that so much is due.⁶

§ 206. It is only necessary here to add, that where judicial admissions have been *made improvidently, and by mistake*, the Court will, in its discretion, relieve the party from the consequences of his error, by ordering a repleader, or by discharging the case stated, or the rule, or agreement, if made in Court.⁷ Agreements made out of Court, between attorneys,

¹ *Dyer v. Ashton*, 1 B. & C. 3.

² *Leggatt v. Cooper*, 2 Stark. R. 103.

³ *Dyer v. Ashton*, 1 B. & C. 3; *Stapleton v. Nowell*, 6 M. & W. 9; *Archer v. English*, 2 Scott, N. S. 156; *Archer v. Walker*, 9 Dowl. 21.

⁴ *Ribbans v. Crickett*, 1 B. & P. 264; *Hitchcock v. Tyson*, 2 Esp. 481, note.

⁵ *Gould v. Oliver*, 2 M. & Gr. 208, 233, 234; *Montgomery v. Richardson*, 5 C. & P. 247.

⁶ *Williamson v. Henley*, 6 Bing. 299.

⁷ "Non fatetur, qui errat, nisi jus ignoravit." Dig. lib. 42, tit. 2, l. 2. "Si vero per errorem fuerit facta ipsa confessio, (scil. ab advocatione,) clienti concessum est, errore probato, usque ad sententiam revocare." Mascard. De Probat. Vol. 1, Quæst. 7, n. 63; Ib. n. 19, 20, 21, 22; Id. Vol. 1, Concl. 348, per tot. See *Kohn v. Marsh*, 3 Rob. Louis. R. 48.

concerning the course of proceedings in Court, are equally under its control, in effect, by means of its coercive power over the attorney in all matters relating to professional character and conduct. But, in all these admissions, unless a clear case of mistake is made out, entitling the party to relief, he is held to the admission; which the Court will proceed to act upon, not as truth in the abstract, but as a *formula* for the solution of the particular problem before it, namely, the case in judgment, without injury to the general administration of justice.¹

§ 207. Admissions which have been *acted upon by others* are conclusive against the party making them, in all cases between him and the person whose conduct he has thus influenced.² It is of no importance whether they were made in express language to the person himself, or implied from the open and general conduct of the party. For, in the latter case, the implied declaration may be considered as addressed to every one in particular, who may have occasion to act upon it. In such cases the party is estopped, on grounds of public policy and good faith, from repudiating his own representations.³ This rule is familiarly illustrated by the case of a man cohabiting with a woman, and treating her in the face of the world as his wife, to whom in fact he is not married. Here, though he thereby acquires no rights against others, yet they may against him; and therefore, if she is supplied with goods during such cohabitation, and the reputed husband is

¹ See Gresley on Evid. in Equity, pp. 349-358. The Roman law was administered in the same spirit. "Si is, cum quo Lege Aquilia agitur, confessus est servum occidisse, licet non occiderit, si tamen occisus sit homo, ex confesso tenetur" Dig. lib. 42, tit. 2, l. 4; Id. l. 6. See also Van Leeuwen's Comm. B. V. ch. 21; Everhardi Concil. 155, n. 3. "Confessus pro judicato est" Dig. ub. supr. l. 1.

² See Ante, § 27; Commercial Bank of Natchez v. King, 3 Rob. Louis. R. 243.

³ See Ante, § 195, 196; Quick v. Staines, 1 B. & P. 203; Graves v. Key, 3 B. & Ad 318; Straton v. Rastall, 2 T. R. 366; Wyatt v. Ld. Hertford, 3 East, 147.

sued for them, he will not be permitted to disprove or deny the marriage.¹ So, if the lands of such woman are taken in execution for the reputed husband's debt, as his own freehold in her right, he is estopped, by the relation *de facto* of husband and wife, from saying that he held them as her servant.² So if a party has taken advantage of, or voluntarily acted under the bankrupt or insolvent laws, he shall not be permitted, as against persons parties to the same proceedings, to deny their regularity.³ So also, where one knowingly permits his name to be used as one of the parties in a trading firm, under such circumstances of publicity as to satisfy a Jury that a stranger knew it, and believed him to be a partner, he is liable to such stranger in all transactions in which the latter engaged, and gave credit upon the faith of his being such partner.⁴ On the same principle it is, that, where one has assumed to act in an official or professional character, it is conclusive evidence against him that he possesses that character, even to the rendering him subject to the penalties attached to it.⁵ So also a tenant who has paid rent, and acted as such, is not permitted to set up a superior title of a third person against his lessor, in bar of an ejectment brought by him; for he derived the possession from him as his tenant,

¹ Watson v. Threlkeld, 2 Esp. 637; Robinson v. Nahor, 1 Campb. 245; Munro v. De Chamant, 4 Campb. 215; Ante, § 27. But where such representation has not been acted upon, namely, in other transactions of the supposed husband, or wife, they are competent witnesses for each other. Bathews v. Galindo, 4 Bing. 610; Wells v. Fletcher, 5 C. & P. 12; Tufis v. Hayes, 5 New Hamp. R. 452.

² Divoll v. Leadbetter, 4 Pick. 220.

³ Like v. Howe, 6 Esp. 20; Clarke v. Clarke, Ib. 61; Goldie v. Gunston, 4 Campb. 381; Watson v. Wace, 5 B. & C. 153, explained in Heane v. Rogers, 9 B. & C. 587; Mercer v. Wise, 3 Esp. 219; Harmer v. Davis, 7 Taunt 577; Flower v. Herbert, 2 Ves. 326.

⁴ Per Parke, J. in Dickinson v. Valpy, 10 B. & C. 128, 140, 141; Fox v. Clifton, 6 Bing. 776, 794, per Tindal, C. J. See also Kell v. Nainby, 10 B. & C. 20; Guidon v. Robson, 2 Campb. 302.

⁵ See Ante, § 195, and cases cited in note.

and shall not be received to repudiate that relation.¹ But this rule does not preclude the tenant, who did not receive the possession from the adverse party, but has only attorned or paid rent to him, from showing that this was done by mistake.² This doctrine is also applied to the relation of bailor and bailee, the cases being in principle the same;³ and also to that of principal and agent.⁴ Thus, where goods in the possession of a debtor were attached as his goods, whereas

¹ Doe v. Pegge, 1 T. R. 759, note, per Ld. Mansfield; Cook v. Loxley, 5 T. R. 4; Hodson v. Sharpe, 10 East, 350, 352, 353, per Ld. Ellenborough; Phipps v. Sculthorpe, 1 B. & A. 50, 53; Cornish v. Searell, 8 B. & C. 471, per Bayley, J.; Doe v. Smythe, 4 M. & S. 347; Doe v. Austin, 9 Bing. 41; Fleaming v. Gooding, 10 Bing. 549; Jackson v. Reynolds, 1 Caines, 444; Jackson v. Scissam, 3 Johns. 499, 504; Jackson v. Dobbin, 1b. 223; Jackson v. Smith, 7 Cowen, 717; Jackson v. Spear, 7 Wend. 401. See 1 Phil. on Evid. by Cowen & Hill, p. 107, note 192.

² Williams v. Bartholomew, 1 B. & P. 326; Rogers v. Pitcher, 6 Taunt. 202, 208.

³ Gosling v. Birnie, 7 Bing. 339; Phillips v. Hall, 8 Wend. 610; Drown v. Smith, 3 New Hamp. 299; Eastman v. Tuttle, 1 Cowen, 248; McNeil v. Philip, 1 McCord, R. 392; Hawes v. Watson, 2 B. & C. 540; Stonard v. Dunkin, 2 Campb. 344; Chapman v. Searle, 3 Pick. 38, 44; Dixon v. Hamond, 2 B. & Ald. 310; Jewett v. Torrey, 11 Mass. 219; Lyman v. Lyman, 1b. 317; Story on Bailments, § 102; Kieran v. Sandars, 6 Ad. & El. 515. But where the bailor was but a trustee, and is no longer liable over to the *cestui que trust*, a delivery to the latter is a good defence for the bailee, against the bailor. This principle is familiarly applied to the case of goods attached by the sheriff, and delivered for safe keeping to a person, who delivers them over to the debtor. After the lien of the sheriff is dissolved, he can have no action against his bailee. Whittier v. Smith, 11 Mass. 211; Cooper v. Mowry, 16 Mass. 8; Jenney v. Rodman, 1b. 464. So, if the goods did not belong to the debtor, and the bailee has delivered them to the true owner. Learned v. Bryant, 13 Mass. 224; Fisher v. Bartlett, 8 Greenl. 122. Ogle v. Atkinson, 5 Taunt. 749, which seems to contradict the text, has been overruled, as to this point, by Gosling v. Birnie, *supra*. See also Story on Agency, § 217, note.

⁴ Story on Agency, § 217, and cases there cited. The agent, however, is not estopped to set up the *jus tertii* in any case, where the title of the principal was acquired by fraud; and the same principle seems to apply to other cases of bailment. Hardman v. Willcock, 9 Bing. 382, note.

they were the goods of another person, who received them of the sheriff in bailment for safe custody, as the goods of the debtor, without giving any notice of his own title, the debtor then possessing other goods, which might have been attached; it was held, that the bailee was estopped to set up his own title in bar of an action by the sheriff for the goods.¹ The acceptance of a bill of exchange is also deemed a conclusive admission, against the acceptor, of the genuineness of the signature of the drawer, though not of the indorsers, and of the authority of the agent, where it was drawn by procuration, as well as of the legal capacity of the preceding parties to make the contract. The indorsement, also, of a bill of exchange or promissory note, is a conclusive admission of the genuineness of the preceding signatures, as well as of the authority of the agent, in cases of procuration, and of the capacity of the parties. So, the assignment of a replevin bond, by the sheriff, is an admission of its due execution and validity as a bond.² So, where land has been dedicated to public use, and enjoyed as such, and private rights have been acquired with reference to it, the original owner is precluded from revoking it.³ And these admissions may be pleaded by way of estoppel *en pais*.⁴

§ 208. It makes no *difference*, in the operation of this rule, whether the thing admitted was *true or false*; it being the fact that it has been acted upon, that renders it conclusive.

¹ Dewey v. Field, 4 Mete. 381. See also Pitt v. Chappelow, 8 M. & W. 616; Sanderson v. Collman, 4 Scott, N. R. 638; Heane v. Rogers, 9 B. & C. 577; Dezell v. Odell, 3 Hill, 215.

² Scott v. Waithman, 3 Stark. 168; Barnes v. Lucas, Ry. & M. 264; Plumer v. Briscoe, 12 Jur. 351.

³ Cincinnati v. White, 6 Pet. 439; Hobbs v. Lowell, 19 Pick. 405.

⁴ Story on Bills of Exchange, § 262, 263; Sanderson v. Collman, 4 Scott, N. R. 638; Pitt v. Chappelow, 8 M. & W. 616; Taylor v. Croker, 4 Esp. 187; Drayton v. Dale, 2 B. & C. 293; Haly v. Lane, 2 Atk. 181; Bass v. Clive, 4 M. & S. 13; Ante, § 195, 196, 197; Weakley v. Bell, 9 Watts, 273.

Thus, where two brokers, instructed to effect insurance, wrote in reply that they had got two policies effected, which was false; in an action of trover against them by the assured for the two policies, Lord Mansfield held them estopped to deny the existence of the policies, and said he should consider them as the actual insurers.¹ This principle has also been applied to the case of a sheriff, who falsely returned that he had taken bail.²

§ 209. On the other hand, verbal admissions, which have *not been acted upon*, and which the party may controvert, without any breach of good faith, or evasion of public justice, though admissible in evidence, are not held conclusive against him. Of this sort is the admission, that his trade was a nuisance, by one indicted for setting it up in another place;³ the admission, by the defendant in an action for criminal conversation, that the female in question was the wife of the plaintiff;⁴ the omission by an insolvent, in his schedule of debts, of a particular claim, which he afterwards sought to enforce by suit.⁵ In these, and the like cases, no wrong is done to the other party, by receiving any legal evidence showing that the admission was erroneous, and leaving the whole evidence, including the admission, to be weighed by the Jury.

¹ *Harding v. Carter*, Park. on Ins. p. 4. See also *Salem v. Williams*, 8 Wend. 483; 9 Wend. 147, S. C.; *Chapman v. Searle*, 3 Pick. 38, 44; *Hall v. White*, 3 C. & P. 136; *Den v. Oliver*, 3 Hawks, R. 479; *Doe v. Lambly*, 2 Esp. 635; 1 B. & A. 650, per Ld. Ellenborough; *Price v. Harwood*, 3 Campb. 108; *Stables v. Eley*, 1 C. & P. 614; *Howard v. Tucker*, 1 B. & Ad. 712. If it is a case of innocent mistake, still, if it has been acted upon by another, it is conclusive in his favor. As, where the supposed maker of a forged note innocently paid it to a *bona fide* holder, he shall be estopped to recover back the money. *Salem Bank v. Gloucester Bank*, 17 Mass. 1, 27.

² *Simmons v. Bradford*, 15 Mass. 82; *Eaton v. Ogier*, 2 Greenl. 46.

³ *Rex v. Neville*, Peake's Cas. 91.

⁴ *Morris v. Miller*, 4 Burr. 2057, further explained in 2 Wils. 399; 1 Doug. 174; and Bull. N. P. 28.

⁵ *Nichols v. Downes*, 1 Mood. & R. 13; *Hart v. Newman*, 3 Campb. 13.

§ 210. In some other cases, connected with the administration of public justice, and of government, the admission is held conclusive, on grounds of *public policy*. Thus in an action on the statute against bribery, it was held that a man, who had given money to another for his vote, should not be admitted to say, that such other person had no right to vote.¹ So, one who has officiously intermeddled with the goods of another recently deceased, is, in favor of creditors, estopped to deny that he is executor.² Thus, also, where a ship-owner, whose ship had been seized as forfeited for breach of the revenue laws, applied to the secretary of the Treasury for a remission of forfeiture, on the ground that it was incurred by the master ignorantly and without fraud, and upon making oath to the application, in the usual course, the ship was given up; he was not permitted afterwards to gainsay it, and prove the misconduct of the master, in an action by the latter against the owner for his wages on the same voyage, even by showing that the fraud had subsequently come to his knowledge.³ The mere fact that an admission was made under oath does not seem alone to render it conclusive against the party, but it adds vastly to the weight of the testimony; throwing upon him the burden of showing that it was a case of clear and innocent mistake. Thus, in a prosecution under

¹ *Combe v. Pitt*, 3 Burr. 1586, 1590; *Rigg v. Curgenvin*, 2 Wils. 395.

² *Reade's case*, 5 Co. 33, 34; *Toller's Law of Exrs.* 37-41. See also *Quick v. Staines*, 1 B. & P. 293. Where the owners of a stage coach took up more passengers than were allowed by statute, and an injury was laid to have arisen from overloading, the excess beyond the statute number was held by Ld. Ellenborough to be conclusive evidence that the accident arose from that cause. *Israel v. Clark*, 4 Esp. 259.

³ *Freeman v. Walker*, 6 Greenl. 68. But a sworn entry at the custom-house, of certain premises, as being rented by A., B. and C. as partners, for the sale of beer, though conclusive in favor of the crown, is not conclusive evidence of the partnership, in a civil suit, in favor of a stranger. *Ellis v. Watson*, 2 Stark. R. 453. The difference between this case and that in the text may be, that, in the latter, the party gained an advantage to himself, which was not the case in the entry of partnership; it being only incidental to the principal object, namely, the designation of the place where an excisable commodity was sold.

the game laws, proof of the defendant's oath, taken under the income act, that the yearly value of his estate was less than £100, was held not quite conclusive against him, though very strong evidence of the fact.¹ And even the defendant's belief of a fact, sworn to in an answer in Chancery, is admissible at law, as evidence against him of the fact, though not conclusive.²

§ 211. Admissions *in deeds* have already been considered, in regard to parties and privies,³ between whom they are generally conclusive; and when not technically so, they are entitled to great weight, from the solemnity of their nature. But when offered in evidence by a stranger, or, as it seems, even by a party against a stranger, the adverse party is not estopped, but may repel their effect, in the same manner as though they were only parol admissions.⁴

§ 212. Other admissions, though in writing, not having been acted upon by another to his prejudice, nor falling within the reasons before mentioned for estopping the party to gainsay them, are not conclusive against him, but are left at large, to be weighed with other evidence by the Jury. Of this sort are *receipts*, or mere acknowledgments, given for goods or money, whether on separate papers, or indorsed on deeds, or

¹ *Rex v. Clarke*, 8 T. R. 220. It is observable, that the matter sworn to was rather a matter of judgment, than of certainty in fact. But in *Thornes v. White*, 1 Tyrwh. & Grang. 110, the party had sworn positively to matter of fact in his own knowledge; but it was held not conclusive in law against him, though deserving of much weight with the Jury.

² *Doe v. Steel*, 3 Campb. 115. Answers in Chancery are always admissible at law, against the party; but do not seem to be held strictly conclusive, merely because they are sworn to. See *Bull. N. P.* 236, 237; 1 Stark. Evid. 284; *Cameron v. Lightfoot*, 2 W. Bl. 1190; *Grant v. Jackson*, Peake's Cas. 203; *Studdy v. Saunders*, 2 D. & R. 347; *De Whelpdale v. Milburn*, 5 Price, 485.

³ *Ante*, § 22, 23, 24, 189, 204.

⁴ *Bowman v. Rostron*, 2 Ad. & El. 295, n.; *Woodward v. Larking*, 3 Esp. 286; *Mayor of Carlisle v. Blamire*, 8 East, 487, 492, 493.

on negotiable securities;¹ the *adjustment of a loss*, on a policy of insurance, made without full knowledge of all the circumstances, or under a mistake of fact, or under any other invalidating circumstances;² and *accounts rendered*, such as an attorney's³ bill and the like. So of a bill in Chancery, which is evidence against the plaintiff of the admissions it contains, though very feeble evidence, so far as it may be taken as the suggestion of counsel.⁴

¹ *Skaife v. Jackson*, 3 B. & C. 421; *Graves v. Key*, 3 B. & A. 313; *Straton v. Rastall*, 2 T. R. 366; *Fairman v. Budd*, 7 Bing. 574; *Lampon v. Corke*, 5 B. & Ald. 606, 611, per Holroyd, J.; *Harden v. Gordon*, 2 Mason, 541, 561; *Fuller v. Crittenden*, 9 Conn. 401; *Ensign v. Webster*, 1 Johns. Cas. 145; *Putnam v. Lewis*, 8 Johns. 389; *Stackpole v. Arnold*, 11 Mass. 27; *Tucker v. Maxwell*, Ib. 143; *Williamson v. Scott*, 17 Mass. 249. The American cases on this subject are collected in Cowen & Hill's valuable notes to 1 Phil. Evid. p. 108, note 194, and p. 549, note 963.

² *Reyner v. Hall*, 7 Taunt. 725; *Shepherd v. Chewter*, 1 Campb. 274, 276, note by the reporter; *Adams v. Sanders*, 1 M. & M. 373; *Christian v. Coombe*, 2 Esp. 489; *Bilbie v. Lumley*, 2 East, 469; *Elting v. Scott*, 2 Johns. 157.

³ *Lovebridge v. Botham*, 1 B. & P. 49.

⁴ *Bull. N. P.* 235; *Doe v. Sybourn*, 7 T. R. 3.

CHAPTER XII.

OF CONFESSIONS.

§ 213. THE only remaining topic, under the general head of admissions, is that of *confessions* of guilt in criminal prosecutions, which we now propose to consider. It has already been observed, that the rules of evidence, in regard to the voluntary admissions of the party, are the same in criminal as in civil cases. But, as this applies only to admissions brought home to the party, it is obvious that the whole subject of admissions made by agents and third persons, together with a portion of that of implied admissions, can of course have very little direct application to confessions of crime, or of guilty intention. In treating this subject, however, we shall follow the convenient course pursued by other writers, distributing this branch of evidence into two classes, namely, *first*, the *direct confessions of guilt*; and *secondly*, the *indirect confessions*, or those which, in civil cases, are usually termed implied admissions.

§ 214. But here, also, as we have before remarked in regard to admissions,¹ the evidence of verbal confessions of guilt is to be *received with great caution*. For, besides the danger of mistake, from the misapprehension of witnesses, the misuse of words, the failure of the party to express his own meaning, and the infirmity of memory, it should be recollected that the mind of the prisoner himself is oppressed by the calamity of his situation, and that he is often influenced by motives of hope or fear to make an untrue confession.² The

¹ Ante, § 200.

² 4 Hawk. P. C. 425, B. 2, ch. 46, § 36; McNally's Evid. 42, 43, 44; Vaughan v. Hann, 6 B. Monr. R. 341. Of this character was the remarkable

zeal, too, which so generally prevails, to detect offenders, especially in cases of aggravated guilt, and the strong disposition, in the persons engaged in pursuit of evidence, to rely on slight

case of the two Boorns, convicted in the Supreme Court of Vermont, in Bennington county, in September term, 1819, of the murder of Russell Colvin, May 10, 1812. It appeared that Colvin, who was the brother-in-law of the prisoners, was a person of a weak and not perfectly sound mind; that he was considered burdensome to the family of the prisoners, who were obliged to support him; that on the day of his disappearance, being in a distant field, where the prisoners were at work, a violent quarrel broke out between them; and that one of them struck him a severe blow on the back of the head with a club, which felled him to the ground. Some suspicions arose at that time that he was murdered; which were increased by the finding of his hat in the same field a few months afterwards. These suspicions in process of time subsided; but, in 1819, one of the neighbors having repeatedly dreamed of the murder, with great minuteness of circumstance, both in regard to his death and the concealment of his remains, the prisoners were vehemently accused, and generally believed guilty of the murder. Upon strict search, the pocket knife of Colvin, and a button of his clothes, were found in an old open cellar in the same field, and in a hollow stump not many rods from it were discovered two nails and a number of bones, believed to be those of a man. Upon this evidence, together with their deliberate confession of the fact of the murder and concealment of the body in those places, they were convicted and sentenced to die. On the same day they applied to the legislature for a commutation of the sentence of death to that of perpetual imprisonment; which, as to one of them only, was granted. The confession being now withdrawn and contradicted, and a reward offered for the discovery of the missing man, he was found in New Jersey, and returned home, in time to prevent the execution. He had fled for fear that they would kill him. The bones were those of some animal. They had been advised, by some misjudging friends, that, as they would certainly be convicted, upon the circumstances proved, their only chance for life was by commutation of punishment, and that this depended on their making a penitential confession, and thereupon obtaining a recommendation to mercy. This case, of which there is a Report in the Law Library of Harvard University, is critically examined in a learned and elaborate article in the North American Review, Vol. 10, p. 418-429. For other cases of false confessions, see Wills on Circumstantial Evidence, p. 88; Phil. & Am. on Evid. 419; 1 Phil. Evid. 397, n.; Warickshall's case, 1 Leach, Cr. Cas. 299, n. Mr. Chitty mentions a case of an innocent person making a false constructive confession, in order to fix suspicion on himself alone, that his guilty brothers might have time to escape; a stratagem

prosecutor,¹ or by his wife, the prisoner being his servant,² or by an officer having the prisoner in custody,³ or by a magistrate,⁴ or, indeed, by *any one having authority* over him, or over the prosecution itself,⁵ or by a private person in the presence of one in authority,⁶ the confession will not be deemed voluntary, and will be rejected. The authority, known to be possessed by those persons, may well be supposed both to animate the prisoner's hopes of favor, on the one hand, and on the other to inspire him with awe, and in some degree to overcome the powers of his mind. It has been argued, that a confession made upon the promises or threats of a person, erroneously believed by the prisoner to possess such authority, the person assuming to act in the capacity of an officer or magistrate, ought, upon the same principle, to be excluded.

¹ Thompson's case, 1 Leach, Cr. Cas. 325; Cass's case, Id. 328, n.; Rex v. Jones, Russ. & R. 152; Rex v. Griffin, Id. 151; Chabcock's case, 1 Mass. 144; Rex v. Gibbons, 1 C. & P. 97, note (a); Rex v. Partridge, 7 C. & P. 551; Roberts's case, 1 Dever. 259; Rex v. Jenkins, Russ. & Ry. 492; Regina v. Hearn, 1 Car. & Marsh. 109. See also Phil. & Am. on Evid. 430, 431.

² Rex v. Upchurch, 1 Mood. Cr. Cas. 465; Regina v. Hewett, 1 Car. & Marsh. 534; Rex v. Taylor, 8 C. & P. 733. In Rex v. Simpson, 1 Mood. Cr. Cas. 410, the inducements were held out by the mother-in-law of the prosecutor, in his house, and in the presence of his wife, who was very deaf; and the confessions thus obtained were held inadmissible. See Mr. Joy's Treatise on the Admissibility of Confessions, p. 5-10.

³ Rex v. Swatkins, 4 C. & P. 548; Rex v. Mills, 6 C. & P. 146; Rex v. Sextons, 6 Petersd. Abr. 84; Rex v. Shepherd, 7 C. & P. 579. See also Rex v. Thornton, 1 Mood. Cr. Cas. 27.

⁴ Rudd's case, 1 Leach, Cr. Cas. 135; Guild's case, 5 Halst. 163.

⁵ Rex v. Parratt, 4 C. & P. 570, which was a confession by a sailor to his captain, who threatened him with prison, on a charge of stealing a watch. Rex v. Enoch, 5 C. & P. 539, was a confession made to a woman, in whose custody the prisoner, who was a female, had been left by the officer. The official character of the person to whom the confession is made does not affect its admissibility, provided no inducements were employed. Joy on Confessions, &c. p. 59-61; Rex v. Gibbons, 1 C. & P. 97, note (a); Knapp's case, 10 Pick. 477; Mosler's case, 6 Penn. Law Journ. 90.

⁶ Roberts's case, 1 Dever. 259; Rex v. Pountney, 7 C. & P. 302; Reg. v. Laughner, 2 C. & K. 225.

The principle itself would seem to require such exclusion; but the point is not known to have received any judicial consideration.

§ 223. But whether a confession, *made to a person who has no authority*, upon an inducement held out by that person, is receivable, is a question upon which learned Judges are known to entertain opposite opinions.¹ In one case, it was laid down as a settled rule, that *any* person telling a prisoner that it would be better for him to confess, will *always* exclude any confession made to that person.² And this rule has been applied in a variety of cases, both early and more recent.³ On the other hand, it has been held, that a promise made by an indifferent person, who interfered officiously, without any kind of authority, and promised, without the means of performance, can scarcely be deemed sufficient to produce any effect, even on the weakest mind, as an inducement to confess; and accordingly confessions made under such circumstances have been admitted in evidence.⁴ The difficulty experienced in this matter seems to have arisen from the endeavor to define and settle, *as a rule of law*, the facts and circumstances which shall be deemed, *in all cases*, to have influenced the mind of the prisoner, in making the confession. In regard to persons

¹ So stated by Parke, B. in Rex v. Spencer, 7 C. & P. 776. See also Rex v. Pountney, Id. 302, per Alderson, B.; Rex v. Row, Russ. & R. 153, per Chambre, J.

² Rex v. Dunn, 4 C. & P. 543, per Bosanquet, J.; Rex v. Slaughter, 8 C. & P. 734.

³ See accordingly, Rex v. Kingston, 4 C. & P. 387; Rex v. Clewes, Id. 231; Rex v. Walkley, 6 C. & P. 175; Guild's case, 5 Halst. 163; Knapp's case, 9 Pick. 496, 500-510; Rex v. Thomas, 6 C. & P. 533.

⁴ Rex v. Hardwick, 6 Petersd. Abr. 84, per Wood, B.; Rex v. Taylor, 8 C. & P. 734. See accordingly, Rex v. Gibbons, 1 C. & P. 97; Rex v. Tyler, Id. 129; Rex v. Lingate, 6 Petersd. Abr. 84; 2 Lewin's Cr. Cas. 125, note. In Rex v. Wild, 1 Mood. Cr. Cas. 452, the prisoner, a boy under fourteen, was required to kneel, and was solemnly adjured to tell the truth. The conviction, upon his confession thus made, was held right, but the mode of obtaining the confession was very much disapproved. Rex v. Row, Russ. & Ry. 153.

grounds of suspicion, which are exaggerated into sufficient proof, together with the character of the persons necessarily called as witnesses, in cases of secret and atrocious crime, all tend to impair the value of this kind of evidence, and sometimes lead to its rejection, where, in civil actions, it would have been received.¹ The weighty observation of Mr. Justice Foster is also to be kept in mind, that "this evidence is not, in the ordinary course of things, to be disproved by that sort of negative evidence, by which the proof of plain facts may be, and often is, confronted."

which was completely successful; after which he proved an *alibi*, in the most satisfactory manner. 1 Chitty's Crim. Law, p. 85; 1 Dickens. Just. 629, note. See also Joy on Confessions, &c. p. 100-109. The civilians placed little reliance on naked confessions of guilt, not corroborated by other testimony. Carpzovius, after citing the opinion of Severus to that effect, and enumerating the various kinds of misery which tempt its wretched victims to this mode of suicide, adds — "quorum omnium ex his fontibus contra se emissæ pronuntiationes, non tam delicti confessione firmati quam vox *doloris*, vel *insanientis* oratio est." B. Carpzov. Pract. Rerum. Criminal. Pars III. Quæst. 114, p. 160. The just value of these instances of false confessions of crime has been happily stated by one of the most accomplished of modern jurists, and is best expressed in his own language. "Whilst such anomalous cases ought to render Courts and Juries, at all times, extremely watchful of every fact attendant on confessions of guilt, the cases should never be invoked, or so urged by the accused's counsel, as to invalidate indiscriminately all confessions put to the Jury, thus repudiating those salutary distinctions which the Court, in the judicious exercise of its duty, shall be enabled to make. Such an use of these anomalies, which should be regarded as mere exceptions, and which should speak only in the voice of warning, is no less unprofessional than impolitic; and should be regarded as offensive to the intelligence both of the Court and Jury." — "Confessions and circumstantial evidence are entitled to a known and fixed standing in the law; and while it behooves students and lawyers to examine, and carefully weigh their just force, and, as far as practicable, to define their proper limits; the advocate should never be induced by professional zeal, or a less worthy motive, to argue against their existence, be they respectively invoked, either in favor of, or against, the accused." Hoffman's Course of Legal Study, Vol. I, p. 367, 368. See also The (London) Law Magazine, Vol. 4, p. 317, New Series.

¹ Foster's Disc. p. 243. See also *Lench v. Lench*, 10 Ves. 518; *Smith v. Burnham*, 3 Sumn. 438.

§ 215. Subject to these cautions in receiving and weighing them, it is generally agreed, that *deliberate confessions of guilt* are among the most effectual proofs in the law.¹ Their value depends on the supposition, that they are deliberate and voluntary, and on the presumption that a rational being will not make admissions prejudicial to his interest and safety, unless when urged by the promptings of truth and conscience. Such confessions, so made by a prisoner, to any person, at any moment of time, and at any place, subsequent to the perpetration of the crime, and previous to his examination before the magistrate, are at Common Law received in evidence, as among proofs of guilt.² Confessions, too, like admissions, may be inferred from the conduct of the prisoner, and from his silent acquiescence in the statements of others, respecting himself, and made in his presence; provided they were not made under circumstances which prevented him from replying to them.³ The degree of credit due to them is to be estimated by the Jury, under the circumstances of each case. Confessions made before the examining magistrate, or during imprisonment, are affected by additional considerations.

§ 216. Confessions are divided into two classes, namely, *judicial* and *extrajudicial*. *Judicial confessions* are those which are made before the magistrate, or in Court, in the due course of legal proceedings; and it is essential that they be made of the free will of the party, and with full and perfect knowledge of the nature and consequences of the confession.

¹ Dig. lib. 42, tit. 2, De Confess.; Van Leeuwen's Comm. B. 5, ch. 21, § 1; 2 Poth. on Obl. (by Evans) App. Numb. xvi. § 13; 1 Gilb. Evid. by Lofft, 216; 4 Hawk. P. C. 425, B. 2, ch. 46, § 35; *Mortimer v. Mortimer*, 2 Hagg. Con. R. 315; *Harris v. Harris*, 2 Hagg. Eccl. R. 409.

² *Lambe's case*, 2 Leach, Cr. Cas. 625, 629, per Grose, J.; *Warickshall's case*, 1 Leach, Cr. Cas. 298; *McNally's Evid.* 42, 47.

³ Ante, § 197; *Rex v. Bartlett*, 7 C. & P. 832; *Rex v. Smithie*, 5 C. & P. 332; *Rex v. Appleby*, 3 Stark. R. 33; Joy on Confessions, &c. 77-80; *Jones v. Morrell*, 1 Car. & Kir. 266.

Of this kind are the preliminary examinations, taken in writing by the magistrate, pursuant to statutes; and the plea of guilty, made in open Court, to an indictment. Either of these is sufficient to found a conviction, even if to be followed by a sentence of death, they being deliberately made, under the deepest solemnities, with the advice of counsel, and the protecting caution and oversight of the Judge. Such was the rule of the Roman Law;—*Confessos in jure, pro judicatis haberi placet*;—and it may be deemed a rule of universal jurisprudence.¹ *Extrajudicial confessions* are those which are made by the party elsewhere than before a magistrate, or in Court; this term embracing not only explicit and *express* confessions of crime, but all those admissions of the accused, from which guilt may be *implied*. All confessions of this kind are receivable in evidence, being proved like other facts, to be weighed by the Jury.

§ 217. Whether *extrajudicial confessions, uncorroborated* by any other proof of the *corpus delicti*, are of themselves sufficient to found a conviction of the prisoner, has been gravely doubted. In the Roman Law, such naked confessions amounted only to a *sempilena probatio*, upon which alone no judgment could be founded; and at most the party could only in proper cases be put to the torture. But if voluntarily made, in the presence of the injured party, or, if reiterated at different times in his absence, and persisted in, they were received as plenary proof.² In each of the English cases usually cited in favor of the sufficiency of this evidence, there was some corroborating circumstance.³ In the United States, the pris-

¹ Cod. Lib. 7, tit. 59; 1 Poth. on Obl. Pt. iv. ch. 3, § 1, num. 798; Van Leeuwen's Comm. B. 5, ch. 21, § 2; Mascard. De Probat. Vol. 1, Concl. 344; Ante, § 179.

² N. Everhard. Concil. xix. 8, lxxii. 5, cxxxi. 1, clxiv. 1, 2, 3, clxxxvi. 2, 3, 11; Mascard. De Probat. Vol. 1, Concl. 347, 349; Van Leeuwen's Comm. B. 5, ch. 21, § 4, 5; B. Carpzov. Practic. Rerum Criminal. Pars II. Quæst. 60, n. 8.

³ Wheeling's case, 1 Leach, Cr. Cas. 349, n., seems to be an exception; but it is too briefly reported to be relied on. It is in these words:—"But

oner's confession, when the *corpus delicti* is not otherwise proved, has been held insufficient for his conviction; and this opinion certainly best accords with the humanity of the criminal code, and with the great degree of caution applied in receiving and weighing the evidence of confessions in other cases; and it seems countenanced by approved writers on this branch of the law.¹

§ 218. In the proof of confessions, as in the case of admissions in civil cases, *the whole of what the prisoner said* on the subject, at the time of making the confession, should be taken together. This rule is the dictate of reason, as well as

in the case of *John Wheeling*, tried before Lord Kenyon, at the Summer Assizes at Salisbury, 1789, it was determined, that a prisoner may be convicted on his own confession, when proved by legal testimony, though it is totally uncorroborated by any other evidence." But in *Eldridge's case*, Russ. & Ry. 440, who was indicted for larceny of a horse, the beast was found in his possession, and he had sold it for £12, after asking £35, which last was its fair value. In the case of *Falkner and Bond*, Ib. 481, the person robbed was called upon his recognizance, and it was proved, that one of the prisoner's had endeavored to send a message to him to keep him from appearing. In *White's case*, Ib. 508, there was strong circumstantial evidence, both of the larceny of the oats from the prosecutor's stable, and of the prisoner's guilt; part of which evidence was also given in *Tippet's case*, Ib. 509, who was indicted for the same larceny; and there was the additional proof, that he was an under ostler in the same stable. And in all these cases, except that of *Falkner and Bond*, the confessions were solemnly made before the examining magistrate, and taken down in due form of law. In the case of *Falkner and Bond*, the confessions were repeated, once to the officer who apprehended them, and afterwards, on hearing the depositions read over, which contained the charge. In *Stone's case*, Dyer, 215, pl. 50, which is a very brief note, it does not appear that the *corpus delicti* was not otherwise proved; on the contrary, the natural inference from the report is, that it was. In *Francia's case*, 6 State Tr. 58, there was much corroborative evidence; but the prisoner was acquitted; and the opinion of the Judges went only to the sufficiency of a confession solemnly made, upon the arraignment of the party for high treason, and this only upon the particular language of the statutes of Ed. 6. See Foster, Disc. p. 240, 241, 242.

¹ *Guild's case*, 5 Halst. 163, 185; *Long's case*, 1 Hayw. 524, (455); 4 Hawk. P. C. 425, B. 2 ch. 46, § 36.

of humanity. The prisoner is supposed to have stated a proposition respecting his own connexion with the crime; but it is not reasonable to assume that the entire proposition, with all its limitations, was contained in one sentence, or in any particular number of sentences; excluding all other parts of the conversation. As in other cases, the meaning and intent of the parties is collected from the whole writing taken together, and all the instruments, executed at one time by the parties, and relating to the same matter, are equally resorted to for that purpose; so here, if one part of a conversation is relied on, as proof of a confession of the crime, the prisoner has a right to lay before the Court the whole of what was said in that conversation; not being confined to so much only as is explanatory of the part already proved against him, but being permitted to give evidence of all that was said upon that occasion, relative to the subject-matter in issue.¹ For, as has been already observed respecting admissions,² unless the whole is received and considered, the true meaning and import of the part which is good evidence against him cannot be ascertained. But if, after the whole statement of the prisoner is given in evidence, the prosecutor can contradict any part of it, he is at liberty to do so; and then the whole testimony is left to the Jury for their consideration, precisely as in other cases, where one part of the evidence is contradictory to another.³ For it is not to be supposed that all the parts of a confession are entitled to equal credit. The Jury may believe that part which charges the prisoner, and reject that which is in his favor, if they see sufficient grounds for so doing.⁴ If what he said in his own favor is not contra-

¹ Per Ld. C. J. Abbott, in *The Queen's case*, 2 B. & B. 297, 298;
⁴ Hawk. P. C. 426, B. 2, ch. 46, § 42; *Rex v. Jones*, 2 C. & P. 629; *Rex v. Higgins*, 2 C. & P. 603; *Rex v. Hearne*, 4 C. & P. 215; *Rex v. Clewes*, lb. 221; *Rex v. Steptoe*, lb. 397.

² Ante, § 201, and cases there cited.

³ *Rex v. Jones*, 2 C. & P. 629.

⁴ *Rex v. Higgins*, 3 C. & P. 603; *Rex v. Steptoe*, 4 C. & P. 397; *Rex v. Clewes*, 4 C. & P. 221; *Respublica v. McCarty*, 2 Dall. 86, 88.

dicted by evidence offered by the prosecutor, nor improbable in itself, it will naturally be believed by the Jury; but they are not bound to give weight to it on that account, but are at liberty to judge of it like other evidence, by all the circumstances of the case. And if the confession implicates other persons by name, yet it must be proved as it was made, not omitting the names; but the Judge will instruct the Jury, that it is not evidence against any but the prisoner who made it.¹

§ 219. Before any confession can be received in evidence in a criminal case, it must be shown that it was *voluntary*. The course of practice is to inquire of the witness, whether the prisoner had been told that it would be better for him to confess, or worse for him if he did not confess, or whether language to that effect had been addressed to him.² "A free and voluntary confession," said Eyre, C. B.,³ "is deserving of the highest credit, because it is presumed to flow from the strongest sense of guilt, and therefore it is admitted as proof of the crime to which it refers; but a confession, forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear,

¹ *Rex v. Hearne*, 4 C. & P. 215; *Rex v. Clewes*, lb. 221, per Littledale, J., who said he had considered this point very much, and was of opinion that the names ought not to be left out. It may be added, that the credit to be given to the confession may depend much on the probability that the persons named were likely to engage in such a transaction. See also *Rex v. Fletcher*, lb. 250. The point was decided in the same way, in *Rex v. Walkley*, 6 C. & P. 175, by Gurney, B., who said it had been much considered by the Judges. Mr. Justice Parke thought otherwise; *Barstow's case*, *Lewin's Cr. Cas.* 110.

² 1 Phil. on Evid. 401; 2 East, P. C. 659. The rule excludes not only direct confessions, but any other declaration tending to implicate the prisoner in the crime charged, even though, in terms, it is an accusation of another, or a refusal to confess. *Rex v. Tyler*, 1 C. & P. 129; *Rex v. Enoch*, 5 C. & P. 539. See further, as to the object of the rule, *Rex v. Court*, 7 C. & P. 486, per Littledale, J.; *The People v. Ward*, 15 Wend. 231.

³ In *Warickshall's case*, 1 Leach, Cr. Cas. 299; *McNally's Evid.* 47; *Knapp's case*, 10 Pick. 489, 490; *Chabcock's case*, 1 Mass. 144.

comes in so questionable a shape, when it is to be considered as the evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be given to it; and therefore it is rejected."¹ The material inquiry, therefore, is, whether the confession has been obtained by the influence of hope or fear, applied by a third person to the prisoner's mind. The evidence to this point, being in its nature preliminary, is addressed to the Judge, who admits the proof of the confession to the Jury, or rejects it, as he may or may not find it to have been drawn from the prisoner by the application of those motives.² This matter resting wholly in the discretion of the Judge, upon all the circumstances of the case, it is difficult to lay down particular rules, *a priori*, for the government of that discretion. The rule of law, applicable to all cases, only demands that the confession shall have been made voluntarily, without the appliances of hope or fear, by any other person; and whether it was so made or not, is for him to determine, upon consideration of the age, situation, and character of the prisoner, and the circumstances under which it was made.³ Language addressed by others, and sufficient to overcome the mind of one, may have no effect upon that of another; a consideration which may serve to reconcile some contradictory decisions, where the principal facts appear similar in the reports, but the lesser circumstances, though often very material in such preliminary inquiries, are omitted. But it cannot be denied, that this rule

¹ In Scotland this distinction, between voluntary confessions and those which have been extorted by fear or elicited by promises, is not recognised; but all confessions, obtained in either mode, are admissible at the discretion of the Judge. In strong cases of undue influence, the course is to reject them; otherwise, the credibility of the evidence is left to the Jury. See Alison's Criminal Law of Scotland, p. 581, 582.

² *Boyd v. The State*, 2 Humphreys, R. 37; *Regina v. Martin*, 1 Armstr. Macartn. & Ogle, R. 197.

³ McNally's Evid. 43; Nute's case, 6 Petersdorf's Abr. 82; Knapp's case, 10 Pick. 496; *United States v. Nott*, 1 McLean, 499; Cowen & Hill's note to 1 Phil. Evid. 111; Ante, § 49; Guild's case, 5 Halst. 163, 180; Drew's case, 8 C. & P. 140; *Rex v. Thomas*, 7 C. & P. 345; *Rex v. Court*, Ib. 486.

has been sometimes extended quite too far, and been applied to cases, where there could be no reason to suppose that the inducement had any influence upon the mind of the prisoner.

§ 220. The rule under consideration has been illustrated in a variety of cases. Thus, where the prosecutor said to the prisoner, "Unless you give me a more satisfactory account, I will take you before a magistrate," evidence of the confession thereupon made was rejected.¹ It was also rejected, where the language used by the prosecutor was, "If you will tell me where my goods are, I will be favorable to you;"²—where the constable, who arrested the prisoner, said, "It is of no use for you to deny it, for there are the man and boy, who will swear they saw you do it;"³—where the prosecutor said, "He only wanted his money, and if the prisoner gave him that, he might go to the devil, if he pleased;"⁴—and where he said he should be obliged to the prisoner, if he would tell all he knew about it, adding, "If you will not, of course we can do nothing," meaning nothing for the prisoner.⁵ So, where the prisoner's superior officer in the police, said to him, "Now be cautious in the answers you give me to the

¹ Thompson's case, 1 Leach's Cr. Cas. 325.

² Cass's case, 1 Leach's Cr. Cas. 328, note; *Boyd v. The State*, 2 Humphreys, R. 37.

³ *Rex v. Mills*, 6 C. & P. 146.

⁴ *Rex v. Jones*, Russ. & Ry. 152. See also Griffin's case, Id. 151.

⁵ *Rex v. Partridge*, 7 C. & P. 551. See also Guild's case, 5 Halst. 163. It is extremely difficult to reconcile these and similar cases with the spirit of the rule, as expounded by Chief Baron Eyre, whose language is quoted in the preceding section. The difference is between confessions made voluntarily, and those "forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear." If the party has made his own calculation of the advantages to be derived from confessing, and thereupon has confessed the crime, there is no reason to say that it is not a voluntary confession. It seems that, in order to exclude a confession, the motive of hope or fear must be directly applied by a third person, and must be sufficient, in the judgment of the Court, so far to overcome the mind of the prisoner, as to render the confession unworthy of credit.

questions I am going to put to you about this watch;" the confession was held inadmissible.¹ There is more difficulty in ascertaining what is such a *threat*, as will exclude a confession; though the principle is equally clear, that a confession induced by threats is not voluntary, and therefore cannot be received.²

§ 221. But though promises or threats have been used, yet if it appears, to the satisfaction of the Judge, that their *influence was totally done away* before the confession was made, the evidence will be received. Thus, where a magistrate, who was also a clergyman, told the prisoner, that if he was not the man who struck the fatal blow, and would disclose all he knew respecting the murder, he would use all his endeavors and influence to prevent any ill consequences from falling on him; and he accordingly wrote to the Secretary of State, and received an answer, that mercy could not be extended to the prisoner; which answer he communicated to the prisoner, who afterwards made a confession to the coroner; it was held, that the confession was clearly voluntary, and as such it was admitted.³ So, where the prisoner had been induced, by promises of favor, to make a confession, which was for that cause excluded, but about five months afterwards, and after having been solemnly warned by two magistrates that he

¹ Regina v. Fleming, 1 Armstr. Macartn. & Ogle, R. 330. But where the examining magistrate said to the prisoner, "Be sure you say nothing but the truth, or it will be taken against you, and may be given in evidence against you at your trial," the statement, thereupon made, was held admissible. Reg. v. Holmes, 1 C. & K. 248.

² Thornton's case, 1 Mood. Cr. Cas. 27; Long's case, 6 C. & P. 179; Roscoe's Crim. Evid. 34; Dillon's case, 4 Dall. 116. Where the prisoner's superior, in the post-office, said to the prisoner's wife, while her husband was in custody for opening and detaining a letter, "Do not be frightened; I hope nothing will happen to your husband, beyond the loss of his situation;" the prisoner's subsequent confession was rejected, it appearing that the wife might have communicated this to the prisoner. Regina v. Harding, 1 Armstr. Macartn. & Ogle, R. 340.

³ Rex v. Clewes, 4 C. & P. 221.

must expect death and prepare to meet it, he again made a full confession, this latter confession was admitted in evidence.¹ In this case, upon much consideration, the rule was stated to be, that, although an original confession may have been obtained by improper means, yet subsequent confessions of the same or of like facts may be admitted, if the Court believes, from the length of time intervening, or from proper warning of the consequences of confession, or from other circumstances, that the delusive hopes or fears, under the influence of which the original confession was obtained, were entirely dispelled.² In the absence of any such circumstances, the influence of the motives proved to have been offered, will be presumed to continue, and to have produced the confession, unless the contrary is shown by clear evidence; and the confession will therefore be rejected.³ Accordingly, where an inducement has been held out by an officer, or a prosecutor, but the prisoner is subsequently warned by the magistrate, that what he may say will be evidence against himself, or that a confession will be of no benefit to him, or he is simply cautioned by the magistrate not to say any thing against himself, his confession, afterwards made, will be received as a voluntary confession.⁴

§ 222. In regard to *the person, by whom the inducements were offered*, it is very clear, that if they were offered by the

¹ Guild's case, 5 Halst. 163, 168.

² Guild's case, 5 Halst. 180.

³ Roberts's case, 1 Devereux, R. 259, 264; Meynell's case, 2 Lewin's Cr. Cas. 122; Sherrington's case, Ib. 123; Rex v. Cooper, 5 C. & P. 535.

⁴ Rex v. Howes, 6 C. & P. 404; Rex v. Richards, 5 C. & P. 318; Nute's case, 2 Russ. on Crimes, 648; Joy on the Admissibility of Confessions, p. 27, 28, 69-75; Rex v. Bryan, Jebb's Cr. Cas. 157. If the inducement was held out by a person of superior authority, and the confession was afterwards made to one of inferior authority, as a turnkey, it seems inadmissible, unless the prisoner was first cautioned by the latter. Rex v. Cooper, 5 C. & P. 535.

in authority, there is not much room to doubt. Public policy, also, requires the exclusion of confessions, obtained by means of inducements held out by such persons. Yet even here, the age, experience, intelligence, and constitution, both physical and mental, of prisoners are so various, and the power of performance so different, in the different persons promising, and under different circumstances of the prosecution, that the rule will necessarily sometimes fail of meeting the truth of the case. But as it is thought to succeed in a large majority of instances, it is wisely adopted as a rule of law applicable to them all. Promises and threats by private persons, however, not being found so uniform in their operation, perhaps may, with more propriety, be treated as mixed questions of law and fact; the principle of law, that the confession must be voluntary, being strictly adhered to, and the question, whether the promises or threats of the private individuals who employed them, were sufficient to overcome the mind of the prisoner, being left to the discretion of the Judge, under all the circumstances of the case.¹

§ 224. The same rule, that the confession must be voluntary, is applied in cases where the prisoner has been *examined before a magistrate*, in the course of which examination the confession is made. The practice of examining the accused was familiar in the Roman jurisprudence, and is still continued in continental Europe;² but the maxim of the Common Law

¹ In Scotland it is left to the Jury. See Alison's Criminal Law of Scotland, p. 581, 582; Ante, § 219, n. Mr. Joy maintains the unqualified proposition, that "a confession is admissible in evidence, although an inducement is held out, if such inducement proceeds from a person not in authority over the prisoner;" and it is strongly supported by the authorities he cites, which are also cited in the notes to this section. See Joy on the Admissibility of Confessions, Sec. 2, p. 23-33. His work has been published since the first edition of this book; but upon a deliberate revision of the point, I have concluded to leave it, where the learned Judges have stated it to stand, as one on which they were divided in opinion.

² The course of proceeding in such cases is fully detailed in B. Carpzov. Practicæ Rerum Criminal. Pars, III, *Quest.* 113, per tot.

was, *Nemo tenetur prodere seipsum*; and therefore no examination of the prisoner himself was permitted in England, until the passage of the statutes of Philip and Mary.¹ By these statutes, the principles of which have been adopted in several of the United States,² the Justices, before whom any person shall be brought, charged with any of the crimes therein mentioned, shall take the examination of the prisoner, as well as that of the witnesses, in writing, which the magistrate shall subscribe, and deliver to the proper officer of the Court where the trial is to be had. The signature of the prisoner, when not specially required by statute, is not necessary; though it is expedient, and therefore is usually obtained.³ The cer-

¹ 1 & 2 Phil. & M. c. 13; 2 & 3 Phil. & M. c. 10; 7 Geo. 4, c. 64; 4 Bl. Comm. 295. The object of these statutes, it is said, is to enable the Judge to see whether the offence is bailable, and that both the Judge and Jury may see whether the witnesses are consistent or contradictory, in their accounts of the transaction. The prisoner should only be asked, whether he wishes to say any thing in answer to the charge, when he has heard all that the witnesses in support of it had to say against him. See Joy on Confessions, &c. p. 92-94; Rex v. Saunders, 2 Leach, Cr. Cas. 652; Rex v. Fagg, 4 C. & P. 567. But if he is called upon to make his answer to the charge, before he is put in possession of all the evidence against him, this irregularity is not sufficient to exclude the evidence of his confession. Rex v. Bell, 5 C. & P. 163. His statement is not an answer to the depositions, but to the charge. He is not entitled to have the depositions first read, as a matter of right. But if his examination refers to any particular depositions, he is entitled to have them read at the trial, by way of explanation. Dennis's case, 2 Lew. Cr. Cas. 261. See further, Rowland v. Ashby, Ry. & M. 231, per Best, C. J.; Rex v. Simons, 6 C. & P. 540; Regina v. Arnold, 8 C. & P. 621.

² See New York Revised Statutes, Part 4, ch. 2, tit. 2, § 14, 15, 16, 26; Cowen & Hill's notes 218, 219, to 1 Phil. Evid. 114, and note 665, to 1 Phil. Ev. 368; Bellinger's case, 8 Wend. 595, 599; Elmer's Laws of New Jersey, p. 450, § 6; Laws of Alabama, (Toulmin's Digest,) tit. 17, ch. 3, § 2, p. 219; Laws of Tennessee, (Carruthers' and Nieholson's Digest,) p. 426; North Carolina Rev. Stat. ch. 35, § 1; Laws of Mississippi, (Alden and Van Hoesen's Digest,) ch. 70, § 5, p. 532; Laws of Delaware, (Revised Code of 1829,) p. 63; Brevard's Laws of South Carolina, Vol. 1, p. 460; Laws of Missouri, (Revision of 1835,) p. 476; Laws of Michigan Territory, p. 215. See also Massachusetts Revised Stat. ch. 85, § 25; Respublica v. McCarty, 2 Dall. 87, per McKean, C. J.

³ 1 Chitty's Crim. Law, 87; Lambe's case, 2 Leach, Cr. Cas. 625.

tificate of the magistrate, as will be hereafter shown in its proper place,¹ is conclusive evidence of the manner in which the examination was conducted; and therefore, where he had certified that the prisoner was examined under oath, parol evidence to show that in fact no oath had been administered to the prisoner, was held inadmissible.² But the examination cannot be given in evidence until its identity is proved.³ If the prisoner has signed it with his name, this implies that he can read, and it is admitted on proof of his signature; but if he has signed it with his mark only, or has not signed it at all, the magistrate or his clerk must be called to identify the writing, and prove that it was truly read to the prisoner, who assented to its correctness.⁴

§ 225. The *manner of the examination* is, therefore, particularly regarded; and if it appears that the prisoner has not been left wholly free, and did not consider himself to be so, in what he was called upon to say, or did not feel himself at liberty wholly to decline any explanation or declaration whatever, the examination is not held to have been voluntary.⁵

¹ Post, § 227.

² *Rex v. Smith & Hornage*, 1 Stark. R. 242; *Rex v. Rivers*, 7 C. & P. 177; *Regina v. Pikesley*, 9 C. & P. 124.

³ 4 Hawk. P. C., B. 2, ch. 46, § 35.

⁴ *Rex v. Chappel*, 1 M. & Rob. 395.

⁵ The proper course to be pursued in these cases by the examining magistrate is thus laid down by Gurney, B. in *Rex v. Greene*, 5 C. & P. 312. — "To dissuade a prisoner was wrong. A prisoner ought to be told that his confessing will not operate at all in his favor; and that he must not expect any favor because he makes a confession; and that, if any one has told him that it will be better for him to confess, or worse for him if he does not, he must pay no attention to it; and that any thing he says to criminate himself will be used as evidence against him on his trial. After that admonition, it ought to be left entirely to himself, whether he will make any statement or not; but he ought not to be dissuaded from making a perfectly voluntary confession, because that is shutting up one of the sources of justice." The same course, in substance, was recommended by Id. Denman, in *Regina v. Arnold*, 8 C. & P. 622. The omission of this course, however, will not render the confession inadmissible.

In such cases, not only is the written evidence rejected, but oral evidence will not be received of what the prisoner said on that occasion.¹ The prisoner, therefore, must not be sworn.² But where, being mistaken for a witness, he was sworn, and afterwards, the mistake being discovered, the deposition was destroyed; and the prisoner, after having being cautioned by the magistrate, subsequently made a statement; this latter statement was held admissible.³ It may, at first view, appear unreasonable to refuse evidence of a confession, merely because it was made under oath, thus having, in favor of its truth, one of the highest sanctions known in the law. But it is to be observed, that none but voluntary confessions are admissible; and that if to the perplexities and embarrassments of the prisoner's situation are added the danger of perjury, and the dread of additional penalties, the confession can scarcely be regarded as voluntary; but, on the contrary, it seems to be made under the very influences, which the law is particularly solicitous to avoid. But where the prisoner, having been examined as a witness, in a prosecution against another person, answered questions to which he might have demurred as tending to criminate himself, and which, therefore, he was not bound to answer, his answers are deemed voluntary, and as such, may be subsequently used against himself, for all purposes;⁴

¹ *Rex v. Rivers*, 7 C. & P. 177; *Rex v. Smith et al.* 1 Stark. R. 242; *Harman's case*, 6 Pennsylv. Law Journ. p. 120. But an examination by way of question and answer is now held good, if it appears free from any other objection; *Rex v. Ellis*, Ry. & M. 439; 2 Stark. Evid. 29, note (g); though formerly it was held otherwise, in *Wilson's case*, Holt, R. 597. See *acc.* *Jones's case*, 2 Russ. 658, n.; *Roscoe's Crim. Evid.* 44; *Cowen & Hill's notes*, 218, 219, to 1 Phil. Evid. 114. So, if the questions were put by a police officer, *Rex v. Thornton*, 1 Mood. Cr. Cas. 27, or, by a fellow prisoner, *Rex v. Shaw*, 6 C. & P. 372, they are not, on that account, objectionable. See also *Rex v. Wild*, 1 Mood. Cr. Cas. 452; Post, § 229.

² Bull. N. P. 242; 4 Hawk. P. C., B. 2, ch. 46, § 37.

³ *Rex v. Webb*, 4 C. & P. 564.

⁴ 2 Stark. Evid. 28; *Wheater's case*, 2 Lewin's Cr. Cas. 157; 2 Mood. Cr. Cas. 45, S. C.; *Joy on Confessions*, &c. p. 62-66; *Hawarth's case*, *Roscoe's Crim. Evid.* 45; *Rex v. Tubby*, 5 C. & P. 530, cited and agreed

though where his answers are compulsory, and under the peril of punishment for contempt, they are not received.¹

§ 226. Thus also, where several persons, among whom was the prisoner, were summoned before a committing magistrate, upon an investigation touching a felony, there being at that time no specific charge against any person; and the prisoner, being sworn with the others, made a statement, and at the conclusion of the examination he was committed for trial; it was held, that the statement so made was not admissible in evidence against the prisoner.² This case may seem, at the first view, to be at variance with what has been just stated as the general principle in regard to testimony given in another case; but the difference lies in the different natures of the two proceedings. In the former case, the mind of the witness is not disturbed by a criminal charge; and, moreover, he is generally aided and protected by the presence of the counsel in the cause; but in the latter case, being a prisoner, subjected to an inquisitorial examination, and himself at least in danger of an accusation, his mind is brought under the full influence of those disturbing forces against which it is the policy of the law to protect him.³

§ 227. As the statutes require, that the magistrate shall

in *Rex v. Lewis*, 6 C. & P. 161; *Rex v. Walker*, cited by Gurney, B. in the same case. But see *Rex v. Davis*, 6 C. & P. 177, contra.

¹ Ante, § 193, note.

² *Rex v. Lewis*, 6 C. & P. 161, per Gurney, B.; *Regina v. Wheeley*, 8 C. & P. 250; *Regina v. Owen*, 9 C. & P. 238.

³ It has been thought, on the authority of *Britton's case*, 1 M. & Rob. 297, that the balance sheet of a bankrupt, rendered in his examination under the commission, was not admissible in evidence against him on a subsequent criminal charge, because it was rendered upon compulsion. But the ground of this decision was afterwards declared by the learned Judge who pronounced it, to be only this, that there was no previous evidence of the issuing of the commission; and, therefore, no foundation had been laid for introducing the balance sheet at all. See *Wheater's case*, 2 Mood Cr. Cas. 45, 51.

reduce to writing the whole examination, or so much thereof as shall be material, the law *conclusively presumes*, that if any thing was taken down in writing, the magistrate performed all his duty, by taking down all that was material.¹ In such case, no parol evidence of what the prisoner may have said on that occasion can be received.² But if it is shown that the examination was not reduced to writing; or if the written examination is wholly inadmissible, by reason of irregularity; parol evidence is admissible, to prove what he voluntarily disclosed.³ And if it remains uncertain, whether it was reduced to writing by the magistrate, or not, it will be presumed that he did his duty, and oral evidence will be rejected.⁴ A written examination, however, will not exclude parol evidence of a confession previously and extrajudicially made;⁵ nor of something incidentally said by the prisoner during his exami-

¹ Mr. Joy, in his *Treatise on Confessions*, &c. p. 89-92, 237, dissents from this proposition, so far as regards the *conclusive* character of the presumption; which, he thinks, is neither "supported by the authorities," nor "reconcilable with the object, with which examinations are taken." See Ante, § 224, note. But upon a careful review of the authorities, and with deference to the opinion of that learned writer, I am constrained to leave the text unaltered. See Post, § 275-277.

² *Rex v. Weller*, 2 Car. & Kir. 223. Whatever the prisoner voluntarily said respecting the particular felony under examination, should be taken down; but not that which relates to another matter. *Ibid.* And see *Reg. v. Butler*, 2 Car. & Kir. 221.

³ *Rex v. Fearshire*, 1 Leach, Cr. Cas. 240; *Rex v. Jacobs*, *Id.* 347; *Irwin's case*, 1 Hayw. 112; *Rex v. Bell*, 5 C. & P. 162; *Rex v. Read*, 1 M. & M. 403; *Phillips v. Wimburn*, 4 C. & P. 273. If the magistrate returns, that the prisoner "declined to say any thing," parol evidence of statements made by him in the magistrate's presence, at the time of the examination, is not admissible. *Rex v. Walter*, 7 C. & P. 267. See also *Rex v. Rivers*, *Id.* 177; *Regina v. Morse et al.* 8 C. & T. 605; *Leach v. Simpson*, 7 Dowl. 513. Upon the same principle, where, on a preliminary hearing of a case, the magistrate's clerk wrote down what a witness said, but the writing was not signed, and therefore was inadmissible; oral evidence was held admissible, to prove what the witness testified. *Jeans v. Wheedon*, 2 M. & Rob. 484.

⁴ *Hinxman's case*, 1 Leach, Cr. Cas. 349, n.

⁵ *Rex v. Carty*, McNally's Evid. p. 45.

nation, but not taken down by the magistrate, provided it formed no part of the judicial inquiry, so as to make it the duty of the magistrate to take it down.¹ So where the prisoner was charged with several larcenies, and the magistrate took down his confession in regard to the property of A., but omitted to write down what he confessed as to the goods of B., not remembering to have heard any thing said respecting them, it was held that parol evidence of the latter confession, being precise and distinct, was properly admitted.²

§ 228. It has already been stated, that the *signature of the prisoner is not necessary* to the admissibility of his examination, though it is usually obtained. But where it has been requested agreeably to the usage, and is absolutely refused by the prisoner, the examination has been held inadmissible, on the ground that it was to be considered as incomplete, and not a deliberate and distinct confession.³ Yet where, in a similar case, the prisoner, on being required to sign the document, said, "it is all true enough; but he would rather decline signing it," the examination was held complete, and was accordingly admitted.⁴ And in the former case, which, however, is not easily reconcilable with those statutes, which require nothing more than the act of the magistrate, though the examination is excluded, yet parol evidence of what the prisoner voluntarily said is admissible. For though, as we have previously observed,⁵ in certain cases, where the examination

¹ Moore's case, Roscoe's Crim. Evid. 45, per Parke, J.; Rex v. Spilsbury, 7 C. & P. 188; Malony's case, Ib. (otherwise Mulvey's case, Joy on Confessions, &c. p. 238,) per Littledale, J. In Rowland v. Ashby, Ry. & M. 231, Mr. Justice Best was of opinion, that "upon clear and satisfactory evidence, it would be admissible to prove something said by a prisoner, beyond what was taken down by the committing magistrate."

² Harris's case, 1 Mood. Cr. Cas. 333. See 2 Phil. Evid. 84, note, where this case is reviewed.

³ Rex v. Telicote, 2 Stark. R. 483; Bennett's case, 2 Leach's Cr. Cas. 627, n.; Rex v. Foster, 1 Lewin's Cr. Cas. 46; Rex v. Hirst, Ib.

⁴ Lambe's case, 2 Leach's Cr. Cas. 625.

⁵ Ante, § 225.

is rejected, parol evidence of what was said on the same occasion is not received; yet the reason is, that in those cases the confession was not voluntary; whereas, in the case now stated, the confession is deemed voluntary, but the examination only is incomplete.¹ And wherever the examination is rejected as documentary evidence, for informality, it may still be used as a writing, to refresh the memory of the witness who wrote it, when testifying to what the prisoner voluntarily confessed upon that occasion.²

§ 229. Though it is necessary to the admissibility of a confession that it should have been voluntarily made, that is, that it should have been made, as before shown, without the appliances of hope or fear from persons having authority; yet it is *not necessary* that it should have been the prisoner's own *spontaneous act*. It will be received, though it were induced by *spiritual exhortations*, whether of a clergyman,³ or of any other person;⁴ by a solemn *promise of secrecy*, even con-

¹ Thomas's case, 2 Leach's Cr. Cas. 727; Dewhurst's case, 1 Lewin's Cr. Cas. 47; Rex v. Swatkins, 4 C. & P. 548; Rex v. Read, 1 M. & M. 403.

² Layer's case, 16 Howell's St. Tr. 215; Rex v. Swatkins, 4 C. & P. 548, and note (a); Rex v. Tarrant, 6 C. & P. 182; Rex v. Pressly, Id. 183; Ante, § 90; Post, § 436.

³ Rex v. Gilham, 1 Mood. Cr. Cas. 186; more fully reported in Joy on Confessions, &c. p. 52-56; Commonwealth v. Drake, 15 Mass. 161. In the Roman law it is otherwise; penitential confessions to the priest being encouraged, for the relief of the conscience, and the priest being bound to secrecy by the peril of punishment. "Confessio coram sacerdote, in penitentia facta, non probat in judicio; quia censetur facta coram Deo; imo, si sacerdos eam enunciat, incidit in pœnam." Mascardus, De Probat. Vol. I, Concl. 377. It was lawful, however, for the priest to testify in such cases to the fact, that the party had made a penitential confession to him, as the church requires, and that he had enjoined penance upon him; and, with the express consent of the penitent, he might lawfully testify to the substance of the confession itself. Ib. See further, Post, § 247.

⁴ Rex v. Wild, 1 Mood. Cr. Cas. 452; Rex v. Court, 7 C. & P. 486; Joy on Confessions, &c. p. 49, 51.

firmed by an oath;¹ or by reason of the prisoner's having been made *drunken*;² or by a promise of some *collateral benefit or boon*, no hope or favor being held out in respect to the criminal charge against him;³ or by any *deception* practised on the prisoner, or false representation made to him for that purpose, provided there is no reason to suppose that the inducement held out was calculated to produce any untrue confession, which is the main point to be considered.⁴ So, a confession is admissible, though it is elicited by *questions*, whether put to the prisoner by a magistrate, officer, or private person; and the form of the question is immaterial to the admissibility, even though it assumes the prisoner's guilt.⁵ In all these cases the evidence may be laid before the Jury, however little it may weigh, under the circumstances, and however reprehensible may be the mode in which, in some of them, it was obtained. All persons, except counsellors and attorneys, are compellable to reveal what they may have heard; and counsellors and attorneys are excepted, only because it is absolutely necessary, for the sake of their clients, and of remedial justice, that communications to them should be protected.⁶ Neither is it necessary to the admissibility of any confession, to whomsoever it may have made, that it should appear that the prisoner was *warned* that what he said would be used against him. On the contrary, if the confession was voluntary, it is sufficient, though it should appear that he was not so warned.⁷

¹ *Rex v. Shaw*, 6 C. & P. 372; *Commonwealth v. Knapp*, 9 Pick. 496, 500-510. So, if it was overheard, whether said to himself or to another. *Rex v. Simons*, *Ib.* 540.

² *Rex v. Spilsbury*, 7 C. & P. 187.

³ *Rex v. Green*, 6 C. & P. 655; *Rex v. Lloyd*, *Ib.* 393.

⁴ *Rex v. Derrington*, 2 C. & P. 418; *Burley's case*, 2 Stark. Ev. 12, n.

⁵ *Rex v. Wild*, 1 Mood. Cr. Cas. 452; *Rex v. Thornton*, *Ib.* 27; *Gibney's case*, *Jebb's Cr. Cas.* 15; *Kerr's case*, 8 C. & P. 179. See *Joy on Confessions*, p. 34-40, 42-44; *Arnold's case*, 8 C. & P. 622; *Ante*, § 225, note (1).

⁶ *Per Patteson, J.* in *Rex v. Shaw*, 6 C. & P. 372.

⁷ *Gibney's case*, *Jebb's Cr. Cas.* 15; *Rex v. Magill*, cited in *McNally's*

§ 230. It has been thought, that *illegal imprisonment* exerted such influence upon the mind of the prisoner, as to justify the inference that his confessions, made during its continuance, were not voluntary; and therefore they have been rejected.¹ But this doctrine cannot yet be considered as satisfactorily established.²

§ 231. The object of all the care which, as we have now seen, is taken to exclude confessions which were not voluntary, is to exclude testimony not probably true. But where, *in consequence of the information obtained from the prisoner, the property stolen, or the instrument of the crime, or the bloody clothes of the person murdered, or any other material fact, is discovered*, it is competent to show that such discovery was made conformably with the information given by the prisoner. The statement as to his knowledge of the place where the property or other evidence was to be found, being thus confirmed by the fact, is proved to be true, and not to have been fabricated in consequence of any inducement. It is competent, therefore, to inquire, whether the prisoner stated that the thing would be found by searching a particular place, and to prove that it was accordingly so found; but it would not be competent to inquire, whether he confessed that he had concealed it there.³ This limitation of the rule was distinctly laid down by Lord Eldon, who said, that where the knowledge of any fact was obtained from a prisoner, under such a promise as excluded the confession itself from being given in evidence, he should direct an acquittal; unless the fact itself proved

Evid. 38; *Regina v. Arnold*, 8 C. & P. 622; *Joy on Confessions*, p. 45-48.

¹ *Per Holroyd, J.* in *Ackroyd and Warburton's case*, 1 Lewin's Cr. Cas. 49.

² *Rex v. Thornton*, 1 Mood. Cr. Cas. 27.

³ 1 *Phil. Evid.* 411; *Warickshall's case*, 1 Leach's Cr. Cas. 298; *Mosey's case*, *Ib.* 301, n.; *Commonwealth v. Knapp*, 9 Pick. 496, 511; *Regina v. Gould*, 9 C. & P. 364; *Rex v. Harris*, 1 Mood. Cr. Cas. 338.

would have been sufficient to warrant a conviction, without any confession leading to it.¹

§ 232. If the *prisoner himself produces the goods stolen*, and delivers them up to the prosecutor, notwithstanding it may appear that this was done upon inducements to confess held out by the latter, there seems no reason to reject the declarations of the prisoner, contemporaneous with the act of delivery, and explanatory of its character and design, though they may amount to a confession of guilt.² But whatever he may have said at the same time, not qualifying or explaining the act of delivery, is to be rejected. And if, in consequence of the confession of the prisoner, thus improperly induced, and of the information by him given, *the search* for the property or person in question *proves wholly ineffectual*, no proof of either will be received. The confession is excluded, because, being made under the influence of a promise, it cannot be relied upon; and the acts and information of the prisoner, under the same influence, not being confirmed by the finding of the property or person, are open to the same objection. The influence which may produce a groundless confession, may also produce groundless conduct.³

§ 233. As to the prisoner's liability to be affected by *the confessions of others*, it may be remarked, in general, that the principle of the law in civil and criminal cases is the same. In civil cases, as we have already seen,⁴ when once the fact of agency or partnership is established, every act and declaration of one, in furtherance of the common business, and until its completion, is deemed the act of all. And so, in cases of conspiracy, riot, or other crime, perpetrated by several persons,

¹ 2 East's P. C. 657; Harvey's case, *Ib.* 658; Lockhart's case, 1 Leach's Cr. Cas. 430.

² Rex v. Griffin, Russ. & Ry. 151; Rex v. Jones, *Ib.* 152.

³ Rex v. Jenkins, Russ. & Ry. 492; Regina v. Hearn, 1 Car. & Marsh. 109.

⁴ Ante, § 112, 113, 114, 174, 176, 177.

when once the conspiracy or combination is established, the act or declaration of one conspirator, or accomplice, in the prosecution of the enterprise, is considered the act of all, and is evidence against all.¹ Each is deemed to assent to, or command, what is done by any other in furtherance of the common object.² Thus, in an indictment against the owner of a ship, for violation of the statutes against the slave-trade, testimony of the declarations of the master, being part of the *res gestæ*, connected with acts in furtherance of the voyage, and within the scope of his authority, as agent of the owner, in the conduct of the guilty enterprise, is admissible against the owner.³ But after the common enterprise is at an end, whether by accomplishment or abandonment is not material, no one is permitted, by any subsequent act or declaration of his own, to affect the others. His confession, therefore, subsequently made, even though by the plea of guilty, is not admissible in evidence, as such, against any but himself.⁴ If it were made in the presence of another, and addressed to him, it might, in certain circumstances, be receivable on the ground of assent, or implied admission. In fine, the declarations of a conspirator or accomplice are receivable against his fellows, only when they are either in themselves acts, or accompany and explain acts, for which the others are respon-

¹ So is the Roman law. "Confessio unius non probat in præjudicium alterius; quia aliàs esset in manu confitentis dicere quod vellet, et sic jus alteri quæsitum auferre, quando omninò jure prohibent; — etiamsi talis confitens esset omni exceptione major. Sed limitabis, quando inter partes convenit parere confessioni et dicto unius alterius." Mascard. De Probat. Concl. 486, Vol. 1, p. 409.

² Per Story, J. in United States v. Gooding, 12 Wheat. 469. And see Ante, § 111, and cases there cited. The American Fur Company v. The United States, 2 Peters, 358; Commonwealth v. Eberle et al. 3 S. & R. 9; Wilbur v. Strickland, 1 Rawle, 458; Reitenback v. Reitenback, *Ib.* 362; 2 Stark. Evid. 232-237.

³ United States v. Gooding, 12 Wheat. 460.

⁴ Rex v. Turner, 1 Mood. Cr. Cas. 347; Rex v. Appleby, 3 Stark. R. 33. And see Melen v. Andrews, 1 M. & M. 336, per Parke, J.; Regina v. Hinks, 1 Den. Cr. Cas. 84; 1 Phil. Ev. 199, 9th Ed.; Regina v. Blake, 6 Ad. & El. 126, N. S.

sible; but not when they are in the nature of narratives, descriptions, or subsequent confessions.¹

§ 234. The same principle prevails in cases of *agency*. In general, no person is answerable criminally for the acts of his servants or agents, whether he be the prosecutor or the accused, unless a criminal design is brought home to him. The act of the agent or servant may be shown in evidence, as proof that such an act was so done; for a fact must be established by the same evidence, whether it is to be followed by a criminal or civil consequence; but it is a totally different question, in the consideration of criminal as distinguished from civil justice, how the principal may be affected by the fact, when so established.² Where it was proposed to show that an agent of the prosecutor, not called as a witness, offered a bribe to a witness, who also was not called, the evidence was held inadmissible; though the general doctrine, as above stated, was recognised.³

¹ 1 Phil. on Evid. 414; 4 Hawk. P. C., B. 2, ch. 46, § 34; Tong's case, Sir J. Kelyng's R. 18, 5th Res. In a case of piracy, where the persons who made the confessions were not identified, but the evidence was only, that *some* did confess, it was held, that, though such confessions could not be applied to any one of the prisoners, as proof of his personal guilt, yet the Jury might consider them, so far as they went to identify the piratical vessel. *United States v. Gibert*, 2 Sumn. 16.

² *Ld. Melville's case*, 29 Howell's St. Tr. 764; *The Queen's case*, 2 B. & B. 306, 307; Ante, § 170.

³ *The Queen's case*, 2 B. & B. 302, 306, 307, 308, 309. To the rule, thus generally laid down, there is an apparent exception, in the case of the proprietor of a newspaper, who is, *prima facie*, criminally responsible for any libel it contains, though inserted by his agent or servant without his knowledge. But Lord Tenterden considered this case as falling strictly within the principle of the rule; for "surely," said he, "a person who derives profit from, and who furnishes means for carrying on the concern, and intrusts the conduct of the publication to one whom he selects, and in whom he confides, may be said to cause to be published what actually appears, and ought to be answerable, though you cannot show that he was individually concerned in the particular publication." *Rex v. Gutch*, 1 M. & M. 433, 437. See also *Story on Agency*, § 452, 453, 455; *Rex v. Almon*, 5 Burr. 2686; *Rex v. Walter*, 3 Esp. 21; *Southwick v. Stevens*, 10 Johns. 443.

§ 235. It was formerly doubted whether the *confession* of the prisoner, indicted for *high treason*, could be received in evidence, unless it were made upon his arraignment, in open Court, and in answer to the indictment; the statutes on this subject requiring the testimony of two witnesses to some overt act of treason.¹ But it was afterwards settled, and is now agreed, that though, by those statutes, no confession could operate conclusively and without other proof, to convict the party of treason, unless it were judicially made in open Court upon the arraignment; yet that, in all cases, the confession of a criminal might be given in evidence against him; and that in cases of treason, if such confession be proved by two witnesses, it is proper evidence to be left to a Jury.² And in regard to collateral facts, which do not conduce to the proof of any overt acts of treason, they may be proved as at Common Law, by any evidence competent in other criminal cases.³

¹ Foster's Disc. I. § 8, p. 232-244; 1 East's P. C. 131, 132, 133. It is sufficient, if one witness prove one overt act, and another prove another, if both acts conduce to the perpetration of the same species of treason charged upon the prisoner. *Lord Stafford's case*, T. Raym. 407; 3 St. Tr. 204, 205; 1 East's P. C. 129; 1 Burr's Trial, 196.

² *Francia's case*, 1 East's P. C. 133, 134, 135.

³ *Smith's case*, Fost. Disc. p. 242; 1 East's P. C. 130. See Post, § 254, 255.

CHAPTER XIII.

OF EVIDENCE EXCLUDED FROM PUBLIC POLICY.

§ 236. THERE are some kinds of evidence which the law excludes, or dispenses with, *on grounds of public policy*; because greater mischiefs would probably result from requiring or permitting its admission, than from wholly rejecting it. The principle of this rule of the law has respect, in some cases, to the person testifying, and in others, to the matters concerning which he is interrogated; thus including the case of the party himself, and that of the husband or wife of the party, on the one hand, and, on the other, the subject of *professional communications, awards, secrets of State*, and some others. The two former of these belong more properly to the head of the Competency of Witnesses, under which they will accordingly be hereafter treated. The latter we shall now proceed briefly to consider.

§ 237. And in the *first* place, in regard to *professional communications*, the reason of public policy, which excludes them, applies solely, as we shall presently show, to those between a client and his legal adviser; and the rule is clear and well settled, that the *confidential counsellor, solicitor, or attorney*, of the party cannot be compelled to disclose papers delivered, or communications, made to him, or letters or entries made by him, in that capacity.¹ "This protection," said Lord Ch.

¹ In *Greenough v. Gaskell*, 1 My. & K. 101. In this decision the Lord Chancellor was assisted by consultation with Lord Lyndhurst, Tindal, C. J., and Parke, J., 4 B. & Ad. 876. And it is mentioned, as one in which all the authorities had been reviewed, in 2 M. & W. 100, per Lord Abinger. The earliest reported case on this subject is that of *Berd v. Lovelace*, 19 Eliz. in Chancery, Cary's R. 88. See also *Austin v. Vesey*, Ib. 89; *Kelway v. Kelway*, Ib. 127; *Dennis v. Codrington*, Ib. 143; all which are stated at

Brougham, "is not qualified by any reference to proceedings pending, or in contemplation. If, touching matters that come within the ordinary scope of professional employment, they receive a communication in their professional capacity, either from a client, or on his account and for his benefit, in the transaction of his business, or, which amounts to the same thing, if they commit to paper, in the course of their employment on his behalf, matters which they know only through their professional relation to the client, they are not only justified in withholding such matters, but bound to withhold them, and will not be compelled to disclose the information or produce the papers, in any Court of Law or Equity, either as party or as witness."¹

§ 238. "The *foundation* of this rule," he adds, "is not on account of any particular importance which the law attributes to the business of legal professors, or any particular disposition to afford them protection. But it is out of regard to the interests of justice, which cannot be upholden, and to the administration of justice, which cannot go on without the aid of men skilled in jurisprudence, in the practice of the Courts, and in those matters affecting rights and obligations, which form the subject of all judicial proceedings." If such communications were not protected, no man, as the same learned Judge remarked in another case, would dare to consult a professional adviser, with a view to his defence, or to the enforcement of his rights; and no man could safely come into a Court, either to obtain redress, or to defend himself.²

large by Mr. Metcalf, in his notes to Stark. Evid. 395, (1st Am. Ed.) See also 12 Vin. Abr. Evid. B. a.; *Wilson v. Rastall*, 4 T. R. 753; *Rex v. Withers*, 2 Campb. 578; *Wilson v. Troup*, 7 Johns. Ch. 25; 2 Cowen, 195; *Mills v. Oddy*, 6 C. & P. 728; *Anon.* 8 Mass. 370; *Walker v. Wildman*, 6 Madd. R. 47; *Story's Eq. Pl.* 458-461; *Jackson v. Burtis*, 14 Johns. 391; *Foster v. Hall*, 12 Pick. 89; *Chirac v. Reinicker*, 11 Wheat. 295; *Rex v. Shaw*, 6 C. & P. 372.

¹ *Greenough v. Gaskell*, 1 My. & K. 102, 103.

² *Bolton v. The Corporation of Liverpool*, 1 My. & K. 94, 95. "This

§ 239. In regard to the *persons*, to whom the communications must have been made, in order to be thus protected, they must have been made to the *counsel, attorney, or solicitor* acting, for the time being, in the character of *legal adviser*.¹ For the reason of the rule, having respect solely to the free and unembarrassed administration of justice, and to security in the enjoyment of civil rights, does not extend to things confidentially communicated to other persons, nor even to those which come to the knowledge of counsel, when not standing in that relation to the party. Whether he be called as a witness, or be made defendant, and a discovery sought from him, as such, by a bill in Chancery, whatever he has learned, as counsel, solicitor, or attorney, he is not obliged nor permitted to disclose.² And this protection extends also to all the necessary organs of communication between the attorney and

rule seems to be correlative with that which governs the summary jurisdiction of the Courts over attorneys. In *Ex parte Aitken*, (4 B. & Ald. 49; see also *Ex parte Yeatman*, 4 Dowl. P. C. 309;) that rule is laid down thus—'Where an attorney is employed in a matter, wholly unconnected with his professional character, the Court will not interfere in a summary way to compel him to execute faithfully the trust reposed in him. But where the employment is so connected with his professional character, as to afford a presumption that his character formed the ground of his employment by the client, there the Court will exercise this jurisdiction.' So, where the communication made relates to a circumstance, so connected with the employment as an attorney, that the character formed the ground of the communication, it is privileged from disclosure." Per Alderson, J. in *Turquand v. Knight*, 2 M. & W. 101. The Roman Law rejected the evidence of the procurator and the advocate, in nearly the same cases in which the Common Law holds them incompetent to testify; but not for the same reasons; the latter regarding the general interest of the community, as stated in the text, while the former seems to consider them as not credible, because of the identity of their interest, opinions, and prejudices with those of their clients. Mascard. De Probat. Vol. I. Concl. 66, Vol. III. Concl. 1239; P. Farinacii Opera, Tom. 2, tit. 6, Quæst. 60, Illat. 5, 6.

¹ If the party has been requested to act as solicitor, and the communication is made under the impression that the request has been acceded to, it is privileged. *Smith v. Fell*, 2 Curt. 667.

² *Greenough v. Gaskell*, 1 My. & K. 95; *Wilson v. Rastall*, 4 T. R. 753.

his client; an *interpreter*¹ and an *agent*² being considered as standing in precisely the same situation as the attorney himself, and under the same obligation of secrecy. It extends also to a case submitted to counsel in a *foreign country*, and his opinion thereon.³ It was formerly thought that an *attorney's* or a *barrister's clerk* was not within the reason and exigency of the rule; but it is now considered otherwise, from the necessity they are under to employ clerks, being unable to transact all their business in person; and accordingly clerks are not compellable to disclose facts, coming to their knowledge in the course of their employment in that capacity, to which the attorney or barrister himself could not be interrogated.⁴ And as the privilege is not personal to the attorney, but is a rule of law, for the protection of the client, the *executor of the attorney* seems to be within the rule, in regard to papers coming to his hands, as the personal representative of the attorney.⁵

§ 240. This protection extends to every communication which the client makes to his legal adviser, for the *purpose of professional advice* or aid, upon the subject of his rights and liabilities. Nor is it necessary that any judicial proceedings in particular should have been commenced or contemplated;

¹ *Du Barre v. Livette*, Peake's Cas. 77, explained in 4 T. R. 756; *Jackson v. French*, 3 Wend. 337; *Andrews v. Solomon*, 1 Pet. C. C. R. 356; *Parker v. Carter*, 4 Munf. 273.

² *Parkins v. Hawkshaw*, 2 Stark. R. 239; *Tait on Evid.* 385; *Bunbury v. Bunbury*, 2 Beav. 173; *Steele v. Stewart*, 1 Phil. Ch. R. 471; *Carpmael v. Powis*, 1 Phillips, Ch. R. 687; 9 Beav. 16, S. C.

³ *Bunbury v. Bunbury*, 2 Beav. 173.

⁴ *Taylor v. Foster*, 2 C. & P. 195, per Best, J., cited and approved in 12 Pick. 93; *Rex v. Upper Boddington*, 8 Dow. & Ry. 726, per Bayley, J.; *Foot v. Hayne*, 1 C. & P. 545, per Abbott, C. J.; R. & M. 165, S. C.; *Jackson v. French*, 3 Wend. 337; *Power v. Kent*, as reported by Mr. Cowen, in note 282, to 1 Phil. Evid. 245; *Bowman v. Norton*, 5 C. & P. 177; *Shore v. Bedford*, 5 M. & Gr. 271; *Jardine v. Sheridan*, 2 C. & K. 24.

⁵ *Fenwick v. Reed*, 1 Meriv. 114, 120, arg.

it is enough if the matter in hand, like every other human transaction, may by possibility become the subject of judicial inquiry. "If," said Lord Ch. Brougham, "the privilege were confined to communications connected with suits begun, or intended, or expected, or apprehended, no one could safely adopt such precautions, as might eventually render any proceedings successful, or all proceedings superfluous."¹ Whether the party himself can be compelled, by a bill in Chancery, to produce a case which he has laid before counsel, with the opinion given thereon, is not perfectly clear. At one time it was held by the House of Lords, that he might be compelled to produce the case which he had sent, but not the opinion which he had received.² This decision, however, was not satisfactory; and though it was silently followed in one case,³ and reluctantly submitted to in another,⁴ yet its principle has since been ably controverted and refuted.⁵ The great object of the rule seems

¹ 1 M. & K. 102, 103; *Carpmael v. Powis*, 9 Beav. 16; 1 Phillips, 687. See also the observations of the learned Judges, in *Cromack v. Heathcote*, 2 Brod. & B. 4, to the same effect; *Gresley's Evid.* 32, 33; *Story's Eq. Pl.* § 600; *Moore v. Terrell*, 4 B. & Ad. 870; *Beltzhoover v. Blackstock*, 3 Watts, 20; *Taylor v. Blacklow*, 3 Bing. N. C. 235; *Foster v. Hall*, 12 Pick. 89, 92, 99, where the English decisions on this subject are fully reviewed by the learned Chief Justice; *Doe v. Harris*, 5 C. & P. 592; *Walker v. Wildman*, 6 Madd. R. 47. There are some decisions which require that a suit be either pending or anticipated. See *Williams v. Mundie*, Ry. & M. 34; *Broad v. Pitt*, 3 C. & P. 518. See also *Cowen & Hill's note* 280, to 1 Phil. Evid. 144; *Duffin v. Smith*, Peake's Cas. 108. But these are now overruled. See *Pearse v. Pearse*, 11 Jur. 52; 1 De Gex & Smale, 12, S. C. The law of Scotland is the same in this matter as that of England. *Tait on Evid.* 384.

² *Radcliffe v. Fursman*, 2 Bro. P. C. 514.

³ *Preston v. Carr*, 1 Y. & Jer. 175.

⁴ *Newton v. Beresford*, 1 You. 376.

⁵ In *Bolton v. Corp. of Liverpool*, 1 My. & K. 88, per Ld. Ch. Brougham; and in *Pearse v. Pearse*, 11 Jur. 52, by Knight Bruce, V. C. In the following observations of this learned Judge, we have the view at present taken of this vexed question in England. — "That cases laid before counsel on behalf of a client stand upon the same footing as other professional communications from the client to the counsel and solicitor, or to either of them, may, I suppose, be assumed; and that, as far as any discovery by the solicitor or counsel

plainly to require that the entire professional intercourse between client and attorney, whatever it may have consisted in, should be protected by profound secrecy.¹

is concerned, the question of the existence or non-existence of any suit, claim, or dispute, is immaterial, the law providing for the client's protection in each state of circumstances, and in each equally, is, I suppose, not a disputable point. I suppose *Cromack v. Heathcote*, (2 Brod. & Bing. 4,) to be now universally acceded to, and the doctrine of this Court to have been correctly stated by Lord Lyndhurst, in *Herring v. Cloberry*, (1 Phil. 91,) when he said, 'I lay down this rule with reference to this cause, that, where an attorney is employed by a client professionally to transact professional business, all the communications that pass between the client and the attorney in the course and for the purpose of that business are privileged communications, and that the privilege is the privilege of the client and not of the attorney.' This I take to be not a peculiar, but a general rule of jurisprudence. The civil law, indeed, considered the advocate and client so identified or bound together, that the advocate was, I believe, generally not allowed to be a witness for the client. '*Ne patroni in causâ, cui patrocinium præstiterunt, testimonium dicant*,' says the Digest (Dig. lib. 22, tit. 5, l. 25.) An old Jurist, indeed, appears to have thought, that, by putting an advocate to the torture, he might be made a good witness for his client; but this seems not to have met with general approbation. Professors of the law probably were not disposed to encourage the dogma practically. Voet puts the communications between a client and an advocate on the footing of those between a penitent and his priest. He says: '*Non etiam advocatus aut procurator in câ causâ, cui patrocinium præstitit aut procuracionem, idoneus testis est, sive pro cliente sive contra eum producatur; saltem non ad id, ut pandere cogeretur ea, quæ non aliunde quam ex revelatione clientis, comperta habet: eo modo, quo, et sacerdoti revelare ea quæ ex auriculari didicit confessione, nefas est.*' Now, whether laying or not laying stress on the observations made by the late Lord Chief Baron in *Knight v. Lord Waterford* (2 Y. & C. 40, 41,) — observations, I need not say, well worthy of attention, — I confess myself at a loss to perceive any substantial difference, in point of reason, or principle, or convenience, between the liability of the client and that of his counsel or solicitor to disclose the client's communications made in confidence professionally to either. True, the client is or may be compellable to disclose all that, before he consulted the counsel or solicitor, he knew, believed, or had seen or heard; but the question is not, I apprehend, one as to the greater or less probability of more or less damage. The question is, I suppose one of principle, — one

¹ Thus, what the attorney saw, namely, the destruction of an instrument, was held privileged. *Robson v. Kemp*, 5 Esp. 52.

§ 240 *a*. In regard to the obligation of the party to discover and produce the opinion of counsel, various distinctions have

that ought to be decided according to certain rules of jurisprudence; nor is the exemption of the solicitor or counsel from compulsory discovery confined to advice given, or opinions stated. It extends to facts communicated by the client. Lord Eldon has said (19 Ves. 267): 'The case might easily be put, that a most honest man, so changing his situation, might communicate a fact, appearing to him to have no connexion with the case, and yet the whole title of his former client might depend on it. Though Sir John Strange's opinion was, that an attorney might, if he pleased, give evidence of his client's secrets, I take it to be clear, that no Court would permit him to give such evidence, or would have any difficulty, if a solicitor, voluntarily changing his situation, was, in his new character, proceeding to communicate a material fact. A short way of preventing him would be by striking him off the roll.' But as to damage: a man, having laid a case before counsel, may die, leaving all the rest of mankind ignorant of a blot on his title stated in the case, and not discoverable by any other means. The whole fortunes of his family may turn on the question whether the case shall be discovered, may be subverted by its discovery. Again, the client is certainly exempted from liability to discover communications between himself and his counsel or solicitor after litigation commenced, or after the commencement of a dispute ending in litigation; at least, if they relate to the dispute or matter in dispute. Upon this I need scarcely refer to a class of authorities to which *Hughes v. Biddulph*, (4 Russ. 190,) *Nias v. Northern and Eastern Railway Company*, (3 Myl. & Cr. 355,) before the present Lord Chancellor in his former chancellorship, and *Holmes v. Baddeley*, (1 Phil. 476,) decided by Lord Lyndhurst, belong. But what, for the purpose of discovery, is the distinction in point of reason, or principle, or justice, or convenience, between such communications and those which differ from them only in this, that they precede instead of following the actual arising, not of a cause for dispute, but of a dispute, I have never hitherto been able to perceive. A man is in possession of an estate as owner, he is not under any fiduciary obligation, he finds a flaw, or a supposed flaw, in his title, which it is not, in point of law or equity, his duty to disclose to any person; he believes that the flaw or supposed defect is not known to the only person, who, if it is a defect, is entitled to take advantage of it, but that this person may probably or possibly soon hear of it, and then institute a suit or make a claim. Under this apprehension he consults a solicitor, and, through the solicitor, lays a case before counsel on the subject, and receives his opinion. Some time afterwards the apprehended adversary becomes an actual adversary, for, coming to the knowledge of the defect or supposed flaw in the title, he makes a claim, and after a preliminary correspondence, commences a suit in equity to enforce it: but between the commencement of the

been attempted to be set up, in favor of a discovery of communications made before litigation, though in contemplation of, and with reference to such litigation, which afterwards took place; and again, in respect to communications which,

correspondence and the actual institution of the suit, the man in possession again consults a solicitor, and through him again lays a case before counsel. According to the respondent's argument before me on this occasion, the defendant, in the instance that I have supposed, is as clearly bound to disclose the first consultation and the first case, as he is clearly exempted from discovering the second consultation, and the second case. I have, I repeat, yet to learn, that such a distinction has any foundation in reason or convenience. The discovery and vindication and establishment of truth are main purposes certainly of the existence of Courts of justice; still, for the obtaining of these objects, which, however valuable and important, cannot be usefully pursued without moderation, cannot be either usefully or creditably pursued unfairly or gained by unfair means, not every channel is or ought to be open to them. The practical inefficacy of torture is not, I suppose, the most weighty objection to that mode of examination, nor probably would the purpose of the mere disclosure of truth have been otherwise than advanced by a refusal on the part of the Lord Chancellor in 1815 to act against the solicitor, who, in the cause between Lord Cholmondeley and Lord Clinton, had acted or proposed to act in the manner which Lord Eldon thought it right to prohibit. Truth, like all other good things, may be loved unwisely — may be pursued too keenly — may cost too much. And surely the meanness and the mischief of prying into a man's confidential consultations with his legal adviser, the general evil of infusing reserve, and dissimulation, uneasiness, and suspicion, and fear, into those communications which must take place, and which, unless in a condition of perfect security, must take place uselessly or worse, are too great a price to pay for truth itself." See 11 Jur. p. 54, 55; 1 De Gex & Smale, 25-29. See also *Gresley on Evid.* 32, 33; *Bp. of Meath v. Marq. of Winchester*, 10 Bing. 330, 375, 454, 455; *Nias v. The Northern &c. Railway Co.* 3 My. & C. 355, 357; *Bunbury v. Bunbury*, 2 Beav. 173; *Herring v. Cloberry*, 1 Turn. & Phil. 91; *Jones v. Pugh*, 1b. 96; *Law Mag. (London)*, Vol. xvii. p. 51-74; and Vol. xxx. p. 107-123; *Holmes v. Baddeley*, 1 Phil. Ch. R. 476. Lord Langdale has held, that the privilege of a client as to discovery was not co-extensive with that of his solicitor; and therefore he compelled the son and heir to discover a case, which had been submitted to counsel by his father, and had come, with the estate, to his hands. *Greenlaw v. King*, 1 Beavan's R. 137. But his opinion, on the general question, whether the party is bound to discover a case submitted to his counsel, is known to be opposed to that of a majority of the English Judges, though still retained by himself. See *Crisp v. Platel*, 8 Beav. 62; *Reece v. Trye*, 9 Beav. 316, 318, 319.

though in fact made after the dispute between the parties, which was followed by litigation, were yet made neither in contemplation of nor with reference to such litigation; and again, in regard to communications of cases or statements of fact, made on behalf of a party by or for his solicitor or legal adviser, on the subject-matter in question, after litigation commenced, or in contemplation of litigation on the same subject with other persons, with the view of asserting the same right; but all these distinctions have been overruled, and the communications held to be within the privilege.¹ And where a *cestui que trust* filed a bill against his trustee, to set aside a purchase by the latter of the trust property, made thirty years back; and the trustee filed his cross-bill, alleging that the *cestui que trust* had long known his situation in respect to the property, and had acquiesced in the purchase, and in proof thereof that he had, fifteen years before, taken the opinion of counsel thereon, of which he prayed a discovery and production; it was held that the opinion, as it was taken after the dispute had arisen which was the subject of the original and cross-bill, and for the guidance of one of the parties in respect of that very dispute, was privileged at the time it was taken; and as the same dispute was still the subject of the litigation, the communication still retained its privilege.² But where a bill for the specific performance of a contract for the sale of an estate was brought by the assignees of a bankrupt who had sold it under their commission, and a cross-bill was filed against them for discovery, in aid of the defence, it was held that the privilege of protection did not extend to professional and confidential communications between the defendants and their counsel, respecting the property and before the sale, but only to such as had passed after the sale; and that it did not extend to communications between

¹ *Ld. Walsingham v. Goodricke*, 3 Hare, 122, 125; *Hughes v. Biddulph*, 4 Russ. 190; *Vent v. Pacey*, *Ib.* 193; *Clagett v. Phillips*, 2 Y. & C. 82; *Combe v. Corp. of Lond.* 1 Y. & C. 631; *Holmes v. Baddeley*, 1 Phil. Ch. R. 476.

² *Woods v. Woods*, 9 Jur. 615, per Sir J. Wigram, V. C.

them in the relation of principal and agent; nor to those had by the defendants or their counsel with the insolvent, or his creditors, or the provisional assignee, or on behalf of the wife of the insolvent.¹

§ 241. Upon the foregoing principles it has been held, that the attorney is *not bound to produce title deeds*, or other documents, left with him by his client for professional advice; though he may be examined to the fact of their existence, in order to let in secondary evidence of their contents, which must be from some other source than himself.² But whether the object of leaving the documents with the attorney was for professional advice or for another purpose, may be determined by the Judge.³ If he was consulted merely as a *conveyancer*, to draw deeds of conveyance, the communications made to him in that capacity are within the rule of protection,⁴ even though he was employed as the mutual adviser and counsel of both parties; for it would be most mischievous, said the learned Judges in the Common Pleas, if it could be doubted, whether or not an attorney, consulted upon a man's title to an estate, were at liberty to divulge a flaw.⁵ Neither does the rule require any regular *retainer*, as counsel, nor any particular form of application or engagement, nor the payment of fees. It is enough that he was applied to for advice or aid in

¹ *Robinson v. Flight*, 8 Jur. 888, per *Ld. Langdale*.

² *Brard v. Ackerman*, 5 Esp. 119; *Doe v. Harris*, 5 C. & P. 592; *Jackson v. Burtis*, 14 Johns. 391; *Dale v. Livingston*, 4 Wend. 558; *Brandt v. Klein*, 17 Johns. 335; *Jackson v. McVey*, 18 Johns. 330; *Bevan v. Waters*, 1 M. & M. 235; *Eicke v. Nokes*, *Ib.* 303; *Mills v. Oddy*, 6 C. & P. 728; *Marston v. Downes*, *Ib.* 381; 1 Ad. & El. 31, S. C.; explained in *Hibbert v. Knight*, 12 Jur. 162; *Bate v. Kinsey*, 1 C. M. & R. 38; *Doe v. Gilbert*, 7 M. & W. 102; *Nixon v. Mayoh*, 1 M. & Rob. 76; *Davies v. Waters*, 9 M. & W. 608; *Coates v. Birch*, 1 G. & D. 474; 1 Dowl. P. C. 540.

³ *Reg. v. Jones*, 1 Denis. Cr. Cas. 166.

⁴ *Cromack v. Heathcote*, 2 B. & B. 4; *Parker v. Carter*, 4 Munf. 273. See also *Wilson v. Troup*, 7 Johns. Ch. 25.

⁵ *Cromack v. Heathcote*, 2 B. & B. 4; *Doe v. Seaton*, 2 Ad. & El. 171; *Clay v. Williams*, 2 Munf. 105, 122; *Doe v. Watkins*, 3 Bing. N. C. 421.

his professional character.¹ But this character must have been known to the applicant; for if a person should be consulted confidentially, on the supposition that he was an attorney, when in fact he was not one, he will be compelled to disclose the matters communicated.²

§ 242. This rule is limited to cases where the witness, or the defendant in a bill in Chancery treated as such, and so called to discover, learned the matter in question only as counsel, solicitor, or attorney, and in no other way. If, therefore, he were a *party to the transaction*, and especially if he were party to a fraud, (as, for example, if he turned informer, after being engaged in a conspiracy,) or, in other words, if he were acting for himself, though he might also be employed for another, he would not be protected from disclosing; for in such a case his knowledge would not be acquired solely by his being employed professionally.³

§ 243. The protection given by the law to such communications does not cease with the termination of the suit, or other litigation or business in which they were made; nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney, and retaining another; nor by any other change of relations between them; nor by the death of the client. The seal of the law once fixed upon them *remains forever; unless removed by the party himself*, in whose favor it was there placed.⁴ It is not removed without the client's consent, even

¹ *Foster v. Hall*, 12 Pick. 89. See also *Bean v. Quimby*, 5 N. Hamp. 94.

² *Fountain v. Young*, 6 Esp. 113.

³ *Greenough v. Gaskell*, 1 My. & K. 103, 104; *Desborough v. Rawlins*, 3 My. & Craig, 515, 521-523; *Story on Eq. Pl.* § 601, 602. In *Duffin v. Smith*, Peake's Cas. 108, Lord Kenyon recognised this principle, though he applied it to the case of an attorney preparing title deeds, treating him as thereby becoming a party to the transaction; but such are now held to be professional communications.

⁴ *Wilson v. Rastall*, 4 T. R. 759, per Buller, J.; *Petrie's case*, cited arg. 4 T. R. 756; *Parker v. Yates*, 12 Moore, 520; *Merle v. More*, R. & M.

though the interests of criminal justice may seem to require the production of the evidence.¹

§ 244. This rule is further illustrated by reference to the cases in which the attorney may be examined, and which are therefore sometimes mentioned as *exceptions to the rule*. These apparent exceptions are, where the communication was made *before the attorney was employed* as such, or *after* his employment had *ceased*;—or where, though consulted by a friend, because he was an attorney, yet he refused to act as such, and was therefore only applied to *as a friend*;—or where there could not be said, in any correctness of speech, to be a communication at all; as where, for instance, a fact, something that was done, became known to him from his having been brought to a certain place by the circumstance of his being the attorney, but of which fact *any other man*, if there, would have been *equally conusant* (and even this has been held privileged in some of the cases);—or where the matter communicated was *not in its nature private*, and could in no sense be termed the subject of a confidential disclosure;—or where the thing had *no reference to the professional employment*, though disclosed while the relation of attorney and client subsisted;—or where the attorney, having made himself a *subscribing witness*, and thereby

390. And the client does not waive this privilege merely by calling the attorney as a witness, unless he also himself examines him in chief to the matter privileged. *Vaillant v. Dodemead*, 2 Atk. 524; *Waldron v. Ward*, Sty. 449. Where the party's solicitor became trustee under a deed for the benefit of the client's creditors, it was held that communications subsequent to the deed were still privileged. *Pritchard v. Foulkes*, 1 Coop. 14.

¹ *Rex v. Smith*, Phil. & Am. on Evid. 182; *Rex v. Dixon*, 3 Burr. 1687; *Anon.* 8 Mass. 370; *Petrie's case*, *supra*. But see *Regina v. Avery*, 8 C. & P. 596, in which it was held, that where the same attorney acted for the mortgagee, in lending the money, and also for the prisoner, the mortgagor, in preparing the mortgage deed, and received from the prisoner, as part of his title deeds, a forged will, it was held, on a trial for forging the will, that it was not a privileged communication; and the attorney was held bound to produce it. See also *Shore v. Bedford*, 5 Man. & Grang. 271.

assumed another character for the occasion, adopted the duties which it imposes, and became bound to give evidence of all that a subscribing witness can be required to prove. In all such cases, it is plain that the attorney is not called upon to disclose matters, which he can be said to have learned by communication with his client, or on his client's behalf, matters which were so committed to him in his capacity of attorney, and matters which in that capacity alone he had come to know.¹

§ 245. Thus, the attorney may be compelled to disclose the name of the person by whom he was retained, in order to let in the confessions of the real party in interest;²—the character in which his client employed him, whether that of executor or trustee, or on his private account;³—the time when an instrument was put into his hands, but not its condition and appearance at that time, as, whether it were stamped or indorsed, or not;⁴—the fact of his paying over to his client moneys collected for him;—the execution of a deed by

¹ Per *Ld. Brougham*, in *Greenough v. Gaskell*, 1 My. & K. 104. See also *Desborough v. Rawlins*, 3 My. & Craig, 521, 522; *Ld. Walsingham v. Goodricke*, 3 Hare, R. 122; *Story's Eq. Pl.* § 601, 602; *Bolton v. Corporation of Liverpool*, 1 My. & K. 88; *Annesley v. E. of Anglesea*, 17 Howell's St. Tr. 1239–1244; *Gillard v. Bates*, 6 M. & W. 547; *Rex v. Brewer*, 6 C. & P. 363. Communications between the solicitor and one of his client's witnesses, as to the evidence to be given by the witness, are not privileged. *Mackenzie v. Yeo*, 2 Curt. 866.

² *Levy v. Pope*, 1 M. & M. 410; *Brown v. Payson*, 6 N. Hamp. 443; *Chirac v. Reinicker*, 11 Wheat. 280; *Gower v. Emery*, 6 Shepl. 79.

³ *Beckwith v. Benner*, 6 C. & P. 681. But see *Chirac v. Reinicker*, 11 Wheat. 280, 295, where it was held, that counsel could not disclose whether they were employed to conduct an ejectment for their client, as *landlord of the premises*.

⁴ *Wheatley v. Williams*, 1 Mees. & W. 533; *Brown v. Payson*, 6 N. Hamp. 443. But if the question were about a rasure in a deed or will, he might be examined to the question, whether he had ever seen it in any other plight. *Bull. N. P.* 284. So, as to a confession of the rasure by his client, if it were confessed before his retainer. *Cuts v. Pickering*, 1 Ventr. 197. See also *Baker v. Arnold*, 1 Caines, 258, per *Thompson and Livingston, Js.*

his client which he attested;¹—a statement made by him to the adverse party.² He may also be called to prove the identity of his client;³—the fact of his having sworn to his answer in Chancery, if he were then present;⁴—usury in a loan made by him as *broker*, as well as attorney to the lender;⁵—the fact that he or his client is in possession of a certain document of his client's, for the purpose of letting in secondary evidence of its contents;⁶—and his client's handwriting.⁷ But in all cases of this sort, the privilege of secrecy is carefully extended to all the matters professionally disclosed, and which he would not have known, but from his being consulted professionally by his client.

§ 246. Where an attorney is called upon, whether by *subpœna duces tecum*, or otherwise, to produce deeds or papers belonging to his client, who is not a party to the suit, the Court will inspect the documents, and pronounce upon their admissibility, according as their production may appear to be prejudicial or not to the client; in like manner, as where a witness objects to the production of his own title deeds.⁸

¹ *Doe v. Andrews*, Cowp. 845; *Robson v. Kemp*, 4 Esp. 235; 5 Esp. 53, S. C.; *Sanford v. Remington*, 2 Ves. 189.

² *Ripon v. Davies*, 2 Nev. & M. 210; *Shore v. Bedford*, 5 M. & Gr. 271; *Griffith v. Davies*, 5 B. & Ad. 502, overruling *Gainsford v. Grammar*, 2 Campb. 9, contra.

³ Cowp. 846; *Beckwith v. Benner*, 6 C. & P. 681; *Hurd v. Moring*, 1 C. & P. 372; *Rex v. Watkinson*, 2 Stra. 1122, and note.

⁴ *Bull. N. P.* 284; Cowp. 846.

⁵ *Duffin v. Smith*, Peake's Cas. 108.

⁶ *Bevan v. Waters*, 1 M. & M. 235; *Eicke v. Nokes*, Ib. 303; *Jackson v. McVey*, 18 Johns. 330; *Brandt v. Klein*, 17 Johns. 335; *Doe v. Ross*, 7 M. & W. 102; *Robson v. Kemp*, 5 Esp. 53; *Coates v. Birch*, 2 Ad. & El. 252, N. S.

⁷ *Hurd v. Moring*, 1 C. & P. 372; *Johnson v. Daverne*, 19 Johns. 134; 4 Hawk. P. C., B. 2, ch. 46, § 89.

⁸ *Copeland v. Watts*, 1 Stark. R. 95; *Amey v. Long*, 9 East, 473; 1 Campb. 14, S. C.; *Phil. & Am. on Evid.* 186; 1 *Phil. Evid.* 175; *Reynolds v. Rowley*, 3 Rob. Louis. R. 201; *Travis v. January*, Ib. 227.

And the same discretion will be exercised by the Courts, where the documents called for are in the hands of solicitors for the assignees of bankrupts;¹ though it was at one time thought that their production was a matter of public duty.² So, if the documents called for are in the hands of the *agent* or *steward* of a third person, or even in the hands of the owner himself, their production will not be required where, in the judgment of the Court, it may injuriously affect his title.³ This extension of the rule, which will be more fully treated hereafter, is founded on a consideration of the great inconvenience and mischief which may result to individuals from a compulsory disclosure and collateral discussion of their titles, in cases where, not being themselves parties, the whole merits cannot be tried.

§ 247. There is one other situation, in which the exclusion of evidence has been strongly contended for, on the ground of confidence and the general good, namely, that of a *clergyman*; and this chiefly, if not wholly, in reference to criminal conduct and proceedings; that the guilty conscience may with safety disburden itself by penitential confessions, and by spiritual advice, instruction, and discipline, seek pardon and relief. The law of Papal Rome has adopted this principle in its fullest extent; not only excepting such confessions from the general rules of evidence, as we have already intimated,⁴

¹ *Bateson v. Hartsink*, 4 Esp. 43; *Cohen v. Templar*, 2 Stark. R. 260; *Laing v. Barclay*, 3 Stark. R. 38; *Hawkins v. Howard*, Ry. & M. 64; *Corsen v. Dubois*, Holt's Cas. 239; *Bull v. Loveland*, 10 Pick. 9, 14.

² *Pearson v. Fletcher*, 5 Esp. 90, per Lord Ellenborough.

³ *Rex v. Hunter*, 3 C. & P. 591; *Pickering v. Noyes*, 1 B. & C. 262; *Roberts v. Simpson*, 2 Stark. R. 203; *Doe v. Thomas*, 9 B. & C. 288; *Bull v. Loveland*, 10 Pick. 9, 14.

⁴ Ante, § 229, note. By the Capitularies of the French kings, and some other continental codes of the middle ages, the clergy were not only excused, but in some cases were utterly prohibited from attending as witnesses in any cause. Clerici de iudicii sui cognitione non cogantur in publicum dicere testimonium. Capit. Reg. Francorum, lib. 7, § 118, (A. D. 827). Ut nulla ad testimonia dicendum, ecclesiastici cujuslibet pulsetur persona. Ibid. § 91. See

but punishing the priest who reveals them. It even has gone farther; for *Mascardus*, after observing, that in general, persons coming to the knowledge of facts under an oath of secrecy are compellable to disclose them as witnesses, proceeds to state the case of confessions to a priest, as not within the operation of the rule; on the ground that the confession is made not so much to the priest as to the Deity, whom he represents; and that therefore the priest, when appearing as a witness in his private character, may lawfully swear that he knows nothing of the subject. *Hoc tamen restringe, non posse procedere in sacerdote producto in testem contra reum criminis, quando in confessione sacramentali fuit aliquid sibi dictum, quia potest dicere, se nihil scire ex eo; quod illud, quod scit, scit ut Deus, et ut Deus non producit in testem, sed ut homo, et tanquam homo ignorat illud super quo producitur.*¹ In Scotland, where a prisoner in custody and preparing for his trial has confessed his crimes to a clergyman, in order to obtain spiritual advice and comfort, the clergyman is not required to give evidence of such confession. But even in criminal cases, this exception is not carried so far as to include communications made confidentially to clergymen, in the ordinary course of their duty.² Though the law of England encourages the penitent to confess his sins, "for the unburthening of his conscience, and to receive spiritual consolation and ease of mind," yet the minister to whom the confession is made is merely excused from presenting the offender to the

Leges Barbar. Antiq. Vol. 3, p. 313, 316. — *Leges Langobardicæ*, in the same collection, Vol. 1, p. 184, 209, 237. But from the constitutions of King Ethelred, which provide for the punishment of priests guilty of perjury, — "Si presbyter *alicubi* inveniatur in falso testimonio, vel in perjurio," — it would seem that the English law of that day did not recognise any distinction between them and the laity, in regard to the obligation to testify as witnesses. See *Leges Barbar. Antiq.* Vol. 4, p. 294; *Ancient Laws and Inst. of England*, Vol. 1, p. 347, § 27.

¹ *Mascard. De Probat.* Vol. 1, Quæst. v. n. 51; Id. Concl. 377. Vid. et P. Farinac. Opera, Tit. 8, Quæst. 78, n. 73.

² *Tait on Evidence*, p. 386, 387; *Alison's Practice*, p. 586.

civil magistracy, and enjoined not to reveal the matter confessed, "under pain of irregularity."¹ In all other respects he is left to the full operation of the rules of the Common Law, by which he is bound to testify in such cases, as any other person, when duly summoned. In the Common Law of evidence there is no distinction between clergymen and laymen; but all confessions and other matters, not confided to legal counsel, must be disclosed, when required for the purposes of justice. Neither penitential confessions, made to the minister, or to members of the party's own church, nor secrets confided to a Roman Catholic priest in the course of confession, are regarded as privileged communications.²

§ 248. Neither is this protection extended to *medical persons*,³ in regard to information which they have acquired

¹ Const. & Canon. 1 Jac. 1, Can. cxiii; 2 Gibson's Codex, p. 963.

² Wilson v. Rastall, 4 T. R. 753; Butler v. Moore, McNally's Evid. 253-255; Anon. 2 Skin. 404, per Holt, C. J.; Du Barre v. Livette, Peake's Cas. 77; Commonwealth v. Drake, 15 Mass. 161. The contrary was held by De Witt Clinton, Mayor, in the Court of General Sessions in New York, June, 1813, in the People v. Phillips, 1 Southw. Law Journ. p. 90. By a subsequent statute of New York, (2 Rev. St. 406, § 72,) "No minister of the gospel, or priest of any denomination whatsoever, shall be allowed to disclose any confessions made to him in his professional character, in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules or practice of such denomination." A similar statute exists in Missouri, (Rev. St. of 1835, p. 623, § 16.) See also Broad v. Pitt, 3 C. & P. 518; in which case, Best, C. J. said, that he, for one, would never compel a clergyman to disclose communications made to him by a prisoner; but that, if he chose to disclose them, he would receive them in evidence. See also Joy on Confessions, &c. p. 49-58.

³ Duchess of Kingston's case, 11 Hargr. St. Tr. 243; 20 Powell's St. Tr. 613; Rex v. Gibbons, 1 C. & P. 97; Broad v. Pitt, 3 C. & P. 518, per Best, C. J. By the Revised Statutes of New York, (Vol. 2, p. 406, § 73,) and of Missouri, (Revised Code of 1835, p. 623, § 17,) "No person, duly authorized to practise physic or surgery, shall be allowed to disclose any information which he may have acquired in attending any patient in a professional character, and which information was necessary to enable him to prescribe for such patient as a physician, or to do any act for him as a surgeon." But though the statute is thus express, yet it seems the party himself may waive the privilege; in which case the facts may be disclosed.

confidentially, by attending in their professional characters; nor to *confidential friends*,¹ *clerks*,² *bankers*,³ or *stewards*,⁴ except as to matters which the employer himself would not be obliged to disclose, such as his title deeds and private papers, in a case in which he is not a party.

§ 249. The case of *Judges* and *arbitrators* may be mentioned, as the *second class* of privileged communications. In regard to Judges of Courts of record, it is considered dangerous to allow them to be called upon to state what occurred before them in Court; and on this ground, the grand jury were advised not to examine the chairman of the Quarter Sessions, as to what a person testified in a trial in that Court.⁵ The case of arbitrators is governed by the same general policy; and neither the Courts of Law nor of Equity will disturb decisions deliberately made by arbitrators, by requiring them to disclose the grounds of their award, unless under very cogent circumstances, such as upon an allegation of fraud; for, *Interest Reipublicæ ut sit finis litium*.⁶

§ 250. We now proceed to the *third class* of cases, in which evidence is excluded from motives of public policy, namely, *secrets of State*, or things, the disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the public interest. These matters are either those which concern the administration of penal justice, or those which concern the administration of govern-

Johnson v. Johnson, 14 Wend. 637. A consultation, as to the means of procuring abortion in another, is not privileged by this statute. Hewitt v. Prime, 21 Wend. 79.

¹ 4 T. R. 758, per Ld. Kenyon; Hoffman v. Smith, 1 Caines, 157, 159.

² Lee v. Birrell, 3 Campb. 337; Webb v. Smith, 1 C. & P. 337.

³ Loyd v. Freshfield, 2 C. & P. 325.

⁴ Vaillant v. Dodemead, 2 Atk. 524; 4 T. R. 756, per Buller, J.; E. of Falmouth v. Moss, 11 Price, 455.

⁵ Regina v. Gizard, 8 C. & P. 595, per Patteson, J.

⁶ Story Eq. pl. 458, note (1); Anon. 3 Atk. 644; 2 Story, Eq. Jurisp. 680; Johnson v. Durant, 4 C. & P. 327; Ellis v. Saltan, Ib. n. (a); Habershon v. Troby, 3 Esp. 38.

ment; but the principle of public safety is in both cases the same, and the rule of exclusion is applied no farther than the attainment of that object requires. Thus, in criminal trials, the names of persons employed in the discovery of the crime are not permitted to be disclosed, any farther than is essential to a fair trial of the question of the prisoner's innocence or guilt.¹ "It is perfectly right," said Lord Chief Justice Eyre,² "that all opportunities should be given to discuss the truth of the evidence given against a prisoner; but there is a rule which has universally obtained, on account of its importance to the public for the detection of crimes, that those persons who are the channel by means of which that detection is made should not be unnecessarily disclosed." Accordingly, where a witness, possessed of such knowledge, testified that he related it to a friend, not in office, who advised him to communicate it to another quarter; a majority of the learned Judges held that the witness was not to be asked the name of that friend; and they all were of opinion that all those questions which tend to the discovery of the channels by which the disclosure was made to the officers of justice, were, upon the general principle of the convenience of public justice, to be suppressed; that all persons in that situation were protected from the discovery; and that, if it was objected to, it was no more competent for the defendant to ask the witness who the person was that advised him to make a disclosure, than to ask who the person was to whom he made the disclosure in consequence of that advice, or to ask any other question respecting the channel of communication, or all that was done under it.³

¹ *Rex v. Hardy*, 24 Howell's St. Tr. 753. The rule has been recently settled, that, in a public prosecution, no question can be put which tends to reveal who was the secret informer of the government; even though the question be addressed to a witness in order to ascertain whether he was not himself the informer. *Attor. Gen. v. Briant*, 15 Law Journ. N. S. Exch. 265; 5 Law Mag. 333, N. S.

² In *Rex v. Hardy*, 24 Howell's St. Tr. 808.

³ *Rex v. Hardy*, 24 Howell's St. Tr. 808-815, per *Ld. C. J. Eyre*; *ib.* 815-820.

Hence it appears that a witness, who has been employed to collect information for the use of government, or for the purposes of the police, will not be permitted to disclose the name of his employer, or the nature of the connexion between them, or the name of any person who was the channel of communication with the government or its officers, nor whether the information has actually reached the government. But he may be asked whether the person to whom the information was communicated was a magistrate or not.¹

§ 251. On a like principle of public policy, the official transactions between the *heads of the departments of State and their subordinate officers* are in general treated as privileged communications. Thus, communications between a provincial governor and his attorney-general, on the state of the colony or the conduct of its officers;² or between such governor and a military officer under his authority;³ the report of a military commission of inquiry, made to the commander-in-chief;⁴ and the correspondence between an agent of the government and a secretary of state,⁵ are confidential and privileged matters, which the interests of the State will not permit to be disclosed. The President of the United States and the Governors of the several States are not bound to produce papers or disclose information communicated to them, when, in their own judgment, the disclosure would on public considerations be inexpedient.⁶ And where the law is restrained by public policy from enforcing the production of

¹ 1 Phil. Evid. 180, 181; *Rex v. Watson*, 2 Stark. R. 136; 32 Howell's St. Tr. 101; *United States v. Moses*, 4 Wash. 726; *Home v. Ld. F. C. Bentinck*, 2 B. & B. 162, per *Dallas, C. J.*

² *Wyatt v. Gore*, Holt's N. P. Cas. 299.

³ *Cooke v. Maxwell*, 2 Stark. R. 183.

⁴ *Home v. Ld. F. C. Bentinck*, 2 B. & B. 130.

⁵ *Anderson v. Hamilton*, 2 B. & B. 156, note; 2 Stark. R. 185, per *Ld. Ellenborough*, cited by the Attorney-General; *Marbury v. Madison*, 1 Cranch, 144.

⁶ 1 Burr's Trial, p. 186, 187, per *Marshall, C. J.*; *Gray v. Pentland*, 2 S. & R. 23.

papers, the like necessity restrains it from doing what would be the same thing in effect, namely, receiving secondary evidence of their contents.¹ But communications, though made to official persons, are not privileged, where they are not made in the discharge of any public duty; such, for example, as a letter by a private individual to the chief secretary of the postmaster-general, complaining of the conduct of the guard of the mail towards a passenger.²

§ 252. For the same reason of public policy, in the furtherance of justice, the *proceedings of grand jurors* are regarded as privileged communications. It is the policy of the law, that the preliminary inquiry, as to the guilt or innocence of a party accused, should be secretly conducted; and in furtherance of this object every grand juror is sworn to secrecy. One reason may be to prevent the escape of the party, should he know that proceedings were in train against him; another may be, to secure freedom of deliberation and opinion among the grand jurors, which would be impaired, if the part taken by each might be made known to the accused. A third reason may be, to prevent the testimony produced before them from being contradicted at the trial of the indictment, by subornation of perjury on the part of the accused. The rule includes

¹ *Gray v. Pentland*, 2 Serg. & R. 23, 31, 32, per Tilghman, C. J., cited and approved in *Yoter v. Sanno*, 6 Watts, 156, per Gibson, C. J. In *Law v. Scott*, 5 Har. & J. 438, it seems to have been held, that a senator of the United States may be examined, as to what transpired in a secret executive session, if the Senate has refused, on the party's application, to remove the injunction of secrecy. *Sed quare*; for if so, the object of the rule, in the preservation of State secrets, may generally be defeated. And see *Plunkett v. Cobbett*, 29 Howell's St. Tr. 71, 72; 5 Esp. 136, S. C., where Lord Ellenborough held, that though one member of parliament may be asked as to the fact, that another member took part in a debate, yet he was not bound to relate any thing which had been delivered by such speaker as a member of parliament. But it is to be observed, that this was placed by Lord Ellenborough on the ground of personal privilege in the member; whereas the transactions of a session, after strangers are excluded, are placed under an injunction of secrecy, for reasons of State.

² *Blake v. Pilford*, 1 M. & Rob. 198.

not only the grand jurors themselves, but their clerk,¹ if they have one, and the prosecuting officer, if he is present at their deliberations;² all these being equally concerned in the administration of the same portion of penal law. They are not permitted to disclose who agreed to find the bill of indictment, or who did not agree; nor to detail the evidence on which the accusation was founded.³ But they may be compelled to state whether a particular person testified as a witness before the grand jury;⁴ though it seems they cannot be asked, if his testimony there agreed with what he testified upon the trial of the indictment.⁵ Grand jurors may also be asked whether twelve of their number actually concurred in the finding of a bill, the certificate of the foreman not being conclusive evidence of that fact.⁶

§ 252 a. On similar grounds of public policy, and for the

¹ 12 Vin. Abr. 38, tit. Evid. B. a. pl. 5; *Trials per Pais*, 315.

² *Commonwealth v. Tilden*, cited in 2 Stark. Evid. 232, note (1), by Metcalf; *McLellan v. Richardson*, 1 Shepl. 82.

³ *Sykes v. Dunbar*, 2 Selw. N. P. p. 815, [1059]; *Huidekoper v. Cotton*, 3 Watts, 56; *McLellan v. Richardson*, 1 Shepl. 82; *Low's case*, 4 Greenl. 439, 446, 453; *Burr's Trial*, [Anon.] Evidence for Deft. p. 2.

⁴ *Sykes v. Dunbar*, 2 Selw. N. P. 815, [1059]; *Huidekoper v. Cotton*, 3 Watts, 56; *Freeman v. Arkell*, 1 C. & P. 135, 137, n. (c).

⁵ 12 Vin. Abr. 20, tit. Evidence, H.; *Inlay v. Rogers*, 2 Halst. 347. The rule in the text is applicable only to civil actions. In the case last cited, which was trespass, the question arose on a motion for a new trial, for the rejection of the grand juror, who was offered in order to discredit a witness; and the Court being equally divided, the motion did not prevail. Probably such also was the nature of the case in *Clayt.* 84, pl. 140, cited by Viner. But where a witness before the grand jury has committed perjury in his testimony, either before them or at the trial, the reasons mentioned in the text, for excluding the testimony of grand jurors, do not prevent them from being called as witnesses, after the indictment has been tried, in order to establish the guilt of the perjured party. See 4 Bl. Comm. 126, n. 5, by Christian; 1 Chitty's Crim. Law, p. [317]; *Sir J. Fenwick's case*, 13 Howell's St. Tr. 610, 611; 5 St. Tr. 72. By the Revised Statutes of New York, Vol. 2, p. 724, § 31, the question may be asked, even in civil cases.

⁶ 4 Hawk. P. C., B. 2, ch. 25, § 15; *McLellan v. Richardson*, 1 Shepl. 82; *Low's case*, 4 Greenl. 439; *Commonwealth v. Smith*, 9 Mass. 107.

protection of parties against fraud, the law excludes the testimony of *traverse jurors*, when offered to prove *misbehavior* in the Jury in regard to the verdict. Formerly, indeed, the affidavits of jurors have been admitted, in support of motions to set aside verdicts by reason of misconduct; but that practice was broken in upon by Lord Mansfield, and the settled course now is to reject them, because of the mischiefs which may result, if the verdict is thus placed in the power of a single jurymen.¹

§ 253. There is a *fourth* species of evidence which is excluded, namely, that which is *indecent*, or offensive to public morals, or *injurious to the feelings or interest of third persons*, the parties themselves having no interest in the matter, except what they have impertinently and voluntarily created. The mere indecency of disclosures does not, in general, suffice to exclude them, where the evidence is necessary for the purposes of civil or criminal justice; as, in an indictment for a rape; or, in a question upon the sex of one, claiming an estate entailed, as heir male or female; or, upon the legitimacy of one claiming as lawful heir; or, in an action by the husband for criminal conversation with the wife. In these and similar cases the evidence is necessary, either for the proof and punishment of crime, or for the vindication of rights existing before, or independent of, the fact sought to be disclosed. But where the parties have voluntarily and impertinently interested themselves in a question, tending to violate the peace of society, by exhibiting an innocent third person to the world in a ridiculous or contemptible light, or to disturb his own peace and comfort, or to offend public decency by the disclosures which its decision may require, the evidence will not be received. Of this sort are wagers or contracts respecting the

¹ Vaise v. Delaval, 1 T. R. 11; Jackson v. Williamson, 2 T. R. 281; Owen v. Warburton, 1 New R. 326; Little v. Larrabee, 2 Greenl. 37, 41, note, where the cases are collected. The State v. Freeman, 5 Conn. 348; Meade v. Smith, 16 Conn. 346; Straker v. Graham, 4 M. & W. 721.

sex of a third person,¹ or upon the question whether an unmarried woman has had a child.² In this place may also be mentioned the declarations of the husband or wife, that they have had no connexion, though living together, and that therefore the offspring is spurious; which, on the same general ground of decency, morality, and policy, are uniformly excluded.³

§ 254. *Communications between husband and wife* belong also to the class of privileged communications, and are therefore protected, independently of the ground of interest and identity which precludes the parties from testifying for or against each other. The happiness of the married state requires that there should be the most unlimited confidence between husband and wife; and this confidence the law secures, by providing that it shall be kept forever inviolable; that nothing shall be extracted from the bosom of the wife, which was confided there by the husband. Therefore, after the parties are separated, whether it be by divorce, or by the death of the husband, the wife is still precluded from disclosing any conversations with him; though she may be admitted to testify to facts which came to her knowledge by means equally accessible to any person not standing in that relation.⁴ Their general incompetency to testify for or against each other will be considered hereafter, in its more appropriate place.

¹ Da Costa v. Jones, Cowp. 729.

² Ditchburn v. Goldsmith, 4 Campb. 152. If the subject of the action is frivolous, or the question impertinent, and this is apparent on the record, the Court will not proceed at all in the trial. Brown v. Leeson, 2 H. Bl. 43; Henkin v. Gerss, 2 Campb. 408.

³ Goodright v. Moss, Cowp. 594, said, per Lord Mansfield, to have been solemnly decided at the Delegates. Cope v. Cope, 1 M. & Rob. 269, per Alderson, J.; Rex v. Book, 1 Wils. 340; Rex v. Luffe, 8 East, 193, 202, 203; Rex v. Kea, 11 East, 132; Commonwealth v. Shepherd, 6 Binn. 283.

⁴ Monroe v. Twistleton, Peake's Evid. App. lxxxvii. as explained by Lord Ellenborough in Aveson v. Lord Kinnaird, 6 East, 192, 193; Docker v.

§ 254 *a*. It may be mentioned in this place, that though papers and other subjects of evidence may have been *illegally taken* from the possession of the party against whom they are offered, or otherwise unlawfully obtained, this is no valid objection to their admissibility, if they are pertinent to the issue. The Court will not take notice how they were obtained, whether lawfully or unlawfully, nor will it form an issue, to determine that question.¹

Hasler, Ry. & M. 198; Stein v. Bowman, 13 Peters, R. 209, 223; Coffin v. Jones, 13 Pick. 441, 445; Edgell v. Bennett, 7 Vermont R. 536; Williams v. Baldwin, Ib. 503, 506, per Royce, J. In Beveridge v. Minter, 1 C. & P. 364, where the widow was permitted, by Abbott, C. J., to testify to certain admissions of her deceased husband, relative to the money in question, this point was not considered, the objection being placed wholly on the ground of her interest in the estate. See also 2 Kent, Comm. 180, and note (a), 4th edit.; 2 Stark. Evid. 399; Robbins v. King, 2 Leigh's R. 142, 144. See further, Post, § 333-345.

¹ Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Metc. 329, 337; Leggett v. Tollewey, 14 East, 302; Jordan v. Lewis, Ib. 306, note.

CHAPTER XIV.

OF THE NUMBER OF WITNESSES, AND THE NATURE AND QUANTITY OF PROOF REQUIRED IN PARTICULAR CASES.

§ 255. UNDER this head it is not proposed to go into an extended consideration of the statutes of Treason, or of Frauds, but only to mention briefly some instances in which those statutes, and some other rules of law, have regulated particular cases, taking them out of the operation of the general principles, by which they would otherwise be governed. Thus, in regard to *treasons*, though by the Common Law the crime was sufficiently proved by one credible witness,¹ yet, considering the great weight of the oath or duty of allegiance, against the probability of the fact of treason,² it has been deemed expedient to provide³ that no person shall be indicted

¹ Foster's Disc. p. 233; Woodbeck v. Keller, 6 Cowen, 120; McNally's Evid. 31.

² This is conceived to be the true foundation on which the rule has, in modern times, been enacted. The manner of its first introduction into the statutes was thus stated by the Lord Chancellor, in Lord Stafford's case, T. Raym. 408. "Upon this occasion my Lord Chancellor in the lords house was pleased to communicate a notion concerning the reason of two witnesses in treason, which he said was not very familiar, he believed; and it was this; anciently all or most of the Judges were churchmen and ecclesiastical persons, and by the canon law now, and then, in use all over the Christian world, none can be condemned of heresy but by two lawful and credible witnesses; and bare words may make a heretic, but not a traitor, and anciently heresy was treason; and from thence the parliament thought fit to appoint, that two witnesses ought to be for proof of high treason."

³ This was first done by Stat. 5 & 6 Ed. 6, c. 11, but was more distinctly enacted by Stat. 7 W. 3, c. 3, § 2. The same regulation has been incorporated into the Constitution of the United States, which provides that—"No person shall be convicted of treason, unless on the testimony of two

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or convicted of high treason, but upon the oaths and testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or to separate overt acts of the same treason, unless upon his voluntary confession in open Court. We have already seen that a voluntary confession out of Court, if proved by two witnesses, is sufficient to warrant a conviction; and that the crime is well proved if there be one witness to one overt act, and another witness to another overt act, of the same species of treason.¹ It is also settled that when the prisoner's confession is offered, as corroborative of the testimony of such witnesses, it is admissible, though it be proved by only one witness; the law not having excluded confessions, proved in that manner, from the consideration of the Jury, but only provided that they alone shall not be sufficient to convict the prisoner.² And as to all matters merely *collateral*, and not conducing to the proof of the overt acts, it may be safely laid down as a general rule, that whatever was evidence at Common Law, is still good evidence under the express constitutional and statutory provision above mentioned.³

§ 256. It may be proper in this place to observe, that, in treason, the rule is that no evidence can be given of any overt act which is not expressly laid in the indictment. But the meaning of the rule is, not that the whole detail of facts should be set forth, but that no overt act, amounting to a distinct independent charge, though falling under the same head of treason, shall be given in evidence, unless it be expressly laid in the indictment. If, however, it will conduce to the proof of any of the overt acts which are laid, it may

witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open Court." Const. U. S. Art. 3, § 3; Laws U. S. Vol. 2, ch. 36, § 1. The same provision exists in the statutes of most, if not of all the States in the Union.

¹ Ante, § 235; Lord Stafford's case, 7 Howell's St. Tr. 1527; Foster's Disc. 237; 1 Burr's Trial, 196.

² Willis's case, 15 Howell's St. Tr. 623, 624, 625; Crossfield's case, 26 Howell's St. Tr. 55, 56, 57; Foster's Disc. 241.

³ Ante, § 235; Foster's Disc. 240, 242; 1 East, P. C. 130.

be admitted as evidence of such overt acts.¹ This rule is not peculiar to prosecutions for treason; though, in consequence of the oppressive character of some former state prosecutions for that crime, it has been deemed expedient expressly to enact it in the later statutes of treason. It is nothing more than a particular application of a fundamental doctrine of the law of remedy and of evidence, namely, that the proof must correspond with the allegations, and be confined to the point in issue.² The issue in treason is, whether the prisoner committed that crime, by doing the treasonable act stated in the indictment; as, in slander, the question is, whether the defendant injured the plaintiff by maliciously uttering the falsehoods laid in the declaration; and evidence of collateral facts is admitted or rejected on the like principle in either case, accordingly as it does or does not tend to establish the specific charge. Therefore the declarations of the prisoner, and seditious language used by him, are admissible in evidence as explanatory of his conduct, and of the nature and object of the conspiracy in which he was engaged.³ And after proof of the overt act of treason, in the county mentioned in the indictment, other acts of treason tending to prove the overt acts laid, though done in a foreign country, may be given in evidence.⁴

§ 257. In proof of the crime of *perjury*, also, it was formerly held that two witnesses were necessary, because otherwise there would be nothing more than the oath of one man against another, upon which the Jury could not safely convict.⁴ But

¹ Foster's Disc. p. 245; 1 Phil. Evid. 471; Deacon's case, 18 Howell's St. Tr. 366; Foster, R. 9, S. C.; Regicide's case, J. Kely. 8, 9; 1 East, P. C. 124, 122, 123; 2 Stark. Evid. 800, 801.

² Ante, § 51, 52, 53.

³ Rex v. Watson, 2 Stark. R. 110, 134.

⁴ Deacon's case, 16 Howell's St. Tr. 367; Foster, R. 9, S. C.; Sir Henry Vane's case, 4th res., 6 Howell's St. Tr. 123, 129, n.; 1 East, P. C. 125, 126.

⁴ 1 Stark. Evid. 443; 4 Hawk. P. C., B. 2, ch. 46, § 10; 4 Bl. Comm. 358; 2 Russ. on Crimes, 1791.

this strictness has long since been relaxed; the true principle of the rule being merely this, that the evidence must be something more than sufficient to counterbalance the oath of the prisoner and the legal presumption of his innocence.¹ The oath of the opposing witness, therefore, will not avail, unless it be corroborated by other independent circumstances. But it is not precisely accurate to say, that these additional circumstances must be tantamount to another witness. The same effect being given to the oath of the prisoner, as though it were the oath of a credible witness, the scale of evidence is exactly balanced, and the equilibrium must be destroyed, by material and independent circumstances, before the party can

¹ The history of this relaxation of the sternness of the old rule is thus stated by Mr. Justice Wayne, in delivering the opinion of the Court, in *The United States v. Wood*, 14 Peters, 440, 441. "At first two witnesses were required to convict in a case of perjury; both swearing directly adversely from the defendant's oath. Contemporaneously with this requisition, the larger number of witnesses on one side or the other prevailed. Then, a single witness, corroborated by other witnesses, swearing to circumstances, bearing directly upon the imputed *corpus delicti* of a defendant, was deemed sufficient. Next, as in the case of *Rex v. Knill*, 5 B. & A. 929, note, with a long interval between it and the preceding, a witness, who gave proof only of the contradictory oaths of the defendant on two occasions, one being an examination before the House of Lords, and the other an examination before the House of Commons, was held to be sufficient; though this principle had been acted on as early as 1764, by Justice Yates, as may be seen in the note to the case of the *King v. Harris*, 5 B. & A. 937, and was acquiesced in by Lord Mansfield, and Justices Wilmut and Aston. We are aware, that, in a note to *Rex v. Mayhew*, 6 C. & P. 315, a doubt is implied concerning the case decided by Justice Yates; but it has the stamp of authenticity, from its having been referred to in a case happening ten years afterwards before Justice Chambre, as will appear by the note in 6 B. & A. 937. Afterwards, a single witness, with the defendant's bill of costs (not sworn to) in lieu of a second witness, delivered by the defendant to the prosecutor, was held sufficient to contradict his oath; and in that case Lord Denman says, 'A letter written by the defendant, contradicting his statement on oath, would be sufficient to make it unnecessary to have a second witness.' 6 C. & P. 315. We thus see that this rule, in its proper application, has been expanded beyond its literal terms, as cases have occurred, in which proofs have been offered equivalent to the end intended to be accomplished by the rule."

be convicted. The additional evidence needs not be such as, standing by itself, would justify a conviction in a case where the testimony of a single witness would suffice for that purpose. But it must be at least strongly corroborative of the testimony of the accusing witness;¹ or, in the quaint but but energetic language of Parker, C. J., "a strong and clear evidence, and more numerous than the evidence given for the defendant."²

§ 257 *a*. When there are several assignments of perjury in the same indictment, it does not seem to be clearly settled, whether, in addition to the testimony of a single witness, there must be corroborative proof with respect to each; but the better opinion is, that such proof is necessary; and that too, although all the perjuries assigned were committed at one time and place.³ For instance, if a person, on putting in his schedule in the insolvent debtors' court, or on other the like occasion, has sworn that he has paid certain creditors, and is then indicted for perjury on several assignments, each specifying a particular creditor who has not been paid, a single witness with respect to each debt will not, it seems, suffice, though it may be very difficult to obtain any fuller evidence.⁴

¹ *Woodbeck v. Keller*, 6 Cowen, 118, 121, per Sutherland, J.; *Champney's case*, 2 Lew. Cr. Cas. 258.

² *The Queen v. Muscot*, 10 Mod. 194. See also *The State v. Molier*, 1 Dev. 263, 265; *The State v. Hayward*, 1 Nott & McCord, 547; *Rex v. Mayhew*, 6 C. & P. 315; *Roscoe on Crim. Evid.* 686, 687; *Clark's Executors v. Van Riemsdyk*, 9 Cranch, 160. It must corroborate him in something more than some slight particulars. *Yates's case*, 1 Car. & Marsh. 139. More recently, corroborative evidence, in cases where more than one witness is required by law, has been defined by Dr. Lushington, to be not merely evidence showing that the account is probable, but evidence, proving facts *ejusdem generis*, and tending to produce the same results. *Simmons v. Simmons*, 11 Jur. 830.

³ *R. v. Virrier*, 12 A. & E. 317, 324, per Ld. Denman.

⁴ *R. v. Parker*, C. & Marsh. 639, 645-647, per Tindal, C. J. In *R. v. Mudie*, 1 M. & Rob. 128, 129, Lord Tenterden, under similar circumstances, refused to stop the case, saying that, if the defendant was convicted, he might move for a new trial. He was, however, acquitted. See the (London) Law Review, &c. for May, 1846, p. 128.

§ 258. The principle that one witness with corroborating circumstances is sufficient to establish the charge of perjury, leads to the conclusion that *circumstances, without any witness*, when they exist in documentary or written testimony, may combine to the same effect; as they may combine, altogether unaided by oral proof, except the evidence of their authenticity, to prove any other fact, connected with the declarations of persons, or the business of human life. The principle is, that circumstances necessarily make a part of the proofs of human transactions; that such as have been reduced to writing, in unequivocal terms, when the writing has been proved to be authentic, cannot be made more certain by evidence *aliunde*; and that such as have not been reduced to writing, whether they relate to the declarations or conduct of men, can only be proved by oral testimony. Accordingly, it is now held that a living witness of the *corpus delicti* may be dispensed with, and documentary or written evidence be relied upon, to convict of perjury, — *first*, where the falsehood of the matter sworn by the prisoner is directly proved by documentary or written evidence springing from himself, with circumstances showing the corrupt intent; *secondly*, in cases where the matter so sworn is contradicted by a public record, proved to have been well known to the prisoner when he took the oath, the oath only being proved to have been taken; and, *thirdly*, in cases where the party is charged with taking an oath, contrary to what he must necessarily have known to be true; the falsehood being shown by his own letters relating to the fact sworn to, or by any other written testimony, existing and being found in his possession, and which has been treated by him as containing the evidence of the fact recited in it.¹

¹ The United States v. Wood, 14 Peters, 440, 441. In this case, under the latter head of the rule here stated, it was held, that, if the Jury were satisfied of the corrupt intent, the prisoner might well be convicted of perjury, in taking, at the custom-house in New York, the "owner's oath in cases where goods, wares, or merchandise have been actually purchased," upon the evidence of the invoice-book of his father, John Wood of Saddleworth, England,

§ 259. If the evidence adduced in proof of the crime of perjury consists of *two opposing statements of the prisoner*, and nothing more, he cannot be convicted. For if one only was delivered under oath, it must be presumed, from the solemnity of the sanction, that that declaration was the truth, and the other an error or a falsehood; though the latter, being inconsistent with what he has sworn, may form important evidence, with other circumstances, against him.¹ And if both the contradictory statements were delivered under oath, there is still nothing to show which of them is false, where no other evidence of the falsity is given. If, indeed, it can be shown that, before giving the testimony on which perjury is assigned, the accused had been tampered with;² or, if there be other circumstances in the case, tending to prove that the statement offered in evidence against the accused was in fact true, a legal conviction may be obtained.³ And "although the Jury may believe that on the one or the other occasion the prisoner swore to what was not true, yet it is not a necessary consequence that he committed perjury. For there are cases in which a person might very honestly and conscientiously swear to a particular fact, from the best of his recollection and belief, and from other circumstances subsequently be convinced that he was wrong, and swear to the reverse, without meaning to swear falsely either time."⁴

and of thirty-five letters from the prisoner to his father, disclosing a combination between them to defraud the United States, by invoicing and entering the goods shipped at less than their actual cost.

¹ See Alison's Principles of the Criminal Law of Scotland, p. 481.

² Anon. 5 B. & A. 939, 940, note. And see 2 Russ. Cr. & M. 653, note.

³ Rex v. Knill, 5 B. & A. 929, 930, note.

⁴ Per Holroyd, J. in Jackson's case, 1 Lewin's Cr. Cas. 270. This very reasonable doctrine is in perfect accordance with the rule of the Criminal Law of Scotland, as laid down by Mr. Alison, in his lucid and elegant treatise on that subject, in the following terms. — "When contradictory and inconsistent oaths have been emitted, the mere contradiction is not decisive evidence of the existence of perjury in one or other of them; but the prosecutor must establish which was the true one, and libel on the other as containing the

§ 260. The principles above stated, in regard to the proof of perjury, apply with equal force to the case of an *answer in Chancery*. Formerly, when a material fact was directly put in issue by the answer, the Courts of Equity followed the maxim of the Roman Law, *Responsio unius non omnino audiatur*, and required the evidence of two witnesses, as the foundation of a decree. But of late years the rule has been referred more strictly to the equitable principle on which it is founded, namely, the right to credit which the defendant may claim, equal to that of any other witness in all cases where his answer is "positively, clearly, and precisely" responsive to any matter stated in the bill. For the plaintiff, by calling on the defendant to answer an allegation which he makes, thereby admits the answer to be evidence.¹ In such case, if the defendant in express terms negatives the allegations in the bill, and the bill is supported by the evidence of only a single witness, affirming what has been so denied, the Court will neither make a decree, nor send the case to be tried at law; but will simply dismiss the bill.² But the corroborating testimony of an additional witness, or of circumstances, may give a turn either way to the balance. And even the evidence

falsehood. Where depositions contradictory to each other have been emitted by the same person on the same matter, it may with certainty be concluded that one or other of them is false. But it is not relevant to infer perjury in so loose a manner; but the prosecutor must go a step farther, and specify distinctly which of the two contains the falsehood, and peril his case upon the means he possesses of proving perjury in that deposition. To admit the opposite course, and allow the prosecutor to libel on both depositions, and make out his charge by comparing them together, without distinguishing which contains the truth and which the falsehood, would be directly contrary to the precision justly required in criminal proceedings. In the older practice this distinction does not seem to have been distinctly recognised; but it is now justly considered indispensable, that the perjury should be specified existing in one, and the other deposition referred to *in modum probationis*, to make out, along with other circumstances, where the truth really lay." See Alison's *Crim. Law of Scotland*, p. 476.

¹ *Gresley on Evid.* p. 4.

² *Cooth v. Jackson*, 6 Ves. 40, per *Ld. Eldon*.

arising from circumstances alone may be stronger than the testimony of any single witness.¹

§ 260 *a*. It has also been held, that the testimony of one witness alone is not sufficient to establish a *usage of trade*, of which all dealers in that particular line are bound to take notice, and are presumed to be informed.²

¹ *Pember v. Mathers*, 1 Bro. Ch. R. 52; 2 Story on Eq. Jur. § 1528; *Gresley on Evid.* p. 4; *Clark v. Van Riemsdyk*, 9 Cranch, 160; *Keys v. Williams*, 3 Y. & C. 55; *Dawson v. Massey*, 1 Ball. & Beat. 234; *Maddox v. Sullivan*, 2 Rich. Eq. R. 4.

² *Wood v. Hickok*, 2 Wend. 501; *Parrott v. Thacher*, 9 Pick. 426; *Thomas v. Graves*, 1 Const. Rep. 150, [308]; *Post*, Vol. 2, § 252. As attempts have been made, in some recent instances, to introduce into Ecclesiastical Courts in the United States, the old and absurd rules of the Canon Law of England, foreign, as they are, to the nature and genius of American institutions; the following statement of the light in which those rules are at present regarded in England, will not be unacceptable to the reader. It is taken from the (London) *Law Review*, &c. for May, 1846, pp. 132-135. "In the Ecclesiastical Courts, the rule requiring a plurality of witnesses is carried far beyond the verge of common sense; and, although no recent decision of those Courts has, we believe, been pronounced, expressly determining that five, seven, or more witnesses are essential to constitute full proof, yet the authority of Dr. Ayliffe, who states that, according to the canon law, this amount of evidence is required in some matters, has been very lately cited with apparent assent, if not approbation, by the learned Sir Herbert Jenner Fust.¹ The case, in support of which the above high

¹ *Evans v. Evans*, 1 Roberts, Ecc. R. 171. The passage cited from Ayliffe, Par 444, is as follows:—"Full proof is made by two or three witnesses at the least. For there are some matters which, according to the canon law, do require, five, seven, or more witnesses to make full proof." The same learned commentator, a little further on, after explaining that "*liquid proof* is that which appears to the Judge from the act of Court, since that cannot properly be said to be *manifest* or *notorious*;" adds,— "By the canon law a Jew is not admitted to give evidence against a Christian, especially if he be a clergyman, for by that law, the proofs against a clergyman ought to be much clearer than against a layman;"—Par. 448. Dr. Ayliffe does not mention what matters require this superabundant proof, but we have already said (vol. i. p. 380, n.) that, in the case of a Cardinal charged with incontinence, the *probatio*, in order to be *plena*, must be established by no less than seven *eye* witnesses; so improbable does it appear to the Church that one of her highest dignitaries should be guilty of such an offence, and so anxious is she to avoid all possibility of judicial scandal. This is adopting with a vengeance the principles of David Hume with respect to miracles.

§ 261. There are also certain *sales*, for the proof of which

authority was quoted, was a suit for a divorce.¹ In a previous action for criminal conversation, a special jury had given 500*l.* damages to the husband, who, with a *female servant*,² had found his wife and the adulterer together in bed. This last fact was deposed to by the servant; but as she was the only witness called to prove it, and as her testimony was uncorroborated, the learned Judge did not feel himself at liberty to grant the promoter's prayer. This doctrine, that the testimony of a single witness, though omni exceptione major, is insufficient to support a decree in the Ecclesiastical Courts, when such testimony stands unsupported by adminicular circumstances, has been frequently propounded by Lord Stowell, both in suits for divorce,³ for defamation,⁴ and for brawling;⁵ and, before the new Will Act was passed,⁶ Sir John Nicholl disregarded similar evidence, as not amounting to legal proof of a testamentary act.⁷ In the case, too, of *Mackenzie v. Yeo*,⁸ when a codicil was propounded, purporting to have been duly executed, and was deposed to by one attesting witness only, the other having married the legatee, Sir Herbert Jenner Fust refused to grant probate, though he admitted the witness was unexceptionable, on the ground that his testimony was not confirmed by adminicular circumstances, and that the probabilities of the case inclined against the factum of such an instrument. In another case,⁹ however, the same learned Judge admitted a paper to probate on the testimony of one attesting witness, who had been examined a few days after the death of the testator, though the other witness, whose deposition had not been taken till two years and a half afterwards, declared that the will was not signed in his presence. In this case there was a formal attestation clause, and that fact was regarded by the Court as favoring the supposition of a due execution. Though the cases cited above certainly establish beyond dispute, that, by the Canon Law, as recognised in our spiritual Courts, one uncorroborated witness is insufficient, they as certainly decide, that, in ordinary cases at least, two or more witnesses need not depose to the principal fact; but that it will suffice if one be called to swear to such fact, and the other or others

¹ *Evans v. Evans*, 1 Roberts, Ecc. R. 165.

² The fact that the witness was a woman does not seem to have formed an element in the judgment of the Court, though Dr. Ayliffe assures his readers, with becoming gravity, that "by the canon law, more credit is given to male than to female witnesses." Par. 545.

³ *Donellan v. Donellan*, 2 Hagg. 144, (Suppl.)

⁴ *Crompton v. Butler*, 1 Cons. R. 460.

⁵ *Hutchins v. Denziloe*, 1 Cons. R. 181, 182.

⁶ W. 4, and 1 Vict. c. 26, which by s. 34, applies to wills made after the 1st of January, 1833.

⁷ *Theakston v. Marson*, 4 Hagg. 313, 314.

⁸ 3 Curteis, 125.

⁹ *Gove v. Gawen*, 3 Curteis, 151.

the law requires a deed, or other *written document*. Thus, by

speak merely to confirmatory circumstances. Nay, it would seem, from some expressions used, that, as in cases of perjury, documentary or written testimony, or the statements or conduct of the party libelled, may supply the place of a second witness.¹ If, indeed, proceedings be instituted under the provisions of some statute, which expressly enacts that the offence shall be proved by two lawful witnesses, as for instance, the Act of 5 & 6 Edw. 6, c. 4, which relates to brawling in a church or churchyard, the Court might feel some delicacy about presuming that such an enactment would be satisfied, by calling one witness to the fact and one to the circumstances.² It seems that this rule of the canonists depends less on the authority of the civilians than on the Mosaic code, which enacts, that one witness shall not rise up against a man for any iniquity; but at the mouth of two or three witnesses shall the matter be established.³ Indeed, the decretal of Pope Gregory the Ninth, which enforces the observance of this doctrine,⁴ expressly cites St. Paul as an authority, where he tells the Corinthians that "in ore duorum vel trium testium stat omne verbum."⁵ Now, however well suited this rule might have been to the peculiar circumstances of the Jewish nation, who like the Hindus of old, the modern Greeks, and other enslaved and oppressed people, entertained no very exalted notions on the subject of truth; and who on one most remarkable occasion gave conclusive proof, that even the necessity for calling two witnesses was no valid protection against the crime of perjury;⁶—it may well be doubted whether, in the present civilized age, such a doctrine, instead of a protection, has not become an impediment to justice, and whether, as such, it should not be abrogated. That this was the opinion of the Common Law Judges in far earlier times than the present, is apparent from several old decisions, which restrict the rule to causes of merely spiritual consanguinity, and determine, that all temporal matters which incidentally arise before the ecclesiastical courts may, and indeed must, be proved there, as elsewhere, by such evidence as the Common Law would allow."⁷

¹ In *Kenrick v. Kenrick*, 4 Hagg. 114, the testimony of a single witness to adultery being corroborated by evidence of the misconduct of the wife, was held to be sufficient, Sir John Nicholl distinctly stating, "that there need not be two witnesses; one witness and circumstances in corroboration are all that the law in these cases requires," p. 136, 137, and Dr. Lushington even admitting, that "he was not prepared to say that one clear and unimpeached witness was insufficient," p. 130. See also 3 Burn. Eccl. L. 304.

² *Hutchins v. Denziloe*, 1 Cons. R. 182, per Lord Stowell.

³ Deut. c. 19, v. 15; Deut. c. 17, v. 6; Numbers, c. 35, v. 30.

⁴ Dec. Greg. lib. 2, tit. 20, c. 23.

⁵ 2 Cor. c. 13, v. 1.

⁶ St. Matthew, c. 26, v. 60, 61.

⁷ *Richardson v. Desborough*, Ventr. 291; *Shotton v. Friend*, 2 Salk. 547; *Breedon v. Gill*, Lord Raym. 221. See further, 3 Burn. Eccl. L. 304-308.

the statutes of the United States,¹ and of Great Britain,² the *grand bill of sale* is made essential to the complete transfer of any *ship or vessel*; though, as between the parties themselves, a title may be acquired by the vendee without such document. Whether this documentary evidence is required by the law of nations or not, is not perfectly settled; but the weight of opinion is clearly on the side of its necessity, and that without this, and the other usual documents, no national character is attached to the vessel.³

§ 262. Written evidence is also required of the several transactions mentioned in the *Statute of Frauds*, passed in the reign of Charles II., the provisions of which have been enacted, generally in the same words, in nearly all of the United States.⁴ The rules of evidence contained in this celebrated statute are calculated for the exclusion of perjury, by requiring, in the cases therein mentioned, some more satisfactory and convincing testimony than mere oral evidence affords. The statute dispenses with no proof of consideration which was previously required, and gives no efficacy to written contracts which they did not previously possess.⁵ Its policy is to impose such requisites upon private transfers of property as, without being hindrances to fair transactions, may be either totally inconsistent with dishonest projects, or

¹ United States Navigation Act of 1792, ch. 45, § 14; Stat. 1793, ch. 52; Abbott on Shipping, by Story, p. 45, n. (2); 3 Kent, Comm. 143, 149.

² Stat. 6 Geo. 4, c. 109, 4 Geo. 4, c. 48; 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 55, § 31; Abbott on Shipping, by Shee, p. 47-52.

³ Abbott on Shipping, by Story, p. 1, n. (1), and cases there cited; Ib. p. 27, n. (1); Ib. p. 45, n. (2); *Ohl v. The Eagle Ins. Co.* 4 Mason, 172; Jacobsen's Sea Laws, B. 1, ch. 2, p. 17.

⁴ 29 Car. 2, c. 3; 4 Kent, Comm. 95, and note (b), (4th edit.) The Civil Code of Louisiana, art. 2415, without adopting in terms the provisions of the statute of frauds, declares generally, that all verbal sales of immovable property or slaves shall be void. 4 Kent, Comm. 450, note (a), (4th edit.)

⁵ 2 Stark. Evid. 341.

tend to multiply the chances of detection.¹ The object of the present work will not admit of an extended consideration

¹ Roberts on Frauds, Pref. xxii. This statute introduced no new principle into the law; it was new in England only in the mode of proof which it required. Some protective regulations, of the same nature, may be found in the early codes of most of the Northern nations, as well as in the laws of the Anglo-Saxon princes; the prevention of frauds and perjuries being sought, agreeably to the simplicity of those unlettered times, by requiring a certain number of witnesses to a valid sale, and sometimes by restricting such sales to particular places. In the Anglo-Saxon laws, such regulations were quite familiar; and the Statute of Frauds was merely the revival of obsolete provisions, demanded by the circumstances of the times, and adapted, in a new mode of proof, to the improved condition and habits of the trading community. By the laws of Lotharius and Edric, Kings of Kent, § 16, if a Kentish man purchased any thing in London, it must be done in the presence of two or three good citizens, or of the mayor of the city. (Canciani, *Leges Barbarorum Antiquæ*, Vol. 4, p. 231.) The laws of King Edward the Elder (*De jure et lite*, § 1,) required the testimony of the mayor, or some other credible person, to every sale, and prohibited all sales out of the city. (Cancian. ub. sup. p. 256.) King Athelstan prohibited sales in the country, above the value of xx pence; and for those in the city, he required the same formalities as in the laws of Edward. (Ib. p. 261, 262, LL. Athelstani, § 12.) By the laws of King Ethelred, every freeman was required to have his surety, (*fidejussor*), without whom, as well as other evidence, there could be no valid sale or barter. "*Nullus homo faciat alterutrum, nec emat, nec permutet, nisi fidejussorem habeat, et testimonium.*" (Ib. p. 287, LL. Ethelredi, § 1, 4.) In the Concilium Seculare of Canute, § 22, it was provided, that there should be no sale, above the value of four pence, whether in the city or country, without the presence of four witnesses. (Ib. p. 305.) The same rule, in nearly the same words, was enacted by William the Conqueror. (Ib. p. 357, LL. Gul. Conq. § 43.) Afterwards in the Charter of the Conqueror, (§ 60,) no cattle, ("*nulla viva pecunia, scil. animalia*"), could be legally sold, unless in the cities, and in the presence of three witnesses. (Cancian. ub. sup. p. 360, *Leges Anglo-Saxonice*, p. 198, note (o). Among the ancient Sueones and Goths, no sale was originally permitted, but in the presence of witnesses, and (*per mediatores*), through the medium of brokers. The witnesses were required, in order to preserve the evidence of the sale; and the brokers, or mediators, (*ut pretium moderarentur*), to prevent extortion, and to see to the title. But these formalities were afterwards dispensed with, except in the sale of articles of value, (*res pretiosæ*), or of great amount. (Cancian. ub. sup. p. 231, n. 4.) Alienations of lands were made only (*publicis literis*) by documents legally authenticated. By the Danish Law, lands in the city or

of the provisions of this statute; but will necessarily restrict us to a brief notice of the rules of evidence which it has introduced.

§ 263. By this statute, the necessity of some writing is universally required, upon all *conveyances of lands, or interest in lands*, for more than three years; all interests, whether of freehold or less than freehold, certain or uncertain, created by parol without writing, being allowed only the force and effect of estates at will; except leases, not exceeding the term of three years from the making thereof, whereon the rent reserved shall amount to two thirds of the improved value. The term of three years for which a parol lease may be good, must be only three years from the making of it; but, if it is

country might be exchanged, without judicial appraisement, (per tabulas manu signoque permutantis affixas,) by deed, under the hand and seal of the party. (Ib. p. 261, n. 4.) The Roman Law required written evidence in a great variety of cases, embracing, among many others, all those mentioned in the Statute of Frauds; which are enumerated by N. De Lascut, De Exam. Testium, Cap. 26. (Ferriac. Oper. Tom. 2, App. p. 243.) See also Brederodii Repertorium Juris, col. 984, *verb.* Scriptura. Similar provisions, extending in some cases even to the proof of payment of debts, were enacted in the statutes of Bologna, (A. D. 1454,) Milan, (1498,) and Naples, which are prefixed to Danty's *Traité de la Preuve par Temoins*. By a Perpetual Edict in the Archduchy of Flanders, (A. D. 1611,) all sales, testaments, and contracts whatever, above the value of three hundred livres Artois, were required to be in writing. And in France, by the Ordonnance de Moulins (A. D. 1566,) confirmed by that of 1667, parol or verbal evidence was excluded in all cases, where the subject-matter exceeded the value of one hundred livres. See Danty, de la Preuve, &c. *passim*; 7 Poth. Œuvres, &c., 4to. p. 56, *Traité de la Procéd. Civ.* ch. 3, art. 4, Règle 3me.; 1 Poth. on Obl. Part 4, ch. 2, art. 1, 2, 3, 5; Commercial Code of France, Art. 109. The dates of these regulations, and of the Statute of Frauds, and the countries in which they were adopted, are strikingly indicative of the revival and progress of commerce. Among the Jews, lands were conveyed by deed only, from a very early period, as is evident from the transaction mentioned in Jer. xxxii. 10, 11, 12; where the principal document was "sealed according to the law and custom," in the presence of witnesses; and another writing, or "open evidence," was also taken, probably, as Sir John Chardin thought, for common use, as is the manner in the East at this day.

to commence *in futuro*, yet if the term is not for more than three years it will be good. And if a parol lease is made to hold from year to year, during the pleasure of the parties, this is adjudged to be a lease only for one year certain, and that every year after it is a new springing interest, arising upon the first contract, and parcel of it; so that if the tenant should occupy ten years, still it is prospectively but a lease for a year certain, and therefore good, within the exception in the statute; though as to the time past it is considered as one entire and valid lease for so many years as the tenant has enjoyed it.¹ But though a parol lease for a longer period than the statute permits is void for the excess, and may have only the effect of a lease for a year, yet it may still have an operation, so far as its terms apply to a tenancy for a year. If, therefore, there be a parol lease for seven years for a specified rent, and to commence and end on certain days expressly named; though this is void as to the duration of the lease, yet it must regulate all the other terms of the tenancy.²

§ 264. By the same statute, no *leases*, estates, or interests, either of freehold or terms of years, or an uncertain interest, other than copyhold or customary interest in lands, tenements, or hereditaments, can be *assigned, granted, or surrendered*, unless by deed or writing, signed by the party, or his agent authorized by writing,³ or by operation of law. At Common Law, surrenders of estates for life or years in things corporeal were good, if made by parol; but things incorporeal, lying in grant, could neither be created nor surrendered but by deed.⁴ The effect of this statute is not to dispense with any

¹ Roberts on Frauds, p. 241-244.

² Doe v. Bell, 5 T. R. 471.

³ In the statutes of some of the United States, the words "authorized by writing" are omitted; in which case it is sufficient that the agent be authorized by parol, in order to make a binding *contract* of sale, provided the contract itself be made in writing; but his authority to *convey* must be by deed. Story on Agency, § 50; Alna v. Plummer, 4 Greenl. 258.

⁴ Co. Lit. 337, b. 338, a; 2 Shep. Touchst. (by Preston) p. 300.

evidence required by the Common Law, but to add to its provisions somewhat of security, by requiring a new and more permanent species of testimony. Wherever, therefore, at Common Law a deed was necessary, the same solemnity is still requisite; but with respect to lands and tenements in possession, which before the statute might have been surrendered by parol, that is, by words only, some note in writing is now made essential to a valid surrender.¹

§ 265. As to the effect of the cancellation of a deed to divest the estate, operating in the nature of a surrender, a distinction is taken between things lying in livery, and those which lie only in grant. In the latter case, the subject being incorporeal, and owing its very existence to the deed, it appears that at Common Law the destruction of the deed by the party, with intent to defeat the interest taken under it, will have that effect. Without such intent, it will be merely a case of casual spoliation. But where the thing lies in livery and manual occupation, the deed being at Common Law only the authentication of the transfer, and not the operative act of conveying the property, the cancellation of the instrument will not involve the destruction of the interest conveyed.² It has been thought, that, since writing is now by the statute made essential to certain leases of hereditaments lying in livery, the destruction of the lease would necessarily draw after it the loss of the interest itself.³ But the better opinion seems to be, that it will not; because the intent of the statute is to take away the mode of transferring interests in lands by symbols and words alone, as formerly used, and therefore a surrender by cancellation, which is but a sign, is also taken away at law; though, a symbolical surrender may still be

¹ Roberts on Frauds, p. 248.

² Roberts on Frauds, p. 248, 249; Bolton v. Bp. of Carlisle, 2 H. Bl. 263, 264; Doe v. Bingham, 4 B. & A. 672; Holbrook v. Tirrell, 9 Pick. 105; Botsford v. Morehouse, 4 Conn. 550; Gilbert v. Bulkley, 5 Conn. 262; Jackson v. Chase, 2 Johns. 86.

³ 4 Bac. Abr. 218, tit. Leases and Terms for years, T.

recognised in Chancery as the basis of relief.¹ The surrender in law, mentioned in the statute, is where a tenant accepts from his lessor a new interest, inconsistent with that which he previously had; in which case a surrender of his former interest is presumed.²

§ 266. This statute further requires that the declaration or creation of trusts of lands shall be manifested and proved only by some writing, signed by the party creating the trust; and all grants and assignments of any such trust or confidence, are also to be in writing, and signed in the same manner. It is to be observed, that the statute does not require that the trust itself be created by writing; but only that it be manifested and proved by writing; plainly meaning that there should be evidence in writing, proving that there was a trust, and what the trust was. A letter acknowledging the trust, and, *à fortiori*, an admission, in an answer in Chancery, has therefore been deemed sufficient to satisfy the statute.³

¹ Roberts on Frauds, p. 251, 252; Magennis v. Mac Cullogh, Gilb. Eq. R. 235; Natcholt v. Porter, 2 Vern. 112, 4 Kent, Comm. 104; 4 Cruise's Dig. p. 85, (White's ed.) Tit. 32, ch. 7, § 5, 6, 7; Roe v. Abp. of York, 6 East, 86. In several of the United States, where the owner of lands, which he holds by an unregistered deed, is about to sell his estate to a stranger, it is not unusual for him to surrender his deed to his grantor, to be cancelled, the original grantor thereupon making a new deed to the new purchaser. This redelivery is allowed to have the practical effect of a surrender, or reconveyance of the estate, the first grantee and those claiming under him not being permitted to give parol evidence of the contents of the deeds, thus surrendered and destroyed with his consent, with a view of passing a legal title to his own alienee. Farrar v. Farrar, 4 N. Hamp. 191; Commonwealth v. Dudley, 10 Mass. 403; Holbrook v. Tirrell, 9 Pick. 105; Barrett v. Thorndike, 1 Greenl. 78.

² Roberts on Frauds, p. 259, 260.

³ Forster v. Hale, 3 Ves. 696, 707, per Ld. Alvanley; 4 Kent, Comm. 205; Roberts on Frauds, p. 95; 1 Cruise, Dig. (by White,) Tit. 12, ch. 1, § 36, 37, p. 390; Lewin on Trusts, p. 30. Courts of Equity will receive parol evidence, not only to explain an imperfect declaration of a testator's intentions of trust, but even to add conditions of trust to what appears a simple devise or bequest. But it must either be fairly presumable, that the testator would have made the requisite declaration, but for the undertaking of the

Resulting trusts, or those which arise by implication of law, are specially excepted from the operation of this statute. Trusts of this sort are said by Lord Hardwicke to arise in three cases; first, where the estate is purchased in the name of one person, but the money paid for it is the property of another; secondly, where a conveyance is made in trust, declared only as to part, and the residue remains undisposed of, nothing being declared respecting it; and thirdly, in certain cases of fraud.¹ Other divisions have been suggested;² but they all seem to be reducible to these three heads. In all these cases, it seems now to be generally conceded that parol evidence, though received with great caution, is admissible to establish the collateral facts, (not contradictory to the deed, unless in the case of fraud,) from which a trust may legally result; and that it makes no difference as to its admissibility whether the supposed purchaser be living or dead.³

§ 267. Written evidence, signed by the party to be charged therewith, or by his agent, is by the same statute required in every case of contract by an executor or administrator, to

person whom he trusted, or else it must be shown to be an attempt to create an illegal trust. *Gresley on Evid. in Equity*, p. 208; *Strode v. Winchester*, 1 Dick. 397. See also the cases cited in Cowen & Hill's note 1003, to 1 Phil. Evid. p. 578.

¹ *Lloyd v. Spillet*, 2 Atk. 148, 150.

² 1 Lomax's Digest, p. 200.

³ 3 Sugden on Vendors, 256-260, (10th edit.); 2 Story, Eq. Jurisp. § 1201, note; *Lench v. Lench*, 10 Ves. 517; *Boyd v. McLean*, 1 Johns. Ch. R. 582; 4 Kent, Comm. 305; *Pritchard v. Brown*, 4 N. Hamp. 397. See also an article in 3 Law Mag. p. 131, where the English cases on this subject are reviewed. The American decisions are collected in Cowen & Hill's note 1003, to 1 Phil. Evid. 578, and in Mr. Rand's note to the case of *Goodwin v. Hubbard*, 15 Mass. 218. In Massachusetts, there are dicta apparently to the effect, that parol evidence is not admissible in these cases; but the point does not seem to have been directly in judgment, unless it is involved in the decision in *Bullard v. Briggs*, 7 Pick. 533, where parol evidence was admitted. See *Storer v. Batson*, 8 Mass. 431, 442; *Northampton Bank v. Whiting*, 12 Mass. 104, 109; *Goodwin v. Hubbard*, 15 Mass. 210, 217.

answer damages out of his own estate; every promise of one person to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another; every agreement made in consideration of marriage; or which is not to be performed within a year from the time of making it; and every contract for the sale of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or any interest in or concerning them. The like evidence is also required in every case of contract for the sale of goods, for the price of £10 sterling or upwards,¹ unless the buyer shall receive part of the goods at the time of sale, or give something in earnest, to bind the bargain, or in part payment.²

§ 268. It is not necessary that the written evidence, required by the statute of frauds, should be comprised in a single document, nor that it should be drawn up in any particular form. It is sufficient, if the contract can be *plainly made out*, in all its terms, from any writings of the party, or even from his correspondence. But it must all be collected from the writings; verbal testimony not being admissible to supply any defects or omissions in the written evidence.³ For the policy

¹ The sum here required is different in the several States of the Union, varying from thirty to fifty dollars; but the rule is every where the same. By the statute of 9 Geo. 4, c. 14, this provision of the statute of frauds is extended to contracts executory, for goods to be manufactured at a future day, or otherwise not in a state fit for delivery at the time of making the contract. Shares in a joint-stock-company, or a projected railway, are held not to be goods or chattels, within the meaning of the statute. *Humble v. Mitchell*, 11 Ad. & El. 205; *Tempest v. Kilner*, 3 M. G. & S. 251; *Bowlby v. Bell*, *Ibid.* 284.

² 2 Kent, Comm. 493, 494, 495.

³ *Boydell v. Drummond*, 11 East, 142; *Chitty on Contracts*, p. 314-316, 4th Am. Edit.; 2 Kent, Comm. 511; *Roberts on Frauds*, p. 121; *Tawney v. Crowther*, 3 Bro. Ch. Rep. 161, 318; 4 Cruise's Dig. (by White) p. 35, 36, 37, tit. 32, ch. 3, § 16-26; *Cooper v. Smith*, 15 East, 103; *Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt*, 1 Johns. Ch. R. 280, 281, 282; *Abeel v. Radcliff*, 13 Johns. 297. Whether the Statute of Frauds, in requiring that in certain cases the "agreement" be proved by writing, requires that the "consideration" should be expressed in the writing, as part of the agreement, is a point which has been much discussed, and upon which the English and some American cases

of the law is to prevent fraud and perjury, by taking all the enumerated transactions entirely out of the reach of any verbal testimony whatever. Nor is the *place of signature* material. It is sufficient, if the vendor's name be printed, in a bill of parcels, if the vendee's name and the rest of the bill are written by the vendor.¹ Even his signature as a witness to a deed, which contained a recital of the agreement, has been held sufficient, if it appears that in fact he knew of the recital.² Neither is it necessary that the agreement or memorandum be *signed by both parties*, or that both be legally bound to the performance; for the statute only requires that it be signed "by the party to be charged therewith," that is, by the defendant, against whom the performance or damages are demanded.³

§ 269. Where the act is *done by procuration*, it is not

are in direct opposition. The English Courts hold the affirmative. See *Wain v. Warlters*, 5 East, 10; reviewed and confirmed in *Saunders v. Wakefield*, 4 B. & Ald. 595; and their construction has been followed in New York; *Sears v. Brink*, 3 Johns. 210; *Leonard v. Vredenburg*, 8 Johns. 29. In New Hampshire, in *Neelson v. Sanborne*, 2 N. Hamp. 414, the same construction seems to be recognised and approved. But in Massachusetts it was rejected by the whole Court, upon great consideration, in *Packard v. Richardson*, 17 Mass. 122. So, in Maine; *Levy v. Merrill*, 4 Greenl. 180; in Connecticut; *Sage v. Wilcox*, 6 Conn. 81; in New Jersey; *Buckley v. Beardsley*, 2 South. 570; and in North Carolina; *Miller v. Irvine*, 1 Dev. & Batt. 103; and now in South Carolina; *Fyler v. Givens*, Riley's Law Cas. p. 56, 62, overruling *Stephens v. Winn*, 2 N. & McC. 372, n.; *Woodward v. Pickett*, Dudley's So. Car. Rep. p. 30. See also *Violet v. Patton*, 5 Cranch, 142; *Taylor v. Ross*, 3 Yerg. 330; 3 Kent, Comm. 122; 2 Stark. Evid. 350, 6th Am. Edit.

¹ *Saunderson v. Jackson*, 2 B. & P. 238, as explained in *Champion v. Plummer*, 1 New Rep. 254; *Roberts on Frauds*, p. 124, 125.

² *Welford v. Beezely*, 1 Ves. sen. 6; 1 Wils. 118, S. C. The same rule, with its qualification, is recognised in the Roman Law, as applicable to all subscribing witnesses, except those whose official duty obliges them to subscribe, such as notaries, &c. *Menochius, De Præsump. Lib. 3; Præsump. 66, per tot.*

³ *Allen v. Bennett*, 3 Taunt. 169; 2 Kent, Comm. 510, and cases there cited.

necessary that the agent's authority should be in writing; except in those cases where, as in the first section of the statute of 29 Car. 2, c. 3, it is so expressly required. These excepted cases are understood to be those of an actual conveyance, not of a contract to convey; and it is accordingly held, that though the agent to *make a deed* must be authorized by deed, yet the agent to enter into an *agreement to convey* is sufficiently authorized by parol only.¹ An *auctioneer* is regarded as the agent of both parties, whether the subject of the sale be lands or goods; and if the whole contract can be made out from the memorandums and entries signed by him, it is sufficient to bind them both.²

§ 270. The word *lands*, in this statute, has been expounded to include every claim of a permanent right to hold the lands of another, for a particular purpose, and to enter upon them at all times, without his consent. It has accordingly been held, that a right to enter upon the lands of another, for the purpose of erecting and keeping in repair a mill-dam, embankment, and canal, to raise water for working a mill, is an interest in land, and cannot pass but by deed or writing.³ But where the interest is vested in a corporation, and not in the individual corporators, the shares of the latter, in the stock of the corporation, are deemed personal estate.⁴

§ 271. The main difficulties under this head have arisen in the application of the principle to cases, where the subject of the contract is trees, growing crops, or other *things annexed*

¹ Story on Agency, § 50; *Coles v. Trecothick*, 9 Ves. 250; *Clinan v. Cooke*, 1 Sch. & Lef. 22; *Roberts on Frauds*, p. 113, n. (54.)

² *Emmerson v. Heelis*, 2 Taunt. 38; *White v. Procter*, 4 Taunt. 209; *Long on Sales*, p. 38, (Rand's ed.); Story on Agency, § 27, and cases there cited; *Cleaves v. Foss*, 4 Greenl. 1; *Roberts on Frauds*, p. 113, 114, note (56); 2 Stark. Ev. 352, (6th Am. Ed.)

³ *Cook v. Stearns*, 11 Mass. 533.

⁴ *Bligh v. Brent*, 2 Y. & Col. 268, 295, 296; *Bradley v. Holdsworth*, 3 M. & W. 422.

to the freehold. It is well settled, that a contract for the sale of fruits of the earth, ripe, but not yet gathered, is not a contract for any interest in lands, and so not within the statute of frauds, though the vendee is to enter and gather them.¹ And subsequently it has been held, that a contract for the sale of a crop of potatoes, was essentially the same, whether they were covered with earth in a field, or were stored in a box; in either case the subject-matter of the sale, namely, potatoes, being but a personal chattel, and so not within the statute of frauds.² The later cases confirm the doctrine involved in this decision, namely, that the transaction takes its character of realty or personalty, from the principal subject-matter of the contract, and the intent of the parties; and that therefore a sale of any growing produce of the earth, reared by labor and expense, in actual existence at the time of the contract, whether it be in a state of maturity or not, is not to be considered a sale of an interest in or concerning land.³ In regard to things produced annually, by the labor of man, the question is sometimes solved by reference to the law of emblements; on the ground, that whatever will go to the executor, the tenant being dead, cannot be considered as an interest in land.⁴ But the case seems also to be covered by a broader principle of distinction, namely, between contracts, conferring an exclusive right to the land for a time, for the

¹ Parker v. Staniland, 11 East, 362; Cutler v. Pope, 1 Shepl. 337.

² Warwick v. Bruce, 2 M. & S. 205. This contract was made on the 12th of October, when the crop was at its maturity; and it would seem that the potatoes were to be forthwith dug and removed.

³ Evans v. Roberts, 5 B. & C. 829; Jones v. Flint, 10 Ad. & El. 753.

⁴ See observations of the learned Judges, in Evans v. Roberts, 5 B. & C. 829. See also Rodwell v. Phillips, 9 M. & W. 501, where it was held, that an agreement for the sale of growing pears was an agreement for the sale of an interest in land, on the principle, that the fruit would not pass to the executor, but would descend to the heir. The learned Chief Baron distinguished this case from Smith v. Surman, 9 B. & C. 561, the latter being the case of a sale of growing timber by the foot, and so treated by the parties, as if it had been actually felled; — a distinction which confirms the view subsequently taken in the text.

purpose of making a profit of the growing surface, and contracts for things annexed to the freehold, in prospect of their immediate separation; from which it seems to result, that where timber or other produce of the land, or any other thing annexed to the freehold, is specifically sold, whether it is to be severed from the soil by the vendor, or to be taken by the vendee, under a special license to enter for that purpose, it is still, in the contemplation of the parties, evidently and substantially a sale of goods only, and so is not within the statute.¹

¹ Roberts on Frauds, p. 126; 4 Kent, Comm 450, 451; Long on Sales, (by Rand,) p. 76-81, and cases there cited; Chitty on Contracts, p. 241, (2d edit.) On this subject neither the English nor the American decisions are quite uniform; but the weight of authority is believed to be as stated in the text, though it is true of the former, as Ld. Abinger remarked, in Rodwell v. Phillips, 9 M. & W. 505, that "no general rule is laid down in any one of them, that is not contradicted by some others." See also Poulter v. Killinbeck, 1 B. & P. 398; Parker v. Staniland, 11 East, 362, distinguishing and qualifying Crosby v. Wadsworth, 6 East, 611; Smith v. Surman, 9 B. & C. 561; Watts v. Friend, 10 B. & C. 446. The distinction taken in Bostwick v. Leach, 3 Day, 476, 484, is this, that when there is a sale of property, which would pass by a deed of land, as such, without any other description, if it can be separated from the freehold, and by the contract is to be separated, such contract is not within the statute. See, accordingly, Whipple v. Foot, 2 Johns. 418, 422; Frear v. Hardenburg, 5 Johns. 276; Stewart v. Doughty, 9 Johns. 108, 112; Austin v. Sawyer, 9 Cowen, 39; Erskine v. Plummer, 7 Greenl. 447; Bishop v. Doty, 1 Vermont R. 38; Miller v. Baker, 1 Mete. 27; Whitmarsh v. Walker, Ib. 313; Clafin v. Carpenter, 4 Mete. 580. Mr. Rand, who has treated this subject, as well as all others on which he has written, with great learning and acumen, would reconcile the English authorities by distinguishing between those cases, in which the subject of the contract, being part of the inheritance, is to be severed and delivered by the vendor, as a chattel, and those in which a right of entry by the vendee to cut and take it is bargained for. "The authorities," says he, "all agree in this, that a bargain for trees, grass, crops, or any such like thing, when severed from the soil, which are growing at the time of the contract upon the soil, but to be severed and delivered by the vendor, as chattels, separate from any interest in the soil, is a contract for the sale of goods, wares, or merchandise, within the meaning of the seventeenth section of the statute of frauds. (Smith v. Surman, 9 B. & C. 561; Evans v. Roberts, 5 B. & C. 836; Watts v. Friend, 10 B. & C. 446; Parker v.

§ 272. *Devises of lands and tenements* are also required to be in writing, signed by the testator, and attested by credible, that is, by competent witnesses. By the statutes, 32 Hen. VIII. c. 1, and 34 & 35 Hen. VIII. c. 5, devises were merely required to be in writing. The statute of frauds, 29 Car. II. c. 3, required the attestation of "three or four credible witnesses;" but the statute, 1 Vict. c. 26, has reduced the number of witnesses to two. The provisions of the statute of frauds on this subject have been adopted in most of the United States.¹ It requires that the witnesses should attest

Staniland, 11 East, 362; Warwick v. Bruce, 2 M. & S. 205.) So, where the subject-matter of the bargain is *fructus industriales*, such as corn, garden-roots, and such like things, which are emblements, and which have already grown to maturity, and are to be taken immediately, and no right of entry forms absolutely part of the contract, but a mere license is given to the vendee to enter and take them, it will fall within the operation of the same section of the statute. (Warwick v. Bruce, 2 M. & S. 205; Parker v. Staniland, 11 East, 362; Park, B., Carrington v. Roots, 2 M. & W. 256; Bayley, B., Shelton v. Livius, 2 Tyrw. 427, 429; Bayley, J., Evans v. Roberts, 5 B. & Cr. 831; Scorell v. Boxall, 1 Y. & J. 398; Mayfield v. Wadsley, 3 B. & Cr. 357.) But, where the subject-matter of the contract constitutes a part of the inheritance, and is not to be severed and delivered by the vendor as a chattel, but a right of entry to cut and take it is bargained for, or where it is emblements growing, and a right in the soil to grow and bring them to maturity, and to enter and take them, makes part of the bargain, the case will fall within the fourth section of the statute of frauds. (Carrington v. Roots, 2 M. & W. 257; Shelton v. Livius, 2 Tyrw. 429; Scorell v. Boxall, 1 Y. & J. 398; Earl of Falmouth v. Thomas, 1 Cr. & M. 89; Teal v. Auty, 2 B. & Bing. 99; Emmerson v. Heelis, 2 Taunt. 38; Waddington v. Bristow, 2 B. & P. 452; Crosby v. Wadsworth, 6 East, 602.) See Long on Sales, (by Rand,) p. 80, 81. But the later English and the American authorities do not seem to recognise such distinction.

¹ In Vermont alone the will is required to be sealed. Three witnesses are necessary to a valid will, in Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi. Two witnesses only are requisite, in New York, Delaware, Virginia, Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Kentucky. In some of the States, the provision as to attestation is more special. In Pennsylvania, a devise is good, if properly signed, though it is not subscribed by any attesting witness, provided it can be proved by two or more competent witnesses; and if it be attested

and subscribe the will in the testator's presence. The attestation of marksmen is sufficient; and if they are dead, the attestation may be proved by evidence, that they lived near the testator, that no others of the same name resided in the neighborhood, and that they were illiterate persons.¹ One object of this provision is, to prevent the substitution of another instrument for the genuine will. It is therefore held, that, to be present, within the meaning of the statute, though the testator need not be in the same room, yet he must be near enough to see and identify the instrument, if he is so disposed, though in truth he does not attempt to do so; and that he must have mental knowledge and consciousness of the fact.² If he be in a state of insensibility at the moment of attestation, it is void.³ Being in the same room is held *prima facie* evidence of an attestation in his presence; as an attestation, not made in the same room, is *prima facie* not an attestation in his presence.⁴ It is not necessary, under the statute of frauds, that the witnesses should attest in the presence of each other, nor that they should all attest at the same time;⁵ nor is it requisite that they should actually have

by witnesses, it may still be proved by others. 4 Kent, Comm. 514; 6 Cruise's Dig. 44, 46, 47, notes, (3d Am. edit.) See Post, Vol. 2, tit. WILLS.

¹ Doe v. Caperton, 9 C. & P. 112; Jackson v. Van Dusen, 5 Johns. 144; Doe v. Davis, 11 Jur. 182.

² Shires v. Glascock, 2 Salk. 688, (by Evans,) and cases cited in notes; 4 Kent, Comm. 515, 516; Casson v. Dade, 1 Bro. Ch. 99; Doe v. Manifold, 1 M. & S. 294; Todd v. E. of Winchelsea, 1 M. & M. 12.

³ Right v. Price, Doug. 241.

⁴ Neil v. Neil, 1 Leigh, R. 6, 10-21, where the cases on this subject are ably reviewed by Carr, J. If the two rooms have a communication by folding doors, it is still to be ascertained whether, in fact, the testator could have seen the witnesses in the act of attestation. In the goods of Colman, 3 Curt. 118.

⁵ Cook v. Parsons, Prec. in Chan. 184; Jones v. Lake, 2 Atk. 177, in note; Grayson v. Atkin, 2 Ves. sen. 455; Dewey v. Dewey, 1 Mete. 349; 1 Williams on Executors, (by Troubat,) p. 46, note (2). The statute of 1 Vict. c. 26, § 9, has altered the law in this respect, by enacting, that no will shall be valid, unless it be in writing, signed by the testator in the presence of two witnesses at one time. See Moore v. King, 3 Curt. 243; In the goods of Simmonds, Ib. 79.

seen the testator sign, or known what the paper was, provided they subscribed the instrument in his presence, and at his request.¹ Neither has it been considered necessary, under this statute, that the testator should *subscribe* the instrument; it being deemed sufficient, that it be *signed* by him in any part with his own name, or mark, provided it appear to have been done *animo perficiendi*, and to have been regarded by him as completely executed. Thus, where the will was signed in the margin only; or where, being written by the testator himself, his name was written only in the beginning of the will, I. A. B. &c., this was held a sufficient signing.² But where it appeared that the testator intended to sign each several sheet of the will, but signed only two of them, being unable, from extreme weakness, to sign the others, it was held incomplete.³

¹ White v. Trustees of the British Museum, 6 Bing. 310; Wright v. Wright, 7 Bing. 457; Dewey v. Dewey, 1 Metc. 349; Johnson v. Johnson, 1 C. & M. 140. See further, as to proof by subscribing witnesses, Post, § 572.

² Lemaine v. Stanley, 3 Lev. 1; Morrison v. Turnour, 18 Ves. 183. But this also is now changed by the statute, 1 Vict. c. 26, § 9, by which no will is valid, unless it be signed at the foot or end thereof, by the testator, or by some other person in his presence, and by his direction; as well as attested by two witnesses, subscribing their names in his presence. See, In the goods of Carver, 3 Curt. 29.

³ Right v. Price, Doug. 241. The statute of frauds, which has been generally followed in the United States, admitted exceptions in favor of nuncupative or verbal wills, made under certain circumstances therein mentioned, as well as in favor of parol testamentary dispositions of personalty, by soldiers in actual service, and by mariners at sea; any farther notice of which would be foreign from the plan of this treatise. The latter exceptions still exist in England; but nuncupative wills seem to be abolished there, by the general terms of the statute of 1 Vict. c. 26, § 9, before cited. The Common Law, which allows a bequest of personal estate by parol, without writing, has been altered by statute in most, if not all of the United States; the course of legislation having tended strongly to the abolition of all distinctions between the requisites for the testamentary disposition of real and of personal property. See 4 Kent, Comm. 516-520; Lovelass on Wills, p. 315-319; 1 Williams on Executors (by Troubat,) p. 46-48, notes.

§ 273. By the statute of frauds, the *revocation of a will*, by the direct act of the testator, must be proved by some subsequent will or codicil, inconsistent with the former; or by some other writing, declaring the same, and signed in the presence of three witnesses; or by burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the same, by the testator, or in his presence and by his direction and consent.¹ It is observable, that this part of the statute only requires that the instrument of revocation, if not a will or codicil, be signed by the testator in presence of the witnesses, but it does not, as in the execution of a will, require that the witnesses should sign in his presence. In regard to the other acts of revocation here mentioned, they operate by one common principle, namely, the intent of the testator. Revocation is an act of the mind, demonstrated by some outward and visible sign or symbol of revocation;² and the words of the statute are satisfied by any act of spoliation, reprobation, or destruction, deliberately done upon the instrument, *animo revocandi*.³ The declarations of the testator, accompanying the act, are of course admissible in evidence as explanatory of his intention.⁴ Accordingly, where the testator rumpled up his will, and threw it into the fire, with intent to destroy it, though it was saved entire without his knowledge, this was held to be a revocation.⁵ So, where he tore off a superfluous seal.⁶ But where, being angry with the devisee, he began to tear his will, but being afterwards pacified, he fitted the pieces carefully together,

¹ Stat. 29 Car. II. c. 3, § 6. The statute of 1 Vict. c. 26, § 20, mentions "burning, tearing, or otherwise destroying the same," &c.

² Bibb v. Thomas, 2 W. Bl. 1043.

³ Burtenshaw v. Gilbert, Cowp. 49, 52; Burns v. Burns, 4 S. & R. 567; 6 Cruise's Dig. (by White,) Tit. 38, ch. 6, § 54; Johnson v. Brailsford, 2 Nott & McC. 272; Winsor v. Pratt, 2 B. & B. 650; Lovelass on Wills, p. 346-350; Card v. Grinman, 5 Conn. 168; 4 Kent, Comm. 531, 532.

⁴ Dan v. Brown, 4 Cowen, 490.

⁵ Bibb v. Thomas, 2 W. Bl. 1043.

⁶ Avery v. Pixley, 4 Mass. 462.

saying he was glad it was no worse, this was held to be no revocation.¹

§ 274. Documentary evidence is also required, in proof of the *contract of apprenticeship*; there being no legal binding, to give the master coercive power over the person of the apprentice, unless it be by indentures, duly executed in the forms prescribed by the various statutes on this subject. The general features of the English statutes of apprenticeship, so far as the mode of binding is concerned, will be found in those of most of the United States. There are various other cases, in which a deed, or other documentary evidence is required by statutes, a particular enumeration of which would be foreign from the plan of this treatise.²

¹ Doe v. Perkes, 3 B. & Ald. 489.

² In several of the United States, two subscribing witnesses are necessary to the execution of a deed of conveyance of lands, to entitle it to registration; in others, but one. In some others, the testimony of two witnesses is requisite, when the deed is to be proved by witnesses. 4 Kent, Comm. 457. See Post, Vol. 2, tit. WILLS, *passim*, where the subject of Wills is more amply treated.

CHAPTER XV.

OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF PAROL OR VEREAL EVIDENCE TO AFFECT THAT WHICH IS WRITTEN.¹

§ 275. By *written evidence*, in this place, is meant not every thing which is in writing, but that only which is of a documentary and more solemn nature, containing the terms of a contract between the parties, and designed to be the repository and evidence of their final intentions. *Fiunt enim de his [contractibus] scripturæ, ut, quod actum est, per eas facilius probari poterit.*² When parties have deliberately put their engagements into writing, in such terms as import a legal obligation, without any uncertainty as to the object or extent of such engagement, it is conclusively presumed that the whole engagement of the parties, and the extent and manner of their undertaking, was reduced to writing; and all oral testimony of a previous *colloquium* between the parties, or of conversation or declarations at the time when it was completed or afterwards, as it would tend, in many instances, to substitute a new and different contract for the one which was really agreed upon, to the prejudice, possibly, of one of the parties, is rejected.³ In other words, as the rule is now

¹ The subject of this chapter is ably discussed in Spence on the Equitable Jurisdiction of Chancery, Vol. 1, p. 553-575, and in 1 Smith's Leading Cases, p. 410-418, [305]-[310,] with Hare & Wallace's notes.

² Dig. Lib. 20, tit. 1, l. 4; Ib. Lib. 22, tit. 4, l. 4.

³ Stackpole v. Arnold, 11 Mass. 30, 31, per Parker, J.; Preston v. Mercereau, 2 W. Bl. 1249; Coker v. Guy, 2 B. & P. 565, 569; Bogert v. Cauman, Anthon's R. 70; Bayard v. Malcolm, 1 Johns. 467, per Kent, C. J.; Rich v. Jackson, 4 Bro. Ch. R. 519, per Ld. Thurlow; Sinclair v. Stevenson, 1 C. & P. 582, per Best, C. J.; McLellan v. The Cumberland Bank, 11 Shepl. 566. The general rule of the Scotch law is to the same effect, namely, that "writing cannot be cut down, or taken away by the testimony of witnesses." Tait on Evid. p. 326, 327.

more briefly expressed, "parol contemporaneous evidence is inadmissible to contradict or vary the terms of a valid written instrument."¹

§ 276. This rule "was introduced in early times, when the most frequent mode of ascertaining a party to a contract was by his seal affixed to the instrument; and it has been continued in force, since the vast multiplication of written contracts, in consequence of the increased business and commerce of the world. It is not because a seal is put to the contract, that it shall not be explained away, varied, or rendered ineffectual; but because the contract itself is plainly and intelligibly stated, in the language of the parties, and is the best possible evidence of the intent and meaning of those who are bound by the contract, and of those who are to receive the benefit of it." "The rule of excluding oral testimony has heretofore been applied generally, if not universally, to simple contracts in writing, to the same extent and with the same exceptions as to specialties or contracts under seal."²

§ 277. It is to be observed, that the rule is directed only against the admission of any other evidence of the *language*, employed by the parties in making the contract, than that which is furnished by the writing itself. The writing, it is true, may be read by the light of surrounding circumstances, in order more perfectly to understand the intent and meaning of the parties; but, as they have constituted the writing to be the only outward and visible expression of their meaning, *no other words* are to be added to it, nor substituted in its stead. The duty of the Court in such cases is to ascertain,

¹ 1 Phil. & Am. on Evid. p. 753; 2 Phil. Evid. 350; 2 Stark. Evid. 544, 548; Adams v. Wordley, 1 M. & W. 379, 380, per Parke, B.; Boorman v. Johnston, 12 Wend. 573.

² Per Parker, J. in Stackpole v. Arnold, 11 Mass. 31. See also Woolam v. Hearn, 7 Ves. 218, per Sir Wm. Grant; Hunt v. Adams, 7 Mass. 522, per Sewall, J.

not what the parties may have secretly intended, as contradistinguished from what their words express; but what is the meaning of the words they have used.¹ It is merely a duty of interpretation; that is, to find out the true sense of the written words, as the parties used them; and of construction, that is, when the true sense is ascertained, to subject the instrument, in its operation, to the established rules of law.² And where the language of an instrument has a settled legal construction, parol evidence is not admissible to contradict that construction. Thus, where no time is expressly limited for the payment of the money mentioned in a special contract in writing, the legal construction is, that it is payable presently; and parol evidence of a contemporaneous verbal agreement for the payment at a future day is not admissible.³

§ 278. The *terms* of every written instrument are to be understood in their *plain, ordinary, and popular sense*, unless they have generally, in respect to the subject-matter, as, by the known usage of trade or the like, acquired a peculiar sense, distinct from the popular sense of the same words; or unless the context evidently points out that, in the particular instance, and in order to effectuate the immediate intention of the parties, they must be understood in some other and

¹ Doe v. Gwillim, 5 B. & Ad. 122, 129, per Parke, J.; Doe v. Martin, 4 B. & Ad. 771, 786, per Parke, J.; Beaumont v. Field, 2 Chitty's R. 275, per Abbott, C. J. See Post, § 295.

² The subject of Interpretation and Construction is ably treated by Professor Lieber, in his Legal and Political Hermeneutics, ch. 1, § 8, and ch. 3, § 2, 3; Doct. & St. 39, c. 24. The interpretation, as well as the construction of a written instrument, is for the Court, and not for the Jury. But other questions of intent, in fact, are for the Jury. The Court, however, where the meaning is doubtful, will, in proper cases, receive evidence, in aid of its judgment; Story on Agency, § 63, note (1); Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, p. 198, n.; Ante, § 49; Hutchinson v. Bowker, 5 M. & W. 535; and where it is doubtful whether a certain word was used in a sense different from its ordinary acceptation, it will refer the question to the Jury. Simpson v. Margitson, 35 Leg. Obs. 172.

³ Warren v. Wheeler, 8 Metc. 97.

peculiar sense. But where the instrument consists partly of a printed formula, and partly of written words, if there is any reasonable doubt of the meaning of the whole, the *written words* are entitled to have *greater effect* in the interpretation, than those which are printed; they being the immediate language and terms, selected by the parties themselves for the expression of their meaning, while the *printed formula*, is more general in its nature, applying equally to their case, and to that of all other contracting parties on similar subjects and occasions.¹

§ 279. The rule under consideration is *applied only in suits between the parties* to the instrument; as they alone are to blame if the writing contains what was not intended, or omits that which it should have contained. It cannot affect third persons; who, if it were otherwise, might be prejudiced by things recited in the writings, contrary to the truth, through the ignorance, carelessness, or fraud of the parties; and who, therefore, ought not to be precluded from proving the truth, however contradictory to the written statements of others.²

§ 280. It is almost superfluous to add, that the rule does not exclude the *testimony of experts*, to aid the Court in reading the instrument. If the characters are difficult to be deciphered, or the language, whether technical, or local and provincial, or altogether foreign, is not understood by the Court, the evidence of persons skilled in deciphering writings, or who understood the language in which the instrument is

¹ Per *Ld. Ellenborough*, in *Robertson v. French*, 4 East, 135, 136. See *Wigram on the Interpretation of Wills*, p. 15, 16, and cases there cited. See also *Boorman v. Johnston*, 12 Wend. 573; *Taylor v. Briggs*, 2 C. & P. 525; *Alsager v. St. Katherine's Dock Co.*, 14 M. & W. 799, per *Parke, B.*

² Ante, § 23, 171, 204; 1 Poth. Obl. by Evans, P. 4, c. 2, art. 3, n. [766]; 2 Stark. Ev. 575; *Krider v. Lafferty*, 1 Whart. 303, 314, per *Kennedy, J.*; *Reynolds v. Magness*, 2 Iredell, R. 26.

written, or the technical or local meaning of the terms employed, is admissible, to declare what are the characters, or to translate the instrument, or to testify to the proper meaning of the particular words.¹ Thus, the words "inhabitant,"² — "level,"³ — "thousand,"⁴ — "fur,"⁵ — "freight,"⁶ — and many others, have been interpreted; and their peculiar meaning, when used in connexion with the subject-matter of the transaction, has been fixed, by parol evidence of the sense, in

¹ *Wigram on the Interpretation of Wills*, p. 48; 2 Stark. Ev. 565, 566; *Birch v. Depeyster*, 1 Stark. R. 210, and cases there cited; Post, § 292; *Sheldon v. Benham*, 4 Hill, N. Y. Rep. 123.

² *The King v. Mashiter*, 6 Ad. & El. 153.

³ *Clayton v. Gregson*, 5 Ad. & El. 302; 4 N. & M. 602, S. C.

⁴ *Smith v. Wilson*, 3 B. & Ad. 728. The doctrine of the text was more fully expounded by *Shaw, C. J.* in *Brown v. Brown*, 8 Metc. 576, 577, as follows: — "The meaning of words and the grammatical construction of the English language, so far as they are established by the rules and usages of the language, are *prima facie*, matter of law, to be construed and passed upon by the Court. But language may be ambiguous and used in different senses; or general words, in particular trades and branches of business — as among merchants, for instance — may be used in a new, peculiar or technical sense; and therefore, in a few instances, evidence may be received, from those who are conversant with such branches of business, and such technical or peculiar use of language, to explain and illustrate it. One of the strongest of these, perhaps, among the recent cases, is the case of *Smith v. Wilson*, 3 Barn. & Adolph. 728, where it was held, that in an action on a lease of an estate including a rabbit warren, evidence of usage was admissible, to show that the words 'thousand of rabbits' were understood to mean one hundred dozen, that is, twelve hundred. But the decision was placed on the ground that the words 'hundred,' 'thousand,' and the like, were not understood, when applied to particular subjects, to mean that number of units; that the definition was not fixed by law, and therefore was open to such proof of usage. Though it is exceedingly difficult to draw the precise line of distinction, yet it is manifest that such evidence can be admitted only in a few cases like the above. Were it otherwise, written instruments, instead of importing certainty and verity, as being the sole repository of the will, intent, and purposes, of the parties, to be construed by the rules of law, might be made to speak a very different language, by the aid of parol evidence."

⁵ *Astor v. The Union Ins. Co.* 7 Cowen, 202.

⁶ *Peisch v. Dickson*, 1 Mason, 11, 12.

which they are usually received, when employed in cases similar to the case at bar. And so of the meaning of the phrase "duly honored,"¹ when applied to a bill of exchange; and of the expression, "in the month of October,"² when applied to the time when a vessel was to sail; and many others of the like kind. If the question arises from the obscurity of the writing itself, it is determined by the Court alone;³ but questions of custom, usage, and actual intention and meaning derived therefrom, are for the Jury.⁴ But where the words have a known legal meaning, such, for example, as measures of quantity fixed by statute, parol evidence, that the parties intended to use them in a sense different from the legal meaning, though it were still the customary and popular sense, is not admissible.⁵

§ 281. The reason and policy of the rule will be further seen by adverting to some of the cases, in which parol evidence has been *rejected*. Thus, where a policy of insurance was effected on goods, "in ship or ships from Surinam to

¹ Lucas v. Groning, 7 Taunt. 164.

² Chaurand v. Angerstein, Peake's Cas. 43. See also Peisch v. Dickson, 1 Mason, 12; Doe v. Benson, 4 B. & Ald. 588; United States v. Breed, 1 Sumn. 159; Taylor v. Briggs, 2 C. & P. 525.

³ Remon v. Hayward, 2 Ad. & El. 666; Crofts v. Marshall, 7 C. & P. 597. But see Sheldon v. Benham, 4 Hill, N. Y. Rep. 123.

⁴ Lucas v. Groning, 7 Taunt. 164, 167, 168; Birch v. Depeyster, 1 Stark. R. 210; Paley on Agency, (by Lloyd) p. 198; Hutchinson v. Bowker, 5 M. & W. 535.

⁵ Smith v. Wilson, 3 B. & Ad. 728, per Ld. Tenterden; Hockin v. Cooke, 4 T. R. 314; Att. Gen. v. The Cast Plate Glass Co. 1 Anstr. 39; Sleght v. Rhineland, 1 Johns. 192; Frith v. Barker, 2 Johns. 335; Stoever v. Whitman, 6 Binn. 417; Henry v. Risk, 1 Dall. 465; Doe v. Lea, 11 East, 312. Conversations between the parties, at the time of making a contract, are competent evidence, as part of the *res gestæ*, to show the sense which they attached to a particular term used in the contract. Gray v. Harper, 1 Story, R. 574. Where a sold note ran thus, — "18 pockets of hops at 100s." parol evidence was held admissible to show that 100s. meant the price per hundred weight. Spicer v. Cooper, 1 G. & D. 52.

London," parol evidence was held inadmissible to show that a particular ship in the fleet, which was lost, was verbally excepted at the time of the contract.¹ So, where a policy described the two *termini* of the voyage, parol evidence was held inadmissible to prove that the risk was not to commence until the vessel reached an intermediate place.² So, where the instrument purported to be an absolute engagement to pay at a specified day, parol evidence of an oral agreement at the same time that the payment should be prolonged,³ or depend upon a contingency,⁴ or be made out of a particular fund, has been rejected.⁵ Where a written agreement of partnership was unlimited as to the time of commencement, parol evidence, that it was at the same time verbally agreed that the partnership should not commence until a future day, was held inadmissible.⁶ So, where, in assumpsit for use and occupation, upon a written memorandum of lease, at a certain rent, parol evidence was offered by the plaintiff of an agreement at the same time to pay a further sum, being the ground rent of the premises, to the ground landlord, it was rejected.⁷ So,

¹ Weston v. Emes, 1 Taunt. 115.

² Kaines v. Knightly, Skin. 54; Leslie v. De la Torre, cited 12 East, 358.

³ Hoare v. Graham, 3 Campb. 57; Hanson v. Stetson, 5 Pick. 506; Spring v. Lovett, 11 Pick. 417.

⁴ Rawson v. Walker, 1 Stark. R. 361; Foster v. Jolly, 1 C. M. & R. 703; Hunt v. Adams, 7 Mass. 518; Free v. Hawkins, 8 Taunt. 92; Thompson v. Ketchum, 8 Johns. 189; Woodbridge v. Spooner, 3 B. & Ald. 233; Moseley v. Hanford, 10 B. & C. 729; Erwin v. Saunders, 1 Cowen, 249.

⁵ Campbell v. Hodgson, 1 Gow, R. 74.

⁶ Dix v. Otis, 5 Pick. 38.

⁷ Preston v. Merceau, 2 W. Bl. 1249. A similar decision was made in *The Isabella*, 2 Rob. Adm. 241, and in *White v. Wilson*, 2 B. & P. 116, where seamen's wages were claimed in addition to the sum named in the shipping articles. The English statutes not only require such contracts to be in writing, but declare that the articles shall be conclusive upon the parties. The statute of the United States is equally imperative as to the writing, but omits the latter provision as to its conclusiveness. But the decisions, in both the cases just cited, rest upon the general rule stated in the text, which is a

where, in a written contract of sale of a ship, the ship was particularly described, it was held, that parol evidence of a further descriptive representation, made prior to the time of sale, was not admissible to charge the vendor, without proof of actual fraud; all previous conversation being merged in the written contract.¹ So, where a contract was for the sale and delivery of "Ware potatoes," of which, there were several kinds or qualities; parol evidence was held not admissible to show that the contract was in fact for the best of those kinds.² Where one signed a premium note in his own name, parol evidence was held inadmissible to show that he signed it as the agent of the defendant, on whose property he had caused insurance to be effected by the plaintiff, at the defendant's request, and who was sued as the promisor in the note, made by his agent.³ Even the subsequent confession of the party, as to the true intent and construction of the title deed, under which he claims, will be rejected.⁴ The books abound in

doctrine of general jurisprudence, and not upon the mere positive enactments of the statutes. See 2 Rob. Adm. 243; *Bogert v. Caunam*, Anthon's R. 70. The same remark is true in regard to the Statute of Frauds. See 11 Mass. 31. See further, *Rich v. Jackson*, 4 Bro. Ch. R. 514; *Brigham v. Rogers*, 17 Mass. 571; *Flinn v. Calow*, 1 M. & G. 589.

¹ *Pickering v. Dowson*, 4 Taunt. 779. See also *Powell v. Edmunds*, 12 East, 6; *Pender v. Fobes*, 1 Dev. & Bat. 250; *Wright v. Crookes*, 1 Scott, N. R. 64.

² *Smith v. Jeffreys*, 15 M. & W. 561.

³ *Stackpole v. Arnold*, 11 Mass. 27. See also *Hunt v. Adams*, 7 Mass. 518; *Shankland v. City of Washington*, 5 Peters, 394. But parol evidence is admissible to show that one of several promises signed as the surety of another. *Carpenter v. King*, 9 Metc. 511; *McGee v. Prouty*, Ib. 547. And where a special agreement was made in writing, for the sale of goods from A. to B., the latter being in part the agent of C., whose name did not appear in the transaction; it was held, that C. might maintain an action in his own name against A. for the breach of this contract, and that parol evidence was admissible to prove, that B. acted merely as the agent of C., and for his exclusive benefit. *Hubbert v. Borden*, 6 Wharton's R. 79.

⁴ *Paine v. McIntier*, 1 Mass. 69, as explained in 10 Mass. 461. See also *Townsend v. Weld*, 8 Mass. 146.

cases of the application of this rule;¹ but these are deemed sufficient to illustrate its spirit and meaning, which is the extent of our present design.

§ 282. From the examples given in the two preceding sections, it is thus apparent that *the rule excludes only parol evidence of the language* of the parties, contradicting, varying, or adding to that which is contained in the written instrument; and this, because they have themselves committed to writing all which they deemed necessary to give full expression to their meaning, and because of the mischiefs which would result, if verbal testimony were in such cases received. But where the agreement in writing is expressed in short and incomplete terms, parol evidence is admissible to explain that which is *per se* unintelligible, such explanation not being inconsistent with the written terms.² It is also to be kept in mind, that though the first question in all cases of contract is one of interpretation and intention, yet the question, as we have already remarked, is not what the parties may have secretly and in fact intended, but what meaning did they intend to convey by the words they employed in the written instrument. To ascertain the meaning of these words, it is obvious that parol evidence of extraneous facts and circumstances may in some cases be admitted to a very great extent, without in any wise infringing the spirit of the rule under consideration. These cases, which in truth are not exceptions to the rule, but on the contrary are out of the range of its operation, we shall now proceed to consider.

§ 283. It is in the first place to be observed, that the rule does not restrict the Court to the perusal of a single instrument or paper; for, while the controversy is between the original parties, or their representatives, *all contemporaneous*

¹ See Cowen & Hill's notes, 938-1003, to 1 Phil. Ev. 531-578; Tait on Evid. p. 326-336.

² *Sweet v. Lee*, 3 Man. & Gr. 452.

writings, relating to the same subject-matter, are admissible in evidence.¹

§ 284. It is in the next place to be noted, that the rule is not infringed by the admission of parol evidence, showing that the instrument is altogether *void*, or that it *never* had any legal existence or binding force; either by reason of fraud, or for want of due execution and delivery, or for the illegality of the subject-matter. This qualification applies to all contracts, whether under seal or not. The *want of consideration* may also be proved, to show that the agreement is not binding; unless it is either under seal, which is conclusive evidence of a sufficient consideration,² or is a negotiable instrument in the hands of an innocent indorsee.³ *Fraud*, practised by the party seeking the remedy, upon him against whom it is sought, and in that which is the subject-matter of the action or claim, is universally held fatal to his title. "The covin," says Lord Coke, "doth suffocate the right." The foundation of the claim, whether it be a record, or a deed, or a writing without seal, is of no importance, they being alike void, if obtained by fraud.⁴ Parol evidence may also be offered to show that the contract was made for the furtherance of objects *forbidden by law*,⁵ whether it be by

¹ Leeds v. Lancashire, 2 Campb. 205; Hartley v. Wilkinson, 4 Campb. 127; Stone v. Metcalf, 1 Stark. R. 53; Bowerbank v. Monteiro, 4 Taunt. 846, per Gibbs, J.; Hunt v. Livermore, 5 Pick. 395; Davlin v. Hill, 2 Fairf. 434; Couch v. Meeker, 2 Conn. 302; Lee v. Dick, 10 Pet. 482; Bell v. Bruen, 17 Pet. 161; 1 Howard, S. C. R. 169, 183, S. C.

² Ante, § 19, 22; Post, § 303.

³ Ante, § 189, 190.

⁴ 2 Stark. Evid. 340; Tait on Evid. 327, 328; Chitty on Contr. 527, a.; Buckler v. Millard, 2 Ventr. 107; Filmer v. Gott, 4 Bro. P. C. 230; Taylor v. Weld, 5 Mass. 116, per Sedgwick, J.; Franchot v. Leach, 5 Cowen, 508; Dorr v. Munsell, 13 Johns. 431; Morton v. Chandler, 8 Greenl. 9; Commonwealth v. Bullard, 9 Mass. 270; Scott v. Burton, 2 Ashm. 312.

⁵ Collins v. Blantern, 2 Wils. 347; 1 Smith's Leading Cas. 154, 168, note, and cases there cited. If the contract is by deed, the illegality must be specially pleaded. Whelpdale's case, 5 Co. 119; Mestayer v. Biggs,

statute, or by an express rule of the Common Law, or by the general policy of the law; or that the writing was obtained by *felony*,¹ or by *duress*; ² or that the party was *incapable* of binding himself, either by reason of some legal impediment, such as infancy or coverture,³ or from actual imbecility or want of reason,⁴ whether it be by means of permanent idiocy or insanity, or from a temporary cause, such as drunkenness;⁵ or that the instrument came into the hands of the plaintiff without any absolute and final *delivery*,⁶ by the obligor or party charged.

§ 284 a. Nor does the rule apply, in cases where the original contract was verbal and entire, and a *part only* of it was *reduced to writing*. Thus, where, upon an adjustment of accounts, the debtor conveyed certain real estate to the creditor at an assumed value, which was greater than the amount due, and took the creditor's promissory note for the balance;

⁴ Tyrw. 471. But the rule in the text applies to such cases, as well as to those arising under the general issue. See also Biggs v. Lawrence, 3 T. R. 454; Waymell v. Read, 5 T. R. 600; Doe v. Ford, 3 Ad. & El. 649; Catlin v. Bell, 4 Campb. 183; Commonwealth v. Pease, 16 Mass. 91; Norman v. Cole, 3 Esp. 253; Sinclair v. Stevenson, 1 C. & P. 582; Chitty on Contr. 519-527.

¹ 2 B. & P. 471, per Heath, J.

² 2 Inst. 482, 483; 5 Com. Dig. Pleader 2, W. 18-23; Stouffer v. Lashaw, 2 Watts, 165; Thompson v. Lockwood, 15 Johns. 256; 2 Stark. Ev. 274.

³ 2 Stark. Evid. 274; Anon. 12 Mod. 609; Van Valkenburg v. Rouk, 12 Johns. 338; 2 Inst. 482, 483; 5 Com. Dig. ub. sup.

⁴ 2 Kent, Comm. 450-453, and cases there cited; Webster v. Woodford, 3 Day, 90; Mitchell v. Kingman, 5 Pick. 431; Rice v. Peet, 15 Johns. 503.

⁵ See Barrett v. Buxton, 2 Aik. 167, where this point is ably examined by Prentiss, J.; Seymour v. Delancey, 3 Cowen, 518; 1 Story's Eq. Jur. § 231, note (2); Wigglesworth v. Steers, 1 Hen. & Munf. 70; Prentice v. Achorn, 2 Paige, 31.

⁶ Clark v. Gifford, 10 Wend. 310; United States v. Leffler, 11 Peters, 86; Jackson d. Titus v. Myers, 11 Wend. 533, 536; Cowen & Hill's note 969, to 1 Phil. Evid. 551; Couch v. Meeker, 2 Conn. R. 302.

it being verbally agreed that the real estate should be sold, and the proceeds accounted for by the grantee, and that the deficiency, if any, below the estimated value, should be made good by the grantor; which agreement the grantor afterwards acknowledged in writing; — it was held, in an action brought by the latter to recover the contents of the note, that the whole agreement was admissible in evidence on the part of the defendant; and that, upon proof that the sale of the land produced less than the estimated value, the deficiency should be deducted from the amount due upon the note.¹

§ 285. Neither is this rule infringed by the introduction of parol evidence, *contradicting* or *explaining* the instrument in some of its *recitals of facts*, where such recitals do not, on other principles, estop the party to deny them; and accordingly in some cases such evidence is received.² Thus, in a settlement case, where the value of an estate, upon which the settlement was gained, was in question, evidence of a greater sum paid than was recited in the deed, was held admissible.³ So, to show that the lands, described in the deed as in one parish, were in fact situated in another.⁴ So, to show that at the time of entering into a contract of service in a particular employment, there was a further agreement to pay a sum of money as a premium for teaching the party the trade, whereby an apprenticeship was intended; and that the whole was therefore void for want of a stamp, and so no settlement was gained.⁵ So, to contradict the recital of the date of a deed; as, for example, by proving that a charter-party, dated Feb. 6th, conditioned to sail on or before Feb. 12th, was not executed till after the latter day, and that therefore the condition was dispensed

¹ *Lewis v. Gray*, 1 Mass. 297; *Lapham v. Whipple*, 8 Metc. 59.

² 2 Poth. on Obl. by Evans, p. 181, 182.

³ *Rex v. Scammonden*, 3 T. R. 474. See also *Doe v. Ford*, 3 Ad. & El. 649.

⁴ *Rex v. Wickham*, 2 Ad. & El. 517.

⁵ *Rex v. Laindon*, 8 T. R. 379.

with.¹ So, to show that the reference, in a codicil, to a will of 1833, was a mistake, that will being supposed to be destroyed; and that the will of 1837 was intended.² And on the other hand, where a written guaranty was expressed to be "in consideration of your *having discounted V.'s note*," and it was objected that it was for a past consideration, and therefore void, explanatory parol evidence was held admissible to show that the discount was contemporaneous with the guaranty.³ So, where the guaranty was "in consideration of your *having this day advanced to V. D.*," similar evidence was held admissible.⁴ It is also admissible to show when a written promise, without date, was in fact made.⁵ Evidence may also be given of a consideration not mentioned in a deed, provided it be not inconsistent with the consideration expressed in it.⁶

§ 286. As it is a leading rule in regard to written instruments, that they are to be interpreted according to their subject-matter; it is obvious that parol or verbal testimony must be resorted to, in order to ascertain the *nature and qualities of the subject*,⁷ to which the instrument refers. Evidence which is calculated to explain the subject of an instrument, is essentially different in its character from evidence of verbal communications respecting it. Whatever, therefore, indicates the

¹ *Hall v. Cazenove*, 4 East, 477. See further, Tait on Evid. p. 332, 333-336; Post, § 304.

² *Quincey v. Quincey*, 11 Jur. 111.

³ *Ex parte Flight*, 35 Leg. Obs. 240. And see *Haigh v. Brooks*, 10 Ad. & El. 309; *Butcher v. Stuart*, 11 M. & W. 857.

⁴ *Goldshede v. Swan*, 35 Leg. Obs. 203; 1 Exch. R. 154. This case has been the subject of some animated discussion in England. See 12 Jur. 22, 94, 102.

⁵ *Lobb v. Stanley*, 5 Ad. & El. 574, N. S.

⁶ *Clifford v. Turrill*, 9 Jur. 633.

⁷ In the term "subject," in this connexion, text writers include every thing to which the instrument relates, as well as the person who is the other contracting party, or who is the object of the provision, whether it be by will or deed. Phil. & Am. on Evid. 732, n. (1).

nature of the subject, is a just medium of interpretation of the language and meaning of the parties in relation to it, and is also a just foundation for giving the instrument an interpretation, when considered relatively, different from that which it would receive if considered in the abstract. Thus, where certain premises were leased, including a yard, described by metes and bounds, and the question was, whether a cellar under the yard was or was not included in the lease; verbal evidence was held admissible to show, that at the time of the lease the cellar was in the occupancy of another tenant, and therefore that it could not have been intended by the parties that it should pass by the lease.¹ So, where a house, or a mill, or a factory is conveyed, *eo nomine*, and the question is as to what was part and parcel thereof, and so passed by the deed, parol evidence to this point is admitted.²

§ 287. Indeed, there is *no material difference* of principle, in the rules of interpretation, *between wills and contracts*, except what naturally arises from the different circumstances of the parties. The object in both cases is the same, namely, to discover the intention. And to do this, the Court may, in either case, *put themselves in the place of the party*, and then see how the terms of the instrument affect the property or subject-matter.³ With this view, evidence must

¹ 2 Poth. on Obl. by Evans, p. 185; Doe d. Freeland v. Burt, 1 T. R. 701.

² Ropps v. Barker, 4 Pick. 239; Farrar v. Stackpole, 6 Greenl. 154; Post, § 287, cases in note (2). But where the language of the deed was broad enough plainly to include a garden, together with the house, it was held that the written paper of conditions of sale, excepting the garden, was inadmissible to contradict the deed. Doe v. Wheeler, 4 P. & D. 273.

³ Doe v. Martin, 1 N. & M. 524; Holsten v. Jumpson, 4 Esp. 189; Brown v. Thorndike, 15 Pick. 400; Phil. & Am. on Evid. 736; 2 Phil. Evid. 277. The rules of interpretation of Wills, laid down by Mr. Wigram, in his admirable treatise on that subject, may be safely applied, *mutato nomine*, to all other private instruments. They are contained in seven propositions, as the result both of principle and authority, and are thus expressed:—"I. A testator is always presumed to use the words, in which he expresses

be admissible of all the circumstances surrounding the author of the instrument.¹ In the simplest case that can be put,

himself, according to their strict and primary acceptation, unless from the context of the will it appears that he has used them in a different sense; in which case the sense, in which he thus appears to have used them, will be the sense, in which they are to be construed. II. Where there is nothing in the context of a will, from which it is apparent that a testator has used the words, in which he has expressed himself, in any other than their strict and primary sense, and where his words so interpreted are sensible with reference to extrinsic circumstances, it is an inflexible rule of construction, that the words of the will shall be interpreted in their strict and primary sense, and in no other, although they may be capable of some popular or secondary interpretation, and although the most conclusive evidence of intention to use them in such popular or secondary sense be tendered. III. Where there is nothing in the context of a will, from which it is apparent that a testator has used the words, in which he has expressed himself, in any other than their strict and primary sense, but his words, so interpreted, are insensible with reference to extrinsic circumstances, a Court of Law may look into the extrinsic circumstances of the case, to see whether the meaning of the words be sensible in any popular or secondary sense, of which, with reference to these circumstances, they are capable. IV. Where the characters, in which a will is written, are difficult to be deciphered, or the language of the will is not understood by the Court, the evidence of persons skilled in deciphering writing, or who understand the language in which the will is written, is admissible to declare what the characters are, or to inform the Court of the proper meaning of the words. V. For the purpose of determining the object of a testator's bounty, or the subject of disposition, or the quantity of interest intended to be given by his will, a Court may inquire into every material fact relating to the person, who claims to be interested under the will, and to the property which is claimed as the subject of disposition, and to the circumstances of the testator and of his family and affairs; for the purpose of enabling the Court to identify the person or thing intended by the testator, or to determine the quantity of interest he has given by his will. The same (it is conceived) is true of every other disputed point, respecting which it can be

¹ The propriety of admitting such evidence, in order to ascertain the meaning of doubtful words or expressions in a will, is expressly conceded by Marshall, C. J., in Smith v. Bell, 6 Peters, 75. See also Wooster v. Butler, 13 Conn. 317. If letters are offered against a party, it seems, he may read his immediate replies; Roe v. Day, 7 C. & P. 705; and may prove a previous conversation with the party, to show the motive and intention in writing them. Reay v. Richardson, 2 C. M. & R. 422; Ante, § 197.

namely, that of an instrument, appearing on the face of it to be perfectly intelligible, inquiry must be made for a subject-matter to satisfy the description. If, in the conveyance of an estate, it is designated as Blackacre, parol evidence must be admitted to show what field is known by that name. Upon the same principle, where there is a devise of an estate purchased of A., or of a farm in the occupation of B., it must be shown by extrinsic evidence what estate it was that was purchased of A., or what farm was in the occupation of B., before it can be known what is devised.¹ So, if a contract in writing is made, for extending the time of payment of "certain notes," held by one party against the other, parol evidence is admissible to show what notes were so held and intended.²

be shown, that a knowledge of extrinsic facts can in any way be made ancillary to the right interpretation of a testator's words. VI. Where the words of a will, aided by evidence of the material facts of the case, are insufficient to determine the testator's meaning, no evidence will be admissible to prove what the testator intended, and the will (except in certain special cases—see Proposition VII.) will be void for uncertainty. VII. Notwithstanding the rule of law, which makes a will void for uncertainty, where the words, aided by evidence of the material facts of the case, are insufficient to determine the testator's meaning—Courts of law, in certain special cases, admit extrinsic evidence of intention, to make certain the person or thing intended, where the description in the will is insufficient for the purpose. These cases may be thus defined: where the object of a testator's bounty, or the subject of disposition (i. e. person or thing intended) is described in terms, which are applicable indifferently to more than one person or thing, evidence is admissible to prove which of the persons or things so described was intended by the testator." See Wigram on the Admission of Extrinsic Evidence in aid of the Interpretation of Wills, p. 11-14. See also Guy v. Sharp, 1 M. & K. 602, per Ld. Brougham, C.

¹ Phil. & Am. on Evid. 732; 2 Phil. Evid. 297; Doe d. Preedy v. Holtom, 4 Ad. & El. 76, 81, per Coleridge, J.; Sanford v. Raikes, 1 Meriv. 653, per Sir W. Grant; Doe v. Martin, 4 B. & Ad. 771, per Parke, J. "Whether parcel, or not, of the thing demised, is always matter of evidence." Per Buller, J., in Doe v. Burt, 1 T. R. 704, R. acc. in Doe v. E. of Jersey, 3 B. & C. 870; Doe v. Chichester, 4 Dow's P. C. 65; 2 Stark. Evid. 558-561.

² Bell v. Martin, 3 Harrison, R. 167.

§ 288. It is only in this mode that parol evidence is admissible, (as is sometimes, but not very accurately said,) to explain written instruments; namely, by showing the situation of the party in all his relations to persons and things around him, or, as elsewhere expressed, by proof of the surrounding circumstances. Thus, if the language of the instrument is applicable to several persons, to several parcels of land, to several species of goods, to several monuments or boundaries, to several writings;¹ or the terms be vague and general, or have divers meanings, as, "household furniture," "stock," "freight," "factory prices," and the like;² or in a will, the words "child," "children," "grandchildren," "son," "family," or "nearest relations," are employed;³ in all these and the like cases, parol evidence is admissible of any extrinsic circumstances, tending to show what person or persons, or what things, were intended by the party, or to ascertain his meaning in any other respect;⁴ and this, without

¹ Miller v. Travers, 8 Bing. 244; Storer v. Freeman, 10 Mass. 435; Waterman v. Johnson, 13 Pick. 261; Hodges v. Horsfall, 1 Rus. & My. 116; Dillon v. Harris, 4 Bligh, N. S. 343, 356; Parks v. The Gen. Int. Assur. Co. 5 Pick. 34; Coit v. Starkweather, 8 Conn. 289; Blake v. Doherty, 5 Wheat. 359; 2 Stark. Evid. 558-561.

² Peisch v. Dickson, 1 Mason, 10-12, per Story, J.; Pratt v. Jackson, 1 Bro. P. C. 222; Kelly v. Powlet, Amb. 610; Bunn v. Winthrop, 1 Johns. Ch. 329; Le Farrant v. Spencer, 1 Ves. sen. 97; Colpoys v. Colpoys, Jacob's R. 451; Wigram on Wills, p. 64; Goblet v. Beechey, 3 Sim. 24; Barrett v. Allen, 1 Wilcox, 426; Avery v. Stewart, 2 Conn. 69; Williams v. Gilman, 3 Greenl. 276.

³ Blackwell v. Bull, 1 Keen, 176; Wylde's case, 6 Co. 16; Brown v. Thorndike, 15 Pick. 400; Richardson v. Watson, 4 B. & Ad. 787. The American cases on this head are cited in Cowen & Hill's notes, 939-958, to 1 Phil. Evid. p. 532-547. See also Wigram on Wills, p. 58; Doe v. Joinville, 3 East, 172; Green v. Howard, 1 Bro. Ch. C. 32; Leigh v. Leigh, 15 Ves. 92; Beachcroft v. Beachcroft, 1 Madd. R. 430.

⁴ Goodinge v. Goodinge, 1 Ves. sen. 231; Jeacock v. Falkener, 1 Bro. Ch. C. 295; Fonnereau v. Poyntz, Ib. 473; Machell v. Winter, 3 Ves. 540, 541; Lane v. Ld. Stanhope, 6 T. R. 345; Doe v. Huthwaite, 3 B. & Ald. 632; Goodright v. Downshire, 2 B. & P. 608, per Ld. Alvanley; Lansdowne v. Lansdowne, 2 Bligh, 60; Clementson v. Gandy, 1 Keen, 309; King v. Badeley, 3 My. & K. 417. So, parol evidence is admissible to show

any infringement of the rule, which, as we have seen, only excludes parol evidence of other language, declaring his meaning, than that which is contained in the instrument itself.

§ 289. In regard to *wills*, much greater latitude was formerly allowed, in the admission of evidence of intention, than is warranted by the later cases. The *modern doctrine* on this subject, is nearly or quite identical with that which governs in the interpretation of other instruments; and is best stated in the language of Lord Abinger's own lucid exposition, in a recent case in the Exchequer.¹ "The object," he remarked,

what debt was referred to, in a letter of collateral guaranty. *Drummond v. Prestman*, 12 Wheat. 515. So, to show that advances, which had been made, were in fact made upon the credit of a particular letter of guaranty. *Douglas v. Reynolds*, 7 Pet. 113. So, to identify a note, which is provided for in an assignment of the debtor's property for the benefit of his creditors, but which is misdescribed in the schedule annexed to the assignment. *Pierce v. Parker*, 4 Metc. 80. So, to show that the indorsement of a note was made merely for collateral security. *Dwight v. Linton*, 3 Rob. Louis. R. 57. See also *Bell v. Firemen's Ins. Co.* 1b. 423, 428, where parol evidence was admitted of an agreement to sell, prior to the deed or act of sale. So, to show what flats were occupied by the riparian proprietor as appurtenant to his upland and wharf, and passed with them by the deed. *Treat v. Strickland*, 10 Shepl. 234.

¹ *Hiscocks v. Hiscocks*, 5 M. & W. 353, 367. This was an action of ejectment, brought on the demise of Simon Hiscocks against John Hiscocks. The question turned on the words of a devise in the will of Simon Hiscocks, the grandfather of the lessor of the plaintiff and of the defendant. By his will, Simon Hiscocks, after devising estates to his son Simon for life, and from and after his death, to his grandson, Henry Hiscocks, in tail male, and making, as to certain other estates, an exactly similar provision in favor of his son John for life; then, after his death, the testator devised those estates to "my grandson John Hiscocks, eldest son of the said John Hiscocks." It was on this devise that the question wholly turned. In fact, John Hiscocks, the father, had been twice married; by his first wife he had Simon, the lessor of the plaintiff, his eldest son; the eldest son of the second marriage was John Hiscocks, the defendant. The devise, therefore, did not, both by name and description, apply to either the lessor of the plaintiff, who was the eldest son, but whose name was Simon, nor to the defendant, who, though his name was John, was not the eldest son.

"in all cases is to discover the intention of the testator. The first and most obvious mode of doing this is to read his will as he has written it, and collect his intention from his words. But as his words refer to facts and circumstances, respecting his property and his family, and others whom he names or describes in his will, it is evident that the meaning and application of his words cannot be ascertained, without evidence of all those facts and circumstances.¹ To understand the meaning of any writer, we must first be apprised of the persons and circumstances, that are the subjects of his allusions or statements; and if these are not fully disclosed in his work, we must look for illustration to the history of the times in which he wrote, and to the works of contemporaneous authors. All the facts and circumstances, therefore, respecting persons or property, to which the will relates, are undoubtedly legitimate, and often necessary evidence, to enable us to understand the meaning and application of his words. Again, the testator may have habitually called certain persons or things by peculiar names, by which they were not commonly known. If these names should occur in his will, they could only be explained and construed by the aid of evidence, to show the sense in which he used them, in like manner as if his will were written in cipher, or in a foreign language. The habits of the testator, in these particulars, must be receivable as evidence to explain the meaning of his will. But there is another mode of obtaining the intention of the testator, which is by evidence of his declarations, of the instructions given for his will, and other circumstances of the like nature, which are not adduced for explaining the words or meaning of the will, but either to supply some deficiency, or remove some obscurity, or to give some effect to expressions that are unmeaning or ambiguous. Now, there is but one case, in which it appears to us, that this sort of evidence of intention can properly be admitted, and that is, where the meaning of the testator's words is neither ambiguous nor

¹ See *Crocker v. Crocker*, 11 Pick. 257; *Lamb v. Lamb*, *Ibid.* 375, per Shaw, C. J.

obscure, and where the devise is on the face of it perfect and intelligible, but from some of the circumstances admitted in proof, an ambiguity arises, as to which of the two or more things, or which of the two or more persons (each answering the words in the will), the testator intended to express. Thus, if a testator devise his manor of S. to A. B., and has two manors of North S. and South S., it being clear he means to devise one only, whereas both are equally denoted by the words he has used, in that case there is what Lord Bacon calls 'an equivocation,' that is, the words equally apply to either manor, and evidence of previous intention may be received to solve this latent ambiguity; for the intention shows what he meant to do; and when you know that, you immediately perceive that he has done it, by the general words he has used, which, in their ordinary sense, may properly bear that construction. It appears to us, that, in all other cases, parol evidence of what was the testator's intention ought to be excluded, upon this plain ground, that his will ought to be made in writing; and if his intention cannot be made to appear by the writing, explained by circumstances, there is no will."¹

¹ The learned Chief Baron's subsequent commentary on the opposing decisions seems, in a great measure, to have exhausted this topic. "It must be owned, however," said he, "that there are decided cases, which are not to be reconciled with this distinction, in a manner altogether satisfactory. Some of them, indeed, exhibit but an apparent inconsistency. Thus, for example, in the case of *Doe v. Huthwaite*, and *Bradshaw v. Bradshaw*, the only thing decided was, that, in a case like the present, some parol evidence was admissible. There, however, it was not decided, that evidence of the testator's intention ought to be received. The decisions, when duly considered, amount to no more than this, that where the words of the devise, in their primary sense, when applied to the circumstances of the family and the property, make the devise insensible, collateral facts may be resorted to, in order to show, that in some secondary sense of the words — and one in which the testator meant to use them — the devise may have a full effect. Thus, again, in *Cheyney's case*, and in *Counden v. Clarke*, 'the averment is taken' in order to show which of two persons, both equally described within the words of the will, was intended by the testator to take the estate; and the late cases of

§ 290. From the above case, and two other leading modern decisions,¹ it has been collected,² (1.) that, where the descrip-

Doe d. Morgan v. Morgan, and *Doe d. Gord v. Needs*, both in this Court, are to the same effect. So, in the case of *Jones v. Newman*, according to the view the Court took of the facts, the case may be referred to the same principles as the former. The Court seems to have thought the proof equivalent only to proof of their being two J. C.s, strangers to each other, and then the decision was right, it being a mere case of what Lord Bacon calls equivocation. The cases of *Price v. Page*, *Still v. Hoste*, and *Careless v. Careless*, do not materially vary in principle from those last cited. They differ, indeed, in this, that the equivalent description is not entirely accurate; but they agree in its being (although inaccurate) equally applicable to each claimant; and they all concur in this, that the inaccurate part of the description is either, as in *Price v. Page*, a mere blank, or, as in the other two cases, applicable to no person at all. These, therefore, may fairly be classed also as cases of equivocation; and, in that case, evidence of the intention of the testator seems to be receivable. But there are other cases not so easily explained, and which seem at variance with the true principles of evidence. In *Selwood v. Mildmay*, evidence of instructions for the will was received. That case was doubted in *Miller v. Travers*; but perhaps, having been put by the Master of the Rolls, as one analogous to that of the devise of all a testator's freehold houses in a given place where the testator had only leasehold houses, it may, as suggested by Lord Chief Justice Tindal, in *Miller v. Travers*, be considered as being only a wrong application to the facts of a correct principle of law. Again, in *Hampshire v. Peirce*, Sir John Strange admitted declarations of the intentions of the testatrix to be given in evidence, to show that by the words, "the four children of my niece Bamfield," she meant the four children by the second marriage. It may well be doubted, whether this was right, but the decision on the whole case was undoubtedly correct; for the circumstances of the family, and their ages, which no doubt were admissible, were quite sufficient to have sustained the judgment, without the questionable evidence. And it may be further observed, that the principle, with which Sir J. Strange is said to have commenced his judgment, is stated in terms much too large, and is so far inconsistent with later authorities. *Beaumont v. Fell*, though somewhat doubtful, can be reconciled with true principles, upon this ground, that there was no such person as Catherine Earnley, and that the testator was accustomed to address Gertude Yardley by the name of

¹ *Miller v. Travers*, 8 Bing. 244, and *Doe d. Gord v. Needs*, 2 M. & W. 129.

² By Mr. Wigram, in his *Treatise on the Interpretation of Wills*, pl. 184, 188. See also *Gresley on Evid.* p. 203.

tion in the will, of the *person or thing* intended, is *applicable* with legal certainty to each of several subjects, extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove, which of such subjects was intended by the testator. But (2.) if the description of the person or thing be *wholly inapplicable* to the subject intended, or said to be intended by it, evidence is admissible to prove whom or what the testator really intended to describe. His declarations of intention, whether made before or after the making of the will, are alike inadmissible.¹ Those made at

Gatty. This, and other circumstances of the like nature, which were clearly admissible, may perhaps be considered to warrant that decision; but there the evidence of the testator's declarations, as to his intention of providing for Gertrude Yardley, was also received; and the same evidence was received at Nisi Prius, in *Thomas v. Thomas*, and approved on a motion for a new trial, by the dicta of Lord Kenyon and Mr. Justice Lawrence. But these cases seem to us at variance with the decision in *Miller v. Travers*, which is a decision entitled to great weight. If evidence of intention could be allowed for the purpose of showing, that by Catherine Earnley and Mary Thomas, the respective testators meant Gertrude Yardley and Elinor Evans, it might surely equally be adduced to prove, that by the county of Limerick, a testator meant the county of Clare. Yet this was rejected, and we think rightly. We are prepared on this point (the point in judgment in the case of *Miller v. Travers*) to adhere to the authority of that case. Upon the whole, then, we are of opinion, that in this case there must be a new trial. Where the description is partly true as to both claimants, and no case of equivocation arises, what is to be done is to determine, whether the description means the lessor of the plaintiff or the defendant. The description, in fact, applies partially to each, and it is not easy to see how the difficulty can be solved. If it were *res integra*, we should be much disposed to hold the devise void for uncertainty; but the cases of *Doe v. Huthwaite*, *Bradshaw v. Bradshaw*, and others, are authorities against this conclusion. If, therefore, by looking at the surrounding facts to be found by the Jury, the Court can clearly see, with the knowledge which arises from those facts alone, that the testator meant either the lessor of the plaintiff or the defendant, it may so decide, and direct the Jury accordingly; but we think that, for this purpose, they cannot receive declarations of the testator of what he intended to do in making his will. If the evidence does not enable the Court to give such a direction to the Jury, the defendant will indeed for the present succeed; but the claim of the heir-at-law will probably prevail ultimately, on the ground, that the devise is void for uncertainty."

¹ Wigram on Wills, pl. 104, 187; *Brown v. Saltonstall*, 3 Mete. 423, 426.

the time of making the will, when admitted at all, are admitted under the general rules of evidence, applicable alike to all written instruments.

§ 291. But declarations of the testator, proving or tending to prove a material fact collateral to the question of intention, where such fact would go in aid of the interpretation of the testator's words, are, on the principles already stated, admissible. These cases, however, will be found to be those only, in which the description in the will is unambiguous in its application to any one of several subjects.¹ Thus, where lands were devised to John Cluer of Calcot, and there were father and son of that name, parol evidence of the testator's

¹ Wigram on Wills, pl. 104, 194, 195. This learned writer's *General Conclusions*, as the result of the whole matter, which he has so ably discussed in the Treatise just cited, are — "(1.) That the evidence of material facts is, in all cases, admissible in aid of the exposition of a will. (2.) That the legitimate purposes to which — *in succession* — such evidence is applicable, are two; namely, *first*, to determine whether the words of the will, with reference to the facts, admit of being construed in their primary sense; and, *secondly*, if the facts of the case *exclude* the primary meaning of the words, to determine whether the intention of the testator is certain in any other sense, of which the words, with reference to the facts, are capable. And, (3.) That intention cannot be averred in support of a will, except in the special cases, which are stated under the Seventh Proposition;" (see Ante, § 287, note,) namely, cases "where the object of a testator's bounty, or the subject of disposition, (*i. e.* the *person or thing* intended), is described in terms, which are applicable indifferently to more than one *person or thing*." *Ib.* pl. 211, 212, 213, 214. And he insists, — "(1.) That the judgment of a Court, in expounding a will, should be simply *declaratory* of what is *in* the instrument; — And, (2.) That every claimant under a will has a right to require that a Court of construction, in the execution of its office, shall — by means of extrinsic evidence — place itself in the situation of the testator, the meaning of whose language it is called upon to declare." *Ib.* pl. 5, 96, 215; *Doe v. Martin*, 1 N. & M. 524, per Parke, J.; 4 B. & Ad. 771, S. C.; *Guy v. Sharp*, 1 M. & K. 602, per Ld. Brougham, C. See also *Boys v. Williams*, 2 Russ. & M. 689, where parol evidence of the testator's property and situation was held admissible, to determine whether a bequest of stock was intended as a specific or a pecuniary legacy. These rules apply with equal force to the interpretation of every other private instrument.

declarations, that he intended to leave them to the son, was held admissible.¹ So, where a legacy was given to "the four children of A.," who had six children, two by a first, and four by a second marriage, parol evidence of declarations by the testatrix, that she meant the latter four, was held admissible.² So, where the devise was, "to my grand-daughter, Mary Thomas of Llechlloyd in Merthyr parish," and the testator had a grand-daughter named Elinor Evans in that parish, and a great grand-daughter Mary Thomas in the parish of Llangam; parol evidence of the testator's declarations at the time of making the will was received, to show which was intended.³ So, where a legacy was given to Catherine Earnley, and there was no person of that name; but the legacy was claimed by Gertrude Yardley; parol proof was received, that the testator's voice, when the scrivener wrote the will, was very low, that he usually called the legatee Gatty, and had declared, that he would do well by her in his will; and thereupon the legacy was awarded to her.⁴ So

¹ Jones v. Newman, 1 W. Bl. 60. See also Doe v. Beynon, 4 P. & D. 193; Doe v. Allen, 4 P. & D. 220.

² Hampshire v. Pierce, 2 Ves. sen. 216.

³ Thomas v. Thomas, 6 T. R. 671.

⁴ Beaumont v. Fell, 2 P. Wms. 140. The propriety of receiving evidence of the testator's declarations, in either of the two last cited cases, was, as we have just seen, (Ante, § 289, note,) strongly questioned by Lord Abinger, (in Hiscocks v. Hiscocks, 5 Mees. & Welsb. 371,) who thought them at variance, in this particular, with the decision in Miller v. Travers, (8 Bing. 244,) which, he observed, was a decision entitled to great weight. But upon the case of Beaumont v. Pell, it has been correctly remarked, that "the evidence, which is confessedly admissible, would, in conjunction with the will itself, show that there was a devise to Catherine Earnley, and that no such person existed, but that there was a claimant named Gertrude Yardley, whom the testator usually called Gatty. In this state of the case, the question would be, whether, upon the principle of *falsa demonstratio non nocet*, the surname of Earnley being rejected, the christian name, if correct, would itself be a sufficient indication of the devisee; and if so, whether Gatty satisfied that indication. Both these questions leave untouched the general question of the admissibility of evidence, to show the process by which Gatty passed into Katty, and from Katty to Catherine." See Phil. & Am. on Evid. p. 729,

also, where a devise was to "the second son of Edward Weld of Lulworth, Esq.," and there was no person of that name, but the testator had two relatives there, bearing the names of Joseph Weld, and Edward-Joseph Weld, it was held, upon the context of the will, and upon extrinsic evidence, that the second son of Joseph Weld was the person intended. So, where a bequest was to John Newbolt, second son of William-Strangways Newbolt, vicar of Somerton; and it appeared *aliunde* that the name of the vicar was William-Robert Newbolt, that his second son was Henry-Robert, and that his third son was John-Pryce; it was held that John-Pryce was entitled to the legacy.¹ So, where the testatrix gave legacies to Mrs. and Miss B. of H., widow and daughter of the Rev. Mr. B.; upon the legacies being claimed by Mrs. and Miss W., widow and daughter of the late Rev. Mr. W. of H., it was held, that they were entitled; it appearing *aliunde* that there were no persons literally answering the description in the will, at its date; but that the claimants were a daughter and grand-daughter of the late Rev. Mr. B., with all of whom the testatrix had been intimately acquainted, and that she was accustomed to call the claimants by the maiden name of Mrs. W.² The general principle in all these cases is this, that if there be a mistake in the name of the devisee, but a right description

note (2). It is not easy, however, to perceive why extrinsic evidence of the testator's declared intentions of beneficence towards an individual is not as admissible, as evidence is, that he used to speak of him or address him as his son, or god-son, or adopted child; when the object in both cases is to ascertain which, of several demonstrations, is to be retained as true, and which rejected as false. Now the evidence of such declarations, in Beaumont v. Fell, went to show that "Earnley" was to be rejected as *falsa demonstratio*; and the other evidence went to designate the individual intended by the word "Catherine;" not by adding words to the will, but by showing what the word used meant. See Post, § 300; Wigram on the Interpretation of Wills, p. 128, 129, pl. 166. See also Baylis v. The Atto. Gen. 2 Atk. 239; Abbot v. Massie, 3 Ves. 148; Doe d. Oxenden v. Chichester, 4 Dow's P. C. 65, 93; Duke of Dorset v. Ld. Hawarden, 3 Curt. 80.

¹ Newbolt v. Pryce, 14 Sim. 354.

² Lee v. Pain, 4 Hare, 251; 9 Jur. 24.

of him, the Court may act upon such right description;¹ and that if two persons equally answer the same name or description, the Court may determine, from the rest of the will and the surrounding circumstances, to which of them the will applies.²

§ 292. It is further to be observed, that the rule under consideration, which forbids the admission of parol evidence to contradict or vary a written contract, is not infringed by any evidence of *known and established usage*, respecting the subject to which the contract relates. To such usage, as well as to the *lex loci*, the parties may be supposed to refer, just as they are presumed to employ words in their usual and ordinary signification; and accordingly the rule is in both cases the same. Proof of usage is admitted, either to interpret the meaning of the language of the contract, or to ascertain the nature and extent of the contract, in the absence of express stipulations, and where the meaning is equivocal and obscure.³ Thus, upon a contract for a year's service, as it does not in terms bind the party, for every day in the year, parol evidence is admissible to show a usage for servants to have certain holidays for themselves.⁴ So, where the contract was for

¹ On the other hand, if the name is right, but the description is wrong, the name will be regarded as the best evidence of the testator's intention. Thus, where the testator had married two wives, Mary and Caroline, successively, both of whom survived him; and he devised an estate to his "dear wife Caroline," the latter was held entitled to take, though she was not the true wife. *Doe v. Roast*, 12 Jur. 99.

² *Blundell v. Gladstone*, 1 Phil. Ch. R. 279, 288, per Patteson, J.

³ 2 Poth. on Obl. by Evans, App. No. xvi. p. 187; 2 Sumn. 569, per Story, J.; 11 Sim. 626, per Parke, B.; 4 East, 135, per Ld. Ellenborough; *Cutter v. Powell*, 6 T. R. 320; *Vallance v. Dewar*, 1 Campb. 503; *Noble v. Kennoway*, 2 Doug. 510; *Bottomley v. Forbes*, 5 Bing. N. C. 121; 8 Scott, 866; *Ellis v. Thompson*, 3 M. & W. 445; Post, Vol. 2, § 251. The usage must be general in the whole city or place, or among all persons in the trade, and not the usage of a particular class only, or the course of practice in a particular office or bank, to whom or which the party is a stranger. *Gabay v. Lloyd*, 3 B. & C. 793.

⁴ *Regina v. Stoke upon Trent*, 5 Ad. & El. 303, N. S.

performance as an actor in a theatre, for *three years*, at a certain sum *per week*, parol evidence was held admissible to show that, according to uniform theatrical usage, the actor was to be paid only during the theatrical *season*, namely, during the time while the theatre was open for performance, in each of those years.¹ So, where a ship is warranted "to depart with convoy," parol evidence is admissible to show at what place convoy for such a voyage is usually taken; and to that place the parties are presumed to refer.² So, where one of the subjects of a charter-party was "cotton in bales," parol evidence of the mercantile use and meaning of this term was held admissible.³ So, where a promissory note or bill is payable with grace, parol evidence of the known and established usage of the bank, at which it is payable, is admissible, to show on what day the grace expired.⁴ But though usage may be admissible to explain what is doubtful, it is not admissible to contradict what is plain.⁵ Thus, where a policy was made in the usual form, upon the ship, her tackle, apparel, boats, &c., evidence of usage, that the underwriters never pay for the loss of boats slung upon the quarter, outside of the ship, was held inadmissible.⁶ So also, in a libel *in rem* upon a bill of lading, containing the usual clause, "the dangers of

¹ *Grant v. Maddox*, 15 M. & W. 737.

² *Lethulier's case*, 2 Salk. 443.

³ *Taylor v. Briggs*, 2 C. & P. 525.

⁴ *Renner v. Bank of Columbia*, 9 Wheat. 581; where the decisions to this point are reviewed by Mr. Justice Thompson.

⁵ 2 Cr. & J. 249, 250, per Ld. Lyndhurst.

⁶ *Blackett v. The Royal Exch. Assurance Co.* 2 Cr. & J. 244. So, where the written contract was for "prime singed bacon," and evidence was offered to prove, that by the usage of the trade a certain latitude of deterioration, called average taint, was allowed to subsist, before the bacon ceases to answer the description of prime bacon; it was held inadmissible. *Yates v. Pym*, 6 Taunt. 446. So also, parol evidence has been held inadmissible to prove, that by the words "glass ware in casks," in the memorandum of excepted articles in a fire policy, according to the common understanding and usage of insurers and insured, were meant such ware in open casks only. *Bend v. The Georgia Ins. Co.* Sup. Court, N. York, 1842. But see *Gray v. Harper*, 1 Story, R. 574; Post, § 292, note (1).

the seas only excepted," where it was articulated in the answer, that there was an established usage, in the trade in question, that the ship owners should see the merchandise properly secured and stowed, and that this being done, they should not be liable for any damages not occasioned by their own neglect; it was held that this article was incompetent, in point of law, to be admitted to proof.¹

¹ The Schooner Reeside, 2 Sumn. 567. In this case the doctrine on this subject was thus briefly but energetically expounded and limited by Mr. Justice Story. "I own myself," said he, "no friend to the almost indiscriminate habit, of late years, of setting up particular usages or customs in almost all kinds of business and trade, to control, vary, or annul the general liabilities of parties under the Common Law, as well as under the Commercial Law. It has long appeared to me, that there is no small danger in admitting such loose and inconclusive usages and customs, often unknown to particular parties, and always liable to great misunderstandings and misinterpretations and abuses, to outweigh the well known and well settled principles of law. And I rejoice to find, that, of late years, the Courts of Law, both in England and in America, have been disposed to narrow the limits of the operation of such usages and customs, and to discountenance any further extension of them. The true and appropriate office of a usage or custom is, to interpret the otherwise indeterminate intentions of parties, and to ascertain the nature and extent of their contracts, arising, not from express stipulations, but from mere implications and presumptions, and acts of a doubtful or equivocal character. It may also be admitted to ascertain the true meaning of a particular word, or of particular words in a given instrument, when the word or words have various senses, some common, some qualified, and some technical, according to the subject-matter to which they are applied. But I apprehend, that it never can be proper to resort to any usage or custom, to control or vary the positive stipulations in a written contract, and, a fortiori, not in order to contradict them. An express contract of the parties is always admissible to supersede, or vary, or control a usage or custom; for the latter may always be waived at the will of the parties. But a written and express contract cannot be controlled, or varied, or contradicted by a usage or custom; for that would not only be to admit parol evidence to control, vary, or contradict written contracts; but it would be to allow mere presumptions and implications, properly arising in the absence of any positive expressions of intention, to control, vary, or contradict the most formal and deliberate written declarations of the parties." See also Taylor v. Briggs, 2 C. & P. 525; Smith v. Wilson, 3 B. & Ad. 728; 2 Stark. Evid. 565; Park on Ins. ch. 2, p. 30-60; Post, Vol. 2, § 251.

§ 293. The reasons which warrant the admission of evidence of usage in any case, apply equally, whether it be required to aid the interpretation of a *statute*, a *public charter* or a *private deed*; and whether the usage be still existing or not, if it were contemporaneous with the instrument.¹ And where the language of a deed is doubtful in the *description of the land conveyed*, parol evidence of the practical interpretation, by the acts of the parties, is admissible to remove the doubt.² So, evidence of former transactions between the same parties, has been held admissible to explain the meaning of terms in a written contract, respecting subsequent transactions of the same character.³

§ 294. Upon the same principle, parol evidence of usage or custom is admissible "*to annex incidents*," as it is termed, that is, to show what things are customarily treated as incidental and accessory to the principal thing, which is the subject of the contract, or to which the instrument relates. Thus, it may be shown by parol, that a heriot is due by custom, on the death of a tenant for life, though it is not expressed in the lease.⁴ So, a lessee by a deed may show that, by the custom of the country, he is entitled to an away-going crop, though no such right is reserved in the deed.⁵ This evidence is

¹ Withnell v. Gartham, 6 T. R. 388; Stammers v. Dixon, 7 East, 200; Wadley v. Bayliss, 5 Taunt. 752; 2 Inst. 282; Stradling v. Morgan, Plowd. 205, ad. cal.; Haydon's case, 3 Co. 7; Wells v. Porter, 2 Bing. N. C. 729, per Tindal, C. J.; Duke of Devonshire v. Lodge, 7 B. & C. 36, 39, 40; Chad v. Tilsed, 2 B. & B. 403; Atto. Gen. v. Boston, 9 Jur. 838; 2 Eq. Rep. 107, S. C.; Farrar v. Stackpole, 6 Greenl. 151.

² Stone v. Clark, 1 Metcalf's R. 378; Cook v. Booth, Cowp. 419. This last case has been repeatedly disapproved of, and may be considered as overruled; not, however, in the principle it asserts, but in the application of the principle to that case. See Phil. & Am. on Evid. 747, note (1); 1 Sugd. Vend. 255, (10th ed.); Cambridge v. Lexington, 17 Pick. 222.

³ Bourne v. Gatliff, 11 Cl. & Fin. 45, 69, 70.

⁴ White v. Sayer, Palm. 211.

⁵ Wigglesworth v. Dallison, 1 Doug. 201; 1 Smith's Leading Cas. 300; 1 Bligh, 287; Senior v. Armytage, Holt's N. P. Cas. 197; Hutton v. Warren, 1 M. & W. 466.

admitted on the principle, that the parties did not intend to express in writing the whole of the contract, by which they were to be bound, but only to make their contract with reference to the known and established usages and customs relating to the subject-matter. But in all cases of this sort, the rule for admitting the evidence of usage or custom must be taken with this qualification, that the evidence be not repugnant to or inconsistent with the contract; for otherwise, it would not go to interpret and explain, but to contradict that which is written.¹ This rule does not add new terms to the contract, which, as has already been shown,² cannot be done; but it shows the full extent and meaning of those which are contained in the instrument.

§ 295. But in resorting to usage for the *meaning of particular words* in a contract, a distinction is to be observed between local and technical words, and other words. In regard to words which are purely technical, or local, that is, words which are not of universal use, but are familiarly known and employed, either in a particular district, or in a particular science or trade; parol evidence is always receivable, to define and explain their meaning among those who use them. And the principle and practice are the same in regard to words which have two meanings, the one common and universal, and the other technical, peculiar, or local; parol evidence being admissible of facts tending to show that the words were used in the latter sense, and to ascertain their technical or local meaning. The same principle is also applied in regard to words and phrases, used in a peculiar sense by members of a particular religious sect.³ But beyond this the

¹ *Yeates v. Pim*, Holt's N. P. Cas. 95; *Holding v. Pigott*, 7 Bing. 465, 474; *Blackett v. The Royal Exch. Assur. Co.* 2 C. & J. 244.

² *Ante*, § 281.

³ The doctrine on this subject has recently been very fully reviewed, in the case of *Lady Hewley's charities*. This lady, who was a non-conformist, in the year 1704, conveyed certain estates by deeds, in trust, for the benefit of "poor and godly preachers of Christ's Holy Gospel," and their widows, and

principle does not extend. If, therefore, a contract is made in ordinary and popular language, to which no local or technical

"for the encouraging and promoting of the preaching of Christ's Holy Gospel," &c.; with the usual provision for preserving a perpetual succession of trustees. Afterwards, in 1707, by other deeds to the same trustees, she made provision for the erection and support of a hospital or almshouse, for certain descriptions of poor persons, ordaining rules for the government of the house, and appointing the trustees as the visitors, &c.; and disposing of the surplus funds as in the deeds of 1704. The rules permitted the admission of none but such as were poor and piously disposed, and of the Protestant religion, and were able to repeat the Lord's Prayer, the Creed, and the Ten Commandments, and Mr. Edward Bowles's Catechism. It was alleged that Lady Hewley, and all the trustees, whose religious opinions could be ascertained, believed in the doctrine of the Trinity, the Atonement, and Original Sin. In the course of time, however, the estates became vested in Trustees, the majority of whom, though calling themselves Presbyterians, professed Unitarian opinions, and the funds had for some years been applied, to a considerable extent, for the support of a seminary, and for the benefit of poor preachers, of that denomination. When the charity was founded, the stat. 9 & 10 W. 3, c. 32, against blasphemy, was in force, by which those persons, who by preaching denied the doctrine of the Trinity, were liable to severe penalties. The object of the suit was, in effect, to take this trust out of the hands of the Unitarians, and to obtain a declaration, that it should be managed and applied by and for none but Orthodox Dissenters; and the controversy turned chiefly on the question, whether certain evidence was admissible, which was offered to show what sort of persons were intended, in the deed of 1704, by "godly preachers of Christ's Holy Gospel," &c. This evidence, in addition to the deed of 1707, consisted principally of the will of Lady Hewley, the sermon of Dr. Coulton, one of the trustees, which was preached at her funeral; and the will of Sir John Hewley, her husband; all containing passages, showing, that she and the trustees were Presbyterians, believing in the Trinity, the Atonement, and Original Sin; together with the depositions of persons, conversant with the history and language of the times, when the deeds were executed, defining the meaning then commonly attached to the words in question, by persons of the donor's faith; and it was argued, that the persons whom she intended to designate as beneficiaries could have been only those of her own faith. The Vice-Chancellor admitted this evidence, and decreed, that preachers of the Unitarian doctrine, and their widows, were not entitled to the benefit of this charity; and he ordered that the existing trustees should be removed and others appointed, and that the charity should in future be applied accordingly. This decree Ld. Ch. Lyndhurst, assisted by Patteson, J., and Alderson, B., afterwards affirmed. An appeal

and peculiar meaning is attached, parol evidence, it seems, is not admissible to show that, in that *particular case*, the

being taken from the judgment of Ld. Lyndhurst, to the House of Lords, the House, after taking the opinions of the Common Law Judges, upon certain questions proposed to them, dismissed the appeal. The first and principal of these questions was, whether the extrinsic evidence adduced, or what part of it was admissible for the purpose of determining who were entitled, under the terms "godly preachers of Christ's Holy Gospel," "godly persons," and the other descriptions contained in the deeds of 1704 and 1707, to the benefit of Lady Hewley's bounty. The other questions, which were five in number, were framed to ascertain, if such evidence should be deemed admissible, what descriptions of persons were, and what were not, the proper objects of the trusts. Of the seven learned Judges, who answered these questions, six were of opinion, but on various grounds, that Unitarians were excluded. *Maule, J.* was of opinion that none of the evidence offered was admissible; and that the religious opinions of the founder of a charity, even if certainly known, could have no legal effect in the interpretation of an instrument, in which no reference is made to his own religious opinions or belief. *Erskine, J.* was also of opinion that none of the evidence was admissible, for the purpose for which it was offered; but that the sense of the words in question might be ascertained from contemporaneous writings, and the history of that day; and that from these sources, already open to the House, it was easy to collect, that the words were applicable to none but Trinitarian Dissenters. *Coleridge, J.* and *Gurney, B.* were of opinion, that the evidence was admissible, to show the opinions of those with whom the founder lived in most confidence, and to what sect she in fact belonged; and that the phraseology of that party might be ascertained from other sources. *Williams, J.* thought that the words employed were so indefinite and ambiguous, that she must be presumed to have used them in a limited sense; and that this sense might be ascertained from her opinions; for which purpose the evidence was admissible. *Parke, B.* and *Tindal, C. J.* were of opinion, that, though it might well be shown, by competent evidence, that the words employed had a peculiar meaning at the time they were used, and what was that meaning; and that the deeds were to be read by substituting the equivalent expressions, thus ascertained, instead of those written in the deeds; yet, that evidence of her own religious opinions was not admissible, to limit or control the meaning of the words. Upon this occasion, the general doctrine of the law was stated by Mr. Baron *Parke*, in the following terms. — "I apprehend that there are two descriptions of evidence, which are clearly admissible, in every case, for the purpose of enabling a Court to construe any written instrument and to apply it practically. In the first place, there is no doubt, that not only where the language of the instrument is such

words were used in any other than their ordinary and popular sense.¹

as the Court does not understand, is it competent to receive evidence of the proper meaning of that language, as when it is written in a foreign tongue; but it is also competent where technical words or peculiar terms, or, indeed, any expressions are used, which, at the time the instrument was written, had acquired any appropriate meaning, either generally or by local usage, or amongst particular classes. This description of evidence is admissible, in order to enable the Court to understand the meaning of the words contained in the instrument itself, by themselves, and without reference to the extrinsic facts on which the instrument is intended to operate. For the purpose of applying the instrument to the facts, and determining what passes by it, and who take an interest under it, a second description of evidence is admissible, viz.: every *material* fact, that will enable the Court to identify the person or thing mentioned in the instrument, and to place the Court, whose province it is to declare the meaning of the words of the instrument, as near as may be, in the situation of the parties to it. From the context of the instrument and from these two descriptions of evidence, with such circumstances as by law the Court without evidence, may of itself notice, it is its duty to construe and apply the words of that instrument; and no extrinsic evidence of the intention of the party to the deed, from his declarations, whether at the time of his executing the instrument, or before or after that time, is admissible; the duty of the Court being to declare the meaning of what is written in the instrument, not of what was intended to have been written." — Ld. Ch. J. *Tindal* expounded the same doctrine as follows. — "The general rule I take to be, that, where, the words of any written instrument are free from ambiguity in themselves, and where external circumstances do not create any doubt or difficulty, as to the proper application of those words to claimants under the instrument, or the subject-matter to which the instrument relates, such instrument is always to be construed according to the strict, plain, common meaning of the words themselves; and that, in such case, evidence *dehors* the instrument, for the purpose of explaining it according to the surmised or alleged intention of the parties to the instrument, is utterly inadmissible. If it were otherwise, no lawyer would be safe in advising upon the construction of a written instrument, nor any party in taking under it; for the ablest advice

¹ 2 Stark. Ev. 566; Ante, § 277, 280. But see *Gray v. Harper*, 1 Story's R. 574, where two booksellers having contracted for the sale and purchase of a certain work at "cost," parol evidence of conversations between them, at the time of making the contract, was held admissible, to show what sense they attached to that term. See also *Selden v. Williams*, 9 Watts, 9.

§ 295 *a*. It is thus apparent, as was remarked at the outset, that in all the cases in which parol evidence has been ad-

might be controlled, and the clearest title undermined, if, at some future period, parol evidence of the particular meaning which the party affixed to his words, or of his secret intention in making the instrument, or of the objects he meant to take benefit under it, might be set up to contradict or vary the plain language of the instrument itself. The true interpretation, however, of every instrument being manifestly that which will make the instrument speak the intention of the party at the time it was made, it has always been considered as an exception, or perhaps, to speak more precisely, not so much an exception from, as a corollary to the general rule above stated, that, where any doubt arises upon the true sense and meaning of the words themselves, or any difficulty as to their application under the surrounding circumstances, the sense and meaning of the language may be investigated and ascertained by evidence *dehors* the instrument itself; for both reason and common sense agree, that, by no other means can the language of the instrument be made to speak the real mind of the party. Such investigation does, of necessity, take place in the interpretation of instruments written in a foreign language; in the case of ancient instruments, where, by the lapse of time and change of manners, the words have acquired, in the present age, a different meaning from that which they bore when originally employed; in cases where terms of art or science occur; in mercantile contracts, which, in many instances, use a peculiar language, employed by those only who are conversant in trade and commerce; and in other instances in which the words, besides their general, common meaning, have acquired, by custom or otherwise, a well known, peculiar, idiomatic meaning in the particular country, in which the party using them was dwelling, or in the particular society, of which he formed a member, and in which he passed his life. In all these cases, evidence is admitted to expound the real meaning of the language used in the instrument, in order to enable the Court, or Judge, to construe the instrument, and to carry such real meaning into effect. But, whilst evidence is admissible, in these instances, for the purpose of making the written instrument speak for itself, which, without such evidence, would be either a dead letter, or would use a doubtful tongue, or convey a false impression of the meaning of the party, I conceive the exception to be strictly limited to cases of the description above given, and to evidence of the nature above detailed; and that in no case whatever, is it permitted to explain the language of a deed by evidence of the private views, the secret intentions, or the known principles of the party to the instrument, whether religious, political, or otherwise, any more than by express parol declarations made by the party himself, which are universally excluded; for the admitting of such evidence would let in all the uncertainty before adverted to; it would be evidence, which, in most

mitted in exposition of that which is written, the principle of admission is, that the Court may be placed, in regard to the surrounding circumstances, as nearly as possible in the situation of the party whose written language is to be interpreted; the question being, what did the person, thus circumstanced, mean by the language he has employed?

§ 296. There is another class of cases, in which parol evidence is allowed by Courts of Equity to affect the operation of a writing, though the writing on its face is free from ambiguity, which is yet considered as no infringement of the general rule; namely, where the evidence is offered to *rebut an equity*. The meaning of this is, that where a certain presumption would, in general, be deduced from the nature of an act, such presumption may be repelled by extrinsic evidence, showing the intention to be otherwise.¹ The simplest instance

instances, could not be met or countervailed by any of an opposite bearing or tendency, and would, in effect, cause the secret undeclared intention of the party to control and predominate over the open intention expressed in the deed." See *Attorney General v. Shore*, 11 Sim. R. 592, 616-627, 631, 632. Though, in this celebrated case, the general learning on this subject has been thus ably opened and illustrated; yet the precise question, whether the religious opinions of the founder of a charity can be received as legal exponents of his intention, in an instrument otherwise intelligible in its terms, and in which no reference is made to his own opinions or belief, can hardly be considered as definitively settled; especially as a majority of the learned Judges, in coming to the conclusion in which they concurred, proceeded on grounds which rendered the consideration of that point wholly unnecessary. The previous judgment of Lord Ch. Lyndhurst, in the same case, is reported in 7 Sim. 309, n. 312-317. See *Attorney General v. Pearson*, et al. 3 Meriv. 353, 409-411, 415; and afterwards in 7 Sim. 290, 307, 308, where such evidence was held admissible. But how far this decision is to be considered as shaken by what fell from the learned Judges, in the subsequent case of *The Attorney General v. Shore*, above stated, remains to be seen. The acts of the founder of such a charity may be shown in aid of the construction of the deed; but his opinions are inadmissible. *Attor. Gen. v. Drummond*, 1 Drury & Warren, 353, per Sugden, C. But see *Attor. Gen. v. Glasgow College*, 10 Jurist, 676.

¹ 2 Poth. on Obl. by Evans, App. No. xvi. p. 184; *Coote v. Boyd*, 2 Bro. C. C. 522; Bull. N. P. 297, 298; *Mann v. Mann*, 1 Johns. Ch. 231.

of this occurs, when two legacies, of which the sums and the expressed motives exactly coincide, are presumed not to have been intended as cumulative. In such case, to rebut the presumption, which makes one of these legacies inoperative, parol evidence will be received; its effect being not to show that the testator did not mean what he said, but, on the contrary, to prove that he did mean what he has expressed.¹ In like manner parol evidence is received to repel the presumption against an executor's title to the residue, from the fact that a legacy has been given to him. So, also, to repel the presumption, that a portion is satisfied by a legacy;² and, in some cases, that the portionment of a legatee was intended as an ademption of the legacy.³

§ 296 a. Courts of Equity also admit parol evidence to contradict or vary a writing, where it is *founded in a mistake* of material facts, and it would be unconscientious or unjust to enforce it against either party, according to its expressed terms. Thus, if the plaintiff seeks a specific performance of the agreement, the defendant may show that such a decree would be against equity and justice, by parol evidence of the circumstances, even though they contradict the writing. So, if the agreement speaks, by mistake, a different language from what the parties intended, this may be shown in a bill to *reform the writing* and correct the mistake. In short, wherever the active agency of a Court of Equity is invoked, specifically to enforce an agreement, it admits parol evidence to show that the claim is unjust, although such evidence contradicts that

¹ Gresley on Evid. 210; Hurst v. Beach, 5 Madd. R. 360, per Sir J. Leach, V. C.

² 5 Madd. R. 360; 2 Poth. on Obl. by Evans, App. No. xvi. p. 184; Ellison v. Cookson, 1 Ves. Jr. 100; Clinton v. Hooper, Ib. 173.

³ Kirk v. Eddowes, 8 Jur. 530. As the farther pursuit of this point, as well as the consideration of the presumed revocation of a will, by a subsequent marriage and the birth of issue, does not consist with the plan of this treatise, the reader is referred to 1 Roper on Legacies, by White, p. 317-353; Gresley on Evid. p. 209-218. See also *post*, Vol. 2, § 684, 685.

which is written. Whether Courts of Equity will sustain a claim to reform a writing, or to establish a mistake in it by parol evidence, and for specific performance of it when corrected in one and the same bill, is still an open question. The English authorities are against it; but in America their soundness is strongly questioned.¹ So also, if a grantee *fraudulently* attempts to convert into an absolute sale that which was originally meant to be a security for a loan, the original design of the conveyance, though contrary to the terms of the writing, may be shown by parol.²

§ 297. Having thus explained the nature of the rule under consideration, and shown that it only excludes evidence of the language of the party, and not of the circumstances in which he was placed, or of collateral facts; it may be proper to consider the case of *ambiguities*, both *latent* and *patent*. The leading rule on this subject is thus given by Lord Bacon; *Ambiguitas verborum latens verificatione suppletur; nam quod ex facto oritur ambiguum, verificatione facti tollitur*.³ Upon which he remarks, that "there be two sorts of ambiguities of words; the one is *ambiguitas patens*, and the other *latens*. *Patens* is that which appears to be ambiguous upon the deed or instrument; *latens* is that which seemeth certain and without ambiguity, for any thing that appeareth upon the deed or instrument; but there is some collateral matter out of the deed that breedeth the ambiguity. *Ambiguitas patens* is never holpen by averment; and the reason is, because the law will not couple and mingle matter of specialty, which is of the higher account, with matter of averment, which is of inferior account in law; for that were to make all deeds hollow and subject to averments, and so, in effect, that to pass without deed, which the law appointeth shall not pass but by deed. Therefore, if a man give land to J. D. and J. S. *et hæredibus*, and do not limit to whether of their heirs, it

¹ 1 Story, Eq. Jurisp. § 152-161; Gresley on Evid. p. 205-209.

² Morris v. Nixon, 17 Pet. 109.

³ Bacon's Maxims, Reg. 23, [25.]

shall not be supplied by averment to whether of them the intention was (that) the inheritance should be limited." "But if it be *ambiguitas latens*, then otherwise it is; as if I grant my manor of S. to J. F. and his heirs, here appeareth no ambiguity at all. But if the truth be, that I have the manors both of South S. and North S., this ambiguity is matter in fact; and therefore it shall be holpen by averment, whether of them it was that the party intended should pass."¹

§ 298. But here it is to be observed, that words cannot be said to be ambiguous, because they are unintelligible to a man who cannot read; nor is a written instrument ambiguous, merely because an ignorant or uninformed person may be unable to interpret it. *It is ambiguous only, when found to be of uncertain meaning, by persons of competent skill and information.* Neither is a Judge at liberty to declare an instrument ambiguous, because he is ignorant of a particular fact, art, or science, which was familiar to the person who used the words, and a knowledge of which is therefore necessary to a right understanding of the words he has used. If this were not so, then the question, whether a will or other instrument were ambiguous, might depend not upon the propriety of the language the party has used, but upon the degree of knowledge, general or even local, which a particular Judge might happen to possess; nay, the technical accuracy and precision of a scientific man might occasion his intestacy, or defeat his contract. Hence it follows, that no Judge is at liberty to pronounce an instrument ambiguous, until he has brought to his aid, in its interpretation, all the lights afforded by the collateral facts and circumstances which, as we have shown, may be proved by parol.²

¹ See Bacon's Law Tracts, p. 99, 100. Where a bill was drawn, expressing £200 in the body in words, but £245 in figures in the margin, it was held, that the words in the body must be taken to be the true amount to be paid; and that the ambiguity created by the figures in the margin was patent, and could not be explained by parol. *Saunderson v. Piper*, 5 Bing. N. C. 425.

² See Wigram on the Interpretation of Wills, p. 174, pl. 200, 201.

§ 299. A distinction is further to be observed, between the *ambiguity* of language and its *inaccuracy*. "Language," Vice Chancellor Wigram remarks, "may be inaccurate, without being ambiguous, and it may be ambiguous, although perfectly accurate. If, for instance, a testator, having one leasehold house in a given place, and no other house, were to devise his freehold house there to A. B., the description, though inaccurate, would occasion no ambiguity. If, however, a testator were to devise an estate to John Baker, of Dale, the son of Thomas, and there were two persons to whom the entire description accurately applied, this description, though accurate, would be ambiguous. It is obvious, therefore, that the whole of that class of cases in which an accurate description is found to be sufficient merely by the rejection of words of surplusage, are cases in which no ambiguity really exists. The meaning is certain, notwithstanding the inaccuracy of the testator's language. A Judge, in such cases, may hesitate long before he comes to a conclusion; but if he is able to come to a conclusion at last, with no other assistance than the light derived from a knowledge of those circumstances, to which the words of the will expressly or tacitly refer, he does in effect declare that the words have legal certainty, — a declaration which, of course, excludes the existence of any ambiguity. The language may be inaccurate; but if the Court can determine the meaning of this inaccurate language, without any other guide than a knowledge of the simple facts, upon which — from the very nature of language in general — its meaning depends, the language, though inaccurate, cannot be ambiguous. The circumstance that the inaccuracy is apparent on the face of the instrument, cannot, in principle, alter the case."¹ Thus, in the will of Nollekens, the sculptor, it was provided, that, upon his decease, "all the marble in the yard, the tools in the shop, bankers, *mod*, tools for carving," &c., should be the property of Alex. Goblet. The controversy was upon the word "*mod*;"

¹ Wigram on the Interpretation of Wills, p. 175, 176, pl. 203, 204.

which was a case of *patent inaccuracy*; but the Court, with no guide to the testator's intention but his words, and the knowledge common to every working sculptor, decided that the word in question sufficiently described the testator's *models*; thus negating the existence of any ambiguity whatever.¹

§ 300. The patent ambiguity, therefore, of which Lord Bacon speaks, must be understood to be that which remains uncertain to the Court, after all the evidence of surrounding circumstances and collateral facts, which is admissible under the rules already stated, is exhausted. His illustrations of this part of the rule are not cases of misdescription, either of the person or of the thing, to which the instrument relates; but are cases, in which the persons and things being sufficiently described, the *intention* of the party in relation to them is ambiguously expressed.² Where this is the case, no parol evidence of expressed intention can be admitted. In other words, and more generally speaking, if the Court, placing itself in the situation in which the testator or contracting party stood at the time of executing the instrument, and with full understanding of the force and import of the words, cannot ascertain his meaning and intention from the language of the instrument thus illustrated, it is a case of incurable and hopeless uncertainty, and the instrument therefore is so far inoperative and void.³

§ 301. There is another class of cases, so nearly allied to

¹ *Goblet v. Beachy*, 3 Sim. 24; *Wigram on the Interpretation of Wills*, p. 179, 185. Parol evidence is admissible to explain short and incomplete terms in a written agreement, which *per se* are unintelligible, if the evidence does not contradict what is in writing. *Sweet v. Lee*, 3 M. & G. 452; *Farm. & Mech. Bank v. Day*, 13 Verm. R. 36.

² *Wigram on the Interpretation of Wills*, p. 179; *Fish v. Hubbard*, 21 Wend. 651.

³ *Per Parsons, C. J.*, in *Worthington v. Hylyer*, 4 Mass. 205; *United States v. Cantril*, 4 Cranch, 167; 1 *Jarman on Wills*, 315; 1 *Powell on Devises*, (by *Jarman*,) p. 348; 4 *Cruise's Dig.* 298, tit. 32, ch. 19, § 29.

these, as to require mention in this place, namely, those in which, upon applying the instrument to its subject-matter, it appears that in relation to the subject, whether person or thing, the description in it is true in part, but not true in every particular. The rule in such cases is derived from the Civil Law; — *Falsa demonstratio non nocet, cum de corpore constat*. Here so much of the description as is false is rejected; and the instrument will take effect, *if a sufficient description remains to ascertain its application*. It is essential, that enough remains to show plainly the intent. "The rule," said Mr. Justice Parke,¹ "is clearly settled, that when there is a sufficient description set forth of premises, by giving the particular name of a close, or otherwise, we may reject a false demonstration; but, that if the premises be described in general terms, and a particular description be added, the latter controls the former." It is not, however, because one part of the description is placed first and the other last, in the sentence; but because, taking the whole together, that intention is manifest. For indeed "it is vain to imagine one part before another; for though words can neither be spoken nor written at once, yet the mind of the author comprehends them at once, which gives *vitam et modum* to the sentence."² Therefore, under a lease of "all that part of Blenheim park, situate in the county of Oxford, now in the occupation of one S. lying" within certain specified abutments, "with all the houses thereto belonging, which are in the occupation of said S.," it was held, that a house lying within the abutments, though not in the occupation of S., would pass.³ So, by a devise of "the farm called Trogue's Farm, now in the occupation of C.," it was held, that the whole farm passed, though it was not all in C.'s occupation.⁴ Thus, also, where one devised all his freehold and real estate "in the county of Limerick and in the city of Limerick;" and the testator had no real estates

¹ *Doe d. Smith v. Galloway*, 5 B. & Ad. 43, 51.

² *Stukeley v. Butler*, Hob. 171.

³ *Doe d. Smith v. Galloway*, 5 B. & Ad. 43.

⁴ *Goodtitle v. Southern*, 1 M. & S. 299.

in the county of Limerick, but his real estates consisted of estates in the county of Clare, which was not mentioned in the will, and a small estate in the city of Limerick, inadequate to meet the charges in the will; it was held, that the devisee could not be allowed to show, by parol evidence, that the estates in the county of Clare were inserted in the devise to him in the first draft of the will, which was sent to a conveyancer, to make certain alterations not affecting those estates; that by mistake he erased the words "county of Clare;" and that the testator, after keeping the will by him for some time, executed it without adverting to the alteration as to that county.¹ And so, where land was described in a patent as lying in the county of M., and further described by reference

¹ *Miller v. Travers*, 8 Bing. 244; *Doe v. Chichester*, 4 Dow's P. C. 65; *Doe v. Lyford*, 4 M. & S. 550. The opinion of the Court in *Miller v. Travers*, by Tindal, C. J., contains so masterly a discussion of the doctrine in question, that no apology seems necessary for its insertion entire. After stating the case, with some preliminary remarks, the learned Chief Justice proceeded as follows:—"It may be admitted, that in all cases, in which a difficulty arises in applying the words of a will to the thing which is the subject-matter of the devise, or to the person of the devisee, the difficulty or ambiguity, which is introduced by the admission of extrinsic evidence, may be rebutted and removed by the production of further evidence, upon the same subject, calculated to explain what was the estate or subject-matter really intended to be devised, or who was the person really intended to take under the will; and this appears to us to be the extent of the maxim, 'Ambiguitas verborum latens, verificatione suppletur.' But the cases to which this construction applies will be found to range themselves into two separate classes, distinguishable from each other, and to neither of which can the present case be referred. The first class is, where the description of the thing devised, or of the devisee, is clear upon the face of the will; but upon the death of the testator, it is found that there are more than one estate or subject-matter of devise, or more than one person, whose description follows out and fills the words used in the will. As, where the testator devises his manor of Dale, and at his death it is found that he has two manors of that name, South Dale and North Dale; or, where a man devises to his son John, and he has two sons of that name. In each of these cases respectively, parol evidence is admissible to show which manor was intended to pass, and which son was intended to take. (Bac. Max. 23; Hob. R. 32; *Edward Altham's case*, 8 Rep. 155.) The other class of cases is that, in which the description

to natural monuments; and it appeared, that the land described by the monuments was in the county of H., and

contained in the will of the thing intended to be devised, or of the person who is intended to take, is true in part, but not true in every particular. As, where an estate is devised called A., and is described as in the occupation of B., and it is found, that, though there is an estate called A., yet the whole is not in B.'s occupation; or, where an estate is devised to a person, whose surname or christian name is mistaken; or whose description is imperfect or inaccurate; in which latter class of cases parol evidence is admissible to show what estate was intended to pass, and who was the devisee intended to take, provided there is sufficient indication of intention appearing on the face of the will to justify the application of the evidence. But the case now before the Court does not appear to fall within either of these distinctions. There are no words in the will which contain an imperfect, or, indeed, any description whatever of the estates in Clare. The present case is rather one, in which the plaintiff does not endeavor to apply the description contained in the will to the estates in Clare; but, in order to make out such intention, is compelled to introduce new words and a new description into the body of the will itself. The testator devises all his estates in the county of Limerick and the city of Limerick. There is nothing ambiguous in this devise on the face of the will. It is found upon inquiry, that he has property in the city of Limerick, which answers to the description in the will, but no property in the county. This extrinsic evidence produces no ambiguity, no difficulty in the application of the words of his will to the state of the property, as it really exists. The natural and necessary construction of the will is, that it passes the estate which he has in the city of Limerick, but passes no estate in the county of Limerick, where the testator had no estate to answer that description. The plaintiff, however, contends, that he has a right to prove that the testator intended to pass, not only the estate in the city of Limerick, but an estate in a county not named in the will, namely, the county of Clare; and that the will is to be read and construed as if the word Clare stood in the place of, or in addition to, that of Limerick. But this, it is manifest, is not merely calling in the aid of extrinsic evidence to apply the intention of the testator, as it is to be collected from the will itself, to the existing state of his property; it is calling in extrinsic evidence to introduce into the will an intention, not apparent upon the face of the will. It is not simply removing a difficulty, arising from a defective or mistaken description; it is making the will speak upon a subject, on which it is altogether silent, and is the same in effect as the filling up a blank, which the testator might have left in his will. It amounts, in short, by the admission of parol evidence, to the making of a new devise for the testator, which he is supposed to have omitted. Now, the first objection to the introduction of such evidence is, that it is inconsistent

not of M.; that part of the description which related to the county was rejected. The entire description in the

with the rule, which reason and sense lay down, and which has been universally established for the construction of wills, namely, that the testator's intention is to be collected from the words used in the will, and that words which he has not used cannot be added. *Denn v. Page*, 3 T. R. 87. But it is an objection no less strong, that the only mode of proving the alleged intention of the testator is by setting up the draft of the will against the executed will itself. As, however, the copy of the will, which omitted the name of the county of Clare, was for some time in the custody of the testator, and therefore open for his inspection, which copy was afterwards executed by him, with all the formalities required by the statute of frauds, the presumption is, that he must have seen and approved of the alteration, rather than that he overlooked it by mistake. It is unnecessary to advert to the danger of allowing the draft of the will to be set up, as of greater authority to evince the intention of the testator than the will itself, after the will has been solemnly executed, and after the death of the testator. If such evidence is admissible to introduce a new subject-matter of devise, why not also to introduce the name of a devisee, altogether omitted in the will? If it is admissible to introduce new matter of devise, or a new devisee, why not to strike out such as are contained in the executed will? The effect of such evidence in either case would be, that the will, though made in form by the testator in his lifetime, would really be made by the attorney after his death; that all the guards intended to be introduced by the statute of frauds would be entirely destroyed, and the statute itself virtually repealed. And upon examination of the decided cases, on which the plaintiff has relied in argument, no one will be found to go the length of supporting the proposition which he contends for. On the contrary, they will all be found consistent with the distinction above adverted to, — that an uncertainty, which arises from applying the description contained in the will, either to the thing devised, or to the person of the devisee, may be helped by parol evidence; but that a new subject-matter of devise, or a new devisee, where the will is entirely silent upon either, cannot be imported by parol evidence into the will itself. Thus, in the case of *Lowe v. Lord Huntingtower*, 4 Russ. 581, n., in which it was held, that evidence of collateral circumstances was admissible, as, of the several ages of the devisees named in the will, of the fact of their being married or unmarried, and the like, for the purpose of ascertaining the true construction of the will; such evidence, it is to be observed, is not admitted to introduce new words into the will itself, but merely to give a construction to the words used in the will, consistent with the real state of his property and family; the evidence is produced to prove facts, which, according to the language of Lord Coke, in 8 Rep. 155, 'stand well with the words of the

patent, said the learned Judge, who delivered the opinion of the Court, must be taken, and the identity of the land

will.' The case of *Standen v. Standen*, 2 Ves. jun. 589, decides no more, than that a devise of all the residue of the testator's real estate, where he has no real estate at all, but has a power of appointment over real estate, shall pass such estate, over which he has the power, though the power is not referred to. But this proceeds upon the principle, that the will would be altogether inoperative, unless it is taken that, by the words used in the will, the testator meant to refer to the power of appointment. The case of *Mosley v. Massey* and others, 8 East, 149, does not appear to bear upon the question now under consideration. After the parol evidence had established, that the local description of the two estates mentioned in the will had been transposed by mistake, the county of Radnor having been applied to the estate in Monmouth, and vice versa; the Court held, that it was sufficiently to be collected, from the words of the will itself, which estate the testator meant to give to the one devisee, and which to the other, independent of their local description; all, therefore, that was done, was to reject the local description, as unnecessary, and not to import any new description into the will. In the case of *Selwood v. Mildway*, 3 Ves. jun. 306, the testator devised to his wife part of his stock in the 4 per cent. annuities of the Bank of England; and it was shown by parol evidence, that at the time he made his will he had no stock in the 4 per cent. annuities, but that he had some which he had sold out, and had invested the produce in long annuities. And in this case it was held, that the bequest was in substance a bequest of stock, using the words as a denomination, not as the identical corpus of the stock; and as none could be found to answer the description but the long annuities, it was held, that such stock should pass, rather than the will be altogether inoperative. This case is certainly a very strong one; but the decision appears to us to range itself under the head, that 'falsa demonstratio non nocet,' where enough appears upon the will itself to show the intention, after the false description is rejected. The case of *Goodtitle v. Southern*, 1 M. & S. 299, falls more closely within the principle last referred to. A devise 'of all that my farm called Trogue's Farm, now in the occupation of A. C.' Upon looking out for the farm devised, it is found that part of the lands, which constituted Trogue's Farm, are in the occupation of another person. It was held, that the thing devised was sufficiently ascertained by the devise of 'Trogue's Farm,' and that the inaccurate part of the devise might be rejected as surplusage. The case of *Day v. Trigg*, 1 P. W. 286, ranges itself precisely in the same class. A devise of all 'the testator's freehold houses in Aldersgate-street,' when in fact he had no freehold, but had leasehold houses there. The devise was held in substance and effect to be a devise of his houses there; and that as there were no freehold houses there to satisfy the description, the word

ascertained, by a reasonable construction of the language used. If there be a repugnant call, which, by the other calls

'freehold' should rather be rejected, than the will be totally void. But neither of these cases affords any authority in favor of the plaintiff; they decide only that, where there is a sufficient description in the will to ascertain the thing devised, a part of the description, which is inaccurate, may be rejected, not that any thing may be added to the will; thus following the rule laid down by Anderson, C. J. in *Godb. R.* 131, — 'An averment to take away surplusage is good, but not to increase that which is defective in the will of the testator.' On the contrary, the cases against the plaintiff's construction appear to bear more closely on the point. In the first place, it is well established, that, where a complete blank is left for the name of the legatee or devisee, no parol evidence, however strong, will be allowed to fill it up as intended by the testator. *Hunt v. Hort*, 3 Bro. C. C. 311, and in many other cases. Now the principle must be precisely the same, whether it is the person of the devisee, or the estate or thing devised, which is left altogether in blank. And it requires a very nice discrimination to distinguish between the case of a will, where the description of the estate is left altogether in blank, and the present case, where there is a total omission of the estates in Clare. In the case of *Doe d. Oxenden v. Chichester*, 4 Dow, P. C. 65, it was held by the House of Lords, in affirmance of the judgment below, that in the case of a devise of 'my estate of Ashton,' no parol evidence was admissible to show, that the testator intended to pass not only his lands in Ashton, but in the adjoining parishes, which he had been accustomed to call by the general name of his Ashton estate. The Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, in giving the judgment of all the Judges, says; 'If a testator should devise his lands of or in Devonshire or Somersetshire, it would be impossible to say, that you ought to receive evidence, that his intention was to devise lands out of those counties.' Lord Eldon, then Lord Chancellor, in page 90 of the Report, had stated in substance the same opinion. The case, so put by Lord Eldon and the Chief Justice, is the very case now under discussion. But the case of *Newburgh v. Newburgh*, decided in the House of Lords on the 16th of June, 1825, appears to be in point with the present. In that case the appellant contended, that the omission of the word 'Gloucester' in the will of the late Lord Newburgh proceeded upon a mere mistake, and was contrary to the intention of the testator, at the time of making his will, and insisted that she ought to be allowed to prove, as well from the context of the will itself, as from other extrinsic evidence, that the testator intended to devise to her an estate for life, as well in the estates in Gloucester, which was not inserted in the will, as in the county of Sussex, which was mentioned therein. The question, 'whether parol evidence was admissible to prove such mistake, for the purpose of correcting the will and

in the patent, clearly appears to have been made through mistake, that does not make void the patent. But if the land granted be so inaccurately described, as to render its identity wholly uncertain, it is admitted that the grant is void.¹ So, if lands are described by the number or name of the lot or parcel, and also by metes and bounds, and the grantor owns lands answering to the one description, and not to the other, the description of the lands which he owned will be taken to be the true one, and the other rejected as *falsa demonstratio*.²

entitling the appellant to the Gloucester estate, as if the word "Gloucester" had been inserted in the will,' was submitted to the Judges, and Lord Chief Justice Abbott declared it to be the unanimous opinion of those who had heard the argument that it could not. As well, therefore, upon the authority of the cases, and more particularly of that which is last referred to, as upon reason and principle, we think the evidence offered by the plaintiff would be inadmissible upon the trial of the issue."

¹ *Boardman v. Reed and Ford's lessees*, 6 Peters, 328, 345; per McLean, J.

² *Loomis v. Jackson*, 19 Johns. 449; *Lush v. Druse*, 4 Wend. 313; *Jackson v. Marsh*, 6 Cowen, 281; *Worthington v. Hylyer*, 4 Mass. 196; *Blague v. Gold*, Cro. Car. 447; *Swyft v. Eyres*, Ib. 548. So, where one devised "all that freehold farm called the Wick Farm, containing 200 acres or thereabouts, occupied by W. E. as tenant to me, with the appurtenances," to uses applicable to freehold property alone; and at the date of the will, and at the death of the testator, W. E. held, under a lease from him, 202 acres of land, which were described in the lease as the Wick Farm, but of which twelve acres were not freehold, but were leasehold only; it was held that these twelve acres did not pass by the lease. *Hall v. Fisher*, 1 Collyer, R. 47. The object in cases of this kind is, to interpret the instrument, that is, to ascertain the intent of the parties. The rule to find the intent is, to give most effect to those things, about which men are least liable to mistake. *Davis v. Rainsford*, 17 Mass. 210; *McIver v. Walker*, 9 Cranch, 178. On this principle, the things usually called for in a grant, that is, the things by which the land granted is described, have been thus marshalled. *First*. The highest regard is had to natural boundaries. *Secondly*. To lines actually run, and corners actually marked, at the time of the grant. *Thirdly*. If the lines and courses of an adjoining tract are called for, the lines will be extended to them, if they are sufficiently established, and no other departure from the deed is thereby required; marked lines prevailing over those which are not marked. *Fourthly*. To courses and distances; giving preference to the one

§ 302. Returning now to the consideration of the general rule, that extrinsic verbal evidence is not admissible to contradict or alter a written instrument, it is further to be observed, that this rule does not exclude such evidence, when it is adduced to prove that the written agreement is *totally discharged*. If the agreement be by deed, it cannot, in general, be dissolved by any executory agreement of an inferior nature; but any obligation by writing not under seal may be totally dissolved, before breach, by an oral agreement.¹ And

or the other, according to circumstances. See *Cherry v. Slade*, 3 Murphy, 82; *Dogan v. Seekright*, 4 Hen. & Munf. 125, 130; *Preston v. Bowmar*, 6 Wheat. 582; *Loring v. Norton*, 8 Greenl. 61; 2 *Flintoff on Real Property*, 537, 538; *Nelson v. Hall*, 1 McLean's R. 518; *Wells v. Crompton*, 3 Rob. Louis. R. 171. Monuments mentioned in the deed, and not then existing, but which are forthwith erected by the parties, in order to conform to the deed, will be regarded as the monuments referred to, and will control the distances given in the deed. *Makepeace v. Bancroft*, 12 Mass. 469; *Davis v. Rainsford*, 17 Mass. 207; *Leonard v. Morrill*, 2 N. Hamp. 197. And if no monuments are mentioned, evidence of long continued occupation, though beyond the given distances, is admissible. *Owen v. Bartholomew*, 9 Pick. 520. If the description is ambiguous or doubtful, parol evidence of the practical construction given by the parties, by acts of occupancy, recognition of monuments or boundaries, or otherwise, is admissible in aid of the interpretation. *Stone v. Clark*, 1 Metcalf, R. 378; *Waterman v. Johnson*, 13 Pick. 261; *Frost v. Spaulding*, 19 Pick. 445; *Clark v. Munyan*, 22 Pick. 410; *Crafts v. Hibbard*, 4 Metcalf, R. 438; Civil Code Louisiana, Art. 1951; *Wells v. Compton*, 3 Rob. Louis. R. 171. Words necessary to ascertain the premises must be retained; but words not necessary for that purpose may be rejected, if inconsistent with the others. *Worthington v. Hylyer*, 4 Mass. 205; *Jackson v. Sprague*, 1 Paine, 494; *Vose v. Handy*, 2 Greenl. 322. The expression of quantity is descriptive, and may well aid in finding the intent, where the boundaries are doubtful. *Mann v. Pearson*, 2 Johns. 37, 41; *Perkins v. Webster*, 2 N. H. 287; *Thorndike v. Richards*, 1 Shepl. 437; *Allen v. Allen*, 2 Shepl. 287; *Woodman v. Lane*, 7 N. H. 241; *Pernam v. Weed*, 6 Mass. 131; *Riddick v. Leggatt*, 3 Murphy, 539, 544. See also 1 *Phil. Evid.* by Cowen & Hill, p. 533, note 942; *Ib.* p. 538, note 948; *Ante*, § 290.

¹ *Bull. N. P.* 152; *Milword v. Ingram*, 1 Mod. 206; 2 Mod. 43, S. C.; *Edwards v. Weeks*, 1 Mod. 262; 2 Mod. 259, S. C.; 1 *Freem.* 230, S. C.; *Lord Milton v. Edgworth*, 5 Bro. P. C. 318; 4 *Cruise's Dig.* Tit. 32, ch. 3, § 51; *Clement v. Durgin*, 5 Greenl. 9; *Ratcliff v. Pemberton*, 1 Esp. 35;

there seems little room to doubt, that this rule will apply even to those cases where a writing is by the Statute of Frauds made necessary to the validity of the agreement.¹ But where there is an entire agreement in writing, consisting of divers particulars, partly requisite to be in writing by the Statute of Frauds, and partly not within the statute, it is not competent to prove an agreed variation of the latter part, by oral evidence, though that part might, of itself, have been good without writing.²

§ 303. Neither is the rule infringed by the admission of oral evidence to prove a *new and distinct agreement*, upon a *new consideration*, whether it be as a substitute for the old, or in addition to and beyond it. And if subsequent, and involving the same subject-matter, it is immaterial whether the new agreement be entirely oral, or whether it refers to, and partially or totally adopts the provisions of the former contract in writing, provided the old agreement be rescinded and abandoned.³ Thus, where one by an instrument under seal agreed

Fleming v. Gilbert, 3 Johns. 531. But if the obligation be by deed, and there be a parol agreement in discharge of such obligation, if the parol agreement be executed, it is a good discharge. *Dearborn v. Cross*, 7 Cowen, 48. See also *Little v. Holland*, 3 T. R. 390; *Peytoe's case*, 9 Co. 77; *Kaye v. Waghorne*, 1 Taunt. 428; *Le Fevre v. Le Fevre*, 4 S. & R. 241; *Suydam v. Jones*, 10 Wend. 180; *Barnard v. Darling*, 11 Wend. 27, 30. In equity, a parol rescission of a written contract, after breach, may be set up in bar of a bill for specific performance. *Walker v. Wheatley*, 2 Humphreys, R. 119. By the law of Scotland, no written obligation whatever can be extinguished or annulled, without either the creditor's oath, or a writing signed by him. *Tait on Evid.* p. 325.

¹ *Phil. & Am. on Evid.* 776; 2 *Phil. Evid.* 363; *Goss v. Ld. Nugent*, 5 B. & Ad. 58, 65, 66, per Ld. Denman, C. J.; *Stowell v. Robinson*, 3 Bing. N. C. 928; *Cummings v. Arnold*, 3 Mete. 486.

² *Harvey v. Grabham*, 5 Ad. & El. 61, 74; *Marshall v. Lynn*, 6 M. & W. 109.

³ *Burn v. Miller*, 4 Taunt. 745; *Foster v. Alanson*, 2 T. R. 479; *Shack v. Anthony*, 1 M. & S. 573, 575; *Sturdy v. Arnaud*, 3 T. R. 596; *Brigham v. Rogers*, 17 Mass. 573, per Putnam, J.; *Heard v. Wadham*, 1 East, 630, per Lawrence, J.; 1 *Chitty on Pl.* 93; *Richardson v. Hooper*, 13 Pick. 446;

to erect a building for a fixed price, which was not an adequate compensation, and having performed part of the work, refused to proceed, and the obligee thereupon promised, that if he would proceed he should be paid for his labor and materials, and should not suffer, and he did so; it was held that he might recover in assumpsit upon this verbal agreement.¹ So, where the abandonment of the old contract was expressly mutual.² So, where a ship was hired by a charter-party under seal, for eight months, commencing from the day of her sailing from Gravesend, and to be loaded at any British port in the English channel; and it was afterwards agreed by parol, that she should be laden in the Thames, and that the freight should commence from her entry outwards at the custom-house; it was held that an action would lie upon the latter agreement.³

§ 304. It is also well settled, that in a case of a simple contract in writing, oral evidence is admissible to show that by a subsequent agreement the *time of performance was enlarged*, or the *place of performance* changed, the contract having been performed according to the enlarged time, or at the substituted place, or the performance having been prevented by the act of the other party; or that the *damages* for non-performance were waived and remitted;⁴ or that it was founded upon an insuffi-

Brewster v. Countryman, 12 Wend. 446; Delacroix v. Bulkley, 13 Wend. 71; Vicary v. Moore, 2 Watts, 456, 457, per Gibson, C. J.; Brock v. Sturdivant, 3 Fairf. 81; Marshall v. Baker, 1 Appleton, R. 402; Chitty on Contracts, p. 88.

¹ Munroe v. Perkins, 9 Pick. 298.

² Lattimore v. Harsen, 14 Johns. 330.

³ White v. Parkin, 12 East, 578.

⁴ Jones v. Barkley, 2 Doug. 684, 694; Hotham v. E. In. Co. 1 T. R. 638; Cummings v. Arnold, 3 Metc. 486; Clement v. Durgin, 5 Greenl. 9; Keating v. Price, 1 Johns. Cas. 22; Fleming v. Gilbert, 3 Johns. 530, 531, per Thompson, J.; Erwin v. Saunders, 1 Cowen, 249; Frost v. Everett, 5 Cowen, 497; Dearborn v. Cross, 7 Cowen, 50; Neil v. Cheves, 1 Bailey's R. 537, 538, note (a); Cuff v. Penn, 1 M. & S. 21; Robinson v. Bachelder, 4 New Hamp. 40; Medomak Bank v. Curtis, 11 Shepl. 36; 1 Phil. Evid.

cient or an unlawful *consideration*, or was without consideration;¹ or that the agreement itself was *waived* and abandoned.² So, it has been held competent to prove an additional and *suppletory agreement*, by parol; as, for example, where a contract for the hire of a horse was in writing, and it was further agreed by parol that accidents, occasioned by his *shying*, should be at a risk of the hirer.³ A further consideration may also be proved by parol, if it is not of a different nature from that which is expressed in the deed.⁴ And if the deed appears to be a voluntary conveyance, a valuable consideration may be proved by parol.⁵

§ 305. In regard to *receipts*, it is to be noted, that they may be either mere acknowledgments of payment or delivery, or

(by Cowen & Hill) p. 563, note 987; Blood v. Goodrich, 9 Wend. 68; Youqua v. Nixon, 1 Peters, C. C. R. 221. But see Marshall v. Lynn, 6 M. & W. 109.

¹ See Ante, § 26, cases in note (1); 1 Phil. Evid. (by Cowen & Hill) p. 108, note 194, and p. 555, note 976; Mills v. Wyman, 3 Pick. 207; Phil. & Am. on Evid. 757; 2 Phil. Evid. p. 367; Erwin v. Saunders, 1 Cowen, 249; Hill v. Buckminster, 5 Pick. 391; Rawson v. Walker, 1 Stark. R. 361; Foster v. Jolly, 1 C. M. & R. 707, 708, per Parke, B.; Stackpole v. Arnold, 11 Mass. 27, 32; Folsom v. Mussey, 8 Greenl. 400.

² Ballard v. Walker, 3 Johns. Cas. 60; Poth. on Obl. Pt. 3, ch. 6, art. 2, No. 636; Marshall v. Baker, 1 Appleton, R. 402; Eden v. Blake, 13 M. & W. 614.

³ Jeffrey v. Walton, 1 Stark. R. 267. In a suit for breach of a written agreement, to manufacture and deliver weekly to the plaintiff a certain quantity of cloth, at a certain price per yard, on eight months' credit, it was held, that the defendant might give in evidence, as a good defence, a subsequent parol agreement between him and the plaintiff, made on sufficient consideration, by which the mode of payment was varied, and that the plaintiff had refused to perform the parol agreement. Cummings v. Arnold, 3 Metc. 486. See further, Wright v. Crookes, 1 Scott, N. S. 685. Where the action is for work and labor extra and beyond a written contract, the plaintiff will be held to produce the written contract, for the purpose of showing what was included in it. Buxton v. Cornish, 12 M. & W. 426; Vincent v. Cole, 1 M. & Malk. 257.

⁴ Clifford v. Turrill, 9 Jur. 633.

⁵ Pott v. Todhunter, 2 Collyer, Ch. Cas. 76, 84.

they may also contain a contract to do something in relation to the thing delivered. In the former case, and so far as the receipt goes only to acknowledge payment or delivery, it is merely *primâ facie* evidence of the fact, and not conclusive; and therefore the fact which it recites may be contradicted by oral testimony. But in so far as it is evidence of a contract between the parties, it stands on the footing of all other contracts in writing, and cannot be contradicted or varied by parol.¹ Thus, for example, a bill of lading, which partakes of both these characters, may be contradicted and explained in its recital, that the goods were in good order and well conditioned, by showing that their internal order and condition was bad; and, in like manner, in any other fact which it erroneously recites; but in other respects it is to be treated like other written contracts.²

We here conclude the Second Part of this Treatise.


¹ *Stratton v. Rastall*, 2 T. R. 366; *Alner v. George*, 1 Campb. 392; Ante, § 26, note (1); 1 Phil. Evid. p. 368; *Stackpole v. Arnold*, 11 Mass. 27, 32; *Tucker v. Maxwell*, Ib. 143; *Johnson v. Johnson*, Ib. 359, 363, per Parker, C. J.; *Wilkinson v. Scott*, 17 Mass. 257; *Rex v. Scammonden*, 3 T. R. 474; 1 Phil. Evid. (by Cowen & Hill) p. 108, note 194, and p. 549, note 963; *Rollins v. Dyer*, 4 Shepl. 475; *Brooks v. White*, 2 Mete. 283. "The true view of the subject seems to be, that such circumstances, as would lead a Court of Equity to set aside a contract, such as fraud, mistake or surprise, may be shown at law, to destroy the effect of a receipt." Per Williams, J. in *Fuller v. Crittenden*, 9 Conn. 406; Ante, § 285.

² *Barrett v. Rogers*, 7 Mass. 297; *Benjamin v. Sinclair*, 1 Bailey, 174. In the latter case it was held, that the recital in the bill of lading, as to the good order and condition of the goods, was applicable only to their external and apparent order and condition; but that it did not extend to the quality of the material in which they were enveloped, nor to secret defects in the goods themselves; and that as to defects of the two latter descriptions, parol evidence was admissible. See also *Smith v. Brown*, 3 Hawks, 580; *May v. Babcock*, 4 Ohio R. 334, 346.

PART III.

OF THE

INSTRUMENTS OF EVIDENCE.



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PART III.

OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF EVIDENCE.

CHAPTER I.

OF WITNESSES, AND THE MEANS OF PROCURING THEIR ATTENDANCE.

§ 306. HAVING thus considered the general Nature and Principles of Evidence, and the rules which govern in the production of Evidence, we come now, in the third place, to speak of the Instruments of Evidence, or the means by which the truth in fact is established.¹ In treating this subject, we shall consider how such Instruments are obtained and used, and their admissibility and effect.

§ 307. The instruments of Evidence are divided into two general classes, namely, *unwritten* and *written*. The former is more naturally to be first considered, because oral testimony is often the first step in proceeding by documentary evidence, it being frequently necessary first to establish, in that mode, the genuineness of the documents to be adduced.

¹ Parties are, ordinarily, permitted to exercise their own judgment as to the order of introducing their proofs. *Lynch v. Benton*, 3 Rob. Louis. R. 105. And testimony, apparently irrelevant, may in the discretion of the Judge be admitted, if it is expected to become relevant by its connexion with other testimony to be afterwards offered. *The State v. M'Allister*, 11 Shepl. 139.

§ 308. By *Unwritten*, or *Oral Evidence*, is meant the testimony given by witnesses, *vivâ voce*, either in open Court, or before a magistrate, acting under its commission, or the authority of law. Under this head it is proposed briefly to consider,—(1.) The method, in general, of procuring the attendance and testimony of witnesses;—(2.) The competency of witnesses;—(3.) The course and practice in the examination of witnesses; and herein, of the impeachment and the corroboration of their testimony.

§ 309. And *first*, in regard to the method of procuring the attendance of witnesses, it is to be observed, that every Court having power definitively to hear and determine any suit, has, by the Common Law, inherent power to call for all adequate proofs of the facts in controversy, and to that end, to summon and compel the attendance of witnesses before it. The ordinary summons is a writ of *subpœna*, which is a judicial writ, directed to the witness, commanding him to appear at the Court, to testify what he knows in the cause therein described, pending in such Court, under a certain penalty mentioned in the writ. If the witness is expected to produce any books or papers in his possession, a clause to that effect is inserted in the writ, which is then termed a *subpœna duces tecum*.¹ The writ of *subpœna* suffices for only one sitting or term of the Court. If the cause is made a *remanet*, or is postponed by adjournment to another term or session, the

¹ This additional clause is to the following effect;—"and also, that you do diligently and carefully search for, examine, and inquire after, and bring with you and produce, at the time and place aforesaid, a bill of exchange, dated," &c. (here describing with precision the papers and documents to be produced,) "together with all copies, drafts, and vouchers relating to the said documents, and all other documents, letters, and paper writings whatsoever, that can or may afford any information or evidence in said cause; then and there to testify and show all and singular those things, which you (or either of you) know, or the said documents, letters, or instruments in writing do import of and concerning the said cause now depending. And this you (or any of you) shall in no wise omit," &c. 3 Chitty's Gen. Practice, 830, n.; Amey v. Long, 9 East, 473.

witness must be summoned anew. The manner of serving the *subpœna* being in general regulated by statutes, or rules of Court, which, in the different States of the Union are not perfectly similar, any farther pursuit of this part of the subject would not comport with the design of this work.¹ And the same observation may be applied, once for all, to all points of practice in matters of evidence, which are regulated by local law.

§ 310. In order to secure the attendance of a witness, in civil cases, it was requisite by Stat. 5 Eliz. c. 9, that he "have tendered to him, according to his countenance or calling, his reasonable charges." Under this statute it is held necessary, in England, that his reasonable expenses, for going to and returning from the trial, and for his reasonable stay at the place, be tendered to him at the time of serving the *subpœna*; and, if he appears, he is not bound to give evidence, until such charges are actually paid or tendered,² unless he resides, and is summoned to testify, within the weekly bills of mortality; in which case it is usual to leave a shilling with him, upon the delivery of the *subpœna* ticket. These expenses of a witness are allowed pursuant to a scale, graduated according to his situation in life.³ But, in this

¹ The English practice is stated in 2 Tidd's Prac. (9th edit.) 805-809; 1 Stark. Evid. 77, et seq.; 3 Chitty's Gen. Prac. 828-834; 2 Phil. Evid. 370-392. The American practice, in its principal features, may be collected from the cases cited in Cowen & Hill's notes to 1 Phil. Evid. p. 2-14, notes 1-42; 1 Paine & Duer's Practice, Part 2, ch. 7, § 4, Conklin's Practice, Part 2, ch. 2, § 7, p. 253-293; Howe's Practice, 228-230.

² Newton v. Harland, 9 Dowl. 16.

³ 2 Phil. Evid. p. 375, 376; 2 Tidd's Pr. (9th edit.) p. 806. An additional compensation, for loss of time, was formerly allowed to medical men and attorneys; but that rule is now exploded. But a reasonable compensation, paid to a foreign witness, who refused to come without it, and whose attendance was essential in the cause, will in general be allowed and taxed against the losing party. See Lonergan v. The Royal Exchange Assurance, 7 Bing. 725; Ib. 729, S. C.; Collins v. Godefroy, 1 B. & Ad. 950. There is also a distinction between a witness to facts, and a witness selected by a party to

country, these reasonable expenses are settled by statutes, at a fixed sum for each day's actual attendance, and for each mile's travel, from the residence of the witness¹ to the place of trial, and back, without regard to the employment of the witness, or his rank in life. The sums paid are not alike in all the States, but the principle is believed to be every where the same. In some States, it is sufficient to tender to the witness his fees for travel, from his home to the place of trial, and one day's attendance, in order to compel him to appear upon the summons; but in others, the tender must include his fees for travel in returning.² Neither is the practice uniform in this country, as to the question whether the witness, having appeared, is bound to attend from day to day, until the trial is closed, without the payment of his daily fees; but the better opinion seems to be, that, without payment of his fees, he is not bound to submit to an examination.³

give his opinion on a subject with which he is peculiarly conversant, from his employment in life. The former is bound, as a matter of public duty, to testify to facts within his knowledge. The latter is under no such obligation; and the party who selects him must pay him for his time, before he will be compelled to testify. *Webb v. Page*, 1 Car. & Kir. 23.

¹ It has been held, that, for witnesses brought from another State, no fees can be taxed for travel, beyond the line of the State, in which the cause is tried. *Howland v. Lenox*, 4 Johns. 311; *Newman v. The Atlas Ins. Co.* Phillips's Dig. 113; *Melvin v. Whiting*, 13 Pick. 190. But the reasons for these decisions are not stated, nor are they very easily perceived. In England the early practice was to allow all the expenses of bringing over foreign witnesses, incurred in good faith; but a large sum being claimed in one case, an order was made in the Common Pleas, that no costs should be allowed, except while the witness was within the reach of process. *Hagedorn v. Allnut*, 3 Taunt. 379. This order was soon afterwards rescinded, and the old practice restored; *Cotton v. Witt*, 4 Taunt. 55; since which the uniform course, both in that Court and in B. R., has been to allow all the actual expenses, of procuring the attendance of the witness, and of his return. *Tremain v. Barrett*, 6 Taunt. 88; 2 Tidd's Pr. 814; 2 Phil. Evid. 376, (9th edit.)

² The latter is the rule in the Courts of the United States. See Conklin's Practice, p. 265, 266; LL. U. S. 1799, ch. 125, § 6, vol. 1, p. 571, (Story's edit.)

³ 1 Paine & Duer's Practice, 497; *Hallett v. Mears*, 14 East, 15, 16, note (a.)

§ 311. In criminal cases, no tender of fees is in general necessary, on the part of the government, in order to compel its witnesses to attend; it being the duty of every citizen to obey a call of that description, and it being also a case, in which he is himself in some sense a party.¹ But his fees will in general be finally paid from the public treasury. In all such cases, the accused is entitled to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.² The payment or tender of fees, however, is not necessary in any case, in order to secure the attendance of the witness, if he has waived it; the provision being solely for his benefit.³ But it is necessary, in all civil cases, that the witness be summoned, in order to compel him to testify; for, otherwise, he is not obliged to answer the call, though he be present in Court; but in criminal cases, a person present in Court, though he have not been summoned, is bound to answer.⁴ And where, in criminal cases, the witnesses for the prosecution are bound to attend upon the summons, without the payment or tender of fees, if, from poverty, a witness cannot obey the summons, he will not, as it seems, be guilty of a contempt.⁵

¹ In New York, witnesses are bound to attend for the State, in all criminal prosecutions, and for the defendant, in any indictment, without any tender or payment of fees. 2 Rev. Stat. p. 729, § 65; *Chamberlain's case*, 4 Cowen, 49. In Pennsylvania, the person accused may have process for his witnesses before indictment. *United States v. Moore*, Wallace's R. 23. In Massachusetts, in capital cases, the prisoner may have process to bring in his witnesses at the expense of the Commonwealth. *Williams's case*, 13 Mass. 501. In England, the Court has power to order the payment of fees to witnesses for the crown, in all cases of felony; and, in some cases, to allow further compensation. Stat. 18 Geo. 3, ch. 19; Phil. & Am. on Evid. 788, 789; 2 Phil. Evid. 380; 1 Stark. Evid. 82, 83.

² Const. U. S., Amendments, Art. 6.

³ *Goodwin v. West*, Cro. Car. 522, 540.

⁴ *Rex v. Sadler*, 4 C. & P. 218; *Blackburne v. Hargreave*, 2 Lewin, Cr. Cas. 259.

⁵ 2 Phil. Evid. 379, 383.

§ 312. If a witness is in custody, or is in the military or naval service, and therefore is not at liberty to attend without leave of his superior officer, which he cannot obtain, he may be brought into Court to testify, by a writ of *habeas corpus ad testificandum*. This writ is grantable at discretion, on motion in open Court, or by any Judge, at chambers, who has general authority to issue a writ of *habeas corpus*. The application, in civil cases, is made upon affidavit, stating the nature of the suit, and the materiality of the testimony, as the party is advised by his counsel and verily believes, together with the fact and general circumstances of restraint, which call for the issuing of the writ; and if he is not actually a prisoner, it should state his willingness to attend.¹ In criminal cases, no affidavit is deemed necessary on the part of the prosecuting attorney. The writ is left with the sheriff, if the witness is in custody; but if he is in the military or naval service, it is left with the officer in immediate command; to be served, obeyed, and returned, like any other writ of *habeas corpus*.² If the witness is a prisoner of war, he cannot be brought up, but by an order from the Secretary of State; but a rule may be granted on the adverse party, to show cause why he should not consent either to admit the fact, or that the prisoner should be examined upon interrogatories.³

§ 313. There is another method, by which the attendance of witnesses for the government, in criminal cases, is enforced, namely, by *recognisance*. This is the usual course, upon all examinations, where the party accused is committed, or is bound over for trial. And any witness, whom the magistrate may order to recognise for his own appearance at the trial, if he refuses so to do, may be committed. Sureties are not usually demanded; though they may be required, at the

¹ *Rex v. Roddam*, Cowp. 672.

² 2 Phil. Evid. 374, 375; Conklin's Pr. 264; 1 Paine & Duer's Pr. 503, 504; 2 Tidd's Pr. 809.

³ *Furly v. Newnham*, 2 Doug. 419.

magistrate's discretion; but if they cannot be obtained by the witness, when required, his own recognisance must be taken.¹

§ 314. The *service* of a *subpœna* upon a witness ought always to be made in a *reasonable time* before trial, to enable him to put his affairs in such order, that his attendance upon the Court may be as little detrimental as possible to his interest.² On this principle, a summons in the morning to attend in the afternoon of the same day has been held insufficient, though the witness lived in the same town, and very near to the place of trial. In the United States, the reasonableness of the time is generally fixed by a statute, requiring an allowance of one day for every certain number of miles' distance from the witness's residence to the place of trial; and this is usually twenty miles. But at least one day's notice is deemed necessary, however inconsiderable the distance may be.³

§ 315. As to the *manner of service*, in order to compel the attendance of the witness, it should be *personal*, since, otherwise, he cannot be chargeable with a contempt in not appearing upon the summons.⁴ The *subpœna* is plainly of no force

¹ 2 Hale's P. C. 282; *Bennett v. Watson*, 3 M. & S. 1; 1 Stark. Evid. 82; Roscoe's Crim. Evid. p. 87; *Evans v. Rees*, 12 Ad. & El. 55.

² *Hammond v. Stewart*, 1 Stra. 510.

³ *Sims v. Kitchen*, 5 Esp. 46; 2 Tidd's Pr. 806; 3 Chitty's Gen. Pr. 801; 1 Paine & Duer's Pr. 497.

⁴ In some of the United States, as well as in England, a *subpœna ticket*, which is a copy of the writ, or more properly a statement of its substance, duly certified, is delivered to the witness, at the same time that the writ is shown to him. 1 Paine & Duer's Pr. 496; 1 Tidd's Pr. 806; 1 Stark. Ev. 77; Phil. & Am. on Evid. 781, 782; 2 Phil. Evid. 373. But the general practice is believed to be, either to show the *subpœna* to the witness, or to serve him with an attested copy. The writ, being directed to the witness himself, may be shown or delivered to him by a private person, and the service proved by affidavit; or it may be served by the sheriff's officer, and proved by his official return.

beyond the jurisdictional limits of the Court in which the action is pending, and from which it issued; but the Courts of the United States, sitting in any District, are empowered by statute¹ to send *subpœnas* for witnesses into any other District, provided that, in civil causes, the witness do not live at a greater distance than one hundred miles from the place of trial.²

§ 316. Witnesses as well as parties are *protected from arrest*, while going to the place of trial, while attending there, for the purpose of testifying in the cause, and while returning home, *eundo, morando, et redeundo*.³ A *subpœna* is not necessary to protection, if the witness have consented to go without one; nor is a writ of protection essential for this purpose; its principal use being to prevent the trouble of an arrest, and an application for discharge, by showing it to the arresting officer; and sometimes, especially where a writ of protection is shown, to subject the officer to punishment for contempt.⁴ Preventing, or using means to prevent a witness from attending Court, who has been duly summoned, is also

¹ Stat. 1793, ch. 66, [22] § 6; 1 LL. U. S. p. 312, (Story's edit.)

² In most of the States, there are provisions, by statute, for taking the depositions of witnesses, who live more than a specified number of miles from the place of trial. But these regulations are made for the convenience of the parties, and do not absolve the witness from the obligation of personal attendance at the Court, at whatever distance it be holden, if he resides within its jurisdiction, and is duly summoned.

³ This rule of protection was laid down, upon deliberation, in the case of *Meekins v. Smith*, 1 H. Bl. 636, as extending to "all persons who had relation to a suit, which called for their attendance, whether they were compelled to attend by process or not, (in which number bail were included,) provided they came *bonâ fide*." *Randall v. Gurney*, 3 B. & Ald. 252; *Hurst's case*, 4 Dall. 387. It extends to a witness coming from abroad, without a *subpœna*. 1 Tidd's Pr. 195, 196; *Norris v. Beach*, 2 Johns. 294.

⁴ *Meekins v. Smith*, 1 H. Bl. 636; *Arding v. Flower*, 8 T. R. 536; *Norris v. Beach*, 2 Johns. 294; *United States v. Edme*, 9 S. & R. 147; *Sanford v. Chase*, 3 Cowen, 381; *Bours v. Tuckerman*, 7 Johns. 538; [Ex parte McNeil, 3 Mass. 288, 6 Mass. 264, contra.]

punishable as a contempt of Court.¹ On the same principle, it is deemed as a contempt to serve process upon a witness, even by summons, if it be done in the immediate or constructive presence of the Court upon which he is attending;² though any service elsewhere, without personal restraint, it seems, is good. But this freedom from arrest is a personal privilege, which the party may waive; and if he willingly submits himself to the custody of the officer, he cannot afterwards object to the imprisonment, as unlawful.³ The privilege of exemption from arrest does not extend through the whole sitting or term of the Court, at which the witness is summoned to attend; but it continues during the space of time necessarily and reasonably employed in going to the place of trial, staying there until the trial is ended, and returning home again. In making this allowance of time, the Courts are disposed to be liberal; but unreasonable loitering and deviation from the way will not be permitted.⁴ But a witness is not privileged from arrest by his bail, on his return from giving evidence; and if he has absconded from his bail, he may be retaken, even during his attendance at Court.⁵

§ 317. This privilege is granted *in all cases*, where the attendance of the party or witness is given in any matter pending *before a lawful tribunal* having jurisdiction of the cause. Thus, it has been extended to a party attending on an arbitration, under a rule of Court;⁶ or on the execution of

¹ *Commonwealth v. Feely*, 2 Virg. Cas. 1.

² *Cole v. Hawkins*, Andrews, 275; *Blight v. Fisher*, 1 Peters, C. C. R. 41; *Miles v. McCullough*, 1 Binn, 77.

³ *Brown v. Getchell*, 11 Mass. 11, 14; *Geyer v. Irwin*, 4 Dall. 107.

⁴ *Meekins v. Smith*, 1 H. Bl. 636; *Randall v. Gurney*, 3 B. & Ald. 252; *Willingham v. Matthews*, 2 Marsh. 57; *Lightfoot v. Cameron*, 2 W. Bl. 1113; *Selby v. Hills*, 8 Bing. 166; *Hurst's case*, 4 Dall. 387; *Smythe v. Banks*, 4 Dall. 329; 1 Tidd's Pr. 195, 196, 197; *Phil. & Am. on Evid.* 782, 783; 2 *Phil. Ev.* 374.

⁵ 1 Tidd's Pr. 197; *Ex Parte Lyne*, 3 Stark. R. 470.

⁶ *Spence v. Stuart*, 3 East, 89; *Sanford v. Chase*, 3 Cowen, 381.

a writ of inquiry;¹ to a bankrupt and witnesses, attending before the commissioners, on notice;² and to a witness attending before a magistrate, to give his deposition under an order of Court.³

§ 318. If a person thus clearly entitled to privilege is *unlawfully arrested*, the Court, in which the cause is to be, or has been tried, if it have power, will *discharge him upon motion*; and not put him to the necessity of suing out process for that purpose, or of filing common bail. But otherwise, and where the question of privilege is doubtful, the Court will not discharge him out of custody upon motion, but will leave him to his remedy by writ; and in either case the trial will be put off until he is released.⁴

§ 319. Where a witness has been duly summoned, and his fees paid or tendered, or the payment or tender waived, if he wilfully neglects to appear, he is guilty of a *contempt* of the process of Court, and may be proceeded against by an *attachment*. It has sometimes been held necessary that the cause should be called on for trial, the Jury sworn, and the witness called to testify;⁵ but the better opinion is, that the witness is to be deemed guilty of contempt, whenever it is distinctly shown that he is absent from Court with intent to disobey the writ of *subpoena*; and that the calling of him in Court is of no other use than to obtain clear evidence of his having neglected to appear; but that is not necessary, if it can be clearly shown by other means that he has disobeyed the order

¹ *Walters v. Rees*, 4 J. B. Moore, 34.

² *Arding v. Flower*, 8 T. R. 534; *Phil. & Am. on Evid.* 783; 2 *Phil. Evid.* 374; 1 *Tidd's Pr.* 197.

³ *Ex parte Edme*, 9 S. & R. 147.

⁴ 1 *Tidd's Pr.* 197, 216; 2 *Paine & Duer's Pr.* 6, 10; *Hurst's case*, 4 *Dall.* 387; *Ex parte Edme*, 9 S. & R. 147; *Sanford v. Chase*, 3 *Cowen*, 381.

⁵ *Bland v. Swafford*, *Peake's Cas.* 60.

of Court.¹ An attachment for contempt proceeds not upon the ground of any damage sustained by an individual, but is instituted to vindicate the dignity of the Court;² and it is said, that it must be a perfectly clear case to call for the exercise of this extraordinary jurisdiction.³ The motion for an attachment should therefore be brought forward as soon as possible, and the party applying must show, by affidavits or otherwise, that the *subpoena* was seasonably and personally served on the witness, that his fees were paid or tendered, or the tender expressly waived, and that every thing has been done which was necessary to call for his attendance.⁴ But if it appears that the testimony of the witness could not have been material, the rule for an attachment will not be granted.⁵ If a case of palpable contempt is shown, such as an express and positive refusal to attend, the Court will grant an attachment in the first instance; otherwise, the usual course is to grant a rule to show cause.⁶ It is hardly necessary to add that if a witness, being present in Court, refuses to be sworn

¹ *Barrow v. Humphreys*, 3 B. & Ald. 598; 2 *Tidd's Pr.* 808; 1 *Phil. Evid.* (by *Cowen & Hill*) p. 3, note (2).

² 3 B. & Ald. 600, per *Best, J.* Where a Justice of the Peace has power to bind a witness by recognisance to appear at a higher Court, he may compel his attendance before himself for that purpose, by attachment. *Bennett v. Watson*, 3 M. & S. 1; 2 *Hale, P. C.* 282; *Evans v. Rees*, 12 Ad. & El. 55; *Ante*, § 313.

³ *Horne v. Smith*, 6 Taunt. 10, 11; *Garden v. Creswell*, 2 M. & W. 319; *Rex v. Ld. J. Russell*, 7 Dowl. 693.

⁴ 2 *Tidd's Pr.* 807, 808; *Phil. & Am. on Evid.* 786; 2 *Phil. Evid.* 376, 377; *Garden v. Creswell*, 2 M. & W. 319; 1 *Paine & Duer's Pr.* 499, 500; *Conklin's Pr.* 265.

⁵ *Dicas v. Lawson*, 1 Cr. M. & R. 934.

⁶ *Anon. Salk.* 84; 4 Bl. Comm. 286, 287; *Rex v. Jones*, 1 Stra. 185; *Jackson v. Mann*, 2 Caines, 92; *Andrews v. Andrews*, 2 Johns. Cas. 109; *Thomas v. Cummins*, 1 Yates, 1; *Conklin's Pr.* 265; 1 *Paine & Duer's Pr.* 500; 2 *Tidd's Pr.* 807, 808. The party injured by the non-attendance of a witness has also his remedy, by action on the case for damages, at Common Law; and a further remedy, by action of debt, is given by Stat. 5 Eliz. ch. 9; but these are deemed foreign to the object of this work.

or to testify, he is guilty of contempt. In all cases of contempt, the punishment is by fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the Court.¹

§ 320. If the witness *resides abroad*, out of the jurisdiction, and refuses to attend, or is *sick and unable to attend*, his testimony can be obtained only by taking his *deposition* before a magistrate, or before a commissioner duly authorized by an order of the Court where the cause is pending; and if the commissioner is not a Judge or magistrate, it is usual to require that he be first sworn.² This method of obtaining testimony from witnesses, in a foreign country, has always been familiar in the Courts of Admiralty; but it is also deemed to be within the inherent powers of all Courts of Justice. For, by the law of Nations, Courts of Justice, of different countries, are bound mutually to aid and assist each other, for the furtherance of justice; and hence, when the testimony of a foreign witness is necessary, the Court, before which the action is pending, may send to the Court, within whose jurisdiction the witness resides, a writ, either patent or close, usually termed a letter rogatory, or a commission *sub mutue vicissitudinis obtentu, ac in juris subsidium*, from those words contained in it. By this instrument, the Court abroad is informed of the pendency of the cause, and the names of the foreign witnesses, and is requested to cause their depositions to be taken, in due course of law, for the furtherance of justice; with an offer, on the part of the tribunal making the request, to do the like for the other in a similar case. The writ or commission is usually accompanied by interrogatories, filed by the parties on each side, to which the answers of the witnesses are desired. The commission is executed by the Judge who receives it, either by calling the witness before himself, or by the intervention of a commissioner for that

¹ 4 Bl. Comm. 286, 287; *Rex v. Beardmore*, 2 Burr. 792.

² *Ponsford v. O'Connor*, 5 M. & W. 673; *Clay v. Stephenson*, 3 Ad. & El. 807.

purpose; and the original answers, duly signed and sworn to by the deponent, and properly authenticated, are returned with the commission to the Court from which it issued.¹ The Court of Chancery has always freely exercised this power, by a commission, either directed to foreign magistrates, by their official designation, or more usually, to individuals by name; which latter course, the peculiar nature of its jurisdiction and proceedings enables it to induce the parties to adopt, by consent, where any doubt exists as to its inherent authority. The

¹ See Clerk's Praxis, Tit. 27; *Cunningham v. Otis*, 1 Gal. 166; Hall's Adm. Pr. Part 2, tit. 19, cum. add. and tit. 27, cum. add. p. 37, 38, 55-60; Oughton's Ordo Judiciorum, Vol. 1, p. 150, 151, 152, tit. 95, 96. See also Id. p. 139-149, tit. 88-94. The general practice, in the foreign continental Courts, is, to retain the original deposition, which is entered of record, returning a copy duly authenticated. But in the Common Law Courts, the production of the original is generally required. *Clay v. Stephenson*, 7 Ad. & El. 185. The practice, however, is not uniform. See an early instance of letters rogatory in 1 Roll. Ar. 530, pl. 15, temp. Ed. 1. The following form may be found in 1 Peters, C. C. R. 236, note (a).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

District of —, ss.

The President of the United States, to any Judge or tribunal having jurisdiction of civil causes, in the city (or province) of —, in the kingdom of —, Greeting:

***** Whereas, a certain suit is pending in our — Court for
 * SEAL. * the district of —, in which A. B. is plaintiff [or claimant,
 * against the ship —,] and C. D. is defendant, and it has
 been suggested to us, that there are witnesses, residing within your jurisdiction, without whose testimony justice cannot completely be done between the said parties. We therefore request you, that in furtherance of justice, you will, by the proper and usual process of your Court, cause such witness or witnesses, as shall be named or pointed out to you by the said parties, or either of them, to appear before you or some competent person, by you for that purpose to be appointed and authorized at a precise time and place by you to be fixed, and there to answer on their oaths and affirmations, to the several interrogatories hereunto annexed; and that you will cause their depositions to be committed to writing, and returned to us under cover, duly closed and sealed up, together with these presents. And we shall be ready and willing to do the same for you in a similar case, when required.
 Witness, &c.

Courts of Common Law in England seem not to have asserted this power in a direct manner, and of their own authority; but have been in the habit of using indirect means to coerce the adverse party into a consent to the examination of witnesses, who were absent in foreign countries, under a commission for that purpose. These means of coercion were various, such as putting off the trial, or refusing to enter judgment, as in case of nonsuit, if the defendant was the recusant party; or by a stay of proceedings, till the party applying for the commission could have recourse to a Court of Equity, by instituting a new suit there, auxiliary to the suit at law.¹ But subsequently, the learned Judges appear not to have been satisfied that it was proper for them to compel a party, by indirect means, to do that which they had no authority to compel him to do directly; and they accordingly refused to put off a trial for that purpose.² This inconvenience was therefore remedied by statutes,³ which provide, that in all cases of the absence of witnesses, whether by sickness, or travelling out of the jurisdiction, or residence abroad, the Courts, in their discretion, for the due administration of justice, may cause the witnesses to be examined under a commission issued for that purpose. In general, the examination is made by interrogatories, previously prepared; but in proper cases, the witnesses may be examined *vivâ voce*, by the commissioner, who in that case writes down the testimony given; or he may be examined partly in that manner and partly upon interrogatories.⁴

¹ *Furly v. Newnham*, Doug. 419; *Anon.* cited in *Mostyn v. Fabrigas*, Cowp. 174; 2 Tidd's Pr. 770, 810.

² *Cailland v. Vaughan*, 1 B. & P. 210. See also *Grant v. Ridley*, 5 Man. & Grang. 203, per Tindal, C. J.; *Macaulay v. Shackell*, 1 Bligh, 119, 120, 131, N. S.

³ 13 Geo. 3, c. 63, and 1 W. 4, c. 22; Report of Commissioners on Chancery Practice, p. 109; Second Report of Commissioners on Courts of Common Law, p. 23, 24.

⁴ 2 Tidd's Pr. 810, 811; 1 Stark. Evid. 274-278; Phil. & Am. on Evid. p. 796-800; 2 Phil. Evid. 386, 387, 388; *Pole v. Rogers*, 3 Bing. N. C. 780.

§ 321. In the United States provisions have existed, in the statutes of the several States, from a very early period, for the taking of depositions to be used in civil actions in the Courts of Law, in all cases where the personal attendance of the witness could not be had, by reason of sickness or other inability to attend; and also in cases where the witness is about to sail on a foreign voyage, or to take a journey out of the jurisdiction, and not to return before the time of trial.¹ Similar provisions have also been made in many of the United States for taking the depositions of witnesses *in perpetuam rei memoriam*, without the aid of a Court of Equity, in cases where no action is pending. In these latter cases there is some diversity in the statutory provisions, in regard to the magistrates before whom the depositions may be taken, and in regard to some of the modes of proceeding, the details of which are not within the scope of this treatise. It may suffice to state, that, generally, notice must be previously given to all persons known to be interested in the subject-matter to which the testimony is to relate; that the names of the persons thus summoned must be mentioned in the magistrate's certificate or caption, appended to the deposition; and that the deposition is admissible only in case of the death or incapacity of the witness,² and against those only who have had opportunity to cross-examine, and those in privity with them.

§ 322. In regard also to the other class of depositions, namely, those taken in civil causes, under the statutes alluded to, there are similar diversities in the forms of proceeding. In some of the States, the Judges of the Courts of Law are empowered to issue commissions, at chambers, in their discretion, for the examination of witnesses unable or not compellable to attend, from any cause whatever. In others, though

¹ See Stat. U. States, 1812, ch. 25, § 3.

² The rule is the same in Equity, in regard to depositions taken *de bene esse*, because of the sickness of the witness. *Weguelin v. Weguelin*, 2 Curt. 263.

with the like diversities in form, the party himself may, on application to any magistrate, cause the deposition of any witness to be taken, who is situated as described in the acts. In their essential features these statutes are nearly alike; and these features may be collected from that part of the Judiciary Act of the United States, and its supplements, which regulate this subject.¹ By that act, when the testimony of a person is necessary in any civil cause, pending in a Court of the United States, and the person lives more than a hundred miles² from the place of trial, or is bound on a voyage to sea, or is about to go out of the United States, or out of the District, and more than that distance from the place of trial, or is ancient, or very infirm, his deposition may be taken, *de bene esse*, before any Judge of any Court of the United States, or before any Chancellor or Judge of any superior Court of a State, or any Judge of a County Court or Court of Common Pleas, or any Mayor or chief magistrate of any city,³ in the United States, not being of counsel, nor interested in the suit; provided, that a notification from the magistrate, before whom the deposition is to be taken, to the adverse party, to be present at the taking, and put interrogatories, if he think fit, be first served on him or his attorney, as either may be nearest, if either is within a hundred miles of the place of caption; allowing time, after the service of the notification, not less than at the rate of one day, Sundays exclusive, for every twenty miles' travel. The witness is to be carefully examined, and cautioned, and sworn or affirmed to testify the whole truth, and must subscribe the testimony by him given, after it has been reduced to writing by the magistrate,

¹ Stat. 1789, ch. 20, § 30; Stat. 1793, ch. 22, § 6. This provision is not peremptory; it only enables the party to take the deposition, if he pleases. *Prouty v. Ruggles*, C. C. U. S. Mass. May, 1842, 4 Law Rep. 161.

² These distances are various in the similar statutes of the States, but are generally thirty miles, though in some cases less.

³ In the several States, this authority is generally delegated to Justices of the Peace.

or by the deponent in his presence. The deposition so taken must be retained by the magistrate, until he shall deliver it with his own hand into the Court, for which it is taken; or it must, together with a certificate of the causes or reasons for taking it, as above specified, and of the notice, if any, given to the adverse party, be by the magistrate sealed up, directed to the Court, and remain under his seal until it is opened in Court.¹ And such witnesses may be compelled to appear and depose as above mentioned, in the same manner as to appear and testify in Court. Depositions, thus taken, may be used at the trial by either party, whether the witness was or was not cross-examined,² if it shall appear, to the satisfaction of the Court, that the witnesses are then dead, or gone out of the United States,³ or more than a hundred miles from the place of trial, or that by reason of age, sickness, bodily infirmity, or imprisonment, they are unable to travel and appear at Court.

§ 323. The provisions of this act being in derogation of the Common Law, it has been held, that they must be strictly complied with.⁴ But if it appears on the face of the deposition, or the certificate which accompanies it, that the magis-

¹ The mode of transmission is not prescribed by the statute; and in practice it is usual to transmit depositions by post, whenever it is most convenient; in which case the postages are included in the taxed costs. *Prouty v. Ruggles*, 4 Law Reporter, 161. Care must be taken, however, to inform the clerk, by a proper superscription, of the nature of the document inclosed to his care; for, if opened by him out of Court, though by mistake, it will be rejected. *Beal v. Thompson*, 8 Cranch, 70. But see *Law v. Law*, 4 Greenl. 167.

² *Dwight v. Linton*, 3 Rob. Louis. R. 57.

³ In proof of the absence of the witness, it has been held not enough to give evidence merely of inquiries and answers at his residence; but, that his absence must be shown by some one who knows the fact. *Robinson v. Markis*, 2 M. & Rob. 375. And see *Hawkins v. Brown*, 3 Rob. Louis. R. 310.

⁴ *Bell v. Morrison*, 1 Peters, 355; *The Thomas & Henry v. The United States*, 1 Brockenbrough's R. 367; *Nelson v. The United States*, 1 Peters, C. C. R. 235.

trate before whom it was taken was duly authorized, within the statute, it is sufficient, in the first instance, without any other proof of his authority;¹ and his certificate will be good evidence of all the facts therein stated, so as to entitle the deposition to be read, if the necessary facts are therein sufficiently disclosed.² In cases where, under the authority of an act of Congress, the deposition of a witness is taken *de bene esse*, the party producing the deposition must show affirmatively that his inability to procure the personal attendance of the witness still continues; or, in other words, that the cause of taking the deposition remains in force. But this rule is not applied to cases where the witness resides more than a hundred miles from the place of trial, he being beyond the reach of compulsory process. If he resided beyond that distance, when the deposition was taken, it is presumed that he continues so to do, until the party opposing its admission shows that he has removed within the reach of a *subpœna*.³

§ 324. By the act of Congress already cited,⁴ the power of the Courts of the United States, as Courts of Common Law, to grant a *dedimus potestatem* to take depositions, whenever it may be necessary, in order to prevent a failure or delay of justice, is expressly recognised; and the Circuit Courts, when sitting as Courts of Equity, are empowered to direct depositions to be taken *in perpetuam rei memoriam*, according to the usages in Chancery, where the matters to which they relate are cognizable in those Courts. A later statute⁵ has facilitated the taking of depositions in the former of these cases, by providing, that when a commission shall be issued by a Court of

¹ *Ruggles v. Bucknor*, 1 Paine, 358; *The Petapco Ins. Co. v. Southgate*, 5 Peters, 604.

² *Bell v. Morrison*, 1 Peters, 356.

³ *The Petapco Ins. Co. v. Southgate*, 5 Peters, 604, 616, 617, 618; *Pettibone v. Derringer*, 4 Wash. 215; 1 Stark. Evid. 277.

⁴ Stat. 1789, ch. 20, § 30.

⁵ Stat. 1827, ch. 4. See the practice and course of proceeding in these cases, in 2 Paine & Duer's Pr. p. 102-110; 2 Tidd's Pr. 810, 811, 812.

the United States, for taking the testimony of a witness, at any place within the United States or the territories thereof, the Clerk of any Court of the United States for the District or Territory where the place may be, may issue a *subpœna* for the attendance of the witness before the commissioner, provided the place be in the county where the witness resides, and not more than forty miles from his dwelling. And if the witness, being duly summoned, shall neglect or refuse to appear, or shall refuse to testify, any Judge of the same Court, upon proof of such contempt, may enforce obedience, or punish the disobedience, in the same manner as the Courts of the United States may do, in case of disobedience to their own process of *subpœna ad testificandum*. Some of the States have made provision by law for the taking of depositions, to be used in suits pending in other States, by bringing the deponent within the operation of their own statutes against perjury; and national comity plainly requires the enactment of similar provisions in all civilized countries. But as yet they are far from being universal; and whether, in the absence of such provision, false swearing in such case is punishable as perjury, has been gravely doubted.¹ Where the production of papers is required, in the case of examinations under commissions issued from Courts of the United States, any Judge of a Court of the United States may, by the same statute, order the clerk to issue a *subpœna duces tecum*, requiring the witness to produce such papers to the commissioner, upon the affidavit of the applicant to his belief, that the witness possesses the papers, and that they are material to his case; and may enforce the obedience and punish the disobedience of the witness, in the manner above stated.

§ 325. But independently of statutory provisions, Chancery has power to sustain bills, filed for the purpose of preserving the evidence of witnesses *in perpetuam rei memoriam*, touching any matter which cannot be immediately investigated in a

¹ *Cailland v. Vaughan*, 1 B. & P. 210.

Court of Law, or where the evidence of a material witness is likely to be lost, by his death, or departure from the jurisdiction, or by any other cause, before the facts can be judicially investigated. The defendant, in such cases, is compelled to appear and answer, and the cause is brought to issue, and a commission for the examination of the witnesses is made out, executed, and returned, in the same manner as in other cases; but no relief being prayed, the suit is never brought to a hearing; nor will the Court ordinarily permit the publication of the depositions, except in support of a suit or action; nor then, unless the witnesses are dead, or otherwise incapable of attending to be examined.¹

¹ 1 Smith's Chancery Practice, 284-286.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES.

§ 326. ALTHOUGH, in the ordinary affairs of life, temptations to practise deceit and falsehood may be comparatively few, and therefore men may ordinarily be disposed to believe the statements of each other; yet, in judicial investigations, the motives to pervert the truth, and to perpetrate falsehood and fraud, are so greatly multiplied, that if statements were received, with the same indiscriminating freedom as in private life, the ends of justice could with far less certainty be attained. In private life, too, men can inquire and determine for themselves, whom they will deal with, and in whom they will confide; but the situation of Judges and Jurors renders it difficult, if not impossible, in the narrow compass of a trial, to investigate the character of witnesses; and from the very nature of judicial proceedings, and the necessity of preventing the multiplication of issues to be tried, it often may happen that the testimony of a witness, unworthy of credit, may receive as much consideration as that of one worthy of the fullest confidence. If no means were employed totally to exclude any contaminating influences from the fountains of justice, this evil would constantly occur. But the danger has always been felt, and always guarded against, in all civilized countries. And while all evidence is open to the objection of the adverse party, before it is admitted, it has been found necessary, to the ends of justice, that certain kinds of evidence should be uniformly excluded.

§ 327. In determining what evidence shall be admitted and weighed by the Jury, and what shall not be received at all, or, in other words, in distinguishing between competent and incompetent witnesses, a principle seems to have been applied,

Court of Law, or where the evidence of a material witness is likely to be lost, by his death, or departure from the jurisdiction, or by any other cause, before the facts can be judicially investigated. The defendant, in such cases, is compelled to appear and answer, and the cause is brought to issue, and a commission for the examination of the witnesses is made out, executed, and returned, in the same manner as in other cases; but no relief being prayed, the suit is never brought to a hearing; nor will the Court ordinarily permit the publication of the depositions, except in support of a suit or action; nor then, unless the witnesses are dead, or otherwise incapable of attending to be examined.¹

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§ 327. In determining what evidence shall be admitted and weighed by the Jury, and what shall not be received at all, or, in other words, in distinguishing between competent and incompetent witnesses, a principle seems to have been applied,

similar to that which distinguishes between conclusive and disputable presumptions of law,¹ namely, the experienced connexion between the situation of the witness, and the truth or falsity of his testimony. Thus the law excludes as incompetent those persons whose evidence, in general, is found more likely than otherwise to mislead Juries; receiving and weighing the testimony of others, and giving to it that degree of credit which it is found on examination to deserve. It is obviously impossible that any test of credibility can be infallible. All that can be done is to approximate to such a degree of certainty, as will ordinarily meet the justice of the case. The question is not, whether any rule of exclusion may not sometimes shut out credible testimony; but whether it is expedient that there should be any rule of exclusion at all. If the purposes of justice require that the decision of causes should not be embarrassed by statements generally found to be deceptive, or totally false, there must be some rule designating the class of evidence to be excluded; and in this case, as in determining the ages of discretion, and of majority, and in deciding as to the liability of the wife, for crimes committed in company with the husband, and in numerous other instances, the Common Law has merely followed the common experience of mankind. It rejects the testimony (1.) of parties; (2.) of persons deficient in understanding; (3.) of persons insensible to the obligations of an oath; and (4.) of persons, whose pecuniary interest is directly involved in the matter in issue; not because they may not sometimes state the truth, but because it would ordinarily be unsafe to rely on their testimony.² Other causes concur, in some of these

¹ Ante, § 14, 15.

² "If it be objected, that interest in the matter in dispute might, from the bias it creates, be an exception to the credit, but that it ought not to be absolutely so to the competency, any more than the friendship or enmity of a party, whose evidence is offered, towards either of the parties in the cause, or many other considerations hereafter to be intimated; the general answer may be this, that in point of authority no distinction is more absolutely settled; and in point of theory, the existence of a direct interest is capable of being

cases, to render the persons incompetent, which will be mentioned in their proper places. We shall now proceed to consider, in their order, each of these classes of persons, held incompetent to testify; adding some observations on certain descriptions of persons, held incompetent in particular cases.

§ 328. But here it is proper to observe, that one of the main provisions of the law, for securing the purity and truth of oral evidence, is, that it be delivered under the *sanction of an oath*. Men in general are sensible of the motives and restraints of religion, and acknowledge their accountability to that Being, from whom no secrets are hid. In a Christian country it is presumed, that all the members of the community entertain the common faith, and are sensible to its influences; and the law founds itself on this presumption, while, in seeking for the best attainable evidence of every fact in controversy, it lays hold on the conscience of the witness by this act of religion, namely, a public and solemn appeal to the Supreme Being for the truth of what he may utter. "The administration of an oath supposes that a moral and religious accountability is felt to a Supreme Being, and this is the sanction which the law requires upon the conscience, before it admits him to testify."¹ An oath is ordinarily de-

precisely proved; but its influence on the mind is of a nature not to discover itself to the Jury, whence it hath been held expedient to adopt a general exception, by which witnesses so circumstanced are free from temptation, and the cause not exposed to the hazard of the very doubtful estimate, what quantity of interest in the question, in proportion to the character of the witness, in any instance, leaves his testimony entitled to belief. Some, indeed, are incapable of being biassed even latently by the greatest interest; many would betray the most solemn obligation and public confidence for an interest very inconsiderable. An universal exclusion, where no line short of this could have been drawn, preserves infirmity from a snare, and integrity from suspicion; and keeps the current of evidence, thus far at least, clear and uninfected." 1 Gilb. Evid. by Lofft, p. 223, 224.

¹ Wakefield v. Ross, 5 Mason, 18, per Story, J. See also Menochius, De Præsumpt. lib. 1, quæst. 1, n. 32, 33; Farinac. Opera, Tom. 2, App.

finied to be a solemn invocation of the vengeance of the Deity upon the witness, if he do not declare the whole truth, as far as he knows it;¹ or, a religious asseveration, by which a person renounces the mercy, and imprecates the vengeance of Heaven, if he do not speak the truth."² But the correctness of this view of the nature of an oath has been justly questioned by a late writer,³ on the ground that the imprecatory clause is not essential to the true idea of an oath, nor to the attainment of the object of the law in requiring this solemnity. The design of the oath is not to call the attention of God to man; but the attention of man to God; — not to call on Him to punish the wrong-doer; but on man to remember that He will. That this is all which the law requires, is evident from the statutes in regard to Quakers, Moravians, and other classes of persons, conscientiously scrupulous of testifying under any other sanction, and of whom, therefore, no other declaration is required. Accordingly, an oath has been well defined, by the same writer, to be, "an outward pledge, given by the juror," (or person taking it,) "that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of

p. 162, n. 32, p. 281, n. 33; Bynkershoek, *Observ. Juris. Rom. lib. 6, cap. 2.*

¹ 1 Stark. Evid. 22. The force and utility of this sanction were familiar to the Romans from the earliest times. The solemn oath was anciently taken by this formula, the witness holding a flint stone in his right hand; — *Si sciens fallo, tum me Diespiter, salva urbe arceque, bonis ejiciat, ut ego hanc lapidem.* Adam's Ant. 247; Cic. Fam. Ep. vii. 1, 12; 12 Law Mag. (Lond.) 272. The early Christians refused to utter any imprecation whatever; Tyler on Oaths, ch. 6; and accordingly, under the Christian Emperors, oaths were taken in the simple form of religious asseveration, *invocato Dei Omnipotentis nomine*, Cod. lib. 2, tit. 4, l. 41; *sacrosanctis evangelis tactis*, Cod. lib. 3, tit. 1, l. 14. Constantine added, in a rescript, — *Jurisjurandi religione testes, prius quam perhibeant testimonium, jamjudum arctari precipimus.* Cod. lib. 4, tit. 20, l. 9. See also *Omichund v. Barker*, 1 Atk. 21, 48, per Ld. Hardwicke; Willes, 538, S. C.; 1 Phil. Evid. p. 8; *Atcheson v. Everitt*, Cowp. 389. The subject of oaths is very fully and ably treated by Mr. Tyler, in his book on Oaths, their Nature, Origin, and History. Lond. 1834.

² White's case, 2 Leach, Cr. Cas. 482.

³ Tyler on Oaths, p. 12, 13.

his responsibility to God."¹ A security to this extent, for the truth of testimony, is all that the law seems to have deemed necessary; and with less security than this, it is believed that the purposes of justice cannot be accomplished.

§ 329. And first, in regard to parties, the general rule of the Common Law is, that a party to the record, in a civil suit, cannot be a witness either for himself, or for a co-suitor in the cause.² The rule of the Roman Law was the same. *Omnibus in re propria dicendi testimonii facultatem jura submoverunt.*³ This rule of the Common Law is founded, not solely in the consideration of interest, but partly also in the general expediency of avoiding the multiplication of temptations to perjury. In some cases at law, and generally by the course of proceedings in Equity, one party may appeal to the conscience of the other, by calling him to answer interrogatories upon oath. But this act of the adversary may be regarded as an emphatic admission, that, in that instance, the party is worthy of credit, and that his known integrity is a sufficient guaranty against the danger of falsehood. But where the party would volunteer his own oath, or a co-suitor, identified in interest with him, would offer it, this reason for the admission of the evidence totally fails;⁴ "and it is not

¹ Tyler on Oaths, p. 15. See also the Report of the Lords' Committee, Ibid. Introd. p. xiv.; 3 Inst. 165; Fleta, lib. 5, c. 22; Fortescue, De Laud. Leg. Angl. c. 26, p. 58.

² Phil. & Am. on Evid. 47; 1 Phil. Evid. 45; 3 Bl. Comm. 371; 1 Gilb. Evid. by Lofft, p. 221; *Frear v. Everton*, 20 Johns. 142.

³ Cod. lib. 4, tit. 20, l. 10. *Nullus idoneus testis in re sua intelligitur.* Dig. lib. 22, tit. 5, l. 10.

⁴ "For where a man, who is interested in the matter in question, would also prove it, it rather is a ground for distrust, than any just cause of belief; for men are generally so short-sighted, as to look to their own private benefit, which is near them, rather than to the good of the world, 'which, though on the sum of things really best for the individual,' is more remote; therefore, from the nature of human passions and actions, there is more reason to distrust such a biased testimony, than to believe it. It is also easy for persons, who are prejudiced and prepossessed, to put false and unequal glosses upon

to be presumed that a man, who complains without cause, or defends without justice, should have honesty enough to confess it."¹

§ 330. The rule of the Common Law goes still further in regard to *parties to the record* in *not compelling* them, in trials by Jury, to give evidence for the opposite party, against themselves, either in civil or in criminal cases. Whatever may be said by theorists, as to the policy of the maxim, *Nemo tenetur seipsum prodere*, no inconvenience has been felt in its practical application. On the contrary, after centuries of experience, it is still applauded by Judges, as "a rule founded in good sense and sound policy;"² and it certainly preserves the party from temptation to perjury. This rule extends to all the actual and real parties to the suit, whether they are named on the record as such or not.³

§ 331. Whether *corporators* are parties within the meaning of this rule, is a point not perfectly clear. Corporations, it is to be observed, are classed into public or municipal, and private corporations. The former are composed of all the inhabitants of any of the local or territorial portions, into which the country is divided in its political organization. Such are counties, towns, boroughs, local parishes, and the like. In these cases the attribute of individuality is conferred on the entire mass of inhabitants, and again is modified, or taken away, at the mere will of the legislature, according to its own views of public convenience, and without any

what they give in evidence; and therefore the law removes them from testimony, to prevent their sliding into perjury; and it can be no injury to truth to remove those from the Jury, whose testimony may hurt themselves, and can never induce any rational belief." 1 Gilb. Evid. by Lofft, p. 223.

¹ 1 Gilb. Evid. by Lofft, p. 243.

² Worrall v. Jones, 7 Bing. 395, per Tindal, C. J. See also Phil. & Am. on Evid. 157; Rex v. Woburn, 10 East, 403, per Ld. Ellenborough, C. J.; Commonwealth v. Marsh, 10 Pick. 57.

³ Rex v. Woburn, 10 East, 395; Maura v. Lamb, 7 Cowen, 174; Appleton v. Boyd, 7 Mass. 131; Fenn v. Granger, 3 Campb. 177.

necessity for the consent of the inhabitants, though not ordinarily against it. They are termed *quasi* corporations; and are dependent on the public will, the inhabitants not, in general, deriving any private and personal rights under the act of incorporation; its office and object being not to grant private rights, but to regulate the manner of performing public duties.¹ These corporations sue and are sued by the name of "the Inhabitants of" such a place; each inhabitant is directly liable in his person to arrest, and in his goods to seizure and sale, on the execution, which may issue against the collective body, by that name; and of course each one is a party to the suit; and his admissions, it seems, are receivable in evidence, though their value, as we have seen, may be exceedingly light.² Being parties, it would seem naturally to follow, that these inhabitants were neither admissible as witnesses for themselves, nor compellable to testify against themselves; but, considering the public nature of the suits, in which they are parties, and of the interest generally involved in them, the minuteness of the private and personal interest concerned, its contingent character, and the almost certain failure of justice, if the rule were carried out to such extent in its application, these inhabitants are admitted as competent witnesses in all cases, in which the rights and liabilities of the corporation only are in controversy. But where the inhabitants are individually and personally interested, it is otherwise.³ Whether this exception to the general rule was solely created by the

¹ Angell & Ames, on Corp. 16, 17; Rumford v. Wood, 13 Mass. 192. The observations in the text are applied to American corporations of a political character. Whether a municipal corporation can in every case be dissolved by an act of the legislature, and to what extent such act of dissolution may constitutionally operate, are questions, which it is not necessary here to discuss. See Willcock on Municipal Corporations, Pt. 1, § 852; Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43, 51; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 629, 663.

² Ante, § 175, and note (4).

³ Swift's Evid. 57; Rex v. Mayor of London, 2 Lev. 231. Thus, an inhabitant is not competent to prove a way by prescription for all the inhabitants; Odiorne v. Wade, 8 Pick. 518; nor, a right, in all the inhabitants to take

statutes, which have been passed on this subject, or previously existed at Common Law, of which the statutes are declaratory, is not perfectly agreed.¹ In either case, the general reason and necessity, on which the exception is founded, seem to require, that where inhabitants are admissible as witnesses for the corporation, they should also be compellable to testify against it; but the point is still a vexed question.²

shell-fish; *Lufkin v. Haskell*, 3 Pick. 356; for in such cases, by the Common Law, the record would be evidence of the custom, in favor of the witness. This ground of objection, however, is now removed in England, by Stat. 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 42. The same principle is applied to any private joint or common interest. *Parker v. Mitchell*, 11 Ad. & El. 788. See also *Prewit v. Tilly*, 1 C. & P. 140; Ang. & Am. on Corp. 390-394; *Connecticut v. Bradish*, 14 Mass. 296; *Gould v. James*, 6 Cowen, 369; *Jacobson v. Fountain*, 2 Johns. 170; *Weller v. The Governors of the Foundling Hospital*, Peake's Cas. 153; Post, § 405. In the English Courts, a distinction is taken between *rated* and *rateable* inhabitants, the former being held inadmissible as witnesses, and the latter being held competent; and this distinction has been recognised in some of our own Courts; though, upon the grounds stated in the text, it does not seem applicable to our institutions, and is now generally disregarded. See *Commonwealth v. Baird*, 4 S. & R. 141; *Falls v. Belknap*, 1 Johns. 486, 491; *Corwein v. Hames*, 11 Johns. 76; *Bloodgood v. Jamaica*, 12 Johns. 285; Ante, § 175, note (4), and the cases above cited. But in England, rated inhabitants are now by statutes made competent witnesses on indictments for non-repair of bridges; in actions against the hundred, under the statute of Winton; in actions for riotous assemblies; in actions against churchwardens for misapplication of funds; in summary convictions under 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, 30; on the trial of indictments under the general highway act, and the general turnpike act; and in matters relating to rates and cesses. Phil. & Am. on Evid. 133-138, 395; 1 Phil. Evid. 138-144. In the Province of New Brunswick, rated inhabitants are now made competent witnesses in all cases where the town or parish may in any manner be affected, or where it may be interested in a pecuniary penalty, or where its officers, acting in its behalf, are parties. Stat. 9 Vict. cap. 4, March 7, 1846.

¹ Ante, § 175, and the cases cited in note (4). See also Phil. & Am. on Evid. p. 395, note (2); 1 Phil. Evid. 375; *City Council v. King*, 4 McCord, 487; *Marsden v. Stansfield*, 7 B. & C. 815; *Rex v. Kirdford*, 2 East, 559.

² In *Rex v. Woburn*, 10 East, 395, and *Rex v. Hardwicke*, 11 East, 578, 584, 586, 589, it was said, that they were not compellable. See accordingly *Plattekill v. New Paltz*, 15 Johns. 305.

§ 332. *Private corporations*, in regard to our present inquiry, may be divided into two classes, namely, *pecuniary*, or *monied institutions*, such as banks, insurance and manufacturing companies, and the like, and institutions or *societies for religious and charitable purposes*. In the former, membership is obtained by the purchase of stock or shares, without the act or assent of the corporation, except prospectively and generally, as provided in its charter and by-laws; and the interest thus acquired is private, pecuniary, and vested, like ownership of any other property. In the latter, membership is conferred by special election; but the member has no private interest in the funds, the whole property being a trust for the benefit of others. But all these are equally corporations proper; and it is the corporation, and not the individual member, that is party to the record in all suits by or against it.¹ Hence it follows, that the declarations of the members are not admissible in evidence in such actions, as the declarations of parties,² though, where a member or an officer is an agent of the corporation, his declarations may be admissible, as part of the *res gestæ*.³

§ 333. But the *members* or stockholders, in institutions created for private emolument, though not parties to the record, are *not* therefore *admissible as witnesses*; for, in matters in which the corporation is concerned, they of course have a direct, certain, and vested interest, which necessarily excludes them.⁴ Yet the *members of charitable and religious*

¹ *Merchants Bank v. Cook*, 4 Pick. 405. It has been held in Maine, that a corporator, or shareholder in a monied institution, is substantially a party, and therefore is not compellable to testify where the corporation is party to the record. *Bank of Oldtown v. Houlton*, 8 Shepl. 501. *Shepley, J.* dissenting.

² *City Bank v. Bateman*, 7 Har. & Johns. 104, 109; *Hartford Bank v. Hart*, 3 Day, 491, 495; *Magill v. Kauffman*, 4 S. & R. 317; *Stewart v. Huntington Bank*, 11 S. & R. 267; *Atlantic Ins. Co. v. Conard*, 4 Wash. 663, 677; *Fairfield Co. Turnp. Comp. v. Thorp*, 13 Conn. 173.

³ Ante, § 108, 113, 114.

⁴ This rule extends to the members of all corporations, having a common

societies, having no personal and private interest in the property holden by the corporation, are *competent witnesses* in any suit, in which the corporation is a party. On this ground, a mere trustee of a savings bank, not being a stockholder or a depositor,¹ and a trustee of a society for the instruction of seamen,² and trustees of many other eleemosynary institutions, have been held admissible witnesses in such suits. But where the member of a private corporation is inadmissible as a witness generally, he may still be called upon to produce the corporate documents, in an action against the corporation; for he is a mere depositary, and the party objecting to his competency is still entitled to inquire of him concerning the

fund distributable among the members, and in which they therefore have a private interest; the principle of exclusion applying to all cases, where that private interest would be affected. *Doe d. Mayor & Burgesses of Stafford v. Tooth*, 3 Younge & Jer. 19; *City Council v. King*, 4 McCord, 487, 488; *Davies v. Morgan*, 1 Tyrwh. 457. See the cases cited in the notes to Cowen & Hill's edition of Phil. Evid. Vol. 3, p. 1541, 1542, 1552. Where a corporation would examine one of its members as a witness, he may be rendered competent, either by a sale of his stock or interest, where membership is gained or lost in that way; or, by being disfranchised; which is done by an information in the nature of a quo warranto against the member who confesses the information, on which the plaintiff obtains judgment to disfranchise him. *Mayor of Colchester v. —*, 1 P. Wms. 595. Where the action is against the corporation for a debt, and the stockholders are by statute made liable for such debt, and their property is liable to seizure upon the execution issued against the corporation, a member, once liable, remains so, notwithstanding his alienation of stock, or disfranchisement, and therefore is not a competent witness for the corporation, in such action. *Hovey v. The Mill-Dam Foundry*, 21 Pick. 453. But where his liability to the execution issued against the corporation is not certain, but depends on a special order to be granted by the Court in its discretion, he is a competent witness. *Needham v. Law*, 12 M. & W. 560.

¹ *Middletown Savings Bank v. Bates*, 11 Conn. 519.

² *Mariner's Church v. Miller*, 7 Greenl. 51. See also *Anderson v. Brock*, 3 Greenl. 243; *Wells v. Lane*, 8 Johns. 462; *Gilpin v. Vincent*, 9 Johns. 219; *Nason v. Thatcher*, 7 Mass. 398; *Cornwell v. Isham*, 1 Day, 35; notes to Cowen & Hill's edition of Phil. Evid. Vol. 3, p. 1542, 1543, 1552; *Richardson v. Freeman*, 6 Greenl. 57; *Weller v. Foundling Hospital*, Peake's Cas. 153.

custody of the documents.¹ And if a trustee, or other member of an eleemosynary corporation, is liable to costs, this is an interest which renders him incompetent, even though he may have an ultimate remedy over.²

§ 334. The rule by which parties are excluded from being witnesses for themselves applies to the case of *husband and wife*; neither of them being admissible as a witness in a cause, civil or criminal, in which the other is a party. This exclusion is founded partly on the identity of their legal rights and interests; and partly on principles of public policy, which lie at the basis of civil society. For it is essential to the happiness of social life, that the confidence subsisting between husband and wife should be sacredly protected and cherished in its most unlimited extent; and to break down or impair the great principles which protect the sanctities of that relation, would be to destroy the best solace of human existence.³

§ 335. The principle of this rule requires its application to all cases, in which *the interests* of the other party are *involved*. And, therefore, the wife is not a competent witness against any co-defendant, tried with her husband, if the testimony concern the husband, though it be not directly given against him.⁴ Nor is she a witness for a co-defendant, if her testi-

¹ *Rex v. Inhabitants of Netherthong*, 2 M. & S. 237; Willcock on Municipal Corp. 309.

² *Rex v. St. Mary Magdalen, Bermondsey*, 3 East, 7.

³ *Stein v. Bowman*, 13 Peters, 223, per McLean, J.; Ante, § 254; Co. Lit. 6, b.; *Davis v. Dinwoody*, 4 T. R. 678; *Barker v. Dixie*, Cas. Temp. Hardw. 264; *Bentley v. Cooke*, 3 Doug. 422, per Ld. Mansfield. The rule is the same in Equity. *Vowles v. Young*, 13 Ves. 144. So is the law of Scotland. *Alison's Practice*, p. 461. See also 2 Kent, Comm. 179, 180; *Commonwealth v. Marsh*, 10 Pick. 57; *Robbins v. King*, 2 Leigh R. 142, 144; *Snyder v. Snyder*, 6 Binn. 488; *Corse v. Patterson*, 6 Har. & Johns. 153.

⁴ 1 Hale, P. C. 301; *Dalt. Just. c. 111*; *Rex v. Hood*, 1 Mood. Cr. Cas. 281; *Rex v. Smith*, Ib. 289.

mony, as in the case of a conspiracy,¹ would tend directly to her husband's acquittal; nor where, as in the case of an assault,² the interests of all the defendants are inseparable; nor in any suit in which the rights of her husband, though not a party, would be concluded by any verdict therein; nor may she, in a suit between others, testify to any matter for which, if true, her husband may be indicted.³ Yet, where the grounds of defence are several and distinct, and in no manner dependent on each other, no reason is perceived why the wife of one defendant should not be admitted as a witness for another.⁴

§ 336. It makes no difference *at what time the relation of husband and wife commenced*; the principle of exclusion being applied in its full extent, wherever the interests of either of them are directly concerned. Thus, where the defendant married one of the plaintiff's witnesses, after she was actually summoned to testify in the suit, she was held incompetent to give evidence.⁵ Nor is there any difference in principle be-

¹ *Rex v. Locker*, 5 Esp. 107, per Ld. Ellenborough, who said it was a clear rule of the Law of England.

² *Rex v. Frederick*, 2 Stra. 1095.

³ *Den d. Stewart v. Johnson*, 3 Harrison's R. 88.

⁴ *Phil. & Am. on Evid.* 160, n. (2); 1 *Phil. Evid.* 75, n. (1). But where the wife of one prisoner was called to prove an *alibi* in favor of another jointly indicated, she was held incompetent, on the ground, that her evidence went to weaken that of the witness against her husband, by showing that that witness was mistaken in a material fact. *Rex v. Smith*, 1 Mood. Cr. Cas. 289. If the conviction of a prisoner, *against* whom she is called, will strengthen the hope of pardon for her husband, who is already convicted, this goes only to her credibility. *Rex v. Rudd*, 1 Leach, 135, 151. Where one of two persons, separately indicted for the same larceny, has been convicted, his wife is a competent witness against the other. *Regina v. Williams*, 8 C. & P. 284.

⁵ *Pedley v. Wellesley*, 3 C. & P. 558. This case forms an exception to the general rule, that neither a witness nor a party can, by his own act, deprive the other party of a right to the testimony of the witness. See § 167, 418.

tween the admissibility of the husband and that of the wife, where the other is a party.¹ And when, in any case, they are admissible against each other, they are also admissible for each other.²

§ 337. Neither is it material, that this relation *no longer exists*. The great object of the rule is to secure domestic happiness, by placing the protecting seal of the law upon all confidential communications between husband and wife; and whatever has come to the knowledge of either by means of the hallowed confidence which that relation inspires, cannot be afterwards divulged in testimony, even though the other party be no longer living.³ And even where a wife, who had been divorced by act of Parliament, and had married another person, was offered as a witness by the plaintiff, to prove a contract against her former husband, Lord Alvanley held her clearly incompetent; adding, with his characteristic energy, — "it never shall be endured, that the confidence, which the law has created while the parties remained in the most intimate of all relations, shall be broken, whenever, by the misconduct of one party, the relation has been dissolved."⁴

¹ *Rex v. Serjeant*, 1 Ry. & M. 352. In this case the husband was, on this ground, held incompetent as a witness against the wife, upon an indictment against her and others for conspiracy, in procuring him to marry her.

² *Rex v. Serjeant*, 1 Ry. & M. 352.

³ *Stein v. Bowman*, 13 Peters, 209.

⁴ *Monroe v. Twistleton*, Peake's Evid. App. lxxxvii. [xci.], expounded and confirmed in *Aveson v. Ld. Kinnaird*, 6 East, 192, 193, per Ld. Ellenborough, and in *Doker v. Hasler*, Ry. & M. 198, per Best, C. J.; *Stein v. Bowman*, 13 Peters, 223. In the case of *Beveridge v. Minter*, 1 C. & P. 364, in which the widow of a deceased promisor was admitted by Abbott, C. J. as a witness for the plaintiff to prove the promise, in an action against her husband's executors, the principle of the rule does not seem to have received any consideration; and the point was not saved, the verdict being for the defendants. See also *Terry v. Belcher*, 1 Bailey's R. 568, that the rule excludes the testimony of a husband or wife separated from each other, under articles. See further, Ante, § 254; *The State v. Jolly*, 3 Dev. & Bat. 110.

§ 338. This rule, in its spirit and extent, is analogous to that which excludes confidential communications made by a client to his attorney, and which has been already considered.¹ Accordingly, the wife, after the death of the husband, has been held competent to prove facts coming to her *knowledge from other sources*, and not by means of her situation as a wife, notwithstanding they related to the transactions of her husband.²

§ 339. This rule of protection is extended only to *lawful marriages*, or at least to such as are innocent in the eye of the law. If the cohabitation is clearly of an immoral character, as, for example, in the case of a kept mistress, the parties are competent witnesses for and against each other.³ On the other hand, upon a trial for bigamy, the first marriage being proved and not controverted, the woman, with whom the second marriage was had, is a competent witness, for the second marriage is void.⁴ But if the proof of the first marriage were doubtful, and the fact were controverted, it is conceived that she would not be admitted.⁵ It seems, however, that a reputed or supposed wife may be examined on the *voir dire*, to facts showing the invalidity of the marriage.⁶ Whether a woman is admissible in favor of a man, with whom she has cohabited for a long time as his wife, whom

¹ Ante, § 238, 240, 243, 244.

² Coffin v. Jones, 13 Pick. 445; Williams v. Baldwin, 7 Verm. 506; Wells v. Tucker, 3 Binn. 366.

³ Batthews v. Galindo, 4 Bing. 610.

⁴ Bull. N. P. 287.

⁵ If the fact of the second marriage is in controversy, the same principle, it seems, will exclude the second wife also. See 2 Stark. Evid. 400; Grigg's case, T. Raym. 1. But it seems, that the wife, though inadmissible as a witness, may be *produced* in Court for the purpose of being *identified*, although the proof thus furnished may affix a criminal charge upon the husband; as, for example, to show that she was the person to whom he was first married; or, who passed a note, which he is charged with having stolen. Alison's Pr. p. 463.

⁶ Peat's case, 2 Lew. Cr. Cas. 288; Wakefield's case, Ib. 279.

he has constantly represented and acknowledged as such, and by whom he has had children, has been declared to be at least doubtful.¹ Lord Kenyon rejected such a witness, when offered by the prisoner, in a capital case tried before him;² and in a later case, in which his decisions were mentioned as entitled to be held in respect and reverence, an arbitrator rejected a witness similarly situated; and the Court, abstaining from any opinion as to her competency, confirmed the award, on the ground that the law and fact had both been submitted to the arbitrator.³ It would doubtless be incompetent for another person to offer the testimony of an acknowledged wife, on the ground that the parties were never legally married, if that relation were always recognised and believed to be lawful by the parties. But where the parties had lived together as man and wife, believing themselves lawfully married; but had separated on discovering that a prior husband, supposed to be dead, was still living; the woman was held a competent witness against the second husband, even as to facts communicated to her by him during their cohabitation.⁴

§ 340. Whether the rule may be relaxed, so as to admit the wife to testify against the husband, *by his consent*, the authorities are not agreed. Lord Hardwicke was of opinion that she

¹ 1 Price, 88, 89, per Thompson, C. B. If a woman sue as a feme sole, her husband is not admissible as a witness for the defendant, to prove her a feme covert, thereby to nonsuit her. Bentley v. Cooke, Tr. 24 Geo. 3, B. R. cited 2 T. R. 265, 269; 3 Doug. 422, S. C.

² Anon. cited by Richards, B. in 1 Price, 83.

³ Campbell v. Twemlow, 1 Price, 81, 88, 90, 91. Richards, B. observed, that he should certainly have done as the arbitrator did. To admit the witness in such a case would both encourage immorality, and enable the parties at their pleasure to perpetrate fraud, by admitting or denying the marriage, as may suit their convenience. Hence, cohabitation and acknowledgment, as husband and wife, are held conclusive against the parties, in all cases, except where the fact or the incidents of marriage, such as legitimacy and inheritance, are directly in controversy. See also Divoll v. Leadbetter, 4 Pick. 220.

⁴ Wells v. Fletcher, 5 C. & P. 12; Wells v. Fisher, 1 M. & Rob. 99, and note.

was not admissible, even with the husband's consent;¹ and this opinion has been followed in this country,² apparently upon the ground, that the interest of the husband in preserving the confidence reposed in her is not the sole foundation of the rule, the public having also an interest in the preservation of domestic peace, which might be disturbed by her testimony, notwithstanding his consent. The very great temptation to perjury, in such case, is not to be overlooked.³ But *Ld. Chief Justice Best*, in a case before him,⁴ said he would receive the evidence of the wife, if her husband consented; apparently regarding only the interest of the husband as the ground of her exclusion, as he cited a case, where *Lord Mansfield* had once permitted a plaintiff to be examined with his own consent.

§ 341. Where the husband or wife is not a party to the record, but yet has an *interest directly involved* in the suit, and is therefore incompetent to testify, the other also is incompetent. Thus, the wife of a bankrupt cannot be called to prove the fact of his bankruptcy.⁵ And the husband cannot be a witness for or against his wife, in a question touching her separate estate, even though there are other parties, in respect of whom he would be competent.⁶ So, also, where the one party, though a competent witness in the cause, is not bound

¹ *Barker v. Dixie*, Cas. temp. Hardw. 264; *Sedgwick v. Walkins*, 1 Ves. 49; *Griggs's case*, T. Raym. 1.

² *Randall's case*, 5 City Hall Rec. 141, 153, 154. See also *Colbern's case*, 1 *Wheeler's Crim. Cas.* 479.

³ *Davis v. Dinwoody*, 4 T. R. 679, per *Ld. Kenyon*.

⁴ *Pedley v. Wellesley*, 3 C. & P. 558.

⁵ *Ex parte James*, 1 P. Wms. 610, 611. But she is made competent by statute, to make discovery of his estate. 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, § 37.

⁶ 1 *Burr.* 424, per *Ld. Mansfield*; *Davis v. Dinwoody*, 4 T. R. 678; *Snyder v. Snyder*, 6 Binn. 483; *Langley v. Fisher*, 5 Beav. 443. But where the interest is contingent and uncertain, he is admissible. *Richardson v. Learned*, 10 Pick. 261. See further, *Hatfield v. Thorp*, 5 B. & Ald. 589; *Cornish v. Pugh*, 8 D. & R. 65; 12 *Vin. Abr. Evidence*, B. If an attesting witness to a will afterwards marries a female legatee, the legacy not being given to her separate use, he is inadmissible to prove the will. *Mackenzie v. Yeo*, 2 Curt. 509. The wife of an executor is also incompetent.

to answer a particular question, because the answer would directly and certainly expose him or her to a criminal prosecution and conviction, the other, it seems, is *not obliged* to answer the same question.¹ The declarations of husband and wife are subject to the same rules of exclusion, which govern their testimony as witnesses.²

§ 342. But though the husband and wife are not admissible as witnesses against each other, where either is directly interested in the event of the proceeding, whether civil or criminal; yet, *in collateral proceedings*, not immediately affecting their mutual interests, their evidence is receivable, notwithstanding it may *tend to criminate*, or may contradict the other, or may subject the other to a legal demand.³ Thus, where, in a question upon a female pauper's settlement, a man

Young v. Richards, *Ib.* 371. But where the statute declares the legacy void which is given to an attesting witness of a will, it has been held, that if the husband is a legatee, and the wife is a witness, the legacy is void, and the wife is admissible. *Winslow v. Kimball*, 12 Shepl. 493.

¹ See *Phil. & Am. on Evid.* 168.

² *Alban v. Pritchett*, 6 T. R. 680; *Denn v. White*, 7 T. R. 112; *Kelly v. Small*, 2 Esp. 716; *Bull. N. P.* 28; *Winsmore v. Greenbank*, *Willes*, 577. Whether, where the husband and wife are jointly indicted for a joint offence, or are otherwise joint parties, their declarations are mutually receivable against each other, is still questioned; the general rule as to persons jointly concerned being in favor of their admissibility, and the policy of the law of husband and wife being against it. See *Commonwealth v. Robbins*, 3 Pick. 63; *Commonwealth v. Briggs*, 5 Pick. 429; *Evans v. Smith*, 5 Monroe, 363, 364; *Turner v. Coe*, 5 Conn. 93.

³ *Phil. & Am. on Evid.* 162; 1 *Phil. Evid.* 72, 73; *Fitch v. Hill*, 11 Mass. 286; *Baring v. Reeder*, 1 Hen. & Mun. 154, 168, per *Roane, J.* In *Griffin v. Brown*, 2 Pick. 308, speaking of the cases cited to this point, *Parker, C. J.* said, — "They establish this principle, that the wife may be a witness to excuse a party sued from a supposed liability, although the effect of her testimony is to charge her husband upon the same debt, in an action afterwards to be brought against him. And the reason is, that the verdict in the action, in which she testifies, cannot be used in the action against her husband; so that, although her testimony goes to show that he is chargeable, yet he cannot be prejudiced by it. And it may be observed, that in these very cases, the husband himself would be a competent witness, if he were willing to testify,

testified that he was married to the pauper upon a certain day, and another woman, being called to prove her own marriage with the same man on a previous day, was objected to as incompetent, she was held clearly admissible for that purpose; for though, if the testimony of both was true, the husband was chargeable with the crime of bigamy, yet neither the evidence nor the record in the present case could be received in evidence against him upon that charge, it being *res inter alios acta*, and neither the husband nor the wife having any interest in the decision.¹ So, where the action was by the indorsee of a bill of exchange, against the acceptor, and the defence was, that it had been fraudulently altered by the drawer, after the acceptance; the wife of the drawer was held a competent witness to prove the alteration.²

§ 343. To this general rule, excluding the husband and wife as witnesses, there are *some exceptions*; which are allowed from the necessity of the case, partly for the protection of the wife in her life and liberty, and partly for the sake of public justice. But the necessity, which calls for this exception for the wife's security, is described to mean, "not a general necessity, as where no other witness can be had, but a particular necessity, as where, for instance, the wife would otherwise be exposed, without remedy, to personal injury."³ Thus,

for his evidence would be a confession against himself." *Williams v. Johnson*, 1 Str. 504; *Vowles v. Young*, 13 Ves. 144; 2 Stark. Evid. 401. See also Mr Hargrave's note [29] to Co. Lit. 6, b.

¹ *Rex v. Bathwick*, 2 B. & Ad. 639, 647; *Rex v. All Saints*, 6 M. & S. 194, S. P. In this case, the previous decision in *Rex v. Cliviger*, 2 T. R. 263, to the effect, that a wife was in every case incompetent to give evidence, even tending to criminate her husband, was considered and restricted, Lord Ellenborough remarking, that the rule was there laid down "somewhat too largely." In *Rex v. Bathwick*, it was held to be "undoubtedly true in the case of a direct charge and proceeding against him for any offence," but was denied in its application to collateral matters.

² *Henman v. Dickenson*, 5 Bing. 183.

³ *Bentley v. Cooke*, 3 Doug. 422, per Ld. Mansfield. In *Sedgwick v. Walkins*, 1 Ves. 49, Ld. Thurlow spoke of this necessity as extending only to security of the peace, and not to an indictment.

a woman is a competent witness against a man indicted for forcible abduction and marriage, if the force were continuing upon her until the marriage; of which fact she is also a competent witness; and this, by the weight of the authorities, notwithstanding her subsequent assent and voluntary cohabitation; for otherwise, the offender would take advantage of his own wrong.¹ So, she is a competent witness against him on an indictment for a rape, committed on her own person;² or, for an assault and battery upon her;³ or, for maliciously shooting her.⁴ She may also exhibit articles of the peace against him; in which case her affidavit shall not be allowed to be controlled and overthrown by his own.⁵ Indeed, Mr. East considered it to be settled, that "in all cases of personal injuries committed by the husband or wife against each other, the injured party is an admissible witness against the other."⁶ But Mr. Justice Holroyd thought, that the wife could only be

¹ 1 East's P. C. 454; *Brown's case*, 1 Vent. 243; 1 Russ. on Crimes, 572; *Wakefield's case*, 2 Lewin, Cr. Cas. 1, 20, 279. See also *Regina v. Yore*, 1 Jebb & Symes, R. 563, 572; *Perry's case*, cited in McNally's Evid. 181; *Rex v. Serjeant, Ry. & M.* 352; 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 41, § 13; 2 Russ. on Crimes, 605, 606. This case may be considered anomalous; for she can hardly be said to be his wife, the marriage contract having been obtained by force. 1 Bl. Comm. 443; McNally's Evid. 179, 180; 3 Chitty's Crim. Law, 817, note (y); Roscoe's Crim. Evid. 115.

² Ld. Audley's case, 3 Howell's St. Tr. 402, 413; *Hutton*, 115, 116; Bull. N. P. 287.

³ *Lady Lawley's case*, Bull. N. P. 287; *Rex v. Azire*, 1 Stra. 633; *Soule's case*, 5 Greenl. 407.

⁴ *Whitehouse's case*, cited 2 Russ. on Crimes, 606.

⁵ *Rex v. Doherty*, 13 East, 171; *Lord Vane's case*, Ib. note (a); 2 Stra. 1202; *Rex v. Earl Ferrers*, 1 Burr. 635. Her affidavit is also admissible, on an application for an information against him for an attempt to take her by force, contrary to articles of separation; *Lady Lawley's case*, Bull. N. P. 287; or, in a habeas corpus sued out by him, for the same object. *Rex v. Mead*, 1 Burr. 542.

⁶ 1 East's P. C. 455. In *Wakefield's case*, 2 Lewin, Cr. Cas. 287, *Hullock, B.* expressed himself to the same effect, speaking of the admissibility of the wife only. 2 Hawk. P. C. c. 46, § 77; *The People ex rel. Ordronaux v. Chegaray*, 18 Wend. 642.

admitted to prove facts, which could not be proved by any other witness.¹

§ 344. The wife has also, on the same ground of necessity, been sometimes admitted as a witness to testify to *secret facts*, which no one but herself could know. Thus, upon an appeal against an order of filiation, in the case of a married woman, she was held a competent witness to prove her criminal connexion with the defendant, though her husband was interested in the event;² but for reasons of public decency and morality, she cannot be allowed to say, after marriage, that she had no connexion with her husband, and that therefore her offspring is spurious.³

§ 345. In cases of *high treason*, the question whether the wife is admissible as a witness against her husband, has been much discussed, and opinions of great weight have been given on both sides. The affirmative of the question is maintained,⁴ on the ground of the extreme necessity of the case, and the nature of the offence, tending as it does to the destruction of many lives, the subversion of government, and the sacrifice of social happiness. For the same reasons, also, it is said, that, if the wife should commit this crime, no plea of coverture shall excuse her; no presumption of the husband's coercion shall extenuate her guilt.⁵ But, on the other hand, it is argued, that, as she is not bound to discover her husband's treason,⁶ by parity of reason, she is not compellable

¹ In *Rex v. Jagger*, cited 2 Russ. on Crimes, 606.

² *Rex v. Reading*, Cas. temp. Hardw. 79, 82; *Rex v. Luffe*, 8 East, 193; *Commonwealth v. Shepherd*, 6 Binn. 283.

³ *Cope v. Cope*, 1 M. & Rob. 269, 274; *Goodright v. Moss*, Cowp. 594; Ante, § 28.

⁴ These authorities may be said to favor the affirmative of the question;— 2 Russ. on Crimes, 607; Bull. N. P. 286; 1 Gilb. Evid. by Lofft, 252; *Mary Griggs's case*, T. Raym. 1; 2 Stark. Evid. 404.

⁵ 4 Bl. Comm. 29.

⁶ 1 Brownl. 47.

to testify against him.¹ The latter is deemed, by the later text writers, to be the better opinion.²

§ 346. Upon the same principle, on which the testimony of the husband or wife is sometimes admitted, as well as for some other reasons already stated,³ the *dying declarations* of either are admissible, where the other party is charged with the murder of the declarant.⁴

§ 347. The rule excluding parties from being witnesses applies to all cases where the party has any interest at stake in the suit, although it be only a liability to costs. Such is the case of a *prochein ami*, a *guardian*, an *executor* or *administrator*; and so also of *trustees*, and the *officers of corporations*, whether public or private, wherever they are liable in the first instance for the costs, though they may have a remedy for reimbursement out of the public or trust funds.⁵

§ 348. But to the general rule, in regard to parties, there are some *exceptions*, in which the *party's own oath* may be received as competent testimony. One class of these exceptions,

¹ 1 Hale's P. C. 48, 301; 2 Hawk. P. C. ch. 46, § 82; 2 Bac. Ab. 578, tit. *Evid.* A. 1; 1 Chitty's Crim. Law, 595; McNally's Evid. 181.

² Roscoe's Crim. Evid. 114; Phil. & Am. on Evid. 161; 1 Phil. Evid. 71. See also 2 Stark. Evid. 404, note (b).

³ Ante, § 156.

⁴ *Rex v. Woodcock*, 2 Leach, 563; McNally's Evid. 174; *Stoops's case*, Addis. 381; *The People v. Green*, 1 Denio, R. 614.

⁵ *Hopkins v. Neal*, 2 Stra. 1026; *James v. Hatfield*, 1 Stra. 548; 1 Gilb. Evid. by Lofft, p. 225; *Rex v. St. Mary Magdalen, Bermondsey*, 3 East, 7; *Whitmore v. Wilks*, 1 Mood. & M. 220, 221; *Gresley on Evid.* 242, 243, 244; *Bellew v. Russell*, 1 Ball & Beat. 99; *Wolley v. Brownhill*, 13 Price, 513, 514, per Hullock, B.; *Barrett v. Gore*, 3 Atk. 401; Phil. & Am. on Evid. 48; *Fountain v. Coke*, 1 Mod. 107; *Goodtitle v. Welford*, 1 Doug. 139. In this country, where the party to the record is in almost every case liable to costs in the first instance, in suits at law, he can hardly ever be competent as a witness. *Fox v. Adams*, 16 Mass. 118, 121; *Sears v. Dillingham*, 12 Mass. 360. See also Willis on Trustees, p. 227, 228, 229; *Frear v. Evertson*, 20 Johns. 142.

namely, that in which the oath *in litem* is received, has long been familiar in Courts administering remedial justice according to the course of the Roman Law, though in the Common Law tribunals its use has been less frequent and more restricted. The oath *in litem* is admitted in two classes of cases; first, where it has been already proved, that the party against whom it is offered has been guilty of some fraud, or other tortious and unwarrantable act of intermeddling with the complainant's goods, and no other evidence can be had of the amount of damages; and secondly, where, on general grounds of public policy, it is deemed essential to the purposes of justice.¹ An example of the former class is given in the case of the bailiffs, who, in the service of an execution, having discovered a sum of money secretly hidden in a wall, took it away and embezzled it, and did great spoil to the debtor's goods; for which they were holden not only to refund the money, but to make good such other damage as the plaintiff would swear he had sustained.² So, where a man ran away with a casket of jewels, he was ordered to answer in Equity, and the injured party's oath was allowed as evidence, *in odium spoliatoris*.³ The rule is the same at Law. Thus, where a shipmaster received on board his vessel a trunk of goods, to be carried to another port, but on the passage he broke open the trunk and rifled it of its contents; in an action by the owner of the goods against the shipmaster, the plaintiff, proving *aliunde* the delivery of the trunk and its violation, was held competent as a witness to testify to the particular contents of the trunk.⁴ And on the same principle, the bailor,

¹ Tait on Evid. 280.

² *Childrens v. Saxby*, 1 Vern. 207; 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 229, S. C.

³ Anon. cited per the Ld. Keeper, in *E. India Co. v. Evans*, 1 Vern. 308. On the same principle, in a case of gross fraud, Chancery will give costs, to be ascertained by the party's own oath. *Dyer v. Tymewell*, 2 Vern. 122.

⁴ *Herman v. Drinkwater*, 1 Greenl. 27. See also, *Sneider v. Geiss*, 1 Yeates, 34; Anon. *coram Montague, B.*; 12 Vin. Abr. 24, *Witnesses*, I. pl. 34. Sed vid. *Bingham v. Rogers*, 6 Watts & Serg. 495. This point, however, has recently been otherwise decided by the Sup. Jud. Court of Massachusetts, in *Snow v. The Eastern Railroad Co.* not yet reported; in which all the previous decisions were reviewed.

though a plaintiff, has been admitted a competent witness to prove the contents of a trunk, lost by the negligence of the bailee.¹ Such evidence is admitted not solely on the ground

¹ *Clark v. Spence*, 10 Watts, R. 335; *Story on Bailm.* § 454, note, (3d edit.) In this case the doctrine in the text was more fully expounded by Rogers, J. in the following terms. "A party is not competent to testify in his own cause; but, like every other general rule, this has its exceptions. Necessity, either physical or moral, dispenses with the ordinary rules of evidence. In 12 Vin. 24, pl. 32, it is laid down, that on a trial at Bodnyr, *coram Montague, B.* against a common carrier, a question arose about the things in a box, and he declared, that this was one of those cases where the party, himself, might be a witness *ex necessitate rei*. For every one did not show what he put in his box. The same principle is recognised in decisions, which have been had on the statute of Hue and Cry in England, where the party robbed is admitted as a witness *ex necessitate*. Bull. N. P. 181. So, in *Herman v. Drinkwater*, 1 Greenl. R. 27, a shipmaster having received a trunk of goods on board his vessel, to be carried to another port, which, on the passage he broke open and rifled of its contents; the owner of the goods, proving the delivery of the trunk and its violation, was admitted as a witness in an action for the goods, against the shipmaster, to testify to the particular contents of the trunk, there being no other evidence of the fact to be obtained. That a party then can be admitted, under certain circumstances, to prove the contents of a box or trunk, must be admitted. But while we acknowledge the exception, we must be careful not to extend it beyond its legitimate limits. It is admitted from necessity, and perhaps on a principle of convenience, because, as is said in *Vezey*, every one does not show what he puts in a box. This applies with great force to wearing apparel, and to every article which is necessary or convenient to the traveller, which, in most cases, are packed by the party himself, or his wife, and which, therefore, would admit of no other proof. A lady's jewelry would come in this class, and it is easier to conceive than to enumerate other articles, which come within the same category. Nor would it be right to restrict the list of articles, which may be so proved, within narrow limits, as the Jury will be the judges of the credit to be attached to the witness, and be able, in most cases, to prevent any injury to the defendant. It would seem to me, to be of no consequence, whether the article were sent by a carrier, or accompanied the traveller. The case of *Herman v. Drinkwater*, I would remark, was decided under very aggravated circumstances, and was rightly ruled. But it must not be understood, that such proof can be admitted, merely because no other evidence of the fact can be obtained. For, if a merchant, sending goods to his correspondent, chooses to pack them himself, his neglect to furnish himself with the ordinary proof,

of the just odium entertained, both in Equity and at Law, against spoliation, but also because, from the necessity of the case and the nature of the subject, no proof can otherwise be expected; it not being usual even for the most prudent persons, in such cases, to exhibit the contents of their trunks to strangers, or to provide other evidence of their value. For, where the law can have no force but by the evidence of the person in interest, there the rules of the Common Law, respecting evidence in general, are presumed to be laid aside; or rather, the subordinate are silenced by the most transcendent and universal rule, that in all cases that evidence is good, than which the nature of the subject presumes none better to be attainable.¹

§ 349. Upon the same necessity, the party is admitted in divers other cases to prove facts, which, from their nature, none but a party could be likely to know. But in such cases, a foundation must first be laid for the party's oath, by proving the other facts of the case down to the period to which the party is to speak. As, for example, if a deed or other material instrument of evidence is lost, it must first be proved, as we shall hereafter show, that such a document existed; after which the party's own oath may be received to the fact and circumstances of its loss, provided it was lost out of his own custody.² To this head of necessity may be referred the

is no reason for dispensing with the rule of evidence, which requires disinterested testimony. It is not of the usual course of business, and there must be something peculiar and extraordinary in the circumstances of the case, which would justify the Court in admitting the oath of the party." See 10 Watts, R. 336, 337. See also David v. Moore, 2 Watts & Serg. 220.

¹ 1 Gilb. Evid. by Lofft, p. 244, 245; Ante, § 82.

² Post, § 558; Tayloe v. Riggs, 1 Peters, 591, 596; Patterson v. Winn, 5 Peters, 240, 242; Riggs v. Taylor, 9 Wheat. 486; Taunton Bank v. Richardson, 5 Pick. 436, 442; Poignard v. Smith, 8 Pick. 278; Page v. Page, 15 Pick. 368, 374, 375; Chamberlain v. Gorham, 20 Johns. 144; Jackson v. Frier, 16 Johns. 193; Douglass v. Sanderson, 2 Dall. 116; 1 Yeates, 15, S. C.; Meeker v. Jackson, 3 Yeates, 442; Blanton v. Miller, 1 Hayw. 4; Seekright v. Bogan, lb. 178, n. See other cases cited in

admission of the party robbed, as a witness for himself, in an action against the hundred upon the statute of Winton.¹ So also, in questions which do not involve the matter in controversy, but matter which is auxiliary to the trial, and which in their nature are preliminary to the principal subject of controversy, and are addressed to the Court, the oath of the party is received.² Of this nature is his affidavit of the materiality of a witness; of diligent search made for a witness, or for a paper; of his inability to attend; of the death of a subscribing witness; and so of other matters of which the books of practice abound in examples.

§ 350. The second class of cases, in which the oath *in litem* is admitted, consists of those in which public necessity or expediency has required it. Some cases of this class have their foundation in the edict of the Roman Prætor; — *Nauta, caupones, stabularii, quod cujusque saluum fore receperint, nisi restituent, in eos judicium dabo*.³ Though the terms of the edict comprehended only shipmasters, innkeepers, and stable keepers, yet its principle has been held to extend to other bailees, against whom, when guilty of a breach of the trust confided to them, damages were awarded upon the oath of the party injured, *per modum pænæ* to the defendant, and

Cowen & Hill's note 122, to 1 Phil. Evid. p. 69. In Connecticut, the party has been adjudged incompetent. Coleman v. Wolcott, 4 Day, 388. In prosecutions for bastardy, whether by the female herself, or by the town or parish officers, she is competent to testify to facts within her own exclusive knowledge, though in most of the United States, the terms of her admission are prescribed by statute. Drowne v. Stimpson, 2 Mass. 441; Judson v. Blanchard, 4 Conn. 557; Davis v. Salisbury, 1 Day, 278; Mariner v. Dyer, 2 Greenl. 172; Anon. 3 N. Hamp. 135; Mather v. Clark, 2 Aik. 209; The State v. Coatney, 8 Yerg. 210.

¹ Bull. N. P. 187, 289.

² 1 Peters, 596, 597, per Marshall, C. J. See also Anon. Cro. Jac. 429; Cook v. Remington, 6 Mod. 237; Ward v. Apprice, lb. 264; Scoresby v. Sparrow, 2 Stra. 1186; Jevans v. Harridge, 1 Saund. 9; Forbes v. Wale, 1 W. Bl. 532; 1 Esp. 278, S. C.; Fortescue and Coake's case, Godb. 193; Anon. Godb. 326; 2 Stark. Evid. 580, note (2), 6th Am. Ed.

³ Dig. lib. 4, tit. 9, l. 1.

from the necessity of the case.¹ But the Common Law has not admitted the oath of the party upon the ground of the Prætor's edict; but has confined its admission strictly to those cases where, from their nature, no other evidence was attainable.² Thus, in cases of necessity, where a statute can receive no execution, unless the party interested be a witness, there he must be allowed to testify; for the statute must not be rendered ineffectual by the impossibility of proof.³

§ 351. Another exception is allowed in Equity, by which the answer of the defendant, so far as it is strictly responsive to the bill, is admitted as evidence in his favor, as well as against him. The reason is, that the plaintiff, by appealing to the conscience of the defendant, admits that his answer is worthy of credit, as to the matter of the inquiry. It is not conclusive evidence; but is treated like the testimony of any other witness, and is decisive of the question only where it is not outweighed by other evidence.⁴

§ 352. So, also, the oath of the party, taken *diverso intuitu*, may sometimes be admitted at law in his favor. Thus, in considering the question of the originality of an invention, the letters patent being in the case, the oath of the inventor,

¹ This head of evidence is recognised in the Courts of Scotland, and is fully explained in Tait on Evid. p. 280-287. In Lower Canada, the Courts are bound to admit the decisory oath (*serment décisoire*) of the parties, in commercial matters, whenever either of them shall exact it of the other. Rev. Stat. 1845, p. 143.

² Wager of law is hardly an exception to this rule of the Common Law, since it was ordinarily allowed only in cases where the transaction was one of personal and private trust and confidence between the parties. See 3 Bl. Comm. 345, 346.

³ The United States v. Murphy, 16 Peters, R. 203. See Post, § 412.

⁴ 2 Story on Eq. Jur. § 1528; Clark v. Van Reimsdyk, 9 Cranch, 160. But the answer of an infant can never be read against him; nor can that of a feme covert, answering jointly with her husband. Gresley on Evid. p. 24. An arbitrator has no right to admit a party in the cause as a witness, unless he has specific authority so to do. Smith v. Sparrow, 11 Jur. 126.

made prior to the issuing of the letters patent, that he was the true and first inventor, may be opposed to the oath of a witness, whose testimony is offered to show that the invention was not original.¹ So, upon the trial of an action for malicious prosecution, in causing the plaintiff to be indicted, proof of the evidence given by the defendant on the trial of the indictment, is said to be admissible in proof of probable cause.²

§ 353. The rule which excludes the party to the suit from being admitted as a witness, is also a rule of protection, no person who is party to the record being *compellable* to testify.³ It is only when he consents to be examined, that he is admissible in any case; nor then, unless under the circumstances presently to be mentioned. If he is only a nominal party, the consent of the real party in interest must be obtained before he can be examined.⁴ Nor can one who is substantially a party to the record be compelled to testify, though he be not nominally a party.⁵

¹ Alden v. Dewey, 1 Story, R. 336; 3 Law Reporter, 383, S. C.; Pettibone v. Derringer, 4 Wash. R. 215.

² Bull. N. P. 14; Johnson v. Browning, 6 Mod. 216. "For otherwise," said Holt, C. J., "one that should be robbed, &c. would be under an intolerable mischief; for if he prosecuted for such robbery, &c., and the party should at any rate be acquitted, the prosecutor would be liable to an action for a malicious prosecution, without a possibility of making a good defence, though the cause of prosecution were never so pregnant."

³ Rex v. Woburn, 10 East, 395; Worrall v. Jones, 7 Bing. 395; Fenn v. Granger, 3 Campb. 177; Mant v. Mainwaring, 8 Taunt. 139.

⁴ Frear v. Everton, 20 Johns. 142. And see The People v. Irving, 1 Wend. 20; Commonwealth v. Marsh, 21 Pick. 37, per Wilde, J.; Columbian Man. Co. v. Dutch, 13 Pick. 125; Bradlee v. Neal, 16 Pick. 501. In Connecticut and Vermont, where the declarations of the assignor of a chose in action are still held admissible to impeach it in the hands of the assignee, in an action brought in the name of the former for the benefit of the latter, the defendant is permitted to read the deposition of the nominal plaintiff, voluntarily given, though objected to by the party in interest. Woodruff v. Westcott, 12 Conn. 134; Johnson v. Blackman, 11 Conn. 342; Sargeant v. Sargeant, 3 Washb. 371. See Ante, § 190.

⁵ Mauran v. Lamb, 7 Cowen, 174; Phil. & Am. on Evid. 158, n. (3); 1 Phil. Evid. 60, n. (1).

§ 354. It has been said, that where one of several *co-plaintiffs* voluntarily comes forward as a witness for the adverse party, he is admissible, without or even against the consent of his fellows; upon the ground, that he is testifying against his own interest, that the privilege of exemption is personal and several, and not mutual and joint, and that his declarations out of Court being admissible, *à fortiori* they ought to be received, when made in Court under oath.¹ But the better opinion is, and so it has been resolved,² that such a rule would hold out to parties a strong temptation to perjury, that it is not supported by principle or authority, and that therefore the party is not admissible, without the consent of all parties to the record, for that the privilege is mutual and joint, and not several. It may also be observed, that the declarations of one of several parties are not always admissible against his fellows, and that when admitted, they are often susceptible of explanation or contradiction, where testimony under oath could not be resisted.

§ 355. Hitherto, in treating of the admissibility of parties to the record as witnesses, they have been considered as still retaining their original situation, assumed at the commencement of the suit. But as the situation of some of the defendants, where there are several in the same suit, may be

¹ Phil. & Am. on Evid. 158; 1 Phil. Evid. 60. The cases which are usually cited to support this opinion are *Norden v. Williamson*, 1 Taunt. 377, *Fenn v. Granger*, 3 Campb. 177, and *Worrall v. Jones*, 7 Bing. 395. But in the first of these cases, no objection appears to have been made on behalf of the other co-plaintiff, that his consent was necessary; but the decision is expressly placed on the ground, that neither party objected at the time. In *Fenn v. Granger*, *Id.* *Ellenborough* would have rejected the witness, but the objection was waived. In *Worrall v. Jones*, the naked question was, whether a defendant, who has suffered judgment by default, and has no interest in the event of the suit, is admissible as a witness for the plaintiff, by his own consent, where "the only objection to his admissibility is this, that he is party to the record." See also *Willings v. Consequa*, 1 Peters, C. C. R. 307, per *Washington, J.*

² *Scott v. Lloyd*, 12 Peters, 149. See also 2 Stark. Evid. 580, note (e).

essentially changed in the course of its progress, by default, or *nolle prosequi*, and sometimes by verdict, their case deserves a distinct consideration. This question has arisen in cases where the testimony of a defendant, thus situated, is material to the defence of his fellows. And here the general doctrine is, that where the suit is ended as to one of several defendants, and he has no direct interest in its event as to the others, he is a competent witness for them, his own fate being at all events certain.¹

§ 356. In *actions on contracts*, the operation of this rule was formerly excluded; for the contract being laid jointly, the judgment by default against one of several defendants, it was thought, would operate against him, only in the event of a verdict against the others; and accordingly he has been held inadmissible in such actions, as a witness in their favor.² On a similar principle, a defendant thus situated has been held not a competent witness for the plaintiff; on the ground, that, by suffering judgment by default, he admitted that he was liable to the plaintiff's demand, and was therefore directly interested in throwing part of that burden on another person.³ But in another case, where the action was upon a bond, and the principal suffered judgment by default, he was admitted as a witness for the plaintiff, against one of the other defendants, his surety; though here the point submitted to the Court was narrowed to the mere abstract question, whether a party to the record was, on that account alone, precluded from being a witness, he having no interest in the event.⁴ But the whole

¹ Post, § 358, 359, 360, 363.

² *Mant v. Mainwaring*, 8 Taunt. 139; *Brown v. Brown*, 4 Taunt. 752; *Schermerhorn v. Schermerhorn*, 1 Wend. 119; *Columbia Man. Co. v. Dutch*, 13 Pick. 125; *Mills v. Lee*, 4 Hill, R. 549.

³ *Green v. Sutton*, 2 M. & Rob. 269.

⁴ *Worrall v. Jones*, 7 Bing. 395. See *Foxcroft v. Nevens*, 4 Greenl. 72, contra. In a case before *Le Blanc, J.*, he refused to permit one defendant, who had suffered judgment to go by default, to be called by the plaintiff to inculpate the others, even in an action of trespass. *Chapman v. Graves*,

subject has more recently been reviewed in England, and the rule established, that, where one of two joint defendants in an action on contract, has suffered judgment by default, he may, if not otherwise interested in procuring a verdict for the plaintiff, be called by him as a witness against the other defendant.¹ So, if the defence, in an action *ex contractu* against several, goes merely to the personal discharge of the party pleading it, and not to that of the others, and the plaintiff thereupon enters a *nolle prosequi* as to him, which in such cases he may well do, such defendant is no longer a party upon the record, and is therefore competent as a witness, if not otherwise disqualified. Thus, where the plea by one of several defendants is bankruptcy,² or, that he was never executor, or as it seems by the later and better opinions, infancy or coverture,³ the plaintiff may enter a *nolle prosequi* as to such party, who, being thus disengaged from the record, may be called as a witness, the suit still proceeding against the

² Campb. 333, 334, note. See acc. *Supervisors of Chenango v. Birdsall*, 4 Wend. 456, 457. The general rule is, that a party to the record can, in no case, be examined as a witness; a rule founded principally on the policy of preventing perjury, and the hardship of calling on a party to charge himself. And this rule is strictly enforced against plaintiffs, because the joining of so many defendants is generally their own act, though sometimes it is a matter of necessity. ² Stark. Evid. 581, note (a); *Blackett v. Weir*, 5 B. & C. 387; *Barrett v. Gore*, 3 Atk. 401; *Bull. N. P.* 285; *Cas. temp. Hardw.* 163.

¹ *Pipe v. Steel*, 2 Ad. & El. 733, N. S.; *Cupper v. Newark*, 2 C. & K. 24.

² *Noke v. Ingham*, 1 Wils. 89; 1 Tidd's Pr. 682, 1 Saund. 207, a. But see *Mills v. Lee*, 4 Hill, R. 549.

³ 1 Paine & Duer's Pr. 642, 643; *Woodward v. Newhall*, 1 Pick. 500; *Hartness v. Thompson*, 5 Johns. 160; *Pell v. Pell*, 20 Johns. 126; *Burgess v. Merrill*, 4 Taunt. 468. The ground is, that these pleas are not in bar of the entire action, but only in bar as to the party pleading; and thus the case is brought within the general principle, that, where the plea goes only to the personal discharge of the party pleading it, the plaintiff may enter a *nolle prosequi*. 1 Pick. 501, 502. See also *Minor v. The Mechanics Bank of Alexandria*, 1 Peters, 74.

others.¹ The mere pleading of the bankruptcy, or other matter of personal discharge, is not alone sufficient to render the party a competent witness; and it has been held, that he is not entitled to a previous verdict upon that plea, for the purpose of testifying for the others.²

§ 357. In actions on torts, these being in their nature and legal consequences several, as well as ordinarily joint, and there being no contribution among wrong doers, it has not been deemed necessary to exclude a material witness for the defendants, merely because the plaintiff has joined him with them in the suit, if the suit, as to him, is already determined, and he has no longer any legal interest in the event. Accordingly, a defendant in an action for a tort, who has suffered judgment to go by default, has uniformly been held admissible as a witness for his co-defendants.³ Whether, being admitted as a witness, he is competent to testify to the amount of dam-

¹ *McIver v. Humble*, 16 East, 171, per Le Blanc, J., cited 7 Taunt. 607, per Park, J.; *Moody v. King*, 2 B. & C. 558; *Aflalo v. Fourdrinier*, 6 Bing. 306.

² *Raven v. Dunning*, 3 Esp. 25; *Emmett v. Butler*, 7 Taunt. 599; 1 Moore, 332, S. C.; *Schermerhorn v. Schermerhorn*, 1 Wend. 119. But in a later case, since the 49 G. 3, c. 121, Parke, J. permitted a verdict to be returned upon the plea, in order to admit the witness. *Bate v. Russell*, 1 Mood. & M. 332. Where, by statute, the plaintiff, in an action on a parol contract against several, may have judgment against one or more of the defendants, according to his proof, there it has been held, that a defendant who has been defaulted is, with his consent, a competent witness in favor of his co-defendants. *Bradley v. Neal*, 16 Pick. 501. But this has since been questioned, on the ground, that his interest is to reduce the demand of the plaintiff against the others to nominal damages, in order that no greater damages may be assessed against him upon his default. *Vinal v. Burrill*, 18 Pick. 29.

³ *Ward v. Haydon*, 2 Esp. 552, approved in *Hawkesworth v. Showler*, 12 M. & W. 48; *Chapman v. Graves*, 2 Camp. 334, per Le Blanc, J.; *Commonwealth v. Marsh*, 10 Pick. 57, 58. The wife of one joint trespasser is not admissible as a witness for the other, though the case is already fully proved against her husband, if he is still a party to the record. *Hawkesworth v. Showler*, 12 M. & W. 45.

ages, which are generally assessed entire against all who are found guilty,¹ may well be doubted.² And indeed the rule, admitting a defendant as a witness for his fellows in any case, must, as it should seem, be limited strictly to the case where his testimony cannot directly make for himself; for if the plea set up by the other defendants is of such a nature, as to show that the plaintiff has no cause of action against any of the defendants in the suit, the one who suffers judgment by default will be entitled to the benefit of the defence, if established, and therefore is as directly interested as if the action were upon a joint contract. It is therefore only where the plea operates solely in discharge of the party pleading it, that another defendant, who has suffered judgment to go by default, is admissible as a witness.³

§ 358. If the person, who is a material witness for the defendants, has been improperly joined with them in the suit, for the purpose of excluding his testimony, the Jury will be directed to find a *separate verdict* in his favor; in which case, the cause being at an end with respect to him, he may be admitted a witness for the other defendants. But this can be allowed only where there is no evidence whatever against him, for then only does it appear that he was improperly joined, through the artifice and fraud of the plaintiff. But if there be any evidence against him, though, in the Judge's opinion, not enough for his conviction, he cannot be admitted as a witness for his fellows, because his guilt or innocence

¹ 2 Tidd's Pr. 896.

² In *Mash v. Smith*, 1 C. & P. 577, Best, C. J. was of opinion, that the witness ought not to be admitted at all, on the ground that his evidence might give a different complexion to the case, and thus go to reduce the damages against himself; but on the authority of *Ward v. Haydon*, and *Chapman v. Graves*, he thought it best to receive the witness, giving leave to the opposing party to move for a new trial. But the point was not moved; and the report does not show which way was the verdict.

³ 2 Tidd's Pr. 895; *Briggs v. Greenfield et al.* 1 Str. 610; 8 Mod. 217; 2 Ld. Raym. 1372, S. C.; Phil. & Am. on Evid. 53, note (3); 1 Phil. Evid. 52, n. (1); *Bowman v. Noyes*, 12 N. Hamp. R. 302.

must wait the event of the verdict, the Jury being the sole judges of the fact.¹ In what stage of the cause the party, thus improperly joined, might be acquitted, and whether before the close of the case on the part of the other defendants, was formerly uncertain; but it is now settled, that the application to a Judge, *in the course of a cause*, to direct a verdict for one or more of several defendants in trespass, is strictly to his discretion; and that discretion is to be regulated, not merely by the fact that at the close of the plaintiff's case no evidence appears to affect them, but by the probabilities whether any such will arise before the whole evidence in the cause closes.² The ordinary course, therefore, is to let the cause go on, to the end of the evidence.³ But if, at the close of the plaintiff's case, there is one defendant against whom no evidence has been given, and none is anticipated with any probability, he instantly will be acquitted.⁴ The mere fact of mentioning the party in the *simul cum*, in the declaration,

¹ 1 Gilb. Evid. by Lofft, p. 250; *Brown v. Howard*, 14 Johns. 119, 122; *Van Deusen v. Van Slyck*, 15 Johns. 223. The admission of the witness, in all these cases, seems to rest in the discretion of the Judge. *Brotherton v. Livingston*, 3 Watts & Serg. 334.

² *Sowell v. Champion*, 6 Ad. & El. 407; *White v. Hill*, 6 Ad. & El. 487, 491, N. S.; *Commonwealth v. Eastman*, S. J. C. Mass. March term, 1848, Suffolk.

³ 6 Ad. & El. 491, N. S. per Ld. Denman.

⁴ *Child v. Chamberlain*, 6 C. & P. 213. It is not easy to perceive, why the same principle should not be applied to actions upon contract, where one of the defendants pleads a matter in his own personal discharge, such as infancy or bankruptcy, and establishes his plea by a certificate, or other affirmative proof, which the plaintiff does not pretend to gainsay or resist. See *Bate v. Russell*, 1 Mood. & M. 332. Upon *Emmett v. Butler*, 7 Taunt. 599, where it was not allowed, Mr. Phillips very justly observes, that the plea was not the common one of bankruptcy and certificate; but, that the plaintiffs *had proved*, (under the commission,) and thereby made their election; and that where a plea is special, and involves the consideration of many facts, it is obvious that there would be much inconvenience in splitting the case, and taking separate verdicts; but there seems to be no such inconvenience, where the whole proof consists of the bankrupt's certificate. Phil. & Am. on Evid. p. 29, note (3).

does not render him incompetent as a witness; but if the plaintiff can prove the person so named to be guilty of the trespass, and party to the suit, which must be by producing the original or process against him, and proving an ineffectual endeavor to arrest him, or that the process was lost, the defendant shall not have the benefit of his testimony.¹

§ 359. If the plaintiff, in trespass, has *by mistake* made one of his own intended witnesses a defendant, the Court will, on motion, give leave to omit him, and have his name stricken from the record, even after issue joined.² In criminal informations, the same object is attained by entering a *nolle prosequi*, as to the party intended to be examined; the rule, that a

¹ Bull. N. P. 286; 1 Gilb. Evid. by Lofft, p. 251; Lloyd v. Williams, Cas. temp. Hardw. 123; Cotton v. Luttrell, 1 Atk. 452. "These cases appear to have proceeded upon the ground, that a co-trespasser, who had been originally made a party to the suit upon sufficient grounds, ought not to come forward as a witness to defeat the plaintiff, after he had prevented the plaintiff from proceeding effectually against him, by his own wrongful act in eluding the process." Phil. & Am. on Evid. p. 60, note (2). But see Stockham v. Jones, 10 Johns. 21, contra. See also 1 Stark. Evid. 132. In Wakeley v. Hart, 6 Binn. 316, all the defendants, in trespass, were arrested, but the plaintiff went to issue with some of them only, and did not rule the others to plead, nor take judgment against them by default; and they were held competent witnesses for the other defendants. The learned Chief Justice placed the decision partly upon the general ground, that they were not interested in the event of the suit; citing and approving the case of Stockham v. Jones, supra. But he also laid equal stress upon the fact, that the plaintiff might have conducted his cause so as to have excluded the witnesses, by laying them under a rule to plead, and taking judgment by default. In Purviance v. Dryden, 3 S. & R. 402, and Gibbs v. Bryant, 1 Pick. 118, both of which were actions upon contract, where the process was not served as to one of the persons named as defendant with the other, it was held, that he was not a party to the record, not being served with process, and so was not incompetent as a witness on that account. Neither of these cases, therefore, except that of Stockham v. Jones, touches the ground of public policy for the prevention of fraud in cases of tort, on which the rule in the text seems to have been founded. *Ideo quare*. See also Curtis v. Graham, 12 Mart. 289.

² Bull. N. P. 285; Berrington d. Dormer v. Fortescue, Cas. temp. Hardw. 162, 163.

plaintiff can in no case examine a defendant, being enforced in criminal as well as in civil cases.¹

§ 360. If a material witness for a defendant *in ejectment* be also made a defendant, he may let judgment go by default, and be admitted as a witness for the other defendant. But if he plead, thereby admitting himself tenant in possession, the Court will not afterward, upon motion, strike out his name.² But where he is in possession of only a part of the premises, and consents to the return of a verdict against him for as much as he is proved to have in possession, Mr. Justice Buller said, he could see no reason why he should not be a witness for another defendant.³

§ 361. In *Chancery*, parties to the record are subject to examination as witnesses, much more freely than at law. A plaintiff may obtain an order, as of course, to examine a defendant, and a defendant a co-defendant, as a witness, upon affidavit that he is a material witness, and is not interested on the side of the applicant, in the matter to which it is proposed to examine him; the order being made subject to all just exceptions.⁴ And it may be obtained *ex parte*, as well after as before decree.⁵ If the answer of the defendant has been replied to, the replication must be withdrawn before the plaintiff can examine him. But a plaintiff cannot be examined by a defendant, except by consent, unless he is merely a trustee,

¹ Bull. N. P. 285; Berrington d. Dormer v. Fortescue, Cas. temp. Hardw. 162, 163.

² Ibid.

³ Bull. N. P. 286. But where the same Jury are also to assess damages against the witness, it seems he is not admissible. See Mash v. Smith, 1 C. & P. 577; Ante, § 356.

⁴ 2 Daniel's Chan. Pr. 1035, note, (Perkins's ed.); Ibid. 1043; Ashton v. Parker, 14 Sim. 632. It has been held in Massachusetts, that the answer of one defendant, so far as it is responsive to the bill, may be read by another defendant as evidence in his own favor. Mills v. Gore, 20 Pick. 28.

⁵ Steed v. Oliver, 11 Jur. 365; Paris v. Hughes, 1 Keen, 1; Van v. Corpe, 3 My. & K. 269.

or has no beneficial interest in the matter in question.¹ Nor can a co-plaintiff be examined by a plaintiff without the consent of the defendant. The course in the latter of such cases is to strike out his name as plaintiff, and make him a defendant; and in the former, to file a cross-bill.²

§ 362. The principles which govern in the admission or exclusion of parties as witnesses in civil cases, are in general applicable with the like force to *criminal prosecutions*, except so far as they are affected by particular legislation, or by considerations of public policy. In these cases, the State is the party prosecuting, though the process is usually, and in some cases always, set in motion by a private individual, commonly styled *the prosecutor*. In general, this individual has no direct and certain interest in the event of the prosecution; and therefore he is an admissible witness. Formerly, indeed, it was supposed that he was incompetent, by reason of an indirect interest, arising from the use of the record of conviction as evidence in his favor in a civil suit; and this opinion was retained down to a late period, as applicable to cases of forgery, and especially to indictments for perjury. But it is now well settled, as will hereafter more particularly be shown,³ that the record in a criminal prosecution cannot be used as evidence in a civil suit, either at law or in equity, except to prove the mere fact of the adjudication, or a judicial

¹ The reason of this rule has often been called in question; and the opinion of many of the profession is inclined in favor of making the right of examination of parties in equity reciprocal, without the intervention of a cross bill. See 1 Smith's Ch. Pr. 459, n. (1); Report on Chancery Practice, App. p. 153, Q. 49. Sir Samuel Romilly was in favor of such change in the practice. *Ib.* p. 54, Q. 266; 1 Hoffman's Ch. Pr. 345.

² 1 Smith's Ch. Pr. 343, 344; 1 Hoffman's Ch. Pr. 485-488. See further, Gresley on Evid. 242, 243, 244; 2 Mad. Chan. 415, 416; Neilson v. McDonald, 6 Johns. Ch. 201; Souverbye v. Arden, 1 Johns. Ch. 240; 2 Daniel's Ch. Pr. 455, 456; Piddock v. Brown, 3 P. W. 288; Murray v. Shadwell, 2 V. & B. 401; Hoffm. Master in Chan. 18, 19; Cotton v. Luttrell, 1 Atk. 451.

³ Post, § 537.

confession of guilt by the party indicted.¹ The prosecutor, therefore, is not incompetent on the ground, that he is a party to the record; but whether any interest which he may have in the conviction of the offender, is sufficient to render him incompetent to testify, will be considered more appropriately under the head of incompetency from interest.

§ 363. In regard to *defendants in criminal cases*, if the State would call one of them, as a witness against others in the same indictment, this can be done only by discharging him from the record; as, by the entry of a *nolle prosequi*;² or, by an order for his dismissal and discharge, where he has pleaded in abatement as to his own person, and the plea is not answered;³ or, by a verdict of acquittal, where no evidence, or not sufficient evidence, has been adduced against him. In the former case, where there is no proof, he is entitled to the verdict; and it may also be rendered at the request of the other defendants, who may then call him as a witness for themselves, as in civil cases. In the latter, where there is some evidence against him, but it is deemed insufficient, a separate verdict of acquittal may be entered, at the instance of the prosecuting officer, who may then call him as a witness against the others.⁴ On the same principle, where two were

¹ Rex v. Boston, 4 East, 572; Bartlett v. Pickersgill, *Ib.* 577, n.; 1 Phil. Evid. 67; 1 Stark. Evid. 234; Gibson v. McCarty, Cas. temp. Hardw. 311; Richardson v. Williams, 12 Mod. 319; Reg. v. Moreau, 36 Leg. Obs. 69. The exception, which had grown up in the case of forgery, was admitted to be an anomaly in the law, in 4 East, 582, per *Ld.* Ellenborough, and in 4 B. & Ald. 210, per Abbott, C. J.; and was finally removed by the declaratory act, for such in effect it certainly is, of 9 Geo. 4, c. 32, § 2. In this country, with the exception of a few early cases, the party to the forged instrument has been held admissible as a witness, on the general principles of the criminal law. See Commonwealth v. Snell, 3 Mass. 82; The People v. Dean, 6 Cowen, 27; Furber v. Hilliard, 2 N. Hamp. 480; Respublica v. Ross, 2 Dall. 239; The State v. Foster, 3 McCord, 442.

² Bull. N. P. 285; Cas. temp. Hardw. 163.

³ Rex v. Sherman, Cas. temp. Hardw. 303.

⁴ Rex v. Rowland, Ry. & M. 401; Rex v. Mutineers of the Bounty, cited arg. 1 East, 312, 313.

indicted for an assault, and one submitted and was fined, and paid the fine, and the other pleaded not guilty; the former was admitted as a competent witness for the latter, because as to the witness the matter was at an end.¹ But the matter is not considered as at an end, so as to render one defendant a competent witness for another, by any thing short of a final judgment, or a plea of guilty.² Therefore, where two were jointly indicted for uttering a forged note, and the trial of one of them was postponed, it was held, that he could not be called as a witness for the other.³ So, where two, being jointly indicted for an assault, pleaded separately not guilty, and elected to be tried separately, it was held, that the one tried first could not call the other as a witness for him.⁴

§ 364. Before we dismiss the subject of parties, it may be proper to take notice of the case, where the facts are personally known by the Judge, before whom the cause is tried. And whatever difference of opinion may once have existed on this point, it seems now to be agreed, that the same person cannot be both *witness and Judge*, in a cause, which is on trial before him. If he is the sole Judge, he cannot be sworn; and if he sits with others, he still can hardly be deemed capable of impartially deciding on the admissibility of his own testimony, or of weighing it against that of

¹ *Rex v. Fletcher*, 1 Stra. 633; *Regina v. Lyons*, 9 C. & P. 555; *Regina v. Williams*, 8 C. & P. 283.

² *Regina v. Hincks*, 1 Denis. C. C. 84.

³ *Commonwealth v. Marsh*, 10 Pick. 57.

⁴ *The People v. Bill*, 10 Johns. 95. In *Rex v. Lafone*, 5 Esp. 154, where one defendant suffered judgment by default, Lord Ellenborough held him incompetent to testify for the others; apparently on the ground, that there was a community of guilt, and that the offence of one was the offence of all. But no authority was cited in the case, and the decision is at variance with the general doctrine in cases of tort. The reason given, moreover, assumes the very point in dispute, namely, whether there was any guilt at all. The indictment was for a misdemeanor, in obstructing a revenue officer in the execution of his duty. See *Phil. & Am. on Evid.* 70, note (3); 1 *Phil. Evid.* 68.

another.¹ Whether his knowledge of common notoriety is admissible proof of that fact, is not so clearly agreed.² On grounds of public interest and convenience, a Judge cannot be called as a witness to testify to what took place before him in the trial of another cause;³ though he may testify to foreign and collateral matters, which happened in his presence while the trial was pending, or after it was ended.⁴ In regard to *attorneys*, it has in England been held a very objectionable proceeding on the part of an attorney, to give evidence when acting as advocate in the cause; and a sufficient ground for a new trial.⁵ But in the United States no case has been found to proceed to that extent; and the fact is hardly ever known to occur.

§ 365. We proceed now to consider the SECOND CLASS of persons incompetent to testify as witnesses, namely, that of PERSONS DEFICIENT IN UNDERSTANDING. We have already seen,⁶ that one of the main securities, which the law has provided for the purity and truth of oral evidence, is, that it be delivered under the sanction of an oath; and that this is none other than a solemn invocation of the Supreme Being, as the

¹ *Ross v. Buhler*, 2 Martin's R. N. S. 312. So is the law of Spain, Partid. 3, tit. 16, l. 19; 1 Moreau & Carleton's Tr. p. 200;—and of Scotland, Glassford on Evid. p. 602; Tait on Evid. 432; Stair's Inst. Book iv. tit. 45, 4; Erskine's Inst. Book iv. tit. 2, 33. This principle has not been extended to jurors. Though the Jury may use their general knowledge on the subject of any question before them; yet, if any juror has a particular knowledge, as to which he can testify, he must be sworn as a witness. *Rex v. Rosser*, 7 C. & P. 648; *Stones v. Byron*, 4 Dowl. & L. 393. See Post, § 386, note.

² Lord Stair and Mr. Erskine seem to have been of opinion that it was, "unless it be overruled by pregnant contrary evidence." But Mr. Glassford and Mr. Tait are of the contrary opinion. See the places cited in the preceding note.

³ *Regina v. Gazard*, 8 C. & P. 595, per Patteson, J.

⁴ *Rex v. E. of Thanet*, 27 Howell's St. Tr. 847, 848. See Ante, § 252, as to the admissibility of jurors.

⁵ *Dunn v. Packwood*, 11 Jur. 242, a.

⁶ Ante, § 327.

Omniscient Judge. The purpose of the law being to lay hold on the conscience of the witness by this religious solemnity, it is obvious, that persons incapable of comprehending the nature and obligation of an oath, ought not to be admitted as witnesses. The repetition of the words of an oath would, in their case, be but an unmeaning formality. It makes no difference, from what cause this defect of understanding may have arisen; nor whether it be temporary and curable, or permanent; whether the party be hopelessly an idiot, or maniac, or only occasionally insane, as a lunatic; or be intoxicated; or whether the defect arises from mere immaturity of intellect, as in the case of children. While the deficiency of understanding exists, be the cause of what nature soever, the person is not admissible to be sworn as a witness. But if the cause be temporary, and a lucid interval should occur, or a cure be effected, the competency also is restored.¹

§ 366. In regard to persons *deaf and dumb* from their birth, it has been said, that in presumption of law they are idiots. And though this presumption has not now the same degree of force which was formerly given to it, that unfortunate class of persons being found, by the light of modern science, to be much more intelligent in general, and susceptible of far higher culture, than was once supposed; yet still the presumption is so far operative, as to devolve the burden of proof on the party adducing the witness, to show that he is a person of sufficient understanding. This being done, a deaf mute may be sworn and give evidence, by means of an interpreter.² If

¹ 6 Com. Dig. 351, 352, *Testmoigne*, A. 1; 1 Stark. Ev. 91, 92; Phil. & Am. on Evid. 4, 5; *Livingston v. Kiersted*, 10 Johns. 362; *Evans v. Hettich*, 7 Wheat. 453, 470; *White's case*, 2 Leach, Cr. Cas. 482; *Tait on Evid.* p. 342, 343. See, as to intoxication, *Hartford v. Palmer*, 16 Johns. 143; *Heinec. ad Pandect. Pars 3, § 14*.

² *Rustin's case*, 1 Leach, Cr. Cas. 455; *Tait on Evid.* p. 343; 1 Russ. on Crimes, p. 7; 1 Hale, P. C. 34. Lord Hale refers, for authority as to the ancient presumption, to the Laws of King Alfred, c. 14, which is in these

he is able to communicate his ideas perfectly by writing, he will be required to adopt that, as the more satisfactory, and therefore the better method;¹ but if his knowledge of that method is imperfect, he will be permitted to testify by means of signs.²

§ 367. But in respect to *children*, there is no precise age, within which they are absolutely excluded, on the presumption that they have not sufficient understanding. At the age of fourteen, every person is presumed to have common discretion and understanding, until the contrary appears; but under that age, it is not so presumed; and therefore inquiry is made as to the degree of understanding which the child, offered as a witness, may possess; and if he appears to have sufficient natural intelligence, and to have been so instructed as to comprehend the nature and effect of an oath, he is admitted to testify, whatever his age may be.³ This examination of the child, in order to ascertain his capacity to be sworn, is made by the Judge, at his discretion; and though, as has been just said, no age has been precisely fixed, within which a child shall be conclusively presumed incapable, yet, in one case, a learned Judge promptly rejected the dying declarations of a child of four years of age, observing, that it was quite impossible that she, however precocious her mind, could have had that idea of a future state, which is necessary to make such declarations admissible.⁴ On the other hand, it is not

words: — "Si quis mutus vel surdus natus sit, ut peccata sua confiteri nequeat, nec inficiari, emendet pater scelera ipsius." Vid. *Leges Barbaror. Antiq.* Vol. 4, p. 249; *Ancient Laws and Statutes of England*, Vol. 1, p. 71.

¹ *Morrison v. Lennard*, 3 C. & P. 127.

² *The State v. De Wolf*, 8 Conn. 93; *Commonwealth v. Hill*, 14 Mass. 207; *Snyder v. Nations*, 5 Blackf. 295.

³ *McNally's Evid.* p. 149, ch. 11; *Bull. N. P.* 293; 1 Hale, P. C. 302; 2 Russ. on Crimes, p. 590; *Jackson v. Gridley*, 18 Johns. 98.

⁴ *Rex v. Pike*, 3 C. & P. 598; *The People v. McNair*, 21 Wend. 608. Neither can the declarations of such a child, if living, be received in evidence. *Rex v. Brasier*, 1 East, P. C. 443.

unusual to receive the testimony of children under nine, and sometimes even under seven years of age, if they appear to be of sufficient understanding;¹ and it has been admitted even at the age of five years.² If the child, being a principal witness, appears not yet sufficiently instructed in the nature of an oath, the Court will, in its discretion, put off the trial, that this may be done.³ But whether the trial ought to be put off for the purpose of instructing an adult witness, has been doubted.⁴

§ 368. The THIRD CLASS of persons incompetent to testify as witnesses, consists of those who are INSENSIBLE TO THE OBLIGATIONS OF AN OATH, from defect of religious sentiment and belief. The very nature of an oath, it being a religious and most solemn appeal to God, as the Judge of all men, presupposes that the witness believes in the existence of an omniscient Supreme Being, who is "the rewarder of truth and avenger of falsehood;"⁵ and that, by such a formal appeal,

¹ 1 East, P. C. 442; Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 10 Mass. 225; McNally's Evid. p. 154; The State v. Whittier, 8 Shepl. 341.

² Rex v. Brasier, 1 Leach, Cr. Cas. 237; Bull. N. P. 293, S. C.; 1 East, P. C. 443, S. C.

³ McNally's Evid. p. 154; Rex v. White, 2 Leach, Cr. Cas. 482, note (a); Rex v. Wade, 1 Mood. Cr. Cas. 86. But in a late case before Mr. Justice Patteson, the learned Judge said, that he must be satisfied that the child felt the binding obligation of an oath, from the general course of her religious education; and that the effect of the oath upon the conscience should arise from religious feelings of a permanent nature, and not merely from instructions, confined to the nature of an oath, recently communicated for the purpose of the particular trial. And therefore, the witness having been visited but twice by a clergyman, who had given her some instructions as to the nature of an oath, but still she had but an imperfect understanding on the subject, her evidence was rejected. Rex v. Williams, 7 C. & P. 320.

⁴ Phil. & Am. on Evid. p. 6, note (2); 1 Phil. Evid. 5; Rex v. Wade, 1 Mood. Cr. Cas. 86.

⁵ Per Ld. Hardwicke, 1 Atk. 48. The opinions of the earlier as well as later Jurists, concerning the nature and obligation of an oath, are quoted and discussed much at large, in Omichund v. Barker, 1 Atk. 21, and in Tyler on Oaths, *passim*, to which the learned reader is referred.

the conscience of the witness is affected. Without this belief, the person cannot be subject to that sanction, which the law deems an indispensable test of truth.¹ It is not sufficient, that a witness believes himself bound to speak the truth from a regard to character, or to the common interests of society, or from fear of the punishment which the law inflicts upon persons guilty of perjury. Such motives have indeed their influence, but they are not considered as affording a sufficient safeguard for the strict observance of truth. Our law, in common with the law of most civilized countries, requires the additional security afforded by the religious sanction implied in an oath; and, as a necessary consequence, rejects all witnesses, who are incapable of giving this security.² Atheists, therefore, and all infidels, that is, those who profess no religion that can bind their consciences to speak truth, are rejected as incompetent to testify as witnesses.³

§ 369. As to the nature and *degree of religious faith* required in a witness, the rule of law, as at present understood, seems to be this, that the person is competent to testify, if he

¹ 1 Stark. Evid. 22. "The law is wise in requiring the highest attainable sanction for the truth of testimony given; and is consistent in rejecting all witnesses incapable of feeling this sanction, or of receiving this test; whether this incapacity arises from the imbecility of their understanding, or from its perversity. It does not impute guilt or blame to either. If the witness is evidently intoxicated, he is not allowed to be sworn; because, for the time being, he is evidently incapable of feeling the force and obligation of an oath. The non compos, and the infant of tender age, are rejected for the same reason, but without blame. The atheist is also rejected, because he, too, is incapable of realizing the obligation of an oath, in consequence of his unbelief. The law looks only to the fact of incapacity, not to the cause, or the manner of avowal. Whether it be calmly insinuated, with the elegance of Gibbon, or roared forth in the disgusting blasphemies of Paine, still it is atheism; and to require the mere formality of an oath, from one who avowedly despises, or is incapable of feeling, its peculiar sanction, would be but a mockery of justice." 1 Law Reporter, p. 346, 347.

² Phil. & Am. on Evid. 11; 1 Phil. Evid. 10.

³ Bull. N. P. 292; 1 Stark. Evid. 22; 1 Atk. 40, 45; Phil. & Am. on Evid. 11; 1 Phil. Evid. 10.

believes in the being of God, and a future state of rewards and punishments; that is, that Divine punishment will be the certain consequence of perjury. It may be considered as now generally settled, in this country, that it is not material, whether the witness believes that the punishment will be inflicted in this world, or in the next. It is enough, if he has the religious sense of accountability to the Omniscient Being, who is invoked by an oath.¹

§ 370. It should here be observed, that defect of religious faith is *never presumed*. On the contrary, the law presumes that every man brought up in a Christian land, where God is generally acknowledged, does believe in him, and fear him. The charity of its judgment is extended alike to all. The burden of proof is not on the party adducing the witness, to prove that he is a believer; but it is on the objecting party, to prove that he is not. Neither does the law presume that

¹ The proper test of the competency of a witness on the score of religious belief was settled, upon great consideration, in the case of *Omichund v. Barker*, Willes, 545, 1 Atk. 21, S. C., to be the belief of a God, and that he will reward and punish us according to our deserts. This rule was recognised in *Butts v. Swartwood*, 2 Cowen, 431; *The People v. Matteson*, 2 Cowen, 433, 573, note; and by Story, J. in *Wakefield v. Ross*, 5 Mason, 18; 9 Dane's Abr. 317, S. P.; and in *Brock v. Milligan*, 1 Wilcox, 125. Whether any belief in a future state of existence is necessary, provided accountability to God in this life is acknowledged, is not perfectly clear. In *Commonwealth v. Bachelier*, 4 Am. Jurist, 81, Thacher, J. seemed to think it was. But in *Hunscom v. Hunscom*, 15 Mass. 184, the Court held, that mere disbelief in a future existence went only to the credibility. This degree of disbelief is not inconsistent with the faith required in *Omichund v. Barker*. The only case, clearly to the contrary, is *Attwood v. Welton*, 7 Conn. 66. In *Curtis v. Strong*, 4 Day, 51, the witness did not believe in the obligation of an oath; and in *Jackson v. Gridley*, 18 Johns. 98, he was a mere atheist, without any sense of religion whatever. All that was said, in these two cases, beyond the point in judgment, was extrajudicial. See also 3 Phil. Evid. by Cowen & Hill, p. 1503, note 53, 55; *Fernandis & Hall v. Henderson*, Cor. Des-saussure Ch. Union Dist. S. Car. Aug. 1827, *ib. cit.* In Maine, a belief in the existence of the Supreme Being is rendered sufficient, by Stat. 1833, ch. 58, without any reference to rewards or punishments. *Smith v. Coffin*, 6 Shepl. 157.

any man is a hypocrite. On the contrary, it presumes him to be what he professes himself to be, whether atheist, or Christian; and the state of a man's opinions, as well as the sanity of his mind, being once proved, is, as we have already seen,¹ presumed to continue unchanged, until the contrary is shown. The state of his religious belief, at the time he is offered as a witness, is the fact to be ascertained; and this is presumed to be the common faith of the country, unless the objector can prove that it is not. The ordinary mode of showing this is by evidence of his declarations, previously made to others; the person himself not being interrogated; for the object of interrogating a witness, in these cases, before he is sworn, is not to obtain the knowledge of other facts, but to ascertain, from his answers, the extent of his capacity, and whether he has sufficient understanding to be sworn.²

¹ Ante, § 42; *The State v. Stinson*, 7 Law Reporter, 383.

² *Swift's Evid.* 48; *Smith v. Coffin*, 6 Shepl. 157. It has been questioned, whether the evidence of his declarations ought not to be confined to a period shortly anterior to the time of proving them, so that no change of opinion might be presumed. *Brock v. Milligan*, 1 Wilcox, 126, per Wood, J. "The witness himself is never questioned in modern practice, as to his religious belief; though formerly it was otherwise. (1 *Swift's Dig.* 739; 5 *Mason*, 19; *American Jurist*, Vol. 4, p. 79, note.) It is not allowed, even after he has been sworn. (The *Queen's case*, 2 B. & B. 284.) Not because it is a question tending to disgrace him; but because it would be a personal scrutiny into the state of his faith, and conscience, foreign to the spirit of our institutions. No man is obliged to avow his belief; but if he voluntarily does avow it, there is no reason why the avowal should not be proved, like any other fact. The truth and sincerity of the avowal, and the continuance of the belief thus avowed, are presumed, and very justly too, till they are disproved. If his opinions have been subsequently changed, this change will generally, if not always, be provable in the same mode. (*Attwood v. Welton*, 7 Conn. 66; *Curtis v. Strong*, 4 Day, 51; *Swift's Evid.* 48-50; Mr. Christian's note to 3 Bl. Comm. 369; 1 Phil. Evid. 18; *Commonwealth v. Bachelier*, 4 Am. Jur. 79, note.) If the change of opinion is very recent, this furnishes no good ground to admit the witness himself to declare it; because of the greater inconvenience which would result from thus opening a door to fraud, than from adhering to the rule requiring other evidence of this fact. The old cases, in which the witness himself was questioned as to his belief, have on this point been overruled. See Christian's note to 3 Bl. Comm. [369], note (30). The

§ 371. It may be added, in this place, that all witnesses are to be sworn according to the peculiar ceremonies of their own

law, therefore, is not reduced to any absurdity in this matter. It exercises no inquisitorial power; neither does it resort to secondary or hearsay evidence. If the witness is objected to, it asks third persons to testify, whether he has declared his disbelief in God, and in a future state of rewards and punishments, &c. Of this fact they are as good witnesses as he could be; and the testimony is primary and direct. It should further be noticed, that the question, whether a person, about to be sworn, is an atheist or not, can never be raised by any one but an adverse party. No stranger or volunteer has a right to object. There must, in every instance, be a suit between two or more parties, one of whom offers the person in question, as a competent witness. The presumption of law, that every citizen is a believer in the common religion of the country, holds good until it is disproved; and it would be contrary to all rule to allow any one, not party to the suit, to thrust in his objections to the course pursued by the litigants. This rule and uniform course of proceeding shows how much of the morbid sympathy expressed for the atheist is wasted. For there is nothing to prevent him from taking any oath of office; nor from swearing to a complaint before a magistrate; nor from making oath to his answer in chancery. In this last case, indeed, he could not be objected to, for another reason, namely, that the plaintiff, in his bill, requests the Court to require him to answer upon his oath. In all these, and many other similar cases, there is no person authorized to raise an objection. Neither is the question permitted to be raised against the atheist, where he is himself the adverse party, and offers his own oath, in the ordinary course of proceeding. If he would make affidavit, in his own cause, to the absence of a witness, or to hold to bail, or to the truth of a plea in abatement, or to the loss of a paper, or to the genuineness of his books of account, or to his fears of bodily harm from one, against whom he requests surety of the peace, or would take the poor debtor's oath; in these and the like cases, the uniform course is to receive his oath, like any other person's. The law, in such cases, does not know that he is an atheist; that is, it never allows the objection of infidelity to be made against any man, seeking his own rights in a Court of Justice; and it conclusively and absolutely presumes that, so far as religious belief is concerned, all persons are capable of an oath, of whom it requires one, as the condition of its protection, or its aid; probably deeming it a less evil, that the solemnity of an oath should, in few instances, be mocked by those who felt not its force and meaning, than that a citizen should, in any case, be deprived of the benefit and protection of the law, on the ground of his religious belief. The state of his faith is not inquired into, where his own rights are concerned. He is only prevented from being made the instrument of taking away those of others." 1 Law Reporter, p. 347, 348.

religion, or in such manner as they may deem binding on their own consciences. If the witness is not of the Christian religion, the Court will inquire as to the form in which an oath is administered in his own country, or among those of his own faith, and will impose it in that form. And if, being a Christian, he has conscientious scruples against taking an oath in the usual form, he will be allowed to make a solemn religious asseveration, involving a like appeal to God for the truth of his testimony, in any mode which he shall declare to be binding on his conscience.¹ The Court, in ascertaining whether the form in which the oath is administered, is binding on the conscience of the witness, may inquire of the witness himself; and the proper time for making this inquiry is before he is sworn.² But if the witness, without making any objection, takes the oath in the usual form, he may be afterwards asked, whether he thinks the oath binding on his conscience; but it is unnecessary and irrelevant to ask him, if he considers any other form of oath more binding, and therefore such question cannot be asked.³ If a witness, without objecting, is sworn in the usual mode, but being of a different faith, the oath was not in a form affecting his conscience, as if, being a

¹ *Omichund v. Barker*, 1 Atk. 21, 46; *Willes*, 538, 545-549, S. C.; *Ramkissenseat v. Barker*, 1 Atk. 19; *Atcheson v. Everitt*, Cowp. 389, 390; *Bull. N. P.* 292; 1 *Phil. Evid.* 9, 10, 11; 1 *Stark. Evid.* 22, 23; *Rex v. Morgan*, 1 *Leach, Cr. Cas.* 64; *Vail v. Nickerson*, 6 *Mass.* 262; *Edmonds v. Rowe, Ry. & M.* 77; *Commonwealth v. Buzzell*, 16 *Pick.* 153. "Quumque sit adseveratio religiosa, — satis patet, — jusjurandum attemperandum esse cujusque religioni." *Heinec. ad Pand. Pars* 3, § 13, 15. "Quodeunque nomen dederis, id utique constat, omne jusjurandum proficisci ex fide et persuasione jurantis; et inutile esse, nisi quis credat Deum, quem testem advocat, pejurii sui idoneum esse vindicem. Id autem credat, qui jurat per Deum suum, per sacra sua, et ex sua ipsius animi religione," &c. *Bynkers. Obs. Jur. Rom. lib.* 6, cap. 2.

² By Stat. 1 & 2 *Vict. c.* 105, an oath is binding, in whatever form, if administered in such form and with such ceremonies as the person may declare binding. But the doctrine itself is conceived to be Common Law.

³ *The Queen's case*, 2 *B. & B.* 284.

Jew, he was sworn on the Gospels, he is still punishable for perjury, if he swears falsely.¹

§ 372. Under this general head of exclusion because of insensibility to the obligation of an oath, may be ranked the case of *persons infamous*; that is, persons who, whatever may be their professed belief, have been guilty of those heinous crimes which men generally are not found to commit, unless when so depraved as to be unworthy of credit for truth. The basis of the rule seems to be, that such a person is morally too corrupt to be trusted to testify;—so reckless of the distinction between truth and falsehood, and insensible to the restraining force of an oath, as to render it extremely improbable that he will speak the truth at all. Of such a person Chief Baron Gilbert remarks, that the credit of his oath is overbalanced by the stain of his iniquity.² The party, however, must have been legally adjudged guilty of the crime. If he is stigmatized by public fame only, and not by the censure of law, it affects the credit of his testimony, but not his admissibility as a witness.³ The record, therefore, is required as the sole evidence of his guilt; no other proof being admitted of the crime; not only because of the gross injustice of trying the guilt of a third person in a case to which he is not a party, but also, lest, in the multiplication of the issues to be

¹ *Sells v. Hoare*, 3 B. & B. 232; *The State v. Whisenhurst*, 2 Hawks, 458. But the adverse party cannot, for that cause, have a new trial. Whether he may, if a witness on the other side testified without having been sworn at all, *quare*. If the omission of the oath was known at the time, it seems he cannot. *Lawrence v. Houghton*, 5 Johns. 129; *White v. Hawn*, Ib. 351. But if it was not discovered until after the trial, he may. *Hawks v. Baker*, 6 Greenl. 72.

² *Gilb. Evid. by Lofft*, p. 256. It was formerly thought, that an infamous punishment, for whatever crime, rendered the person incompetent as a witness, by reason of infamy. But this notion is exploded; and it is now settled, that it is the crime and not the punishment that renders the man infamous. *Bull. N. P.* 292; *Pendock v. Mackinder*, Willes, R. 666.

³ 2 Dods. R. 186, per Sir Wm. Scott.

tried, the principal case should be lost sight of, and the administration of justice should be frustrated.¹

§ 373. It is a point of no small difficulty to determine precisely the crimes which render the perpetrator thus infamous. The rule is justly stated to require, that “the *publicum judicium* must be upon an offence, implying such a dereliction of moral principle, as carries with it a conclusion of a total disregard to the obligation of an oath.”² But the difficulty lies in the specification of those offences. The usual and more general enumeration is, *treason*, *felony*, and the *crimen falsi*.³ In regard to the two former, as all treasons, and almost all felonies were punishable with death, it was very natural that crimes, deemed of so grave a character as to render the offender unworthy to live, should be considered as rendering him unworthy of belief in a Court of Justice. But the extent and meaning of the term, *crimen falsi*, in our law, is nowhere laid down with precision. In the Roman Law, from which we have borrowed the term, it included not only forgery, but every species of fraud and deceit.⁴ If the offence

¹ *Rex v. Castel Careinion*, 8 East, 77; *Lee v. Gansell*, Cowp. 3, per Id. Mansfield.

² 2 Dods. R. 186, per Sir Wm. Scott.

³ *Phil & Am. on Evid.* p. 17; 6 Com. Dig. 353, *Testmoigne*, A. 4, 5; Co. Lit. 6, b.; 2 Hale, P. C. 277; 1 Stark. Evid. 94, 95. A conviction for petty larceny disqualifies, as well as for grand larceny. *Pendock v. Mackinder*, Willes, R. 665.

⁴ Cod. Lib. 9, tit. 22, ad legem Cornelianam de falsis. Cujac. Opera. Tom. ix. in locum. (Ed. Prati, A. D. 1839, 4to p. 2191–2200); 1 Brown's Civ. & Adm. Law, p. 426; Dig. lib. 48, tit. 10; Heinec. in Pand. Pars vii. § 214–218. The law of Normandy disposed of the whole subject in these words:—“Notandum siquidem est, quod nemo in querelâ sua pro teste recipiendus est; nec ejus hæredes nec participes querelæ. Et hoc intelligendum est tam ex parte actoris, quam ex parte defensoris. Omnes autem illi, qui perjurio vel lesione fide sunt infames, ob hoc etiam sunt repellendi, et omnes illi, qui in bello succubuerunt.” *Jura Normaniæ*, Cap. 62; [in *Le Grand Coustumier*, fol. Ed. 1539.] In the ancient Danish Law it is thus defined, in the chapter entitled, *Falsi crimen quodnam censetur*. “Falsum est, si terminum, finesve quis moverit, monetam nisi venia vel mandato regio

did not fall under any other head, it was called *stellionatus*,¹ which included "all kinds of cozenage and knavish practice in bargaining." But it is clear, that the Common Law has not employed the term in this extensive sense, when applying it to the disqualification of witnesses; because convictions for many offences, clearly belonging to the *crimen falsi* of the civilians, have not this effect. Of this sort are deceits in the quality of provisions, deceits by false weights and measures, conspiracy to defraud by spreading false news,² and several others. On the other hand, it has been adjudged, that persons are rendered infamous, and therefore incompetent to testify, by having been convicted of forgery,³ perjury, subornation of perjury,⁴ suppression of testimony by bribery, or conspiracy to procure the absence of a witness,⁵ or other conspiracy, to accuse one of a crime,⁶ and barratry.⁷ And from these decisions it may be deduced, that the *crimen falsi* of the Common Law not only involves the charge of falsehood, but

cusserit, argentum adulterinum confaverit, nummisve reprobis dolo malo emat vendatque, vel argento adulterino." Ancher, *Lex Cimbrica*, lib. 3, cap. 65, p. 249.

¹ Dig. lib. 47, tit. 20, l. 3, Cujac (in locum,) Opera, Tom. ix. (Ed. supra) p. 2224. *Stellionatus* nomine significatur omne crimen, quod nomen proprium non habet, omnis fraus, quæ nomine proprio vacat. — Translatum autem esse nomen *stellionatus*, nemo est qui nesciat, ab animali ad hominem vafrum, et decipiendi peritum. Ib. Heinec. ad Pand. Pars vii. § 147, 148; 1 Brown's Civ. & Adm. Law, p. 426.

² The Ville de Varsovie, 2 Dods. R. 174. But see *Crowther v. Hopwood*, 3 Stark. R. 21.

³ *Rex v. Davis*, 5 Mod. 74.

⁴ Co. Lit. 6, b.; 6 Com. Dig. 353, *Testm.* A. 5.

⁵ *Clancey's case*, Fortesc. R. 208; *Bushell v. Barrett*, Ry. & M. 434.

⁶ 2 Hale, P. C. 277; Hawk. P. C. b. 2, ch. 46, § 101; Co. Lit. 6, b.; *Rex v. Priddle*, 2 Leach, Cr. Cas. 496; *Crowther v. Hopwood*, 3 Stark. R. 21, arg.; 1 Stark. Evid. 95; 2 Dods. R. 191.

⁷ *Rex v. Ford*, 2 Salk. 690; Bull. N. P. 292. The receiver of stolen goods is incompetent as a witness. See the Trial of Abner Rogers, p. 136, 137. If a statute declare the perpetrator of a crime "infamous," this, it seems, will render him incompetent to testify. Phil. & Am. on Evid. p. 18; 1 Phil. Evid. p. 18; 1 Gilb. Evid. by Lofft, p. 256, 257.

also is one which may injuriously affect the administration of justice, by the introduction of falsehood and fraud. At least it may be said, in the language of Sir William Scott,¹ "so far the law has gone, affirmatively; and it is not for me to say where it should stop, negatively."

§ 374. In regard to the *extent and effect of the disability* thus created, a distinction is to be observed between cases in which the person disqualified is a party, and those in which he is not. In cases between third persons, his testimony is universally excluded.² But where he is a party, in order that he may not be wholly remediless, he may make any affidavit necessary to his exculpation or defence, or for relief against an irregular judgment, or the like;³ but it is said, that his affidavit shall not be read to support a criminal charge.⁴ If he was one of the subscribing witnesses to a deed, will, or other instrument, before his conviction, his hand-writing may be proved, as though he were dead.⁵

§ 375. We have already remarked, that no person is deemed infamous in law, until he has been legally found guilty of an infamous crime. But the mere verdict of the Jury is not sufficient for this purpose; for it may be set aside, or the judgment may be arrested, on motion for that purpose. It is *the judgment*, and that only, which is received as the legal and conclusive evidence of the party's guilt, for the purpose of rendering him incompetent to testify.⁶ And it must appear,

¹ 2 Dods. R. 191. See also 2 Russ. on Crimes, 592, 593.

² Even where it is merely offered as an affidavit in showing cause against a rule calling upon the party to answer, it will be rejected. *In re Sawyer*, 2 Ad. & El. 721, N. S.

³ *Davis and Carter's case*, 2 Salk. 461; *Rex v. Gardiner*, 2 Burr. 1117; *Atcheson v. Everitt*, Cowp. 382; *Skinner v. Perot*, 1 Ashm. 57.

⁴ *Walker v. Kearney*, 2 Stra. 1148; *Rex v. Gardiner*, 2 Burr. 1117.

⁵ *Jones v. Mason*, 2 Stra. 833.

⁶ 6 Com. Dig. 354, *Testm.* A. 5; *Rex v. Castel Careinion*, 8 East, 77; *Lee v. Gansell*, Cowp. 3; Bull. N. P. 292; *Fitch v. Smalbrook*, T. Ray. 32; *The People v. Whipple*, 9 Cowen, 707; *The People v. Herrick*, 13

that the judgment was rendered by a Court of competent jurisdiction.¹ Judgment of outlawry for treason or felony will have the same effect;² for the party, in submitting to an outlawry, virtually confesses his guilt; and so the record is equivalent to a judgment upon confession. If the guilt of the party should be shown by oral evidence, and even by his own admission, [though in neither of these modes can it be proved, if the evidence be objected to,] or, by his plea of guilty, which has not been followed by a judgment,³ the proof does not go to the competency of the witness, however it may affect his credibility.⁴ And the judgment itself, when offered against his admissibility, can be proved only by the record, or, in proper cases, by an authenticated copy, which the objector must offer and produce at the time when the witness is about to be sworn, or at farthest in the course of the trial.⁵

§ 376. Whether judgment of an infamous crime, passed by a foreign tribunal, ought to be allowed to affect the competency of the party as a witness, in the Courts of this country, is a question upon which Jurists are not entirely agreed. But the weight of modern opinions seems to be, that personal disqualifications, not arising from the law of nature, but from the positive law of the country, and especially such as are of a penal nature, are strictly territorial, and cannot be enforced

Johns. 82; *Cushman v. Loker*, 2 Mass. 108; *Castellano v. Peillon*, 2 Martin, N. S. 466.

¹ *Cooke v. Maxwell*, 2 Stark. R. 183.

² Co. Lit. 6, b.; Hawk. P. C. b. 2, ch. 48, § 22; 3 Inst. 212; 6 Com. Dig. 354, *Testm. A. 5*; 1 Stark. Evid. 95, 96. In Scotland it is otherwise. Tait's Evid. p. 347.

³ *Regina v. Hinks*, 1 Dennis. Cr. Cas. 84.

⁴ *Rex v. Castel Careinion*, 8 East, 77; *Wicks v. Smallbroke*, 1 Sid. 51; T. Ray. 32, S. C.; *The People v. Herrick*, 13 Johns. 82.

⁵ *Ib. Hilt v. Colven*, 14 Johns. 182; *Commonwealth v. Green*, 17 Mass. 537. In *The State v. Ridgley*, 2 Har. & McHen. 120, and *Clark's lessee v. Hall*, *ib.* 378, which have been cited to the contrary, parol evidence was admitted to prove only the fact of the witness's having been transported as a convict; not to prove the judgment of conviction.

in any country other than that in which they originate.¹ Accordingly it has been held, upon great consideration, that a conviction and sentence for a felony in one of the United States, did not render the party incompetent as a witness, in the Courts of another State; though it might be shown in diminution of the credit due to his testimony.²

§ 377. The *disability* thus arising from infamy may, in general, be removed in two modes; (1.) by reversal of the judgment; and (2.) by a pardon. The reversal of the judgment must be shown in the same manner that the judgment itself must have been proved, namely, by production of the record of reversal, or, in proper cases, by a duly authenticated exemplification of it. The pardon must be proved, by production of the charter of pardon under the great seal. And though it were granted after the prisoner had suffered the entire punishment awarded against him, yet it has been held sufficient to restore the competency of the witness, though he would, in such case, be entitled to very little credit.³

¹ Story on Conf. of Law, § 91, 92, 104, 620-625; Martens' Law of Nations, B. 3, ch. 3, § 24, 25.

² *Commonwealth v. Green*, 17 Mass. 515, 539-549, per totam Curiam; *Contra, The State v. Candler*, 3 Hawks, 393, per Taylor, C. J. and Henderson, J.; Hall, J. dubitante, but inclining in favor of admitting the witness. In the cases of *The State v. Ridgley*, 2 Har. & McHen. 120; *Clark's lessee v. Hall*, *ib.* 378; and *Cole's lessee v. Cole*, 1 Har. & Johns. 572; which are sometimes cited in the negative, this point was not raised nor considered; they being cases of persons sentenced in England for felony, and transported to Maryland, under the sentence prior to the Revolution.

³ *The United States v. Jones*, 2 Wheeler's Cr. Cas. 451, per Thompson, J. By Stat. 9 Geo. 4, c. 32, § 3, enduring the punishment to which an offender has been sentenced for any felony not punishable with death, has the same effect as a pardon under the great seal, for the same offence; and of course it removes the disqualification to testify. And the same effect is given by § 4, of the same statute, to the endurance of the punishment awarded for any misdemeanor, except perjury and subornation of perjury. See also 1 W. 4, c. 37, to the same effect; Tait on Evid. 346, 347. But whether these enactments have proceeded on the ground, that the incompetency is in the nature of punishment, or, that the offender is reformed by the salutary discipline he has undergone, does not clearly appear.

§ 378. The rule, that a pardon restores the competency and completely rehabilitates the party, is *limited* to cases where the disability is a consequence of the judgment, according to the principles of the Common Law.¹ But where the disability is annexed to the conviction of a crime by the express words of a statute, it is generally agreed that the pardon will not, in such a case, restore the competency of the offender; the prerogative of the sovereign being controlled by the authority of the express law. Thus, if a man be adjudged guilty on an indictment for perjury, at Common Law, a pardon will restore his competency. But if the indictment be founded on the statute of 5 Eliz. c. 9, which declares, that no person, convicted and attainted of perjury or subornation of perjury, shall be from thenceforth received as a witness in any Court of record, he will not be rendered competent by a pardon.²

¹ If the pardon of one sentenced to the penitentiary for life, contains a proviso that nothing therein contained shall be construed, so as to relieve the party from the legal disabilities consequent upon his sentence, other than the imprisonment, the proviso is void, and the party is fully rehabilitated. *The People v. Pease*, 3 Johns. Cas. 333.

² *Rex v. Ford*, 2 Salk. 689; *Dover v. Maestaer*, 5 Esp. 92, 94; 2 Russ. on Crimes, 595, 596; *Rex v. Greepe*, 2 Salk. 513, 514; Bull. N. P. 292; Phil. & Am. on Evid. 21, 22. See also Mr. Hargrave's Juridical Arguments, Vol. 2, p. 221, et seq., where this topic is treated with great ability. Whether the disability is, or is not, made a part of the judgment, and entered as such on the record, does not seem to be of any importance. The form in which this distinction is taken in the earlier cases, evidently shows that its force was understood to consist in this, that in the former case, the disability was declared by the statute, and in the latter, that it stood at Common Law. "Although the incapacity to testify, especially considered as a mark of infamy, may really operate as a severe punishment upon the party; yet there are other considerations affecting other persons, which may well warrant his exclusion from the halls of justice. It is not consistent with the interests of others, nor with the protection which is due to them from the State, that they should be exposed to the peril of testimony from persons regardless of the obligation of an oath; and hence, on grounds of public policy, the legislature may well require, that, while the judgment itself remains unreversed, the party convicted shall not be heard as a witness. It may be more safe to

§ 379. The case of *accomplices* is usually mentioned under the head of Infamy; but we propose to treat it more appropriately, when we come to speak of persons disqualified by Interest, since accomplices generally testify under a promise or expectation of pardon, or some other benefit. But it may here be observed, that it is a settled rule of evidence, that a *particeps criminis*, notwithstanding the turpitude of his conduct, is not, on that account, an incompetent witness, so long as he remains not convicted and sentenced for an infamous

exclude in all cases, than to admit in all, or attempt to distinguish by investigating the grounds, on which the pardon may have been granted. And it is without doubt as clearly within the power of the legislature, to modify the law of evidence, by declaring what manner of persons shall be competent to testify, as by enacting, as in the statute of frauds, that no person shall be heard *vivâ voce* in proof of a certain class of contracts. The statute of Elizabeth itself seems to place the exception on the ground of a rule of evidence, and not on that of a penal fulmination against the offender. The intent of the legislature appears to have been not so much to punish the party, by depriving him of the privilege of being a witness or a juror, as to prohibit the Courts from receiving the oath of any person convicted of disregarding its obligation. And whether this consequence of the conviction be entered on the record or not, the effect is the same. The judgment under the statute being properly shown to the Judges of a Court of Justice, their duty is declared in the statute, independent of the insertion of the inhibition as part of the sentence, and unaffected by any subsequent pardon. The legislature, in the exercise of its power to punish crime, awards fine, imprisonment, and the pillory against the offender; in the discharge of its duty to preserve the temple of justice from pollution, it repels from its portal the man who feareth not an oath. Thus it appears, that a man convicted of perjury cannot be sworn in a Court of Justice, while the judgment remains unreversed, though his offence may have been pardoned, after the judgment; but the reason is found in the express direction of the statutes to the Courts, and not in the circumstances of the disability being made a part of the judgment. The pardon exerts its full vigor on the offender; but is not allowed to operate beyond this, upon the rule of evidence enacted by the statute. The punishment of the crime belongs to the criminal code; the rule of evidence to the civil." See Amer. Jurist, Vol. 11, p. 360, 361, 362. In several of the United States, the disqualification is expressly declared by statutes, and is extended to all the crimes therein enumerated; comprehending not only all the varieties of the *crimen falsi*, as understood in the Common Law, but divers other offences.

crime. The admission of accomplices, as witnesses for the government, is justified by the necessity of the case, it being often impossible to bring the principal offenders to justice without them. The usual course is, to leave out of the indictment those who are to be called as witnesses; but it makes no difference as to the admissibility of an accomplice, whether he is indicted or not, if he has not been put on his trial at the same time with his companions in crime. He is also a competent witness in their favor; and if he is put on his trial at the same time with them, and there is only very slight evidence, if any at all, against him, the Court may, as we have already seen,¹ and generally will, forthwith direct a separate verdict as to him, and upon his acquittal, will admit him as a witness for the others. If he is convicted, and the punishment is by fine only, he will be admitted for the others, if he has paid the fine.² But whether an accomplice already charged with the crime, by indictment, shall be admitted as a witness for the government, or not, is determined by the Judges, in their discretion, as may best serve the purposes of justice. If he appears to have been the principal offender, he will be rejected.³ And if an accomplice, having made a private confession, upon a promise of pardon made by the attorney-general, should afterwards refuse to testify, he may be convicted upon the evidence of that confession.⁴

¹ Ante, § 362.

² 2 Russ. on Crimes, 597, 600; Rex v. Westbeer, 1 Leach, Cr. Cas. 14; Charnock's case, 4 St. Tr. 582, (Ed. 1730); 12 Howell's St. Tr. 1454, S. C.; Rex v. Fletcher, 1 Stra. 633. The rule of the Roman Law, *Nemo, allegans turpitudinem suam, est audiendus*, though formerly applied to witnesses, is now to that extent exploded. It can only be applied, at this day, to the case of a party seeking relief. See also 2 Stark. Evid. 9, 10; 2 Hale, P. C. 280; 7 T. R. 611; Musson v. Fales, 16 Mass. 335; Churchill v. Suter, 2 Mass. 162; Townsend v. Bush, 1 Conn. 267, per Trumbull, J.

³ The People v. Whipple, 9 Cowen, 707; Phil. & Am. on Evid. p. 28; 1 Phil. Evid. 28, 29.

⁴ Commonwealth v. Knapp, 10 Pick. 477; Rex v. Burley, 2 Stark. Evid. 12, note (r).

§ 380. The *degree of credit* which ought to be given to the testimony of an accomplice, is a matter exclusively within the province of the Jury. It has sometimes been said, that they ought not to believe him, unless his testimony is corroborated by other evidence; and, without doubt, great caution in weighing such testimony is dictated by prudence and good reason. But, there is no such rule of law; it being expressly conceded that the Jury may, if they please, act upon the evidence of the accomplice, without any confirmation of his statement.¹ But, on the other hand, Judges, in their discretion, will advise a Jury not to convict of felony, upon the testimony of an accomplice alone, and without corroboration; and it is now so generally the practice to give them such advice, that its omission would be regarded as an omission of duty on the part of the Judge.² And considering the respect always paid by the Jury to this advice from the bench, it may be regarded as the settled course of practice, not to convict a prisoner, in any case of felony, upon the solè and uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. The Judges do not, in such cases, withdraw the cause from the Jury by positive directions to acquit, but only advise them not to give credit to the testimony.

§ 381. But though it is thus the settled practice, in cases of felony, to require other evidence in corroboration of that of an accomplice; yet in regard to the *manner and extent of the corroboration* to be required, learned Judges are not perfectly

¹ Rex v. Hastings, 7 C. & P. 152, per Ld. Denman, C. J.; Rex v. Jones, 2 Campb. 132, per Ld. Ellenborough; 31 Howell's St. Tr. 315, S. C.; Rex v. Atwood, 2 Leach, Cr. Cas. 521; Rex v. Durham, Ib. 528; Rex v. Dawber, 3 Stark. R. 34; Rex v. Barnard, 1 C. & P. 87, 88; The People v. Costello, 1 Denio, N. Y. Rep. 83.

² Roscoe's Crim. Evid. p. 120; 2 Stark. Evid. 12; Rex v. Barnard, 1 C. & P. 87. For the limitation of this practice to cases of felony, see Rex v. Jones, 31 Howell's St. Tr. 315, per Gibbs, Attor. Gen. arg. See also Rex v. Hargrave, 5 C. & P. 170, where persons present at a fight, which resulted in manslaughter, though principals in the second degree, were held not to be such accomplices as required corroboration, when testifying as witnesses.

agreed. Some have deemed it sufficient, if the witness is confirmed in any material part of the case,¹ others have required confirmatory evidence as to the *corpus delicti* only;

¹ This is the rule in Massachusetts, where the law was stated by Morton, J. as follows:—"1. It is competent for a Jury to convict on the testimony of an accomplice alone. The principle which allows the evidence to go to the Jury, necessarily involves in it a power in them to believe it. The defendant has a right to have the Jury decide upon the evidence which may be offered against him; and their duty will require of them to return a verdict of guilty or not guilty, according to the conviction which that evidence shall produce in their minds. 2 Hawk. P. C. ch. 46, § 135; Hale's P. C. 304, 305; Roscoe's Crim. Ev. 119; 1 Phil. Ev. 32; 2 Stark. Ev. 18, 20. 2. But the source of this evidence is so corrupt, that it is always looked upon with suspicion and jealousy, and is deemed unsafe to rely upon without confirmation. Hence the Court ever consider it their duty to advise a Jury to acquit, where there is no evidence other than the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. 1 Phil. Evid. 34; 2 Stark. Ev. 24; Rex v. Durham, Leach, 528; Rex v. Jones, 2 Campb. 132; 1 Wheeler's Crim. Cas. 418; 2 Rogers's Recorder, 38; 5 Ibid. 95. 3. The mode of corroboration seems to be less certain. It is perfectly clear, that it need not extend to the whole testimony; but it being shown, that the accomplice has testified truly in some particulars, the Jury may infer that he has in others. But what amounts to corroboration? We think the rule is, that the corroborative evidence must relate to some portion of the testimony which is material to the issue. To prove that an accomplice had told the truth in relation to irrelevant and immaterial matters which were known to every body, would have no tendency to confirm his testimony involving the guilt of the party on trial. If this were the case, every witness, not incompetent for the want of understanding, could always furnish materials for the corroboration of his own testimony. If he could state where he was born, where he had resided, in whose custody he had been, or in what jail, or what room in the jail he had been confined, he might easily get confirmation of all these particulars. But these circumstances having no necessary connexion with the guilt of the defendant, the proof of the correctness of the statement in relation to them, would not conduce to prove that a statement of the guilt of the defendant was true. Roscoe's Crim. Ev. 120; Rex v. Addis, 6 Car. & Payne, 388." See Commonwealth v. Bosworth, 22 Pick. 397, 399, 400; The People v. Costello, 1 Denio, R. 83. A similar view of the nature of corroborative evidence, in cases where such evidence is necessary, was taken by Dr. Lushington, who held that it meant evidence not merely showing that the account given is probable, but proving facts *ejusdem generis*, and tending to produce the same result. Simmons v. Simmons, 11 Jur. 830. And see Maddox v. Sullivan, 2 Rich. Eq. R. 4.

and others have thought it essential, that there should be corroborating proof, that the prisoner actually participated in the offence; and that when several prisoners are to be tried, confirmation is to be required as to all of them, before all can be safely convicted; the confirmation of the witness, as to the commission of the crime, being regarded as no confirmation at all, as it respects the prisoner. For, in describing the circumstance of the offence, he may have no inducement to speak falsely, but may have every motive to declare the truth, if he intends to be believed, when he afterwards fixes the crime upon the prisoner.¹ If two or more accomplices are produced as witnesses, they are not deemed to corroborate each other; but the same rule is applied, and the same confirmation is required, as if there were but one.²

§ 382. There is one class of persons, *apparently accomplices*, to whom the rule, requiring corroborating evidence, does not apply; namely, persons who have entered into communication with conspirators, but either afterwards repenting, or having

¹ Rex v. Wilkes, 7 C. & P. 272, per Alderson, B.; Rex v. Moore, Ib. 270; Rex v. Addis, 6 C. & P. 388, per Patteson, J.; Rex v. Wells, 1 Mood. & M. 326, per Littledale J.; Commonwealth v. Bosworth, 22 Pick. 399, per Morton, J. The course of opinions and practice on this subject is stated more at large in 1 Phil. Evid. p. 30-38, and in 2 Stark. Evid. p. 12, note (x), to which the learned reader is referred. See also Roscoe's Crim. Evid. p. 120. Chief Baron Joy, after an elaborate examination of the English authorities, states the true rule to be this, that—"the confirmation ought to be in such and so many parts of the accomplice's *narrative*, as may reasonably satisfy the Jury that he is telling truth, without restricting the confirmation to any particular points, and leaving the effect of such confirmation (which may vary in its effect according to the nature and circumstances of the particular case) to the consideration of the Jury, aided in that consideration by the observations of the Judge." See Joy on the Evidence of Accomplices, p. 98, 99. By the Scotch Law, the evidence of a single witness is in no case sufficient to warrant a conviction, unless supported by a train of circumstances. Alison's Practice, p. 551.

² Rex v. Noakes, 3 C. & P. 326, per Littledale, J.; Regina v. Bannen, 2 Mood. Cr. Cas. 309. The testimony of the wife of an accomplice, is not considered as corroborative of her husband. Rex v. Neale, 7 C. & P. 168, per Park, J.

originally determined to frustrate the enterprise, have subsequently disclosed the conspiracy to the public authorities, under whose direction they continue to act with their guilty confederates, until the matter can be so far advanced and matured, as to insure their conviction and punishment. The early disclosure is considered as binding the party to his duty; and though a great degree of objection or disfavor may attach to him for the part he has acted as an *informer*, or on other accounts, yet his case is not treated as the case of an accomplice.¹

§ 383. Whether a *party to a negotiable instrument*, who has given it credit and currency by his signature, shall afterwards be admitted as a witness, in a suit between other persons, to prove the instrument *originally void*, is a question upon which Judges have been much divided in opinion. The leading case against the admissibility of the witness is that of *Walton v. Shelley*,² in which the indorser of a promissory note was called to prove it void for usury in its original concoction. The security was in the hands of an innocent holder. Lord Mansfield and the other learned Judges held, that, upon general grounds of public policy, the witness was inadmissible; it being "of consequence to mankind, that no person should hang out false colors to deceive them, by first affixing his signature to a paper, and then afterwards giving testimony to invalidate it." And in corroboration of this opinion, they referred to the spirit of that maxim of the Roman Law, — *Nemo, allegans suam turpitudinem, est audiendus*.³

¹ *Rex v. Despard*, 28 Howell's St. Tr. 489, per Ld. Ellenborough.

² 1 T. R. 296.

³ This maxim, though it is said not to be expressed, in terms, in the text of the *Corpus Juris*, (see Gilmer's Rep. p. 275, note,) is exceedingly familiar among the civilians; and is found in their Commentaries on various laws in the Code. See *Corpus Juris Glossatum*, Tom iv. col. 461, 1799; *Corp. Juris Gothofredi* (fol. ed.) Cod. lib. 7, tit. 8, l. 5, in margine; *Codex Justiniani* (4to. Parisiis, 1550), lib. 7, tit. 16, l. 1; *Ib.* tit. 8, l. 5, in margine. It seems formerly to have been deemed sufficient to exclude witnesses, testifying to their own turpitude; but the objection is now held to go only to the credi-

§ 384. The doctrine of this case afterwards came under discussion in the equally celebrated case of *Jordaine v. Lashbrooke*.¹ This was an action by the indorsee of a bill of exchange against the acceptor. The bill bore date at Ham-burgh; and the defence was, that it was drawn in London, and so was void at its creation, for want of a stamp; the statute² having declared, that unstamped bills should neither be pleaded, given in evidence, or allowed to be available, in law or equity. The indorser was offered by the defendant as a witness, to prove this fact, and the Court held that he was admissible. This case might, perhaps, have formed an exception to the general rule, adopted in *Walton v. Shelley*, on the ground, that the general policy of the law of commerce ought to yield to the public necessity in matters of revenue; and this necessity was relied upon by two of the three learned Judges who concurred in the decision. But they also concurred with Lord Kenyon in reviewing and overruling the doctrine of that case. The rule, therefore, now received in England, is, that the party to any instrument, whether negotiable or not, is a competent witness to prove any fact, to which any other witness would be competent to testify; provided he is not shown to be legally infamous, and is not directly interested in the event of the suit. The objection, that thereby he asserts that to be false which he has solemnly attested or held out to the world as true, goes only to his credibility with the Jury.³

bility of the testimony. 2 Stark. Evid. 9, 10; 2 Hale, P. C. 280; 7 T. R. 609, per Grose, J.; *Ib.* 611, per Lawrence, J. Thus, a witness is competent to testify that his former oath was corruptly false. *Rex v. Teal*, 11 East, 309; *Rands v. Thomas*, 5 M. & S. 244.

¹ 7 T. R. 599.

² 31 Geo. 3, c. 25, § 2, 16. This act was passed subsequent to the decision of *Walton v. Shelley*, 1 T. R. 296.

³ 1 Phil. Evid. 39, 40. On this ground, parties to other instruments, as well as subscribing witnesses, if not under some other disability, are, both in England and in the United States, held admissible witnesses to impeach the original validity of such instruments. 7 T. R. 611, per Lawrence, J.; *Heward v. Shipley*, 4 East, 180; *Lowe v. Jolliffe*, 1 W. Bl. 365; *Austin v.*

§ 385. The Courts of some of the *American States* have adopted the later English rule, and admitted the indorser, or other party to an instrument, as a competent witness to impeach it, in all cases where he is not on other grounds disqualified. In other States, decisions are found which go to the exclusion of the party to an instrument, in every case, when offered as a witness to defeat it, in the hands of a third person; thus importing into the law of evidence the maxim of the Roman Law, in its broadest extent. In other States, the Courts, referring the rule of exclusion to the ground of public convenience, have restricted its application to the case of a negotiable security, actually negotiated and put into circulation before its maturity, and still in the hands of an innocent indorsee, without notice of the alleged original infirmity, or any other defect in the contract. And in this case, the weight of American authority may now be considered as against the admissibility of the witness, to impeach the original validity of the security; although the contrary is still holden in some Courts, whose decisions in general are received with the highest respect.¹

Willes, Bull. N. P. 264; Howard v. Brathwaite, 1 Ves. & B. 202, 208; Title v. Grevett, 2 Ld Raym. 1008; Twambly v. Henley, 4 Mass. 441.

¹ The rule, that the indorser of a negotiable security, negotiated before it was due, is not admissible as a witness to prove it originally void, when in the hands of an innocent indorsee, is sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States, in *The Bank of the United States v. Dunn*, 6 Peters, 51, 57, explained and confirmed in *The Bank of the Metropolis v. Jones*, 8 Peters, 12, and in *The United States v. Leffler*, 11 Peters, 86, 94, 95; *Scott v. Lloyd*, 12 Peters, 149; *Henderson v. Anderson*, 3 Howard, S. C. Rep. 73; *Taylor v. Luther*, 2 Sumner, 235, per Story, J. It is also adopted in *Massachusetts*; *Churchill v. Suter*, 4 Mass. 156; *Fox v. Whitney*, 16 Mass. 118; *Packard v. Richardson*, 17 Mass. 122. See also the case of *Thayer v. Crossman*, 1 Metcalf, R. 416, in which the decisions are reviewed, and the rule clearly stated and vindicated by Shaw, C. J. And in *New Hampshire*; *Bryant v. Ritterbush*, 2 N. Hamp. 212; *Haddock v. Wilmarth*, 5 N. Hamp. 187. And in *Maine*; *Deering v. Sawtel*, 4 Greenl. 191; *Chandler v. Morton*, 5 Greenl. 374. And in *Pennsylvania*; *O'Brien v. Davis*, 6 Watts, 498, *Harrisburg Bank v. Forster*, 8 Watts, 304, 309. In *Louisiana*, the rule was stated and conceded, by Porter, J. in *Shamburg v. Commagere*, 10 Martin,

§ 386. Another class of persons, incompetent to testify in a cause, consists of those who are *interested in its result*.

18; and was again stated, but an opinion withheld, by Martin, J. in *Cox v. Williams*, 5 Martin, 139, N. S. In *Vermont*, the case of *Jordaine v. Lashbrooke*, was followed, in *Nichols v. Holgate*, 2 Aik. 138; but the decision is said to have been subsequently disapproved by all the Judges, in *Chandler v. Mason*, 2 Verm. 198, and the rule in *Walton v. Shelley*, approved. In *Ohio*, the indorser was admitted to prove facts *subsequent* to the indorsement; the Court expressing no opinion upon the general rule, though it was relied upon by the opposing counsel. *Stone v. Vance*, 6 Ohio Rep. 246. In *Mississippi*, the witness was admitted for the same purpose; and the rule in *Walton v. Shelley* was approved. *Drake v. Henly*, Walker, R. 541. In *Illinois*, the indorser has been admitted, where, in taking the note, he acted as the agent of the indorsee, to whom he immediately transferred it; without any notice of the rule. *Webster v. Vickers*, 2 Scam. 295. But the rule of exclusion has been rejected, and the general doctrine of *Jordaine v. Lashbrooke*, followed, in *New York*; *Stafford v. Rice*, 5 Cowen, 23; *Bank of Utica v. Hillard*, Ib. 153; *Williams v. Walbridge*, 3 Wend. 415. And in *Virginia*; *Taylor v. Beck*, 3 Randolph, R. 316. And in *Connecticut*; *Townsend v. Bush*, 1 Conn. 260. And in *South Carolina*; *Knight v. Packard*, 3 McCord, 71. And in *Tennessee*; *Stump v. Napier*, 2 Yerger, 35. In *Maryland*, it was rejected by three Judges against two, in *Ringgold v. Tyson*, 3 H. & J. 172. It was also rejected in *New Jersey*, in *Freeman v. Brittin*, 2 Harrison, 192. And in *North Carolina*; *Guy v. Hall*, 3 Murthy, 151. And in *Georgia*; *Slack v. Moss*, Dudley, 161. And in *Alabama*; *Todd v. Stafford*, 1 Stew. 199; *Griffing v. Harris*, 9 Porter, 226. In *Kentucky*, in the case of *Gorham v. Carrol*, 3 Littel, 221, where the indorser was admitted as a witness, it is to be observed, that the note was indorsed without recourse to him, and thereby marked with suspicion; and that the general rule was not considered. More recently in *New Hampshire*, the doctrine of *Walton v. Shelley*, has been denied, and the rule of the Roman Law has been admitted only as a rule of estoppel upon the parties to the transaction and in regard to their rights, and not as a rule of evidence, affecting the competency of witnesses; and therefore, the maker of a note, being released by his surety, was held competent, in an action by an indorsee against the surety, to testify to an alteration of the note, made by himself and the payee, which rendered it void as to the surety. *Haines v. Dennett*, 11 N. Hamp. 180. See further, 2 Stark. Evid. 179, note (A); 1 Phil. Evid. p. 44; Cowen & Hill's note 78, and Suppt.; Bayley on Bills, p. 586, note (b), (Phillips & Sewell's Ed.) But all these decisions against the rule in *Walton v. Shelley*, except that in *New Jersey*, and the last cited case in *New Hampshire*, were made long before that rule was recognised and adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States.

The principle on which these are rejected, is the same with that which excludes the parties themselves, and which has already been considered;¹ namely, the danger of perjury, and the little credit generally found to be due to such testimony in judicial investigations. This disqualifying interest, however, must be some legal, certain, and immediate interest, however minute, either in the event of the cause itself; or in the record, as an instrument of evidence, in support of his own claims, in a subsequent action.² It must be a legal interest, as distinguished from the prejudice or bias resulting from friendship or hatred, or from consanguinity, or any other domestic or social or any official relation, or any other motives by which men are generally influenced; for these go only to the credibility. Thus, a servant is a competent witness for his master, a child for his parent, a poor dependent for his patron, an accomplice for the government, and the like. Even a wife has been held admissible against a prisoner, though she believed that his conviction would save her husband's life.³ The rule of the Roman Law, — *Idonei non videntur esse testes, quibus imperari potest ut testes fient*,⁴ — has never been recognised in the Common Law, as affecting the competency; but it prevails in those countries in whose jurisprudence the authority of the Roman Law is recognised. Neither does the Common Law regard as of binding force the rule that excludes an advocate from testifying in the cause, for his

¹ Ante, § 326, 327, 329. And see the observations of Best, C. J. in *Hovill v. Stephenson*, 5 Bing. 493.

² 1 Stark. Evid. 102; *Bent v. Baker*, 3 T. R. 27; *Doe v. Tyler*, 6 Bing. 390, per Tindal, C. J.; *Smith v. Prager*, 7 T. R. 62; *Wilcox v. Farrell*, 1 H. Lord's Cas. 93.

³ *Rex v. Rudd*, 1 Leach, Cr. Cas. 135, 151. In weighing the testimony of witnesses naturally biassed, the rule is, to give credit to their statements of facts, and to view their deductions from facts with suspicion. *Dillon v. Dillon*, 3 Curt. 96.

⁴ Dig. lib. 22, tit. 5, l. 6. Poth. Obl. [793]. In Lower Canada, the incompetency of the relations and connexions of the parties, in civil cases, beyond the degree of cousins german, is removed, by Stat. 41 Geo. 3, c. 8. See Rev. Code 1845, p. 144.

client; — *Mandatis cavetur, ut Præsides attendant, ne patrōni, in causa cui patrocinium præstiterunt, testimonium dicunt*.¹ But on grounds of public policy, and for the purer administration of justice, the relation of lawyer and client is so far regarded by the rules of practice in some Courts, as that the lawyer is not permitted to be both advocate and witness for his client in the same cause.²

§ 387. The interest, too, must be *real, and not merely apprehended* by the party. For it would be exceedingly dangerous to violate a general rule, because, in a particular case, an individual does not understand the nature or extent of his rights and liabilities. If he believes and states that he has no interest, the very statement of the objection to his competency may inform him that he has; and, on the other hand, if he erroneously thinks and declares that he is interested, he may learn, by the decision of the Court, that he is not. Indeed, there would be danger in resting the rule on the judgment of a witness, and not on the fact itself; for the apprehended existence of the interest might lead his judgment to a wrong conclusion. And moreover, the inquiry which would be necessary into the grounds and degree of the witness's belief, would always be complicated, vague, and indefinite, and productive of much inconvenience. For these reasons, the more simple and practicable rule has been adopted of determining the admissibility of the witness by the actual existence, or not, of any disqualifying interest in the matter.³

¹ Dig. lib. 22, tit. 5, l. 25; Poth. Obl. [793].

² *Stones v. Byron*, 4 Dowl. & Lowndes, 393; *Dunn v. Packwood*, 11 Jur. 242; Reg. Gen. Sup. Court, N Hamp Reg. 23; 6 N. Hamp. R. 580.

³ 1 Phil. Evid. 127, 128; 1 Stark. Evid. 102; *Gresley on Evid.* p. 253; *Tait on Evid.* p. 351. In America, and in England, there are some early but very respectable authorities to the point, that a witness, believing himself interested, is to be rejected as incompetent. See *Fotheringham v. Greenwood*, 1 Stra. 129; *Trelawny v. Thomas*, 1 H. Bl 307, per Ld. Loughborough, C. J. and Gould, J.; *L'Amitie*, 6 Rob. Adm. 269, note (a); *Plumb v. Whiting*, 4 Mass. 518; *Richardson v. Hunt*, 2 Munf. 148; *Freeman v. Luckett*, 2 J. J. Marsh. 390. But the weight of modern authority is clearly

§ 388. If the witness believes himself to be under an *honorary obligation*, respecting the matter in controversy, in favor of the party calling him, he is nevertheless a competent witness, for the reasons already given; and his credibility is left with the Jury.¹

§ 389. The disqualifying interest of the witness must be in the event of the cause itself, and not in the *question* to be decided. His liability to a like action, or his standing in the same predicament with the party, if the verdict cannot be given in evidence for or against him, is an interest in the question only, and does not exclude him.² Thus, one underwriter may be a witness for another underwriter upon the same policy;³ or, one seaman for another, whose claim for wages is resisted, on grounds equally affecting all the crew;⁴ or, one freeholder for another, claiming land under the same title, or by the same lines and corners;⁵ or, one devisee for another, claiming under the same will;⁶ or, one trespasser for his co-trespasser;⁷ or, a creditor for his debtor;⁸ or, a tenant

the other way. See *Commercial Bank of Albany v. Hughes*, 17 Wend. 94, 101, 102; *Stall v. The Catskill Bank*, 18 Wend. 466, 475, 476; *Smith v. Downs*, 6 Conn. 371; *Long v. Baillé*, 4 S. & R. 222; *Dellone v. Rehmer*, 4 Watts, 9; *Stimmel v. Underwood*, 3 G. & J. 282; *Havis v. Barkley*, 1 Harper's Law Rep. 63.

¹ *Pederson v. Stoffles*, 1 Campb. 144; *Solarete v. Melville*, 1 Man. & Ryl. 198; 1 Phil. Evid. 128; 1 Stark. Evid. 102; *Gilpin v. Vincent*, 9 Johns. 219; *Moore v. Hitchcock*, 4 Wend. 292; *Union Bank v. Knapp*, 3 Pick. 96, 108; *Smith v. Downs*, 6 Conn. 365; *Stimmel v. Underwood*, 3 Gill & Johns. 282.

² *Evans v. Eaton*, 7 Wheat. 356, 424, per Story, J.; *Van Nuys v. Terhune*, 3 Johns. Cas. 82; *Stewart v. Kip*, 5 Johns. 256; *Evans v. Hettich*, 7 Wheat. 453.

³ *Bent v. Baker*, 3 T. R. 27.

⁴ *Spurr v. Pearson*, 1 Mason, 104; *Hoyt v. Wildfire*, 3 Johns. 518.

⁵ *Richardson v. Carey*, 2 Rand. 87; *Owings v. Speed*, 5 Wheat. 423.

⁶ *Jackson v. Hogarth*, 6 Cowen, 248.

⁷ Per Ashhurst, J. in *Walton v. Shelley*, 1 T. R. 301. See also *Blackett v. Weir*, 5 B. & C. 387, per Abbott, C. J.; *Duncan v. Meikleham*, 3 C. & P. 172; *Curtis v. Graham*, 12 Martin, 289.

⁸ *Paull v. Brown*, 6 Esp. 34; *Nowell v. Davies*, 5 B. & Ad. 368.

by the curtesy, or tenant in dower, for the heir at law, in a suit concerning the title.¹ And the purchaser of a license to use a patent may be a witness for the patentee, in an action for infringing the patent.²

§ 390. The *true test of the interest* of a witness is, that he will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment, or, that the record will be legal evidence for or against him, in some other action.³ It must be a present, certain, and vested interest, and not an interest uncertain, remote, or contingent. Thus, the heir apparent to an estate is a competent witness in support of the claim of his ancestor; though one, who has a vested interest in remainder, is not competent.⁴ And if the interest is of a doubtful nature, the objection goes to the credit of the witness, and not to his competency.⁵ For, being always presumed to be competent, the burden of proof is on the objecting party, to sustain his exception to the competency; and if he fails satisfactorily to establish it, the witness is to be sworn.

§ 391. The *magnitude or degree of the interest* is not regarded, in estimating its effect on the mind of the witness; for it is impossible to measure the influence which any given interest may exert. It is enough, that the interest which he has in the subject is direct, certain, and vested, however small

¹ *Jackson v. Brooks*, 8 Wend. 426; *Doe v. Maisey*, 1 B. & Ad. 439.

² *De Rosnie v. Fairlie*, 1 M. & Rob. 457.

³ 1 Gilb. Evid. by Lofft, p. 225; Bull. N. P. 284; *Bent v. Baker*, 3 T. R. 27; 6 Bing. 394, per Tindal, C. J.; Ante, § 386; *Rex v. Boston*, 4 East, 581, per Ld. Ellenborough.

⁴ *Smith v. Blackham*, 1 Salk. 283; *Doe v. Tyler*, 6 Bing. 390. But in an action for waste, brought by a landlord, who is tenant for life, the remainder-man is a competent witness for the plaintiff; for the damages would not belong to the witness, but to the plaintiff's executor. *Leach v. Thomas*, 7 C. & P. 327.

⁵ *Bent v. Baker*, 3 T. R. 27, 32; *Jackson v. Benson*, 2 Y. & J. 45; *Rex v. Cole*, 1 Esp. 169.

may be its amount;¹ for, interest being admitted as a disqualifying circumstance in any case, it must of necessity be so in every case, whatever be the character, rank, or fortune of the party interested. Nor is it necessary, that the witness should be interested in that which is the subject of the suit; for if he is liable for the costs, as in the case of a *prochein amy*, or a guardian, or the like, we have already seen,² that he is incompetent. And though, where the witness is equally interested on both sides, he is not incompetent; yet if there is a certain excess of interest on one side, it seems that he will be incompetent to testify on that side; for he is interested, to the amount of the excess, in procuring a verdict for the party, in whose favor his interest preponderates.³

§ 392. The nature of the direct interest in the event of the suit which disqualifies the witness, may be illustrated by reference to some adjudged cases. Thus, persons having become bail for the defendant have been held incompetent to testify as witnesses on his side; for they are immediately

¹ *Burton v. Hinde*, 5 T. R. 173; *Butler v. Warren*, 11 Johns. 57; *Doe v. Tooth*, 3 Y. & J. 19.

² *Ante*, § 347. See also, *Post*, § 401, 402.

³ *Larbalestier v. Clark*, 1 B. & Ad. 899. Where this preponderance arose from a liability to costs only, the rule formerly was to admit the witness; because of the extreme difficulty which frequently arose, of determining the question of his liability to pay the costs. See *Ilderton v. Atkinson*, 7 T. R. 480; *Birt v. Kershaw*, 2 East, 458. But these cases were broken in upon, by *Jones v. Brooke*, 4 Taunt. 464; and the witness is now held incompetent, wherever there is a preponderance of interest on the side of the party adducing him, though it is created only by the liability to costs. *Townsend v. Downing*, 14 East, 565; *Hubbly v. Brown*, 16 Johns. 70; *Scott v. McLellan*, 2 Greenl. 199; *Bottomley v. Wilson*, 3 Stark. R. 148; *Harman v. Lesbrey*, 1 Holt's Cas. 390; *Edmonds v. Lowe*, 8 B. & C. 407. And see Mr. Evans's observations, in 2 Poth. Obl. p. 269, App. No. 16. The existence of such a rule, however, was regretted by Mr. Justice Littledale, in 1 B. & Ad. 903; and by some it is still thought that the earlier cases, above cited, are supported by the better reason. See further, *Barretto v. Snowden*, 5 Wend. 181; *Hall v. Hale*, 8 Conn. 336.

made liable, or discharged, by the judgment against or in favor of the principal. And if the bail have given security for the appearance of the defendant, by depositing a sum of money with the officer, the effect is the same.¹ If an underwriter, who has paid his proportion, is to be repaid in the event of the plaintiff's success in a suit against another underwriter upon the same policy, he cannot be a witness for the plaintiff.² A creditor, whether of a bankrupt, or of an estate, or of any other person, is not admissible as a witness to increase or preserve the fund, out of which he is entitled to be paid, or otherwise benefitted.³ Nor is a bankrupt competent in an action by his assignees, to prove any fact tending to increase the fund; though both he and his creditors may be witnesses to diminish it.⁴ The same is true of a legatee, without a

¹ *Lacon v. Higgins*, 3 Stark. R. 132; 1 T. R. 164, per Buller, J. But in such cases, if the defendant wishes to examine his bail, the Court will either allow his name to be stricken out, on the defendant's adding and justifying another person as his bail; or, even at the trial, will permit it to be stricken out of the bail piece, upon the defendant's depositing a sufficient sum with the proper officer. 1 Tidd's Pr. 259; *Baillie v. Hole*, 1 Mood. & M. 289; 3 C. & P. 560, S. C.; *Whatley v. Fearnley*, 2 Chitty, R. 103. And in the like manner the surety in a replevin bond may be rendered a competent witness for the plaintiff. *Bailey v. Bailey*, 1 Bing. 92. And so, of the indorser of a writ, who thereby becomes surety for payment of the costs. *Roberts v. Adams*, 9 Greenl. 9. See further, *Salmon v. Rance*, 3 S. & R. 311, 314; *Hall v. Baylies*, 15 Pick. 51, 53; *Beckley v. Freeman*, Ib. 468; *Allen v. Hawks*, 13 Pick. 79; *McCulloch v. Tyson*, 2 Hawks, 336; *Post*, § 430; *Comstock v. Paie*, 3 Rob. Louis. R. 440.

² *Forrester v. Pigou*, 3 Campb. 380; 1 M. & S. 9, S. C.

³ *Craig v. Cundell*, 1 Campb. 381; *Williams v. Stevens*, 2 Campb. 301; *Shuttleworth v. Bravo*, 1 Stra. 507; *Powel v. Gordon*, 2 Esp. 735; *Stewart v. Kip*, 5 Johns. 256; *Holden v. Hearn*, 1 Beav. 445. But to disqualify the witness, he must be legally entitled to payment out of the fund. *Phenix v. Ingraham*, 5 Johns. 427; *Peyton v. Hallett*, 1 Caines, 363, 379; *Howard v. Chadbourne*, 3 Greenl. 461; *Marland v. Jefferson*, 2 Pick. 240; *Wood v. Braynard*, 9 Pick. 322. A mere expectation of payment, however strong, if not amounting to a legal right, has been deemed insufficient to render him incompetent. *Seaver v. Bradley*, 6 Greenl. 60.

⁴ *Butler v. Cooke*, Cowp. 70; *Ewens v. Gold*, Bull. N. P. 43; *Green v. Jones*, 2 Campb. 411; *Loyd v. Stretton*, 1 Stark. R. 40; *Rudge v. Fergu-*

release, and also of an heir or distributee, in any action affecting the estate.¹ So, where the immediate effect of the judgment for the plaintiff is to confirm the witness in the enjoyment of an interest in possession,² or, to place him in the immediate possession of a right,³ he is not a competent witness for the plaintiff. Neither can a lessor be admitted as a witness, to prove a right of possession in his lessee to a portion of land, claimed as part of the premises leased.⁴

son, 1 C. & P. 253; *Masters v. Drayton*, 2 T. R. 496; *Clark v. Kirkland*, 4 Martin, 405. In order to render the bankrupt competent, in such cases, he must release his allowance and surplus; and he must also have obtained his certificate, without which he is in no case a competent witness for his assignees. *Masters v. Drayton*, 2 T. R. 496; *Goodhay v. Hendry*, 1 Mood. & M. 319. And though his certificate has been allowed by the competent number of creditors, and no opposition to its final allowance is anticipated, yet, until its allowance by the Lord Chancellor, he is still incompetent; nor will the trial, for that purpose, be postponed. *Tennant v. Strachan*, 1 Mood. & M. 377. So, if his certificate has been finally obtained, yet, if his future effects remain liable, (as in the case of a second bankruptcy, where he has not yet paid the amount necessary to exempt his future acquisitions,) he is still incompetent as a witness for the assignees, being interested to increase the fund. *Kennet v. Greenwollers*, Peake's Cas. 3. The same rules apply to the case of insolvent debtors. *De lafield v. Freeman*, 6 Bing. 294; 4 C. & P. 67, S. C.; *Rudge v. Ferguson*, 1 C. & P. 253. But upon grounds of public policy and convenience, a bankrupt is held inadmissible to prove any fact which is material to support or to defeat the fiat issued against him. Nor is a creditor competent to support the fiat, whether he has or has not availed himself of the right of proving under the bankruptcy. See 1 Phil. Evid. 94, 95, 96, and cases there cited.

¹ *Hilliard v. Jennings*, 1 Ld. Raym. 505; 1 Burr. 424; 2 Stark. R. 546; *Green v. Salmon*, 3 N. & P. 388; *Bloor v. Davies*, 7 M. & W. 235. And if he is a residuary legatee, his own release of the debt will not render him competent for the executor, in an action against the debtor; for he is still interested in supporting the action, in order to relieve the estate from the charge of the costs. *Baker v. Tyrwhitt*, 4 Campb. 27; 6 Bing. 394, per Tindal, C. J.; *Matthews v. Smith*, 2 Y. & J. 426; *Allington v. Bearcroft*, Peake's Add. Cas. 212; Phil. & Am. on Evid. 87; 1 Phil. Evid. 93, 94; *West v. Randall*, 2 Mason, 181; *Randall v. Phillips*, 3 Mason, 378; *Campbell v. Tousey*, 7 Cowen, 64; *Carlisle v. Burley*, 3 Greenl. 250.

² *Doe v. Williams*, Cowp. 621.

³ *Rex v. Williams*, 9 B. & C. 549.

⁴ *Smith v. Chambers*, 4 Esp. 164.

§ 393. So, where the event of the suit, if it is adverse to the party adducing the witness, will render the latter *liable* either to a third person, or to the party himself, whether the liability arise from an express or implied legal obligation to indemnify, or from an express or implied contract to pay money upon that contingency, the witness is in like manner incompetent. The cases under this branch of the rule are apparently somewhat conflicting; and therefore it may deserve a more distinct consideration. And here it will be convenient to distinguish between those cases where the judgment will be evidence of the material facts involved in the issue, and those where it will be evidence only of the amount of damages recovered, which the defendant may be compelled to pay. In the former class, which will hereafter be considered, the interest of the party is in the record, to establish his entire claim; in the latter, which belongs to the present head, it is only to prove the amount of the injury which he has suffered.

§ 394. Thus, in an action against the principal for damage, occasioned by the neglect or *misconduct of his agent or servant*, the latter is not a competent witness for the defendant without a release; for he is, in general, liable over to his master or employer, in a subsequent action, to refund the amount of damages which the latter may have paid. And though the record will not be evidence against the agent, to establish the fact of misconduct, unless he has been duly and seasonably informed of the pendency of the suit, and required to defend it, in which case it will be received as evidence of all the facts found;¹ yet it will always be admissible to show the amount of damages recovered against his employer.² The principle of this rule applies to the relation of master and servant, or employer and agent, wherever that relation, in its broadest sense, may be found to exist; as, for example, to the

¹ *Hamilton v. Cutts*, 4 Mass. 349; *Tyler v. Ulmer*, 12 Mass. 163. See *post*, under the head of Judgments.

² *Green v. New River Co.* 4 T. R. 589; 1 Phil. Evid. p. 101, 102.

case of a pilot, in an action against the captain and owner of a vessel, for mismanagement while the pilot was in charge;¹ or, of the guard of a coach, implicated in the like mismanagement, in an action against the proprietor;² or, of a broker, in an action against the principal for misconduct in the purchase of goods, which he had done through the broker;³ or, of a sheriff's officer, who had given security for the due execution of his duty, in an action against the sheriff for misconduct in the service of process by the same officer;⁴ or, of a ship-master, in an action by his owner against underwriters, where the question was, whether there had been a deviation;⁵ neither of whom are competent to give testimony, the direct legal effect of which will be, to place themselves in a situation of entire security against a subsequent action. But the liability must be direct and immediate to the party; for if the witness is liable to a third person, who is liable to the party, such circuitry of interest is no legal ground of exclusion.⁶ The liability also must be legal; for if the contract be against law, as, for example, if it be a promise to indemnify an officer for a violation of his duty in the service of process, it is void; and the promisor is a competent witness, the objection going only to his credibility.⁷

¹ *Hawkins v. Finlayson*, 3 C. & P. 305. But the pilot has been held admissible in an action by the owners against the underwriters, for the loss of the vessel while in his charge; on the ground, that his interest was balanced. *Vairin v. Canal Ins. Co.* 1 Wilcox, 223.

² *Whitmore v. Waterhouse*, 4 C. & P. 383.

³ *Field v. Mitchell*, 6 Esp. 71; *Gevers v. Mainwaring*, 1 Holt's Cas. 139; *Boorman v. Browne*, 1 P. & D. 364; *Moorish v. Foote*, 8 Taunt. 454.

⁴ *Powel v. Hord*, 1 Stra. 650; 2 Ld. Raym. 1411, S. C.; *Whitehouse v. Atkinson*, 3 C. & P. 344; *Broom v. Bradley*, 8 C. & P. 500. So, the creditor is incompetent to testify for the officer, where he is liable over to the latter, if the plaintiff succeeds. *Keightley v. Birch*, 3 Campb. 521. See also *Jewett v. Adams*, 8 Greenl. 30; *Turner v. Austin*, 16 Mass. 181; *Rice v. Wilkins*, 8 Shepl. 558.

⁵ *De Symonds v. De la Cour*, 2 New Rep. 374.

⁶ *Clark v. Lucas*, Ry. & M. 32.

⁷ *Hodsdon v. Wilkins*, 7 Greenl. 113.

§ 395. The same principle applies to *other cases*, where the direct effect of the judgment will be to create *any other legal claim* against the witness. Thus, if he is to repay a sum of money to the plaintiff, if he fails in the suit, he is incompetent to be sworn for the plaintiff.¹ So, in an action on a policy of insurance, where there has been a consolidation rule, an underwriter, who is a party to such rule, is not a competent witness for the others.² The case is the same, wherever a rule is entered into, that one action shall abide the event of another; for in both these cases all the parties have a direct interest in the result. And it makes *no difference*, in any of these cases, whether the witness is called by the plaintiff or by the defendant; for in either case the test of interest is the same; the question being, whether a judgment in favor of the party, calling the witness, will procure a direct benefit to the witness. Thus, in *assumpsit*, if the non-joinder of a co-contractor is pleaded in abatement, such person is not a competent witness for the defendant, to support the plea, unless he is released; for though, if the defence succeeds, the witness will still be liable to another action, yet he has a direct interest to defeat the present action, both to avoid the payment of costs, and also to recover the costs of the defence.³ The case is the same, where, in a defence upon the merits, a witness is called by the defendant, who is confessedly or by his own testimony a co-contractor or partner with him in the subject of the action.⁴ So, in a suit against one on a joint obligation, a

¹ *Fotheringham v. Greenwood*, 1 Stra. 129; *Rogers v. Turner*, 5 West. Law Journ. 406.

² The same principle also applies where the underwriter, offered as a witness for the defendant, has paid the loss, upon an agreement with the assured, that the money should be repaid, if he failed to recover against the other underwriters. *Forrester v. Pigou*, 1 M. & S. 9; 3 Campb. 380, S. C.

³ *Young v. Bairner*, 1 Esp. 103; *Lefferts v. De Mott*, 21 Wend. 136.

⁴ *Birt v. Wood*, 1 Esp. 20; *Goodacre v. Breame*, Peake's Cas. 174; *Cheyne v. Koops*, 4 Esp. 112; *Evans v. Yeatherd*, 2 Bing. 133; *Hall v. Cecil*, 6 Bing. 181; *Russell v. Blake*, 2 M. & G. 373, 381, 382; *Vanzant v. Kay*, 2 Humph. 106, 112. But this point has in some cases been otherwise decided. See *Cossham v. Goldney*, 2 Stark. R. 413; *Blackett v. Weir*, 5 B. & C. 385. See also, *Poole v. Palmer*, 9 M. & W. 71.

co-obligor, not sued, is not a competent witness for the plaintiff, to prove the execution of the instrument by the defendant; for he is interested to relieve himself of part of the debt by charging it on the defendant.¹ And upon a similar principle, where an action was brought upon a policy of insurance, averred in the declaration to have been effected by the plaintiffs as agents, for the use and benefit and on the account of a third person, it was held, that this third person was not a competent witness for the plaintiffs; and that his release to the plaintiffs, prior to the action, of all actions, claims, &c., which he might have against them by reason of the policy, or for any moneys to be recovered of the underwriters, did not render him competent; neither could his assignment to them, after action brought, of all his interest in the policy, have that effect; for the action being presumed to have been brought by his authority, he was still liable to the attorney for the costs.² So, in an action on a joint and several bond against the surety, he cannot call the principal obligor to prove the payment of money by the latter in satisfaction of the debt; for the witness has an interest in favor of his surety to the extent of the costs.³ So also, where a legatee sued the executor for the recovery of a specific legacy, namely, a bond; it was held that the obligor, having a direct interest in preventing its being enforced, was not a competent witness to prove that the circumstances, under which the bond was given, were such as to show that it was irrecoverable.⁴

§ 396. It may seem, at the first view, that where the plain-

¹ *Marshall v. Thrailkill*, 12 Ohio R. 275; *Ripley v. Thompson*, 12 Moore, 55; *Brown v. Brown*, 4 Taunt. 752; *Marquand v. Webb*, 16 Johns. 89; *Purviance v. Dryden*, 3 S. & R. 402, 407. And see *Latham v. Kenniston*, 13 N. Hamp. R. 203.

² *Bell v. Smith*, 5 B. & C. 188.

³ *Townsend v. Downing*, 5 East, 565, 567, per Ld. Ellenborough. In an action against the sheriff, for a negligent escape, the debtor is not a competent witness for the defendant, he being liable over to the defendant for the damages and costs. *Griffin v. Brown*, 2 Pick. 304.

⁴ *Davies v. Morgan*, 1 Beav. 405.

tiff calls his own servant or agent to prove an injury to his property while in the care and custody of the servant, there could be no objection to the competency of the witness, to prove misconduct in the defendant; because, whatever might be the result of the action, the record would be no evidence against him in a subsequent action by the plaintiff. But still the witness in such case is held inadmissible; upon the general principle already mentioned,¹ in cases where the master or principal is defendant, namely, that a verdict for the master would place the servant or agent in a state of security against any action, which, otherwise, the master might bring against him; to prevent which, he is directly interested to fix the liability on the defendant. Thus, in an action for an injury to the plaintiff's cart, or coach, or horses, by negligently driving against them, the plaintiff's own driver or coachman is not a competent witness for him, without a release.² So, in an action by the shipper of goods, on a policy of insurance, the owner of the ship is not a competent witness for the plaintiff, to prove the seaworthiness of the ship, he having a direct interest to exonerate himself from liability to an action for the want of seaworthiness, if the plaintiff should fail to recover of the underwriter.³ The only difference between the case, where the master is plaintiff, and where he is defendant, is this, that in the latter case he might claim of the servant both the damages and costs, which he had been compelled to pay; but in the former, he could claim only such damages

¹ Ante, § 393. This principle is applied to all cases, where the testimony of the witness, adduced by the plaintiff, would discharge him from the plaintiff's demand, by establishing it against the defendant. Thus, in an action by A. against B. for the board of C., the latter is not a competent witness for the plaintiff, to prove the claim. *Emerton v. Andrews*, 4 Mass. 653; *Hodson v. Marshall*, 7 C. & P. 16.

² *Miller v. Falconer*, 1 Campb. 251; *Moorish v. Foote*, 8 Taunt. 454; *Kerrison v. Coatsworth*, 1 C. & P. 645; *Wake v. Lock*, 5 C. & P. 454. In *Sherman v. Barnes*, 1 M. & Rob. 69, the same point was so ruled, by Tindal, C. J., upon the authority of *Moorish v. Foote*, though he seems to have thought otherwise, upon principle, and perhaps with better reason.

³ *Rotheroe v. Elton*, Peake's Cas. 84, cited and approved, per Gibbs, C. J. in 8 Taunt. 457.

as directly resulted from the servant's misconduct, of which the costs of an unfounded suit of his own would not constitute a part.¹

§ 397. Where the interest of the witness arises from liability over, it is sufficient that he is *bound to indemnify* the party calling him, against the consequence of some fact essential to the judgment. It is not necessary, that there should be an engagement to indemnify him generally against the judgment itself, though this is substantially involved in the other; for a covenant of indemnity against a particular fact, essential to the judgment, is in effect a covenant of indemnity against such a judgment. Thus, the warrantor of title to the property which is in controversy, is generally incompetent as a witness for his vendee, in an action concerning the title. And it makes no difference, in what manner the liability arises, nor whether the property is real or personal estate. If the title is in controversy, the person who is bound to make it good to one of the litigating parties against the claim of the other, is identified in interest with that party, and therefore cannot testify in his favor.² And if the quality or soundness is the subject of dispute, and the vendee with warranty has resold the article with similar warranty, the principle is still the same. If the effect of the judgment is certainly to render him liable, though it be only for costs, he is incompetent;³

¹ Per Tindal, C. J. in *Faucourt v. Bull*, 1 Bing. N. C. 681, 688.

² *Serle v. Serle*, 2 Roll. Abr. 685; 21 Vin. Abr. 362, tit. *Trial*, G. f. pl. 1; *Steers v. Carwardine*, 8 C. & P. 570. But if the vendor sold without any covenant of title, or with a covenant restricted to claims set up under the vendor himself alone, the vendor is a competent witness for his vendee. *Busby v. Greenslate*, 1 Stra. 445; *Twambly v. Henley*, 4 Mass. 441; *Beidelman v. Foulk*, 5 Watts, 308; *Adams v. Cuddy*, 13 Pick. 460; *Bridge v. Eggleston*, 14 Mass. 245; *Davis v. Spooner*, 3 Pick. 284; *Lathrop v. Muzzy*, 5 Greenl. 450.

³ *Lewis v. Peake*, 7 Taunt. 153. In this case, the buyer of a horse with warranty, resold him with a similar warranty, and being sued thereon, he gave notice of the action to his vendor, offering him the option of defending it; to which having received no answer, he defended it himself, and failed; and it was holden, that he was entitled to recover of his vendor the costs of

but if it is only to render it more or less probable that he will be prosecuted, the objection goes only to his credibility. But whatever the case may be, his liability must be direct and immediate to the party calling him, and not circuitous and to some other person; as, if a remote vendor with warranty is called by the defendant as a witness, where the article has been successively sold, by several persons, with the same warranty, before it came to the defendant.¹

§ 398. In order to render the witness liable, and therefore incompetent, as warrantor of the title, it is not necessary to show an express contract to that effect; for an *implied warranty* is equally binding. Thus the vendor of goods, having possession and selling them as his own, is held bound in law, to warrant the title to the vendee;² and therefore he is generally not competent as a witness for the vendee in support of the title.³ This implied warranty of title, however, in the

defending that action, as part of the damages he had sustained by the false warranty. In the later case of *Baldwin v. Dixon*, 1 M. & Rob. 59, where the defendant, in an action on a warranty of a horse, called his vendor, who had given a similar warranty, Ld. Tenterden, after examining authorities, admitted the witness. A vendor was admitted, under similar circumstances, by Ld. Alvanley, in *Briggs v. Crick*, 5 Esp. 99. But in neither of these cases does it appear that the witness had been called upon to defend the suit. In the still more recent case of *Biss v. Mountain*, 1 M. & Rob. 302, after an examination of various authorities, Alderson, J. held the vendor incompetent, on the ground, that the effect of the judgment for the defendant would be to relieve the witness from an action at his suit.

¹ *Clark v. Lucas*, Ry. & M. 32; *Briggs v. Crick*, 5 Esp. 99; *Martin v. Kelly*, 1 Stew. Ala. R. 198.

² 2 Bl. Comm. 451. See also 2 Kent's Comm. 478, and cases there cited. See also *Emerson v. Brigham*, 10 Mass. 203, (Rand's Ed.) note.

³ *Heermance v. Vernoy*, 6 Johns. 5; *Hale v. Smith*, 6 Greenl. 416; *Baxter v. Graham*, 5 Watts, 418. See also the cases cited in Cowen & Hill's notes to 1 Phil. Evid. Vol. 3, p. 1532. In the general doctrine, stated in the text, that where the vendor is liable over, though it be only for costs, he is not a competent witness for the vendee, the English and American decisions agree. And it is believed that the weight of English authority is on the side of the American doctrine, as stated in the text,

case of sales by sheriffs, executors, administrators, and other trustees, is understood to extend no farther than this, that they do not know of any infirmity in their title to sell in such capacity; and therefore they are in general competent witnesses.¹

§ 399. In regard to *parties to bills of exchange* and negotiable promissory notes, we have already seen that the persons, who have put them into circulation by indorsement, are sometimes held incompetent witnesses, to prove them originally void.² But, subject to this exception, which is maintained on grounds of public policy, and of the interest of trade, and the necessity of confidence in commercial transactions, and which, moreover, is not every where conceded, parties to these instruments are admitted or rejected, in suits between other parties,

namely, that the vendor in possession stipulates that his title is good. But where the witness claims to have derived from the plaintiff the same title which he conveyed to the defendant, and so is accountable for the value to the one party or the other, in either event of the suit, unless he can discharge himself by other proof, he is a competent witness for the defendant; unless he has so conducted as to render himself accountable to the latter for the costs of the suit, as part of the damages to be recovered against him. Thus, where, in trover for a horse, the defendant called his vendor to prove that the horse was pledged to him for a debt due from the plaintiff, with authority to sell him after a certain day, and that he sold him accordingly to the defendant; he was held a competent witness. *Nix v. Cutting*, 4 Taunt. 18. So, in *assumpsit*, for the price of wine sold to the defendant, where the defence was, that he bought it of one Faircloth, and not of the plaintiff, Faircloth was held a competent witness for the defendant to prove that he himself purchased the wine of the plaintiff, and sold it to the defendant, who had paid him the price. *Labalastier v. Clark*, 1 B. & Ad. 899. So, the defendant's vendor has been held competent, in trover, to prove that the goods were his own, and had been fraudulently taken from him by the plaintiff. *Ward v. Wilkinson*, 4 B. & Ald. 410, where *Nix v. Cutting* is explained by Holroyd, J. See also *Baldwin v. Dixon*, 1 M. & R. 59; *Briggs v. Crick*, 5 Esp. 99, and Mr. Starkie's observations on some of these cases, 1 Stark. Evid. 109, note (n); 2 Stark. Evid. 894, note (d).

¹ *Peto v. Blades*, 5 Taunt. 657; *Mockbee v. Gardiner*, 2 Har. & Gill, 176; *Petermans v. Laws*, 6 Leigh's R. 523, 529.

² Ante, § 384, 385.

like any other witnesses, according as they are interested or not in the event of the suit. In general, their interest will be found to be equal on both sides; and in all cases of *balanced interest*, the witness, as we shall hereafter see, is admissible.¹ Thus, in an action against one of several makers of a note, another maker is a competent witness for the plaintiff, as he stands indifferent; for if the plaintiff should recover in that action, the witness will be liable to pay his contributory share; and if the plaintiff should fail in that action, and force the witness to pay the whole, in another suit, he will still be entitled to contribution.² So, in an action against the acceptor of a bill, the drawer is in general a competent witness for either party; for if the plaintiff recovers, the witness pays the bill by the hands of the acceptor; if not, he is liable to pay it himself.³ And in an action by the indorsee of a note against the indorser, the maker is a competent witness for the plaintiff; for if the plaintiff prevails, the witness will be liable to pay the note to the defendant; and if the defendant prevails, the witness will be liable, to the same extent, to the plaintiff.⁴

§ 400. And though the testimony of the witness, by defeating the present action on the bill or note, *may probably deter* the holder from proceeding in another action against the witness, yet this only affords matter of observation to the Jury, as to the *credit* to be given to his testimony. Thus, in an action by the indorsee of a note against the indorser, the maker is a competent witness for the defendant, to prove that

¹ Post, § 420.

² *York v. Blott*, 5 M. & S. 71. But *quare*, and see the cases cited Ante, § 395, notes 2, 3, and 12 Ohio R. 279.

³ *Dickinson v. Prentice*, 4 Esp. 32; *Lowber v. Shaw*, 5 Mason, 241, per Story, J.; *Rich v. Topping*, Peake's Cas. 224. But if he is liable in one event for the costs, he has an interest on that side, and is inadmissible. *Scott v. McLellan*, 2 Greenl. 199; Ante, § 391, and note (5).

⁴ *Venning v. Shuttleworth*, Bayley on Bills, p. 593; *Hubbly v. Brown*, 16 Johns. 70. But the maker of an accommodation note, made for his own benefit, is incompetent. *Pierce v. Butler*, 14 Mass. 303, 312; Post, § 401.

the date has been altered.¹ And in an action by the indorsee of a bill against the drawer or acceptor, an indorser is, in general, a competent witness for either party; for the plaintiff, because, though his success *may* prevent him from calling on the indorser, it is not certain that it will; and whatever part of the bill or note he may be compelled to pay, he may recover again of the drawer or acceptor; and he is competent for the defendant, because if the plaintiff fails against the drawer or acceptor, he is driven either to sue the indorser or abandon his claim.²

§ 401. But if the verdict would necessarily benefit or affect the witness, as if he would be *liable*, in one event, *to the costs of the action*, then, without a release, which will annul his interest in the event, he will not be admissible as a witness on the side of the party, in whose favor he is so interested. Thus, the party, for whose use an accommodation note or bill has been drawn or accepted, is incompetent as a witness, when adduced by him who has lent his own name and liability for the accommodation of the witness.³ So, in an action against the drawer of a bill of exchange, it has been held, that the acceptor is not a competent witness for the defendant, to prove a set-off; because he is interested in lessening the balance, being answerable to the defendant only for the amount which the plaintiff may recover against him.⁴

¹ *Levi v. Essex*, MSS. 2 Esp. Dig. 708, per Ld. Mansfield; *Chitty on Bills*, p. 654, note (b), (8th Ed.)

² *Bayley on Bills*, 594, 595, (2d Am. Ed. by Phillips & Sewall.) And see *Bay v. Gunn*, 1 Denio, R. 108.

³ *Jones v. Brooke*, 4 Taunt. 463; Ante, § 391, and note (5). See also *Bottomly v. Wilson*, 3 Stark. R. 148; *Harman v. Lasbrey*, Holt's Cas. 390; *Edmonds v. Lowe*, 8 B. & C. 407; *Hall v. Cecil*, 6 Bing. 181; *Scott v. McLellan*, 2 Greenl. 199; *Pierce v. Butler*, 14 Mass. 303, 312; *Southard v. Wilson*, 8 Shepl. 494.

⁴ *Mainwaring v. Mytton*, 1 Stark. R. 83. It is deemed unnecessary any farther to pursue this subject in this place, or particularly to mention any of the numerous cases, in which a party to a bill or note has been held

§ 402. Where a *liability to costs* in the suit arises in any other manner, it is still an interest sufficient to render the witness incompetent.¹ Thus, where the witness, called by the plaintiff, had himself employed the attorney, to whom he had made himself liable for the costs, he was held incompetent, without a release from the attorney.² So, where he had given the plaintiff a bond of indemnity against the costs of the suit, he was held incompetent as a witness for the plaintiff, as to any point arising in the action; even such as the service of a notice on the defendant, to produce certain papers at the trial.³ Thus, also, where an attorney,⁴ or an executor,⁵ or the tenant, on whose premises the goods of the plaintiff in replevin had been distrained for rent,⁶ or the principal in an administration bond, the action being only against the surety,⁷ have been found personally liable for the costs of the suit, they have been held incompetent as witnesses on the side of the party, in whose favor they were thus interested. But if the contract of indemnity is illegal, as, for example, if it be a contract to bear each other harmless in doing wrong, it creates no legal liability to affect the witness.⁸

competent, or otherwise, on the ground of being free from interest, or interested, under the particular circumstances of the case. It will suffice to refer the reader to the cases collected in *Bayley on Bills*, p. 586-599, (2d Am. Ed. by Phillips & Sewall,) with the notes of the learned editors; *Chitty on Bills*, 654-659, (8th Ed.); 1 Phil. Evid. 67, note 118; *Ib.* p. 70, note 76; *Ib.* p. 71, note 78, (by Cowen & Hill); 2 Phil. Evid. p. 21, note 73; 2 Stark. Evid. 179, 182, (6th Am. Ed. with Metcalf's, Ingraham's, and Gerhard's notes); *Thayer v. Crossman*, 1 Metcalf, R. 416.

¹ See Ante, § 395.

² *York v. Gribble*, 1 Esp. 319; *Marland v. Jefferson*, 2 Pick. 240; *Handley v. Edwards*, 1 Curt. 722.

³ *Butler v. Warren*, 11 Johns. 57.

⁴ *Chadwick v. Upton*, 3 Pick. 442.

⁵ *Parker v. Vincent*, 3 C. & P. 38.

⁶ *Rush v. Flickwire*, 17 S. & R. 82.

⁷ *Owens v. Collinson*, 3 Gill & Johns. 25. See also *Cannon v. Jones*, 4 Hawks, 368; *Riddle v. Moss*, 7 Cranch, 206.

⁸ *Humphreys v. Miller*, 4 C. & P. 7, per Ld. Tenterden; *Hodsdon v. Wilkins*, 7 Greenl. 113.

§ 403. This doctrine is applied in the same manner in *criminal cases*, where the witness has a direct, certain, and immediate interest in the result of the prosecution. Thus, in cases of summary convictions, where a penalty is imposed by statute, and the whole or a part is given to the informer or prosecutor, who becomes entitled to it forthwith upon the conviction, he is not at the Common Law a competent witness for the prosecution.¹ So, in a prosecution under the statutes for forcible entry, where the party injured is entitled to an award of immediate restitution of the lands, he is not a competent witness.² This rule, however, is subject to many exceptions, which will hereafter be stated.³ But it may be proper here to remark, that, in general, where the penalty or provision for restitution is evidently introduced for the sake of the party injured, rather than to insure the detection and punishment of the offender, the party is held incompetent.⁴

§ 404. Having thus briefly considered the subject of disqualification, resulting from a direct, certain, and immediate interest in the event of the suit, we come now to the *second branch of the general rule*, namely, that of *interest in the record*, as an instrument of evidence in some other suit, to prove a fact therein alleged. The record of a judgment, as hereafter will be seen, is always admissible, even in an action between strangers, to prove the fact that such a judgment was rendered, and for such a sum; but it is not always and in all cases admissible to prove the truth of any fact, on which the judgment was founded. Thus, the record of a judgment against the master, for the negligence of his servant, would be

¹ *Rex v. Williams*, 9 B. & C. 549; *Commonwealth v. Paull*, 4 Pick. 251; *Rex v. Tilly*, 1 Stra. 316; 2 Russ. on Crimes, 601, 602. But where the penalty is to be recovered by the witness in a subsequent civil action, he is not an incompetent witness upon the indictment. *Rex v. Luckup*, Willes, 425; 9 B. & C. 557, 558; 1 Phil. Evid. 65, 66.

² *Rex v. Bevan*, Ry. & M. 242.

³ See Post, § 412.

⁴ *Rex v. Williams*, 9 B. & C. 549, per Bayley, J.

admissible in a subsequent action by the master against the servant, to prove the fact, that such a judgment had been recovered against the master for such an amount, and upon such and such allegations; but not to prove that either of those allegations was true; unless in certain cases, where the servant or agent has undertaken the defence, or being bound to indemnify, has been duly required to assume it. But under the present head are usually classed only those cases, in which the record is admissible in evidence for or against the witness, to establish the facts therein alleged or involved, in order to acquire a benefit or repel a loss;¹ and it is in this view alone that the subject will now be considered.

§ 405. The usual and clearest illustration of this branch of the rule is the case of an action, brought by or against one of several persons, who claim a *customary right* of common, or some other species of customary right. In general, in all cases depending on the existence of a particular custom, a judgment establishing that custom is evidence, though the parties are different. Therefore, no person is a competent witness in support of such custom, who would derive a benefit from its establishment; because the record would be evidence for him in another suit, in which his own right may be controverted. Thus, where the plaintiff prescribed for common of pasture upon Hampton common, as appurtenant to his ancient messuage, and charged the defendant with neglect to repair the fence; it was held, that another commoner, who claimed a similar prescription in right of another tenement, was not a competent witness to prove the charge;² and *à fortiori* he is not, where the prescription is, that all the inhabitants of the place have common there.³ Thus, also, an inhabitant of a town is not a competent witness to prove a

¹ 1 Stark. Evid. 114, 115; *Hunter v. King*, 4 B. & Ald. 210.

² *Ansecomb v. Shore*, 1 Taunt. 261. See also *Parker v. Mitchell*, 11 Ad. & El. 788.

³ *Hockley v. Lamb*, 1 Ld. Raym. 731.

prescription for all the inhabitants to dig clams in a certain place;¹ nor, to prove a prescriptive right of way for all the inhabitants.² So, where the right to a seat in the common council of a borough was in controversy, and it was insisted, that by prescription no person was entitled, unless he was an inhabitant and also had a burgage tenure; it was held, that, though a person having but one of these qualifications was a competent witness to prove the prescription, one who had them both was not; for he would thereby establish an exclusive right in favor of himself.³ So, where a corporation was lord of a manor, and had approved and leased a part of the common, a freeman was held incompetent to prove that a sufficiency of common was left for the commoners.⁴ So, one who has acted in breach of an alleged custom by the exercise of a particular trade, is not a competent witness to disprove the existence of such custom.⁵ Nor is the owner of property within a chapelry a competent witness to disprove an immemorial usage, that the land-owners there ought to repair the chapel.⁶ And it is proper here to add, that in order to exclude a witness, where the verdict depends on a custom, which he is interested to support, it seems to be necessary that the custom should be stated on the record;⁷ for it is said, that the effect of the verdict to support the custom may be aided by evidence.⁸

¹ *Lufkin v. Haskell*, 3 Pick. 356; *Moore v. Griffin*, 9 Shepl. 350.

² *Odiome v. Wade*, 8 Pick. 518. The statutes which render the inhabitants of towns competent witnesses, where the corporation is a party, or is interested, apply only to cases of corporate rights or interest, and not to cases of individual and private interest, though these may extend to every inhabitant. See Ante, § 331.

³ *Stevenson v. Nevins*, 2 Ld. Raym. 1353.

⁴ *Burton v. Hinde*, 5 T. R. 174.

⁵ *The Carpenters, &c. of Shrewsbury v. Hayward*, 1 Doug. 374.

⁶ *Rhodes v. Ainsworth*, 1 B. & Ald. 87. See also *Lord Falmouth v. George*, 5 Bing. 286.

⁷ *Ld. Falmouth v. George*, 5 Bing. 286; *Stevenson v. Nevins et al.* 2 Ld. Raym. 1353.

⁸ 1 Stark. Evid. 115, note (e).

§ 406. There are some cases, in which the interest of the witness falls under *both branches* of this rule, and in which he has been rejected, sometimes on the ground of immediate interest in the event of the suit, and sometimes on the ground of interest in the record, as an instrument of evidence. Such is the case of the tenant in possession in an action of ejectment; who is held incompetent, either to support his landlord's title,¹ or, to prove that himself, and not the defendant, was the tenant in possession of the land.² And where a declaration was served on two tenants, in possession of different parts of the premises, and a third person entered into a rule to defend alone, as landlord, it was held, that neither of the tenants was a competent witness for the landlord, to prove an adverse possession by the other of the part held by him; for as they were identified with the landlord in interest, the judgment for the plaintiff would be evidence of his title, in a future action against them for the mesne profits.³

§ 407. So, in *criminal cases*, a person interested in the record is not a competent witness. Thus, an *accessary*, whether before or after the fact, is not competent to testify for the principal.⁴ And where several were indicted for a

¹ *Doe v. Williams*, Cowp. 621; *Bourne v. Turner*, 1 Stra. 682.

² *Doe v. Wilde*, 5 Taunt. 183; *Doe v. Bingham*, 4 B. & Ald. 672.

³ *Doe v. Preece*, 1 Tyrwh. 410. Formerly, it was not material in England, as it still is not in the United States, to determine with precision, in which of these modes the witness was interested. But by Stat. 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 42, § 26, 27, the objection arising from interest in the record, as a future instrument of evidence, is done away; the Court being directed, whenever this objection is taken, to indorse the name of the witness on the record or document, on which the trial shall be had, and of the party on whose behalf he was called to testify; after which the verdict or judgment in that action shall never be evidence for or against the witness, or any one claiming under him. The practice under this statute seems to be not yet completely settled; but the cases which have arisen, and which it is deemed unnecessary here to examine, are stated and discussed in Phil. & Am on Evid. p. 108-113; 1 Phil. Evid. 114-117. See also *Poole v. Palmer*, 9 M. & W. 71.

⁴ 1 Stark. Evid. 130.

conspiracy, the wife of one was held not admissible as a witness for the others; a joint offence being charged, and an acquittal of all the others being a ground of discharge for her husband.¹ Nor is the wife of one joint trespasser a competent witness for another, even after the case is already clearly proved against her husband.²

§ 408. The extent and meaning of the rule, by which an interested witness is rejected as incompetent, may be further illustrated by reference to some cases, in which the witness has been *deemed not disqualified*. We have already seen, that mere wishes or bias on the mind of the witness in favor of the party producing him, or strong hopes or expectations of benefit, or similarity of situation, or any other motive, short of an actual and legal interest in the suit, will not disqualify the witness.³ Such circumstances may influence his mind, and affect his opinions, and perhaps may tempt him at least to give a false color to his statements; and therefore they should be carefully considered by the Jury, in determining the weight or credibility to be given to his testimony; but they are not deemed sufficient to justify its utter exclusion from the Jury. It may now be further observed, that a *remote, contingent, and uncertain interest* does not disqualify the witness. Thus, a paid legatee of a specific sum, or of a chattel, is a competent witness for the executor; for though the money paid to a legatee may sometimes be recovered back, when necessary for the payment of paramount claims, yet it is not certain that it will be needed for such purpose; nor is it certain, if the legacy has not been paid, that there are not other funds sufficient to pay it.⁴ So, also, a creditor of an estate, not in a course of liquidation as an insolvent estate, is a competent witness for the administrator; for he stands in the same relation to the estate now, as he did to the

¹ *Rex v. Locker*, 5 Esp. 107; 2 Russ. on Crimes, 602; Ante, § 403.

² *Hawkesworth v. Showler*, 12 M. & W. 45.

³ Ante, § 387, 389.

⁴ *Clarke v. Gannon*, Ry. & M. 31.

debtor in his lifetime; and the probability that his testimony may be beneficial to himself, by increasing the fund out of which he is to be paid, is equally remote and contingent, in both cases.¹ It is only where his testimony will certainly have that effect, as in the case of a creditor to an insolvent estate, or a residuary legatee, or a distributee, that the witness is rendered incompetent.² Yet in these cases, and in the case of a creditor to a bankrupt estate, if the legatee, distributee, or creditor has assigned his interest to another person, even equitably, his competency is restored.³ In an action of covenant against a lessee for not laying the stipulated quantity of manure upon the land; upon a plea of performance, a sub-lessee of the defendant is a competent witness for him, to support the plea;⁴ for it does not appear that he is under the like duty to the defendant, or that a recovery by the latter would place the witness in a state of security against a similar action.⁵ Upon the same principle, a defendant against whom a civil action is pending, is a competent witness for the government on the trial of an indictment for perjury, against one who has been summoned as a witness for the plaintiff in the civil action.⁶

§ 409. Thus, also, the tenant in possession is a competent witness to support an action on the case, brought by the reversioner for an injury done to the inheritance.⁷ So, in an action against an administrator for a debt due by the intestate, a surety in the administrator's bond in the Ecclesiastical Court is a competent witness for him, to prove a tender; for

¹ *Paull v. Brown*, 6 Esp. 34; *Davies v. Davies*, 1 Mood. & M. 345; *Carter v. Pierce*, 1 T. R. 164. An annuitant under the will is also a competent witness for the executor, in an action against him for the debt of the testator. *Nowell v. Davies*, 5 B. & Ad. 368.

² Ante, § 392.

³ *Heath v. Hall*, 4 Taunt. 326; *Boynston v. Turner*, 13 Mass. 391.

⁴ *Wishaw v. Barnes*, 1 Campb. 341.

⁵ Ante, § 394.

⁶ *Hart's case*, 2 Rob. Virg. Rep. 819.

⁷ *Doddington v. Hudson*, 1 Bing. 257.

it is but a bare possibility that an action may be brought upon the bond.¹ So, in an action against a debtor, who pleads the insolvent debtor's act in discharge, another creditor is a competent witness for the plaintiff, to prove, that in fact the defendant is not within the operation of the act.² An executor or trustee under a will, taking no beneficial interest under the will, is a good attesting witness.³ And in an action against an administrator, upon a bond of the intestate, and a plea of *plene administravit* by the payment of another bond debt, the obligee in the latter bond is a competent witness to support the plea.⁴ A trespasser, not sued, is a competent witness for the plaintiff, against his co-trespasser.⁵ In a *qui tam* action for the penalty for taking excessive usury, the borrower of the money is a competent witness for the plaintiff.⁶ A person who has been arrested on mesne process and suffered to escape, is a competent witness for the plaintiff, in an action against the sheriff for the escape;⁷ for though the whole debt may be recovered against the sheriff, yet, in an action on the judgment against the original debtor, the latter can neither plead in bar, nor give in evidence in mitigation of damages, the judgment recovered against the sheriff. And one who has been rescued, is a competent witness for the

¹ Carter v. Pierce, 1 T. R. 163.

² Norcott v. Orcott, 1 Stra. 650.

³ Phipps v. Pitcher, 6 Taunt. 220; Comstock v. Hadlyme, 8 Conn. R. 254. In Massachusetts, the executor has been held incompetent to prove the will in the Court of Probate, he being party to the proceedings and liable to the cost of the trial. Sears v. Dillingham, 12 Mass. 358. But the will may be proved by the testimony of the other witnesses, he having been a competent witness at the time of attestation. Ibid.

⁴ Bull. N. P. 143; 1 Ld. Raym. 745.

⁵ Morris v. Daubigny, 5 Moore, 319. In an action against the printer of a newspaper for a libel, a proprietor of the paper is a competent witness, as he is not liable to contribution. Moscati v. Lawson, 7 C. & P. 52.

⁶ Smith v. Prager, 7 T. R. 60.

⁷ Cass v. Cameron, Peake's Cas. 124; Hunter v. King, 4 B. & Ald. 210. If the escape was committed while the debtor was at large, under a bond for the prison liberties, the gaoler, who took the bond, is a competent witness for the sheriff. Stewart v. Kip, 5 Johns. 256.

defendant, in an action against him for the rescue.¹ So, a mariner, entitled to a share in a prize, is a competent witness for the captain, in an action brought by him for part of the goods taken.² In all these cases, it is obvious, that whatever interest the witness might have, it was merely contingent and remote; and on this ground the objection has been held to go only to his credibility.

§ 410. It is hardly necessary to observe, that where a witness is produced to testify *against his interest*, the rule, that interest disqualifies, does not apply, and the witness is competent.

§ 411. The general rule, that a witness interested in the subject of the suit or in the record, is not competent to testify on the side of his interest, having been thus stated and explained, it remains for us to consider some of the *exceptions* to the rule, which, for various reasons, have been allowed. These exceptions chiefly prevail either in criminal cases, or in the affairs of trade and commerce, and are admitted on grounds of public necessity and convenience, and to prevent a failure of justice. They may be conveniently classed thus; — (1.) Where the witness, in a criminal case, is entitled to a reward, upon conviction of the offender; — (2.) Where, being otherwise interested, he is made competent by statute; — (3.) The case of agents, carriers, factors, brokers, or servants, when called to prove acts done for their principals, in the course of their employment; and — (4.) The case of a witness, whose interest has been acquired after the party had become entitled to his testimony. To these a few others may be added, not falling under either of these heads.

§ 412. And, in the *first place*, it is to be observed, that the circumstance that a witness for the prosecution will be *entitled to a reward from the government*, upon conviction of the

¹ Wilson v. Gary, 6 Mod. 211.

² Anon. Skin. 403.

offender, or to a restoration, as owner of the property stolen, or to a portion of the fine or penalty inflicted, is not admitted as a valid objection to his competency. By the very statute, conferring a benefit upon a person, who, but for that benefit, would have been a witness, his competency is virtually continued, and he is as much a witness after that benefit, as he would have been before. The case is clear, upon grounds of public policy, with a view to the public interest, and because of the principle on which rewards are given. The public has an interest in the suppression of crime, and the conviction of criminals; it is with a view to stir up greater vigilance in apprehending, that rewards are given; and it would defeat the object of the legislature, to narrow the means of conviction, by means of those rewards, and to exclude testimony, which otherwise would have been admissible.¹ The distinction between these excepted cases, and those which fall under the general rule, is, that in the latter, the benefit resulting to the witness is created chiefly for his own sake, and not for public purposes. Such is the case of certain summary convictions, heretofore mentioned.² But where it is plain, that the infliction of a fine or penalty is intended as a punishment, in furtherance of public justice, rather than as an indemnity to the party injured, and that the detection and conviction of the offender are the objects of the legislature, the case will be within the exception, and the person benefitted by the conviction will, notwithstanding his interest, be competent.³ If the reward to which the witness will be

¹ *Rex v. Williams*, 9 B. & C. 549, 556, per Bayley, J. See also 1 Gilb. Evid. by Lofft, 245-250.

² Ante, § 403.

³ *Rex v. Williams*, 9 B. & C. 549, 560, per Bayley, J. See also the case of *The Rioters*, 1 Leach, Cr. Cas. 353, note (a), where the general question of the admissibility of witnesses, to whom a reward was offered by the government, being submitted to the twelve Judges, was resolved in the affirmative. McNally's Evid. p. 61, Rule 12; *United States v. Murphy*, 16 Peters, R. 203; *United States v. Wilson*, 1 Baldw. 90; *Commonwealth v. Moulton*, 9 Mass. 30; *Rex v. Teasdale*, 3 Esp. 68, and the cases cited in Mr. Day's

entitled has been offered by a private individual, the rule is the same, the witness being still competent; but the principle on which it stands is different; namely this, that the public have an interest upon public grounds, in the testimony of every person who knows any thing as to a crime; and that nothing which private individuals can do will take away the public right.¹ The interest, also, of the witness is contingent; and, after all, he may not become entitled to the reward.

§ 413. The reason of this exception extends to, and accordingly it has been held to include, the cases where, instead of a pecuniary reward, a *pardon*, or *exemption from prosecution*, is offered by statute to any person participating in a particular offence, provided another of the parties should be convicted upon his evidence. In such cases, Lord Ellenborough remarked, that the statute gave a parliamentary capacitation to the witness, notwithstanding his interest in the cause; for it was not probable that the legislature would intend to discharge one offender, upon his discovering another, so that the latter might be convicted, without intending that the discoverer should be a competent witness.²

§ 414. And in like manner, where the witness will directly derive any other benefit from the conviction of the offender, he is still a competent witness for the government, in the cases already mentioned. Formerly, indeed, it was held, that the person whose name was alleged to be forged, was not admissible as a witness against the prisoner, on an indictment for the forgery, upon the notion that the prosecution was in the nature of a proceeding *in rem*, and that the conviction

note; *Salisbury v. Connecticut*, 6 Conn. 101; 1 Phil. Evid. 252, the cases cited in Cowen & Hill's notes, Vol. 3, p. 1556.

¹ 9 B. & C. 556, per Bayley, J.

² *Heward v. Shipley*, 4 East, 180, 183. See also *Rex v. Rudd*, 1 Leach, Cr. Cas. 151, 156-158; *Bush v. Ralling*, Sayer, 289; *Mead v. Robinson*, Willes, 422; *Sutton v. Bishop*, 4 Burr. 2283.

warranted a judicial cancellation of the instrument. And the prosecutor in an indictment for perjury has been thought incompetent, where he had a suit pending, in which the person prosecuted was a material witness against him, or was defendant against him in a suit in equity, in which his answer might be evidence. But this opinion as to cases of perjury has since been exploded; and the party is in all such cases held admissible as a witness; his credibility being left to the Jury. For wherever the party offers as evidence, even to a collateral point, a record which has been obtained on his own testimony, it is not admitted; and, moreover, the record in a criminal prosecution is generally not evidence of the facts in a civil suit, the parties not being the same.¹ And as to the person, whose name has been forged, the unsoundness of the rule, by which he was held incompetent, was tacitly conceded in several of the more recent cases, which were held not to be within the rule; and at length it was repealed in England by an express statute,² which renders the party injured a competent witness in all criminal prosecutions for forgery. In America, though in some of the earlier cases the old English rule of exclusion was followed, yet the weight of authority, including the later decisions, is quite the other way, and the witness is now almost universally held admissible.³

¹ 1 Gilb. Evid. by Lofft, p. 33, 34; Bull. N. P. 232, 245; 1 Stark. Evid. 234; 1 Phil. Evid. 62; Abrahams v. Bunn, 4 Burr. 2251. See further, Post, § 537.

² 9 Geo. 4, c. 32.

³ *Respublica v. Keating*, 1 Dall. 110; *Pennsylvania v. Farrell*, Addis. 246; *The People v. Howell*, 4 Johns. 296, 302; *The People v. Dean*, 6 Cowen, 27; *Commonwealth v. Frost*, 5 Mass. 53; *Commonwealth v. Waite*, Ib. 261; *The State v. Stanton*, 1 Iredell, 424. See other cases in Cowen & Hill's note, 236, and Suppt. to 1 Phil. Evid. 124. *Ld. Denman* is reported to have ruled, at *nisi prius*, that where the prosecutor, in an indictment for perjury, expected that the prisoner would be called as a witness against him in a civil action about to be tried, he was incompetent as a witness to support the indictment. *Rex v. Hulme*, 7 C. & P. 8. But *quere*, and see *Rex v. Boston*, 4 East, 572; Ante, § 362.

§ 415. The *second class* of cases, in which the general rule of incompetency by reason of interest does not apply, consists of exceptions created by *express statutes*, and which otherwise would not fall within the reason of the first exception. Of this sort are cases, where the informer and prosecutor, in divers summary convictions and trials for petty offences, is, by the statutes of different States, expressly made a competent witness, notwithstanding his interest in the fine or forfeiture; but of which the plan of this Treatise does not require a particular enumeration.

§ 416. The *third class* of cases, excepted out of the general rule, is that of *agents, carriers, factors, brokers*, and other *servants*, when offered to prove the making of contracts, the receipt or payment of money, the receipt or delivery of goods, and other acts done within the scope of their employment. This exception has its foundation in public convenience and necessity;¹ for otherwise, affairs of daily and ordinary occurrence could not be proved, and the freedom of trade and commercial intercourse would be inconveniently restrained. And it extends, in principle, to every species of agency or intervention, by which business is transacted; unless the case is overborne by some other rule. Thus, where the acceptor of a bill of exchange was also the agent of the defendant, who was both drawer and indorser, he was held incompetent in an action by the indorsee, to prove the terms on which he negotiated the bill to the indorsee, in order to defeat the action, though the facts occurred in the course of his agency for the defendant, for whose use the bill was negotiated; it being

¹ Bull. N. P. 289; 10 B. & C. 864, per Parke, J.; 1 Phil. Evid. 145; 1 Stark. Evid. 113; *Mathews v. Haydon*, 2 Esp. 509. This necessity, says Mr. Evans, is that which arises from the general state and order of society, and not that which is merely founded on the accidental want or failure of evidence, in the particular case. Poth. on Obl. by Evans, App. No. 16, p. 208, 267. In all the cases of this class, there seems also to be enough of contingency in the nature of the interest, to render the witness admissible under the general rule.

apparent that the witness was interested in the costs of the suit.¹ But in cases not thus controlled by other rules, the constant course is to admit the witness, notwithstanding his apparent interest in the event of the suit.² Thus, a porter, a journeyman, or salesman is admissible, to prove the delivery of goods.³ A broker, who has effected a policy, is a competent witness for the assured, to prove any matters connected with the policy; even though he has an interest in it arising from his lien.⁴ A factor, who sells for the plaintiff, and is to have a poundage on the amount, is a competent witness to prove the contract of sale.⁵ So, though he is to have for himself all he has bargained for beyond a certain amount, he is still a competent witness for the seller.⁶ A clerk, who has received money, is a competent witness for the party who paid it, to prove the payment, though he is himself liable on the receipt of it.⁷ A carrier is admissible for the plaintiff, to prove that he paid a sum of money to the defendant by mistake, in an action to recover it back.⁸ So, of a banker's clerk.⁹ A servant is a witness for his master, in an action against the latter for a penalty, such, for example, as for selling coals without measure by the bushel, though the act were done by the servant.¹⁰ A carrier's book-keeper is a competent witness for his master, in an action for not safely carrying goods.¹¹ A shipmaster is a competent witness for the defendant in an action against his owner, to prove the advancement of moneys for the purposes of the voyage, even though he gave the plain-

¹ Edmonds v. Lowe, 8 B. & C. 407.

² Theobald v. Tregott, 11 Mod. 262, per Holt, C. J.

³ Bull. N. P. 289; 4 T. R. 590; Adams v. Davis, 3 Esp. 48.

⁴ Hunter v. Leathley, 10 B. & C. 858.

⁵ Dixon v. Cooper, 3 Wils. 40; Shephard v. Palmer, 6 Conn. 95; Depeau v. Hyams, 2 McCord, 146; Scott v. Wells, 6 Watts & Serg. 357.

⁶ Benjamin v. Porteous, 2 H. Bl. 590; Caune v. Sagory, 4 Martin, 81.

⁷ Mathews v. Haydon, 2 Esp. 509.

⁸ Barker v. Macrae, 3 Campb. 144.

⁹ Martin v. Horrell, 1 Stra. 647.

¹⁰ E. Ind. Co. v. Gossing, Bull. N. P. 289, per Lee, C. J.

¹¹ Spencer v. Goulding, Peake's Cas. 129.

tiff a bill of exchange on his owner for the amount.¹ The cashier or teller of a bank is a competent witness for the bank, to charge the defendant on a promissory note,² or for money lent, or overpaid,³ or obtained from the officer without the security which he should have received; and even though the officer has given bond to the bank for his official good conduct.⁴ And an agent is also a competent witness to prove his own authority, if it be by parol.⁵

§ 417. This exception being thus founded upon considerations of public necessity and convenience, for the sake of trade and the common usage of business, it is manifest, that it *cannot be extended* to cases where the witness is called to testify to facts *out of the usual and ordinary course* of business, or, to contradict or deny the effect of those acts which he has done as agent. He is safely admitted, in all cases, to prove that he acted according to the directions of his principal, and within the scope of his duty; both on the ground of necessity, and because the principal can never maintain an action against him, for any act done according to his own directions, whatever may be the result of the suit, in which he is called as a witness. But if the cause depends on the question, whether the agent has been guilty of some tortious act, or some negligence in the course of executing the orders of his principal, and in respect of which he would be liable over to the principal, if the latter should fail in the action pending against him, the agent, as we have seen,

¹ Descadillas v. Harris, 8 Greenl. 298; Milward v. Hallett, 2 Caines, 77. And see Martineau v. Woodland, 2 C. & P. 65.

² Stafford Bank v. Cornell, 1 N. Hamp. 192.

³ O'Brien v. Louisiana State Bank, 5 Martin, 305, N. S.; United States Bank v. Johnson, Ib. 310.

⁴ The Franklin Bank v. Freeman, 16 Pick. 535; U. S. Bank v. Stearns, 15 Wend. 314.

⁵ Lowber v. Shaw, 5 Mason, 242, per Story, J.; McGunnagle v. Thornton, 10 S. & R. 251; Ilderton v. Atkinson, 7 T. R. 480; Birt v. Kershaw, 2 East, 458.

is not a competent witness for his principal, without a release.¹

§ 418. In the *fourth class of exceptions* to the rule of incompetency by reason of interest, regard is paid to the time and manner in which the interest was acquired. It has been laid down in general terms, that where one person becomes entitled to the testimony of another, the latter shall not be rendered incompetent to testify, by reason of any *interest subsequently acquired* in the event of the suit.² But though the doctrine is not now universally admitted to that extent, yet it is well settled and agreed, that in all cases where the interest has been subsequently created by the fraudulent act of the adverse party, for the purpose of taking off his testimony, or by any act of mere wantonness, and aside from the ordinary course of business, on the part of the witness, he is not thereby rendered incompetent. And where the person was the original witness of the transaction or agreement between the parties, in whose testimony they both had a common interest, it seems also agreed, that it shall not be in the power either of the witness, or of one of the parties, to deprive the other of his testimony, by reason of any interest subsequently acquired, even though it were acquired without any such intention on the part of the witness, or of the party.³ But the question, upon which learned Judges have been divided in

¹ Ante, § 394, 395, 396; *Miller v. Falconer*, 1 Campb. 251; *Theobald v. Tregott*, 11 Mod. 262; *Gevers v. Mainwaring*, 1 Holt's Cas. 139; *McBraine v. Fortune*, 3 Campb. 317; 1 Stark. Evid. 113; *Fuller v. Wheelock*, 10 Pick. 135, 138; *McDowell v. Stimpson*, 3 Watts, 129, 135, per Kennedy, J. For other authorities, as to the admissibility of agents, see Cowen & Hill's notes, 89, 95, 103, 106, 241, 245, and Suppt. to 1 Phil. Evid. p. 96, 106, 110, 113, 254.

² See *Bent v. Baker*, 3 T. R. 27, per Ld. Kenyon, and Ashurst, J.; *Barlow v. Vowell*, Skin. 586, per Ld. Holt; *Cowp.* 736; *Jackson v. Rumsey*, 3 Johns. Cas. 234, 237; Ante, § 167.

³ *Forrester v. Pigou*, 3 Campb. 381; 1 Stark. Evid. 118; *Long v. Bailie*, 4 S. & R. 222; 14 Pick. 47; *Phelps v. Riley*, 3 Conn. 266, 272; *Rex v. Fox*, 1 Stra. 652; Ante, § 167.

opinion is, whether, where the witness was not the agent of both parties, or was not called as a witness of the original agreement or transaction, he ought to be rendered incompetent by reason of an interest subsequently acquired in good faith, and in the ordinary course of business. On this point, it was held by Lord Ellenborough, that the pendency of a suit could not prevent third persons from transacting business *bonâ fide* with one of the parties; and that, if an interest in the event of the suit is thereby acquired, the common consequence of law must follow, that the person so interested cannot be examined as a witness for that party, from whose success he will necessarily derive an advantage.¹ And therefore it was held, that where the defence to an action on a policy of insurance was, that there had been a fraudulent concealment of material facts, an underwriter, who had paid on a promise of repayment if the policy should be determined invalid, and who was under no obligation to become a witness for either party, was not a competent witness for another underwriter, who disputed the loss.² This doctrine has been recognised in the Courts of several of the United States, as founded in good reason:³ but the question being presented to the Supreme Court of the United States, the learned Judges were divided in opinion, and no judgment was given upon the point.⁴ If the subsequent interest has been created by the agency of the party producing the witness, he is disqualified; the party having no right to complain of his own act.⁵

¹ *Forrester v. Pigou*, 3 Campb. 381; 1 M. & S. 9, S. C.; *Hovill v. Stephenson*, 5 Bing. 493; Ante, § 167.

² *Forrester v. Pigou*, 3 Campb. 381; 1 M. & S. 9, S. C.

³ *Phelps v. Riley*, 3 Conn. 266, 272; *Eastman v. Winship*, 14 Pick. 44, 47; *Long v. Bailie*, 4 Serg. & R. 222; *The Manchester Iron Manuf. Co. v. Sweeting*, 10 Wend. 162; Cowen & Hill's note 273, and Suppt. to 1 Phil. Evid. 139. In Maine, the Court seem to have held the witness admissible in all cases, where the party objecting to the witness is himself a party to the agreement, by which his interest is acquired. *Burgess v. Lane*, 3 Greenl. 165, 170; Ante, § 167.

⁴ *Winship v. Bank U. States*, 5 Peters, 529, 552.

⁵ *Hovill v. Stephenson*, 5 Bing. 493; Ante, § 167.

§ 419. It may here be added, that where an interested witness does all in his power to divest himself of his interest, by offering to surrender or release it, which the surrenderee or releasee, even though he be a stranger, refuses to accept, the principle of the rule of exclusion no longer applies, and the witness is held admissible. Thus, in an ejectment, where the lessors of the plaintiff claimed under a will, against the heir at law, and the executor was called by the plaintiff to prove the sanity of the testator, and was objected to by the defendant, because by the same will he was devisee of the reversion of certain copyhold lands; to obviate which objection he had surrendered his estate in the copyhold lands to the use of the heir at law, but the heir had refused to accept the surrender; the Court held him a competent witness.¹ So, if the interest may be removed by the release of one of the parties in the suit, and such party offers to remove it, but the witness refuses, he cannot thereby deprive the party of his testimony.²

§ 420. Where the witness, though interested in the event of the cause, is so situated that the event is to him a matter of indifference, he is still a competent witness. This arises where he is equally interested on both sides of the cause, so that his interest on one side is counterbalanced by his interest on the other.³ But if there is a preponderance in the amount or value of the interest on one side, this seems, as we have already seen, to render him an interested witness to the amount of the excess, and therefore to disqualify him from testifying on that side.⁴ Whether the circumstance, that the

¹ Goodtitle v. Welford, 1 Doug. 139; 5 T. R. 35, per Buller, J. The legatee in a will, who has been paid, is considered a competent witness to support the will, in a suit at law. Wyndham v. Chetwynd, 1 Burr. 414.

² 1 Phil. Evid. 149.

³ Ante, § 399. See also Cushman v. Loker, 2 Mass. 108; Emerson v. Providence Hat Man. Co., 12 Mass. 237; Roberts v. Whiting, 16 Mass. 186; Rice v. Austin, 17 Mass. 197; Prince v. Shephard, 9 Pick. 176. Other cases of balanced interest are cited in Cowen & Hill's note 117, and Suppt to 1 Phil Evid p 66. See also Lewis v. Hodgdon, 5 Shepl. 267.

⁴ Ante, § 391, 399, and cases there cited.

witness has a *remedy over* against another, to indemnify him for what he may lose by a judgment against the party calling him, is sufficient to render him competent by equalizing his interest, is not clearly agreed. Where his liability to costs appears from his own testimony alone, and in the same mode it is shown that he *has funds in his hands* to meet the charge, it is settled that this does not render him incompetent.¹ So, where he stated that he was *indemnified* for the costs, and considered that he had *ample security*.² And where, upon this objection being taken to the witness, the party calling him forthwith executed a bond to the adverse party, for the payment of all costs with sureties, whom the counsel for the obligee admitted to be abundantly responsible, but at the same time he refused to receive the bond, the Court held the competency of the witness to be thereby restored; observing, however, that if the solvency of the sureties had been denied, it might have presented a case of more embarrassment, it being very questionable whether the Judge could determine upon the sufficiency of the obligors, so as to absolve the witness from liability to costs.³ The point upon which the authorities seem to be conflicting, is, where there is merely a right of action over, irrespective of the solvency of the party liable, the productiveness of the remedy, in actual satisfaction, being wholly contingent and uncertain. But in such cases, the weight of authority is against the admissibility of the witness. Thus, in an action against the sheriff for taking goods, his officer, who made the levy, being called as a witness for the defence, stated upon the *voir dire*, that he gave security to the sheriff, and added, that he was indemnified by the creditor, meaning that he had his bond of indemnity. But Lord Tenterden held him not a competent witness; observing, that

¹ Collins v. McCrummen, 3 Martin, N. S. 166; Allen v. Hawks, 13 Pick. 79.

² Chaffee v. Thomas, 7 Cowen, 358; Contra, Pond v. Hartwell, 17 Pick. 272, per Shaw, C. J.

³ Brandigee v. Hale, 13 Johns. 125; Lake v. Auburn, 17 Wend. 18, S. P.; Ante, § 392.

if the result of the action were against the sheriff, the witness was liable to a certainty; and he might never get repaid on his indemnity; therefore it was his interest to defeat the action.¹ So, where the money, with which the surety in a replevin bond was to be indemnified, had been deposited in the hands of a receiver designated by the Judge, it was held, that this did not restore the competency of the surety as a witness in the cause for the principal; for the receiver might refuse to pay it over, or become insolvent, or, from some other cause, the remedy over against him might be unproductive.² The true distinction lies between the case, where the witness must resort to an action for his indemnity, and that in which the money is either subject to the order of the Court, and within its actual control and custody, or is in the witness's own hands. Therefore it has been laid down by a learned Judge, that where a certain sum of money can be so placed, either with the witness himself, or with the Court and its officers, under a proper rule directing and controlling its application according to the event, as that the interest creating the disability may be met and extinguished before the witness is or can be damnified, it shall be considered as balancing or extinguishing that interest, so as to restore the competency of the witness.³

§ 421. In regard to the *time of taking the objection* to the competency of a witness, on the ground of interest, it is obvious that, from the preliminary nature of the objection, it

¹ *Whitehouse v. Atkinson*, 3 C. & P. 344; *Jewett v. Adams*, 8 Greenl. 30; *Paine v. Hussey*, 5 Shepl. 274.

² *Wallace v. Twyman*, 3 J. J. Marsh. 459-461. See also *Owen v. Mann*, 2 Day, R. 399, 404; *Brown v. Lynch*, 1 Paige, 147, 157; *Allen v. Hawks*, 13 Pick. 85, per Shaw, C. J.; *Schillenger v. McCann*, 6 Greenl. 364; *Kendall v. Field*, 2 Shepl. 30; *Shelby v. Smith*, 2 A. K. Marsh. 504. The cases in which a mere remedy over seems to have been thought sufficient to equalize the interest of the witness, are *Martineau v. Woodland*, 2 C. & P. 65; *Banks v. Kain*, 1b 597; *Gregory v. Dodge*, 14 Wend. 593. See further, Cowen & Hill's notes to Phil. Evid. Vol. 3, p. 1544, 1545.

³ *Pond v. Hartwell*, 17 Pick. 269, 272, per Shaw, C. J.

ought in general to be taken before the witness is examined in chief. If the party is aware of the existence of the interest, he will not be permitted to examine the witness, and afterwards to object to his competency, if he should dislike his testimony. He has his election, to admit an interested person to testify against him, or not; but in this, as in all other cases, the election must be made as soon as the opportunity to make it is presented; and failing to make it at that time, he is presumed to have waived it forever.¹ But he is not prevented from taking the objection at any time during the trial, provided it is taken as soon as the interest is discovered.² Thus, if discovered during the examination in chief by the plaintiff, it is not too late for the defendant to take the objection.³ But if it is not discovered until after the trial is concluded, a new trial will not for that cause alone be granted;⁴ unless the interest was known and concealed by the party producing the witness.⁵ The rule on this subject in criminal and civil cases is the same.⁶ Formerly, it was deemed necessary to take the objection to the competency of a witness on the *voir dire*; and if once sworn in chief, he could not afterwards be objected to, on the ground of interest. But the strictness of this rule is relaxed; and the objection is now usually taken after he is sworn in chief, but previous to his direct examination. It is in the discretion of the Judge, to permit the adverse party to cross-examine the witness as to his interest, after he has been examined in chief; but the usual course is not to

¹ *Donelson v. Taylor*, 8 Pick. 390, 392; *Belcher v. Magnay*, 1 New Pr. Cas. 110.

² *Stone v. Blackburn*, 1 Esp. 37; 1 Stark. Evid. 124. Where a party has been fully apprized of the grounds of a witness's incompetency by the opening speech of counsel, or the examination in chief of the witness, doubts have been entertained at nisi prius, whether an objection to the competency of a witness can be postponed. 1 Phil. Evid. 154, note (3).

³ *Jacobs v. Laybourn*, 11 M. & W. 685. And see *Yardley v. Arnold*, 10 M. & W. 141; 6 Jur. 718.

⁴ *Turner v. Pearte*, 1 T. R. 717; *Jackson v. Jackson*, 5 Cowen, 173.

⁵ *Niles v. Brackett*, 15 Mass. 378.

⁶ *Commonwealth v. Green*, 17 Mass. 538; *Roscoe's Crim. Evid.* 124.

allow questions to be asked upon the cross-examination, which properly belong only to an examination upon the *voir dire*.¹ But if, notwithstanding every ineffectual endeavor to exclude the witness on the ground of incompetency, it afterwards should appear incidentally, in the course of the trial, that the witness is interested, his testimony will be stricken out, and the Jury will be instructed wholly to disregard it.² The rule in Equity is the same as at Law;³ and the principle applies with equal force to testimony given in a deposition in writing, and to an oral examination in Court. In either case, the better opinion seems to be, that if the objection is taken as soon as may be after the interest is discovered, it will be heard; but after the party is *in mora*, it comes too late.⁴ One reason for requiring the objection to

¹ Howell v. Lock, 2 Campb. 14; Odiome v. Winkley, 2 Gallis. 51; Perigal v. Nicholson, 1 Wightw. 64. The objection, that the witness is the real plaintiff, ought to be taken on the *voir dire*. Dewdney v. Palmer, 4 M. & W. 664; 7 Dowl. 177, S. C.

² Davis v. Barr, 9 S. & R. 137; Schillenger v. McCann, 6 Greenl. 364; Fisher v. Willard, 13 Mass. 379; Evans v. Eaton, 1 Peters, C. C. R. 338; Butler v. Tufts, 1 Shepl. 302; Stout v. Wood, 1 Blackf. 71. In one case, however, where the examination of a witness was concluded, and he was dismissed from the box, but was afterwards recalled by the Judge, for the purpose of asking him a question, it was ruled by Gibbs, C. J., that it was then too late to object to his competency. Beeching v. Gower, 1 Holt's Cas. 313. And in Chancery it is held, that where a witness has been cross-examined by a party, with full knowledge of an objection to his competency, the Court will not allow the objection to be taken at the hearing. Flagg v. Mann, 2 Sumn. 487.

³ Swift v. Dean, 6 Johns. 523, 538; Needham v. Smith, 2 Vern. 463; Vaughan v. Worrall, 2 Swanst. 400. In this case Lord Eldon said, that no attention could be given to the evidence, though the interest were not discovered until the last question, after he has been "cross-examined to the bone." See Gresley on Evid. 234-236; Rogers v. Dibble, 3 Paige, 238; Town v. Needham, Ib. 545, 552; Harrison v. Courtauld, 1 Russ. & M. 428; Moorhouse v. De Passon, G. Cooper, Ch. Cas. 300; 19 Ves. 433, S. C. See also Jacobs v. Laybourn, 7 Jur. 562.

⁴ Donelson v. Taylor, 8 Pick. 390. Where the testimony is by deposition, the objection, if the interest is known, ought regularly to be taken *in limine*; and the cross-examination should be made *de bene esse*, under

be made thus early is, that the other party may have opportunity to remove it by a release; which is always allowed to be done, when the objection is taken at any time before the examination is completed.¹ It is also to be noted as a rule, applicable to all objections to the reception of evidence, that the ground of objection must be distinctly stated at the time, or it will be held vague and nugatory.²

§ 422. Where the objection to the competency of the witness arises from *his own examination*, he may be further interrogated to facts tending to remove the objection, though the testimony might, on other grounds, be inadmissible. When the whole ground of the objection comes from himself only, what he says must be taken together, as he says it.³ Thus, where his interest appears, from his own testimony, to arise from a written instrument, which is not produced, he may also testify to the contents of it; but if he produces the instrument, it must speak for itself.⁴ So, where the witness for a chartered company stated that he had been a member, he was permitted also to testify that he had subsequently been disfranchised.⁵ So, where a witness, called by an administrator, testified that he was one of the heirs at law, he was also permitted to testify that he had released all his interest in

protest, or with an express reservation of the right of objection at the trial; unless the interest of the witness is developed incidentally, in his testimony to the merits. But the practice on this point admits of considerable latitude, in the discretion of the Judge. United States v. One Case of hair pencils, 1 Paine, 400; Talbot v. Clark, 8 Pick. 51; Smith v. Sparrow 11 Jur. 126; The Mohawk Bank v. Atwater, 2 Paige, 54; Ogle v. Pelaski, 1 Holt's Cas. 485; 2 Tidd's Pr. 812. As to the mode of taking the objection in Chancery, see 1 Hoffm. Chan. 489; Gass v. Stinson, 3 Sumn. 605.

¹ Tallman v. Dutcher, 7 Wend. 180; Doty v. Wilson, 14 Johns. 378; Wake v. Lock, 5 C. & P. 454.

² Camden v. Doremus, 3 Howard, S. C. Rep. 515, 530.

³ Abrahams v. Bunn, 4 Burr. 2256, per Ld. Mansfield.

⁴ Butler v. Carver, 2 Stark. R. 433. See also Rex v. Gisburn, 15 East, 57.

⁵ Butcher's Company v. Jones, 1 Esp. 160. And see Botham v. Swingler, Peake's Cas. 218.

the estate.¹ And generally a witness, upon an examination in Court as to his interest, may testify to the contents of any contracts, records, or documents not produced, affecting the question of his interest.² But if the testimony of the witness is taken upon interrogatories in writing, previously filed and served on the adverse party, who objects to his competency on the ground of interest, which the witness confesses, but testifies that it has been released; the release must be produced at the trial, that the Court may judge of it.³

§ 423. The *mode of proving the interest* of a witness is either by his own examination, or by evidence *aliunde*. But whether the election of one of these modes will preclude the party from afterwards resorting to the other, is not clearly settled by the authorities. If the evidence offered *aliunde* to prove the interest is rejected, as inadmissible, the witness may then be examined on the *voir dire*.⁴ And if the witness on the *voir dire*, states that he does not know, or leaves it doubtful whether he is interested or not, his interest may be shown by other evidence.⁵ It has also been held, that a resort to one of these modes, to prove the interest of the witness on one

¹ *Ingram v. Dade*, Lond. Sittings after Mich. T. 1817; 1 C. P. 234, n.; 1 Phil. Evid. 155; *Wandless v. Cawthorne*, B. R. Guildhall, 1829; 1 M. & M. 321, n.

² *Miller v. The Mariner's Church*, 7 Greenl. 51; *Fifield v. Smith*, 8 Shepl. 383; *Sewell v. Stubbs*, 1 C. & P. 73; *Quarterman v. Cox*, 8 C. & P. 97; *Luniss v. Row*, 2 P. & D. 538; *Hays v. Richardson*, 1 Gill & J. 366; *Stebbins v. Sackett*, 5 Conn. 258; *Baxter v. Rodman*, 3 Pick. 435. The case of *Goodhay v. Hendry*, 1 Mo. & M. 319, apparently *contra*, is opposed by *Carlisle v. Eady*, 1 C. & P. 234, and by *Wandless v. Cawthorne*, 1 Mo. & M. 321, n.

³ *Southard v. Wilson*, 8 Shepl. 494; *Hobart v. Bartlett*, 5 Shepl. 429.

⁴ *Main v. Newson*, Anthon's Cas. 13. But a witness cannot be excluded by proof of his own admission that he was interested in the suit. *Bates v. Ryland*, 6 Alabama R. 668; *Pierce v. Chase*, 8 Mass. 487, 488; *Commonwealth v. Waite*, 5 Mass. 261.

⁵ *Shannon v. The Commonwealth*, 8 S. & R. 444; *Galbraith v. Galbraith*, 6 Watts, 112; *Bank of Columbia v. Magruder*, 6 Har. & J. 172.

ground, does not preclude a resort to the other mode, to prove the interest on another ground.¹ And where the objection to the competency of the witness is founded upon the evidence, already adduced by the party offering him, this has been adjudged not to be such an election of the mode of proof, as to preclude the objector from the right to examine the witness on the *voir dire*.² But, subject to these modifications, the rule recognised and adopted by the general current of authorities is, that where the objecting party has undertaken to prove the interest of the witness, by interrogating him upon the *voir dire*, he shall not, upon failure of that mode, resort to the other to prove facts, the existence of which was known when the witness was interrogated.³ The party, appealing to the

¹ *Stebbins v. Sackett*, 5 Conn. 258.

² *Bridge v. Wellington*, 1 Mass. 221, 222.

³ In the old books, including the earlier editions of Mr. Starkie's and Mr. Phillips's Treatises on Evidence, the rule is clearly laid down; that after an examination upon the *voir dire*, no other mode of proof can in any case be resorted to; excepting only the case, where the interest was developed in the course of trial of the issue. But in the last editions of those works it is said, that "if the witness discharge himself on the *voir dire*, the party who objects, may still support his objection by evidence;" but no authority is cited for the position. 1 Stark. Evid. 124; Phil. & Am. on Evid. 149; 1 Phil. Evid. 154. Mr. Starkie had previously added these words—"as part of his own case"; (see 2 Stark. Evid. p. 756, 1st Ed.); and with this qualification the remark is supported by authority, and is correct in principle. The question of competency is a collateral question; and the rule is, that when a witness is asked a question upon a collateral point, his answer is final, and cannot be contradicted; that is, no collateral evidence is admissible for that purpose. *Harris v. Tippet*, 2 Campb. 637; *Philadelphia & Trenton Co. v. Stimpson*, 14 Peters, 448, 461; *Harris v. Wilson*, 7 Wend. 57; *Odiorne v. Winkley*, 2 Gallis. 53; *Rex v. Watson*, 2 Stark. R. 149-157. But if the evidence, subsequently given upon the matter in issue, should also prove the witness interested, his testimony may well be stricken out, without violating any rule. *Brockbank v. Anderson*, 7 Man. & Gr. 295, 313. The American Courts have followed the old English rule, as stated in the text. *Butler v. Butler*, 3 Day, R. 214; *Stebbins v. Sackett*, 5 Conn. 258, 261; *Chance v. Hine*, 6 Conn. 231; *Welden v. Buck*, Anthon's Cas. 9; *Chatfield v. Lathrop*, 6 Pick. 418. See also Cowen & Hill's note 250, to 1 Phil. Evid. p. 132; *Evans v. Eaton*, 1 Peters, C. C. R. 322.

conscience of the witness, offers him to the Court as a credible witness; and it is contrary to the spirit of the law of evidence, to permit him afterwards to say, that the witness is not worthy to be believed. It would also violate another rule, by its tendency to raise collateral issues. Nor is it deemed reasonable to permit a party to sport with the conscience of a witness, when he has other proof of his interest. But if evidence of his interest has been given *aliunde*, it is not proper to examine the witness, in order to explain it away.¹

§ 424. A witness is said to be examined upon the *voir dire*, when he is sworn and examined as to the fact whether he is not a party interested in the cause.² And though this term was formerly and more strictly applied only to the case where the witness was sworn to make true answers to such questions as the Court might put to him, and before he was sworn in chief, yet it is now extended to the preliminary examination to his interest, whatever may have been the form of the oath under which the inquiry is made.

§ 425. The question of interest, though involving facts, is still a preliminary question, preceding, in its nature, the admission of the testimony to the Jury. It is therefore to be determined by the Court alone, it being the province of the Judge, and not of the Jury, in the first instance, to pass upon its sufficiency.³ If, however, the question of fact in any preliminary inquiry, such, for instance, as the proof of an instrument by subscribing witnesses, is decided by the Judge, and the same question of fact afterwards recurs in the course of the trial upon the merits, the Jury are not precluded by the decision of the Judge, but may, if they are satisfied upon the

¹ Mott v. Hicks, 1 Cowen, 513; Evans v. Gray, 1 Martin, N. S. 709.

² Termes de la Ley, Verb. *Voyer dire*. And see Jacobs v. Laybourn, 11 M. & W. 685, where the nature and use of an examination upon the *voir dire* are stated and explained by Ld Abinger, C. B.

³ Harris v. Wilson, 7 Wend. 57; Ante, § 49; Cowen & Hill's notes to Phil. Evid. Vol. 3, p. 1501.

evidence, find the fact the other way.¹ In determining the question of interest, where the evidence is derived *aliunde*, and it depends upon the decision of intricate questions of fact, the Judge may, in his discretion, take the opinion of the Jury upon them.² And if a witness, being examined on the *voir dire*, testifies to facts tending to prove that he is not interested, and is thereupon admitted to testify; after which opposing evidence is introduced, to the same facts, which are thus left in doubt, and the facts are material to the issue; the evidence must be weighed by the Jury, and if they thereupon believe the witness to be interested, they must lay his testimony out of the case.³

§ 426. The competency of a witness, disqualified by interest, may always be restored by a proper release. If it consists in an interest vested in himself, he may divest himself of it by a release, or other proper conveyance. If it consists in a liability over, whether to the party calling him, or to another person, it may be released by the person to whom he is liable. A general release of all actions and causes of action for any matter or thing, which has happened previous to the date of the release, will discharge the witness from all liability consequent upon the event of a suit then existing. Such a release from the drawer to the acceptor of a bill of exchange, was therefore held sufficient to render him a competent witness for the drawer, in an action then pending by the payee against him; for the transaction was already passed, which was to lay the foundation of the future liability; and upon all such transactions and inchoate rights such a release will operate.⁴ A release, to qualify a witness, must be given before the testimony is closed, or it comes too late. But if the trial is not over, the Court will permit the witness to be re-examined,

¹ Ross v. Gould, 5 Greenl. 204.

² Phil. & Am. on Evid. p. 2, note (1).

³ Walker v. Sawyer, 13 N. Hamp. R. 191.

⁴ Scott v. Lifford, 1 Campb. 249, 250; Cartwright v. Williams, 2 Stark. R. 340.

after he is released; and it will generally be sufficient to ask him if his testimony, already given, is true, the circumstances under which it has been given going only to the credibility.¹

§ 427. As to the person *by whom the release should be given*, it is obvious, that it must be by the party holding the interest to be released, or by some person duly authorized in his behalf. A release of a bond debt by one of several obligees, or to one of several obligors, will operate as to them all.² So, where several had agreed to bear the expense of a joint undertaking, in preferring a petition to Parliament, and an action was brought against one of them, another of the contractors was held a competent witness for the defendant, after being released by him; for the event of the suit could at most only render him liable to the defendant for his contributory share.³ But if there is a joint fund or property to be directly affected by the result, the same reason would not decisively apply; and some act of divestment on the part of the witness himself would be necessary.⁴ Thus, in an action

¹ Wake v. Lock, 5 C. & P. 454; Tallman v. Dutcher, 7 Wend. 180; Doty v. Wilson, 14 Johns. 378.

² Co. Lit. 232, a; Cheetham v. Ward, 1 B. & P. 630. So, by one of several partners, or joint proprietors, or owners. Whitmore v. Waterhouse, 4 C. & P. 383; Hockless v. Mitchell, 4 Esp. 86; Bulkley v. Dayton, 14 Johns. 387. But where the interest of the parties to the record is several, a release by one of them only is not sufficient. Betts v. Jones, 9 C. & P. 199.

³ Duke v. Pownall, 1 M. & Malk. 430; Ransom v. Keyes, 9 Cowen, 128. So, in other cases of liability to contribution. Bayley v. Osborn, 2 Wend. 527; Robertson v. Smith, 18 Johns. 459; Gibbs v. Bryant, 1 Pick. 118; Ames v. Withington, 3 N. Hamp. 115; Carleton v. Witcher, 5 N. Hamp. 196. One of several copartners, not being sued with them, may be rendered a competent witness for them by their release. Lefferts v. De Mott, 21 Wend. 136; (sed vide Cline v. Little, 5 Blackf. 486); but *quære*, if he ought not also to release to them his interest in the assets of the firm, so far as they may be affected by the demand in controversy? *Ib.*

⁴ Waite v. Merrill, 4 Greenl. 102; Richardson v. Freeman, 6 Greenl. 57; 1 Holt's Cas. 430, note; Anderson v. Brock, 3 Greenl. 243. The heir is rendered a competent witness for the administrator, by releasing to the latter all his interest in the action; provided it does not appear, that there is any real estate to be affected by the result. Boynton v. Turner, 13 Mass. 391.

on a charter-party, a joint-owner with the plaintiff, though not a registered owner, is not a competent witness for the plaintiff, unless cross releases are executed between them.¹ A release by an infant is generally sufficient for this purpose; for it may be only voidable, and not void; in which case, a stranger shall not object to it.² But a release by a guardian *ad litem*,³ or by a *prochein amy*, or by an attorney of record,⁴ is not good. A surety may always render the principal a competent witness for himself, by a release.⁵ And it seems sufficient, if only the costs are released.⁶

§ 428. Though there are no interests of a disqualifying nature, but what may in some manner be annihilated,⁷ yet there are some which *cannot be reached by a release*. Such is the case of one, having a common right, as an inhabitant of a town; for a release by him, to the other inhabitants, will not render him a competent witness for one of them, to maintain the common right.⁸ So, where in trover, the plaintiff claimed the chattel by purchase from B., and the defendant claimed it under a purchase from W., who had previously bought it from B., it was held, that a release to B. from the defendant would not render him a competent witness for the latter; for

¹ Jackson v. Galloway, 8 C. & P. 480.

² Rogers v. Berry, 10 Johns. 132; Walker v. Ferrin, 4 Verm. 523.

³ Fraser v. Marsh, 2 Stark. R. 41; Walker v. Ferrin, *ub. sup.*

⁴ Murray v. House, 11 Johns. 464; Walker v. Ferrin, *ub. sub.*

⁵ Reed v. Boardman, 20 Pick. 441; Harmon v. Arthur, 1 Bail. 83; Willard v. Wickham, 7 Watts, 292.

⁶ Perryman v. Steggall, 6 C. & P. 197. See also Van Shaack v. Stafford, 12 Pick. 565.

⁷ In a writ of entry by a mortgagee, the tenant claimed under a deed from the mortgagor, subsequent in date, but prior in registration, and denied notice of the mortgage. To prove that he purchased with notice, the mortgagor was admitted a competent witness for the mortgagee, the latter having released him from so much of the debt as should not be satisfied by the land mortgaged, and covenanted to resort to the land as the sole fund for payment of the debt. Howard v. Chadbourne, 5 Greenl. 15.

⁸ Jacobson v. Fountain, 2 Johns. 170; Abby v. Goodrich, 3 Day, 433; Ante, § 405.

the defendant's remedy was not against B., but against W. alone.¹ And in the case of a covenant real, running with the land, a release by the covenantee, after he has parted with the estate, is of no avail, no person but the present owner being competent to release it.² Where the action is against the surety of one, who has since become bankrupt, the bankrupt is not rendered a competent witness for the surety by a release from him alone; because a judgment against the surety would still give him a right to prove under the commission. The surety ought also to release the assignees from all claim on the bankrupt's estate, it being vested in them; and the bankrupt should release his claim to the surplus.³ So, a residuary legatee is not rendered a competent witness for the executor, who sues to recover a debt due to the testator, merely by releasing to the executor his claim to that debt; for, if the action fails, the estate will still be liable for the costs to the plaintiff's attorney, or to the executor. The witness must also release the residue of the estate; or, the estate must be released from all claim for the costs.⁴

§ 429. It is *not necessary* that the release be *actually delivered* by the releasor into the hands of the releasee. It may be deposited in Court for the use of the absent party.⁵ Or, it may be delivered to the wife for the use of the husband.⁶ But in such cases it has been held necessary that the delivery of the release to a third person should be known to the witness at the time of giving his testimony.⁷ The objection

¹ Radburn v. Morris, 4 Bing. 649.

² Leighton v. Perkins, 2 N. Hamp. 427; Pile v. Benham, 3 Hayw. 176.

³ Perryman v. Steggall, 8 Bing. 369.

⁴ Baker v. Tyrwhitt, 4 Campb. 27.

⁵ Perry v. Fleming, 2 N. Car. Law Repos. 458; Lilly v. Kitzmiller, 1 Yeates, 30.

⁶ Van Deusen v. Frink, 15 Pick. 449; Peaceable v. Keep, 1 Yeates, 576.

⁷ Seymour v. Strong, 4 Hill, R. 225. Whether the belief of the witness, as to his interest, or the impression under which he testifies, can go farther than to affect the credibility of his testimony, *quære*; and see Ante, § 387, 388, 419.

of interest, as before remarked, proceeds on the presumption that it may bias the mind of the witness; but this presumption is taken away by proof of his having done all in his power to get rid of the interest.¹ It has even been held, that where the defendant has suffered an interested witness to be examined, on the undertaking of the plaintiff's attorney to execute a release to him after the trial, which, after a verdict for the plaintiff, he refused to execute, this was no sufficient cause for a new trial; for the witness had a remedy on the undertaking.² But the witness, in such cases, will not be permitted to proceed with his testimony, even while the attorney is preparing or amending the release, without the consent of the adverse party.³

§ 430. There are *other modes*, besides a release, in which the competency of an interested witness may be restored. Some of these modes, to be adopted by the witness himself, have already been adverted to;⁴ namely, where he has assigned his own interest, or done all in his power to assign it; or, where he refuses to accept a release tendered to him by another. So, where, being a legatee or distributee, he has been fully paid.⁵ An indorser is made a competent witness for the indorsee, by striking off his name from the back of the note or bill; but if the bill is drawn in sets, it must appear that his name is erased from each one of the set, even though one of them is missing and supposed to be lost; for it may be in the hands of a *bonâ fide* holder.⁶ A guarantor, also, is rendered a competent witness for the creditor, by delivering up the letter of guaranty, with permission to destroy it.⁷ And this may be done by the attorney of the party, his relation as

¹ Goodtitle v. Welford, 1 Doug. 139, 141, per Ashhurst, J.

² Hemming v. English, 1 Cr. M. & R. 568; 5 Tyrwh. 185, S. C.

³ Doty v. Wilson, 14 Johns. 378.

⁴ Ante, § 419.

⁵ Clarke v. Gannon, Ry. & M. 31; Gebhardt v. Shindle, 15 S. & R. 235.

⁶ Steinmetz v. Currie, 1 Dall. 269.

⁷ Merchants' Bank v. Spicer, 6 Wend. 443.

such and the possession of the paper being sufficient to justify a presumption of authority for that purpose.¹ The bail or surety of another may be rendered a competent witness for him, as we have already seen, by substituting another person in his stead; which, where the stipulation is entered into in any judicial proceeding, as in the case of bail, and the like, the Court will order upon motion. The same may be done by depositing in Court a sufficient sum of money; or, in the case of bail, by a surrender of the body of the principal.² So, where the liability, which would have rendered the witness incompetent, is discharged by the operation of law; as, for example, by the bankrupt or the insolvent laws, or by the statute of limitations.³ Where, in trespass, several justifications are set up in bar, one of which is a prescriptive or customary right in all the inhabitants of a certain place, one of those inhabitants may be rendered a competent witness for the defendant, by his waiving that branch of the defence.⁴ In trover by a bailee, he may render the bailor a competent witness for him, by agreeing to allow him, at all events, a certain sum for the goods lost.⁵ The assignee of a chose in action, who, having commenced a suit upon it in the name of the assignor, has afterwards sold and transferred his own interest to a stranger, is thereby rendered a competent witness for the plaintiff.⁶ But the interest which an informer has in a statute penalty, is held not assignable for that purpose.⁷ So,

¹ Ibid.; *Watson v. McLaren*, 19 Wend. 557.

² Ante, § 392, note (1); *Bailey v. Hole*, 3 C. & P. 560; 1 Mood. & M. 289, S. C.; *Leggett v. Boyd*, 3 Wend. 376; *Tompkins v. Curtis*, 3 Cowen, 251; *Grey v. Young*, 1 Harper, 38; *Allen v. Hawks*, 13 Pick. 79; *Beckley v. Freeman*, 15 Pick. 468; *Pearcy v. Fleming*, 5 C. & P. 503; *Lees v. Smith*, 1 M. & Rob. 329; *Comstock v. Paie*, 3 Rob. Louis. R. 440.

³ *Murray v. Judah*, 6 Cowen, 484; *Ludlow v. Union Ins. Co.* 2 S. & R. 119; *United States v. Smith*, 4 Day, 121; *Quimby v. Wroth*, 3 H. & J. 249; *Murray v. Marsh*, 2 Hayw. 200.

⁴ *Prewitt v. Tilly*, 1 C. & P. 140.

⁵ *Maine Stage Co. v. Longley*, 2 Shepl. 444.

⁶ *Soulden v. Van Rensselaer*, 9 Wend. 293.

⁷ *Commonwealth v. Hargesheimer*, 1 Ashm. 413.

the interest of a legatee being assigned, he is thereby rendered competent to prove the will; though the payment is only secured to him by bond, which is not yet due.¹ So, a stockholder in any money-corporation may be rendered a competent witness for the corporation, by a transfer of his stock, either to the company, or to a stranger; even though he intends to repossess it, and has assigned it merely to qualify himself to testify; provided there is no agreement between him and the assignee or purchaser for a reconveyance.² Where a witness was liable to the plaintiff's attorney for the costs, and the attorney had prepared a release in order to restore his competency in case it should be questioned, but no objection being made to the witness, he was examined for the plaintiff without a release, this was considered as a gross imposition upon the Court; and in a subsequent action by the attorney against the witness for his costs, he was nonsuited.³ These examples are deemed sufficient for the purpose of illustrating this method of restoring the competency of a witness disqualified by interest.⁴

¹ *Mellroy v. Mellroy*, 1 Rawle, 423.

² *Gilbert v. Manchester Iron Co.* 11 Wend. 627; *Utica Ins. Co. v. Cadwell*, 3 Wend. 296; *Stall v. The Catskill Bank*, 18 Wend. 466; *Bank of Utica v. Smalley*, 2 Cowen, 770; *Bell v. Hull, &c. Railway Co.* 6 M. & W. 701.

³ *Williams v. Goodwin*, 11 Moore, 342.

⁴ There are numerous decisions on this point, which are collected in Cowen & Hill's notes 257-272, to 1 Phil. Evid. p. 133-137.

CHAPTER III.

OF THE EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES.

§ 431. HAVING thus treated of the means of procuring the attendance of witnesses, and of their competency, we come now to consider the manner in which they are to be examined. And here, in the first place, it is to be observed, that the subject lies chiefly in the discretion of the Judge, before whom the cause is tried, it being from its very nature susceptible of but few positive and stringent rules. The great object is to elicit the truth from the witness; but the character, intelligence, moral courage, bias, memory, and other circumstances of witnesses are so various, as to require almost equal variety in the manner of interrogation, and the degree of its intensity, to attain that end. This manner and degree, therefore, as well as the other circumstances of the trial, must necessarily be left somewhat at large, subject to the few general rules, which we shall proceed to state; remarking only, that wherever any matter is left to the discretion of one Judge, his decision is not subject to be reversed or revised by another.

§ 432. If the Judge deems it essential to the discovery of truth, that the witnesses should be *examined out of the hearing of each other*, he will so order it. This order, upon the motion or suggestion of either party, is rarely withheld; but, by the weight of authority, the party does not seem entitled to it as a matter of right.¹ The course in such cases is, either

¹ In *Rex v. Cook*, 13 Howell, St. Tr. 348, it was declared by Ld. C. J. Treby to be grantable of favor only, at the discretion of the Court. And this opinion was followed by Ld. C. J. Holt, in *Rex v. Vaughan*, Ib. 494, and by Sir Michael Foster, in *Rex v. Goodere*, 17 Howell, St. Tr. 1015. See also 1 Stark. Evid. 163; *Beamon v. Ellice*, 4 C. & P. 585, per Taunton, J.;

to require the names of the witnesses to be stated by the counsel of the respective parties, by whom they were summoned, and to direct the sheriff to keep them in a separate room until they are called for; or, more usually, to cause them to withdraw, by an order from the bench, accompanied with notice, that if they remain they will not be examined. In the latter case, if a witness remains in Court in violation of the order, even by mistake, it is in the discretion of the Judge, whether or not he shall be examined. The course formerly was to exclude him; and this is still the inflexible rule in the Exchequer in revenue cases, in order to prevent any imputation of unfairness in proceedings between the crown and the subject. But with this exception, the rule in criminal and civil cases is the same.¹ But an attorney in the cause, whose personal attendance in Court is necessary, is usually excepted from the order

The *State v. Sparrow*, 3 Murphy, R. 487. The rule is stated by Fortescue, in these words:—*Et si necessitas exegerit, dividantur testes hujusmodi, donec ipsi deposuerint quicquid velint, ita quod dictum unius non docebit aut concitavit eorum alium ad consimiliter testificandum.* Fortesc. De Laud. Leg. Angl. c. 26. This, however, does not necessarily exclude the right of the Court to determine whether there is any need of a separate examination. Mr. Phillips states it only as the uniform course of practice, that "the Court, on the application of counsel, will order the witnesses on both sides to withdraw." 2 Phil. Evid. 395. And see, accordingly, *Williams v. Hulie*, 1 Sid. 131; *Swift on Evid.* 512. In *Taylor v. Lawson*, 3 C. & P. 543, Best, C. J. regretted that the rule of Parliamentary practice, which excludes all witnesses but the one under examination, was not universally adopted. But in *Southey v. Nash*, 7 C. & P. 632, Alderson, B. expressly recognised it as "the right of either party, at any moment, to require that the unexamined witnesses shall leave the Court." It is a general rule in the Scotch Law, that witnesses should be examined separately; and it is founded on the importance of having the story of each witness fresh from his own recollection, unmingled with the impression received from hearing the testimony of others in the same case. To this rule, an exception is allowed in the case of medical witnesses; but even those, on matters of medical opinion, are examined apart from each other. See *Alison's Practice*, p. 542-545; *Tait on Evid.* 420.

¹ *Attor. Gen. v. Bulpit*, 9 Price, 4; *Parker v. McWilliam*, 6 Bing. 683; 4 Moore & Payne, 480, S. C.; *Thomas v. David*, 7 C. & P. 350; *Rex v. Colley*, 1 M. & Malk. 329; *Beamon v. Ellice*, 4 C. & P. 585, and note (b).

to withdraw.¹ The right of excluding witnesses for disobedience to such an order, though well established, is rarely exercised in America;² but the witness is punishable for the contempt.

§ 433. When a witness has been duly sworn, and his competency is settled, if objected to,³ he is first examined by the party producing him; which is called his *direct examination*. He is afterwards examined to the same matters by the adverse party; which is called his *cross-examination*. These examinations are conducted orally in open Court, under the regulation and order of the Judge, and in his presence and that of the Jury, and of the parties and their counsel.

§ 434. In the direct examination of a witness, it is not allowed to put to him what are termed *leading questions*; that is, questions which suggest to the witness the answer desired.⁴ This rule is to be understood in a reasonable sense; for if it were not allowed to approach the points at issue by such questions, the examination would be most inconveniently protracted. To abridge the proceedings, and bring the witness as soon as possible to the material points on which he is to speak, the counsel may lead him on to that length, and may recapitulate to him the acknowledged facts of the case which have been already established. The rule, therefore, is not applied to that

¹ *Everett v. Lowdham*, 5 C. & P. 91; *Pomeroy v. Baddeley*, Ry. & M. 430.

² 1 Phil. Evid. 268, note 501, by Cowen & Hill.

³ The course in the Scotch Courts, after a witness is sworn, is, first to examine him *in initialibus*, namely, whether he has been instructed what to say, or has received or has been promised any good deed for what he is to say, or bears any ill will to the adverse party, or has any interest in the cause, or concern in conducting it; together with his age, and whether he is married or not, and the degree of his relationship to the party adducing him. Tait on Evid. 424.

⁴ 1 Stark. Evid. 149; 2 Phil. Evid. 401; *Parkin v. Moon*, 7 C. & P. 408; *Alison's Practice*, 545; Tait on Evid. 427.

part of the examination, which is merely introductory of that which is material. Questions are also objectionable, as leading, which, embodying a material fact, admit of an answer by a simple negative or affirmative. An argumentative or pregnant course of interrogation, is as faulty as the like course in pleading. The interrogatory must not assume facts to have been proved, which have not been proved; nor, that particular answers have been given, which have not been given.¹ The witness, except in certain cases hereafter to be mentioned, is to be examined only to matters of fact within his own knowledge, whether they consist of words or actions; and to these matters he should in general be plainly, directly, and distinctly interrogated. Inferences or conclusions, which may be drawn from facts, are ordinarily to be drawn by the Jury alone; except where the conclusion is an inference of skill and judgment; in which case it may be drawn by an expert, and testified by him to the Jury.²

§ 435. In some cases, however, *leading questions* are permitted, even in a *direct examination*; namely, where the witness appears to be hostile to the party producing him, or in the interest of the other party, or unwilling to give evidence;³ or where an omission in his testimony is evidently caused by want of recollection, which a suggestion may assist. Thus, where the witness stated, that he could not recollect the names of the component members of a firm, so as to repeat them without suggestion, but thought he might possibly recollect them if suggested to him, this was permitted to be done.⁴ So, where the transaction involves numerous items or dates.

¹ *Hill v. Coombe*, 1 Stark. Evid. 163, note, (qq); *Handley v. Ward*, Ib.; *Turney v. The State*, 8 Sm. & Marsh. 104.

² 1 Stark. Evid. 152; *Goodtitle d. Revett v. Braham*, 4 T. R. 497.

³ *Clarke v. Saffery*, Ry. & M. 126, per Best, C. J.; *Regina v. Chapman*, 8 C. & P. 558; *Regina v. Ball*, Ib. 745; *Regina v. Murphy*, Ib. 297. Leading questions are not allowed in Scotland, even in cross-examining. Tait on Evid. 427; *Alison's Practice*, 545.

⁴ *Acerro et al. v. Petroni*, 1 Stark. R. 100, per Ld. Ellenborough.

So, where, from the nature of the case, the mind of the witness cannot be directed to the subject of inquiry, without a particular specification of it; as, where he is called to contradict another, as to the contents of a letter which is lost, and cannot, without suggestion, recollect all its contents, the particular passage may be suggested to him.¹ So, where a witness is called to contradict another, who has stated, that such and such expressions were used, or the like, counsel are sometimes permitted to ask, whether those particular expressions were used, or those things said, instead of asking the witness to state what was said.² Where the witness stands in a situation, which of necessity makes him adverse to the party calling him, as, for example, on the trial of an issue out of Chancery, with power to the plaintiff to examine the defendant himself as a witness, he may be cross-examined, as a matter of right.³ Indeed, when and under what circumstances a leading question may be put, is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the Court, and not a matter which can be assigned for error.⁴

¹ *Courteen v. Touse*, 1 Campb. 43; *Edmonds v. Walter*, 3 Stark. R. 7.

² 1 Stark. Evid. 152. Mr. Phillips is of opinion that the regular mode should first be exhausted in such cases, before leading questions are resorted to. Phil. & Am. on Evid. p. 890, 891; 2 Phil. Evid. 404, 405.

³ *Clarke v. Saffery*, Ry. & M. 126. The policy of these rules, as well as of almost all other rules of the Common Law on the subject of evidence, is controverted in the *Rationale of Judicial Evidence*, by Jeremy Bentham;—"a learned writer, who has devoted too much of his time to the theory of jurisprudence, to know much of the practical consequences of the doctrines he has published to the world." Per Best, C. J. in *Hovill v. Stephenson*, 5 Bing. 493.

⁴ *Moody v. Rowell*, 17 Pick. 498. In this case the law on this point was thus stated by the learned Chief Justice:—"The Court have no doubt, that it is within the discretion of a Judge at the trial, under particular circumstances, to permit a leading question to be put to one's own witness; as, when he is manifestly reluctant and hostile to the interest of the party calling him, or where he has exhausted his memory, without stating the particular required, where it is a proper name, or other fact, which cannot be significantly pointed to by a general interrogatory, or where the witness is a child of tender years, whose attention can be called to the matter required, only by a pointed or

§ 436. Though a witness can testify only to such facts as are within his own knowledge and recollection, yet he is permitted to refresh and *assist his memory, by the use of a written instrument*, memorandum, or entry in a book, and may be compelled to do so, if the writing is present in Court.¹ It does not seem to be necessary that the writing should have been made by the witness himself, nor that it should be an original writing, provided, after inspecting it, he can speak to the facts from his own recollection.² So also, where the witness recollects that he saw the paper while the facts were fresh in his memory, and remembers that he then knew that the particulars therein mentioned were correctly stated.³ And it is not necessary that the writing thus used to refresh the memory, should itself be admissible in evidence; for if inadmissible in itself, as, for want of a stamp, it may still be

leading question. So a Judge may, in his discretion, prohibit certain leading questions from being put to an adversary's witness, where the witness shows a strong interest or bias in favor of the cross-examining party, and needs only an intimation, to say whatever is most favorable to that party. The witness may have purposely concealed such bias in favor of one party, to induce the other to call him and make him his witness; or the party calling him may be compelled to do so, to prove some single fact necessary to his case. This discretionary power, to vary the general rule, is to be exercised only so far as the purposes of justice plainly require it, and is to be regulated by the circumstances of each case."

¹ *Reed v. Boardman*, 20 Pick. 441.

² *Doe v. Perkins*, 3 T. R. 749, expounded in *Rex v. St. Martin's Leicester*, 2 Ad. & El. 215; *Burton v. Plummer*, Ib. 341; *Barrough v. Martin*, 2 Campb. 112; *Duchess of Kingston's case*, 20 Howell's St. Tr. 619; *Henry v. Lee*, 2 Chitty, R. 124; *Rambert v. Cohen*, 4 Esp. 213. In *Meagoe v. Simmons*, 3 C. & P. 75, Ld. Tenterden observed, that the usual course was not to permit the witness to refresh his memory from any paper not of his own writing. And so is the Scotch practice. Tait on Evid. 433. But a witness has been allowed to refresh his memory from the notes of his testimony, taken by counsel at a former trial. *Laws v. Reed*, 2 Lewin, Cr. Cas. 152. And from his deposition. *Smith v. Morgan*, 2 M. & Rob. 259. And from a printed copy of his report. *Home v. Mackenzie*, 6 C. & Fin. 628.

³ *Burrough v. Martin*, 2 Campb. 112; *Burton v. Plummer*, 2 Ad. & El. 343, per Ld. Denman; *Jacob v. Lindsay*, 1 East, 460.

referred to by the witness.¹ But where the witness neither recollects the fact, nor remembers to have recognised the written statement as true, and the writing was not made by him, his testimony, so far as it is founded upon the written paper, is but hearsay; and a witness can no more be permitted to give evidence of his inference from what a third person has written, than from what a third person has said.²

§ 437. The cases in which writings are permitted to be used for this purpose may be divided into three classes. (1.) Where the writing is used only for the purpose of assisting the memory of the witness. In this case, it does not seem necessary that the writing should be produced in Court,³ though its absence may afford matter of observation to the Jury; for the witness at last testifies from his own recollection. (2.) Where the witness recollects having seen the writing before, and though he has now no independent recollection of the facts mentioned in it, yet he remembers that at the time he saw it he knew the contents to be correct. In this case, the writing itself must be produced in Court, in order that the other party may cross-examine; not that such writing is thereby made evidence of itself, but that the other party may have the benefit of the witness's refreshing his memory by every part.⁴ And for the

¹ *Maugham v. Hubbard*, 8 B. & C. 14; *Kensington v. Inglis*, 8 East, 273; *Ante*, § 90, 228.

² *Phil. & Am. on Evid.* 895; 2 *Phil. Evid.* 413.

³ *Kensington v. Inglis*, 8 East, 273; *Burton v. Plummer*, 2 Ad. & El. 341.

⁴ *Ante*, § 115, 436; *Rex v. St. Martin's Leicester*, 2 Ad. & El. 215, per Patteson, J.; *Sinclair v. Stevenson*, 1 C. & P. 582; 2 Bing. 516, S. C.; 10 Moore, 46, S. C.; *Lloyd v. Freshfield*, 2 C. & P. 325; 8 D. & R. 19, S. C. If the paper is shown to the witness merely to prove the handwriting, it has been ruled, that the other party has not therefore a right to see it. *Sinclair v. Stevenson*, *supra*. But the contrary has since been held by Bosanquet, J., in *Russell v. Ryder*, 6 C. & P. 416, and with good reason; for the adverse party has a right to cross-examine the witness as to the handwriting. 2 *Phil. Evid.* 400. But if the counsel, in cross-examination, puts a paper into a witness's hand in order to refresh his memory, the opposite counsel has a

same reason, a witness is not permitted to refresh his memory by extracts made from other writings.¹ (3.) Where the writing in question neither is recognised by the witness, as one which he remembers to have before seen, nor awakens his memory to the recollection of any thing contained in it; but, nevertheless, knowing the writing to be genuine, his mind is so convinced, that he is on that ground enabled to swear positively to the fact. An example of this kind is where a banker's clerk is shown a bill of exchange, which has his own writing upon it, from which he knows and is able to state positively that it passed through his hands. So, where an agent made a parol lease, and entered a memorandum of the terms in a book, which was produced, but the agent stated that he had no memory of the transaction but from the book, without which he should not, of his own knowledge, be able to speak to the fact, but on reading the entry he had no doubt that the fact really happened; it was held sufficient.² So, where a witness, called to prove the execution of a deed, sees his own signature to the attestation, and says, that he is therefore

right to look at it, without being bound to read it in evidence; and may also ask the witness when it was written, without being bound to put it into the case. *Rex v. Ramsden*, 2 C. & P. 603. The American Courts have sometimes carried the rule farther than it has been carried in England, by admitting the writing itself to go in evidence to the Jury in all cases, where it was made by the witness at the time of the fact, for the purpose of preserving the memory of it, if, at the time of testifying, he can recollect nothing further than that he had accurately reduced the whole transaction to writing. *Farmers and Mechanics Bank v. Boraef*, 1 Rawle, 152; *Smith v. Lane*, 12 S. & R. 84, per Gibson, J.; *The State v. Rawls*, 2 Nott & McCord, 331; *Clark v. Vorce*, 15 Wend. 193; *Merrill v. Ithaca & Oswego Rail Road Co.* 16 Wend. 586, 596, 597, 598; *Haven v. Wendell*, 11 N. Hamp. 112. But see *Lightner v. Wike*, 4 S. & R. 203. Other American cases upon the general subject of the text, are stated in Cowen & Hill's note 528, to 1 *Phil. Evid.* 290.

¹ *Doe v. Perkins*, 3 T. R. 749; 2 Ad. & El. 215.

² *Rex v. St. Martin's Leicester*, 2 Ad. & El. 210; *Phil. & Am. on Evid.* 893. See also *Haig v. Newton*, 1 Const. Rep. 423; *Sharpe v. Bingley*, 1b. 373.

sure that he saw the party execute the deed, that is sufficient proof of the execution of the deed, though he adds that he has no recollection of the fact.¹ In these and the like cases, for the reason before given, the writing itself must be produced.²

§ 438. As to the *time when the writing*, thus used to restore the recollection of facts, *should have been made*, no precise rule seems to have been established. It is most frequently said, that the writing must have been made at the time of the fact in question, or recently afterwards.³ At the farthest, it ought to have been made before such a period of time has elapsed, as to render it probable that the memory of the witness might have become deficient.⁴ But the practice in this respect is governed very much by the circumstances of the particular case. In one case, to prove the date of an act of bankruptcy committed many years before, a witness was permitted to recur to his own deposition, made some time

¹ *Maugham v. Hubbard*, 8 B. B. & C. 16, per Bayley, J.; *Russell v. Coffin*, 8 Pick. 143, 150; *Den v. Downam*, 1 Green's R. 135, 142; *Jackson v. Christman*, 4 Wend. 277, 282; *Merrill v. Ithaca & C. Rail Road Co.* 16 Wend. 598; *Patterson v. Tucker*, 4 Halst. 322, 332, 333; *Wheeler v. Hatch*, 3 Fairf. 389; *Pigott v. Holloway*, 1 Binn. 436; *Collins v. Lemasters*, 2 Bail. 141; 1 Phil. Evid. by Cowen & Hill, p. 475, note 899.

² *Tanner v. Taylor*, cited by Buller, J. in *Doe v. Perkins*, 3 T. R. 754; *Howard v. Canfield*, 5 Dowl. P. C. 417; *Dupuy v. Truman*, 2 Y. & Col. 341. Where A. was proved to have written a certain article in a newspaper, but the manuscript was lost, and A. had no recollection of the fact of writing it, it was held that the newspaper might be used to refresh his memory, and that he might then be asked whether he had any doubt that the fact was as therein stated. *Topham v. McGregor*, 1 Car. & Kir. 320. So, where the transaction had faded from the memory of the witness, but he recollected that while it was recent and fresh in his memory, he had stated the circumstances in his examination before commissioners of bankrupt, which they had reduced to writing, and he had signed; he was allowed to look at his examination to refresh his memory. *Wood v. Cooper*, lb. 645.

³ 1 Stark. Evid. 154, 155; *Alison's Practice*, p. 540, 541; *Tait on Evid.* 432.

⁴ Phil. & Am. on Evid. 896; 2 Phil. Evid. 414.

during the year in which the fact happened.¹ In another case, the witness was not permitted to refresh his memory with a copy of a paper, made by himself six months after he made the original, though the original was proved to have been so written over with figures as to have become unintelligible; the learned Judge saying, that he could only look at the original memorandum, made near the time.² And in a still later case, where it was proposed to refer to a paper, which the witness had drawn up for the party who called him, after the cause was set down for trial, the learned Judge refused it, observing, that the rule must be confined to papers written contemporaneously with the transaction.³ But where the witness had herself noted down the transactions from time to time as they occurred, but had requested the plaintiff's solicitor to digest her notes into the form of a deposition, which she afterwards had revised, corrected, and transcribed, the Lord Chancellor indignantly suppressed the deposition.⁴

§ 439. If a witness has *become blind*, a contemporaneous writing made by himself, though otherwise inadmissible, may yet be read over to him, in order to excite his recollection.⁵ So, where a receipt for goods was inadmissible for want of a stamp, it was permitted to be used to refresh the memory of a witness who heard it read over to the defendant, the latter at the same time admitting the receipt of the goods.⁶

¹ *Vaughan v. Martin*, 1 Esp. 440.

² *Jones v. Stroud*, 2 C. & P. 196, per Best, C. J. In this case the words in the copy, and as sworn to by the witness, were spoken to the plaintiff; but on producing the original, which, on farther reflection, was confirmed by the witness, it appeared that they were spoken of him. The action was slander; and the words being laid according to the copy, for this variance the plaintiff was nonsuited.

³ *Steinkeller v. Newton*, 9 C. & P. 313.

⁴ Anon. cited per Ld. Kenyon, in *Doe v. Perkins*, 3 T. R. 752. See also *Sayer v. Wagstaff*, 5 Beav. 462.

⁵ *Catt v. Howard*, 3 Stark. R. 3.

⁶ *Jacob v. Lindsay*, 1 East, 460. In Scotland, the subject of the use and proper office of writings, in restoring the recollection of witnesses, has been

§ 440. In general, though a witness must depose to such facts only as are *within his own knowledge*, yet there is no rule

well considered and settled; and the law, as practised in the Courts of that country, is stated with precision by Mr. Alison, in his elegant and philosophical Treatise on the Practice of the Criminal Law. "It is frequently made a question," he observes, "whether a witness may refer to notes or memorandums made to assist his memory. On this subject, the rule is, that notes or memoranda made up by the witness at the moment, or recently after the fact, may be looked to in order to refresh his memory; but if they were made up at the distance of weeks or months thereafter, and still more, if done at the recommendation of one of the parties, they are not admissible. It is accordingly usual to allow witnesses to look to memorandums made at the time, of dates, distances, appearances on dead bodies, lists of stolen goods, or the like, before emitting his testimony, or even to read such notes to the Jury, as his evidence, he having first sworn that they were made at the time, and faithfully done. In regard to lists of stolen goods, in particular, it is now the usual practice to have inventories of them made up at the time from the information of the witness in precognition, signed by him, and libelled on as a production at the trial, and he is then desired to read them, or they are read to him, and he swears that they contain a correct list of the stolen articles. In this way much time is saved at the trial, and much more correctness and accuracy is obtained, than could possibly have been expected, if the witness were required to state from memory all the particulars of the stolen articles, at the distance perhaps of months from the time when they were lost. With the exception, however, of such memorandums, notes, or inventories, made up at the time, or shortly after the occasion libelled, a witness is not permitted to refer to a written paper as containing his disposition; for that would annihilate the whole advantages of parol evidence, and viva voce examination, and convert a Jury trial into a mere consideration of written instruments. There is one exception, however, properly introduced into this rule; in the case of medical or other scientific reports or certificates, which are lodged in process before the trial, and libelled on as productions in the indictment, and which the witness is allowed to read as his deposition to the Jury, confirming it at its close by a declaration on his oath, that it is a true report. The reason of this exception is founded in the consideration, that the medical, or other scientific facts or appearances, which are the subject of such a report, are generally so minute and detailed, that they cannot with safety be intrusted to the memory of the witness, but much more reliance may be placed on a report made out by him at the time, when the facts or appearances are fresh in his recollection; while, on the other hand, such witnesses have generally no personal interest in the matter, and from their situation and rank in life, are much less liable to suspicion than those of an inferior class, or more intimately con-

that requires him to speak with such expression of certainty, as to exclude all doubt in his mind. If the fact is impressed on his memory, but his recollection does not rise to positive assurance, it still admissible, to be weighed by the Jury; but if the impression is not derived from recollection of the fact, and is so slight as to render it probable that it may have been derived from others, or may have been some unwarrantable deduction of the witness's own mind, it will be rejected.¹ And though the opinions of witnesses are in general not evidence, yet on certain subjects some classes of witnesses may deliver their opinions, and on certain other subjects any competent witness may express his *opinion or belief*; and on any subject, to which a witness may testify, if he has any recollection at all of the fact, he may express it as it lies in his memory, of which the Jury will judge.² Thus, it is the constant practice to receive in evidence any witness's belief of the identity of a person, or that the handwriting in question is or is not the handwriting of a particular individual, provided he has any knowledge of the person or handwriting; and if he testifies falsely as to his belief, he may be convicted of perjury.³ On questions of science, skill, or trade, or others of the like kind, persons of skill, sometimes called *experts*, may not only testify

connected with the transaction in question. Although, therefore, the scientific witness is always called on to read his report, as affording the best evidence of the appearances he was called on to examine, yet he may be, and generally is, subjected to a farther examination by the prosecutor, or a cross-examination on the prisoner's part; and if he is called on to state any facts in the case, unconnected with his scientific report, as conversations with the deceased, confessions heard by him from the panel, or the like, *utitur jur commune*, he stands in the situation of an ordinary witness, and must give his evidence verbally in answer to the questions put to him, and can only refer to jottings or memorandums of dates, &c. made up at the time, to refresh his memory, like any other person put into the box." See Alison's Practice, p. 540 - 542.

¹ Clark v. Bigelow, 4 Shepl. 246.

² Miller's case, 3 Wils. 427, per. Ld. Ch. Just. De Grey; McNally's Evid. 262, 263. And see Carmalt v. Post, 8 Watts, 411, per Gibson, C. J.

³ Rex v. Pedley, Leach, Cr. Cas. 365, case 152.

to facts, but are permitted to give their opinions in evidence. Thus, the opinions of medical men are constantly admitted, as to the cause of disease, or of death, or the consequences of wounds, and as to the sane or insane state of a person's mind, as collected from a number of circumstances; and as to other subjects of professional skill.¹ And such opinions are admissible in evidence, though the witness founds them, not on his own personal observation, but on the case itself, as proved by other witnesses on the trial.² But where scientific men are called as witnesses, they cannot give their opinions as to the general merits of the cause, but only their opinions upon the facts proved.³ And if the facts are doubtful, and remain to be found by the Jury, it has been held improper to ask an expert, who has heard the evidence, what is his opinion upon the case on trial; though he may be asked his opinion upon a similar case, hypothetically stated.⁴ Nor is the opinion of a medical man admissible, that a particular act, for which a prisoner is tried, was an act of insanity.⁵ So, the subscribing witnesses to a will may testify their opinions, in respect to the sanity of the testator at the time of executing the will; though other witnesses can speak only as to facts; for the law has placed the subscribing witnesses about the testator, to ascertain and judge of his capacity.⁶ Seal engravers may be called to

¹ Stark. Evid. 154; Phil. & Am. on Evid. 899; Tait on Evid. 433; Hathorn v. King, 8 Mass. 371; Hoge v. Fisher, 1 Pet. C. C. R. 163; Folkes v. Chadd, 3 Doug. 157, per. Ld. Mansfield; McNally's Evid. 329-335, ch. 30.

² Rex v. Wright, Russ. & Ry. 456; Rex v. Searle, 1 M. & Rob. 75; McNaghten's case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 212.

³ Jameson v. Drinkald, 12 Moore, 148. But professional books, or books of science, (e. g. medical books,) are not admissible in evidence; though professional witnesses may be asked the grounds of their judgment and opinion, which might in some degree be founded on these books as a part of their general knowledge. Collier v. Simpson, 5 C. & P. 73.

⁴ Sills v. Brown, 9 C. & P. 601.

⁵ Rex v. Wright, Russ. & R. 456.

⁶ Chase v. Lincoln, 3 Mass. 237; Poole v. Richardson, Ib. 330; Rambler v. Tryon, 7 S. & R. 90, 92; Buckminster v. Perry, 4 Mass. 593; Grant v.

give their opinion upon an impression, whether it was made from an original seal, or from an impression.¹ So, the opinion of an artist in painting is evidence of the genuineness of a picture.² And it seems, that the genuineness of a postmark may be proved by the opinion of one who has been in the habit of receiving letters with that mark.³ In an action for breach of a promise to marry, a person accustomed to observe the mutual deportment of the parties, may give in evidence his opinion upon the question, whether they were attached to each other.⁴ A shipbuilder may give his opinion as to the seaworthiness of a ship, even on facts stated by others.⁵ A nautical person may testify his opinion whether, upon the facts proved by the plaintiff, the collision of two ships could have been avoided by proper care on the part of the defendant's servants.⁶ Where the question was, whether a bank which had been erected to prevent the overflowing of the sea, had caused the choking up of a harbor, the opinions of scientific engineers, as to the effect of such an embankment upon the harbor, were held admissible evidence.⁷ A secretary of a fire insurance company, accustomed to examine buildings with reference to

Thompson, 4 Conn. 203. And see Sheafe v. Rowe, 2 Lee's R. 415; Kinside v. Harrison, 2 Phil. 523; Wogan v. Small, 11 S. & R. 141. But where the witness has had opportunities for knowing and observing the conversation, conduct, and manners of the person whose sanity is in question, it has been held, upon grave consideration, that the witness may depose, not only to particular facts, but to his opinion or belief as to the sanity of the party, formed from such actual observation. Clary v. Clary, 2 Iredell, R. 78. Such evidence is also admitted in the Ecclesiastical Courts. See Wheeler v. Alderson, 3 Hagg. Eccl. R. 574, 604, 605.

¹ Per. Ld. Mansfield, in Folkes v. Chadd, 3 Doug. 157.

² Ibid.

³ Abbey v. Lill, 5 Bing. 299, per Gaselee, J.

⁴ McKee v. Nelson, 4 Cowen, 355.

⁵ Thornton v. The Royal Exch. Assur. Co. 1 Peake, R. 25; Chaumond v. Angerstein, Ib. 43; Beckwith v. Sydebotham, 1 Campb. 117. So of nautical men, as to navigating a ship. Malton v. Nesbit, 1 C. & P. 70.

⁶ Fenwick v. Bell, 1 Car. & Kirw. 312.

⁷ Folkes v. Chadd, 3 Doug. 157.

the insurance of them, and who, as a county commissioner, had frequently estimated damages occasioned by the laying out of railroads and highways, has been held competent to testify his opinion, as to the effect of laying a railroad within a certain distance of a building, upon the value of the rent, and the increase of the rate of insurance against fire.¹ Persons accustomed to observe the habits of certain fish, have been permitted to give in evidence their opinions, as to the ability of the fish to overcome certain obstructions in the rivers which they were accustomed to ascend.² A practical surveyor may express his opinion, whether the marks on trees, piles of stone, &c., were intended as monuments of boundaries;³ but he cannot be asked whether, in his opinion, from the objects and appearances which he saw on the ground, the tract he surveyed was identical with the tract marked on a certain diagram.⁴

§ 441. But witnesses are *not receivable to state their views* on matters of *legal or moral obligation*, nor on the manner in which *other persons* would probably be influenced, if the parties acted in one way rather than in another.⁵ Therefore the

¹ *Webber v. Eastern Railroad Co.* 2 Mete. 147. Where a point, involving questions of practical science, is in dispute in Chancery, the Court will advise a reference of it to an expert in that science, for his opinion upon the facts; which will be adopted by the Court as the ground of its order. *Webb v. Manchester & Leeds Railw. Co.* 4 My. & C. 116, 120; 1 Railw. Cas. 576.

² *Cottrill v. Myrick*, 3 Fairf. 222.

³ *Davis v. Mason*, 4 Pick. 156.

⁴ *Farar v. Warfield*, 8 Mart. N. S. 695, 696.

⁵ Per. *Ld. Denman*, C. J. in *Campbell v. Rickards*, 5 B. & Ad. 840; 2 N. & M. 542, S. C. But where a libel consisted in imputing to the plaintiff that he acted dishonorably in withdrawing a horse which had been entered for a race; and he proved by a witness that the rules of the Jockey Club, of which he was a member, permitted owners to withdraw their horses, before the race was run; it was held that the witness, on cross-examination, might be asked whether such conduct as he had described as lawful under those rules, would not be regarded by him as dishonorable. *Greville v. Chapman*, 5 Ad. & El. 731, N. S.

opinions of medical practitioners, upon the question, whether a certain physician had honorably and faithfully discharged his duty to his medical brethren, have been rejected.¹ So, the opinion of a person conversant with the business of insurance, upon the question, whether certain parts of a letter, which the broker of the insured had received, but which he suppressed, when reading the letter to the underwriters, were or were not material to be communicated, has been held inadmissible;² for, whether a particular fact was material or not in the particular case, is a question for the Jury to decide, under the circumstances.³ Neither can a witness be asked, what would have been his own conduct, in the particular case.⁴ But, in an action against a broker for negligence in not procuring the needful alterations in a policy of insurance, it has been held, that other brokers might be called to say, looking at the policy, the invoices, and the letter of instructions, what alterations a skilful broker ought to have made.⁵

¹ *Ramadge v. Ryan*, 9 Bing. 333. See also *Cowen & Hill's note* 529, to 1 Phil. Evid. 290.

² *Campbell v. Rickards*, 5 B. & Ad. 840, in which the case of *Rickards v. Murdock*, 10 B. & C. 527, and certain other decisions to the contrary, are considered and overruled. See, accordingly, *Phil. & Am. on Evid.* 899, 900; *Carter v. Boehm*, 3 Burr. 1905, 1918; *Durell v. Bederley*, 1 Holt's Cas. 263; *Jefferson Ins. Co. v. Cotheal*, 7 Wend. 72, 79.

³ *Rawlins v. Desborough*, 2 M. & Rob. 328; *Westbury v. Aberdeen*, 2 M. & W. 267.

⁴ *Berthon v. Loughman*, 2 Stark. R. 258.

⁵ *Chapman v. Walton*, 10 Bing. 57. Upon the question, whether the opinion of a person, conversant with the business of insurance, is admissible, to show that the rate of the premium would have been affected by the communication of particular facts, there has been much diversity of opinion among Judges, and the cases are not easily reconciled. See *Phil. & Am. on Evid.* 899; 2 Stark. Evid. 886. But the later decisions are against the admissibility of the testimony, as a general rule. See *Campbell v. Rickards*, 5 B. & Ad. 840. Perhaps the following observations of Mr. Starkie, on this subject, will be found to indicate the true principle of discrimination among the cases which call for the application of the rule. "Whenever the fixing the fair price and value upon a contract to insure is

§ 442. When a party offers a witness in proof of his cause, he thereby, in general, represents him as worthy of belief. He is presumed to know the character of the witnesses he adduces; and having thus presented them to the Court, *the law will not permit the party afterwards to impeach their general reputation* for truth, or to impugn their credibility by general evidence, tending to show them to be unworthy of belief. For this would enable him to destroy the witness if he spoke against him, and to make him a good witness if he spoke for him, with the means in his hand of destroying his credit if he spoke against him.¹

§ 443. But to this general rule there are *some exceptions*. For, where the witness is not one of the party's own selection, but is one whom *the law obliges him to call*, such as the subscribing witness to a deed, or a will, or the like; here he can hardly be considered as the witness of the party calling him, and therefore, as it seems, his character for truth may be generally impeached.² But, however this may be, it is

a matter of skill and judgment, acting according to certain general rules and principles of calculation, applied to the particular circumstances of each individual case, it seems to be matter of evidence to show whether the facts suppressed would have been noticed as a term in the particular calculation. It would not be difficult to propound instances, in which the materiality of the fact withheld would be a question of pure science; in other instances it is very possible that mere common sense, independent of any peculiar skill or experience, would be sufficient to comprehend that the disclosure was material, and its suppression fraudulent, although not to understand to what extent the risk was increased by that fact. In intermediate cases, it seems to be difficult in principle wholly to exclude the evidence, although its importance may vary exceedingly according to circumstances." See 2 Stark. Evid. 887, 888, (3d Lond. Ed.) 649, (6th Am. Ed.)

¹ Bull. N. P. 297; Ewer v. Ambrose, 3 B. & C. 746; Stockton v. Demuth, 7 Watts, 39; Smith v. Price, 8 Watts, 447. But where a witness testified to the Jury, contrary to her statement in a former deposition given in the same cause, it was held not improper for the Judge to order the deposition to be read, in order to impeach the credit of the witness. Rex v. Oldroyd, Rus. & Ry. 88.

² Lowe v. Jolliffe, 1 W. Bl. 365; Poth. on Obl. by Evans, Vol. 2, p. 232, App. No. 16, Williams v. Walker, 2 Rich. Eq. R. 291. And see Good-

exceedingly clear that the party, calling a witness, is not precluded from proving the truth of any *particular fact*, by any other competent testimony, in direct *contradiction* to what such witness may have testified; and this not only where it appears that the witness was innocently mistaken, but even where the evidence may collaterally have the effect of showing that he was generally unworthy of belief.¹

§ 444. Whether it be competent for a party to prove that a witness whom he has called, and whose testimony is unfavorable to his cause, *had previously stated the facts in a different manner*, is a question upon which there exists some diversity of opinion. On the one hand it is urged, that a party is not to be sacrificed to his witness; that he is not represented by him, nor identified with him; and that he ought not to be entrapped by the arts of a designing man, perhaps in the interest of his adversary.² On the other hand, it is said, that to admit such proof, would enable the party to get the naked declarations of a witness before the Jury, operating, in fact, as independent evidence; and this, too, even where the declarations were made out of Court, by collusion, for the purpose of being thus introduced.³ But the weight of au-

title v. Clayton, 4 Burr. 2234; Cowden v. Reynolds, 12 S. & R. 281. But see Whitaker v. Salisbury, 15 Pick. 544, 545; Dennett v. Dow, 5 Shepl. 19; Brown v. Bellows, 4 Pick. 194.

¹ Bull. N. P. 297; Alexander v. Gibson, 2 Campb. 555; Richardson v. Allan, 2 Stark. R. 334; Ewer v. Ambrose, 3 B. & C. 746; 6 D. & R. 127; 4 B. & C. 25, S. C.; Friedlander v. London Assur. Co. 4 B. & Ad. 193; Lawrence v. Barker, 5 Wend. 305, per Savage, C. J.; Cowden v. Reynolds, 12 S. & R. 281; Bradley v. Ricardo, 8 Bing. 57; Jackson v. Leek, 12 Wend. 105; Stockton v. Demuth, 7 Watts, 39; Brown v. Bellows, 4 Pick. 179, 194; Perry v. Massey, 1 Bail. 32. See further cases, in Cowen & Hill's notes, 534, 535, 536, to 1 Phil. Evid. p. 309, 310; Spencer v. White, 1 Iredell, R. 239; Dennett v. Dow, 5 Shepl. 19; McArthur v. Hurlbert, 21 Wend. 190.

² Phil. & Am. on Evid. 904, 905; 2 Phil. Evid. 447.

³ Ibid.; Smith v. Price, 8 Watts, 447; Wright v. Beckett, 1 M. & Rob. 414, 428, Per Bolland, B.

thority seems in favor of admitting the party to show, that the evidence has taken him by surprise, and is contrary to the examination of the witness preparatory to the trial, or to what the party had reason to believe he would testify; or, that the witness has recently been brought under the influence of the other party, and has deceived the party calling him. For it is said this course is necessary for his protection against the contrivance of an artful witness; and the danger of its being regarded by the Jury as substantive evidence is no greater in such cases, than it is where the contradictory declarations are proved by the adverse party.¹

§ 445. When a witness has been examined in chief, the other party has a right to *cross-examine* him. But a question often arises, whether the witness has been so examined in chief, as to give the other party this right. If the witness is called merely for the purpose of producing a paper, which is to be proved by another witness, he need not be sworn.² Whether the right of cross-examination, that is, of treating the witness as the witness of the adverse party, and of examining him by leading questions, extends to the whole case, or is to be limited to the matters upon which he has already been examined in chief, is a point upon which there is some diversity of opinion. In England, when a competent witness is called and sworn, the other party will, ordinarily, and in strictness, be entitled to cross-examine him, though the party

¹ Wright v. Beckett, 1 M. & Rob. 414, 416, per Ld. Denman; Phil. & Am. on Evid. 904-907; Rice v. New Eng. Marine Ins. Co. 4 Pick. 439; Rex v. Oldroyd, Rus. & Ry. 88, 90, per Ld. Ellenborough and Mansfield, C. J.; Brown v. Bellows, 4 Pick. 179; The State v. Norris, 1 Hayw. 437, 438; 2 Phil. Evid. 450-463; Dunn v. Aslett, 2 M. & Rob. 122; Bank of Northern Liberties v. Davis, 6 Watts & Serg. 285; Post, § 467, n. 5. But see Holdsworth v. Mayor of Dartmouth, 2 M. & Rob. 153; Regina v. Ball, 8 C. & P. 745; and Regina v. Farr, 8 C. & P. 768, where evidence of this kind was rejected.

² Perry v. Gibson, 1 Ad. & El. 48; Davis v. Dale, 1 Mo. & M. 514; Read v. James, 1 Stark. R. 132; Rush v. Smith, 1 C. M. & R. 94; Summers v. Moseley, 2 C. & M. 477.

calling him does not choose to examine him in chief;¹ unless he was sworn by mistake;² or, unless an immaterial question having been put to him, his further examination in chief has been stopped by the Judge.³ And even where a plaintiff was under the necessity of calling the defendant in interest as a witness, for the sake of formal proof only, he not being party to the record, it has been held, that he was thereby made a witness for all purposes, and might be cross-examined to the whole case.⁴ In some of the American Courts the same rule has been adopted;⁵ but in others the contrary has been held;⁶ and the rule is now considered by the Supreme Court of the United States, to be well established, that a party has no right to cross-examine any witness, except as to facts and circumstances connected with the matters stated in his direct examination; and that if he wishes to examine him to other matters, he must do so by making the witness his own, and calling him, as such, in the subsequent progress of the cause.⁷

§ 446. The power of cross-examination has been justly said to be one of the principal, as it certainly is one of the most efficacious tests, which the law has devised for the discovery of truth. By means of it, the situation of the witness with respect to the parties and to the subject of litigation, his interest, his motives, his inclination and prejudices, his means of obtaining a correct and certain knowledge of the facts, to

¹ Rex v. Brooke, 2 Stark. R. 472; Phillips v. Eamer, 1 Esp. 357; Dickinson v. Shee, 4 Esp. 67; Regina v. Murphy, 1 Armstr. Macartn. & Ogle, R. 204; 2 Phil. Evid. 397, 398.

² Clifford v. Hunter, 3 C. & P. 16; Rush v. Smith, 1 C. M. & R. 94; Wood v. Mackinson, 2 M. & Rob. 273.

³ Creevy v. Carr, 7 C. & P. 64.

⁴ Morgan v. Brydges, 2 Stark. R. 314.

⁵ Moody v. Rowell, 17 Pick. 490, 498; Jackson v. Varick, 7 Cowen, 238; 2 Wend. 166; Fulton Bank v. Stafford, 2 Wend. 483.

⁶ Harrison v. Rowan, 3 Wash. 580; Ellmaker v. Buckley, 16 S. & R. 77.

⁷ The Philadelphia & Trenton Rail Road Co. v. Stimpson, 14 Peters, R. 448, 461; Floyd v. Bovard, 6 Watts & Serg. 75.

which he bears testimony, the manner in which he has used those means, his powers of discernment, memory and description, are all fully investigated and ascertained, and submitted to the consideration of the Jury, before whom he has testified, and who have thus had an opportunity of observing his demeanor, and of determining the just weight and value of his testimony. It is not easy for a witness, who is subjected to this test, to impose on a Court or Jury; for however artful the fabrication of falsehood may be, it cannot embrace all the circumstances to which a cross-examination may be extended.¹

¹ 1 Stark. Evid. 160, 161. On the subject of examining and cross-examining witnesses *viva voce*, Quintilian gives the following instructions. "Primum est, nosse testem. Nam timidus terreri, stultus decipi, iracundus concitari, ambitiosus inflari, longus protrahi potest: prudens vero et constans, vel tanquam inimicus et perversus dimittendus statim, vel non interrogatione, sed brevi interlocutione patroni, refutandus est; aut aliquo, si continget, urbane dicto refrigerandus; aut, si quid in ejus vitam dici poterit, infamia criminum destruendus. Probos quosdam et verecundos non asperere incessere profuit; nam sæpe, qui adversus insectantem pugnassent, modestia mitigantur. Omnis autem interrogatio, aut in causa est, aut extra causam. In causa, (sicut accusatori præcepimus,) patronus quoque altius, unde nihil suspecti sit, repetita percontatione, priora sequentibus applicando, sæpe eo perducit homines, ut invitis, quod prosit, extorqueat. Ejus rei, sine dubio, nec disciplina ulla in scholis, nec exercitatio traditur; et naturali magis acumine, aut usu contingit hæc virtus. * * Extra causam quoque multa, quæ prosint, rogari solent, de vita testium aliorum, de sua quisque, si turpitudine, si humilitas, si amicitia accusatoris, si inimicitia cum reo, in quibus aut dicant aliquid, quod prosit, aut in mendacio vel cupiditate lædendi deprehendantur. Sed in primis interrogatio debet esse circumspecta; quia multa contra patronos venuste testis sæpe respondet eique præcipue vulgo favetur; tum verbis quam maxime ex medio sumptis; ut qui rogatur (is autem sæpius imperitus) intelligat, aut ne intelligere se neget, quod interrogantis non leve frigus est." Quintil. Inst. Orat. lib. 5, c. 7. Mr. Alison's observations on the same subject are equally interesting both to the student and the practitioner. He observes:—"It is often a convenient way of examining, to ask a witness, whether such a thing was said or done, because the thing mentioned aids his recollection, and brings him to that stage of the proceeding on which it is desired that he should dilate. But this is not always fair; and when any subject is approached, on which his evidence is expected to be really important, the proper course is to ask

§ 447. Whether, when a party is once entitled to cross-examine a witness, *this right continues through all the subsequent stages of the cause*, so that if the party should afterwards recall the same witness, to prove a part of his own case, he may interrogate him by leading questions, and treat him as the witness of the party who first adduced him, is also a question upon which different opinions have been held. Upon the general ground, on which this course of examina-

him what was done, or what was said, or to tell his own story. In this way also, if the witness is at all intelligent, a more consistent and intelligible statement will generally be got, than by putting separate questions; for the witnesses generally think over the subjects, on which they are to be examined in criminal cases, so often, or they have narrated them so frequently to others, that they go on much more fluently and distinctly, when allowed to follow the current of their own ideas, than when they are at every moment interrupted or diverted by the examining counsel. Where a witness is evidently prevaricating or concealing the truth, it is seldom by intimidation or sternness of manner that he can be brought, at least in this country, to let out the truth. Such measures may sometimes terrify a timid witness into a true confession; but in general they only confirm a hardened one in his falsehood, and give him time to consider how seeming contradictions may be reconciled. The most effectual method is to examine rapidly and minutely, as to a number of subordinate and apparently trivial points in his evidence, concerning which there is little likelihood of his being prepared with falsehood ready made; and where such a course of interrogation is skillfully laid, it is rarely that it fails in exposing perjury or contradiction in some parts of the testimony which it is desired to overturn. It frequently happens, that in the course of such a rapid examination, facts most material to the cause are elicited, which are either denied, or but partially admitted before. In such cases, there is no good ground on which the facts thus reluctantly extorted, or which have escaped the witness in an unguarded moment, can be laid aside by the Jury. Without doubt they come tainted from the polluted channel, through which they are adduced; but still it is generally easy to distinguish what is true in such depositions from what is false, because the first is studiously withheld, and the second is as carefully put forth; and it frequently happens, that in this way the most important testimony in a case is extracted from the most unwilling witness, which only comes with the more effect to an intelligent Jury, because it has emerged by the force of examination in opposition to an obvious desire to conceal." See Alison's Practice, 546, 547. See also the remarks of Mr. Evans on cross-examination, in his Appendix to Poth. on Obl. No. 16, Vol. 2, p. 233, 234.

tion is permitted at all, namely, that every witness is supposed to be inclined most favorably towards the party calling him, there would seem to be no impropriety in treating him, throughout the trial, as the witness of the party who first caused him to be summoned and sworn. But as the general course of the examination of witnesses is subject to the discretion of the Judge, it is not easy to establish a rule, which shall do more than guide, without imperatively controlling, the exercise of that discretion.¹ A party, however, who has not opened his own case, will not be allowed to introduce it to the Jury by cross-examining the witnesses of the adverse party,² though, after opening it, he may recall them for that purpose.

§ 448. We have already stated it as one of the rules, governing the production of testimony, that the evidence offered must correspond with the allegations, and be confined to the point in issue. And we have seen, that this rule *excludes all evidence of collateral facts*, or those which afford no reasonable inference as to the principal matter in dispute.³ Thus, where a broker was examined to prove the market value of certain stocks, it was held that he was not compellable to state the names of the persons to whom he had sold such stocks.⁴ As the plaintiff is bound, in the proof of his case, to confine his evidence to the issue, the defendant is in like manner restricted to the same point; and the same rule is applied to the respective parties, through all the subsequent stages of the cause, all questions as to collateral facts, *except in cross-examination*, being strictly excluded. The reasons of this rule have been already intimated. If it were not so, the true merits of the controversy might be lost sight of, in the mass of testimony to other points, in which they would be

¹ 2 Phil. Evid. 403; 1 Stark. Evid. 162; *Moody v. Rowell*, 17 Pick. 498; Ante, § 435.

² *Ellmaker v. Bulkley*, 16 S. & R. 77; 1 Stark. Evid. 164.

³ Ante, § 51, 52.

⁴ *Jonau v. Ferrand*, 3 Rob. Louis. R. 366.

overwhelmed; the attention of the Jury would be wearied and distracted; judicial investigations would become interminable; the expenses might be enormous, and the characters of witnesses might be assailed by evidence which they could not be prepared to repel.¹ It may be added, that the evidence not being to a material point, the witness could not be punished for perjury, if it were false.²

§ 449. In cross-examinations, however, this rule is not usually applied with the same strictness as in examinations in chief; but, on the contrary, great latitude of interrogation is sometimes permitted by the Judge, in the exercise of his discretion, where, from the temper and conduct of the witness, or other circumstances, such course seems essential to the discovery of the truth; or, where the cross-examiner will undertake to show the relevancy of the interrogatory afterwards, by other evidence.³ On this head, it is difficult to lay down any precise rule.⁴ But it is a well settled rule, that a witness *cannot be cross-examined as to any fact, which is collateral and irrelevant to the issue, merely for the purpose of contradicting him* by other evidence, if he should deny it, thereby to discredit his testimony.⁵ And, if a question is put to a witness which is collateral or irrelevant to the issue, his answer cannot be contradicted by the party who asked the question; but it is conclusive against him.⁶ But it is *not irrelevant* to inquire of

¹ Phil. & Am. on Evid. 909, 910.

² But a question, having no bearing on the matter in issue, may be made material by its relation to the witness's credit, and false swearing thereon will be perjury. *Reg. v. Overton*, 2 Mood. Cr. Cas. 263.

³ *Haigh v. Belcher*, 7 C. & P. 389; Ante, § 52.

⁴ *Lawrence v. Baker*, 5 Wend. 305.

⁵ *Spenceley v. De Willott*, 7 East, 108; 1 Stark. Evid. 164; *Lee's case*, 2 Lewin's Cr. Cas. 154; *Harrison v. Gordon*, Ib. 156.

⁶ *Harris v. Tippet*, 2 Campb. 627; *Odiorne v. Winkley*, 2 Gall. 51, 53; *Ware v. Ware*, 8 Greenl. 42; *Rex v. Watson*, 2 Stark. R. 116, 149; *Lawrence v. Barker*, 5 Wend. 301, 305; *Meagoe v. Simmons*, 3 C. & P. 75; *Crowley v. Page*, 7 C. & P. 789; *Commonwealth v. Buzzell*, 16 Pick. 157, 158. Thus, if he is asked whether he has not said to A. that a bribe had

the witness, whether he has not on some former occasion *given a different account* of the matter of fact, to which he has already testified, in order to lay a foundation for impeaching his testimony by contradicting him. The inquiry, however, in such cases, must be confined to matters of *fact only*; mere opinions which the witness may have formerly expressed being inadmissible, unless the case is such as to render evidence of opinions admissible and material.¹ Thus, if the witness should give, in evidence in chief, his opinion of the identity of a person, or of his handwriting, or of his sanity, or the like, he may be asked, whether he has not formerly expressed a different opinion upon the same subject; but if he has simply testified to a fact, his previous opinion of the merits of the case is inadmissible. Therefore, in an action upon a marine policy, where the broker, who effected the policy for the plaintiff, being called as a witness for the defendant, testified that he omitted to disclose a certain fact, now contended to be material to the risk, and being cross-examined whether he had not expressed his opinion that the underwriter had not a leg to stand upon in the defence, he

been offered to him by the party by whom he was called; and he denies having so said; evidence is not admissible to prove that he did so state to A. *Attor. Gen. v. Hitchcock*, 11 Jur. 478; 1 Exch. R. 91, S. C. Where a witness, called by the plaintiff to prove the handwriting in issue, swore it was not that of the defendant, and another paper, not evidence in the cause, being shown to him by the plaintiff, he swore that this also was not the defendant's, the latter answer was held conclusive against the plaintiff. *Hughes v. Rogers*, 8 M. & W. 123. See also *Griffiths v. Ivery*, 11 Ad. & El. 322; *Philad. & Trenton Railroad Co. v. Stimpson*, 14 Peters, 461; *Harris v. Wilson*, 7 Wend. 57; *Tennant v. Hamilton*, 7 Clark & Fin. 122; *The State v. Patterson*, 2 Iredell, R. 346.

¹ *Elton v. Larkins*, 5 C. & P. 385; *Daniels v. Conrad*, 4 Leigh's R. 401, 405. But a witness cannot be cross-examined as to what he has sworn in an affidavit, unless the affidavit is produced. *Sainthill v. Bound*, 4 Esp. 74; *Rex v. Edwards*, 8 C. & P. 26; *Regina v. Taylor*, lb. 726. If the witness does not recollect saying that which is imputed to him, evidence may be given that he did say it, provided it is relevant to the matter in issue. *Crowley v. Page*, 7 C. & P. 789.

denied that he had said so; this was deemed conclusive, and evidence to contradict him in this particular was rejected.¹

§ 450. So also, it has been held not irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of one charged with a crime, to inquire of the witness for the prosecution, in cross-examination, whether he has not expressed feelings of hostility towards the prisoner.² The like inquiry may be made in a civil action; and if the witness denies the fact, he may be contradicted by other witnesses.³ So also, in assumpsit upon a promissory note, the execution of which was disputed, it was held material to the issue, to inquire of the subscribing witness, she being a servant of the plaintiff, whether she was not his kept mistress.⁴

• § 451. In regard to the *privilege of witnesses, in not being compellable to answer*, the cases are distinguishable into several classes. (1.) Where it reasonably appears that the answer will have a tendency to expose the witness to a penal liability, or to any kind of punishment, or to a criminal charge. Here the authorities are exceedingly clear that the witness is not bound to answer.⁵ And he may claim the protection at any stage of the inquiry, whether he has already answered the question in part, or not at all.⁶ If the fact, to

¹ *Elton v. Larkins*, 5 C. & P. 385.

² *Rex v. Yewin*, cited 2 Campb. 638.

³ *Atwood v. Welton*, 7 Conn. 66.

⁴ *Thomas v. David*, 7 C. & P. 350, per Coleridge, J.

⁵ 1 Stark. Evid. 165, 166; Phil. & Am. on Evid. 913, 914; 1 Phil. Evid. 417-420; Cowen & Hill's note 516, to 1 Phil. Evid. 277, and cases there cited; *E. Ind. Co. v. Campbell*, 1 Vez. 227. See also *Paxton v. Douglass*, 19 Ves. 225; *Cates v. Hardacre*, 3 Taunt. 424; *Macbride v. Macbride*, 4 Esp. 248; *Rex v. Lewis*, lb. 225; *Rex v. Slaney*, 5 C. & P. 213; *Rex v. Pegler*, 5 C. & P. 521; *Dodd v. Norris*, 3 Campb. 519; *Maloney v. Bartly*, lb. 210. If he is wrongfully compelled to answer, what he says will be regarded as obtained by compulsion, and cannot be given in evidence against him. *Regina v. Garbett*, 1 Denis. C. C. 236. And see Ante, § 193; 7 Law Rev. 19-30.

⁶ *Regina v. Garbett*, 1 Denis. C. C. 236; *Ex parte Cossens, Buck, Bankr.* Cas. 531, 545.

which he is interrogated, forms but one link in the chain of testimony, which is to convict him, he is protected. And whether it may tend to criminate or expose the witness, is a point upon which the Court are bound to instruct him;¹ and which the Court will determine, under all the circumstances of the case; but without requiring the witness fully to explain how he might be criminated by the answer, which the truth would oblige him to give. For if he were obliged to show how the effect would be produced, the protection which this rule of law is designed to afford him would at once be annihilated.² But the Court will not prevent the

¹ *Close v. Olney*, 1 Denio, R. 319.

² *The People v. Mather*, 4 Wend. 229; 1 Burr's Trial, 245; *Southard v. Rexford*, 6 Cowen, 254, 255; *Bellinger, in error, v. The People*, 8 Wend. 595. In the first of these cases, this doctrine was stated by the learned Judge, in the following terms:—"The principal reliance of the defendant, to sustain the determination of the Judge, is placed, I presume, on the rule of law, that protects a witness in refusing to answer a question, which will have a tendency to accuse him of a crime or misdemeanor. Where the disclosures he may make can be used against him to procure his conviction for a criminal offence, or to charge him with penalties and forfeitures, he may stop in answering, before he arrives at the question, the answer to which may show directly his moral turpitude. The witness, who knows what the Court does not know, and what he cannot communicate without being a self-accuser, is to judge of the effect of his answer, and if it proves a link in the chain of testimony, which is sufficient to convict him, when the others are made known, of a crime, he is protected by law from answering the question. If there be a series of questions, the answer to all of which would establish his criminality, the party cannot pick out a particular one and say, if that be put, the answer will not criminate him. 'If it is one step having a tendency to criminate him, he is not compelled to answer.' (16 Ves. 242.) The same privilege that is allowed to a witness, is the right of a defendant in a Court of Equity, when called on to answer. In *Parkhurst v. Lowten*, 2 Swanst. 215, the Chancellor held, that the defendant 'was not only not bound to answer the question, the answer to which would criminate him directly, but not any which, however remotely connected with the fact, would have a tendency to prove him guilty of simony.' The language of Chief Justice Marshall, on Burr's trial, is equally explicit on this point. 'Many links,' he says, 'frequently compose that chain of testimony, which is necessary to convict an individual of a crime.' It appears to the Court to be the true sense of the rule, that no witness is

witness from answering it, if he chooses; they will only advertise him of his right to decline it.¹ This rule is also administered in Chancery, where a defendant will not be compelled to discover that which, if answered, would tend to subject him to a penalty or punishment, or which might lead to a criminal accusation, or to ecclesiastical censures.² But in all cases where the witness, after being advertised of his privilege, chooses to answer, he is bound to answer every

compellable to furnish any one of them against himself. It is certainly not only a possible but a probable case, that a witness, by disclosing a single fact, may complete the testimony against himself, and, to every effectual purpose, accuse himself entirely as he would by stating every circumstance, which would be required for his conviction. That fact of itself would be unavailing, but all other facts without it would be insufficient. While that remains concealed in his own bosom, he is safe; but draw it from thence, and he is exposed to a prosecution. The rule which declares, that no man is compellable to accuse himself, would most obviously be infringed by compelling a witness to disclose a fact of this description.' (1 Burr's Trial, 244.) My conclusion is, that where a witness claims to be excused from answering a question, because the answer may disgrace him, or render him infamous, the Court must see that the answer may, without the intervention of other facts, fix on him moral turpitude. Where he claims to be excused from answering, because his answer will have a tendency to implicate him in a crime or misdemeanor, or will expose him to a penalty or forfeiture, then the Court are to determine, whether the answer he may give to the question can criminate him directly or indirectly, by furnishing direct evidence of his guilt, or by establishing one of many facts, which together may constitute a chain of testimony sufficient to warrant his conviction, but which one fact of itself could not produce such result; and if they think the answer may in any way criminate him, they must allow his privilege, without exacting from him to explain how he would be criminated by the answer, which the truth may oblige him to give. If the witness was obliged to show how the effect is produced, the protection would at once be annihilated. The means which he would be in that case compelled to use to obtain protection, would involve the surrender of the very object, for the security of which the protection was sought.' See 4 Wend. 252, 253, 254.

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Story's Eq. Pl.* § 524, 576, 577, 592-498; *McIntyre v. Mancius*, 16 Johns. 592; *Wigram on Discovery*, p. 61, 150, 195; *Mitford's Eq. Pl.* 157-163.

thing relative to the transaction.¹ But the privilege is his own, and not that of the party; counsel, therefore, will not be allowed to make the objection.² And if the witness declines answering, no inference of the truth of the fact is permitted to be drawn from that circumstance.³ If the prosecution to which he might be exposed is barred by lapse of time, the privilege ceases, and the witness is bound to answer.⁴

§ 452. (2.) Where the witness, by answering, may *subject himself to a civil action, or pecuniary loss*, or charge himself with a debt. This question was very much discussed in England, in Lord Melville's case; and being finally put to the Judges, by the House of Lords, eight Judges, and the Chancellor, were of opinion that a witness, in such case, was bound to answer, and four thought that he was not. To remove the doubts which were thrown over the question by such a diversity of opinion among eminent Judges, a statute was passed,⁵ declaring the law to be, that a witness could not legally refuse to answer a question relevant to the matter in issue, merely on the ground that the answer may establish, or tend to establish, that he owes a debt, or is otherwise subject to a civil suit; provided the answer has no tendency to accuse himself, or to expose him to any kind of penalty or forfeiture. In the United States, this act is generally considered as declaratory of the true doctrine of the Common Law; and accordingly, by the current of authorities, the witness is held

¹ Dixon v. Vale, 1 C. & P. 278; The State v. K —, 4 N. Hamp. 562; East v. Chapman, 1 M. & Malk. 46; 2 C. & P. 570, S. C.; Low v. Mitchell, 6 Shepl. 272.

² Thomas v. Newton, 1 M. & Malk. 48, note; Rex v. Adey, 1 M. & Rob. 94.

³ Rose v. Blakemore, Ry. & M. 383.

⁴ Roberts v. Allatt, 1 M. & Malk. 192; The People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 229, 252-255.

⁵ 46 Geo. 3, c. 37; Phil. & Am. on Evid. 914, 915; 2 Phil. Evid. 420; 1 Stark. Evid. 165. It is so settled by statute, in New York. 2 Rev. St. 405, § 71.

bound to answer.¹ But neither is the statute, nor the rule of the Common Law, considered as compelling a person, interested in the cause as party, though not named on the record, to testify as a witness in the cause, much less to disclose any thing against his own interest.²

§ 453. (3.) Where the answer will subject the witness to a *forfeiture of his estate*. In this case, as well as in the case of an exposure to a criminal prosecution or penalty, it is well settled, that a witness is not bound to answer.³ And this is an established rule in Equity, as well as at Law.⁴

§ 454. (4.) Where the answer, though it will not expose the witness to any criminal prosecution or penalty, or to any forfeiture of estate, yet has a *direct tendency to degrade his character*. On this point there has been a great diversity of opinion, and the law still remains not perfectly settled by authorities.⁵ But the conflict of opinions may be somewhat

¹ Bull v. Loveland, 10 Pick. 9; Baird v. Cochran, 4 S. & R. 397; Nass v. Van Swearingen, 7 S. & R. 192; Taney v. Kemp, 4 H. & J. 348; Naylor v. Semmes, 4 G. & J. 273; City Bank v. Bateman, 7 H. & J. 104; Stoddart v. Manning, 2 H. & G. 147; Copp v. Upham, 3 N. Hamp. 159; Cox v. Hill, 3 Ohio R. 411, 424; Planters' Bank v. George, 6 Martin, 679, N. J.; Jones v. Lanier, 2 Dev. Law Rep. 480; Conover v. Bell, 6 Monroe, 157; Gorham v. Carroll, 3 Littel, 221; Zollicoffer v. Turney, 6 Yerger, 297; Ward v. Sharp, 15 Verm. 115. The contrary seems to have been held in Connecticut. Benjamin v. Hathaway, 3 Conn. 528, 532.

² Rex v. Woburn, 10 East, 395; Mauran v. Lamb, 7 Cowen, 174; Appleton v. Boyd, 7 Mass. 131; Fenn v. Granger, 3 Camph. 177; The People v. Irving, 1 Wend. 20; White v. Everest, 1 Verm. 181.

³ Phil. & Am. on Evid. 916; 2 Phil. Evid. 420.

⁴ Mitford's Eq. Pl. 157, 161; Story's Eq. Pl. § 607, 846.

⁵ The arguments on the respective sides of this question are thus summed up by Mr. Phillips: — "The advocates for a compulsory power in cross-examination, maintain that, as parties are frequently surprised by the appearance of a witness unknown to them, or, if known, entirely unexpected, without such power they would have no adequate means of ascertaining what credit is due to his testimony; that on the cross-examination of spies, informers, and accomplices, this power is more particularly necessary; and that if a witness

reconciled by a distinction, which has been very properly taken between cases, where the testimony is relevant and material to the issue, and cases where the question is not strictly relevant, but is collateral, and is asked only under the latitude allowed in a cross-examination. In the former case, there seems great absurdity in excluding the testimony of a witness, merely because it will tend to degrade himself, when others have a direct interest in that testimony, and it is essential to the establishment of their rights of property, of liberty, or even of life; or to the course of public justice. Upon such a rule, one who had been convicted and punished for an

may not be questioned as to his character, at the moment of trial, the property and even the life of a party must often be endangered. Those on the other side, who maintain that a witness is not compellable to answer such questions, argue to the following effect. They say, the obligation to give evidence arises from the oath, which every witness takes; that by this oath, he binds himself only to speak touching the matters in issue; and that such particular facts as these, whether the witness has been in gaol for felony, or suffered some infamous punishment, or the like, cannot form any part of the issue, as appears evident from this consideration, that the party against whom the witness is called would not be allowed to prove such particular facts by other witnesses. They argue, further, that it would be an extreme grievance to a witness, to be compelled to disclose past transactions of his life, which may have been since forgotten, and to expose his character afresh to evil report, when, perhaps, by his subsequent conduct, he may have recovered the good opinion of the world; that if a witness is privileged from answering a question, though relevant to the matters in issue, because it may tend to subject him to a forfeiture of property, with much more reason ought he to be excused from answering an irrelevant question to the disparagement and forfeiture of his character; that in the case of accomplices, in which this compulsory power of cross-examination is thought to be more particularly necessary, the power may be properly conceded to a certain extent, because accomplices stand in a peculiar situation, being admitted to give evidence only under the implied condition of making a full and true confession of the whole truth; but even accomplices are not to be questioned, in their cross-examination, as to other offences, in which they have not been concerned with the prisoner; that with respect to other witnesses, the best course to be adopted, both in point of convenience and justice, is to allow the question to be asked, at the same time allowing the witness to shelter himself under his privilege of refusing to answer." Phil. & Am. on Evid. p. 917, 918; 2 Phil. Evid. 422.

offence, when called as a witness against an accomplice, would be excused from testifying to any of the transactions, in which he had participated with the accused, and thus the guilty might escape. And, accordingly, the better opinion seems to be, that where the transaction, to which the witness is interrogated, forms any part of the issue to be tried, the witness will be obliged to give evidence, however strongly it may reflect on his character.¹

§ 455. But where the question is not material to the issue, but is *collateral and irrelevant*, being asked under the license allowed in cross-examination, it stands on another ground. In general, as we have already seen, the rule is, that upon cross-examination to try the credit of a witness, only general questions can be put; and he cannot be asked as to any collateral and independent fact, merely with a view to contradict him afterwards by calling another witness. The danger of such a practice, it is said, is obvious; besides the inconvenience of trying as many collateral issues, as one of the parties might choose to introduce, and which the other could not be prepared to meet.² Whenever, therefore, the question put to the witness is plainly of this character, it is easy to perceive, that it falls under this rule, and should be excluded. But the difficulty lies in determining with precision the materiality and relevancy of the question, when it goes to the character of the witness. There is certainly great force in the argument, that where a man's liberty, or his life, depends upon the testimony of another, it is of infinite importance, that

¹ Phil. & Am. on Evid. 916, 917; 2 Phil. Evid. 421; *The People v. Mather*, 4 Wend. 250-254, per Marcy, J.; *Peake's Evid.* (by Norris), p. 202; *Cundell v. Pratt*, 1 M. & Malk. 108; *Swift's Evid.* 80; 1 Phil. Evid. 279, note 521, by Cowen & Hill. So in Scotland; *Alison's Practice*, p. 528.

² *Spenceley v. De Willott*, 7 East, 108, 110, *Ld. Ellenborough* remarked, that he had ruled this point again and again at the sittings, until he was quite tired of the agitation of the question, and therefore he wished that a bill of exceptions should be tendered by any party dissatisfied with his judgment, that the question might be finally put at rest.

those who are to decide upon that testimony should know, to the greatest extent, how far the witness is to be trusted. They cannot look into his breast, to see what passes there; but must form their opinion on the collateral indications of his good faith and sincerity. Whatever, therefore, may materially assist them in this inquiry, is most essential to the investigation of truth; and it cannot but be material for the Jury to understand the character of the witness, whom they are called upon to believe; and to know whether, although he has not been convicted of any crime, he has not in some measure rendered himself less credible, by his disgraceful conduct.¹ The weight of this argument seems to have been felt by the Judge, in several cases in which questions, tending to disgrace the witness, have been permitted in cross-examination.

§ 456. It is, however, generally conceded, that where the answer, which the witness may give, will *not directly and certainly show his infamy*, but will *only tend* to disgrace him, he may be compelled to answer. Such is the rule in Equity, as held by Lord Eldon;² and its principle applies with equal force at Common Law; and accordingly it has been recognised in the Common Law Courts.³ In questions involving a criminal offence, the rule, as we have seen,⁴ is different; the witness being permitted to judge for the most part for himself, and to refuse to answer, wherever it would tend to subject him to a criminal punishment or forfeiture. But here the Court must see for itself, that the answer will directly show his infamy, before it will excuse him from testifying to the fact.⁵ Nor does there seem to be any good

¹ 1 Stark. Evid. 170.

² Parkhurst v. Lowten, 1 Meriv. 400; 2 Swanst. 194, 216, S. C.

³ The People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 232, 252, 254; The State v. Patterson, 2 Iredell, R. 346.

⁴ Ante, § 451.

⁵ Macbride v. Macbride, 4 Esp. 242, per Ld. Alvanley; The People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 254, per Marcy, J.

reason why a witness should be privileged from answering a question, touching his present situation, employment, and associates, if they are of his own choice; as, for example, in what house or family he resides, what is his ordinary occupation, and whether he is intimately acquainted and conversant with certain persons, and the like; for, however these may disgrace him, his position is one of his own selection.¹

§ 457. But, on the other hand, where the question *involves the fact of a previous conviction*, it ought not to be asked; because there is higher and better evidence which ought to be offered. If the inquiry is confined in terms to the fact of his having been *subjected to an ignominious punishment*, or to imprisonment alone, it is made, not for the purpose of showing that he was an innocent sufferer, but that he was guilty; and the only competent proof of this guilt is the record of his conviction. Proof of the same nature, namely, documentary evidence, may also be had of the cause of his commitment to prison, whether in execution of a sentence, or on a preliminary charge.²

¹ Thus, when a witness was asked, whether she was not cohabiting with a particular individual in a state of incest, Best, C. J. prohibited the question, stating expressly, that he did this only on the ground, that the answer would expose her to punishment. *Candell v. Pratt*, 1 M. & Malk. 108.

² *The People v. Herrick*, 13 Johns. 84, per Spencer, J.; *Clement v. Brooks*, 13 N. Hamp. R. 92. In *Rex v. Lewis*, 4 Esp. 225, the prosecutor, who was a common informer, was asked, whether he had not been in the house of correction in Sussex; but Ld. Ellenborough interposed and suppressed the question, partly on the old rule of rejecting all questions, the object of which was to degrade the witness; but chiefly because of the injury to the administration of justice, if persons, who came to do their duty to the public, might be subjected to improper investigation. Inquiries of this nature have often been refused, on the old ground alone. As in *The State v. Bailey*, Pennington's R. 304, (2d Ed.); *Millman v. Tucker*, 2 Peake's Cas. 222; *Stout v. Russell*, 2 Yeates, 334. A witness is also privileged from answering respecting the commission of an offence, though he has received a pardon; "for," said North, C. J., "if he hath his pardon, it doth take away as well

§ 458. There is another class of questions, which do not seem to come within the reasons already stated in favor of permitting this extent of cross-examination; namely, questions, the answers to which, though they may disgrace the witness in other respects, yet *will not affect the credit* due to his testimony. For it is to be remembered, that the object of indulging parties in this latitude of inquiry, is, that the Jury may understand the character of the witness, whom they are asked to believe, in order that his evidence may not pass for more than it is worth. Inquiries, therefore, having no tendency to this end, are clearly impertinent. Such are the questions frequently attempted to be put to the principal female witness, in trials for seduction *per quod servitium amisit*, and on indictments for rape, &c., whether she had not previously been criminal with other men, or with some particular person; which are generally suppressed.¹ So, on an indictment of a female prisoner, for stealing from the person, in a house, the prosecutor cannot be asked, whether at that house any thing improper passed between him and the prisoner.²

all calumny, as liahness to punishment, and sets him right against all objection." *Rex v. Reading*, 7 Howell's St. Tr. 296. It may also be observed, as a further reason for not interrogating a witness respecting his conviction and punishment for a crime, that he may not understand the legal character of the crime, for which he was punished, and so may admit himself guilty of an offence which he never committed. In *Rex v. Edwards*, 4 T. R. 440, the question was not asked of a witness, but of one who offered himself as bail for another, indicted of grand larceny.

¹ *Dodd v. Norris*, 3 Campb. 519; *Rex v. Hodgdon*, Russ. & Ry. 211; *Vaughn v. Perrine*, Pennigt. R. 534. But where the prosecution is under a bastardy act, the issue being upon the paternity of the child, this inquiry to its mother, if restricted to the proper time, is material, and she will be held to answer. *Swift's Evid.* p. 81. See also *Macbride v. Macbride*, 4 Esp. 242; *Bate v. Hill*, 1 C. & P. 100. In *Rex v. Teal et al.* 11 East, 307, 311, which was an indictment for conspiring falsely to charge one with being the father of a bastard child, similar inquiries were permitted to be made of the mother, who was one of the conspirators, but was admitted a witness for the prosecution. See Post, Vol. 2, § 577.

² *Rex v. Pitcher*, 1 C. & P. 85.

§ 459. But where the question *does not fall within either of the classes mentioned* in the three preceding sections, and goes clearly to the credit of the witness for veracity, it is not easy to perceive why he should be privileged from answering, notwithstanding it may disgrace him. The examination being governed and kept within bounds by the discretion of the Judge, all inquiries into transactions of a remote date will of course be suppressed; for the interests of justice do not require that the errors of any man's life, long since repented of and forgiven by the community, should be recalled to remembrance, and their memory be perpetuated in judicial documents, at the pleasure of any future litigant. The State has a deep interest in the inducements to reformation, held out by the protecting veil, which is thus cast over the past offences of the penitent. But where the inquiry relates to transactions comparatively recent, bearing directly upon the present character and moral principles of the witness, and therefore essential to the due estimation of his testimony by the Jury, learned Judges have of late been disposed to allow it.¹ Thus, it has been held, that a witness called by one party, may be asked in cross-examination, whether he had not attempted to dissuade a witness for the other party from attending the trial.² So, where one was indicted for larceny, and the principal witness for the prosecution was his servant boy, the learned Judge allowed the prisoner's counsel to ask the boy, whether he had not been charged with robbing his master, and whether he had not afterwards said he would be revenged of him, and would soon fix him in gaol.³ Similar

¹ This relaxation of the old rule was recognised, some years ago, by Lord Eldon. "It used to be said," he observed, "that a witness could not be called on to discredit himself; but there seems to be something like a departure from that; I mean, that in modern times, the Courts have permitted questions to show, from transactions not in issue, that the witness is of impeached character, and therefore not so credible." *Parkhurst v. Lowten*, 2 Swanst. 216.

² *Harris v. Tippet*, 2 Campb. 637.

³ *Rex v. Yewin*, cited 2 Campb. 638.



inquiries have been permitted in other cases.¹ The great question, however, whether a witness may not be bound in some cases to answer an interrogatory to his own moral degradation, where, though it is collateral to the main issue, it is relevant to his character for veracity, has not yet been brought into direct and solemn judgment, and must therefore be regarded as an open question, notwithstanding the practice of eminent Judges at *nisi prius*, in favor of the inquiry, under the limitations we have above stated.²

§ 460. Though there may be cases, in which a witness is not bound to answer a question which goes directly to disgrace him, yet *the question may be asked*, wherever the answer, if the witness should waive his privilege, would be received as evidence.³ It has been said, that if the witness declines to answer, his refusal may well be urged against his credit with the Jury.⁴ But in several cases this inference has been repudiated by the Court; for it is the duty of the Court, as well as the objects of the rule, to protect the witness from disgrace, even in the opinion of the Jury and other persons present;

¹ *Rex v. Watson*, 2 Stark. R. 116, 149; *Rex v. Teal et al.* 11 East, 311; *Cundell v. Pratt*, 1 M. & Malk. 108; *Rex v. Barnard*, 1 C. & P. 85, note (a); *Rex v. Gilroy*, *ib.*; *Frost v. Holloway*, cited in Phil. & Am. on Evid. 921, note (1); 2 Phil. Evid. 425.

² See 1 Stark. Evid. 167-172; Phil. & Am. on Evid. 916-920; 2 Phil. Evid. 423-428; Peake's Evid. by Norris, p. 202-204; Cowen & Hill's notes 520, 521, 522, to 1 Phil. Evid. p. 276, 282. In *Respublica v. Gibbs*, 3 Yeates, 429, where the old rule of excluding the inquiry was discussed on general grounds, and approved, the inquiry was clearly inadmissible on another account, as the answer would go to a forfeiture of the witness's right of suffrage and of citizenship.

³ 2 Phil. Evid. 423-428; 1 Stark. Evid. 172; *Southard v. Rexford*, 6 Cowen, 254. But it should be remembered, that if the question is collateral to the issue, the answer cannot be contradicted. In such cases, the prudent practitioner will seldom put a question, unless it be one which, if answered either way, will benefit his client. Such was the question put by the prisoner's counsel, in *Rex v. Pitcher*, Ante, § 458. See 1 C. & P. 85, note (a).

⁴ 1 Stark. Evid. 172; *Rose v. Blakemore*, Ry. & M. 382, per Brougham, arg.

and there would be an end of this protection, if a demurrer to the question were to be taken as an admission of the fact inquired into.¹

§ 461. After a witness has been examined in chief, his *credit may be impeached* in various modes, besides that of exhibiting the improbabilities of a story, by a cross-examination. (1.) By *disproving the facts* stated by him, by the testimony of other witnesses. (2.) By general evidence affecting his credit for veracity. But in *impeaching the credit* of a witness, the examination must be confined to his general reputation, and not be permitted as to particular facts; for every man is supposed to be capable of supporting the one, but it is not likely that he should be prepared to answer the other, without notice; and unless his general character and behavior be in issue, he has no notice.² This point has been much discussed, but may now be considered at rest.³ The regular mode of examining into the general reputation is to inquire of the witness whether he knows the general reputation of the person in question among his neighbors; and what that reputation is. In the English Courts the course is further to inquire whether, from such knowledge, the witness would believe that person, upon his oath.⁴ In the American Courts the same course has been pursued;⁵ but its propriety has of

¹ *Rose v. Blakemore*, Ry. & M. 382, per Abbott, Ld. Ch. J.; *Rex v. Watson*, 2 Stark. R. 158, per Holroyd, J.; *Lloyd v. Passingham*, 16 Ves. 64; Ante, § 451.

² Bull. N. P. 296, 297. The mischief of raising collateral issues is also adverted to, as one of the reasons of this rule. "Look ye," said Holt, Ld. C. J., "you may bring witnesses to give an account of the general tenor of the witness's conversation; but you do not think, sure, that we will try, at this time, whether he be guilty of robbery." *Rex v. Rookwood*, 4 St. Tr. 681; 13 Howell's St. Tr. 211, S. C.; 1 Stark. Evid. 182. It is competent, however, for the party against whom a witness has been called, to show that he has been bribed to give his evidence. *Attor. Gen. v. Hitchcock*, 11 Jur. 478.

³ See 2 Phil. Evid. 431; Swift's Evid. 143.

⁴ Phil. & Am. on Evid. 925; *Mawson v. Hartsink*, 4 Esp. 104, per Ld. Ellenborough; 1 Stark. Evid. 182; *Carlos v. Brook*, 10 Ves. 50.

⁵ *The People v. Mather*, 4 Wend. 257, 258; *The State v. Boswell*,

late been questioned, and perhaps the weight of authority is now against permitting the witness to testify as to his own opinion.¹ In answer to such evidence, the other party may cross-examine those witnesses, as to their means of knowledge, and the grounds of their opinion; or may attack their general character, and by fresh evidence support the character of his own witness.² The inquiry must be made as to his general

² Dev. R. 209, 211; Anon. 1 Hill, S. Car. R. 258; Cowen & Hill's note 531, to 1 Phil. Evid. 293; Ford v. Ford, 7 Humph. 92.

¹ Gass v. Stinson, 2 Sumn. 610, per Story, J.; Kimmel v. Kimmel, 3 S. & R. 336-338; Wike v. Lightner, 11 S. & R. 198; Swift's Evid. 143; Phillips v. Kingfield, 1 Applet. R. 375. In this last case the subject was ably examined by Shepley, J., who observed—"The opinions of a witness are not legal testimony except in special cases; such, for example, as experts in some profession or art, those of the witnesses to a will, and in our practice, opinions on the value of property. In other cases, the witness is not to substitute his opinion for that of the Jury; nor are they to rely upon any such opinion instead of exercising their own judgment, taking into consideration the whole testimony. When they have the testimony that the reputation of a witness is good or bad for truth, connecting it with his manner of testifying and with the other testimony in the case, they have the elements from which to form a correct conclusion, whether any and what credit should be given to his testimony. To permit the opinion of a witness, that another witness should not be believed, to be received and acted upon by a Jury, is to allow the prejudices, passions, and feelings of that witness, to form, in part at least, the elements of their judgment. To authorize the question to be put, whether the witness would believe another witness on oath, although sustained by no inconsiderable weight of authority, is to depart from sound principles and established rules of law respecting the kind of testimony to be admitted for the consideration of a Jury, and their duties in deciding upon it. It moreover would permit the introduction and indulgence in Courts of Justice of personal and party hostilities, and of every unworthy motive, by which man can be actuated, to form the basis of an opinion to be expressed to a Jury to influence their decision."

¹ Applet. R. 379. But *quare*, whether a witness to impeach reputation may not be asked in cross-examination, if he would not believe the principal witness on oath.

² 2 Phil. Evid. 432; Mawson v. Hartsink, 4 Esp. 104, per Ld. Ellenborough; 1 Stark. Evid. 182. It is not usual to cross-examine witnesses to character, unless there is some definite charge upon which to cross-examine them. Rex v. Hodgkiss, 7 C. & P. 298. Nor can such witnesses be contradicted as to collateral facts. Lee's case, 2 Lewin, Cr. Cas. 154.

reputation, where he is best known. It is not enough that the impeaching witness professes merely to state what he has heard "others" say; for those others may be but few. He must be able to state what is *generally said* of the person, by those among whom he dwells, or with whom he is chiefly conversant; for it is this only that constitutes his general reputation or character.¹ And, ordinarily, the witness ought himself to come from the neighborhood of the person whose character is in question. If he is a stranger, sent hither by the adverse party to learn his character, he will not be allowed to testify as to the result of his inquiries.²

¹ Boynton v. Kellog, 3 Mass. 192, per Parsons, C. J.; Wike v. Lightner, 11 S. & R. 198, 199, 200; Kimmel v. Kimmel, 3 S. & R. 337, 338; Phillips v. Kingfield, 1 Applet. R. 375.

² Douglass v. Tousey, 2 Wend. 352. Whether this inquiry into the general reputation or character of the witness should be restricted to his reputation for truth and veracity, or may be made in general terms, involving his entire moral character and estimation in society, is a point upon which the American practice is not uniform. All are agreed, that the true and primary inquiry is into his general character for truth and veracity, and to this point, in the northern States, it is still confined. But in several of the other States greater latitude is allowed. In South Carolina, the true mode is said to be, first to ask what is his general character, and if this is said to be bad, then, to inquire whether the witness would believe him on oath; leaving the party who adduced him, to inquire whether, notwithstanding his bad character in other respects, he has not preserved his character for truth. Anon. 1 Hill, S. Car. R. 251, 258, 259. In Kentucky, the same general range of inquiry is permitted; and is thus defended by one of the learned Judges. "Every person conversant with human nature, must be sensible of the kindred nature of the vices to which it is addicted. So true is this, that, to ascertain the existence of one vice, of a particular character, is frequently to prove the existence of more at the same time, in the same individual. Add to this, that persons of infamous character may, and do frequently exist, who have formed no character as to their lack of truth; and society may have never had the opportunity of ascertaining, that they are false in their words or oaths. At the same time they may be so notoriously guilty of acting falsehood, in frauds, forgeries, and other crimes, as would leave no doubt of their being capable of speaking and swearing it, especially as they may frequently depose falsehood with greater security against detection, than practise those other vices. In such cases, and with

§ 462. (3.) The credit of a witness may also be impeached by proof, that he has made *statements out of Court, contrary to what he has testified at the trial*. But it is only in such matters as are relevant to the issue, that the witness can be contradicted. And before this can be done, it is generally held necessary, in the case of verbal statements, first to ask him as to the time, place, and person involved in the supposed contradiction. It is not enough to ask him the general question, whether he has ever said so and so, nor whether he has always told the same story; because it may frequently happen, that, upon the general question, he may not remember whether he has so said; whereas, when his attention is challenged to particular circumstances and occasions, he may recollect and explain what he has formerly said.¹ This course

such characters, ought the Jury to be precluded from drawing inferences unfavorable to their truth as witnesses, by excluding their general turpitude? By the character of every individual, that is, by the estimation in which he is held in the society or neighborhood where he is conversant, his word and his oath is estimated. If that is free from imputation, his testimony weighs well. If it is sullied, in the same proportion his word will be doubted. We conceive it perfectly safe, and most conducive to the purposes of justice, to trust the Jury with a full knowledge of the standing of a witness, into whose character an inquiry is made. It will not thence follow, that from minor vices, they will draw the conclusion, in every instance, that his oath must be discredited, but only be put on their guard to scrutinize his statements more strictly, while in cases of vile reputation, in other respects, they would be warranted in disbelieving him, though he had never been called so often to the book, as to fix upon him the reputation of a liar, when on oath." *Hume v. Scott*, 3 A. K. Marsh. 261, 262, per Mills, J. This decision has been cited and approved in North Carolina, where a similar course prevails. *The State v. Boswell*, 2 Dev. Law Rep. 209, 210. See also *The People v. Mather*, 4 Wend. 257, 258, per Marey, J.; Cowen's note 531, to 1 Phil. Evid. p. 293. Whether evidence of common prostitution is admissible to impeach a female witness, *quære*. See *Commonwealth v. Murphy*, 14 Mass. 387; 2 Stark. Ev. 369, note (1), by Metcalf, that it is admissible. *Spears v. Forrest*, 15 Verm. 435, that it is not.

¹ *Angus v. Smith*, 1 M. & Malk. 473, per Tindal, J.; *Crowley v. Page*, 7 C. & P. 789, per Parke, B.; *Regina v. Shellard*, 9 C. & P. 277; *Regina v. Holden*, 8 C. & P. 606. In the Queen's case, this subject was very much discussed, and the unanimous opinion of the learned Judges was delivered by

of proceeding is considered indispensable, from a sense of justice to the witness; for, as the direct tendency of the evidence is to impeach his veracity, common justice requires

Abbott, C. J. in these terms:—"The legitimate object of the proposed proof is to discredit the witness. Now the usual practice of the Courts below, and a practice, to which we are not aware of any exception, is this; if it be intended to bring the credit of a witness into question by proof of any thing that he may have said or declared, touching the cause, the witness is first asked, upon cross-examination, whether or no he has said or declared that which is intended to be proved. If the witness admits the words or declarations imputed to him, the proof on the other side becomes unnecessary; and the witness has an opportunity of giving such reason, explanation, or exculpation of his conduct, if any there may be, as the particular circumstances of the transaction may happen to furnish; and thus the whole matter is brought before the Court at once, which, in our opinion, is the most convenient course. If the witness denies the words or declarations imputed to him, the adverse party has an opportunity, afterwards, of contending, that the matter of the speech or declaration is such, that he is not to be bound by the answer of the witness, but may contradict and falsify it; and, if it be found to be such, his proof in contradiction will be received at the proper season. If the witness declines to give any answer to the question proposed to him, by reason of the tendency thereof to criminate himself, and the Court is of opinion that he cannot be compelled to answer, the adverse party has, in this instance, also his subsequent opportunity of tendering his proof of the matter, which is received, if by law it ought to be received. But the possibility, that the witness may decline to answer the question, affords no sufficient reason for not giving him the opportunity of answering, and of offering such explanatory or exculpatory matter as I have before alluded to; and it is, in our opinion, of great importance that this opportunity should be thus afforded, not only for the purpose already mentioned, but because, if not given in the first instance, it may be wholly lost; for a witness, who has been examined, and has no reason to suppose that his further attendance is requisite, often departs the Court, and may not be found or brought back until the trial be at an end. So that, if evidence of this sort could be adduced on the sudden and by surprise, without any previous intimation to the witness or to the party producing him, great injustice might be done; and, in our opinion, not unfrequently would be done both to the witness and to the party; and this not only in the case of a witness called by a plaintiff or prosecutor, but equally so in the case of a witness called by a defendant; and one of the great objects of the course of proceeding, established in our Courts, is the prevention of surprise, as far as practicable, upon any person who may appear therein." *The Queen's case*, 2 Brod. & Bing. 313, 314. In the United States the same course is under-

that, by first calling his attention to the subject he should have an opportunity to recollect the facts, and, if necessary, to correct the statement already given, as well as by a re-examination to explain the nature, circumstances, meaning, and design of what he is proved elsewhere to have said.¹ And this

stood to be generally adopted; except in Maine; *Ware v. Ware*, 8 Greenl. 42; and perhaps in Massachusetts, *Tucker v. Welch*, 17 Mass. 160. But see *Brown v. Bellows*, 4 Pick. 188. The utility of this practice, and of confronting the two opposing witnesses, is illustrated by a case, mentioned by Mr. Justice Cowen, in his notes to Phillips on Evidence, Vol. 2, p. 774, (Note 533, to Phil. Evid. 308); "in which a highly respectable witness, sought to be impeached through an out of door conversation, by another witness, who seemed very willing to bring him into a contradiction, upon both being placed on the stand, furnished such a distinction to the latter, as corrected his memory, and led him, in half a minute, to acknowledge that he was wrong. The difference lay in only one word. The first witness had now sworn, that he did not rely on a certain firm as being in good credit; for he was not well informed on the subject. The former words imputed to him were a plain admission, that he was fully informed, and did rely on their credit. It turned out that, in his former conversation, he spoke of a partnership, from which one name was soon afterward withdrawn, leaving him now to speak of the latter firm thus weakened by the withdrawal. In regard to the credit of the first firm, he had, in truth, been fully informed by letters. With respect to the last, he had no information. The sound in the titles of the two firms was so nearly alike, that the ear would easily confound them; and had it not been for the colloquium thus brought on, an apparent contradiction would doubtless have been kept on foot, for various purposes, through a long trial. It involved an inquiry into a credit, which had been given to another on the fraudulent representations of the defendant." Mr. Starkie, for a different purpose, mentions another case, of similar character, where the Judge understood the witness to testify that the prisoner, who was charged with forgery, said, "I am the drawer, acceptor, and indorser of the bill," whereas the words were, "I know the drawer, acceptor, and indorser of the bill." 1 Stark. Evid. 484.

¹ *Regina v. St. George*, 9 C. & P. 483, 489; *Carpenter v. Wahl*, 11 Ad. & El. 803. On this subject, the following observations of Ld. Langdale deserve great consideration. "I do not think," said he, "that the veracity or even the accuracy of an ignorant and illiterate person is to be conclusively tested by comparing an affidavit, which he has made, with his testimony given upon an oral examination in open Court. We have too much experience of the great infirmity of affidavit evidence. When the witness is illiterate and

rule is extended, not only to contradictory statements by the witness, but to other declarations, and to acts done by him, through the medium of verbal communications or correspondence, which are offered with the view either to contradict

ignorant, the language presented to the Court is not his; it is, and must be, the language of the person who prepares the affidavit; and it may be, and too often is, the expression of that person's erroneous inference as to the meaning of the language used by the witness himself; and however carefully the affidavit may be read over to the witness, he may not understand what is said in language so different from that which he is accustomed to use. Having expressed his meaning in his own language, and finding it translated by a person on whom he relies, into language not his own, and which he does not perfectly understand, he is too apt to acquiesce; and testimony not intended by him is brought before the Court as his. Again, evidence taken on affidavit, being taken *ex parte*, is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions, and sometimes from the want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances, necessary for the correction of the first suggestions of his memory, and for his accurate recollection of all that belongs to the subject. For these and other reasons, I do not think that discrepancies between the affidavit and the oral testimony of a witness are conclusive against the testimony of the witness. It is further to be observed, that witnesses, and particularly ignorant and illiterate witnesses, must always be liable to give imperfect or erroneous evidence, even when orally examined in open Court. The novelty of the situation, the agitation and hurry which accompanies it, the cajolery or intimidation to which the witness may be subjected, the want of questions calculated to excite those recollections which might clear up every difficulty, and the confusion occasioned by cross-examination, as it is too often conducted, may give rise to important errors and omissions; and the truth is to be elicited, not by giving equal weight to every word the witness may have uttered, but by considering all the words with reference to the particular occasion of saying them, and to the personal demeanor and deportment of the witness during the examination. All the discrepancies which occur, and all that the witness says in respect of them, are to be carefully attended to, and the result, according to the special circumstances of each case, may be, either that the testimony must be altogether rejected, on the ground that the witness has said that which is untrue, either wilfully or under self-delusion, so strong as to invalidate all that he has said, or else the result must be, that the testimony must, as to the main purpose, be admitted, notwithstanding discrepancies which may have arisen from innocent mistake, extending to collateral matters, but perhaps not affecting the main question in any important degree." See *Johnson v. Todd*, 5 Beav. 600 - 602.

his testimony in chief, or to prove him a corrupt witness himself, or to have been guilty of attempting to corrupt others.¹

§ 463. A similar principle prevails in cross-examining a witness as to the *contents of a letter*, or other paper written by him. The counsel will not be permitted to represent, in the statement of a question, the contents of a letter, and to ask the witness, whether he wrote a letter to any person with such contents, or contents to the like effect; without having first shown to the witness the letter, and having asked him whether he wrote that letter, and his admitting that he wrote it. For the contents of every written paper, according to the ordinary and well established rules of evidence, are to be proved by the paper itself, and by that alone, if it is in existence.² But it is not required that the whole paper should be shown to the witness. Two or three lines only of a letter may be exhibited to him, and he may be asked, whether he wrote the part exhibited. If he denies, or does not admit that he wrote that part, he cannot be examined as to the contents of such letter, for the reason already given; nor is the opposite counsel entitled, in

¹ See 2 Phil. Evid. 433-442; 1 Stark. Evid. 183-185. If the witness does not recollect the conversation imputed to him, it may be proved by another witness, provided it is relevant to the matter in issue. *Crowley v. Page*, 7 C. & P. 789, per Parke, B. The contrary seems to have been ruled, some years before, in *Pain v. Beeston*, 1 M. & Rob. 20, per Tindal, C. J. But if he is asked, upon cross-examination, if he will swear that he has not said so and so, and he answers that he will not swear that he has not, the party cannot be called to contradict him. *Long v. Hitchcock*, 9 C. & P. 619; Ante, § 449. If he denies having made the contradictory statements inquired of, and a witness is called to prove that he did, the particular words must not be put, but the witness must be required to relate what passed. *Hallett v. Cousens*, 2 M. & Rob. 238.

² The Queen's case, 2 Brod. & Bing. 286; Ante, § 87, 88; *Bellinger v. The People*, 8 Wend. 595, 598; *Rex v. Edwards*, 8 C. & P. 26; *Regina v. Taylor*, lb. 726. If the paper is not to be had, a certified copy may be used. *Regina v. Shellard*, 9 C. & P. 277. So, where a certified copy is in the case for other purposes, it may be used for this also. *Davies v. Davies*, 9 C. & P. 253.

that case, to look at the paper.¹ And if he admits the letter to be his writing, he cannot be asked whether statements, such as the counsel may suggest, are contained in it, but the whole letter itself must be read, as the only competent evidence of that fact.² According to the ordinary rule of proceeding in such cases, the letter is to be read as the evidence of the cross-examining counsel, in his turn, when he shall have opened his case. But if he suggests to the Court, that he wishes to have the letter read immediately, in order to found certain questions upon its contents, after they shall have been made known to the Court, which otherwise could not well or effectually be done; that becomes an excepted case; and, for the convenient administration of justice, the letter is permitted to be read, as part of the evidence of the counsel so proposing it, subject to all the consequences of its being so considered.³

§ 464. If the *paper in question is lost*, it is obvious that the course of examination, just stated, cannot be adopted. In such case, it would seem, that regularly, the proof of the loss of the paper should first be offered, and that then the witness may be cross-examined as to its contents; after which he may be contradicted by secondary evidence of the contents of the paper. But, where this course would be likely to occasion inconvenience, by disturbing the regular progress of the cause, and distracting the attention, it will always be in the power of the Judge, in his discretion, to prevent this inconvenience, by postponing the examination, as to this point, to some other stage of the cause.⁴

§ 465. A witness cannot be asked, on cross-examination, *whether he has written such a thing*, stating its particular nature or purport; the proper course being to put the writing into his hands, and to ask him whether it is his writing. And

¹ *Regina v. Duncombe*, 8 C. & P. 369.

² *Ibid.*; 2 Phil. Evid. 438.

³ The Queen's case, 2 Brod. & Bing. 289, 290.

⁴ Phil. & Am. on Evid. 439, 440.

if he is asked, generally, whether he has made *representations*, of the particular nature stated to him, the counsel will be required to specify, whether the question refers to representations in writing, or in words alone; and if the former is meant, the inquiry, for the reasons before mentioned, will be suppressed, unless the writing is produced.¹ But whether the witness may be asked the general question, whether he has given any account, by letter or otherwise, differing from his present statement; the question being proposed without any reference to the circumstance, whether the writing, if there be any, is or is not in existence, or whether it has or has not been seen by the cross-examining counsel; is a point which is considered still open for discussion. But so broad a question, it is conceived, can be of very little use, except to test the strength of the witness's memory, or his confidence in assertion; and, as such, it may well be suffered to remain with other questions of that class, subject to the discretion of the Judge.²

§ 466. If the memory of the witness is *refreshed by a paper* put into his hands, the adverse party may cross-examine the witness upon that paper, without making it his evidence in the cause. But if it be a book of entries, he cannot cross-examine as to other entries in the book, without making them his evidence.³ But if the paper is shown to the witness merely to prove the handwriting, this alone does not give the opposite party a right to inspect it, or to cross-examine as to its contents.⁴ And if the paper is shown to the witness upon his cross-examination, and he is cross-examined

¹ The Queen's case, 2 Brod. & Bing. 292-294.

² This question is raised and acutely treated, in Phil. & Am. on Evid. 932-938. See also Regina v. Shellard, 9 C. & P. 277; Regina v. Holden, 8 C. & P. 606.

³ Gregory v. Tavernor, 6 C. & P. 280; Ante, § 437, note (3). And see Stephens v. Foster, 6 C. & P. 289.

⁴ Russell v. Rider, 6 C. & P. 416; Sinclair v. Stevenson, 1 C. & P. 582; 2 Bing. 514, S. C.; Ante, § 437, note (3).

upon it, the party will not be bound to have the paper read, until he has entered upon his own case.¹

§ 467. After a witness has been cross-examined respecting a former statement made by him, the party who called him has a *right to re-examine* him to the same matter.² The counsel has a right, upon such re-examination, to ask all questions which may be proper to draw forth an explanation of the sense and meaning of the expressions, used by the witness on cross-examination, if they be in themselves doubtful; and also of the motive, by which the witness was induced to use those expressions; but he has no right to go further and to introduce matter new in itself, and not suited to the purpose of explaining either the expressions or the motives of the witness.³ This point, after having been much discussed in the Queen's case, was brought before the Court several years afterwards, when the learned Judges held it as settled, that proof of a detached statement, made by a witness at a former time, does not authorize proof, by the party calling that witness, of all that he said at the same time, but only of so much as can be in some way connected with the statement proved.⁴ Therefore, where a witness had been cross-examined as to what the plaintiff said in a particular conversation, it was held,

¹ Holland v. Reeves, 7 C. & P. 36.

² In the examination of witnesses in Chancery, under a commission to take depositions, the plaintiff is not allowed to re-examine, unless upon a special case, and then only as to matters not comprised in the former interrogatories. King of Hanover v. Wheatley, 4 Beav. 78.

³ Such was the opinion of seven out of eight Judges, whose opinion was taken in the House of Lords, in the Queen's case, as delivered by Lord Tenterden, 2 Brod. & Bing. 297. The counsel calling a witness who gives adverse testimony, cannot, in re-examination, ask the witness whether he has not given a different account of the matter to the attorney. Winter v. Butt, 2 M. & Rob. 357. See Ante, § 444. See also Holdsworth v. Mayor of Dartmouth, Ib. 153. But he may ask the question, upon his examination in chief. Wright v. Beckett, 1 M. & Rob. 414; Dunn v. Aslett, 2 M. & Rob. 122.

⁴ Prince v. Samo, 7 Ad. & Fl. 627.

that he could not be re-examined as to other assertions, made by the plaintiff in the same conversation, but not connected with the assertions to which the cross-examination related; although the assertions as to which it was proposed to re-examine him were connected with the subject-matter of the suit.¹

§ 468. If the counsel chooses to cross-examine the witness to facts, which were not admissible in evidence, the other party has a right to re-examine him as to the evidence so given. Thus, where issue was joined upon a plea of prescription, to a declaration for trespass in G., and the plaintiff's witnesses were asked, in cross-examination, questions respecting the user in other places than G., which they proved; it was held that the plaintiff, in re-examination, might show an interruption in the user, in such other places.² But an adverse witness will not be permitted to obtrude such irrelevant matter, in answer to a question not relating to it; and if he should, the other party may either cross-examine to it, or may apply to have it stricken out of the Judge's notes.³

§ 469. Where evidence of contradictory statements by a witness, or of other particular facts, is offered by way of impeaching his veracity, his *general character* for truth being thus in some sort *put in issue*, it has been deemed reasonable to admit general evidence, that he is a man of strict integrity, and scrupulous regard for truth.⁴ But evidence, that he has on other occasions made statements, similar to what he has

¹ Ibid. In this case, the opinion of Lord Tenterden, in the Queen's case, 2 Brod. & Bing. 298, quoted in 1 Stark. Evid. 180, that evidence of the whole conversation, if connected with the suit, was admissible, though it were of matters not touched in the cross-examination, was considered, and overruled.

² Blewett v. Tregonning, 3 Ad. & El. 554.

³ Blewett v. Tregonning, 3 Ad. & El. 554, 565, 581, 584.

⁴ Phil. & Am. on Evid. 944; Rex v. Clarke, 2 Stark. R. 241. And see Ante, § 54, 55.

testified in the cause, is not admissible; ¹ unless where a design to misrepresent is charged upon the witness, in consequence of his relation to the party, or to the cause; in which case, it seems, it may be proper to show that he made a similar statement before that relation existed.² So, if the character of a deceased attesting witness to a deed or will is impeached on the ground of fraud, evidence of his general good character is admissible.³ But mere contradiction among witnesses examined in Court, supplies no ground for admitting general evidence as to character.⁴

¹ Bull. N. P. 294.

² 2 Phil. Evid. 445, 446.

³ Doe v. Stephenson, 3 Esp. 284; 4 Esp. 50, S. C., cited and approved by Lord Ellenborough in The Bishop of Durham v. Beaumont, 1 Campb. 207-210, and in Provis v. Reed, 5 Bing. 135.

⁴ Bishop of Durham v. Beaumont, 1 Campb. 207; 1 Stark. Evid. 186.

CHAPTER IV.

OF WRITTEN EVIDENCE.

§ 470. WRITINGS are divisible into two classes, namely, PUBLIC and PRIVATE. The former consist of the acts of public functionaries, in the *Executive, Legislative* and *Judicial* Departments of Government; including, under this general head, the transactions which official persons are required to enter in books or registers, in the course of their public duties, and which occur within the circle of their own personal knowledge and observation. To the same head may be referred the consideration of documentary evidence of the acts of State, the Laws, and Judgments of Courts of foreign governments. Public writings are susceptible of another division, they being either (1.) judicial, or (2.) not judicial; and with respect to the means and mode of proving them, they may be classed into, (1.) those which are of record, and (2.) those which are not of record. It is proposed to treat, *first*, of public documents, and *secondly*, of those writings which are private. And in regard to both classes, our inquiries will be directed, (1.) to the mode of obtaining an inspection of such documents and writings; (2.) to the method of proving them; and, (3.) to their admissibility and effect.

§ 471. And *first*, in regard to the INSPECTION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS, it has been admitted, from a very early period, that the inspection and exemplification of the *records of the King's Courts* is the common right of the subject. This right was extended, by an ancient statute,¹ to cases where the subject was concerned against the King. The exercise of this right does not appear to have been restrained, until the reign

¹ 46 Ed. 3, in the Preface to 3 Coke's Rep. p. iv.

of Charles II., when in consequence of the frequency of actions for malicious prosecution, which could not be supported without a copy of the record, the Judges made an order for the regulation of the Sessions at the Old Bailey, prohibiting the granting of any copy of an indictment for felony, without a special order, upon motion in open Court, at the general gaol delivery.¹ This order, it is to be observed, relates only to indictments for felony. In cases of misdemeanor the right to a copy has never been questioned.² But in the United States, no regulation of this kind is known to have been expressly made; and any limitation of the right to a copy of a judicial record or paper, when applied for by any person having an interest in it, would probably be deemed repugnant to the genius of American institutions.³

§ 472. Where writs or other papers in a cause are officially in the *custody of an officer of the Court*, he may be compelled by a rule of Court to allow an inspection of them, even though it be to furnish evidence in a civil action against himself.

¹ Orders and Directions, 16 Car. 2, prefixed to Sir J. Kelyng's Reports, Order vii. With respect to the general records of the realm, in such cases, copies are obtained upon application to the Attorney-General. *Leggatt v. Tollervey*, 14 East, 306. But if the copy were obtained without order, it will not, on that account, be rejected. *Ibid.* *Jordan v. Lewis*, 1b. 395, note (b); *Caddy v. Barlow*, 1 M. & Ry. 275. But Lord Chief Justice Willes, in *Rex v. Brangam*, 1 Leach, Cr. Cas. 32, in the case of a prosecution for robbery, evidently vexatious, refused an application for a copy of the record, on the ground, that no order was necessary; declaring, that "by the laws of the realm, every prisoner, upon his acquittal, had an undoubted right and title to a copy of the record, of such acquittal, for any use he might think fit to make of it; and that, after a demand of it had been made, the proper officer might be punished for refusing to make it out." A strong doubt of the legality of the order of 16 Car. 2, was also raised in *Browne v. Cumming*, 10 B. & C. 70.

² *Morrison v. Kelly*, 1 W. Bl. 385.

³ The only case, known to the author, in which the English rule was acted on, is that of *The People v. Poyllon*, 2 Caines, 202, in which a copy was moved for and granted.

Thus, a rule was granted against the marshal of the King's Bench prison, in an action against him for an escape of one arrested upon mesne process, to permit the plaintiff's attorney to inspect the writ, by which he was committed to his custody.¹

§ 473. In regard to the *records of inferior tribunals*, the right of inspection is *more limited*. As all persons have not necessarily an interest in them, it is not necessary that they should be open to the inspection of all, without distinction. The party, therefore, who wishes to inspect the proceedings of any of those Courts, should first apply to that Court, showing that he has some interest in the document, and that he requires it for a proper purpose. If it should be refused, the Court of Chancery, upon affidavit of the fact, may at any time send, by a writ of *certiorari*, either for the record itself, or an exemplification. The King's Bench in England, and the Supreme Courts of Common Law in America, have the same power, by *mandamus*; ² and this whether an action be pending or not.³

§ 474. There are *other records*, which partake *both of a public and private character*, and are treated as the one or the other, according to the relation in which the applicant stands to them. Thus, the books of a corporation are public with respect to its members, but private with respect to strangers.⁴ In regard to its members, a rule for inspection of the writings of the corporation will be granted of course, on their application, where such inspection is shown to be necessary, in regard to some particular matter in dispute, or where the granting of

¹ Fox v. Jones, 7 B. & C. 732.

² Gresley on Evid. p. 115, 116; Wilson v. Rogers, 2 Stra. 1242; Rex v. Smith, 1 Stra. 126; Rex v. Tower, 4 M. & S. 162; Herbert v. Ashburner, 1 Wils. 297; Rex v. Allgood, 7 T. R. 746; Rex v. Sheriff of Chester, 1 Chitty, R. 479.

³ Rex v. Lucas, 10 East, 235, 236, per Ld. Ellenborough.

⁴ Gresley on Evid. 116.

it is necessary, to prevent the applicant from suffering injury, or to enable him to perform his duties; and the inspection will then be granted, only so far as is shown to be essential to that end.¹ But a stranger has no right to such rule, and it will not be granted, even where he is defendant in a suit brought by the corporation.² In this class of records, are enumerated parish books,³ transfer books of the East India Company,⁴ public lottery books,⁵ the books of incorporated banking companies,⁶ a bishop's registry of presentations,⁷ and some others of the like kind. If an inspection is wanted by a stranger, in a case not within this rule of the Common Law, it can only be obtained by a bill for a discovery; a Court of Equity permitting a discovery in some cases, and under some circumstances, where Courts of Law will not grant an inspection.⁸ And an inspection is granted only where civil rights are depending; for it is a constant and invariable rule, that, in criminal cases, the party shall never be obliged to furnish evidence against himself.⁹

¹ Rex v. Merchant Tailor's Co. 2 B. & Ad. 115; State of Louisiana, ex rel. Hatch v. City Bank of New Orleans, Sup. Court, La., March T. 1842; The People v. Throop, 12 Wend. 183.

² Mayor of Southampton v. Greaves, 8 T. R. 590. The party in such case, can only give notice to the corporation to produce its books and papers, as in other cases between private persons. See accordingly, Burrell v. Nicholson, 3 B. & Ad. 649; Bank of Utica v. Hillard, 5 Cowen, 419; 6 Cowen, 62, S. C.; Imperial Gas. Co. v. Clarke, 7 Bing. 95; Rex v. Justices of Buckingham, 8 B. & C. 375.

³ Cox v. Copping, 5 Mod. 395; Newell v. Simkin, 6 Bing. 565.

⁴ Geery v. Hopkins, 2 Ld. Raym. 851; 7 Mod. 129, S. C.; Shelling v. Farmer, 1 Stra. 646.

⁵ Schinotti v. Bumstead, 1 Tidd's Pr. 594.

⁶ Brace v. Ormond, 1 Meriv. 409; The People v. Throop, 12 Wend. 183; Union Bank v. Knapp, 3 Pick. 96; Mortimer v. McCallan, 6 M. & W. 58.

⁷ Rex v. Bp. of Ely, 8 B. & C. 112; Finch v. Bp. of Ely, 2 M. & Ry. 127.

⁸ Gresley on Evid. 116, 117.

⁹ 1 Tidd's Pr. 593. Under this rule an information, in the nature of a *quo warranto*, is considered as merely a civil proceeding. Rex v. Babb, 3 T. R. 582. See also Rex v. Dr. Purnell, 1 Wils. 239.

§ 475. Inspection of the *books of public offices* is subject to the same restriction, as in the case of corporation books; and access to them will not be granted in favor of persons, who have no interest in the books. Thus, an inspection of the books of the post-office has been refused, upon the application of the plaintiff in a *qui tam* action against a clerk in the post-office, for interfering in the election of a member of parliament, because the action did not relate to any transaction in the post-office, for which alone the books were kept.¹ Upon the same ground, that the subject of the action was collateral to the subject-matter and design of the books, an inspection of the books of the custom-house has been refused.² Such inspections are also sometimes refused on grounds of public policy, the disclosures sought being considered detrimental to the public interest. Upon the same principle of an interest in the books, the tenants of a manor are generally entitled to an inspection of the court-rolls, wherever their own rights are concerned; but this privilege is not allowed to a stranger.³

§ 476. But, in all cases of public writings, if the disclosure of their contents would, either in the judgment of the Court, or of the Chief Executive Magistrate, or the Head of department, in whose custody or under whose control they may be kept, be *injurious to the public interests*, an inspection will not be granted.⁴

§ 477. The motion for a rule to inspect and take copies of books and writings, *when an action is pending*, may be made at any stage of the cause, and is founded on an *affidavit*, stating the circumstances under which the inspection is

¹ *Crew v. Blackburn*, cited 1 Wils. 240; *Crew v. Saunders*, 2 Stra. 1005.

² *Atherfold v. Beard*, 2 T. R. 610.

³ *Rex v. Shelley*, 3 T. R. 141; *Rex v. Allgood*, 7 T. R. 746. See 2 Phil. Evid. 182-190; *Rex v. Hostmen of Newcastle*, 2 Stra. 1223, note (1), by Nolan.

⁴ Ante, § 250, 251, and cases there cited.

claimed, and that an application therefor has been made to the proper quarter, and refused.¹

§ 478. But *when no action is pending*, the proper course is to move for a rule to show cause why a *mandamus* should not issue, commanding the officer having custody of the books to permit the applicant to inspect them, and take copies. The application in this case should state some specific object sought by the inspection, and be supported by an *affidavit*, as in the case preceding. If a rule is made to show cause why an *information* in the nature of a *quo warranto* should not be filed, a rule for an inspection will be granted to the prosecutor, immediately upon the granting of a rule to show cause. But if a rule be made to show cause why a *mandamus* should not be awarded, the rule for an inspection will not be granted, until the *mandamus* has been issued and returned.²

§ 479. We proceed now, in the SECOND PLACE, to consider the MODE OF PROOF of public documents, beginning with those which are *not judicial*. And first, of *acts of State*. It has already been seen, that Courts will judicially take notice of the political constitution, or frame of the government of their own country, its essential political agents, or officers, and its essential ordinary and regular operations. The great seal of the State and the seals of its judicial tribunals require no proof. Courts also recognise, without other proof than inspection, the seals of State of other nations, which have been recognised by their own sovereign. The seals also of foreign Courts of Admiralty, and of notaries public, are recognised in the like manner.³ Public statutes, also, need no proof, being

¹ 1 Tidd's Pr. 595, 596; 2 Phil. Evid. 189, 190.

² 1 Tidd's Pr. 596; *Rex v. Justices of Surrey*, Sayer, R. 144; *Rex v. Shelley*, 3 T. R. 141; *Rex v. Hollister*, Cas. Temp. Hardw. 245.

³ Ante, § 4, 5, 6; Story on Conf. of Laws, § 643. A protest of a bill of exchange, in a foreign country, is sufficiently proved by the seal of the foreign

supposed to exist in the memories of all; but, for certainty of recollection, reference is had either to a copy from the legislative rolls or to the book printed by public authority.¹ Acts of State may be proved by production of the original printed document, from a press authorized by government.² Proclamations, and other acts and orders of the Executive, of the like character, may be proved by production of the government Gazette, in which they were authorized to be printed.³ Printed copies of public documents, transmitted to Congress by the President of the United States, and printed by the printer to Congress, are evidence of those documents.⁴ And here it may be proper to observe, that, in all cases of proof by a copy, if the copy has been taken by a machine, worked by the witness who produces it, it is sufficient.⁵ The certificate of the Secretary of State is evidence that a particular person has been recognised as a foreign minister.⁶ And the certificate of a foreign governor, duly authenticated, is evidence of his own official acts.⁷

§ 480. Next, as to *legislative acts*, which consist of statutes, resolutions, and orders, passed by the legislative body. In regard to *private statutes*, resolutions, &c., the only mode of proof, known to the Common Law, is either by means of a

notary. Willes, 550; Anon. 12 Mod. 345; Bayley on Bills, 515, (Phillips & Sewall's Ed.); Story on Bills, § 276, 277; La Caygas v. Larienda, 4 Mart. 283.

¹ Bull. N. P. 225.

² Rex v. Withers, cited 5 T. R. 446; Watkins v. Holman, 16 Peters, R. 25.

³ Rex v. Holt, 5 T. R. 436; Van Omeron v. Dowick, 2 Campb. 42; Bull. N. P. 226; Attor. Gen. v. Theakstone, 8 Price, 89. An appointment to a commission in the army cannot be proved by the Gazette. Rex v. Gardner, 2 Campb. 513; Kirwan v. Cockburn, 5 Esp. 233. See also Rex v. Forsyth, R. & Ry. 274, 275.

⁴ Radcliff v. United Ins. Co. 7 Johns. 38, per Kent, C. J.

⁵ Simpson v. Thoreton, 2 M. & Rob. 433.

⁶ United States v. Benner, 1 Baldw. 238.

⁷ United States v. Mitchell, 3 Wash. 95.

copy, proved on oath to have been examined by the roll itself; or, by an exemplification under the great seal. But in several of the United States, the printed copies of the laws and resolves of the legislature, published by its authority, are held competent evidence; and it is sufficient, *prima facie*, that the book purports to have been so printed.¹ It is the invariable course of the legislatures of the several States, as well as of the United States, to have the laws and resolutions of each session printed by authority. Confidential persons are selected to compare the copies with the original rolls, and superintend the printing. The very object of this provision is to furnish the people with authentic copies; and, from their nature, printed copies of this kind, either of public or private laws, are as much to be depended on, as the exemplification, verified by an officer, who is a keeper of the record.²

§ 481. If in a *private statute* a *clause* is inserted, that it shall be *taken notice of*, as if it were a *public act*; this not only dispenses with the necessity of pleading it specially, but also changes the mode of proof, by dispensing with the production of an exemplified or sworn copy.³

§ 482. In regard to the *Journals* of either branch of the legislature, a former remark⁴ may be here repeated, equally applicable to all other *public records and documents*, namely, that they constitute an exception to the general rule, which requires the production of the best evidence, and may be

¹ Young v. Bank of Alexandria, 4 Cranch, 388; Biddis v. James, 6 Binn. 321, 326; 1 Rev. Stat. New York, p. 184, § 12; Rex v. Forsyth, Rus. & Ry. 275.

² Per Tilghman, C. J., 6 Binn. 326. See also Watkins v. Holman, 16 Peters, R. 25; Holt, C. J. held, that an act, printed by the King's printers, was always good evidence to a Jury; though it was not sufficient upon an issue of *null tiel record*. Anon. 2 Salk. 566.

³ Beaumont v. Mountain, 10 Bing. 404. The contrary seems to have been held in Brett v. Beales, 1 M. & Malk. 421; but that case was overruled, as to this point, in Woodward v. Cotton, 1 C. M. & R. 44, 47.

⁴ Ante, § 91.

proved by examined copies. This exception is allowed, because of their nature, as original public documents, which are not removable at the call of individuals; and because, being interesting to many persons, they might be necessary, as evidence, in different places at the same time.¹ Moreover, these being public records, they would be recognised as such by the Court, upon being produced, without collateral evidence of their identity or genuineness; and it is a general rule, that, whenever the thing to be proved would require no collateral proof upon its production, it is provable by a copy.² These journals may also be proved by the copies printed by the government printer, by authority of the House.³

§ 483. The next class of public writings to be considered, consists of *official registers*, or books kept by persons in public office, in which they are required, whether by statute or by the nature of their office, to write down particular transactions, occurring in the course of their public duties, and under their personal observation. These documents, as well as all others of a public nature, are generally admissible in evidence, notwithstanding their authenticity is not confirmed by those usual and ordinary tests of truth, the obligation of an oath, and the power of cross-examining the persons, on whose authority the truth of the documents depends. The extraordinary degree of confidence, it has been remarked, which is reposed in such documents, is founded principally upon the circumstance, that they have been made by authorized and accredited agents, appointed for the purpose; but partly also on the publicity of their subject-matter. Where the particular facts are inquired into and recorded for the benefit of

¹ *Ld. Melville's case*, 29 Howell's St. Tr. 683-685; *Rex v. Ld. George Gordon*, 2 Doug. 593, and note (3); *Jones v. Randall*, Loft, 383, 428; Cowp. 17, S. C.

² *Rex v. Smith*, 1 Stra. 126.

³ *Root v. King*, 7 Cowen, 613, 636; *Watkins v. Holman*, 16 Peters, R. 25.

the public, those who are empowered to act in making such investigations and memorials, are in fact the agents of all the individuals who compose the State; and every member of the community may be supposed to be privy to the investigation. On the ground, therefore, of the credit due to agents so empowered, and of the public nature of the facts themselves, such documents are entitled to an extraordinary degree of confidence; and it is not necessary that they should be confirmed and sanctioned by the ordinary tests of truth. Beside this, it would always be difficult, and often impossible, to prove facts of a public nature, by means of actual witnesses upon oath.¹

§ 484. These books, therefore, are recognised by law, because they are required by law to be kept, because the entries in them are of public interest and notoriety, and because they are made under the sanction of an oath of office, or at least under that of official duty. They belong to a particular custody, from which they are not usually taken but by special authority, granted only in cases where inspection of the book itself is necessary, for the purpose of identifying the book, or the handwriting, or of determining some question arising upon the original entry, or of correcting an error, which has been duly ascertained. Books of this public nature being themselves evidence, when produced, their contents may be proved by an immediate copy, duly verified.² Of this description are parish registers;³ the books of the Bank of England, which contain the transfers of public stock;⁴ the transfer books of the East India Company;⁵

¹ 1 Stark. Evid. 195; Ante, § 128.

² *Lynch v. Clerke*, 3 Salk. 154, per Holt, C. J.; 2 Doug. 593, 594, note (3).

³ Phil. & Am. on Evid. 594-597; 2 Phil. Evid. 183-186; *Lewis v. Marshall*, 5 Peters, 472, 475; 1 Stark. Evid. 205.

⁴ *Breton v. Cope*, Peake's Cas. 30; *Marsh v. Collnett*, 2 Esp. 655; *Mortimer v. McCallan*; 6 M. & W. 58.

⁵ 2 Doug. 593, note, (3).

the rolls of Courts baron;¹ the books which contain the official proceedings of corporations, and matters respecting their property, if the public at large is concerned with it;² books of assessment of public rates and taxes;³ vestry books;⁴ bishops' registers, and chapter-house registers;⁵ terriers;⁶ the books of the post-office, and custom-house, and registers of other public offices;⁷ prison registers;⁸ enrollment of deeds;⁹ the registers of births and of marriages, made pursuant to the statutes of any of the United States;¹⁰ the registration of vessels in the custom-house;¹¹ and the books of records of

¹ Bull. N. P. 247; Doe v. Askew, 10 East, 520; 2 Phil. Evid. 185.

² Warriner v. Giles, 2 Stra. 954; Ibid. 1223, note (1); Marriage v. Lawrence, 3 B. & Ald. 144, per Abbott, C. J.; Gibbon's case, 17 Howell's St. Tr. 810; Moore's case, Ib. 854; Owings v. Speed, 5 Wheat. 420.

³ Doe v. Seaton, 2 Ad. & El. 171, 178, per Patteson, J.; Doe v. Arkwright, Ib. 182, (note), per Denman, C. J.; Rex v. King, 2 T. R. 234; Ronkendorff v. Taylor, 4 Peters, 349, 360; Doe v. Cartwright, Ry. & M. 62.

⁴ Rex v. Martin, 2 Campb. 100. See, as to Church Records, Sawyer v. Baldwin, 11 Pick. 494.

⁵ Arnold v. Bp. of Bath and Wells, 5 Bing. 316; Coombs v. Coether, 1 M. & Malk. 398.

⁶ Bull. N. P. 248; 1 Stark. Evid. 201.

⁷ Bull. N. P. 249; Rex v. Fitzgerald, 1 Leach, Cr. Cas. 24; Rex v. Rhodes, Ib. 29; D'Israeli v. Jowett, 1 Esp. 427; Barber v. Holmes, 3 Esp. 190; Wallace v. Cook, 5 Esp. 117; Johnson v. Ward, 6 Esp. 48; Tomkins v. Attor. Gen. 1 Dow, 404; Rex v. Grimwood, 1 Price, 369; Henry v. Leigh, 3 Campb. 499; United States v. Johns, 4 Dall. 412, 415.

⁸ Salte v. Thomas, 3 B. & P. 188; Rex v. Aickles, 1 Leach, Cr. Cas. 435.

⁹ Bull. N. P. 229; Phil. & Am. on Evid. 616; 2 Phil. Evid. 132; Hastings v. Blue Hill Turnp. Corp. 9 Pick. 80.

¹⁰ Milford v. Worcester, 7 Mass. 48; Commonwealth v. Littlejohn, 15 Mass. 163; Sumner v. Sebee, 3 Greenl. 223; Wedgwood's case, 8 Greenl. 75; Jacock v. Gilliam, 3 Murphy, 47; Martin v. Gunby, 2 H. & J. 248; Jackson v. Boneham, 15 Johns. 226; Jackson v. King, 5 Cowen, 237; Richmond v. Patterson, 3 Ohio R. 368.

¹¹ United States v. Johns, 5 Dall. 415; Colson v. Bonzey, 6 Greenl. 474; Hacker v. Young, 6 N. Hamp. 95; Coolidge v. N. York Firemen's Ins. Co. 14 Johns. 308; Catlett v. Pacific Ins. Co. 1 Wend. 651.

the transactions of towns, city councils, and other municipal bodies.¹ In short, the rule may be considered as settled, that every document of a public nature, which there would be an inconvenience in removing, and which the party has a right to inspect, may be proved by a duly authenticated copy.²

§ 485. It is deemed *essential to the official character* of these books, that the entries in them be made promptly, or at least without such long delay as to impair their credibility, and that they be made by the person whose duty it was to make them, and in the mode required by law, if any has been prescribed.³ When the books themselves are produced, they are received as evidence, without further attestation. But they must be accompanied by proof that they come from the *proper repository*.⁴ Where the proof is by a copy, an examined copy, duly made and sworn to by any competent witness is always admissible. Whether a *copy, certified* by the officer having legal custody of the book or document, he not being specially appointed by law to furnish copies, is admissible, has been doubted; but though there are decisions against the admissibility, yet the weight of authority seems to have established the rule, that a copy given by a public officer, whose duty it is to keep the original, ought to be received in evidence.⁵

¹ Saxton v. Nimms, 14 Mass. 320, 321; Thayer v. Stearns, 1 Pick. 309; Taylor v. Henry, 2 Pick. 401; Denning v. Roome, 6 Wend. 651; Dudley v. Grayson, 6 Monroe, 259; Bishop v. Cone, 3 N. Hamp. 513.

² Gresley on Evid. 115.

³ Doe v. Bray, 8 B. & C. 813; Walker v. Wingfield, 18 Ves. 443.

⁴ 1 Stark. Evid. 202; Atkins v. Hatton, 2 Anstr. 387; Armstrong v. Hewett, 4 Price, 216; Pulley v. Hilton, 12 Price, 625; Swinnerton v. Marquis of Stafford, 3 Taunt. 91. See Ante, § 142, as to the nature of the repository required.

⁵ United States v. Percheman, 7 Peters, 51, 85, [A. D. 1833,] per totam Curiam; Oakes v. Hill, 14 Pick. 442, 448; Abbott on Shipping, p. 63, note 1, (Story's Ed.); United States v. Johns, 4 Dall. 412, 415; Judice v. Chrétien, 3 Rob. Louis. R. 15; Wells v. Compton, Ib. 171. In accordance with the principle of this rule, is the statute of the United States, of March

§ 486. In regard to *foreign laws*, the established doctrine now is, that no Court takes judicial notice of the laws of a foreign country, but they must be proved as facts. And the better opinion seems to be, that this proof must be made to the Court, rather than to the Jury. "For," observes Mr. Justice Story, "all matters of law are properly referable to the Court, and the object of the proof of foreign laws is to enable the Court to instruct the Jury what, in point of law, is the result of the foreign law to be applied to the matters in controversy before them. The Court are, therefore, to decide what is the proper evidence of the laws of a foreign country; and when evidence is given of those laws, the Court are to judge of their applicability, when proved, to the case in hand."¹

27, 1804, (3 LL. U. S. 621, ch. 409, Bioren's Ed.) by which it is enacted, that "all records and exemplifications of office books, which are or may be kept in any public office of any State, not appertaining to a Court, shall be proved or admitted in any other Court or Office in any other State, by the attestation of the keeper of the said records or books, and the seal of his office thereto annexed, if there be a seal, together with a certificate of the presiding Justice of the Court of the county or district, as the case may be, in which such office is or may be kept; or of the Governor, the Secretary of State, the Chancellor or the Keeper of the great seal of the State, that the said attestation is in due form, and by the proper officer; and the said certificate, if given by the presiding Justice of a Court, shall be farther authenticated by the Clerk or Prothonotary of the said Court, who shall certify, under his hand and the seal of his office, that the said presiding Justice is duly commissioned and qualified; or if the said certificate be given by the Governor, the Secretary of State, the Chancellor or Keeper of the great seal, it shall be under the great seal of the State, in which the said certificate is made. And the said records and exemplifications, authenticated as aforesaid, shall have such faith and credit given to them in every Court and office within the United States, as they have by law or usage in the Courts or Offices of the State, from whence the same are or shall be taken." By another section this provision is extended to the records and public books, &c. of all the Territories of the United States. The earlier American authorities, opposed to the rule in the text, are cited in Cowen & Hill's notes 786, 787, 802, to 1 Phil. Evid. 411, 412, 423. These cases are in accordance with the English rule. 2 Phil. Evid. 130-134.

¹ Story on Conf. of Laws, § 638, and cases there cited.

§ 487. "Generally speaking, authenticated copies of the written laws, or of other public instruments, of a foreign government, are expected to be produced. For it is not to be presumed, that any civilized nation will refuse to give such copies duly authenticated, which are usual and necessary for the purpose of administering justice in other countries. It cannot be presumed, that an application to a foreign government to authenticate its own edict or law will be refused; but the fact of such a refusal must, if relied on, be proved. But if such refusal is proved, then inferior proofs may be admissible.¹ Where our own government has promulgated any foreign law or ordinance of a public nature as authentic, that may of itself be sufficient evidence of the actual existence, and terms of such law or ordinance."²

§ 488. "In general, foreign laws are required to be verified by the sanction of an oath, unless they can be verified by some high authority, such as the law respects, not less than it respects the oath of an individual.³ The usual mode of authenticating foreign laws (as it is of authenticating foreign judgments) is by an exemplification of a copy under the great seal of a State; or by a copy proved to be a true copy by a witness, who has examined and compared it with the original;

¹ Church v. Hubbard, 2 Cranch, 237, 238. It is now settled in England, upon great consideration, that a foreign written law may be proved by parol evidence of a witness, learned in the law of that country; without first attempting to obtain a copy of the law itself. Baron de Bode v. Reginam, 10 Jur. 217.

² Story on Conf. of Laws, § 640; Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch, 38. The Acts of State of a foreign government can only be proved by copies of such Acts, properly authenticated. Richardson v. Anderson, 1 Campb. 65, note (a).

³ Church v. Hubbard, 2 Cranch, 237; Brackett v. Norton, 4 Conn. 517; Hempstead v. Reed, 6 Conn. 480; Dyer v. Smith, 12 Conn. 384. But the Court may proceed on its own knowledge of foreign laws, without the aid of other proof; and its judgment will not be reversed for that cause, unless it should appear that the Court was mistaken as to those laws. The State v. Rood, 12 Verm. 396.

or by the certificate of an officer properly authorized by law to give the copy; which certificate must itself also be duly authenticated.¹ But foreign unwritten laws, customs and usages may be proved, and indeed must ordinarily be proved by parol evidence. The usual course is to make such proof by the testimony of competent witnesses, instructed in the laws, customs, and usages, under oath.² Sometimes, however, certificates of persons in high authority have been allowed as evidence without other proof.³

¹ Church v. Hubbard, 2 Cranch, 238; Packard v. Hill, 2 Wend. 411; Lincoln v. Battelle, 6 Wend. 475.

² Church v. Hubbard, 2 Cranch, 237; Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 2 Hagg. Appx. p. 15-144; Brush v. Wilkins, 4 Johns. Ch. 520; Mostyn v. Fabrigas, Cowp. 174. It is not necessary that the witness should be of the legal profession. Regina v. Dent, 1 Car. & Kirw. 97.

³ Story on Conf. of Laws, § 641, 642; In re Dormay, 3 Hagg. Eccl. R. 767, 769; Rex v. Picton, 30 Howell's State Trials, 515-573; The Diana, 1 Dods. 95, 101, 102. A copy of the code of laws of a foreign nation, printed by order of the foreign government, it seems, is not admissible evidence of those laws; but they must be proved, as stated in the text. Chanoine v. Fowler, 3 Wend. 173; Hill v. Packard, 5 Wend. 375, 384, 389. See further 2 Phil. Evid. 144, 148. But see United States v. Glass Ware, 4 Law Reporter, 36, where Betts, J. held the contrary, the printed book having been purchased of the Queen's printer. See also Farmers & Mechanics Bank v. Ward, Ib. 37, S. P. In regard to the effect of foreign laws, it is generally agreed that they are to govern every where so far as may concern the validity and interpretation of all contracts made under or with respect to them; where the contract is not contrary to the laws or policy of the country in which the remedy is sought. An exception has been admitted in the case of foreign revenue laws, of which, it is said, the Courts will not take notice, and which will not be allowed to invalidate a contract made for the express purpose of violating them. This exception has obtained place upon the supposed authority of Ld. Hardwicke, in Boucher v. Lawson, (a), temp. Hardw. 198, and of Ld. Mansfield, in Planché v. Fletcher, 1 Doug. 252. But in the former of these cases, which was that of a shipment of gold in Portugal, to be delivered in London, though the exportation of gold was forbidden by the laws of Portugal, the judgment was right on two grounds; first, because the foreign law was contrary to the policy and interest of England, where bullion was very much needed at that time; and secondly, because the contract was to be performed in England;

§ 489. The relations of the *United States* to each other, in regard to all matters not surrendered to the General Government by the national constitution, are those of *foreign States in close friendship*, each being sovereign and independent.¹ Upon strict principles of evidence, therefore, the laws and public documents of one State can be proved in the Courts of another, only as other foreign laws. And accordingly, in some of the States such proof has been required.² But the Courts of other States, and the Supreme Court of the United States, being of opinion that the connexion, intercourse, and constitutional ties which bind together these several States, require some relaxation of the strictness of this rule, have accordingly held that a printed volume, purporting on the face of it to

and the rule is, that the law of the *place of performance* is to govern. The latter of these cases was an action on a policy of insurance on a voyage to Nantz, with liberty to touch at Ostend; the vessel being a Swedish bottom, and the voyage being plainly intended to introduce into France English goods, on which the duties were high, as Dutch goods, on which much lower duties were charged. Here, too, the French law of high countervailing duties was contrary to British interest and policy; and moreover, the French ministry were understood to connive at this course of trade, the supply of such goods being necessary for French consumption. Both these cases, therefore, may well stand, on the ground of the admitted qualification of the general rule; and the brief general observations of those learned Judges, if correctly reported, may be regarded as *obiter dicta*. But it should be remembered, that the language of the learned Judges seems to import nothing more than that Courts will not take notice of foreign revenue laws; and such seems to have been the view of Ld. Denman in the recent case of Spence v. Chodwick, 11 Jur. 874, where he said — "We are not bound to take notice of the revenue laws of a foreign country; but if we are informed of them, that is another case." The exception alluded to was tacitly disapproved by Ld. Kenyon, in Waymell v. Reed, 5 T. R. 599; and is explicitly condemned, as not founded in legal or moral principle, by the best modern Jurists. See Vattel, b. 2, ch. 5, § 64; Ibid. ch. 6, § 72; Pothier on Assurance, n. 58; Marshall on Ins. p. 59-61, 2d Ed.; 1 Chitty on Comm. & Manuf. p. 83, 84; 3 Kent, Comm. 266, 267; Story, Conf. Laws, § 257; Story on Bills, § 136; Story on Agency, § 197, 343, note, 2d Ed.

¹ Post, § 504.

² Brackett v. Norton, 4 Conn. 517, 521; Hempstead v. Reed, 6 Conn. 480; Packard v. Hill, 2 Wend. 411.

contain the laws of a sister State, is admissible as *prima facie* evidence, to prove the statute laws of that State.¹ The act of Congress,² respecting the exemplification of public office-books, is not understood to exclude any other modes of authentication, which the Courts may deem it proper to admit.³ And in regard to the laws of the States, Congress has provided,⁴ under the power vested for that purpose by the constitution, that the acts of the legislatures of the several States shall be authenticated, by having the seal of their respective States affixed thereto; but this method, as in the case of public books just mentioned, is not regarded as exclusive of any other which the States may respectively adopt. Under this statute it is held, that the seal of the State is a sufficient authentication, without the attestation of any officer, or any other proof; and it will be presumed, *prima facie*, that the seal was affixed by the proper officer.⁵

§ 490. The reciprocal relations between the national government and the several States, composing the United States, are not foreign, but domestic. Hence the Courts of the United States take judicial notice of all the public laws of the respective States, whenever they are called upon to consider and apply them. And in like manner the Courts of the sev-

¹ Young v. Bank of Alexandria, 4 Cranch, 384, 388; Thompson v. Musser, 1 Dall. 458, 463; Biddis v. James, 6 Binn. 321, 327; Muller v. Morris, 2 Barr, R. 85; Raynham v. Canton, 3 Pick. 293, 296; Kean v. Rice, 12 S. & R. 203; The State v. Stade, 1 D. Chipm. 303; Comparet v. Jernegan, 5 Blackf. 375; Taylor v. Bank of Illinois, 7 Monroe, 585; Taylor v. Bank of Alexandria, 5 Leigh, 471; Allen v. Watson, 2 Hill, 319; Hale v. Ross, Pennington, R. 591. But see Van Buskirk v. Mulock, 3 Harrison, R. 185, *contra*. The common law of a sister State may be shown by the books of Reports of adjudged cases, accredited in that State. Inge v. Murphy, 10 Alab. R. 885.

² Stat. March 27, 1804, cited Ante, 485.

³ See cases cited supra, note (1).

⁴ Stat. May 26, 1790, 1 LL. U. S. ch. 38, p. 102, (Bioren's Ed.)

⁵ United States v. Amedy, 11 Wheat. 392; United States v. Johns, 4 Dall. 412; The State v. Carr, 5 N. Hamp. 367.

eral States take judicial notice of all public acts of Congress, including those which relate exclusively to the District of Columbia, without any formal proof.¹ But private statutes must be proved in the ordinary mode.²

§ 491. We are next to consider the *admissibility and effect* of the *public documents* we have been speaking of, as instruments of evidence. And here it may be generally observed, that to render such documents, when properly authenticated, admissible in evidence, their contents must be pertinent to the issue. It is also necessary that the document be made by the person whose duty it was to make it, and that the matter it contains be such as belonged to his province, or came within his official cognizance and observation. Documents having these requisites are, in general, admissible to prove either *prima facie* or conclusively the facts they recite. Thus, where certain *public statutes* recited that great outrages had been committed in a certain part of the country, and a public *proclamation* was issued, with similar recitals, and offering a reward for the discovery and conviction of the perpetrators, these were held admissible and sufficient evidence of the existence of those outrages, to support the averments to that effect, in an information for a libel on the government in relation to them.³ So, a recital of a state of war, in the preamble of a public statute, is good evidence of its existence, and it will be taken notice of without proof; and this whether the nation be or be not a party to the war.⁴ So also, *legislative resolutions* are evidence of the public matters which they recite.⁵ The *Journals* also of either House, are the proper

¹ Owings v. Hull, 9 Peters, 607; Hinde v. Vattier, 5 Peters, 308; Young v. Bank of Alexandria, 4 Cranch, 384, 388; Canal Co. v. Rail Road Co.

² G. & J. 1, 63.

³ Leland v. Wilkinson, 6 Peters, 317.

⁴ Rex v. Sutton, 4 M. & S. 532.

⁵ Rex v. De Berenger, 3 M. & S. 67, 69. See also Brazen Nose College v. Bp. of Salisbury, 4 Taunt. 831.

⁶ Rex v. Francklin, 17 Howell's St. Tr. 637.

evidence of the action of that House, upon all matters before it.¹ The *diplomatic correspondence*, communicated by the President to Congress, is sufficient evidence of the acts of foreign governments and functionaries, therein recited.² A *foreign declaration of war* is sufficient proof of the day when the state of war commenced.³ Certified copies, under the hand and seal of the Secretary of State, of the *letters of a public agent* resident abroad, and of the *official order of a foreign colonial governor*, concerning the sale and disposal of a cargo of merchandise, have been held admissible evidence of those transactions.⁴ How far diplomatic correspondence may go to establish the facts recited therein, does not clearly appear; but it is agreed to be generally admissible in all cases; and to be sufficient evidence, whenever the facts recited come in collaterally, or by way of introductory averment, and are not the principal point in issue before the Jury.⁵

§ 492. The *government Gazette* is admissible and sufficient evidence of such acts of the Executive, or of the government, as are usually announced to the public through that channel, such as proclamations,⁶ and the like. For besides the motives of official duty, and of self-interest, which bind the publisher to accuracy, it is to be remembered, that intentionally to publish any thing as emanating from public authority, with knowledge that it did not so emanate, would be a misdemeanor.⁷

¹ Jones v. Randall, Cowp. 17; Root v. King, 7 Cowen, 613.

² Radcliff v. United Ins. Co. 7 Johns. 38, 51; Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch, 1, 37, 38.

³ Thelluson v. Cosling, 4 Esp. 266. See also Foster, Disc. 1, ch. 2, § 12, that public notoriety is sufficient evidence of the existence of war. See also Bradley v. Arthur, 4 B. & C. 292, 304.

⁴ Bingham v. Cabot, 3 Dall. 19, 23, 39-41.

⁵ Radcliff v. United Ins. Co. 7 Johns. 51, per Kent, C. J.

⁶ Rex v. Holt, 5 T. R. 436, 443; Attor. Gen. v. Theakstone, 8 Price, 89; Ante, § 480, and cases cited in note (3); Gen. Picton's case, 30 Howell's St. Tr. 493.

⁷ 2 Phil. Evid. 108.

But in regard to other acts of public functionaries, having no relation to the affairs of government, the Gazette is not admissible evidence.¹

§ 493. In regard to *official registers*, we have already stated² the principles on which these books are entitled to credit; to which it is only necessary to add, that, where the books possess all the requisites there mentioned, they are admissible as competent evidence of the facts they contain. But it is to be remembered that they are not, in general, evidence of any facts not required to be recorded in them, and which did not occur in the presence of the registering officer. Thus, a parish register is evidence only of the time of the marriage, and of its celebration *de facto*; for these are the only facts necessarily within the knowledge of the party making the entry.³ So, a register of baptism, taken by itself, is evidence only of that fact; though, if the child were proved *aliunde* to have then been very young, it might afford presumptive evidence that it was born in the same parish.⁴ Neither is the mention of the child's age, in the register of christenings, any evidence of the day of his birth, to support a plea of infancy.⁵ In all these and similar cases, the register is no proof of the identity of the parties there named, with the parties in controversy; but the fact of identity must be established by other evidence.⁶ It is also necessary, in all these cases, that the register be one which the law requires should be kept, and that it be kept in the manner

¹ Rex v. Holt, 5 T. R. 443, per Ld. Kenyon.

² Ante, § 483, 484, 485.

³ Doe v. Barnes, 1 M. & Rob. 386, 389. As to the kind of books which may be read as registers of marriage, see 2 Phil. Evid. 112, 113, 114.

⁴ Rex v. North Petherton, 5 B. & C. 508; Clark v. Trinity Church, 5 Watts & Serg. 266.

⁵ Burghart v. Angerstein, 6 C. & P. 690. See also Rex v. Clapham, 4 C. & P. 29; Huet v. Le Mesurier, 1 Cox, R. 275.

⁶ Birt v. Barlow, 1 Doug. 170; Bain v. Mason, 1 C. & P. 202, and note; Wedgwood's case, 8 Greenl. 75.

required by law.¹ Thus also, the registers kept at the navy office are admissible, to prove the death of a sailor, and the time when it occurred;² as well as to show to what ship he belonged, and the amount of wages due to him.³ The prison kalendar is evidence to prove the date and fact of the commitment and discharge of a prisoner.⁴ The books of assessment of public taxes are admissible to prove the assessment of the taxes upon the individuals, and for the property therein mentioned.⁵ The books of municipal corporations are evidence of the elections of their officers, and of other corporate acts there recorded.⁶ The books of private corporations are admissible for similar purposes, between members of the corporation; for

¹ See the cases cited Ante, § 484, note (12); *Newham v. Raithby*, 1 Phillim. 315. Therefore the books of the Fleet, and of a Wesleyan chapel, have been rejected. *Reed v. Passer*, 1 Esp. 213; *Whittuck v. Waters*, 4 C. & P. 375. It is said that a copy of a register of baptism, kept in the island of Guernsey, is not admissible; for which *Huet v. Le Mesurier*, 1 Cox, 275, is cited. But the report of that case is short and obscure; and for aught appearing to the contrary, the register was rejected only as not competent to prove the age of the person. It is also said, on the authority of *Leader v. Barry*, 1 Esp. 353, that a copy of a register of a foreign chapel is not evidence to prove a marriage. But this point also is very briefly reported, in three lines; and it does not appear, but that the ground of the rejection of the register was, that it was not authorized or required to be kept by the laws of France, where the marriage was celebrated, namely, in the Swedish ambassador's chapel, in Paris. And such, probably enough, was the fact. Subsequently, an examined copy of a register of marriages in Barbadoes has been admitted. *Cood v. Cood*, 1 Curt. 755. In the United States, an authenticated copy of a foreign register, legally kept, is admissible in evidence. *Kingston v. Lesley*, 10 S. & R. 383, 389.

² *Wallace v. Cook*, 5 Esp. 117; *Barber v. Holmes*, 3 Esp. 190.

³ *Rex v. Fitzgerald*, 1 Leach, Cr. Cas. 24; *Rex v. Rhodes*, Ib. 29.

⁴ *Salte v. Thomas*, 3 B. & P. 188; *Rex v. Aickles*, 1 Leach, Cr. Cas. 435.

⁵ *Doe v. Seaton*, 2 Ad. & El. 178; *Doe v. Arkwright*, Ib. 182, n.; *Rex v. King*, 2 T. R. 234; *Ronkendorff v. Taylor*, 4 Peters, 349, 360. Such books are also *prima facie* evidence of domicil. *Phil. & Am. on Evid.* p. 581; *Doe v. Cartwright*, Ry. & M. 62; 1 C. & P. 218.

⁶ *Rex v. Martin*, 2 Campb. 100.

as between them the books are of the nature of public books.¹ And all the members of a company are chargeable with knowledge of the entries made on their books by their agent, in the course of his business, and with the true meaning of those entries, as understood by him.² But the books cannot, in general, be adduced by the corporation, in support of its own claims against a stranger.³

§ 494. The *registry of a ship* is not of the nature of the public or official registers now under consideration, the entry not being of any transaction, of which the public officer who makes the entry is conusant. Nor is it a document required by the law of nations, as expressive of the ship's national character. The registry acts are considered as institutions purely local and municipal, for purposes of public policy. The register, therefore, is not of itself evidence of property, except so far as it is confirmed by some auxiliary circumstance, showing that it was made by the authority or assent of the person named in it, and who is sought to be charged as owner. Without such connecting proof, the register has been held not to be even *prima facie* evidence, to charge a person as owner; and even with such proof, it is not conclusive evidence of ownership; for an equitable title in one person may well consist with the documentary title at the custom-house in another. Where the question of ownership is merely incidental, the register alone has been deemed sufficient *prima facie* evidence. But in favor of the person claiming as owner it is no evidence at all, being nothing more than his own declaration.⁴

¹ *Marriage v. Lawrence*, 3 B. & Ald. 144; *Gibbon's case*, 17 Howell's St. Tr. 810.

² *Allen v. Coit*, 6 Hill, N. Y. Rep. 318.

³ *London v. Lynn*, 1 H. Bl. 214, note (c); *Commonwealth v. Woelper*, 3 S. & R. 29; *Highland Turp. Co. v. McKean*, 10 Johns. 154.

⁴ 3 Kent, Comm. 149, 150; *Weston v. Penniman*, 1 Mason, 306, 318, per Story, J.; *Bixby v. The Franklin Ins. Co.* 8 Pick. 86; *Colson v. Bonzey*, 6 Greenl. 474; *Abbott on Shipping*, p. 63-66, (Story's Ed. and notes);

§ 495. A *ship's log-book*, where it is required by law to be kept, is an official register, so far as regards the transactions required by law to be entered in it; but no farther. Thus, the act of Congress¹ provides, that if any seaman who has signed the shipping articles, shall absent himself from the ship without leave, an entry of that fact shall be made in the log-book, and the seaman will be liable to be deemed guilty of desertion. But of this fact the log-book, though an indispensable document, in making out the proof of desertion, in order to incur a forfeiture of wages, is never conclusive, but only *prima facie* evidence, open to explanation, and to rebutting testimony. Indeed it is in no sense *per se* evidence, except in the cases provided for by statute; and therefore it cannot be received in evidence, in favor of the persons concerned in making it, or others, except by force of a statute making it so; though it may be used against any persons, to whom it may be brought home, as concerned either in writing or directing what should be contained therein.²

§ 496. To entitle a book to the character of an official register, it is not necessary that it be required by an express statute to be kept; nor that the nature of the office should render the book indispensable. It is sufficient, that it be *directed by the proper authority to be kept*, and that it be kept according to such directions. Thus, a book kept by the secretary of bankrupts, by order of the Lord Chancellor, was held admissible evidence of the allowance of a certificate of bankruptcy.³ Terriers seem to be admitted, partly on the

Tinkler v. Walpole, 14 East, 226; McIver v. Humble, 16 East, 169; Fraser v. Hopkins, 2 Taunt. 5; 2 Phil. Evid. 114; Jones v. Pitcher, 3 Stewart & Porter, R. 135.

¹ Stat. 1790, ch. 29, § 5.

² Abbott on Shipping, p. 468, note (1), (Story's Ed.); Orne v. Townsend, 4 Mason, 544; Cloutman v. Tunison, 1 Sumner, 373; United States v. Gibert, 2 Sumner, 19, 78; The Sociedade Feliz, 1 W. Rob. R. 303, 311.

³ Henry v. Leigh, 3 Campb. 499, 501.

same principle; as well as upon the ground, that they are admissions by persons who stood in privity with the parties, between whom they are sought to be used.¹

§ 497. Under this head may be mentioned *books and chronicles of public history*, as partaking in some degree of the nature of public documents, and being entitled on the same principles to a great degree of credit. Any approved public and general history, therefore, is admissible to prove ancient facts of a public nature, and the general usages and customs of the country.² But in regard to matters not of a public and general nature, such as the custom of a particular town, a descent, the nature of a particular abbey, the boundaries of a county, and the like, they are not admissible.³

§ 498. In regard to *certificates, given by persons in official station*, the general rule is, that the law never allows a certificate of a mere matter of fact, not coupled with any matter of law, to be admitted as evidence.⁴ If the person was bound to record the fact, then the proper evidence is a copy of the record, duly authenticated. But as to matters which he was not bound to record, his certificate, being extra-official, is merely the statement of a private person, and will therefore be

¹ By the ecclesiastical canons, an inquiry is directed to be made, from time to time, of the temporal rights of the clergyman in every parish, and to be returned into the registry of the bishop. This return is denominated a terrier. 2 Phil. Evid. 119, 120.

² Bull. N. P. 248, 249; Morris v. Harmer, 7 Peters, 554; Case of Warren Hastings, referred to in 30 Howell's St. Tr. 492; Phil. & Am. on Evid. p. 606; Neal v. Fry, cited 1 Salk. 281; Ld. Bridgewater's case, cited Skin. 15. The statements of the chroniclers, Stow & Sir W. Dugdale, were held inadmissible as evidence of the fact, that a person took his seat by special summons to Parliament in the reign of Henry VIII. The Vaux Peerage case, 5 Clark & Fin. 538.

³ Stainer v. Droitwich, 1 Salk. 281; Skin. 623, S. C.; Piercy's case, Tho. Jones, 164; Evans v. Getting, 6 C. & P. 586, and note.

⁴ Willes, 549, 550, per Willes, Ld. Ch. J.

rejected.¹ So, where an officer's certificate is made evidence of certain facts, he cannot extend its effect to other facts, by stating those also in the certificate; but such parts of the certificate will be suppressed.² The same rules are applied to an officer's return.³

¹ *Oakes v. Hill*, 14 Pick. 442, 448; *Wolfe v. Washburn*, 6 Cowen, 261; *Jackson v. Miller*, Ib. 751; *Governor v. McAfee*, 2 Dev. 15, 18; *United States v. Buford*, 3 Peters, 12, 29.

² *Johnson v. Hocker*, 1 Dall. 406, 407; *Governor v. Bell*, 3 Murph. 331; *Governor v. Jeffreys*, 1 Hawks. 297; *Stewart v. Alison*, 6 S. & R. 324, 329.

³ *Cator v. Stokes*, 1 M. & S. 599; *Arnold v. Tourtelot*, 13 Pick. 172. See, on the general subject, the cases cited in Cowen & Hill's notes 702, & 741, to 1 Phil. Evid. p. 382, 391. A notary's certificate that no note of a certain description was protested by him, is inadmissible. *Exchange, &c. Co. of N. Orleans v. Boyce*, 3 Rob. Louis. R. 307.

CHAPTER V.

RECORDS AND JUDICIAL WRITINGS.

§ 499. THE next class of Written Evidence consists of *Records and Judicial Writings*. And here also, as in the case of Public Documents, we shall consider, first, the *mode of proving* them; and, secondly, their *admissibility and effect*.

§ 500. The case of *statutes*, which are records, has already been mentioned, under the head of legislative acts, to which they seem more properly to belong, the term *record* being generally taken in the more restricted sense, with reference to judicial tribunals. It will only be observed in this place, that, though the Courts will take notice of all public statutes, without proof, yet private statutes must be proved, like any other legislative documents, namely, by an exemplification under the great seal, or by an examined copy, or by a copy printed by authority.

§ 501. As to the *proof of records*, this is done either by mere *production* of the records, without more, or by a copy. Copies of record are, (1.) exemplifications; (2.) copies made by an authorized officer; (3.) sworn copies. Exemplifications are either, first, under the great seal, or, secondly, under the seal of the particular Court where the record remains.¹ When a record is the *gist* of the issue, if it is not in the same Court, it should be proved by an exemplification. By the course of the Common Law, where an exemplification under the great seal is requisite, the record may be removed into the Court of

¹ Bull. N. P. 227, 228. An exemplification under the great seal is said to be of itself a record, of the greatest validity. 1 Gilb. Evid. by Lofft, p. 19; Bull. N. P. 226. Nothing but a record can be exemplified in this manner. 3 Inst. 173.

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Chancery by a *certiorari*, for that is the centre of all the Courts, and there the great seal is kept. But in the United States, the great seal being usually if not always kept by the Secretary of State, a different course prevails; and an exemplified copy, under the seal of the Court, is usually admitted, even upon an issue of *nul tiel record*, as sufficient evidence.¹ When the record is not the *gist* of the issue, the last mentioned kind of exemplification is always sufficient proof of the record, at Common Law.²

§ 502. The *record itself* is produced only when the cause is in the same Court, whose record it is; or, when it is the subject of proceedings in a superior Court. And in the latter case, although it may by the Common Law be obtained through the Court of Chancery, yet a *certiorari* may also be issued from a superior Court of Common Law, to an inferior tribunal, for the same purpose, whenever the tenor only of the record will suffice; for in such cases nothing is returned but the tenor, that is, a literal transcript of the record, under the seal of the Court; and this is sufficient to countervail the plea of *nul tiel record*.³ Where the record is put in issue in a

¹ Vail v. Smith, 4 Cowen, 71. See also Pepoon v. Jenkins, 2 Johns. Cas. 118; Coleman & Cain, Cas. 136, S. C. In some of the States, copies of record of the Courts of the same State, attested by the clerk, have, either by immemorial usage, or by early statutes, been received as sufficient in all cases. Vance v. Reardon, 2 Nott & McCord, 299; Ladd v. Blunt, 4 Mass. 402. Whether the seal of the Court to such copies is necessary, in Massachusetts, *quere*; and see Commonwealth v. Phillips, 11 Pick. 30.

² Gilb. Evid. 26.

³ Woodcraft v. Kinaston, 2 Atk. 317, 318; 1 Tidd's Pr. 398; Butcher & Aldworth's case, Cro. El. 821. Where a domestic record is put in issue by the plea, the question is tried by the Court, notwithstanding it is a question of fact. And the judgment of a Court of record of a sister State in the Union, is considered, for this purpose, as a domestic judgment. Hall v. Williams, 6 Pick. 227; Carter v. Wilson, 1 Dev. & Bat. 362. But if it is a foreign record, the issue is tried by the Jury. The State v. Isham, 3 Hawks. 185; Adams v. Betz, 1 Watts, 425; Baldwin v. Hale, 17 Johns. 272. The reason is, that in the former case the Judges can themselves have an inspection of

superior Court of concurrent jurisdiction and authority, it is proved by an exemplification out of Chancery, being obtained and brought thither by a *certiorari* issued out of Chancery, and transmitted thence by *mittimus*.¹

§ 503. In proving a record by a *copy under seal*, it is to be remembered, that the Courts recognise without proof the seal of State, and the seals of the superior Courts of Justice, and of all Courts, established by public statutes.² And by parity of reason it would seem, that no extraneous proof ought to be required of the seal of any department of State, or public office established by law, and required or known to have a seal.³ And here it may be observed, that copies of records and judicial proceedings, under seal, are deemed of higher credit than sworn copies, as having passed under a more exact critical examination.⁴

§ 504. In regard to the several *States composing the United States*, it has already been seen, that though they are sovereign and independent, in all things not surrendered to the national government by the Constitution, and therefore, on general principles, are liable to be treated by each other in all other respects as foreign States, yet their mutual relations are rather those of domestic independence, than of foreign aliena-

the very record. But in the latter, it can only be proved by a copy, the veracity of which is a mere fact, within the province of the Jury. And see Collins v. Matthews, 5 East, 473. But in New York, the question in every case is now, by statute, referred to the Jury. Trotter v. Mills, 6 Wend. 512.

¹ 1 Tidd's Pr. 398.

² Olive v. Guin, 2 Sid. 145, 146, per Witherington, C. B.; Gilb. Evid. 19; 12 Vin. Abr. 132, 133, tit. Evid. A. b. 69; Delafield v. Hand, 3 Johns. 310, 314; Den v. Vreelandt, 2 Halst. 555. The seals of counties Palatine, and of the Ecclesiastical Courts, are judicially known, on the same general principle. See also, as to Probate Courts, Chase v. Hathaway, 14 Mass. 222; Judge, &c. v. Briggs, 3 N. Hamp. 309.

³ Ante, § 6.

⁴ 2 Phil. Evid. 130.

tion.¹ It is accordingly provided in the Constitution, that "full faith and credit shall be given, in each State, to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State; and that the Congress may, by general laws, prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof."² Under this provision it has been enacted, that "the records and judicial proceedings of the Courts of any State shall be proved or admitted, in any other Court within the United States, by the attestation of the Clerk and the seal of the Court annexed, if there be a seal, together with a certificate of the Judge, Chief Justice, or presiding Magistrate, as the case may be, that the said attestation is in due form. And the said records and judicial proceedings, authenticated as aforesaid, shall have such faith and credit given to them, in every Court within the United States, as they have by law or usage in the Courts of the State, from whence said records are or shall be taken."³ By a subsequent act, these provisions are extended to the Courts of all Territories, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.⁴

§ 505. It seems to be generally agreed, that this method of authentication, as in the case of public documents before mentioned, is *not exclusive* of any other, which the States may think proper to adopt.⁵ It has also been held, that these acts of Congress do not extend to judgments in *criminal* cases, so as to render a witness incompetent in one State, who has been

¹ *Mills v. Duryee*, 7 Cranch, 481; *Hampton v. McConnel*, 3 Wheat. 234; Ante, § 489.

² Const. U. S. Art. iv. § i.

³ Stat. U. S. May 26, 1790, 2 LL. U. S. ch. 38, p. 102, (Bioren's Ed.)

⁴ Stat. U. S. March 27, 1804, 3 LL. U. S. ch. 409, p. 621, (Bioren's Ed.)

⁵ *Kean v. Rice*, 12 S. & R. 203, 208; *The State v. Stade*, 1 D. Chipm. 303; *Raynham v. Canton*, 3 Pick. 293; *Biddis v. James*, 6 Binn. 321; *Ex parte Povall*, 3 Leigh's R. 816; *Pepoon v. Jenkins*, 2 Johns. Cas. 119; *Ellmore v. Mills*, 1 Hayw. 359; Ante, § 489; Rev. Stat. Mass. ch. 94, § 57, 59, 60, 61.

convicted of an infamous crime in another.¹ The judicial proceedings, referred to in these acts, are also generally understood to be the proceedings of Courts of general jurisdiction, and not those which are merely of municipal authority; for it is required that the copy of the record shall be certified by the Clerk of the Court, and that there shall also be a certificate of the Judge, Chief Justice, or presiding Magistrate, that the attestation of the Clerk is in due form. This, it is said, is founded on the supposition that the Court, whose proceedings are to be thus authenticated, is so constituted as to admit of such officers; the law having wisely left the records of magistrates, who may be vested with limited judicial authority, varying in its objects and extent in every State, to be governed by the laws of the State, into which they may be introduced for the purpose of being carried into effect.² Accordingly it has been held, that the judgments of *Justices of the Peace* were not within the meaning of these constitutional and statutory provisions.³ But the proceedings of Courts of Chancery, and of Probate, as well as of the Courts of Common Law, may be proved in the manner directed by the statute.⁴

§ 506. Under these provisions it has been held, that the *attestation of the copy* must be according to the form used in

¹ *Commonwealth v. Green*, 17 Mass. 515; Ante, § 376, and cases there cited.

² *Warren v. Flagg*, 2 Pick. 450, per Parker, C. J.

³ *Warren v. Flagg*, 2 Pick. 448; *Robinson v. Prescott*, 4 N. Hamp. 450; *Mahurin v. Bickford*, 6 N. Hamp. 567; *Silver Lake Bank v. Harding*, 5 Ohio R. 545; *Thomas v. Robinson*, 3 Wend. 267. In Connecticut and Vermont, it is held, that if the Justice is bound by law to keep a record of his proceedings, they are within the meaning of the act of Congress. *Bissell v. Edwards*, 5 Day, 363; *Starkweather v. Loomis*, 2 Verm. 573; *Blodget v. Jordan*, 6 Verm. 580. See acc. *Scott v. Cleveland*, 3 Monroe, 62.

⁴ *Scott v. Blanchard*, 8 Martin, N. S. 303; *Hunt v. Lyle*, 8 Yerg. 142; *Barbour v. Watts*, 2 A. K. Marsh. 290, 293; *Balfour v. Chew*, 5 Martin, N. S. 517; *Johnson v. Rannels*, 6 Martin, N. S. 621; *Ripple v. Ripple*, 1 Rawle, 386; *Craig v. Brown*, 1 Peters, C. C. R. 352.

the State, from which the record comes; and that it must be certified to be so, by the presiding Judge of the same Court, the certificate of the Clerk to that effect being insufficient.¹ Nor will it suffice for the Judge simply to certify that the person who attests the copy is the Clerk of the Court, and that the signature is in his handwriting.² The seal of the Court must be annexed to the record with the certificate of the Clerk, and not to the certificate of the Judge.³ If the Court, whose record is certified, has no seal, this fact should appear, either in the certificate of the Clerk, or in that of the Judge.⁴ And if the Court itself is extinct, but its records and jurisdiction have been transferred by law to another Court, it seems that the Clerk and presiding Judge of the latter tribunal are competent to make the requisite attestations.⁵ If the copy produced purports to be a record, and not a mere transcript of minutes from the docket, and the Clerk certifies "that the foregoing is truly taken from the record of the proceedings" of the Court, and this attestation is certified to be in due form of law, by the presiding Judge, it will be presumed that the paper is a full copy of the entire record, and will be deemed sufficient.⁶ It has also been held, that it must appear from the Judge's certificate, that at the time of certifying he is the presiding Judge of that Court; a certificate, that he is "the Judge that presided" at the time of the trial, or that he is "the senior Judge of the Courts of Law" in the State, being

¹ Drummond v. Magruder, 9 Cranch, 122; Craig v. Brown, 1 Pet. C. C. R. 352. The Judge's certificate is the only competent evidence of this fact. Smith v. Blagge, 1 Johns. Cas. 238. And it is conclusive. Ferguson v. Harwood, 7 Cranch, 408.

² Craig v. Brown, 1 Pet. C. C. R. 352.

³ Turner v. Waddington, 3 Wash. 126. And being thus affixed, and certified by the clerk, it proves itself. Dunlap v. Waldo, 6 N. Hamp. 450.

⁴ Craig v. Brown, 1 Pet. C. C. R. 352; Kirkland v. Smith, 2 Martin, N. S. 497.

⁵ Thomas v. Tanner, 6 Monroe, 52.

⁶ Ferguson v. Harwood, 7 Cranch, 408; Edmiston v. Schwartz, 13 S. & R. 135; Goodman v. James, 2 Rob. Louis. R. 297.

deemed insufficient.¹ The Clerk also who certifies the record, must be the clerk himself of the same Court, or of its successor, as above mentioned; the certificate of his under clerk, in his absence, or of the clerk of any other tribunal, office, or body, being held incompetent for this purpose.²

§ 507. An *office copy* of a record is a copy authenticated by an officer intrusted for that purpose; and it is admitted in evidence upon the credit of the officer, without proof that it has been actually examined.³ The rule on this subject is, that an office copy, in the same Court, and in the same cause, is equivalent to the record; but in another Court, or in another cause in the same Court, the copy must be proved.⁴ But the latter part of this rule is applied only to copies, made out by an officer having no other authority to make them, than the mere order of the particular Court, made for the convenience of suitors; for if it is made his duty by law to furnish copies, they are admitted in all Courts under the same jurisdiction. And we have already seen, that in the United States an officer having the legal custody of public records, is, *ex officio*, competent to certify copies of their contents.⁵

§ 508. The proof of records, by an *examined copy*, is by

¹ Stephenson v. Bannister, 3 Bibb, 369; Kirkland v. Smith, 2 Martin, N. S. 497.

² Attestation by an under clerk is insufficient. Sampson v. Overton, 4 Bibb, 409. So, by late clerk not now in office. Donohoe v. Brannon, 1 Overton, 328. So, by Clerk of the Council, in Maryland. Schnertzell v. Young, 3 H. & McHen. 502. See further, Conklin's Practice, p. 256; 1 Paine & Duer's Practice, 480, 481.

³ 2 Phil. Evid. 131; Bull. N. P. 229.

⁴ Denn v. Fulford, 2 Burr. 1179, per Ld. Mansfield. Whether, upon trial at law of an issue out of Chancery, office copies of depositions in the same cause in Chancery are admissible, has been doubted; but the better opinion is, that they are admissible. Highfield v. Peake, 1 M. & Malk. 109, (1827); Studdy v. Sanders, 2 D. & Ry. 347; Hennell v. Lyon, 1 B. & Ald. 142; Contra, Burnand v. Nerot, 1 C. & P. 578, (1824.)

⁵ Ante, § 485. But his certificate of the substance or purport of the record is inadmissible. McGuire v. Sayward, 9 Shepl. 230.

producing a witness who has compared the copy with the original, or with what the officer of the Court or any other person read, as the contents of the record. It is not necessary for the persons examining to exchange papers, and read them alternately both ways.¹ But it should appear that the record, from which the copy was taken, was found in the proper place of deposit, or in the hands of the officer, in whose custody the records of the Court are kept. And this cannot be shown by any light, reflected from the record itself, which may have been improperly placed where it was found. Nothing can be borrowed, *ex visceribus judicii*, until the original is proved to have come from the proper Court.² And the record itself must have been finally completed, before the copy is admissible in evidence. The minutes from which the judgment is made up, and even a judgment in paper, signed by the master, are not proper evidence of the record.³

§ 509. If the *record is lost*, and is ancient, its existence and contents may sometimes be presumed;⁴ but whether it be ancient or recent, after proof of the loss, its contents may be proved, like any other document, by any secondary evidence, where the case does not, from its nature, disclose the existence of other and better evidence.⁵

¹ Reid v. Margison, 1 Campb. 469; Gyles v. Hill, Ib. 471, n.; Fyson v. Kemp, 6 C. & P. 71; Rolf v. Dart, 2 Taunt. 52; Hill v. Packard, 5 Wend. 387; Lynde v. Judd, 3 Day, 499.

² Adamthwaite v. Synge, 1 Stark. R. 183.

³ Bull. N. P. 228; Rex v. Smith, 8 B. & C. 341; Godefroy v. Jay, 3 C. & P. 192; Lee v. Meacock, 5 Esp. 177; Rex v. Bellamy, Ry. & M. 171; Porter v. Cooper, 6 C. & P. 354. But the minutes of a judgment in the House of Lords are the judgment itself, which it is not the practice to draw up in form. Jones v. Randall, Cowp. 17.

⁴ Bull. N. P. 228; Green v. Proude, 1 Mod. 117, per Ld. Hale.

⁵ See Ante, § 84, note (2), and cases there cited. See also Adams v. Betz, 1 Watts, 425, 428; Stockbridge v. West Stockbridge, 12 Mass. 400; Donaldson v. Winter, 1 Miller, R. 137; Newcomb v. Drummond, 4 Leigh, 57; Bull. N. P. 228; Knight v. Dauler, Hard. 323; Anon. 1 Salk. 284, cited per Holt, C. J.; Gore v. Elwell, 9 Shepl. 442.

§ 510. A *verdict* is sometimes admissible in evidence, to prove the finding of some matter of reputation, or custom, or particular right. But here, though it is the verdict, and not the judgment, which is the material thing to be shown, yet the rule is, that where the verdict was returned to a Court having power to set it aside, the verdict is not admissible, without producing a copy of the judgment rendered upon it; for it may be that the judgment was arrested, or that a new trial was granted. But this rule does not hold in the case of a verdict upon an issue out of Chancery, because it is not usual to enter up judgment in such cases.¹ Neither does it apply where the object of the evidence is merely to establish the fact that the verdict was given, without regard to the facts found by the Jury, or to the subsequent proceedings in the cause.² And where, after verdict in ejectment, the defendant paid the plaintiff's costs, and yielded up the possession to him, the proof of these facts, and of the verdict, has been held sufficient to satisfy the rule, without proof of a judgment.³

§ 511. A *decree in Chancery* may be proved by an exemplification, or by a sworn copy, or by a decretal order in paper, with proof of the bill and answer.⁴ And if the bill and

¹ Bull. N. P. 234; Pitton v. Walter, 1 Stra. 162; Fisher v. Kitchingman, Willes, 367; Ayrey v. Davenport, 2 New Rep. 474; Donaldson v. Jude, 2 Bibb, 60. Hence it is not necessary, in New York, to produce a copy of the judgment upon a verdict given in a Justice's Court, the Justice not having power to set it aside. Felter v. Mulliner, 2 Johns. 181. In North Carolina, owing to an early looseness of practice in making up the record, a copy of the verdict is received, without proof of the judgment; the latter being presumed, until the contrary is shown. Deloah v. Worke, 3 Hawks, 36. See also Evans v. Thomas, 2 Stra. 833; Dayrell v. Bridge, Ib. 1264; Thurston v. Slatford, 1 Salk. 284. If the docket is lost before the record is made up, it will be considered as a loss of the record. Pruden v. Alden, 22 Pick. 184.

² Barlow v. Dupuy, 1 Martin, N. S. 442.

³ Schaeffer v. Kreitzer, 6 Binn. 430.

⁴ Trowel v. Castle, 1 Keb. 21, confirmed by Bayley, B. in Blower v. Hollis, 1 Crompt. & Mees. 396; 4 Com. Dig. 97, tit. *Evidence*, C. 1; Gresley on Evid. p. 109.

answer are recited in the order, that has been held sufficient, without other proof of them.¹ But though a former decree be recited in a subsequent decree, this recital is not proper evidence of the former.² The general rule is, that where a party intends to avail himself of a decree, as an adjudication upon the subject-matter, and not merely to prove collaterally that the decree was made, he must show the proceedings upon which the decree was founded. "The whole record," says Chief Baron Comyn, "which concerns the matter in question, ought to be produced."³ But where the decree is offered merely for proof of the *res ipsa*, namely, the fact of the decree, here, as in the case of verdicts, no proof of any other proceeding is required.⁴ The same rules apply to sentences in the Admiralty, and to judgments in Courts Baron, and other inferior Courts.⁵

§ 512. The proof of an *answer in Chancery* may, in civil cases, be made by an examined copy.⁶ Regularly, the answer cannot be given in evidence without proof of the bill also, if it can be had.⁷ But in general, proof of the decree is not necessary, if the answer is to be used merely as the party's admission under oath, or for the purpose of contradicting him as a witness, or to charge him upon an indictment for perjury. The absence of the bill, in such cases, goes only to the effect and value of the evidence, and not to its admissibility.⁸ In an indictment for perjury in an answer, it is considered necessary to produce the original answer, together with proof of the

¹ Bull. N. P. 244; 1 Keb. 21.

² *Winans v. Dunham*, 5 Wend. 47; *Wilson v. Conine*, 2 Johns. 280.

³ 4 Com. Dig. 89, tit. *Evidence*, A. 4; 2 Phil. Evid. 138, 139. The rule equally applies to decrees of the Ecclesiastical Courts. *Leake v. Marquis of Westmeath*, 2 M. & Rob. 394.

⁴ *Jones v. Randall*, Cowp. 17.

⁵ Com. Dig. 97, 98, tit. *Evidence*, C. 1.

⁶ *Ewer v. Ambrose*, 4 B. & C. 25.

⁷ *Gilb. Evid.* 55, 56; *Gresley on Evid.* p. 108, 109.

⁸ *Ewer v. Ambrose*, 4 B. & C. 25; *Rowe v. Brenton*, 8 B. & C. 737, 765; *Lady Dartmouth v. Roberts*, 16 East, 334, 339, 340.

administration of the oath; but of this fact, as well as of the place where it was sworn, the certificate of the master, before whom it was sworn, his signature also being proved, is sufficient *prima facie* evidence.¹ The original must also be produced, on a trial for forgery. In civil cases, it will be presumed that the answer was made upon oath.² But whether the answer be proved by production of the original, or by a copy, and in whatever case, some proof of the identity of the party will be requisite. This may be by proof of his handwriting; which was the reason of the order in Chancery requiring all defendants to sign their answers; or it may be by any other competent evidence.³

§ 513. The *judgments of inferior Courts* are usually proved, by producing from the proper custody the book containing the proceedings. And as the proceedings in these Courts are not usually made up in form, the minutes, or examined copies of them, will be admitted, if they are perfect.⁴ If they are not entered in books, they may be proved by the officer of the Court, or by any other competent person.⁵ In either case, resort will be had to the best evidence, to establish the tenor of the proceedings; and therefore, where the course is to record them, which will be presumed until the contrary is

¹ Bull. N. P. 238, 239; *Rex v. Morris*, 2 Burr. 1189; *Rex v. Benson*, 2 Campb. 508; *Rex v. Spencer*, Ry. & M. 97. The *jurat* is not conclusive as to the place. *Rex v. Embden*, 9 East, 437. The same strictness seems to be required in an action on the case for a malicious criminal prosecution. 16 East, 340; 2 Phil. Evid. 140. *Sed quære*.

² Bull. N. P. 238.

³ *Rex v. Morris*, 2 Burr. 1189; *Rex v. Benson*, 2 Campb. 508. It seems that slight evidence of identity will be deemed *prima facie* sufficient. In *Hennell v. Lyon*, 1 B. & Ald. 182, coincidence of name, and character as administrator, was held sufficient; and Lord Ellenborough thought, that coincidence of name alone ought to be enough to call upon the party to show that it was some other person. See also *Hodgkinson v. Willis*, 3 Campb. 401, and the cases cited in Phil. & Am. on Evid. p. 621, note (7); 2 Phil. Evid. 141.

⁴ *Arundel v. White*, 14 East, 216; *Fisher v. Lane*, 2 W. Bl. 834; *Rex v. Smith*, 8 B. & C. 342, per *Ld. Tenterden*.

⁵ *Dyson v. Wood*, 3 B. & C. 449, 451.

shown, the record, or a copy, properly authenticated, is the only competent evidence.¹ The caption is a necessary part of the record; and the record itself, or an examined copy, is the only legitimate evidence to prove it.²

§ 514. The usual modes of authenticating *foreign judgments* are, either by an exemplification of a copy under the great seal of a State; or by a copy, proved to be a true copy by a witness who has compared it with the original; or by the certificate of an officer, properly authorized by law to give a copy; which certificate must itself also be duly authenticated.³ If the copy is certified under the hand of the Judge of the Court, his handwriting must be proved.⁴ If the Court has a seal, it ought to be affixed to the copy, and proved; even though it be worn so smooth, as to make no distinct impression.⁵ And if it is clearly proved that the Court has no seal, it must be shown to possess some other requisites to entitle it to credit.⁶ If the copy is merely certified by an officer of the Court, without other proof, it is inadmissible.⁷

¹ See, as to Justices' Courts, *Mathews v. Houghton*, 2 Fairf. 377; *Holcomb v. Cornish*, 8 Conn. 375, 380; *Wolf v. Washburn*, 6 Cowen, 261; *Webb v. Alexander*, 7 Wend. 281, 286. As to Probate Courts, *Chase v. Hathaway*, 14 Mass. 222, 227; *Judge of Probate v. Briggs*, 3 N. Hamp. 309. As to Justices of the Sessions, *Commonwealth v. Bolkom*, 3 Pick. 281.

² *Rex v. Smith*, 8 B. & C. 341, per Bayley, J.

³ *Church v. Hubbard*, 2 Cranch, 238, per Marshall, C. J.; Ante, § 488, and cases there cited. Proof by a witness, who saw the clerk affix the seal of the Court, and attest the copy with his own name, the witness having assisted him to compare it with the original, was held sufficient. *Buttrick v. Allen*, 8 Mass. 273. So, where the witness testified that the Court had no seal. *Packard v. Hill*, 7 Cowen, 434.

⁴ *Henry v. Adey*, 3 East, 221; *Buchanan v. Rucker*, 1 Campb. 63. The certificate of a notary public, to this fact, was deemed sufficient, in *Yeaton v. Fry*, 5 Cranch, 335.

⁵ *Cavan v. Stewart*, 1 Stark. R. 525; *Flindt v. Atkins*, 3 Campb. 215, n.; *Gardere v. Columbian Ins. Co.*, 7 Johns. 514.

⁶ *Black v. Ld. Braybrook*, 2 Stark. R. 7, per Ellenborough; *Packard v. Hill*, 7 Cowen, 434.

⁷ *Appleton v. Ld. Braybrook*, 2 Stark. R. 6; 6 M. & S. 34, S. C.; *Thompson v. Stewart*, 3 Conn. 171.

§ 515. In cases of *inquisitions post mortem*, and other *private offices*, the return cannot be read, without also reading the commission. But in cases of more general concern, the commission is of such public notoriety, as not to require proof.¹

§ 516. With regard to the proof of *depositions in Chancery*, the general rule is, that they cannot be read, without proof of the bill and answer, in order to show that there was a cause depending, as well as who were the parties, and what was the subject-matter in issue. If there were no cause depending, the depositions are but voluntary affidavits; and if there were one, still the depositions cannot be read, unless it be against the same parties, or those claiming in privity with them.² But ancient depositions, given when it was not usual to enroll the pleadings, may be read without antecedent proof.³ They may also be read upon proof of the bill, but without proof of the answer, if the defendant is in contempt, or has had an opportunity of cross-examining, which he chose to forego.⁴ And no proof of the bill or answer is necessary, where the deposition is used against the deponent, as his own declaration or admission, or for the purpose of contradicting him as a witness.⁵ So, where an issue is directed out of Chancery, and an order is made there, for the reading of the depositions upon the trial of the issue, the Court of Law will read them upon the order, without antecedent proof of the bill and answer, provided the witnesses themselves cannot be produced.⁶

¹ Bull. N. P. 228, 229.

² 2 Phil. Evid. 149; *Gresley on Evid.* 185; *Gilb. Evid.* 56, 57.

³ *Gilb. Evid.* 64; *Gresley on Evid.* 185; *Bayley v. Wylie*, 6 Esp. 85.

⁴ *Cazenove v. Vaughan*, 1 M. & S. 4; *Carrington v. Carnock*, 2 Sim. 567.

⁵ *Highfield v. Peake*, 1 M. & Malk. 109; Ante, § 512.

⁶ *Palmer v. Ld. Aylesbury*, 15 Ves. 176; *Gresley on Evid.* 185; *Bayley v. Wylie*, 6 Esp. 85.

§ 517. Depositions taken upon interrogatories, *under a special commission*, cannot be read without proof of the commission, under which they were taken; together with the interrogatories, if they can be found. The absence of the interrogatories, if it renders the answers obscure, may destroy their effect, but does not prevent their being read.¹ Both depositions and affidavits, taken in another domestic tribunal, may be proved by examined copies.²

§ 518. *Testaments*, in England, are proved in the Ecclesiastical Courts; and in the United States, in those Courts which have been specially charged with the exercise of this branch of that jurisdiction; generally styled Courts of Probate, but in some States known by other designations, as Orphans' Courts, &c. There are two modes of proof, namely, the common form, which is upon the oath of the executor alone, before the Court having jurisdiction of the probate of wills, without citing the parties interested; and the more solemn form of law, *per testes*, upon due notice and hearing of all parties concerned.³ The former mode has, in the United States, fallen into general disuse. By the Common Law, the Ecclesiastical Courts have no jurisdiction of matters concerning the realty; and therefore the probate, as far as the realty is concerned, gives no validity to the will.⁴ But in most of the United States, the probate of the will has the same effect, in the case of real estate, as in that of the personalty; and where it has not, the effect will be stated hereafter.⁵ This being the case, the present general course is to deposit the original will in the registry of the Court of Probate, delivering to the executor a copy of the will, and an exemplification of the decree of allowance and probate. And in all cases, where the Court of Probate has jurisdiction, its decree is the proper evidence of the

¹ Rowe v. Brenton, 8 B. & C. 737, 765.

² 2 Phil. Evid. 151, 152, and authorities there cited.

³ 2 Bl. Comm. 508.

⁴ Hoe v. Melthorpe, 3 Salk. 154; Bull. N. P. 245, 246.

⁵ See Post, § 550, and Vol. 2, tit. WILLS, § 672.

probate of the will, and is proved in the same manner as the decrees and judgments of other Courts.¹ A Court of Common Law will not take notice of a will, as a title to personal property, until it has been thus proved;² and where the will is required to be originally proved to the Jury, as documentary evidence of title, it is not permitted to be read, unless it bears the seal of the Ecclesiastical Court, or some other mark of authentication.³

§ 519. *Letters of administration* are granted under the seal of the Court, having jurisdiction of the probate of wills; and the general course, in the United States, as in the case of wills, is to pass a formal decree to that effect, which is entered in the book of records of the Court. The letter of administration, therefore, is of the nature of an exemplification of this record, and as such is received without other proof. But where no formal record is drawn up, the book of Acts, or the original minutes or memorial of the appointment, or a copy thereof duly authenticated, will be received as competent evidence.⁴

§ 520. *Examinations of prisoners, in criminal cases*, are

¹ Ante, § 501-509, 513; Chase v. Hathaway, 14 Mass. 222, 227; Judge of Probate v. Briggs, 3 N. Hamp. 309; Farnsworth v. Briggs, 6 N. Hamp. 561; Cowen & Hill's notes 767, 768, to 1 Phil. Evid. 397.

² Stone v. Forsyth, 2 Doug. 707. The character of executor may be proved by the Act-book, without producing the probate of the will. Cox v. Allingham, Jacob, R. 514. And see Doe v. Mew, 7 Ad. & El. 240.

³ Rex v. Barnes, 1 Stark. R. 243; Shumway v. Holbrook, 1 Pick. 114. See further, 2 Phil. Evid. 172; Gorton v. Dyson, 1 B. & B. 221, per Richardson, J.

⁴ The practice on this subject is various in the different States. See Dickenson v. McCraw, 4 Rand. 158; Seymour v. Beach, 4 Verm. 493; Jackson v. Robinson, 4 Wend. 436; Farnsworth v. Briggs, 6 N. Hamp. 561; Hoskins v. Miller, 2 Devereux, 360; Owings v. Beall, 1 Littel, 257, 259; Browning v. Huff, 2 Bailey, 174, 179; Owings v. Hull, 9 Peters, 608, 626. See also, Bull. N. P. 246; Elden v. Keddel, 8 East, 187; 2 M. & S. 567, per Bayley, J.; 2 Phil. Evid. 172, 173; 1 Stark. Evid. 255.

usually proved by the magistrate or clerk who wrote them down.¹ But there must be antecedent proof of the identity of the prisoner and of the examination. If the prisoner has subscribed the examination with his name, proof of his handwriting is sufficient evidence that he has read it; but if he has merely made his mark, or has not signed it at all, the magistrate or clerk must identify the prisoner, and prove that the writing was duly read to him, and that he assented to it.²

§ 521. In regard to the *proof of writs*, the question whether this is to be made by production of the writ itself, or by a copy, depends on its having been returned or not. If it is only matter of inducement to the action, and has not been returned, it may be proved by producing it. But after the writ is returned, it has become matter of record, and is to be proved by a copy from the record, this being the best evidence.³ If it cannot be found, after diligent search, it may be proved by secondary evidence, as in other cases.⁴ The fact, however, of the issuing of the writ may sometimes be proved by the admission of the party against whom it is to be proved.⁵ And the precise time of suing it out may be shown by parol.⁶

¹ 2 Hale, P. C. 52, 284.

² See Ante, § 224, 225, 227, 228.

³ Bull. N. P. 234; Foster v. Trull, 12 Johns. 456; Pigot v. Davis, 3 Hawks, 25; Frost v. Shapleigh, 7 Greenl. 236; Brush v. Taggart, 7 Johns. 19; Jenner v. Jolliffe, 6 Johns. 9.

⁴ Ante, § 84, note (2).

⁵ As, in an action by the officer against the bailee of the goods attached, for which he has given a forthcoming obligation, reciting the attachment. Lyman v. Lyman, 11 Mass. 317; Spencer v. Williams, 2 Verm. 209; Lowry v. Cady, 4 Verm. 504; Foster v. Trull, 12 Johns. 456. So where the sheriff is sued for an escape, and has not returned the precept, on which the arrest was made. Hinman v. Brees, 13 Johns. 529.

⁶ Lester v. Jenkins, 8 B. & C. 339; Morris v. Pugh, 3 Burr. 1241; Wilton v. Girdlestone, 5 B. & Ald. 847; Michaels v. Shaw, 12 Wend. 587; Allen v. The Portland Stage Co. 8 Greenl. 207; Taylor v. Dundass, 1 Wash. 94.

§ 522. We proceed, in the next place, to consider THE ADMISSIBILITY AND EFFECT OF RECORDS, as instruments of evidence. The rules of law upon this subject are founded upon these evident principles, or axioms, that it is for the interest of the community that a limit should be prescribed to litigation; and that the same cause of action ought not to be brought twice to a final determination. Justice requires that every cause be once fairly and impartially tried; but the public tranquillity demands that, having been once so tried, all litigation of that question, and between those parties, should be closed forever. It is also a most obvious principle of justice, that no man ought to be bound by proceedings to which he was a stranger; but the converse of this rule is equally true, that by proceedings to which he was not a stranger he may well be held bound.

§ 523. Under the term *parties*, in this connexion, the law includes all who are directly interested in the subject-matter, and had a right to make defence, or to control the proceedings, and to appeal from the judgment. This right involves also the right to adduce testimony, and to cross-examine the witnesses adduced on the other side. Persons not having these rights are regarded as *strangers* to the cause.¹ But to give full effect to the principle by which parties are held bound by a judgment, all persons who are represented by the parties, and claim under them, or in privity with them, are equally concluded by the same proceedings. We have already seen, that the term *privity* denotes mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property.² The ground, therefore, upon which persons standing in this relation to the litigating party are bound by the proceedings, to which he was a party, is, that

¹ Duchess of Kingston's case, 20 Howell's St. Tr. 538, n. Where a father, during the absence of his minor son from the country, commenced an action of crim. con. as his *prochein amy*, the judgment was held conclusive against the son, after his majority; the *prochein amy* having been appointed by the Court. Morgan v. Thorne, 9 Dowl. 228.

² Ante, § 189. See also § 19, 20.

they are identified with him in interest; and wherever this identity is found to exist, all are alike concluded. Hence all privies, whether in estate, in blood, or in law, are estopped from litigating that which is conclusive upon him with whom they are in privity.¹ And if one covenants for the results or consequences of a suit between others, as, if he covenants that a certain mortgage, assigned by him, shall produce a specified sum, he thereby connects himself in privity with the proceedings, and the record of the judgment in that suit will be conclusive evidence against him.²

§ 524. But to prevent this rule from working injustice, it is held essential that its operation be *mutual*. Both the litigants must be alike concluded, or the proceedings cannot be set up as conclusive upon either. For if the adverse party was not also a party to the judgment offered in evidence, it may have been obtained upon his own testimony; in which case, to allow him to derive a benefit from it would be unjust.³ Another qualification of the rule is, that a party is not to be concluded by a judgment in a prior suit or prosecution, where, from the nature or course of the proceedings, he could not avail himself of the same means of defence, or of redress, which are open to him in the second suit.⁴

§ 525. An apparent *exception* to this rule, as to the identity of the parties, is allowed in the cases usually termed proceedings *in rem*; which include not only judgments of condemnation of property as forfeited, or as prize, in the Exchequer or Admiralty, but also the decisions of other Courts directly upon the personal *status*, or relations of the party, such as marriage, divorce, bastardy, settlement, and the like. These decisions are binding and conclusive, not only upon the parties actually

¹ Carver v. Jackson, 4 Peters, 85, 86; Case v. Reeve, 14 Johns. 81. See also Kinnersley v. Wm. Orpe, 2 Doug. 517, expounded in 14 Johns. 81, 82, by Spencer, J.

² Rapelye v. Prince, 4 Hill, R. 119.

³ Wood v. Davis, 7 Cranch, 271; Davis v. Wood, 1 Wheat. 6.

⁴ 1 Stark. Evid. 214, 215.

litigating in the cause, but upon all others; partly upon the ground, that in most cases of this kind, and especially in questions upon property seized and proceeded against, every one who can possibly be affected by the decision, has a right to appear and assert his own rights, by becoming an actual party to the proceedings; and partly upon the more general ground of public policy and convenience, it being essential to the peace of society, that questions of this kind should not be left doubtful, but that the domestic and social relations of every member of the community should be clearly defined and conclusively settled and at rest.¹

§ 526. A further exception is admitted in the case of verdicts and judgments upon subjects of a *public nature*, such as customs, and the like; in most or all of which cases, evidence of reputation is admissible; and also in cases of judgments *in rem*, which may be again mentioned hereafter.²

§ 527. A judgment, when used by way of *inducement*, or to establish a *collateral* fact, may be admitted, though the parties are not the same. Thus, the record of a conviction may be shown, in order to prove the legal infamy of a witness. So, it may be shown, in order to let in the proof of what was sworn at the trial; or, to justify proceedings in execution of the judgment. So, it may be used to show that the suit was determined; or, in proper cases, to prove the amount which a principal has been compelled to pay for the default of his agent; or, the amount which a surety has been compelled to pay for the principal debtor; and in general, to show the fact, that the judgment was actually rendered at such a time and for such an amount.³

§ 527 a. A record may also be admitted in evidence in

¹ 1 Stark. Evid. 27, 28.

² See Post, § 541, 542, 544, 555.

³ 2 Phil. Evid. p. 3; Green v. New River Co. 4 T. R. 589, per Ld. Kenyon. See further, Post, § 538, 539.

favor of a stranger, against one of the parties, as containing a *solemn admission*, or judicial declaration by such party, in regard to a certain fact. But in that case, it is admitted not as a judgment conclusively establishing the fact, but as the deliberate declaration or admission of the party himself that the fact was so. It is therefore to be treated according to the principles governing admissions, to which class of evidence it properly belongs. Thus, where a carrier brought trover against a person, to whom he had delivered the goods intrusted to him, and which were lost, the record in this suit was held admissible for the owner, in a subsequent action brought by him against the carrier, as amounting to a confession in a Court of record, that he had the plaintiff's goods.¹ So also, where the plaintiff in an action of trespass *quare clausum fregit*, claimed title by disseisin, against a grantee of the heirs of the disseisee, it was held, that the count in a writ of right, sued by those heirs against him, might be given in evidence, as their declaration and admission that their ancestor died disseised, and that the present plaintiff was in possession.² So, where two had been sued as partners, and had suffered judgment by default, the record was held competent evidence of an admission of the partnership, in a subsequent action brought by a third person against them as partners.³ And on the same ground, in a libel by a wife for a divorce, because of the extreme cruelty of the husband, the record of his conviction of an assault and battery upon her, founded upon his plea of guilty, was held good evidence against him, as a judicial admission of the fact. But if the plea had been not guilty, it would have been otherwise.⁴

§ 528. The principle upon which judgments are held con-

¹ *Tiley v. Cowling*, 1 *Ld. Raym.* 744, per Holt, C. J.; *Bull. N. P.* 243, S. C.

² *Robinson v. Swett*, 3 *Greenl.* 316; *Ante*, § 195; *Wells v. Compton*, 3 *Rob. Louis. R.* 171.

³ *Cragin v. Carleton*, 8 *Shepl.* 492.

⁴ *Bradley v. Bradley*, 2 *Fairf.* 367; *Woodruff v. Woodruff*, *Ib.* 475.

clusive upon the parties, requires that the rule should apply only to that which was *directly in issue*, and not to every thing which was incidentally brought into controversy during the trial. We have seen, that the evidence must correspond with the allegations, and be confined to the point in issue. It is only to the material allegations of one party that the other can be called to answer; it is only upon such that an issue can properly be formed; to such alone can testimony be regularly adduced; and upon such an issue only is judgment to be rendered. A record, therefore, is not held conclusive as to the truth of any allegations, which were not material nor traversable; but as to things material and traversable, it is conclusive and final. The general rule on this subject was laid down, with admirable clearness, by Lord Chief Justice De Grey, in the *Duchess of Kingston's case*,¹ and has been repeatedly confirmed and followed, without qualification. "From the variety of cases," said he, "relative to judgments being given in evidence in civil suits, these two deductions seem to follow as generally true; first, that the judgment of a Court of concurrent jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is, as a plea, a bar; or, as evidence, conclusive, between the same parties, upon the same matter, directly in question in another Court; secondly, that the judgment of a Court of exclusive jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is, in like manner, conclusive upon the same matter, between the same parties, coming incidentally in question in another Court, for a different purpose."² But neither the judgment of a concurrent nor exclusive jurisdiction is evidence of any matter, which came collaterally in question, though within their jurisdiction; nor of any matter incidentally cognizable; nor of any matter to be inferred by argument from the judgment."³

¹ 20 *Howell's St. Tr.* 538; expressly adopted and confirmed in *Harvey v. Richards*, 2 *Gall.* 229, per Story, J.; and in *Hibsham v. Dulleban*, 4 *Watts*, 183, per Gibson, C. J.

² Thus, a judgment at Law, against the validity of a bill, as having been given for a gambling debt, is conclusive of that fact in Equity also. *Pearce v. Gray*, 2 *Y. & C.* 322.

³ The American cases, to the same point, are collected in *Cowen & Hill's*

§ 529. It is only where the point in issue has been *determined*, that the judgment is a bar. If the suit is discontinued, or the plaintiff becomes nonsuit, or for any other cause there has been no judgment of the Court upon the matter in issue, the proceedings are not conclusive.¹

§ 530. So also, in order to constitute the former judgment a complete bar, it must appear to have been a *decision upon the merits*; and this will be sufficient, though the declaration were essentially defective, so that it would have been adjudged bad on demurrer.² But if the trial went off on a technical defect,³ or because the debt was not yet due,⁴ or because the Court had not jurisdiction,⁵ or because of a temporary disability of the plaintiff to sue,⁶ or the like, the judgment will be no bar to a future action.

§ 531. It is well settled, that a former recovery may be shown in evidence, under the general issue, as well as pleaded in bar; and that when pleaded, it is conclusive upon the parties.⁷ But whether it is *conclusive when given in evidence*,

note 557, to 1 Phil. Evid. 321. This subject, particularly with regard to the identity of the issue or subject-matter in controversy, in actions concerning the realty, is ably reviewed and illustrated by Putnam, J. in *Arnold v. Arnold*, 17 Pick. 7-14.

¹ *Knox v. Waldoborough*, 5 Greenl. 185; *Hull v. Blake*, 13 Mass. 155; *Sweigart v. Berk*, 8 S. & R. 305; *Bridge v. Sumner*, 1 Pick. 371; 3 Bl. Comm. 296, 377. So, if the judgment has been reversed. *Wood v. Jackson*, 8 Wend. 9. If there has been no judgment, it has been ruled that the pleadings are not admissible, as evidence of the facts recited in them. *Holt v. Miers*, 9 C. & P. 191.

² *Hughes v. Blake*, 1 Mason, 515, 519, per Story, J.

³ *Ibid.*; *Lane v. Harrison*, Munf. 573; *McDonald v. Rainor*, 8 Johns. 442; *Lepping v. Kedgewin*, 1 Mod. 207.

⁴ *N. Eng. Bank v. Lewis*, 8 Pick. 113.

⁵ *Estill v. Taul*, 2 Yerg. 467, 470.

⁶ *Dixon v. Sinclair*, 4 Verm. 354.

⁷ *Trevivan v. Lawrence*, 1 Salk. 276; 3 Salk. 151, S. C.; *Outram v. Morewood*, 3 East, 346; *Kitchen v. Campbell*, 3 Wils. 304; 2 W. Bl. 827, S. C.

is a point which has been much doubted. It is agreed, that when there has been no opportunity to plead a matter of estoppel in bar, and it is offered in evidence, it is equally conclusive, as if it had been pleaded.¹ And it is further laid down, that when the matter, to which the estoppel applies, is alleged by one party, and the other, instead of pleading the estoppel, chooses to take issue on the fact, he waives the benefit of the estoppel, and leaves the Jury at liberty to find according to the fact.² This proposition is admitted, in its application to estoppels arising from an act of the party himself, in making a deed, or the like; but it has been denied in its application to judgments recovered; for, it is said, the estoppel, in the former case, is allowed for the benefit of the other party, which he may waive; but the whole community have an interest in holding the parties conclusively bound by the result of their own litigation. And it has been well remarked, that it appears inconsistent, that the authority of a *res judicata* should govern the Court, when the matter is referred to them by pleading, but that a Jury should be at liberty altogether to disregard it, when the matter is referred to them in evidence; and, that the operation of so important a principle should be left to depend upon the technical forms of pleading in particular actions.³ And notwithstanding there are many respectable opposing decisions, the weight of authority, at least in the United States, is believed to be in favor of the position, that where a former recovery is given in evidence, it is equally conclusive, in its effect, as if it were specially pleaded by way of estoppel.⁴

¹ *Howard v. Mitchell*, 14 Mass. 241; *Adams v. Barnes*, 17 Mass. 365. (R)

² *Ibid.*

³ Phil. & Am. on Evid. 512.

⁴ This point was briefly, but very forcibly, argued by Kennedy, J. in *Marsh v. Pier*, 4 Rawle, 288, 289, in the following terms. "The propriety of those decisions, which have admitted a judgment in a former suit to be given in evidence to the Jury, on the trial of a second suit for the same cause, between the same parties, or those claiming under them, but at the same time have held that the Jury were not absolutely bound by such judgment, because it was

§ 532. When a former judgment is shown by way of bar, whether by pleading, or in evidence, it is competent for the plaintiff to reply, that it did *not relate to the same property*

not pleaded, may well be questioned. The maxim, *nemo debet bis vexari, si constet euriæ quod sit pro una et eadem causa*, being considered, as doubtless it was, established for the protection and benefit of the party, he may therefore waive it; and unquestionably, so far as he is individually concerned, there can be no rational objection to his doing so. But then it ought to be recollected, that the community has also an equal interest and concern in the matter, on account of its peace and quiet, which ought not to be disturbed at the will and pleasure of every individual, in order to gratify vindictive and litigious feelings. Hence, it would seem to follow, that, wherever on the trial of a cause, from the state of the pleadings in it, the record of a judgment rendered by a competent tribunal upon the merits in a former action for the same cause, between the same parties, or those claiming under them, is properly given in evidence to the Jury, that it ought to be considered conclusively binding on both Court and Jury, and to preclude all further inquiry in the cause; otherwise the rule or maxim, *expedit reipublicæ ut sit finis litium*, which is as old as the law itself, and a part of it, will be exploded and entirely disregarded. But if it be part of our law, as seems to be admitted by all that it is, it appears to me, that the Court and Jury are clearly bound by it, and not at liberty to find against such former judgment. A contrary doctrine, as it seems to me, subjects the public peace and quiet to the will or neglect of individuals, and prefers the gratification of a litigious disposition, on the part of suitors, to the preservation of the public tranquillity and happiness. The result, among other things, would be, that the tribunals of the State would be bound to give their time and attention to the trial of new actions, for the same causes, tried once or oftener, in former actions between the same parties or privies without any limitation, other than the will of the parties litigant, to the great delay and injury, if not exclusion occasionally of other causes, which never have passed in *rem judicatam*. The effect of a judgment of a Court, having jurisdiction over the subject-matter of controversy between the parties, even as an estoppel, is very different from an estoppel arising from the act of the party himself, in making a deed of indenture, &c., which may, or may not, be enforced at the election of the other party; because, whatever the parties have done by compact, they may undo by the same means. But a judgment of a proper Court, being the sentence or conclusion of the law, upon the facts contained within the record, puts an end to all further litigation on account of the same matter, and becomes the law of the case, which cannot be changed or altered, even by the consent of the parties, and is not only binding upon them, but upon the Courts and Juries, ever afterwards, as long as it shall remain in force and unreversed." A similar view, with the like distinction,

or transaction in controversy in the action, to which it is set up in bar; and the question of identity, thus raised, is to be determined by the Jury, upon the evidence adduced.¹ And though the declaration in the former suit may be broad enough to include the subject-matter of the second action, yet if, upon the whole record, it remains doubtful whether the same subject-matter were actually passed upon, it seems that parol evidence may be received to show the truth. So also, if the pleadings present several distinct propositions, and the verdict may be referred to either or to all with the same propriety, the judgment is not conclusive, but only *prima facie* evidence upon any one of the propositions, and evidence

was taken by Huston, J. in *Kilheffer v. Herr*, 17 S. & R. 325, 326. See also, to the point, that the evidence is conclusive, *Shafer v. Stonebraker*, 4 G. & J. 345; *Cist v. Zigler*, 16 S. & R. 282; *Betts v. Starr*, 5 Conn. 550, 553; *Preston v. Harvey*, 2 H. & Mun. 55; *Estill v. Taul*, 2 Yerg. 467, 471. In New York, as remarked by Savage, C. J. in *Wood v. Jackson*, 8 Wend. 24, 25, the decisions have not been uniform, nor is it perfectly clear, where the weight of authority or of argument lies. But in the later case of *Lawrence v. Hunt*, 10 Wend. 83, 84, the learned Judge, who delivered the opinion of the Court, seems inclined in favor of the conclusiveness of the evidence. See, to the same point, *Hancock v. Welch*, 1 Stark. R. 347; *Whately v. Menheim*, 2 Esp. 608; *Strutt v. Bovingdon*, 5 Esp. 56, 59; *Rex v. St. Pancras*, Peake's Cas. 220; *Duchess of Kingston's case*, 20 Howell's St. Tr. 538; *Bird v. Randall*, 3 Burr. 1353. The contrary decision of *Voight v. Winch*, 2 B. & Ald. 662, was cited, but without being approved by Best, C. J. in *Stafford v. Clark*, 1 C. & P. 405, and was again discussed in the same case, 2 Bing. 377; but each of the learned Judges expressly declined giving any opinion on the point. This case, however, is reconciled with other English cases, by Mr. Smith, on the ground, that it means no more than this, that where the party might plead the record by estoppel, but does not, he waives its conclusive character. See 2 Smith's Leading Cases, 434, 444, 445. The learned author in the note here referred to, has reviewed the doctrine of estoppels in a masterly manner. The judgment of a Court Martial, when offered in evidence in support of a justification of imprisonment, by reason of military disobedience and misconduct, is not regarded as conclusive; for the special reasons stated by Lord Mansfield in *Wall v. McNamara*, 1 T. R. 536. See acc. *Hannaford v. Hunn*, 2 C. & P. 148.

¹ So, if a deed is admitted in pleading, proof of the identity may still be required. *Johnston v. Cottingham*, 1 Armstr. Macartn. & Ogle, R. 11.

aliunde is admissible to rebut it.¹ Thus, where the plaintiff in a former action declared upon a promissory note, and for goods sold, but upon executing the writ of inquiry, after judgment by default, he was not prepared with evidence on the count for goods sold, and therefore took his damages only for the amount of the note; he was admitted, in a second action for the goods sold, to prove the fact by parol, and it was held no bar to the second action.² And upon the same principle, if one wrongfully take another's horse and sell him, applying the money to his own use, a recovery in trespass, in an action by the owner for the taking, would be a bar to a subsequent action of *assumpsit* for the money received, or for the price, the cause of action being proved to be the same.³

¹ *Henderson v. Kenner*, 1 Richardson, R. 474.

² *Seddon v. Tutop*, 6 T. R. 608; *Hadley v. Green*, 2 Tyrwh. 390. See acc. *Bridge v. Gray*, 14 Pick. 55; *Webster v. Lee*, 5 Mass. 334; *Ravee v. Farmer*, 4 T. R. 146; *Thorpe v. Cooper*, 5 Bing. 116; *Phillips v. Berrick*, 16 Johns. 136. But if the Jury have passed upon the claim, it is a bar, though they may have disallowed it for want of sufficient evidence. *Stafford v. Clark*, 2 Bing. 377, 382, per Best, C. J.; *Phillips v. Berrick*, supra. So, if the fact constituting the basis of the claim was proved, among other things, before an arbitrator, but he awarded no damages for it, none having been at that time expressly claimed. *Dunn v. Murray*, 9 B. & C. 780. So, if he sues for part only of an entire and indivisible claim; as, if one labors for another a year, on the same hiring, and sues for a month's wages, it is a bar to the whole. *Miller v. Covert*, 1 Wend. 487. But it seems that, generally, a running account for goods sold and delivered does not constitute an entire demand. *Badger v. Titcomb*, 15 Pick. 415. Contra, *Guernsey v. Carver*, 8 Wend. 492. So, if, having a claim for a greater amount, consisting of several distinct particulars, he sues in an inferior Court, and takes judgment for a less amount. *Bagot v. Williams*, 3 B. & C. 235. So, if he obtains an interlocutory judgment for his whole claim, but, to avoid delay, takes a rule to compute on one item only, and enters a *nolle prosequi* as to the other. *Bowden v. Horne*, 7 Bing. 716.

³ 17 Pick. 13, per Putnam, J.; *Young v. Black*, 7 Cranch, 565; *Livermore v. Herschell*, 3 Pick. 33. Whether parol evidence would be admissible, in such case, to prove that the damages awarded in trespass were given merely for the tortious taking, without including the value of the goods, to which no evidence had been offered; *quare*, and see *Loomis v. Green*, 7 Greenl. 386.

But where, from the nature of the two actions, the cause of action cannot be the same in both, no averment will be received to the contrary. Therefore, in a writ of right, a plea in bar that the same title had been the sole subject of litigation in a former action of trespass *quare clausum fregit*, or in a former writ of entry, between the same parties, or others privy in estate, was held to be a bad plea.¹ Whether the judgment in an action of trespass, upon the issue of *liberum tenementum*, is admissible in a subsequent action of ejectment between the same parties, is not perfectly clear; but the weight of American authority is in favor of admitting the evidence.²

§ 533. The effect of a former recovery has been very much discussed, in the cases where different actions in tort have successively been brought, in regard to the same chattel; as, for example, an action of trover, brought after a judgment in trespass. Here, if title to the property was set up by the defendant in the first action, and it was found for him, it is clearly a bar to a second action for the same chattel;³ even though brought against one not a party to the former suit, but an accomplice in the original taking.⁴ So, a judgment for the defendant in trover, upon trial of the merits, is a bar to an action for money had and received, for the money arising from the sale of the same goods.⁵ But, whether the plaintiff, having recovered judgment in trespass, without satisfaction, is thereby barred from afterwards maintaining trover against another person, for the same goods, is a point upon which

¹ *Arnold v. Arnold*, 17 Pick. 4; *Bates v. Thompson*, Ib. 14, n.; *Bennett v. Holmes*, 1 Dev. & Bat. 486.

² *Hoey v. Furman*, 1 Barr, Pennsylv. R. 295. And see *Meredith v. Gilpin*, 6 Price, 146; *Kerr v. Chess*, 7 Watts, 371; *Foster v. McDivitt*, 9 Watts, 349.

³ *Putt v. Roster*, 2 Mod. 218; 3 Mod. 1, S. C. nom. *Putt v. Rawstern*. See 2 Show. 211; *Skin*, 49, 57; *T. Raym.* 472, S. C.

⁴ *Ferrers v. Arden*, Cro. El. 668; 6 Co. 7, S. C.

⁵ *Kitchen v. Campbell*, 3 Wils. 304; 2 W. Bl. 827, S. C.

there has been great diversity of opinion. On the one hand it is said, that, by the recovery of judgment in trespass for the full value, the title to the property is vested in the defendant, the judgment being a security for the price; and that the plaintiff cannot take them again, and therefore cannot recover the value of another.¹ On the other hand, it is argued, that the rule of *transit in rem judicatam*, extends no farther than to bar another action for the same cause against the same party;² that, on principle, the original judgment can imply nothing more than a promise by the defendant to pay the amount, and an agreement by the plaintiff, that, upon payment of the money by the defendant, the chattel shall be his own; and that it is contrary to justice, and the analogies of the law, to deprive a man of his property without satisfaction, unless by his express consent. *Solutio pretii emptionis loco habetur*. The weight of authority seems in favor of the latter opinion.³

¹ Broome v. Wooton, Yelv. 67; Adams v. Broughton, 2 Stra. 1078; Andrews, 18, S. C.; White v. Philbrick, 5 Greenl. 147; Rogers v. Thompson, 1 Rice, 60.

² Drake v. Mitchell, 3 East, 258; Campbell v. Phelps, 1 Pick. 70, per Wilde, J.

³ Putt v. Rawstern, 3 Mod. 1; Jenk. Cent. p. 189; 1 Shep. Touchst. 227; More v. Watts, 12 Mod. 428; 1 Ld. Raym. 614, S. C.; Luttrell v. Reynell, 1 Mod. 282; Bro. Abr. tit. *Judgm.* pl. 98; Moreton's case, Cro. El. 30; Cooke v. Jenner, Hob. 66; Livingston v. Bishop, 1 Johns. 290; Rawson v. Turner, 4 Johns. 425; 2 Kent, Comm. 388; Curtis v. Groat, 6 Johns. 168; Corbett et al. v. Barnes, W. Jones, 377; Cro. Car. 443; 7 Vin. Abr. 341, pl. 10, S. C.; Barb v. Fish, 5 West. Law Journ. 278. The foregoing authorities are cited as establishing principles in opposition to the doctrine of Broome v. Wooton. The following cases are *direct adjudications* to the contrary of that case. Sanderson v. Caldwell, 2 Aiken, 195; Osterhout v. Roberts, 8 Cowen, 43; Elliot v. Porter, 5 Dana, 299. See also Campbell v. Phelps, 1 Pick. 70, per Wilde, J.; Claxton v. Swift, 2 Show. 441, 494; Jones v. McNeil, 2 Bail. 466; Cooper v. Shepherd, 3 M. G. & S. 266. The just deduction from all the authorities, as well as the right conclusion upon principle, seems to be this; that the judgment in trespass or trover will not *transfer the title* of the goods to the defendant, although it is pleadable in bar of any action afterwards brought by the same plaintiff, or those in

§ 534. It is not necessary, to the conclusiveness of the former judgment, that *issue* should have been *taken upon the precise point*, which is controverted in the second trial; it is sufficient, if that point was essential to the finding of the former verdict. Thus, where the parish of Islington was indicted and convicted for not repairing a certain highway, and afterwards the parish of St. Pancras was indicted for not repairing the same highway, on the ground, that the line dividing the two parishes ran along the middle of the road; it was held, that the former record was admissible and conclusive evidence for the defendants in the latter case, to show that the road was wholly in Islington; for the Jury must have found that it was so, in order to find a verdict against the defendants.¹

§ 535. We have already observed, in general, that *parties in the larger legal sense*, are all persons having a right to control the proceedings, to make defence, to adduce and cross-examine witnesses, and to appeal from the decision, if any appeal lies. Upon this ground, the lessor of the plaintiff in

privity with him, against the same defendant, or those in privity with him. See 3 Am. Law Mag. p. 49-57. And as to the original parties, it seems a just rule, applicable to all personal actions, that wherever two or more are liable *jointly*, and *not severally*, a judgment against one, though without satisfaction, is a bar to another action against any of the others for the same cause; but it is not a bar to an action against a stranger. As far as an action in the form of tort can be said to be exclusively joint in its nature, this rule may govern it; but no farther. This doctrine, as applicable to joint contracts, has been recently discussed in England, in the case of King v. Hoare, 13 M. & W. 494, in which it was held that the judgment against one alone was a bar to a subsequent action against the other.

¹ Rex v. St. Pancras, Peake's Cas. 219; 2 Saund. 159, note (10), by Williams. So, where upon a complaint for flowing the plaintiff's lands, under a particular statute, damages were awarded for the past, and a prospective assessment of damages made, for the future flowage; upon a subsequent application for an increase of the assessment, the defendant was precluded from setting up a right in himself to flow the land, for the right must necessarily have been determined in the previous proceedings. Adams v. Pearson, 7 Pick. 341.

ejectment, and the tenant, are the real parties to the suit, and are concluded in any future action in their own names, by the judgment in that suit.¹ So, if there be a trial between B.'s lessee and E., who recovers judgment; and afterwards another trial of title to the same lands, between E.'s lessee and B., the former verdict and judgment will be admissible in evidence in favor of E.'s lessee against B.; for the real parties in both cases were B. and E.²

§ 536. The case of *privies*, which has already been mentioned, is governed by similar principles to those which have been stated in regard to admissions;³ the general doctrine being this, that the person who represents another, and the person who is represented, have a legal identity, so that whatever binds the one in relation to the subject of their common interest, binds the other also. Thus, a verdict and judgment for or against the ancestor bind the heir.⁴ So, if several successive remainders are limited in the same deed, a judgment for one remainder man is evidence for the next in succession.⁵ But a judgment, to which a tenant for life was a party, is not evidence for or against the reversioner, unless he came into the suit upon *aid prayer*.⁶ So, an assignee is bound by a judgment against the assignor, prior to the assignment.⁷ There is the like privity between the ancestor and all claiming under him, not only as heir, but as tenant in dower,

¹ Doe v. Huddart, 2 Cr. M. & R. 316, 322; Doe v. Preece, 1 Tyrw. 410; Aslin v. Parkin, 2 Burr. 665; Wright v. Tatham, 1 Ad. & El. 3, 19; Bull. N. P. 232; Graves v. Joice, 5 Cowen, 261, and cases there cited.

² Bull. N. P. 232; Calhoun v. Dunning, 4 Dall. 120. So a judgment in trespass against one who justifies as the servant of J. S., is evidence against another defendant in another action, it appearing that he also acted by the command of J. S., who was considered the real party in both cases. Kinnersley v. Orpe, 2 Doug. 517; 1 Doug. 56.

³ Ante, § 180, 189, 523.

⁴ Locke v. Norborne, 3 Mod. 141.

⁵ Bull. N. P. 232; Pyke v. Crouch, 1 Ld. Raym. 730.

⁶ Bull. N. P. 232.

⁷ Adams v. Barnes, 17 Mass. 365.

tenant by the curtesy, legatee, devisee, &c.¹ A judgment of ouster, in a *quo warranto*, against the incumbent of an office, is conclusive evidence against those who derive their title to office under him.² Where one sued for diverting water from his works, and had judgment; and afterwards he and another sued the same defendants for a similar injury; the former judgment was held admissible in evidence for the plaintiffs, being *prima facie* evidence of their privity in estate with the plaintiff in the former action.³ The same rule applies to all grantees, they being in like manner bound by a judgment concerning the same land, recovered by or against their grantor, prior to the conveyance.⁴

§ 537. Upon the foregoing principles, it is obvious that, as a general rule, a verdict and judgment in a *criminal case* cannot be given in evidence in a civil action, to establish the facts on which it was rendered.⁵ If the defendant was convicted, it may have been upon the evidence of the very plaintiff in the civil action; and if he was acquitted, it may have been by collusion with the prosecutor. But besides this, and upon more general grounds, there is no mutuality; the parties are not the same; neither are the rules of decision and the course of proceeding the same. The defendant could not avail himself, in the criminal trial, of any admissions of the plaintiff in the civil action; and, on the other hand, the Jury in the civil action must decide upon the mere preponderance of evidence, whereas, in order to a criminal conviction, they

¹ Locke v. Norborne, 3 Mod. 141; Outram v. Morewood, 353.

² Rex v. Mayor, &c. of York, 5 T. R. 66, 72, 76; Bull. N. P. 231; Rex v. Hebden, 2 Stra. 1109, n. (1).

³ Blakemore v. Glamorganshire Canal Co. 2 C. M. & R. 133.

⁴ Foster v. E. of Derby, 1 Ad. & El. 787, per Littledale, J.

⁵ In one case it was held, that the deposition of a witness, taken before the coroner, on an inquiry touching the death of a person killed by a collision between two vessels, was receivable in evidence, in an action for the negligent management of one of them, if the witness be shown to be beyond sea. Sills v. Brown, 9 C. & P. 601, per Coleridge, J. But *quære*, and see 2 Phil. Evid. 74, 75; Post, § 553.

must satisfied of the party's guilt, beyond any reasonable doubt. The same principles render a judgment in a *civil action* inadmissible evidence in a criminal prosecution.¹

538. But, as we have before remarked,² the verdict and judgment in any case are always admissible to *prove the fact*, that the *judgment was rendered*, or the *verdict given*; for there is a material difference between proving the existence of the record and its tenor, and using the record as the medium of proof of the matters of facts recited in it. In the former

¹ 1 Stark. Evid. 231; 2 Phil. Evid. 23; Jones v. White, 1 Stra. 68, per Pratt, J. Some of the older authorities have laid much stress upon the question whether the plaintiff in the civil action was or was not a witness on the indictment. Upon which Parke, B., in *Blakemore v. Glamorgan-shire Canal Co.*, 2 C. M. & R. 139, remarked as follows:—"The case being brought within the general rule, that a verdict on the matter in issue is evidence for and against parties and privies, no exception can be allowed in the particular action, on the ground, that a circumstance occurs in it, which forms one of the reasons why verdicts between different parties are held to be inadmissible; any more than the absence of all such circumstances, in a particular case, would be allowed to form an exception to the general rule, that verdicts between other parties cannot be received. It is much wiser and more convenient for the administration of justice, to abide as much as possible by general rules." A record of judgment in a criminal case, upon a plea of guilty, is admissible in a civil action against the party, as a solemn judicial confession of the fact; and, according to some authorities, it is conclusive. But its conclusiveness has since been doubted; for the plea may have been made to avoid expense. See Phil. & Am. on Evid. 523, n. (4); 2 Phil. Evid. 25; *Bradley v. Bradley*, 2 Fairf. 367. But the plea of *nolo contendere* is an admission for that trial only; and is not admissible in a subsequent action. *Commonwealth v. Horton*, 9 Pick. 206; *Guild v. Lee*, 3 Law Reporter, p. 433; Ante, § 179, 216. In *Regina v. Moreau*, 36 Leg. Obs. 69, which was an indictment for perjury in an affidavit, in which the defendant had sworn that the prosecutor was indebted to him in £40, and the civil suit being submitted to arbitration, the arbitrator awarded that nothing was due, the award was offered in evidence against the prisoner as proof of the falsity of his affidavit; but the Court held it as merely the declaration of the arbitrator's opinion, and therefore not admissible in a criminal proceeding.

² Ante, § 527.

case, the record can never be considered as *res inter alios acta*; the judgment being a public transaction, rendered by public authority, and being presumed to be faithfully recorded. It is therefore the only proper legal evidence of itself, and is conclusive evidence of the fact of the rendition of the judgment, and of all the legal consequences resulting from that fact, whoever may be the parties to the suit, in which it is offered in evidence. Thus, if one indicted for an assault and battery has been acquitted, and sues the prosecutor for malicious prosecution, the record of acquittal is evidence for the plaintiff, to establish that fact, notwithstanding the parties are not the same. But if he were convicted of the offence, and then is sued in trespass for the assault, the record in the former case would not be evidence to establish the fact of the assault; for as to the matters involved in the issue, it is *res inter alios acta*.¹

§ 539. The distinction between the admissibility of a judgment as a *fact*, and as *evidence of ulterior facts*, may be farther illustrated by the instances in which it has been recognised. Thus, a judgment against the sheriff for the misconduct of his deputy, is evidence against the latter of the fact that the sheriff has been compelled to pay the amount awarded, and for the cause alleged; but it is not evidence of the fact upon which it was founded, namely, the misconduct of the deputy, unless he was notified of the suit and required to defend it.² So it is in other cases, where the officer or party has a remedy over.³ So, where the record is matter of inducement, or necessarily introductory to other evidence; as, in an action against the sheriff for neglect in regard to an execution;⁴ or, to show the testimony of a witness upon a

¹ 1 Stark. Evid. 213.

² *Tyler v. Ulmer*, 12 Mass. 166, per Parker, C. J.

³ *Kip v. Brigham*, 6 Johns. 158; 7 Johns. 168; *Griffin v. Brown*, 2 Pick. 304.

⁴ *Adams v. Balch*, 5 Greenl. 188.

former trial;¹ or, where the judgment constitutes one of the muniments of the party's title to an estate; as, where a deed was made under a decree in Chancery,² or, a sale was made by a sheriff, upon an execution.³ So, where a party has concurrent remedies against several, and has obtained satisfaction upon a judgment against one, it is evidence for the others.⁴ So, if one be sued alone, upon a joint note by two, it has been held, that the judgment against him may be shown by the defendants, in bar of a second suit against both, for the same cause, to prove that as to the former defendant the note is extinct.⁵ So, a judgment *inter alios* is admissible to show the character in which the possessor holds his lands.⁶

§ 539 *a*. But where the contract is several as well as joint, it seems that the judgment in an action against one is no bar to a subsequent action against all; nor is the judgment against all, jointly, a bar to a subsequent action against one alone. For when a party enters into a joint and several obligation, he in effect agrees that he will be liable to a joint action, and to a several action for the debt. In either case, therefore, the bar of a former judgment would not seem to apply; for in a legal sense it was not a judgment between the same parties, nor upon the same contract. The contract, it is said, does not merely give the obligee an election of the one remedy or the other, but entitles him at once to both, though he can have but one satisfaction.⁷

¹ *Clarges v. Sherwin*, 12 Mod. 343; *Foster v. Shaw*, 7 S. & R. 156.

² *Barr v. Gratz*, 4 Wheat. 213.

³ *Witmer v. Schlatter*, 2 Rawle, 359; *Jackson v. Wood*, 3 Wend. 27, 34; *Fowler v. Savage*, 3 Conn. 90, 96.

⁴ *Farwell v. Hilliard*, 3 N. Hamp. 318.

⁵ *Ward v. Johnson*, 13 Mass. 148. See also *Lechmere v. Fletcher*, 1 C. & M. 623, 634, 635, per Bayley, B.

⁶ *Davis v. Loundes*, 1 Bing. N. C. 607, per Tindal, C. J. See further, *Ante*, § 527 *a*; *Wells v. Compton*, 3 Rob. Louis. R. 171.

⁷ *The United States v. Cushman*, 2 Sumn. R. 426, 437-441, per Story, J. See also *Sheehy v. Mandeville*, 6 Cranch, 253, 265; *Lechmere v. Fletcher*, 1 C. & M. 623, 634, 635, per Bayley, B.

§ 540. In regard to *foreign judgments*, they are usually considered in two general aspects; first, as to judgments *in rem*, and secondly, as to judgments *in personam*. The latter are again considered under several heads; first, where the judgment is set up by way of defence to a suit in a foreign tribunal; secondly, where it is sought to be enforced in a foreign tribunal against the original defendant, or his property; and thirdly, where the judgment is either between subjects, or between foreigners, or between foreigners and subjects.¹ But in order to found a proper ground of recognition of a foreign judgment, under whichever of these aspects it may come to be considered, it is indispensable to establish, that the Court which pronounced it had a lawful jurisdiction over the cause, over the thing, and over the parties. If the jurisdiction fails as to either, it is treated as a mere nullity, having no obligation, and entitled to no respect beyond the domestic tribunals.²

§ 541. As to *foreign judgments in rem*, if the matter in controversy is land, or other *immovable property*, the judgment pronounced in the *forum res sitæ* is held to be of universal obligation, as to all the matters of right and title which it professes to decide in relation thereto.³ "The same principle," observes Mr. Justice Story,⁴ "is applied to all other cases of proceedings *in rem*, where the subject is *movable property*, within the jurisdiction of the Court pronouncing the judgment.⁵ Whatever the Court settles as to the right or title, or whatever disposition it makes of the property by sale, reversion, transfer, or other act, will be held valid in every

¹ In what follows on the subject of foreign judgments, I have simply transcribed and abridged what has recently been written by Mr. Justice Story, in his learned Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, ch. 15, (2d Ed.)

² Story, Conf. Laws, § 584, 586; *Rose v. Himely*, 4 Cranch, 269, 270, per Marshall, C. J.; *Smith v. Knowlton*, 11 N. Hamp. R. 191; *Rangely v. Webster*, *Ibid.* 299.

³ Story, Conf. Laws, § 532, 545, 551, 591.

⁴ Story, Conf. Laws, § 592. See also *Ib.* § 597.

⁵ See Kaims on Equity, B. 3, ch. 8, § 4.

other country where the same question comes directly or indirectly in judgment before any other foreign tribunal. This is very familiarly known in the cases of proceedings *in rem* in foreign Courts of Admiralty, whether they are causes of prize, or of bottomry, or of salvage, or of forfeiture, or of any the like nature, over which such Courts have a rightful jurisdiction, founded on the actual or constructive possession of the subject-matter.¹ The same rule is applied to other Courts proceeding *in rem*, such as to the Court of Exchequer in England, and to other Courts exercising a like jurisdiction *in rem* upon seizures.² And in cases of this sort it is wholly immaterial, whether the judgment be of acquittal or of condemnation. In both cases it is equally conclusive.³ But the doctrine, however, is always to be understood with this limitation, that the judgment has been obtained *bonâ fide* and without fraud; for if fraud has intervened, it will doubtless avoid the force and validity of the sentence.⁴ So it must appear that there have

¹ *Croudson v. Leonard*, 4 Cranch, 434; *Williams v. Armroyd*, 7 Cranch, 423; *Rose v. Himely*, 4 Cranch, 241; *Hudson v. Guestier*, 4 Cranch, 293; *The Mary*, 9 Cranch, 126, 142-146; 1 Stark. Evid. p. 246, 247, 248; *Marshall on Insur. B. 1*, ch. 9, § 6, p. 412, 435; Cases cited in 4 Cowen, 520, n. 3; *Grant v. McLachlin*, 4 Johns. 34; *Peters v. The Warren Ins. Co.* 3 Sumner, 389; *Blad v. Bamfield*, 3 Swanst. 604, 605; *Bradstreet v. Neptune Insur. Co.* 3 Sumner, 600; *Magoun v. New England Insur. Co.* 1 Story, R. 157. The different degrees of credit given to foreign sentences of condemnation in prize causes, by the American State Courts, are stated in Cowen & Hill's note 626, to 1 Phil. Evid. 348. See also 2 Kent, Comm. 121. If a foreign sentence of condemnation as prize is manifestly erroneous, as if it professes to be made on particular grounds, which are set forth, but which plainly do not warrant the decree; *Calvert v. Bovil*, 7 T. R. 523; *Pollard v. Bell*, 8 T. R. 444; or, on grounds contrary to the law of nations; 3 B. & P. 215, per Ld. Alvanley, C. J.; or, if there be any ambiguity as to what was the ground of condemnation; it is not conclusive. *Dalglish v. Hodgson*, 7 Bing. 495, 504; 2 Phil. Evid. 52.

² *Ibid.*; 1 Stark. on Evid. p. 228-232, 246, 247, 248; *Gelston v. Hoyt*, 3 Wheaton, 246; *Williams v. Armroyd*, 7 Cranch, 423.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Duchess of Kingston's case*, 11 State Trials, p. 261, 262; S. C. 20 Howell, State Trials, p. 355; *Id.* p. 538, the opinion of the Judges; *Brad-*

been regular proceedings to found the judgment or decree; and that the parties in interest *in rem* have had notice, or an opportunity to appear and defend their interests, either personally, or by their proper representatives, before it was pronounced; for the common justice of all nations requires that no condemnation should be pronounced, before the party has an opportunity to be heard."¹

§ 542. Proceedings also by creditors against the personal property of their debtor, in the hands of third persons, or against debts due to him by such third persons, (commonly called the process of *foreign attachment*, or *garnishment*, or *trustee process*,) are treated as in some sense proceedings *in rem*, and are deemed entitled to the same consideration.² But in this last class of cases we are especially to bear in mind, that, to make any judgment effectual, the Court must possess and exercise a rightful jurisdiction over the *Res*, and also over the person, at least so far as the *Res* is concerned; otherwise it will be disregarded. And if the jurisdiction over the *Res* be well founded, but not over the person, except as to the *Res*, the judgment will not be either conclusive or binding upon the party *in personam*, although it may be *in rem*.³

§ 543. In all these cases the same principle prevails, that the judgment, acting *in rem*, shall be held *conclusive upon the*

street v. The Neptune Insur. Co. 3 Sumner, 600; *Magoun v. The New England Insur. Co.* 1 Story, R. 157. If the foreign Court is constituted by persons interested in the matter in dispute, the judgment is not binding. *Price v. Dewhurst*, 8 Sim. 279.

¹ *Sawyer v. Maine Fire and Mar. Insur. Co.* 12 Mass. 291; *Bradstreet v. The Neptune Insur. Co.* 3 Sumner, 600; *Magoun v. N. England Insur. Co.* 1 Story, R. 157.

² See cases cited in 4 Cowen, 520, 521, n.; Story, Conf. Laws, § 549; *Holmes v. Remsen*, 20 Johns. 229; *Hull v. Blake*, 13 Mass. 153; *McDaniel v. Hughes*, 3 East, 366; *Phillips v. Hunter*, 2 H. Black. 402, 410.

³ Story, Conf. Laws, § 592 a. See also *Ibid.* § 549, and note; *Bissell v. Briggs*, 9 Mass. 468; 3 Burge, Comm. on Col. & For. Law, Pt. 2, ch. 24, p. 1014-1019.

title and transfer and disposition of the property itself, in whatever place the same property may afterwards be found, and by whomsoever the latter may be questioned; and whether it be directly or incidentally brought in question. But it is not so universally settled, that the judgment is conclusive of all the points which are *incidentally* disposed of by the judgment, or of the facts or allegations upon which it professes to be founded. In this respect, *different rules* are adopted by different States, both in Europe and in America. In England, such judgments are held conclusive, not only *in rem*, but also as to all the points and facts which they professedly or incidentally decide.¹ In some of the American States the same doctrine prevails. While in other American States the judgments are held conclusive only *in rem*, and may be controverted as to all the incidental grounds and facts on which they profess to be founded.²

§ 544. A similar doctrine has been contended for, and in many cases successfully, in favor of sentences which touch the general *capacity of persons*, and those which concern *marriage* and *divorce*. Foreign Jurists strongly contend that the decree of a foreign Court, declaring the state (*status*) of a person, and placing him, as an idiot, or a minor, or a prodigal, under guardianship, ought to be deemed of universal authority and obligation. So it doubtless would be deemed,

¹ In *Blad v. Bamfield*, decided by Lord Nottingham, and reported in 3 Swanst. 604, a perpetual injunction was awarded to restrain certain suits of trespass and trover for seizing the goods of the defendant (Bamfield) for trading in Ireland, contrary to certain privileges granted to the plaintiff and others. The property was seized and condemned in the Danish Courts. Lord Nottingham held the sentence conclusive against the suits, and awarded the injunction accordingly.

² Story, Conf. Laws, § 593. See 4 Cowen, 522, n., and cases there cited; *Vandenhoevel v. U. Insur. Co.* 2 Cain. Cases in Err. 217; 2 Johns. Cases, 451; *Id.* 481; *Robinson v. Jones*, 8 Mass. 536; *Mayley v. Shattuck*, 3 Cranch, 488; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 37, p. 120, 121, 4th edit., and cases there cited; *Tarleton v. Tarleton*, 4 M. & Selw. 20. See *Peters v. Warren Insur. Co.* 3 Sumn. p. 389; *Gelston v. Hoyt*, 3 Wheat. 246.

in regard to all acts done within the jurisdiction of the sovereign whose tribunals pronounced the sentence. But in the United States the rights and powers of *guardians* are considered as strictly local; and no guardian is admitted to have any right to receive the profits, or to assume the possession of the real estate, or to control the person of his ward, or to maintain any action for the personalty, out of the State, under whose authority he was appointed, without having received a due appointment from the proper authority of the State, within which the property is situated, or the act is to be done, or to whose tribunals resort is to be had. The same rule is also applied to the case of *executors* and *administrators*.¹

§ 545. In regard to *marriages*, the general principle is, that between persons *sui juris*, marriage is to be decided by the law of the place where it is celebrated. If valid there, it is valid every where. It has a legal ubiquity of obligation. If invalid there, it is invalid every where. The most prominent, if not the only known exceptions to this rule, are marriages involving polygamy and incest; those prohibited by the public law of a country from motives of policy; and those celebrated in foreign countries by subjects entitling themselves, under special circumstances, to the benefit of the laws of their own country.² As to *sentences confirming marriages*, some English Jurists seem disposed to concur with those of Scotland and America, in giving to them the same conclusiveness, force, and effect. If it were not so, as Lord Hardwicke observed, the rights of mankind would be very precarious. But others, conceding that a judgment of a third country, on the validity of a marriage not within its territories, nor had between subjects of that country, would be entitled to credit

¹ Story, Conf. Laws, § 499, 504, 594; *Morrell v. Dickey*, 1 Johns. Ch. 153; *Kraft v. Wickey*, 4 G. & J. 332. See, as to foreign executors and administrators, cases in Cowen & Hill's note 621, to 1 Phil. Evid. p. 344.

² Story, Conf. Laws, § 80, 81, 113.

and attention, deny that it would be universally binding.¹ In the United States, however, as well as in Scotland, it is firmly held, that a *sentence of divorce*, obtained *bonâ fide* and without fraud, pronounced between parties actually domiciled in the country, whether natives or foreigners, by a competent tribunal, having jurisdiction over the case, is valid, and ought to be every where held a complete dissolution of the marriage, in whatever country it may have been originally celebrated.²

§ 546. "In the next place, as to *judgments in personam*, which are *sought to be enforced* by a suit in a foreign tribunal. There has certainly been no inconsiderable fluctuation of opinion in the English Courts upon this subject. It is admitted on all sides, that, in such cases, the foreign judgments are *primâ facie* evidence to sustain the action, and are to be deemed right, until the contrary is established;³ and of course they may be avoided, if they are founded in fraud, or are pronounced by a Court, not having any competent jurisdiction over the cause.⁴ But the question is, whether they are not deemed conclusive; or whether the defendant is at liberty to go at large into the original merits, to show that the judgment

¹ Roach v. Garvan, 1 Ves. 157; Story, Conf. Laws, § 595, 596; Sinclair v. Sinclair, 1 Hagg. Consist. R. 297; Scrimshire v. Scrimshire, 2 Hagg. Consist. R. 395, 410.

² Story, Conf. Laws, § 597. See also the lucid judgment delivered by Gibson, C. J. in Dorsey v. Dorsey, 7 Watts, 350. The whole subject of foreign divorces has received a masterly discussion by Mr. Justice Story, in his Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, ch. vii. § 200-230 b.

³ See Walker v. Witter, 1 Doug. 1, and cases there cited; Arnold v. Redfern, 3 Bing. 353; Sinclair v. Fraser, cited 1 Doug. 4, 5, note; Houlditch v. Donegal, 2 Clark & Finnell. 470; S. C. 8 Bligh, 301; Don v. Lippmann, 5 Clark & Finn. 1, 19, 20; Price v. Dewhurst, 8 Sim. 279; Alivon v. Furnival, 1 Cromp. Mees. & Rose. 277; Hall v. Odber, 11 East, 118; Ripple v. Ripple, 1 Rawle, 386.

⁴ See Bowles v. Orr, 1 Younge & Coll. 464; Story, Conf. Laws, § 544, 545-550; Ferguson v. Mahon, 3 Perry & Dav. 143; Price v. Dewhurst, 8 Simons, 279, 302; Don v. Lippmann, 5 Clark & Finn. 1, 19, 20, 21.

ought to have been different upon the merits, although obtained *bonâ fide*. If the latter course be the correct one, then a still more embarrassing consideration is, to what extent, and in what manner, the original merits can be properly inquired into."¹ But though there remains no inconsiderable diversity of opinion among the learned Judges of the different tribunals, yet the present inclination of the English Courts seems to be to sustain the conclusiveness of foreign judgments.²

¹ Story, Conf. Laws, § 603.

² Ibid. § 604, 605, 606. See Guinness v. Carroll, 1 Barn. & Adolph. 459; Becquet v. McCarthy, 2 B. & A. 951. In Houlditch v. Donegal, 8 Bligh, 301, 337-340, Lord Brougham held a foreign judgment to be only *primâ facie* evidence, and gave his reasons at large for that opinion. On the other hand, Sir L. Shadwell, in Martin v. Nicolls, 3 Sim. 458, held the contrary opinion, that it was conclusive; and also gave a very elaborate judgment on the point, in which he reviewed the principal authorities. Of course, the learned Judge meant to except, and did except, in a later case, (Price v. Dewhurst, 8 Sim. 279, 302,) judgments which were produced by fraud. See also Don v. Lippmann, 5 Clark & Finnell. 1, 20, 21; Story, Conf. Laws, § 545-550, 605; Alivon v. Furnival, 1 Cromp. Mees. & Rose. 277, 284. "It is indeed very difficult," observes Mr. Justice Story, "to perceive what could be done, if a different doctrine were maintainable to the full extent of opening all the evidence and merits of the cause anew, on a suit upon the foreign judgment. Some of the witnesses may be since dead; some of the vouchers may be lost or destroyed. The merits of the case, as formerly before the Court upon the whole evidence, may have been decidedly in favor of the judgment; upon a partial possession of the original evidence, they may now appear otherwise. Suppose a case purely sounding in damages, such as an action for an assault, for slander, for conversion of property, for a malicious prosecution, or for a criminal conversation; is the defendant to be at liberty to re-try the whole merits, and to make out, if he can, a new case, upon new evidence? Or is the Court to review the former decision, like a Court of appeal, upon the old evidence? In a case of covenant, or of debt, or of a breach of contract, are all the circumstances to be re-examined anew? If they are, by what laws and rules of evidence and principles of justice is the validity of the original judgment to be tried? Is the Court to open the judgment, and to proceed *ex æquo et bono*? Or is it to administer strict law, and stand to the doctrines of the local administration of justice? Is it to act upon the rules of evidence acknowledged in its own jurisprudence, or upon those of the foreign jurisprudence? These and many more questions might be put to

§ 547. "The general doctrine maintained in the *American Courts*, in relation to foreign judgments *in personam*, certainly is, that they are *prima facie* evidence; but that they are impeachable. But how far and to what extent this doctrine is to be carried, does not seem to be definitely settled. It has been declared that the jurisdiction of the Court, and its power over the parties and the things in controversy, may be inquired into; and that the judgment may be impeached for fraud. Beyond this no definite lines have as yet been drawn."¹

§ 548. We have already adverted to the provisions of the Constitution and *Statutes of the United States*, in regard to the admissibility and effect of the judgments of one State in the tribunals of another.² By these provisions, such judg-

show the intrinsic difficulties of the subject. Indeed the rule, that the judgment is to be *prima facie* evidence of the plaintiff, would be a mere delusion, if the defendant might still question it by opening all or any of the original merits on his side; for under such circumstances it would be equivalent to granting a new trial. It is easy to understand, that the defendant may be at liberty to impeach the original justice of the judgment, by showing that the Court had no jurisdiction; or, that he never had any notice of the suit; or, that it was procured by fraud; or, that upon its face it is founded in mistake; or, that it is irregular, and bad by the local law, *Fori rei judicatae*. To such an extent the doctrine is intelligible and practicable. Beyond this, the right to impugn the judgment is in legal effect the right to re-try the merits of the original cause at large, and to put the defendant upon proving those merits. See *Alivon v. Furnival*, 1 Crompt. Mees. & Rose. 277."

¹ Story, *Conf. Laws*, § 608. See also 2 Kent, Comm. 119-121; and the valuable notes of Mr. Metcalf to his edition of Starkie on Evid. Vol. 1, p. 232, 233, (6th Am. Ed.) The American cases are collected in Cowen & Hill's notes 636, 337, to 1 Phil. Evid. p. 353. The American cases seem further to agree, that when a foreign judgment comes *incidentally* in question, as, where it is the foundation of a right or title derived under it, and the like, it is conclusive. See Cowen & Hill's notes just cited, p. 895. If a foreign judgment proceeds upon an error in law, apparent upon the face of it, it may be impeached every where; as, if a French Court, professing to decide according to the law of England, clearly mistakes it. *Novelli v. Rossi*, 2 B. & Ad. 757.

² Ante, § 504, 505, 506.

ments, authenticated as the statutes provide, are put upon the same footing as domestic judgments. "But this," observes Mr. Justice Story, "does not prevent an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the Court, in which the original judgment was rendered, to pronounce the judgment, nor an inquiry into the right of the State to exercise authority over the parties, or the subject-matter, nor an inquiry whether the judgment is founded in, and impeachable for a manifest fraud.¹ The Constitution did not mean to confer any new power upon the States; but simply to regulate the effect of their acknowledged jurisdiction over persons and things within their territory.² It did not make the judgments of other States domestic judgments to all intents and purposes; but only gave a general validity, faith, and credit to them as evidence. No execution can issue upon such judgments, without a new suit in the tribunals of other States. And they enjoy not the right of priority, or privilege, or lien, which they have in the State where they are pronounced, but that only which the *Lex fori* gives to them by its own laws, in the character of foreign judgments."³

¹ *Taylor v. Bryden*, 8 Johns. 173. Where the jurisdiction of an inferior Court depends on a fact, which such Court must necessarily and directly decide, its decision is taken as conclusive evidence of the fact. *Brittain v. Kinnaird*, 1 B. & B. 432; *Betts v. Bagley*, 12 Pick. 572, 582, per Shaw, C. J.; Cowen & Hill's note 694, to 1 Phil. Evid. 380; *Steele v. Smith*, 7 Law Rep. 461.

² See Story's Comment. on the Constit. U. S. ch. 20, § 1297-1307, and cases there cited;—*Hall v. Williams*, 6 Pick. 237; *Bissell v. Briggs*, 9 Mass. 462; *Shumway v. Stillman*, 6 Wend. 447; *Evans v. Tarleton*, 9 Serg. & R. 260; *Benton v. Burgot*, 10 Serg. & R. 240; *Hancock v. Barrett*, 1 Hall, 155; S. C. 2 Hall, 302; *Wilson v. Niles*, 2 Hall, 358; *Hoxie v. Wright*, 2 Verm. 263; *Bellows v. Ingraham*, 2 Verm. 573; *Aldrich v. Kinney*, 4 Conn. 380; *Bennett v. Morley*, 1 Wilcox, 100. See further, 1 Kent, Comm. 260, 261, and note (d). As to the effect of a discharge under a foreign insolvent law, see the learned judgment of Shaw, C. J. in *Betts v. Bagley*, 12 Pick. 572.

³ Story, *Conf. Laws*, § 609; *McElmoyle v. Cohen*, 13 Peters, 312, 328, 329; Story, *Conf. Laws*, § 582 a, note.

§ 549. The *Common Law* recognises *no distinction* whatever, as to the effect of foreign judgments, whether they are between citizens, or between foreigners, or between citizens and foreigners; deeming them of equal obligation in all cases, whoever are the parties.¹

§ 550. In regard to the decrees and sentences of Courts, exercising any branches of the *Ecclesiastical jurisdiction*, the same general principles govern, which we have already stated.² The principal branch of this jurisdiction in existence in the United States, is that which relates to matters of *probate and administration*. And as to these, the inquiry, as in other cases, is, whether the matter was exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Court, and whether a decree or judgment has directly been passed upon it. If the affirmative be true, the decree is conclusive. Where the decree is of the nature of proceedings *in rem*, as is generally the case in matters of probate and administration, it is conclusive, like those proceedings, against all the world. But where it is a matter of exclusively private litigation, such as, in assignments of dower, and some other cases of jurisdiction conferred by particular statutes, the decree stands upon the footing of a judgment at Common Law.³ Thus, the probate of a will, at least as to the personalty, is conclusive in civil cases, in all questions upon its execution and validity.⁴ The grant of letters of administration is, in general, *prima facie* evidence of the intestate's death; for, only upon evidence of that fact ought they to have been granted.⁵ And if the grant of administra-

¹ Story, Conf. Laws, § 610. On the general subject of the effect of foreign judgments, see also 2 Phil. Evid. 49-64.

² 2 Smith's Leading Cases, 446-448.

³ Ante, § 525, 528.

⁴ Poplin v. Hawke, 8 N. Hamp. 124; 1 Jarman on Wills, p. 22, 23, 24, and notes by Perkins; Langdon v. Goddard, 3 Story, R. 1.

⁵ Thompson v. Donaldson, 3 Esp. 63; French v. French, 1 Dick. 268; Succession of Hamblin, 3 Rob. Louis. R. 130. But if the fact, that the intestate is living, when pleadable in abatement, is not so pleaded, the grant of administration is conclusive. Newman v. Jenkins, 10 Pick. 515. In

tion turned upon the question as to which of the parties was next of kin, the sentence or decree upon that question is conclusive every where, in a suit between the same parties for distribution.¹ But the grant of administration upon a woman's estate determines nothing as to the fact whether she were a feme covert or not; for that is a collateral fact, to be collected merely by inference from the decree or grant of administration, and was not the point directly tried.² Where a Court of Probate has power to grant letters of guardianship of a lunatic, the grant is conclusive of his insanity at that time, and of his liability, therefore, to be put under guardianship, against all persons subsequently dealing directly with the lunatic, instead of dealing, as they ought to do, with the guardian.³

§ 551. *Decrees in Chancery* stand upon the same principles with judgments at Common Law, which have already been stated. Whether the statements in the *bill* are to be taken conclusively against the complainant as admissions by him, has been doubted; but the prevailing opinion is supposed to be against their conclusiveness, on the ground that the facts therein stated are frequently the mere suggestions of counsel, made for the purpose of obtaining an answer, under oath.⁴ If the bill has been sworn to, without doubt the party would

Moons v. De Bernales, 1 Russ. 301, the general practice was stated and not denied, to be to admit the letters of administration, as sufficient proof of the death, until impeached; but the Master of the Rolls, in that case, which was a foreign grant of administration, refused to receive them; but allowed the party to examine witnesses to the fact.

¹ Barrs v. Jackson, 1 Phil. Ch. R. 582; 2 Y. & C. 585; Thomas v. Ketteriche, 1 Vez. 333.

² Blackham's case, 1 Salk. 290, per Holt, C. J. See also Hibsham v. Dulleban, 4 Watts, 183.

³ Leonard v. Leonard, 14 Pick. 280. But it is not conclusive against his subsequent capacity to make a will. Stone v. Damon, 12 Mass. 488. See further, 1 Stark. Evid. 241-244; 2 Phil. Evid. 29-36; Cowen & Hill's notes 616-622, to 1 Phil. Evid. 344.

⁴ 2 Phil. Evid. 27.

be held bound by its statements, so far as they are direct allegations of fact. The admissibility and effect of the *answer* of the defendant is governed by the same rules.¹ But a *demurrer* in Chancery does not admit the facts charged in the bill; for if it be overruled, the defendant may still answer. So it is, as to *pleas* in Chancery; these, as well as demurrers, being merely hypothetical statements, that, *supposing* the facts to be as alleged, the defendant is not bound to answer.² But pleadings, and depositions, and a decree, in a former suit, the same title being in issue, are admissible, as showing the acts of parties, who had the same interest in it as the present party, against whom they are offered.³

§ 552. In regard to *depositions*, it is to be observed, that, though informally taken, yet as mere declarations of the witness, under his hand, they are admissible against him, wherever he is a party, like any other admissions; or, to contradict and impeach him, when he is afterwards examined as a witness. But, as secondary evidence, or as a substitute for his testimony *viva voce*, it is essential that they be regularly taken, under legal proceedings duly pending, or in a case and manner provided by law.⁴ And though taken in a foreign State, yet if taken to be used in a suit pending here, the forms of our law, and not of the foreign law, must be pursued.⁵ But if the deposition was taken *in perpetuam*, the forms of the law under which it was taken must have been strictly

¹ Ante, § 171, 179, 186, 202.

² *Tompkins v. Ashby*, 1 M. & Malk. 32, 33, per Abbott, Ld. C. J.

³ *Viscount Lorton v. Earl of Kingston*, 5 Clark & Fin. 269.

⁴ As to the manner of taking depositions, and in what cases they may be taken, see Ante, § 320-325.

⁵ *Evans v. Eaton*, 7 Wheat. 426; *Farley v. King*, S. J. Court, Maine, in Lincoln, Oct. Term, 1822, per Preble, J. But depositions taken in a foreign country, under its own laws, are admissible here in proof of probable cause, for the arrest and extradition of a fugitive from justice, upon the preliminary examination of his case before a Judge. See *Metzger's case*, before Betts, J., 5 N. Y. Legal Obs. 83.

pursued, or it cannot be read in evidence.¹ If a bill in equity be dismissed merely as being in its substance unfit for a decree, the depositions, when offered as secondary evidence in another suit, will not on that account be rejected. But if it is dismissed for irregularity, as, if it come before the Court by a bill of revivor, when it should have been by an original bill; so that in truth there was never regularly any such cause in the Court, and consequently no proofs, the depositions cannot be read; for the proofs cannot be exemplified without bill and answer, and they cannot be read at law, unless the bill on which they were taken can be read.²

§ 553. We have seen, that in regard to the admissibility of a former judgment in evidence, it is generally necessary that there be a perfect *mutuality* between the parties; neither being concluded, unless both are alike bound.³ But with respect to *depositions*, though this rule is admitted in its general principle, yet it is applied with more latitude of discretion; and complete mutuality, or identity of all the parties, is not required. It is generally deemed sufficient, if the matters in issue were the same in both cases, and the party, against whom the deposition is offered, had full power to cross-examine the witness. Thus, where a bill was pending in Chancery, in favor of one plaintiff against several defendants, upon

¹ *Gould v. Gould*, 3 Story, R. 516.

² *Backhouse v. Middleton*, 1 Ch. Cas. 173, 175; *Hall v. Hodgesdon*, 2 P. Wms. 162; *Vaughan v. Fitzgerald*, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 316.

³ Ante, § 524. The reason given by Chief Baron Gilbert, for applying the rule, to the same extent, to depositions taken in Chancery is, that otherwise great mischief would ensue; "for then a man, that never was party to the Chancery proceedings, might use against his adversary all the depositions that made against him, and he, in his own advantage, could not use the depositions that made for him, because the other party, not being concerned in the suit, had not the liberty to cross-examine, and therefore cannot be encountered with any depositions, out of the cause." *Gilb. Evid.* 62; *Rushworth v. Countess of Pembroke*, Hardr. 472. But the exception allowed in the text is clearly not within this mischief, the right of cross-examination being unlimited, as to the matters in question.

which the Court ordered an issue of *devisavit vel non*, in which the defendants in Chancery should be plaintiffs, and the plaintiff in Chancery defendant; and the issue was found for the plaintiffs; after which the plaintiff in Chancery brought an ejectment on his own demise, claiming, as heir at law of the same testator, against one of those defendants alone, who claimed as devisee under the will formerly in controversy; it was held, that the testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses to the will, who was examined at the former trial, but had since died, might be proved by the defendant in the second action, notwithstanding the parties were not all the same; for the same matter was in controversy, in both cases, and the lessor of the plaintiff had precisely the same power of objecting to the competency of the witness, the same right of calling witnesses to discredit or contradict his testimony, and the same right of cross-examination, in the one case, as in the other.¹ If the power of cross-examination was more limited in the former suit, in regard to the matters in controversy in the latter, it would seem that the testimony ought to be excluded.² The same rule applies to privies, as well as to parties.

§ 554. But though the *general rule, at law*, is, that no evidence shall be admitted, but what is or might be under the examination of both parties;³ yet it seems clear, that, in

¹ Wright v. Tatham, 1 Ad. & El. 3; 12 Vin. Abr. tit. Evidence, A. b. 31, pl. 45, 47. As to the persons who are to be deemed parties, see Ante, § 523, 535.

² Phil. & Am. on Evid. 572, note (3); 1 Stark. Evid. 270, 271. It has been held that the deposition of a witness before the coroner, upon an inquiry touching the death of a person killed by a collision of vessels, was admissible in an action for the negligent management of one of them, if the witness is shown to be beyond sea. Sills v. Brown, 9 C. & P. 601, 603, per Coleridge, J.; 1 Phil. Evid. 373, (4th Am. from 7th Lond. Ed.) But *quare*, and see Phil. & Am. on Evid. 570, note (1).

³ Cazenove v. Vaughan, 1 M. & S. 4, 6; Attor. Gen. v. Davison, 1 McC. & Y. 160; Gass v. Stinson, 3 Sumn. 98, 104, 105; 1 Stark. Evid. 270, 271.

Equity, a deposition is *not, of course, inadmissible* in evidence, because there has been *no cross-examination*, and no waiver of the right. For if the witness, after his examination on the direct interrogatories, should refuse to answer the cross-interrogatories, the party producing the witness will not be deprived of his direct testimony, for, upon application of the other party, the Court would have compelled him to answer.¹ So, after a witness was examined for the plaintiff, but before he could be cross-examined, he died; the Court ordered his deposition to stand;² though the want of the cross-examination ought to abate the force of his testimony.³ So, where the direct examination of an infirm witness was taken by the consent of parties, but no cross-interrogatories were ever filed, though the witness lived several months afterwards, and there was no proof that they might not have been answered, if they had been filed; it was held that the omission to file them was at the peril of the party, and that the deposition was admissible.⁴ A new commission may be granted, to cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses abroad, upon subsequent discovery of matter for such examination.⁵ But where the deposition of a witness, since deceased, was taken, and the direct examination was duly signed by the magistrate, but the cross-examination, which was taken on a subsequent day, was not so signed, the whole was held inadmissible.⁶

§ 555. *Depositions*, as well as *verdicts*, which relate to a custom, or prescription, or pedigree, where reputation would be evidence, are admissible against strangers; for as the declarations of persons deceased would be admissible in such

¹ Courtenay v. Hoskins, 2 Russ. 253.

² Arundel v. Arundel, 1 Chan. R. 90.

³ O'Callaghan v. Murphy, 2 Sch. & Lef. 158; Gass v. Stinson, 3 Sumn. 98, 106, 107. But see Kissam v. Forrest, 25 Wend. 651.

⁴ Gass v. Stinson, 3 Sumn. 98, where this subject is fully examined by Story, J. See also 2 Phil. Evid. 91; 1 Stark. Evid. 171.

⁵ King of Hanover v. Wheatley, 4 Beav. 78.

⁶ Regina v. France, 2 M. & Rob. 207.

cases, *à fortiori* their declarations on oath are so.¹ But in all cases at law, where a deposition is offered as secondary evidence, that is, as a substitute for the testimony of the witness *vivâ voce*, it must appear that the witness cannot be personally produced; unless the case is provided for by statute, or by a rule of the Court.²

§ 556. The last subject of inquiry under this head, is that of *inquisitions*. These are the results of inquiries, made under competent public authority, to ascertain matters of public interest and concern. They are said to be analogous to proceedings *in rem*, being made on behalf of the public; and that therefore no one can strictly be said to be a stranger to them. But the principle of their admissibility in evidence, between private persons, seems to be, that they are matters of public and general interest, and therefore within some of the exceptions to the rule in regard to hearsay evidence, which we have heretofore considered.³ Whether, therefore, the adjudication be founded on oath or not, the principle of its admissibility is the same. And moreover, it is distinguished from other hearsay evidence, in having peculiar guaranties for its accuracy and fidelity.⁴ The general rule in regard to these documents, is, that they are admissible in evidence, but that they are not conclusive, except against the parties immediately concerned, and their privies. Thus, an inquest of office, by the attorney general, for lands escheating to the government by reason of alienage, was held to be evidence of title, in all cases; but not conclusive against any person, who was not tenant at the time of the inquest, or party or privy thereto, and that such persons, therefore, might show that there were lawful heirs *in esse*, who were not aliens.⁵ So, it has been

¹ 1 Stark. Evid. 272; Bull. N. P. 239, 240; Ante, § 127-130, 139, 140.

² Ante, § 322, 323.

³ Ante, § 127-140.

⁴ Phil. & Am. on Evid. 578, 579; 1 Stark. Evid. 260, 261, 263.

⁵ Stokes v. Dawes, 4 Mason, 268, per Story, J.

repeatedly held, that inquisitions of lunacy may be read; but that they are not generally conclusive against persons not actually parties.¹ But inquisitions, extrajudicially taken, are not admissible in evidence.²

¹ Sergeson v. Sealey, 2 Atk. 412; Den v. Clark, 5 Halst. 217, per Ewing, C. J.; Hart v. Deamer, 6 Wend. 497; Faulder v. Silk, 3 Campb. 126; 2 Madd. Chan. 578.

² Glossop v. Pole, 3 M. & S. 175; Latkow v. Eamer, 2 H. Bl. 437. See Ante, § 550, that the inquisition is conclusive against persons, who undertake subsequently to deal with the lunatic, instead of dealing with the guardian, and seek to avoid his authority, collaterally, by showing that the party was restored to his reason.

CHAPTER VI.

OF PRIVATE WRITINGS.

§ 557. THE last class of Written Evidence, which we proposed to consider, is that of PRIVATE WRITINGS. And in the discussion of this subject, it is not intended separately to mention every description of writings, comprised in this class; but to state the principles which govern the proof, admissibility, and effect of them all. In general, all private writings, produced in evidence, must be proved to be genuine; but in what is now to be said, particular reference is had to solemn obligations and instruments, under the hand of the party, purporting to be evidence of title; such as deeds, bills, and notes. These must be produced, and the execution of them generally be proved; or their absence must be duly accounted for, and their loss supplied by secondary evidence.

§ 558. And first, in regard to the PRODUCTION of such documents; if the instrument is *lost*, the party is required to give some evidence that such a paper once existed, though slight evidence is sufficient for this purpose, and that a *bonâ fide* and diligent search has been unsuccessfully made for it in the place where it was most likely to be found, if the nature of the case admits such proof; after which, his own affidavit is admissible to the fact of its loss.¹ The same rule prevails where the instrument is destroyed. What degree of diligence in the search is necessary, it is not easy to define, as each case

¹ Goodier v. Lake, 1 Atk. 446; Ante, § 349, and cases there cited. See also Cowen & Hill's note 861, to 1 Phil. Evid. p. 452. It is sufficient, if the party has done all that could reasonably be expected of him, under the circumstances of the case, in searching for the instrument. Kelsey v. Hammer, 18 Conn. R. 311.

depends much on its peculiar circumstances, and the question, whether the loss of the instrument is sufficiently proved, to admit secondary evidence of its contents, is to be determined by the Court, and not by the Jury.¹ But it seems, that, in general, the party is expected to show that he has in good faith exhausted, in a reasonable degree, all the sources of information and means of discovery which the nature of the case would naturally suggest, and which were accessible to him.² It should be recollected, that the object of the proof is merely to establish a reasonable presumption of the loss of the instrument; and that this is a preliminary inquiry, addressed to the discretion of the Judge. If the paper was supposed to be of little value, or is ancient, a less degree of diligence will be demanded, as it will be aided by the presumption of loss, which these circumstances afford. If it belonged to the custody of certain persons, or is proved or may be presumed to have been in their possession, they must, in general, be called and sworn to account for it, if they are within reach of the process of the Court.³ And so, if it might or ought to have been deposited in a public office, or other particular place, that place must be searched. If the search was made by a third person, he must be called to testify respecting it.⁴ And if the paper belongs to his custody, he must be served with a *subpœna duces tecum*, to produce it.⁵ If it be

¹ Page v. Page, 15 Pick. 368.

² Rex v. Morton, 4 M. & S. 48; Rex v. Castleton, 6 T. R. 236; 1 Stark. Evid. 336-340; Wills v. McDole, 2 South. 501; Thompson v. Travis, 8 Scott, 85; Parks v. Dunklee, 3 Watts & Serg. 291; Gathercole v. Miall, 15 Law Journ. 179. The admission of the nominal plaintiff, that he had burnt the bond, he being interested adversely to the real plaintiff, has been held sufficient to let in secondary evidence of its contents. Shortz v. Unagst, 3 Watts & Serg. 45.

³ Ralph v. Brown, 3 Watts & Serg. 395.

⁴ The authorities to these points, which are quite too numerous to be cited here, may be found in Cowen & Hill's note 867, to 1 Phil. Evid. p. 457.

⁵ The duty of the witness to produce such document, is thus laid down by Shaw, C. J. "There seems to be no difference in principle, between compelling a witness to produce a document in his possession, under a

an instrument, which is the foundation of the action, and which, if found, the defendant may be compelled again to pay to a *bonâ fide holder*, the plaintiff must give sufficient proof of its destruction, to satisfy the Court and Jury that the defendant cannot be liable to pay it a second time.¹ And if the instrument was executed in duplicate, or triplicate, or more parts, the loss of all the parts must be proved, in order to let in secondary evidence of the contents.² Satisfactory proof being thus made of the loss of the instrument, the party will be admitted to give secondary evidence of its contents.³

subpoena duces tecum, in a case where the party calling the witness has a right to the use of such document, and compelling him to give testimony, when the facts lie in his own knowledge. It has been decided, though it was formerly doubted, that a *subpoena duces tecum* is a writ of compulsory obligation, which the Court has power to issue, and which the witness is bound to obey, and which will be enforced by proper process to compel the production of the paper, when the witness has no lawful or reasonable excuse for withholding it. *Amey v. Long*, 9 East, 473; *Corsen v. Dubois*, 1 Holt's N. P. R. 239. But of such lawful or reasonable excuse, the Court at nisi prius, and not the witness, is to judge. And when the witness has the paper ready to produce, in obedience to the summons, but claims to retain it on the ground of legal or equitable interests of his own, it is a question to the discretion of the Court, under the circumstances of the case, whether the witness ought to produce, or is entitled to withhold the paper." *Bull v. Loveland*, 10 Pick. 14.

¹ *Hansard v. Robinson*, 7 B. & C. 90; *Lubbock v. Tribe*, 3 M. & W. 607. See also *Peabody v. Denton*, 2 Gall. 351; *Anderson v. Robson*, 2 Bay, 495; *Davis v. Todd*, 4 Taunt. 602; *Pierson v. Hutchinson*, 2 Campb. 211; *Rowley v. Ball*, 3 Cowen, 303; *Kirby v. Sisson*, 2 Wend. 550; *Murray v. Carrett*, 3 Call, 373; *Mayor v. Johnson*, 3 Campb. 324; *Swift v. Stevens*, 8 Conn. 431; *Ramuz v. Crowe*, 11 Jur. 715.

² *Bull. N. P.* 254; *Rex v. Castleton*, 6 T. R. 236; *Doe v. Pulman*, 3 Ad. & El. 622, N. S.

³ See, as to secondary evidence, Ante, § 84, and note (2). Where secondary evidence is resorted to, for proof of an instrument which is lost or destroyed, it must, in general, be proved to have been executed. *Jackson v. Frier*, 16 Johns. 196; *Kimball v. Morrell*, 4 Greenl. 368; *Kelsey v. Hanmer*, 11 Conn. R. 311. But if the secondary evidence is a copy of the instrument, which appears to have been attested by a witness, it is not necessary to call this witness. *Poole v. Warren*, 3 Nev. & P. 693. In case of the loss or destruction of the instrument, the admissions of the party may be proved, to es-

§ 559. The *production of private writings*, in which another person has an interest, may be had either by a bill of discovery, in proper cases, or, in trials at law, by a writ of *subpoena duces tecum*,¹ directed to the person who has them in his possession. The Courts of Common Law may also make an *order for the inspection for writings* in the possession of one party to a suit, in favor of the other. The extent of this power, and the nature of the order, whether it should be peremptory, or in the shape of a rule to enlarge the time to plead, unless the writing is produced, does not seem to be very clearly agreed;² and in the United States the Courts have been unwilling to exercise the power, except where it is given by statute. It seems, however, to be agreed, that where the action is *ex contractu*, and there is but one instrument between the parties, which is in the possession or power of the defendant, to which the plaintiff is either an actual party, or a party in interest, and of which he has been refused an inspection, upon request, and the production of which is necessary to enable him to declare against the defendant, the Court, or a Judge at chambers, may grant him a rule on the defendant to produce the document, or give him a copy, for that purpose.³ Such order may also be obtained by the defendant, on a special case, such as, if there is reason to suspect that the

establish both its existence and contents. *Mauri v. Heffernan*, 13 Johns. 58, 74; *Thomas v. Harding*, 8 Greenl. 417; *Corbin v. Jackson*, 14 Wend. 619. A copy of a document, taken by a machine, worked by the witness who produces it, is admissible as secondary evidence. *Simpson v. Thoreton*, 2 M. & Rob. 433.

¹ See the course in a parallel case, where a witness is out of the jurisdiction, Ante, § 320. It is no sufficient answer for a witness not obeying this subpoena, that the instrument required was not material. *Doe v. Kelly*, 4 Dowl. 273. But see *Rex v. Ld. John Russell*, 7 Dowl. 693.

² Ante, § 320.

³ 3 Chitty's Gen. Pr. 433, 434; 1 Tidd's Pr. 590, 591, 592; 1 Paine & Duer's Pr. 486-488; Graham's Practice, p. 524; *Lawrence v. Ocean Ins. Co.* 11 Johns. 245, n. (a); *Jackson v. Jones*, 3 Cowen, 17; *Wallis v. Murray*, 4 Cowen, 399; *Denslow v. Fowler*, 2 Cowen, 592; *Davenport v. McKinnie*, 5 Cowen, 27; *Utica Bank v. Hillard*, 6 Cowen, 62.

document is forged, and the defendant wishes that it may be seen by himself and his witnesses.¹ But in all such cases, the application should be supported by the *affidavit* of the party, particularly stating the circumstances.²

§ 560. When the instrument or writing is in the *hands or power of the adverse party*, there are, in general, except in the cases above mentioned, no means at law of compelling him to produce it; but the practice in such cases is, to give him or his attorney a regular *notice to produce* the original. Not that, on proof of such notice, he is compellable to give evidence against himself; but to lay a foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence of the contents of the document or writing, by showing that the party has done all in his power to produce the original.³

¹ *Brush v. Gibbon*, 3 Cowen, 18, n. (a).

² 3 Chitty's Gen. Pr. 434. See also 2 Phil. Evid. 191-201. This course being so seldom resorted to, in the American Common Law Courts, a more particular statement of the practice is deemed unnecessary in this place.

³ 2 Tidd's Pr. 802; 1 Paine & Duer's Pr. 483; Graham's Practice, p. 528. Notice to produce the instrument is not alone sufficient to admit the party to give secondary evidence of its contents. He must prove the existence of the original. *Sharp v. Lambe*, 3 P. & D. 454. He must also show that the instrument is in the possession, or under the control of the party required to produce it. *Smith v. Sleaf*, 1 Car. & Kirw. 48. But of this fact, very slight evidence will raise a sufficient presumption, where the instrument exclusively belongs to him, and has recently been, or regularly ought to be, in his possession, according to the course of business. *Henry v. Leigh*, 3 Campb. 499, 502; *Harvey v. Mitchell*, 2 M. & Rob. 366; *Robb v. Starkey*, 2 C. & K. 143. And if the instrument is in the possession of another, in privity with the party, such as his banker, or agent, or servant, or the like, notice to the party himself is sufficient. *Baldney v. Ritchie*, 1 Stark. R. 338; *Sinclair v. Stevenson*, 1 C. & P. 582; *Burton v. Payne*, 2 C. & P. 520; *Partridge v. Coates*, Ry. & M. 153, 156; *Taplin v. Atty*, 3 Bing. 164. If a deed is in the hands of an attorney having a lien upon it, as security for money due from his client, on which ground he refuses to produce it in obedience to a *subpoena duces tecum*, as he justly may; *Kemp v. King*, 2 M. & Rob. 437; the party calling for it may give secondary evidence of its contents. *Doe v. Ross*, 7 M. & W. 102. The notice to

§ 561. There are *three cases* in which such *notice to produce* is not necessary. First, where the instrument to be produced and that to be proved are *duplicate originals*; for in such case, the original being in the hands of the other party, it is in his power to contradict the duplicate original, by producing the other, if they vary;¹ secondly, where the instrument to be proved, is *itself a notice*, such as a notice to quit, or notice of the dishonor of a bill of exchange; and thirdly, where, from the *nature of the action*, the defendant has notice that the plaintiff intends to charge him with possession of the instrument; as, for example, in trover for a bill of exchange. And the principle of the rule does not require notice to the adverse party, to produce a paper belonging to a third person, of which he has fraudulently obtained possession; as, where after service of a *subpoena duces tecum*, the adverse party had received the paper from the witness, in fraud of the *subpoena*.²

§ 562. The *notice may be directed* to the party, or to his attorney, and may be *served* on either; and it must describe the writing demanded, so as to leave no doubt, that the party was aware of the particular instrument intended to be called for.³ But as to the time and place of the service, no precise rule can be laid down, except that it must be such as to enable the party, under the known circumstances of the case, to comply with the call. Generally, if the party dwells in another

produce may be given verbally. *Smith v. Young*, 1 Campb. 440. After notice and refusal to produce a paper, and secondary evidence given of its contents, the adverse party cannot afterwards produce the document as his own evidence. *Doe v. Hodgson*, 4 P. & D. 142; 12 Ad. & El. 135, S. C.

¹ *Jory v. Orchard*, 2 B. & P. 39, 41; *Doe v. Somerton*, 9 Jur. 775; *Swain v. Lewis*, 2 C. M. & R. 261.

² 2 Tidd's Pr. 803. Proof that the adverse party, or his attorney, has the instrument in Court, does not, it seems, render notice to produce it unnecessary; for the object of the notice is not only to procure the paper, but to give the party an opportunity to provide the proper testimony to support or impeach it. *Doe v. Grey*, 1 Stark. R. 283; *Exall v. Patridge*, lb. cit.; *Knight v. Marquis of Waterford*, 4 Y. & Col. 284.

³ *Rogers v. Custance*, 2 M. & Rob. 179.

town, than that in which the trial is had, a service on him at the place where the trial is had, or after he has left home to attend the Court, is not sufficient.¹ But if the party has gone abroad, leaving the cause in the hands of his attorney, it will be presumed that he left with the attorney all the papers material to the cause, and the notice should therefore be served on the latter. The notice, also, should generally be served previous to the commencement of the trial.²

§ 563. The regular time for calling for the production of papers, is not until the party who requires them has entered upon his case; until which time, the other party may refuse to produce them, and no cross-examination, as to their contents, is usually permitted.³ The production of papers, upon notice, does not make them evidence in the cause, unless the party calling for them inspects them, so as to become acquainted with their contents; in which case, the English rule is, that they are admitted as evidence for both parties.⁴ The reason is, that it would give an unconscionable advantage, to enable a party to pry into the affairs of his adversary, for the purpose of compelling him to furnish evidence against himself, without at the same time subjecting him to the risk of making what-

¹ George v. Thompson, 4 Dowl. 656; Foster v. Pointer, 9 C. & P. 718. See also, as to the time of service, Holt v. Miers, 9 C. & P. 191.

² 2 Tidd's Pr. 803; Hughes v. Budd, 8 Dowl. 315; Firkin v. Edwards, 9 C. & P. 478; Gibbons v. Powell, Ib. 634; Bate v. Kinsey, 1 C. M. & R. 38; Emerson v. Fisk, 6 Greenl. 200; 1 Paine & Duer's Pr. 485, 486. The notice must point out, with some degree of precision, the papers required. Notice to produce "all letters, papers, and documents, touching, or concerning the bill of exchange mentioned in the declaration, and the debt sought to be recovered," has been held too general. France v. Lucy, Ry. & M. 341. So, "to produce letters, and copies of letters, and all books, relating to this cause." Jones v. Edwards, 1 McCl. & Y. 139. But notice to produce all letters written by the party to, and received by the other, between the years 1837 and 1841, inclusive, was held sufficient to entitle the party to call for a particular letter. Morris v. Hauser, 2 M. & Rob. 392.

³ Ante, § 447, 463, 464.

⁴ 2 Tidd's Pr. 804; Calvert v. Flower, 7 C. & P. 386.

ever he inspects evidence for both parties. But in the American Courts, the rule on this subject is not uniform.¹

§ 564. If, on production of the instrument, it appears to have been altered, it is incumbent on the party offering it in evidence to explain this appearance. Every alteration on the face of a written instrument detracts from its credit, and renders it suspicious; and this suspicion the party claiming under it, is ordinarily held bound to remove.² If the alteration is noted in the attestation clause, as having been made before the execution of the instrument, it is sufficiently accounted for, and the instrument is relieved from that suspicion. And if it appears in the same handwriting and ink with the body of the instrument, it may suffice. So, if the alteration is against the interest of the party deriving title under the instrument, as, if it be a bond or note, altered to a less sum, the law does not so far presume that it was improperly made, as to throw on him the burden of accounting for it.³ And generally speaking, if nothing appears to the contrary, the alteration will be presumed to be contemporaneous with the execution of the instrument.⁴ But if any ground of suspicion is apparent upon

¹ 1 Paine & Duer's Pr. 484; Withers v. Gillespy, 7 S. & R. 14. The English rule was adopted in Jordan v. Wilkins, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 482, 484, n.; Randel v. Chesapeake & Del. Can. Co. 1 Harringt. R. 233, 284; Penobscot Boom Corp. v. Lamson, 4 Shepl. 224.

² Perk. Conv. 55; Henman v. Dickinson, 5 Bing. 183, 184; Knight v. Clements, 8 Ad. & El. 215; Newcomb v. Presbrey, 8 Metc. 406. But where a farm was demised from year to year by parol, and afterwards an agreement was signed, containing stipulations as to the mode of tillage, for breach of which an action was brought, and on producing the agreement it appeared that the term of years had been written seven, but altered to fourteen; it was held that this alteration, being immaterial to the parol contract, need not be explained by the plaintiff. Earl of Falmouth v. Roberts, 9 M. & W. 469. See further, Cariss v. Tattershall, 2 Man. & Gr. 890; Clifford v. Parker, Ib. 909.

³ Bailey v. Taylor, 11 Conn. R. 531; Coulson v. Walton, 9 Pet. 789.

⁴ Trowel v. Castle, 1 Keb. 22; Fitzgerald v. Fauconberg, Fitzg. 207, 213; Bailey v. Taylor, 11 Conn. R. 531, 534; Gooch v. Bryant, 1 Shepl. 386, 390; Pullen v. Hutchinson, 12 Shepl. 249, 254. In Morris v. Vande-

the face of the instrument, the law presumes nothing, but leaves the question of the time when it was done, as well as that of the person by whom, and the intent with which the alteration was made, as matters of fact, to be ultimately found by the Jury, upon proofs to be adduced by the party offering the instrument in evidence.¹

§ 565. Though the effect of the alteration of a legal instrument is generally discussed with reference to deeds, yet the principle is *applicable to all other instruments*. The early decisions were chiefly upon deeds, because almost all written engagements were anciently in that form; but they establish the general proposition, that written instruments, which are *altered*, in the legal sense of that term, as hereafter

ren, 1 Dall. 67, and Prevost v. Gratz, 1 Pet. C. C. R. 364, 369, it was held, that an alteration should be presumed to have been made *after* the execution of the instrument; but this has been overruled in the United States, as contrary to the principle of the law, which never presumes wrong. The reporters' marginal notes in *Burgoyne v. Showler*, 1 Rob. Eccl. R. 5, and *Cooper v. Bockett*, 4 Moore, P. C. C. 419, state the broad proposition, that alterations in a *will*, not accounted for, are *prima facie* presumed to have been made after its execution. But on examination of these cases they will be found to turn entirely on the provisions of the statute of Wills, 1 Vict. c. 26, § 21, which directs that all alterations, made before the execution of the will, be noted in a memorandum upon the will, and attested by the testator and witnesses. If this direction is not complied with, it may well be presumed that the alterations were subsequently made.

¹ Knight v. Clements, 8 Ad. & El. 215; Cariss v. Tattershall, 2 M. & Gr. 890; Clifford v. Parker, Ib. 909; Vanhorne v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304; Gooch v. Bryant, 1 Shepl. 386; Wickes v. Caulk, 5 H. & J. 41; Horry Dist. v. Hanison, 1 N. & McC. 554; Whitfield v. Collingwood, 1 Car. & Kir. 325; Gillett v. Sweat, 1 Gilman, R. 475; Cumberland Bank v. Hall, 1 Halst. 215; Haffelfinger v. Shutz, 16 S. & R. 44; Bishop v. Chambre, 1 M. & Malk. 116; Jackson v. Osborn, 2 Wend. 555; Johnson v. D. of Marlborough, 2 Stark. R. 278; Emerson v. Murray, 4 N. Hamp. 171; Bailey v. Taylor, 11 Conn. 531; Taylor v. Mosely, 6 C. & P. 273; Whitfield v. Collingwood, 1 Car. & Kir. 325. All these questions are of course determined, in the first instance, by the Court, when they are raised upon a preliminary objection to the admissibility of the instrument; but they are again open to the Jury. *Ross v. Gould*, 5 Greenl. 204.

explained, are *thereby made void*.¹ The grounds of this doctrine are twofold. The first is that of public policy, to prevent fraud, by not permitting a man to take the chance of committing a fraud, without running any risk of losing by the event, when it is detected.² The other is to insure the identity of the instrument, and prevent the substitution of another, without the privity of the party concerned.³ The instrument derives its legal virtue from its being the sole repository of the agreement of the parties, solemnly adopted as such, and attested by the signature of the party engaging to perform it. Any alteration, therefore, which causes it to speak a language different in legal effect from that which it originally spake, is a material alteration.

§ 566. A distinction, however, is to be observed, between the *alteration* and the *spoliation* of an instrument, as to the legal consequences. An *alteration*, is an act done upon the instrument, by which its meaning or language is changed. If what is written upon or erased from the instrument has no tendency to produce this result, or to mislead any person, it is not an alteration. The term is, at this day, usually applied to the act of the party, entitled under the deed or instrument, and imports some fraud or improper design on his part to change its effect. But the act of a stranger, without the participation of the party interested, is a mere *spoliation*, or mutilation of the instrument, not changing its legal operation, so long as the original writing remains legible, and, if it be a deed, any trace remains of the seal. If, by the unlawful act of a stranger, the instrument is mutilated or

¹ *Masters v. Miller*, 4 T. R. 329, 330; *Newell v. Mayberry*, 3 Leigh, R. 250.

² *Masters v. Miller*, 4 T. R. 329, per *Ld. Kenyon*.

³ *Sanderson v. Symonds*, 1 B. & B. 430, per *Dallas, C. J.* It is on this ground that the alteration of a deed in an immaterial part is sometimes fatal, where its identity is put in issue by the pleadings, every part of the writing being then material to the identity. See *Ante*, § 58, 69; *Hunt v. Adams*, 6 Mass. 521.

defaced, so that its identity is gone, the law regards the act, so far as the rights of the parties to the instrument are concerned, merely as an accidental destruction of primary evidence, compelling a resort to that which is secondary. Thus, if it be a deed, and the party would plead it, it cannot be pleaded with a *profert*, but the want of *profert* must be excused by an allegation that the deed, meaning its legal identity as a deed, has been accidentally, and without the fault of the party, destroyed.¹ And whether it be a deed or other instrument, its original tenor must be substantially shown, and the alteration or mutilation accounted for, in the same manner as if it were lost.

§ 567. In considering the effect of alterations *made by the party himself*, who holds the instrument, a *further distinction* is to be observed, between the insertion of *those words which the law would supply*, and those of a different character. If

¹ Powers v. Ware, 2 Pick. 451; Read v. Brookman, 3 T. R. 152; Morrill v. Otis, 12 N. Hamp. R. 466. The necessity of some fraudulent intent, carried home to the party claiming under the instrument, in order to render the alteration fatal, was strongly insisted on by Buller, J., in Masters v. Miller, 4 T. R. 334, 335. And, on this ground, at least tacitly assumed, the old cases, to the effect that an alteration of a deed by a stranger, in a material part, avoids the deed, have been overruled. In the following cases, the alteration of a writing, without fraudulent intent, has been treated as a merely accidental spoliation. Henfree v. Bromley, 6 East, 309; Cutts, in error v. United States, 1 Gall. 69; United States v. Spaulding, 2 Mason, 478; Rees v. Overbaugh, 6 Cowen, 746; Lewis v. Payn, 8 Cowen, 71; Jackson v. Malin, 15 Johns. 297, per Platt, J.; Nichols v. Johnson, 10 Conn. 192; Marshall v. Gougler, 10 S. & R. 164; Palm. 403; Wilkinson v. Johnson, 3 B. & C. 428; Raper v. Birkbeck, 15 East, 17. The old doctrine, that every material alteration of a deed, even by a stranger, and without privity of either party, avoided the deed, was strongly condemned by Story, J., in United States v. Spaulding, *supra*, as repugnant to common sense and justice, as inflicting on an innocent party all the losses occasioned by mistake, by accident, by the wrongful acts of third persons, or by the providence of Heaven; and which ought to have the support of unbroken authority before a Court of Law was bound to surrender its judgment, to what deserved no better name than a technical quibble.

the law would have supplied the words which were omitted, and were afterwards inserted by the party, it has been repeatedly held, that even his own insertion of them will not vitiate the instrument; for the assent of the obligor will in such cases be presumed. It is not an *alteration*, in the sense of the law, avoiding the instrument; although, if it be a deed, and to be set forth *in hæc verba*, it should be recited as it was originally written.¹

§ 568. It has been strongly doubted, whether an *immaterial* alteration, in any matter, though made *by the obligee himself*, will avoid the instrument, provided it be done innocently, and to no injurious purpose.² But, if the alteration be *fraudulently made*, by the party claiming under the instrument, it does not seem important whether it be in a material or an immaterial part; for in either case he has brought himself under the operation of the rule, established for the prevention of fraud; and having fraudulently destroyed the identity of the instrument, he must take the peril of all the consequences.³ But here also, a further distinction is to be observed, between deeds of conveyance and covenants; and also between covenants or agreements executed, and those which are still executory. For if the grantee of land alter or destroy his title deed, yet his title to the land is not gone. It passed to him by the deed; the deed has performed its office, as an instrument of conveyance; and its continued existence is not necessary to the continuance of title in the grantee; but the estate remains in him, until it has passed to another by some mode of conveyance,

¹ Hunt v. Adams, 6 Mass. 519, 522; Waugh v. Bussell, 5 Taunt. 707; Paget v. Paget, 3 Chan. Rep. 410; Zouch v. Clay, 1 Vent. 185; Smith v. Crooker, 5 Mass. 538; Hale v. Russ, 1 Greenl. 334; Knapp v. Maltby, 13 Wend. 587; Brown v. Pinkham, 18 Pick. 172.

² Hatch v. Hatch, 9 Mass. 311, per Sewall, J.; Smith v. Dunbar, 8 Pick. 246.

³ If an obligee procure a person, who was not present at the execution of the bond, to sign his name as an attesting witness, this is *prima facie* evidence of fraud, and avoids the bond. Adams v. Frye, 3 Metc. 103.

recognised by the law.¹ The same principle applies to contracts executed, in regard to the acts done under them. If the estate lies in grant, and cannot exist without deed, it is said that any alteration, by the party claiming the estate, will avoid the deed as to him, and that therefore the estate itself, as well as all remedy upon the deed, will be utterly gone.² But whether it be a deed conveying real estate or not, it seems well settled that any alteration in the instrument, made by the grantee or obligee, if it be made with a fraudulent design, and do not consist in the insertion of words which the law would supply, is fatal to the instrument, as the foundation of any remedy at law, upon the covenants or undertakings contained in it.³ And in such case, it seems, that the party will not be permitted to prove the covenant or promise, by other evidence.⁴ But where there are several parties to an indenture, some of whom have executed it, and in the progress of the transaction it is altered as to those who have not signed it, without the knowledge of those who have, but yet in a part

¹ *Hatch v. Hatch*, 9 Mass. 307; *Dr. Leyfield's case*, 10 Co. 88; *Bolton v. Carlisle*, 2 H. Bl. 259; *Davis v. Spooner*, 3 Pick. 284; *Barrett v. Thorndike*, 1 Greenl. 73; *Lewis v. Payn*, 8 Cowen, 71; *Jackson v. Gould*, 7 Wend. 364; *Beckrow's case*, Hetl. 138. Whether the deed may still be read by the party, as evidence of title, is not agreed. That it may be read, see *Doe v. Hirst*, 3 Stark. R. 60; *Lewis v. Payn*, 8 Cowen, 71; *Jackson v. Gould*, 7 Wend. 364. That it may not, see *Babb v. Clemson*, 10 S. & R. 419; *Withers v. Atkinson*, 1 Watts, 236; *Chesley v. Frost*, 1 N. Hamp. 145; *Newell v. Mayberry*, 3 Leigh, R. 250.

² *More v. Salter*, 3 Bulstr. 79, per Coke, C. J.; *Lewis v. Payn*, 8 Cowen, 71.

³ *Ibid.* *Davidson v. Cooper*, 11 M. & W. 778; *Jackson v. Gould*, 7 Wend. 364; *Hatch v. Hatch*, 9 Mass. 307; *Barrett v. Thorndike*, 1 Greenl. 73; *Withers v. Atkinson*, 1 Watts, 236; *Arrison v. Harmstead*, 2 Barr, 191; *Whitmer v. Frye*, 10 Missouri R. 348.

⁴ *Martindale v. Follet*, 1 N. Hamp. 95; *Newell v. Mayberry*, 3 Leigh, R. 250; *Blade v. Nolan*, 12 Wend. 173; *Arrison v. Harmstead*, 2 Barr, 191. The strictness of the English rule, that every alteration of a bill of exchange, or promissory note, even by consent of the parties, renders it utterly void, has particular reference to the stamp act of 1 Ann. St. 2, c. 22. *Chitty on Bills*, p. 207-214.

not at all affecting the latter, and then is executed by the residue, it is good as to all.¹

§ 568 *a*. In all these cases of alterations, it is further to be remarked, that they are supposed to have been made without the consent of the other party. For, if the alteration is *made by consent of parties*, such as by the filling up of blanks, or the like, it is valid.² But here, also, a distinction has been taken between the insertion of matter, essential to the existence and operation of the instrument as a deed, and that which is not essential to its operation. Accordingly, it has been held, that an instrument, which, when formally executed, was deficient in some material part, so as to be incapable of any operation at all, and was no deed, could not afterwards become a deed, by being completed and delivered by a stranger, in the absence of the party who executed it, and unauthorized by an instrument under seal.³ Yet this rule, again, has its exceptions, in divers cases, such as powers of attorney to transfer stock,⁴ navy bills,⁵ custom-house bonds,⁶ appeal bonds,⁷ bail bonds,⁸ and the like, which have been held good, though executed in blank, and afterwards filled up by parol authority only.⁹

¹ *Doe v. Bingham*, 4 B. & Ald. 672, 675, per Bayley, J.; *Hibblewhite v. McMorine*, 6 M. & W. 208, 209.

² *Markham v. Gonaston*, Cro. El. 626; *Moor*, 547; *Zouch v. Clay*, 1 Ventr. 185; 2 Lev. 35. So, where a power of attorney was sent to B., with his christian name in blank, which he filled by inserting it, this was held valid. *Eagleton v. Gutteridge*, 11 M. & W. 468. This consent may be implied. *Hale v. Russ*, 1 Greenl. 34; *Smith v. Crooker*, 5 Mass. 538; 19 Johns. 396, per Kent. C.

³ *Hibblewhite v. McMorine*, 6 M. & W. 200, 216.

⁴ *Commercial Bank of Buffalo v. Kortwright*, 22 Wend. 348.

⁵ Per *Wilson, J.* in *Masters v. Miller*, 1 Anstr. 229.

⁶ 22 Wend. 366.

⁷ *Ex parte Decker*, 6 Cowen, 59; *Ex parte Kerwin*, 8 Cowen, 118.

⁸ *Hale v. Russ*, 1 Greenl. 334; *Gordon v. Jeffreys*, 2 Leigh, R. 410; *Vanhook v. Barrett*, 4 Dev. Law R. 272. But see *Harrison v. Tiernans*, 1 Randolph, R. 177; *Gilbert v. Anthony*, 1 Yerger, 69.

⁹ In *Texira v. Evans*, cited 1 Anstr. 228, where one executed a bond in

§ 569. The instrument, being thus produced and freed from suspicion, must be *proved by the subscribing witnesses*, if there

blank, and sent it into the money-market to raise a loan upon, and it was negotiated, and filled up by parol authority only, Lord Mansfield held it a good bond. This decision was questioned by Mr. Preston, in his edition of *Shep. Touchst.* p. 68, and it was expressly overruled in *Hibblewhite v. McMorine*, 6 M. & W. 215. It is also contradicted by *McKee v. Hicks*, 2 Dev. Law R. 379, and some other American cases. But it was confirmed in *Wiley v. Moor*, 17 S. & R. 438; *Knapp v. Maltby*, 13 Wend. 587; *Commercial Bank of Buffalo v. Kortwright*, 22 Wend. 348; *Boardman v. Gore*, 1 Stewart, Alab. R. 517; *Duncan v. Hodges*, 4 McCord, 239; and in several other cases the same doctrine has been recognised. In *The United States v. Nelson*, 2 Brockenbrough, R. 64, 74, 75, which was the case of a paymaster's bond, executed in blank and afterwards filled up, Chief Justice Marshall, before whom it was tried, felt bound by the weight of authority, to decide against the bond; but expressed his opinion, that in principle it was valid, and his belief that his judgment would be reversed in the Supreme Court of the United States; but the cause was not carried farther. Instruments executed in this manner have become very common, and the authorities, as to their validity, are distressingly in conflict. But upon the principle adopted in *Hudson v. Revett*, 5 Bing. 368, there is very little difficulty in holding such instruments valid, and thus giving full effect to the actual intentions of the parties, without the violation of any rule of law. In that case, the defendant executed and delivered a deed, conveying his property to trustees, to sell for the benefit of his creditors, the particulars of whose demands were stated in the deed; but a blank was left for one of the principal debts, the exact amount of which was subsequently ascertained and inserted in the deed, in the grantor's presence, and with his assent, by the attorney who had prepared the deed and had it in his possession, he being one of the trustees. The defendant afterwards recognised the deed as valid, in various transactions. It was held that the deed was not intended to be a complete and perfect deed, until all the blanks were filled, and that the act of the grantor, in assenting to the filling of the blank, amounted to a delivery of the deed, thus completed. No formality, either of words or action, is prescribed by the law as essential to delivery. Nor is it material how or when the deed came into the hands of the grantee. Delivery, in the legal sense, consists in the transfer of the possession and dominion; and whenever the grantor assents to the possession of the deed by the grantee, as an instrument of title, then, and not until then, the delivery is complete. The possession of the instrument by the grantee may be simultaneous with this act of the grantor's mind, or it may have been long before; but it is this assent of the grantor which changes the character of that prior possession, and imparts validity to the deed. Mr. Preston

be any, or at least by one of them. Various reasons have been assigned for this rule; but that upon which it seems best founded is, that a fact may be known to the subscribing witness, not within the knowledge or recollection of the obligor; and that he is entitled to avail himself of all the knowledge of the subscribing witness, relative to the transaction.¹ The party, to whose execution he is a witness, is considered as invoking him, as the person to whom he refers, to prove what passed at the time of attestation.² The rule, though origi-

observes, that "all cases of this sort depend on the inquiry whether the intended grantor has given sanction to the instrument, so as to make it conclusively his deed." 3 Preston on Abstracts, p. 64. And see *Parker v. Hill*, 8 Metc. 447; *Hope v. Harman*, 11 Jur. 1097; Post, Vol. 2, § 297. The same effect was given to clear and unequivocal acts of assent *en pais*, by a feme mortgagor, after the death of her husband, as amounting to a re-delivery of a deed of mortgage, executed by her while a feme covert. *Goodright v. Straphan*, Cowp. 201, 204; *Shep. Touchst.* by Preston, p. 58. "The general rule," said Mr. Justice Johnson, in delivering the judgment of the Court, in *Duncan v. Hodges*, "is, that if a blank be signed, sealed, and delivered, and afterwards written, it is no deed; and the obvious reason is, that as there was nothing of substance contained in it, nothing could pass by it. But the rule was never intended to prescribe to the grantor the order of time, in which the several parts of a deed should be written. A thing to be granted, a person to whom, and the sealing and delivery, are some of those which are necessary, and the whole is consummated by the delivery; and if the grantor should think proper to reverse this order, in the manner of execution, but in the end makes it perfect before the delivery, it is a good deed." See 4 McCord, R. 239, 240. Whenever, therefore, a deed is materially altered, by consent of the parties, after its formal execution, the grantor or obligor assents that the grantee or obligee shall retain it in its altered and completed form, as an instrument of title; and this assent amounts to a delivery or re-delivery, as the case may require, and warrants the Jury in finding accordingly. Such plainly was the opinion of the learned Judges in *Hudson v. Revett*, as stated by Best, C. J. in 5 Bing. 388, 389; and further expounded in *West v. Steward*, 14 M. & W. 47. See also *Hartley v. Manson*, 4 M. & G. 172; *Story on Bailments*, § 55.

¹ Per Le Blanc, J., in *Call v. Dunning*, 4 East, 54; *Manners v. Postan*, 4 Esp. 240, per Lord Alvanley, C. J.; 3 Preston on Abstracts of Title, p. 73.

² *Cussons v. Skinner*, 11 M. & W. 168, per Ld. Abinger; *Hollenback v. Fleming*, 6 Hill, N. Y. Rep. 303.

nally framed in regard to deeds, is now extended to every species of writing, attested by a witness.¹ Such being the principle of the rule, its application has been held indispensable, even where it was proved that the obligor had admitted that he had executed the bond;² and though the admission were made in answer to a bill of discovery.³

§ 569 *a.* A *subscribing witness* is one who was present when the instrument was executed, and who, at that time, at the request or with the assent of the party, subscribed his name to it, as a witness of the execution. If his name is signed not by himself, but by the party, it is no attestation. Neither is it such, if, though present at the execution, he did not subscribe the instrument at that time, but did it afterwards and without request, or by the fraudulent procurement of the other party. But it is not necessary that he should have actually seen the party sign, nor have been present at the very moment of signing; for if he is called in immediately afterwards, and the party acknowledges his signature to the witness, and requests him to attest it, this will be deemed part of the transaction, and therefore a sufficient attestation.⁴

¹ Doe v. Durnford, 2 M. & S. 62; which was a notice to quit. So, of a warrant to distrain. Higgs v. Dixon, 2 Stark. R. 180. A receipt. Heckert v. Haine, 6 Binn. 16; Wishart v. Downey, 15 S. & R. 77; Mahan v. McGrady, 5 S. & R. 314.

² Abbot v. Plumbe, 1 Doug. 216, referred to by Lawrence, J. in 7 T. R. 267, and again in 2 East, 187, and confirmed by Ld. Ellenborough, as an inexorable rule, in Rex v. Harringworth, 4 M. & S. 353. The admission of the party may be given in evidence; but the witness must also be produced, if to be had. This rule was broken in upon, in the case of the admitted execution of a promissory note, in Hall v. Phelps, 2 Johns. 451; but the rule was afterwards recognised as binding in the case of a deed, in Fox v. Reil, 3 Johns. 477, and confirmed in Henry v. Bishop, 2 Wend. 575.

³ Call v. Dunning, 4 East, 53. But see Bowles v. Langworthy, 5 T. R. 366.

⁴ Hollenback v. Fleming, 6 Hill, N. Y. Rep. 303; Cussons v. Skinner, 11 M. & W. 168; Ledgard v. Thompson, Ibid. 41, per Parke, B. And see Brckett v. Mountfort, 2 Fairf. 115. See further, on signature and attestation, Post, Vol. 2, tit. WILLS, § 674, 676, 678.

§ 570. To this rule, requiring the production of the subscribing witnesses, there are several *classes of exceptions*. The *first* is, where the *instrument is thirty years old*; in which case, as we have heretofore seen,¹ it is said to prove itself, the subscribing witnesses being presumed to be dead, and other proof being presumed to be beyond the reach of the party. But such documents must be free from just grounds of suspicion, and must come from the proper custody,² or have been acted upon, so as to afford some corroborative proof of their genuineness.³ And in this case it is not necessary to call the subscribing witnesses, though they be living.⁴ This

¹ Ante, § 21, and cases there cited. From the dictum of Parker, C. J., in Emerson v. Tolman, 4 Pick. 162, it has been inferred, that the subscribing witnesses must be produced, if living, though the deed be more than thirty years old. But the case of Jackson v. Blanshan, 3 Johns. 292, which is there referred to, contains no such doctrine. The question in the latter case, which was the case of a will, was, whether the thirty years should be computed from the date of the will, or from the time of the testator's death; and the Court held that it should be computed from the time of his death. But on this point, Spencer, J. differed from the rest of the Court; and his opinion, which seems more consistent with the principle of the rule, is fully sustained by Doe v. Deakin, 3 C. & P. 402; Doe v. Wolley, 8 B. & C. 22; McKenire v. Frazer, 9 Ves. 5; Gough v. Gough, 4 T. R. 707, n. See Adams on Eject. p. 260. And it was accordingly so decided, in Man v. Ricketts, 7 Beavan, R. 93.

² Ante, § 142.

³ See Ante, § 21, 142, and cases there cited; Doe d. Edgett v. Stiles, 1 Kerr's Rep. (New Br.) 338. Mr. Evans thinks, that the antiquity of the deed is alone sufficient to entitle it to be read; and that the other circumstances only go to its effect in evidence; 2 Poth. Obl. App. xvi. sec. 5, p. 149. See also Doe v. Burdett, 4 Ad. & El. 1, 19; Brett v. Beales, 1 M. & Malk. 416, 418; Jackson v. Larroway, 3 Johns. Cas. 283. In some cases, proof of possession, under the deed or will, seems to have been deemed indispensable; but the principle pervading them all is that of corroboration merely; that is, that some evidence shall be offered, auxiliary to the apparent antiquity of the instrument, to raise a sufficient presumption in its favor.

⁴ Marsh v. Colnett, 2 Esp. 665; Doe v. Burdett, 4 Ad. & El. 1, 19; Doe v. Deakin, 3 C. & P. 402; Jackson v. Christman, 4 Wend. 277, 282, 283; Doe v. Wolley, 8 B. & C. 22; Fetherly v. Waggoner, 11 Wend. 603; Ante, § 142.

exception is co-extensive with the rule, applying to ancient writings of every description, provided they have been brought from the proper custody and place; for the finding them in such a custody and place is a presumption that they were honestly and fairly obtained, and preserved for use, and are free from suspicion of dishonesty.¹ But whether it extends to the seal of a private corporation, has been doubted, for such a case does not seem clearly to be within the principle of the exception.²

§ 571. A *second exception* to this rule, is allowed where the instrument is *produced by the adverse party*, pursuant to notice, the party producing it *claiming an interest* under the instrument. In this case, the party producing the instrument is not permitted to call on the other for proof of its execution; for, by claiming an interest under the instrument, he has admitted its execution.³ The same principle is applied where both parties claim similar interests, under the same deed; in which case, the fact of such claim may be shown by parol.⁴ So, where both parties claim under the same ancestor, his title deed, being equally presumable to be in the possession of either, may be proved by a copy from the registry.⁵ But it

¹ 12 Vin. Abr. tit. *Evidence*, A. b. 5, pl. 7, cited by Ld. Ellenborough in *Roe v. Rawlings*, 7 East, 291; *Gov. &c. of Chelsea Waterworks v. Cowper*, 1 Esp. R. 275; *Forbes v. Wale*, 1 W. Bl. 532; *Wynne v. Tyrwhitt*, 4 B. & Ald. 376.

² *Rex v. Bathwick*, 2 B. & Ad. 639, 648.

³ *Pearce v. Hooper*, 3 Taunt. 60; *Carr v. Burdiss*, 1 C. M. & R. 784, 785; *Orr v. Morice*, 3 Br. & Bing. 139; *Bradshaw v. Bennett*, 1 M. & Rob. 143. In assumpsit by a servant against his master, for breach of a written contract of service, the agreement being produced under notice, proof of it by the attesting witness was held unnecessary. *Bell v. Chaytor*, 1 Car. & Kirw. 162; 5 C. & P. 48.

⁴ *Doe v. Wilkins*, 4 Ad. & El. 86; 5 Nev. & M. 434, S. C.; *Knight v. Martin*, 1 Gow, R. 26.

⁵ *Burghardt v. Turner*, 12 Pick. 534. It being the general practice in the United States, for the grantor to retain his own title deeds, instead of delivering them over to the grantee, the grantee is not held bound to produce them;

seems that the interest claimed in these cases must be of an *abiding nature*. Therefore, where the defendant would show that he was a partner with the plaintiff, and in proof thereof called on the plaintiff to produce a written personal contract, made between them both as partners, of the one part, and a third person of the other part, for labor which had been performed, which was produced accordingly, the defendant was still held bound to prove its execution.¹ The interest, also, which is claimed under the instrument produced on notice, must, in order to dispense with this rule, be *an interest claimed in the same cause*. Therefore, where in an action by an agent against his principal, for his commission due for procuring him an apprentice, the indenture of apprenticeship was produced by the defendant on notice; it was held that the plaintiff was still bound to prove its execution by the subscribing witness; and that, having been nonsuited for want of this evidence, he was not entitled to a new trial on the ground of surprise, though he was not previously aware that there was a subscribing witness, it not appearing that he had made any inquiry on the subject.²

§ 572. A *third class* of exceptions to this rule arises from the circumstances of the witnesses themselves, the party, either from *physical or legal obstacles*, being *unable to adduce* them.

but the person, making title to lands is, in general, permitted to read certified copies from the registry, of all deeds and instruments under which he claims, and to which he is not himself a party, and of which he is not supposed to have the control. *Seanlan v. Wright*, 13 Pick. 523; *Woodman v. Coolbroth*, 7 Greenl. 181; *Loomis v. Bedel*, 11 N. Hamp. 74. And where a copy is, on this ground, admissible, it has been held that the original might be read in evidence, without proof of its formal execution. *Knox v. Silloway*, 1 Fairf. 201. This practice, however, has been restricted to instruments which are by law required to be registered, and to transmissions of title *inter vivos*; for if the party claims by descent from a grantee, it has been held that he must produce the deed to his ancestor, in the same manner as the ancestor himself would be obliged to do. *Kelsey v. Hanmer*, 18 Conn. R. 311.

¹ *Collins v. Bayntun*, 1 Ad. & El. N. S. 117.

² *Rearden v. Minter*, 5 M. & Gr. 204.

Thus, if the witness is proved or presumed to be dead;¹ or, cannot be found, after diligent inquiry;² or, is resident beyond sea;³ or, is out of the jurisdiction of the Court;⁴ or, is a fictitious person, whose name has been placed upon the deed by the party who made it;⁵ or, if the instrument is lost, and the name of the subscribing witness is unknown;⁶ or, if the witness is insane;⁷ or, has subsequently become infamous;⁸ or, has become the adverse party;⁹ or, has been made executor or administrator to one of the parties, or has otherwise, and without the agency of the party, subsequently become interested, or otherwise incapacitated;¹⁰ or, was incapacitated

¹ Anon. 12 Mod. 607; Barnes v. Trompowsky, 7 T. R. 265; Adams v. Kerr, 1 B. & P. 360; Banks v. Farquharson, 1 Dick. 167; Mott v. Doughty, 1 Johns. Ca. 230; Dudley v. Sumner, 5 Mass. 463. That the witness is sick, even though despaired of, is not sufficient. Harrison v. Blades, 3 Campb. 457. See Ante, § 272, n., as to the mode of proving the attestation of a marksman.

² Coghlan v. Williamson, 1 Doug. 93; Cunliffe v. Sefton, 2 East, 183; Call v. Dunning, 5 Esp. 16; 4 East, 53; Crosby v. Piercy, 1 Taunt. 364; Jones v. Brinkley, 1 Hayw. 20; Anon. 12 Mod. 607; Wardell v. Ferner, 2 Campb. 282; Jackson v. Burton, 11 Johns. 64; Mills v. Twist, 8 Johns. 121; Parker v. Haskins, 2 Taunt. 223; Whittemore v. Brooks, 1 Greenl. 57; Burt v. Walker, 4 B. & Ald. 697; Pytt v. Griffith, 6 Moore, 538.

³ Anon. 12 Mod. 607; Barnes v. Trompowsky, 7 T. R. 266.

⁴ Holmes v. Pontin, Peake's Cas. 99; Banks v. Farquharson, 1 Dick. 167; Cooper v. Marsden, 1 Esp. 1; Prince v. Blackburn, 2 East, 250. Sluby v. Champlin, 4 Johns. 461; Dudley v. Sumner, 5 Mass. 444; Homer v. Wallis, 11 Mass. 309; Cooke v. Woodrow, 5 Cranch, 13; Baker v. Blunt, 2 Hayw. 404; Hodnett v. Forman, 1 Stark. R. 90; Glubb v. Edwards, 2 M. & Rob. 300; Engles v. Bruington, 4 Yeates, R. 345; Wiley v. Bean, 1 Gilman, R. 302; Dunbar v. Marden, 13 N. Hamp. R. 311. If the witness has set out to leave the jurisdiction by sea, but the ship has been beaten back, he is still considered absent. Ward v. Wells, 1 Taunt. 461. See also Emery v. Twombly, 5 Shepl. 65.

⁵ Fassett v. Brown, Peake's Cas. 23.

⁶ Keeling v. Ball, Peake's Ev. App. 78.

⁷ Currie v. Child, 3 Campb. 283. See also 3 T. R. 712, per Buller, J.

⁸ Jones v. Mason, 2 Stra. 833. If the conviction were previous to the attestation, it is as if not attested at all. 1 Stark. Evid. 325.

⁹ Strange v. Dashwood, 1 Cooper's Ch. Cas. 497.

¹⁰ Goss v. Tracy, 1 P. Wms. 289; Godfrey v. Norris, 1 Stra. 34; Davison

at the time of signing, but the fact was not known to the party;¹ in all these cases, the execution of the instrument may be proved by other evidence. If the adverse party, pending the cause, solemnly agrees to admit the execution, other proof is not necessary.² And if the witness being called, denies, or does not recollect having seen it executed, it may be established by other evidence.³ If the witness has become blind, it has been held that this did not excuse the party from calling him; for he may be able still to testify to other parts of the *res gestæ* at the time of signing.⁴ If the witness was infamous at the time of attestation, or was interested, and continues so, the

v. Bloomer, 1 Dall. 123; Bulkley v. Smith, 2 Esp. 697; Cunliffe v. Sefton, 2 East, 183; Burrett v. Taylor, 9 Ves. 381; Hamilton v. Marsden, 6 Binn. 45; Hamilton v. Williams, 1 Hayw. 139; Hovill v. Stephenson, 5 Bing. 493; per Best, C. J.; Saunders v. Ferrill, 1 Iredell, R. 97. And see, as to the manner of acquiring the interest, Ante, § 418.

¹ Nelius v. Brickell, 1 Hayw. 19. In this case the witness was the wife of the obligor. But see Amherst Bank v. Root, 2 Metc. 522, that if the subscribing witness was interested at the time of attestation, and is dead at the time of trial, his handwriting may not be proved.

² Lang v. Raine, 2 B. & P. 85.

³ Abbott v. Plumbe, 1 Doug. 216; Leshner v. Levan, 1 Dall. 96; Ley v. Ballard, 3 Esp. 173, n.; Powell v. Blackett, 1 Esp. 97; Park v. Mears, 3 Esp. 171; Fitzgerald v. Elsee, 2 Campb. 635; Blarion v. Toon, Skin. 639; McCraw v. Gentry, 3 Campb. 132; Grellier v. Neale, Peake's Cas. 145; Whitaker v. Salisbury, 15 Pick. 534; Quimby v. Buzzell, 4 Shepl. 470; Ante, § 272. Where one of the attesting witnesses to a will has no recollection of having subscribed it, but testifies that the signature of his name thereto is genuine; the testimony of another attesting witness, that the first did subscribe his name in the testator's presence, is sufficient evidence of that fact. Dewey v. Dewey, 1 Metc. 349. See also Quimby v. Buzzell, 4 Shepl. 470; New Haven Co. Bank v. Mitchell, 15 Conn. R. 206. If the witness to a deed recollects seeing the signature only, but the attesting clause is in the usual formula, the Jury will be advised, in the absence of controlling circumstances, to find the sealing and delivery also. Burling v. Paterson, 9 C. & P. 570. See Ante, § 38 a.

⁴ Cronk v. Frith, 9 C. & P. 197; 2 M. & Rob. 262, S. C., per Ld. Abinger, C. B. In a former case of Pedler v. Paige, 1 M. & Rob. 258, Park, J. expressed himself of the same opinion, but felt bound by the opposite ruling of Ld. Holt, in Wood v. Drury, 1 Ld. Raym. 734.

party not then knowing the fact, the attestation is treated as a nullity.¹

§ 573. A *fourth* exception has been sometimes admitted, in regard to *office bonds*, required by law to be taken in the name of some public functionary, in trust for the benefit of all persons concerned, and to be preserved in the public registry for their protection and use; of the due execution of which, as well as of their sufficiency, such officer must first be satisfied and the bond approved, before the party is qualified to enter upon the duties of his office. Such, for example, are the bonds given for their official fidelity and good conduct, by *guardians, executors, and administrators*, to the Judge of Probate. Such documents, it is said, have a high character of authenticity, and need not be verified by the ordinary tests of truth, applied to merely private instruments, namely, the testimony of the subscribing witnesses; but when they are taken from the proper public repository, it is only necessary to prove the identity of the obligor with the party in the action.² Whether this exception, recently asserted, will be generally admitted, remains to be seen.

¹ *Swire v. Bell*, 5 T. R. 371; *Honeywood v. Peacock*, 3 Campb. 196; *Amherst Bank v. Root*, 2 Metc. 521.

² *Kello v. Maget*, 1 Dev. & Bat. 414. The case of *deeds enrolled* would require a distinct consideration in this place, were not the practice so various in the different States, as to reduce the subject to a mere question of local law, not falling within the plan of this work. In general, it may be remarked, that in all the United States, provision is made for the registration and enrollment of deeds of conveyance of lands; and that, prior to such registration, the deed must be acknowledged by the grantor, before the designated magistrate; and, in case of the death or refusal of the grantor, and in some other enumerated cases, the deed must be *proved* by witnesses, either before a magistrate, or in a Court of record. But, generally speaking, such acknowledgment is merely designed to entitle the deed to registration, and registration is, in most States, not essential to passing the estate, but is only intended to give notoriety to the conveyance, as a substitute for livery of seisin. And such acknowledgment is not generally received, as *prima facie* evidence of the execution of the deed, unless by force of some statute, or immemorial usage, rendering it so; but the grantor, or party to be affected by the instrument, may still controvert its validity. But where the deed

§ 573 *a*. A further exception to this rule has been admitted, in the case of letters received in reply to others proved to have been sent to the party. Thus where the plaintiff's attorney wrote a letter addressed to the defendant at his residence, and sent it by the post, to which he received a reply purporting to be from the defendant; it was held, that the letter thus received was admissible in evidence, without proof of the defendant's handwriting; and that letters of an earlier date in the same handwriting, might also be read, without other proof.¹

§ 574. The *degree of diligence in the search* for the subscribing witnesses, is the same which is required in the search for a lost paper, the principle being the same in both cases.² It must be a strict, diligent, and honest inquiry and search, satisfactory to the Court, under the circumstances of the case. It should be made at the residence of the witness, if known, and at all other places where he may be expected to be found; and inquiry should be made of his relatives, and others who may be supposed to be able to afford information. And the answers given to such inquiries may be given in evidence, they being not hearsay, but parts of the *res gestæ*.³ If there is more than one attesting witness, the absence of them all must be satisfactorily accounted for, in order to let in the secondary evidence.⁴

falls under one of the exceptions, and has been proved *per testes*, there seems to be good reason for receiving this probate, duly authenticated, as sufficient *prima facie* proof of the execution; but no certain rule is known to have been established upon this point. The American cases on this subject, which are very numerous, are collected in Cowen & Hill's note 874, to 1 Phil. Evid. 464. The English doctrine is found in 2 Phil. Evid. 243-247; 1 Stark. Evid. 355-358. And see Mr. Metcalf's note to 1 Stark. Evid. 357; *Brotherton v. Livingston*, 3 Watts & Serg. 334; *Vance v. Schuyler*, 1 Gilm. Ill. R. 160.

¹ *Overtson v. Wilson*, 2 Car. & Kir. 1.

² Ante, § 558.

³ The cases on this subject are numerous; but as the application of the rule is a matter in the discretion of the Judge, under the particular circumstances of each case, it is thought unnecessary to encumber the work with a particular reference to them.

⁴ *Cunliffe v. Sefton*, 2 East, 183; *Kelsey v. Hammer*, 18 Conn. R. 311.

§ 575. When secondary evidence of the execution of the instrument is thus rendered admissible, it will not be necessary to prove the *handwriting* of more than one witness.¹ And this evidence is, in general, deemed sufficient to admit the instrument to be read,² being accompanied with proof of the *identity of the party* sued, with the person who appears to have executed the instrument; which proof, it seems, is now deemed requisite,³ especially where the deed on its face excites

¹ *Adams v. Kerr*, 1 B. & P. 360; 3 Preston on Abstracts of Title, p. 72, 73.

² *Kay v. Brookman*, 3 C. & P. 555; *Webb v. St. Lawrence*, 3 Bro. P. C. 640; *Mott v. Doughty*, 1 Johns. Cas. 230; *Sluby v. Champlin*, 4 Johns. 461; *Adams v. Kerr*, 1 B. & P. 360; *Cunliffe v. Seston*, 2 East, 183; *Prince v. Blackburn*, 2 East, 250; *Douglas v. Sanderson*, 2 Dall. 116; *Cooke v. Woodrow*, 5 Cranch, 13; *Hamilton v. Marsden*, 6 Binn. 45; *Powers v. McFerran*, 2 S. & R. 44; *McKinder v. Littlejohn*, 1 Iredell, R. 66. Some Courts have also required proof of the handwriting of the obligor, in addition to that of the subscribing witness; but on this point the practice is not uniform. *Clark v. Courtney*, 5 Peters, R. 319; *Hopkins v. De Graffenreid*, 2 Bay, 187; *Oliphant v. Taggart*, 1 Bay, 255; *Irving v. Irving*, 2 Hayw. 27; *Clark v. Saunderson*, 3 Binn. 192; *Jackson v. Le Grange*, 19 Johns. 386; *Jackson v. Waldron*, 11 Wend. 178, 183, 197, 198, *semble*. See also *Gough v. Cecil*, 1 Selw. N. P. 538, n. (7), (10th Ed.) See Ante, § 84, n. (2); *Thomas v. Turnley*, 3 Rob. Louis. R. 206; *Dunbar v. Marden*, 13 N. Hamp. 311.

³ *Whitelocke v. Musgrove*, 1 C. & M. 511. But it seems that slight evidence of identity will suffice. See *Nelson v. Whittall*, 1 B. & Ald. 19; *Warren v. Anderson*, 8 Scott, 384. See also 1 Selw. N. P. 538, note (7), (10th Ed.); *Phil. & Am. on Evid.* 661, n. (4). This subject has recently been reviewed, in the cases of *Sewell v. Evans*, and *Roden v. Ryde*, 4 Ad. & El. N. S. 626. In the former case, which was an action for goods sold, against *William Seal Evans*, it was proved that the goods had been sold to a person of that name, who had been a customer, and had written a letter, acknowledging the receipt of the goods; but there was no other proof that this person was the defendant. In the latter case, which was against *Henry Thomas Ryde*, as the acceptor of a bill of exchange, it appeared that a person of that name had kept cash at the bank where the bill was payable, and had drawn checks, which the cashier had paid. The cashier knew the person's handwriting, by the checks, and testified that the acceptance was in the same writing; but he had not paid any check for some time, and did not personally know him; and there was no other proof of his identity with the defendant. The Court, in both these cases, held that the evidence of identity was *prima facie* sufficient.

suspicious of fraud.¹ The instrument may also in such cases be read, upon proof of the handwriting of the obligor, or

In the latter case, the learned Judges gave their reasons as follows:— Lord Denman, C. J. “The doubt raised here has arisen out of the case of *Whitelocke v. Musgrove*, (1 Cro. & M. 511; S. C. 8 Tyrwh. 541); but there the circumstances were different. The party to be fixed with liability was a marksman, and the facts of the case made some explanation necessary. But where a person, in the course of the ordinary transactions of life, has signed his name to such an instrument as this, I do not think there is an instance in which evidence of identity has been required, except *Jones v. Jones*, (9 M. & W. 75). There the name was proved to be very common in the country; and I do not say that evidence of this kind may not be rendered necessary by particular circumstances, as, for instance, length of time since the name was signed. But in cases where no particular circumstance tends to raise a question as to the party being the same, even identity of name is something from which an inference may be drawn. If the name were only *John Smith*, which is of very frequent occurrence, there might not be much ground for drawing the conclusion. But *Henry Thomas Rydes* are not so numerous; and from that, and the circumstances generally, there is every reason to believe that the acceptor and the defendant are identical. The dictum of Bolland, B. (3 Tyrwh. 558,) has been already answered. Lord Lyndhurst, C. B. asks (Tyrwh. 543,) why the onus of proving a negative in these cases should be thrown upon the defendant; the answer is, because the proof is so easy. He might come into Court and have the witness asked whether he was the man. The supposition that the right man has been sued is reasonable, on account of the danger a party would incur if he served process on the wrong; for, if he did so wilfully, the Court would no doubt exercise their jurisdiction of punishing for a contempt. But the fraud is one which, in the majority of cases, it would not occur to any one to commit. The practice, as to proof, which has constantly prevailed in cases of this kind, shows how unlikely it is that such frauds should occur. The doubt now suggested has never been raised before the late cases which have been referred to. The observations of Lord Abinger and Alderson, B. in *Greenshields v. Crawford*, (9 M. & W. 314,) apply to this case. The transactions of the world could not go on if such an objection were to prevail. It is unfortunate that the doubt should ever have been raised; and it is best that we should sweep it away as soon as we can.” — Patteson, J. “I concur in all that has been said by my Lord. And the rule always laid down in books of evidence agrees with our present decision. The execution of a deed has always proved, by mere evidence

¹ *Brown v. Kimball*, 25 Wend. 469.

party by whom it was executed;¹ but in this case also, it is conceived, that the like proof of the identity of the party should be required.

§ 576. In considering the proof of private writings, we are naturally led to consider the subject of the *comparison of hands*, upon which great diversities of opinion have been entertained. This expression seems formerly to have been applied to every case, where the genuineness of one writing was proposed to be tested before the Jury, by comparing it with another, even though the latter were an acknowledged autograph; and it was held inadmissible, because the Jury were supposed to be too illiterate to judge of this sort of evidence; a reason long since exploded.² All evidence of hand-

of the subscribing witness's handwriting, if he was dead. The party executing an instrument may have changed his residence. Must a plaintiff show where he lived at the time of the execution, and then trace him through every change of habitation until he is served with the writ? No such necessity can be imposed."—Williams, J. "I am of the same opinion. It cannot be said here that there was not some evidence of identity. A man of the defendant's name had kept money at the branch bank; and this acceptance is proved to be his writing. Then, is that man the defendant? That it is a person of the same name is some evidence, until another party is pointed out who might have been the acceptor. In *Jones v. Jones*, (9 M. & W. 75,) the same proof was relied upon; and Lord Abinger said: 'The argument for the plaintiff might be correct, if the case had not introduced the existence of many Hugh Jones's in the neighborhood where the note was made.' It appeared that the name Hugh Jones, in the particular part of Wales, was so common as hardly to be a name; so that a doubt was raised on the evidence by cross-examination. That is not so here; and therefore the conclusion must be different."

¹ In *Jackson v. Waldron*, 11 Wend. 178, 183, 196, 197, proof of the handwriting of the obligor was held not regularly to be offered, unless the party was unable to prove the handwriting of the witness. But in *Valentine v. Piper*, 22 Pick. 90, proof of the handwriting of the party was esteemed more satisfactory than that of the witnesses. The order of the proofs, however, is a matter resting entirely in the discretion of the Court.

² The admission of evidence by comparison of hands, in Col. Sidney's case, 8 Howell's St. Tr. 467, was one of the grounds of reversing his attainder. Yet, though it clearly appears that his handwriting was proved

writing, except where the witness saw the document written, is, in its nature, comparison. It is the belief which a witness entertains, upon comparing the writing in question with its exemplar in his mind, derived from some previous knowledge.¹ The admissibility of some evidence of this kind is now too well established to be shaken. It is agreed, that, if the witness has the proper knowledge of the party's handwriting, he *may declare his belief* in regard to the genuineness of the writing in question. He may also be interrogated as to the circumstances on which he founds his belief.² The point upon which learned Judges have differed in opinion is, upon the source from which this knowledge is derived, rather than as to the degree or extent of it.

§ 577. There are *two modes of acquiring this knowledge* of the handwriting of another, either of which is universally admitted to be sufficient, to enable a witness to testify to its genuineness. The *first* is from *having seen him write*. It is held sufficient for this purpose, that the witness has seen him write but once, and then only his name. The proof, in such case, may be very light; but the Jury will be permitted to weigh it.³ The *second* mode is, from *having seen letters*, or

by two witnesses, who had seen him write, and by a third who had paid bills purporting to have been indorsed by him, this was held illegal evidence, in a criminal case.

¹ *Doe v. Suckermore*, 5 Ad. & El. 730, per Patteson, J. See also the remarks of Mr. Evans, 2 Poth. Obl. App. xvi. § 6, ad. calc. p. 162.

² *Regina v. Murphy*, 8 C. & P. 297.

³ *Garrells v. Alexander*, 4 Esp. 37. In *Powell v. Ford*, 2 Stark. R. 164, the witness had never seen the defendant write his christian name; but only "M. Ford," and then but once; whereas the acceptance of the bill in question was written with both the christian and surname at full length; and Lord Ellenborough thought it not sufficient, as the witness had no perfect exemplar of the signature in his mind. But in *Lewis v. Sapio*, 1 M. & Malk. 39, where the signature was "L. B. Sapio," and the witness had seen him write several times, but always "Mr. Sapio," Lord Tenterden held it sufficient. A witness has also been permitted to speak as to the genuineness of a person's mark, from having seen it affixed by him on several occasions. *George*

other documents, purporting to be the handwriting of the party, and having afterwards *personally communicated* with him respecting them; or *acted upon them* as his, the party having known and acquiesced in such acts, founded upon their supposed genuineness; or, by such *adoption* of them into the *ordinary business transactions* of life, as induces a reasonable presumption of their being his own writings; evidence of the identity of the party being of course added *aliunde*, if the witness be not personally acquainted with him.¹ In both these cases, the witness acquires his knowledge by his own observation of facts, occurring under his own eye, and which is especially to be remarked, without having regard to any particular person, case, or document.

§ 578. This rule, requiring personal knowledge on the part of the witness, has been *relaxed in two cases*. (1.) Where the writings are of such *antiquity*, that living witnesses cannot be had, and yet are not so old as to prove themselves.² Here the course is, to produce other documents, either admitted to be genuine, or proved to have been respected and treated and acted upon as such, by all parties; and to call *experts* to compare them, and to testify their opinion concerning the

v. Surrey, 1 M. & Malk. 516. But where the knowledge of the handwriting has been obtained by the witness from seeing the party write his name, *for that purpose*, after the commencement of the suit, the evidence is held inadmissible. *Stranger v. Searle*, 1 Esp. 14. See also *Page v. Homans*, 2 Shepl. 478. In *Slaymaker v. Wilson*, 1 Pennsylv. R. 216, the deposition of a witness, who swore positively to her father's hand, was rejected, because she did not say *how* she knew it to be his hand. But in *Moody v. Rowell*, 17 Pick. 490, such evidence was very properly held sufficient, on the ground, that it was for the other party to explore the sources of the deponent's knowledge, if he was not satisfied that it was sufficient.

¹ *Doe v. Suckermore*, 5 Ad. & El. 731, per Patteson, J.; *Ld. Ferrers v. Shirley*, Fitzg. 195; *Carey v. Pitt*, Peake's Evid. App. 81; *Thorpe v. Gisburne*, 2 C. & P. 21; *Harrington v. Fry*, Ry. & M. 90; *Commonwealth v. Carey*, 2 Pick. 47; *Johnson v. Davenport*, 19 Johns. 134; *Burr v. Harper*, Holt's Cas. 420; 2 Phil. Evid. 252, 253; *Pope v. Askew*, 1 Iredell, R. 16.

² Ante, § 570.

genuineness of the instrument in question.¹ (2.) Where *other writings*, admitted to be genuine, are *already in the case*. Here the comparison may be made by the Jury, with or without the aid of experts. The reason assigned for this is, that as the Jury are entitled to look at such writings, for one purpose, it is better to permit them, under the advice and direction of the Court, to examine them for all purposes, than to embarrass them with impracticable distinctions, to the peril of the cause.²

§ 579. A *third mode* of acquiring knowledge of the party's handwriting was proposed to be introduced, in the case of *Doe v. Suckermore*;³ upon which, the learned Judges being equally divided in opinion, no judgment was given; namely, by first satisfying the witness, by some information or evidence, not falling under either of the two preceding heads, that certain papers were genuine, and then desiring the wit-

¹ See 20 Law Mag. 323; *Brune v. Rawlings*, 7 East, 282; *Morewood v. Wood*, 14 East, 328; *Gould v. Jones*, 1 W. Bl. 384; *Doe v. Tarver*, Ry. & M. 143; *Jackson v. Brooks*, 8 Wend. 426; 2 Phil. Evid. 258.

² See 20 Law Mag. 319, 323, 324; *Griffith v. Williams*, 1 C. & J. 47; *Solita v. Yarrow*, 1 M. & Rob. 133; *Rex v. Morgan*, Ib. 134, n.; *Doe v. Newton*, 5 Ad. & El. 514; *Bromage v. Rice*, 7 C. & P. 548; *Hammond's case*, 2 Greenl. 33; 2 Phil. Evid. 256; *Waddington v. Cousins*, 7 C. & P. 595.

³ 5 Ad. & El. 703. In this case a defendant in ejectment produced a will, and on one day of the trial (which lasted several days) called an attesting witness, who swore that the attestation was his. On his cross-examination, two signatures to depositions respecting the same will in an ecclesiastical Court, and several other signatures, were shown to him (none of these being in evidence for any other purpose of the cause), and he stated that he believed them to be his. On the following day, the plaintiff tendered a witness to prove the attestation not to be genuine. The witness was an inspector at the Bank of England, and had no knowledge of the handwriting of the supposed attesting witness, except from having, previously to the trial, and again between the two days, examined the signatures admitted by the attesting witness, which admission he had heard in Court.* Per *Ld. Denman*, C. J. and *Williams, J.*, such evidence was receivable; per *Patteson and Coleridge, Js.*, it was not.

ness to study them, so as to acquire a knowledge of the party's handwriting, and fix an exemplar in his mind; and then asking him his opinion in regard to the disputed paper; or else, by offering such papers to the Jury, with proof of their genuineness, and then asking the witness to testify his opinion, whether those and the disputed paper were written by the same person. This method supposes the writing to be generally that of a stranger, for if it is that of the party to the suit, and is denied by him, the witness may well derive his knowledge from papers, admitted by that party to be genuine, if such papers were not selected nor fabricated for the occasion; as has already been stated in the preceding section. It is obvious, that if the witness does not speak from his own knowledge, derived in the first or second modes before mentioned, but has derived it from papers shown to him for that purpose, the production of these papers may be called for, and their genuineness contested. So that the third mode of information proposed resolves itself into this question, namely, whether documents, irrelevant to the issues on the record, may be received in evidence at the trial, to enable the Jury to institute a comparison of hands, or to enable a witness so to do.¹

§ 580. In regard to admitting such evidence upon an examination in chief, for the mere *purpose* of enabling the Jury to judge of the handwriting, the modern English decisions are clearly opposed to it.² For this, two reasons have been

¹ See 5 Ad. & El. 734, per Patteson, J.

² Bromage v. Rice, 7 C. & P. 548; Waddington v. Cousins, Ib. 595; Doe v. Newton, 5 Ad. & El. 514; Hughes v. Rogers, 8 M. & W. 123; Griffiths v. Ivery, 11 Ad. & El. 322; The Fitzwalter Peerage, 10 Cl. & Fin. 193; Regina v. Barber, 1 Car. & Kir. 434. See also Regina v. Murphy, 1 Armstr. Macartn. & Ogle, R. 204; Regina v. Caldwell, Ib. 324. But where a witness upon his examination in chief, stated his opinion that a signature was not genuine, because he had never seen it signed R. H., but always R. W. H., it was held proper, on cross-examination, to show him a paper signed R. H. and ask him if it were genuine, though it was not connected with the cause; and he answering that in his opinion it was so, it was

assigned, namely, first, the danger of *fraud in the selection* of the writings, offered as specimens for the occasion; and, secondly, that, if admitted, the genuineness of these specimens may be contested, and others successively introduced, to the infinite multiplication of *collateral issues*, and the subversion of justice. To which may be added the danger of surprise upon the other party, who may not know what documents are to be produced, and therefore may not be prepared to meet the inferences drawn from them.¹ The same mischiefs would follow, if the same writings were introduced to the Jury through the medium of *experts*.²

§ 581. But with respect to the admission of papers irrelevant to the record, for the sole purpose of creating a standard of comparison of handwriting, the *American decisions* are far from being uniform.³ If it were possible to extract from the

held proper further to ask him whether he would now say that he had never seen a genuine signature of the party without the initials R. W.; the object being to test the value of the witness's opinion. *Younge v. Honner*, 1 Car. & Kir. 51; 2 M. & Rob. 536, S. C.

¹ Phil. & Am. on Evid. 700, 701. See the Law Review, No. 4, for August, 1845, p. 285-304, where this subject is more fully discussed.

² Experts are received to testify, whether a writing is a real or a feigned hand, and may compare it with other writings already in evidence in the cause. *Revett v. Braham*, 4 T. R. 497; *Hammond's case*, 2 Greenl. 33; *Moody v. Rowell*, 17 Pick. 490; *Commonwealth v. Carey*, 2 Pick. 47; *Lyon v. Lyman*, 9 Conn. 55; *Hubly v. Vanhorne*, 7 S. & R. 185; *Lodge v. Phipper*, 11 S. & R. 333. And the Court will determine whether the witness is or is not an expert, before admitting him to testify. *The State v. Allen*, 1 Hawks, 6. But upon this kind of evidence, learned Judges are of opinion that very little, if any reliance ought to be placed. See *Doe v. Suckermore*, 5 Ad. & El. 751, per Ld. Denman; *Gurney v. Langlands*, 5 B. & Ald. 330; *Rex v. Cator*, 4 Esp. 117; *The Tracy Peerage*, 10 Cl. & Fin. 154. In *The People v. Spooner*, 1 Denio, R. 343, it was held inadmissible. Where one writing crosses another, an expert may testify which, in his opinion, was first made. *Cooper v. Bockett*, 4 Moore, P. C. Cas. 433.

³ In New York, Virginia, and North Carolina, the English rule is adopted, and such testimony is rejected. *Jackson v. Phillips*, 9 Cowen, 94, 112; *Titford v. Knott*, 2 Johns. Cas. 210; *The People v. Spooner*, 1 Denio, R.

conflicting judgments a rule, which would find support from the majority of them, perhaps it would be found not to extend beyond this; that such papers can be offered in evidence to the Jury, only when no collateral issue can be raised concerning them; which is only where the papers are either conceded to be genuine, or are such as the other party is estopped to deny; or are papers belonging to the witness, who was himself previously acquainted with the party's handwriting, and who exhibits them in confirmation and explanation of his own testimony.¹

§ 582. Where the sources of primary evidence of a written instrument are exhausted, secondary evidence, as we have elsewhere shown, is admissible; but whether, in this species of evidence, any degrees are recognised as of binding force, is not perfectly agreed; but the better opinion seems to be, that, generally speaking, there are none. But this rule, with its excep-

343; *Rowt v. Kile*, 1 Leigh, R. 216; *The State v. Allen*, 1 Hawks, 6; *Pope v. Askew*, 1 Iredell, R. 16. In Massachusetts, Maine, and Connecticut, it seems to have become the settled practice to admit any papers to the Jury, whether relevant to the issue or not, for the purpose of comparison of the handwriting. *Homer v. Wallis*, 11 Mass. 309; *Moody v. Rowell*, 17 Pick. 490; *Richardson v. Newcomb*, 21 Pick. 315; *Hammond's case*, 2 Greenl. 33; *Lyon v. Lyman*, 9 Conn. 55. In New Hampshire, and South Carolina, the admissibility of such papers has been limited to cases, where other proof of handwriting is already in the cause, and for the purpose of turning the scale, in doubtful cases. *Myers v. Toscan*, 3 N. Hamp. 47; *The State v. Carr*, 5 N. Hamp. 367; *Boman v. Plunket*, 3 McC. 518; *Duncan v. Beard*, 2 Nott & McC. 401. In Pennsylvania, the admission has been limited to papers conceded to be genuine. *McCorkle v. Binns*, 5 Binn. 340; *Lancaster v. Whitehill*, 10 S. & R. 110; or, concerning which there is no doubt. *Baker v. Haines*, 6 Whart. 284.

¹ *Smith v. Fenner*, 1 Gall. 170, 175. See also *Goldsmith v. Bane*, 3 Halst. 87; *Bank of Pennsylvania v. Haldemand*, 1 Pennsylv. R. 161; *Greaves v. Hunter*, 2 C. & P. 477; *Clermont v. Tullidge*, 4 C. & P. 1; *Burr v. Harper*, Holt's Cas. 420; *Sharp v. Sharp*, 2 Leigh, 249; *Baker v. Haines*, 6 Whart. 284; *Finch v. Gridley*, 25 Wend. 469; *Fogg v. Dennis*, 3 Humph. 47; *Depue v. Place*, 7 Penn. Law Journ. 289.

tions, having been previously discussed, it is not necessary here to pursue the subject any farther.¹

§ 583. The effect of private writings, when offered in evidence, has been incidentally considered under various heads, in the preceding pages, so far as it is established and governed by any rules of law. The rest belongs to the Jury, into whose province it is not intended to intrude.

§ 584. Having thus completed the original design of this Volume, in a view of the Principles and Rules of the Law of Evidence, understood to be common to all the United States, the work is here properly brought to a close. The student will not fail to observe the symmetry and beauty of this branch of the law, under whatever disadvantages it may labor, from the manner of treatment; and will rise from the study of its principles, convinced with Lord Erskine, that "they are founded in the charities of religion,—in the philosophy of nature,—in the truths of history,—and in the experience of common life."²

¹ Ante, § 84, note (2); *Doe v. Ross*, 7 M. & W. 102; 8 Dowl. 389, S. C.

² 24 Howell's St. Tr. 966.




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