vinces subjugated; whereas, in affairs of opinion, it is not so much the object to subdue the country, and to occupy one's self with accessories; there are necessary sufficient means for moving directly to the end, without halting at any consideration of detail, and endeavoring, above all things, to shun whatever could alarm the nation as to its independence and the integrity of its territory.

The war made in Spain in 1823, and of which we have spoken in the preceding article, is an example to cite in favor of those truths, and in opposition to that of the French Revolution. Doubtless the conditions were somewhat different, for the French army of 1792, was composed of elements more solid than that of the radicals of the island of Leon. The war of the Revolution was at once a war of opinion, a national and civil war, whilst, if the first war with Spain, in 1808, was altogether national, that of 1823 was a partial struggle of opinions without nationality: hence the enormous difference in the results.

The expedition of the Duke d'Angoulême was, moreover, well conducted in regard to execution.* Far from amusing himself with taking places, his army acted conformably to the maxims above mentioned; after having pushed briskly to the Ebro, it was divided here to cut off at their sources, all the elements of the hostile strength, because it well knew that, seconded by a majority of the inhabitants of the country, it could be divided without danger. If it had followed the instructions of the ministry, who prescribed to it to subdue methodically all the country and places situated between the Pyrenées and the Ebro, in order to base itself militarily, it would, perhaps, have failed in its object, or at least, rendered the struggle long and bloody, by rousing the national pride with the idea of an occupation like that of 1807. But, emboldened by the good reception of all the population, it comprehended that it was an operation more political than military, and that it was a question of leading on rapidly to the end. Its conduct, very different from that of the allies in 1793, merits the reflection of all those who should have like expeditions to direct. It was, therefore, in less than three months under the walls of Cadiz.

If what is passing at this day in the Peninsula, attests that policy knew not how to profit from its success, and to found a suitable and solid

* There were some faults committed under the triple relation, political, military and administrative but they were, it is said, the work of coteries which are never wanting at every general head quarters. For the rest, the ensemble of the operations did honor to General Guilleminot, who directed them under the prince, and who, according to the Spaniards, could claim the principal part of the success.

order of things, the fault was neither in the army nor its chiefs, but in the Spanish government, which delivered up to violent reactionary counsels, was not equal to its mission. Arbiter between two hostile interests, Ferdinand blindly threw himself into the arms of that one of the parties which affected a great veneration for the throne, but which counted to make the most of the royal authority for its own profit, without troubling itself about future consequences. Society remained divided into two hostile camps, which it would not have been impossible to calm and to bring together in course of time. Those camps have come anew to blows, as I had predicted at Verona in 1823; a great lesson, from which it appears for the rest, that no person is disposed to profit in this beautiful and too unhappy country, although history is not wanting in examples to attest that violent reactions are, no more than revolutions, proper elements for constructing and consolidating. God grant that there may result from this frightful conflict, a throne strong and respected, equally free of all factions, and supported upon a disciplined army as well as the general interests of the country: a throne, finally, capable of rallying this incomprehensible Spanish nation which, from qualities not less extraordinary than its defects, was ever a problem for those even whom we should have thought in the best condition to judge it.

ARTICLE VIII.

NATIONAL WARS.

National wars, of which we have already been forced to say a few words in speaking of those of invasion, are the most formidable of all; this name can be given only to those which are made against a whole population, or at least against the majority of that population, animated by a noble fire for its independence; then every step is disputed by a combat; the army which enters into such a country holds in it only the field where it encamps; its supplies can only be obtained at the point of the sword, its convoys are every where menaced or carried away.

This spectacle of the spontaneous movement of a whole nation is rarely seen, and if it presents something grand and generous which commands admiration, the consequences of it are so terrible that, for the sake of humanity, we should desire never to witness it.*

Such a movement may be produced by the most opposite causes: a serf people can be raised in mass at the voice of its government, and its masters even set the example by putting themselves at its head, when they are animated by a noble love for their sovereign and for their country; in the same manner a fanatic people arm themselves at the voice of their monks, and a people excited by political opinions, or by the sacred love they bear for their institutions, precipitate themselves to meet the enemy in order to defend what they hold most dear.

The command of the sea enters for much in the results of a national invasion; if the people aroused has a great extent of coast, and is master of the sea, or in alliance with a power which commands it, then its resistance is centupled, not only through the facility had for feeding the fire of insurrection, of alarming the enemy on all points of the country which he occupies, but still by the difficulties which will be interposed to its supplies by the maritime route.

The nature of the country contributes also a great deal to the facility of a national defense; mountainous countries are always those in which a people is most formidable. After those come countries cut up by vast forests.

The struggle of the Swiss against Austria and against the Duke of Burgundy; those of the Catalans in 1712 and in 1809; the difficulties which the Russians experience in subduing the people of Caucasus; finally, the reiterated efforts of the Tyroleans, demonstrated sufficiently that mountain people have always resisted longer than those of the plains, as much through their character and manners, as from the nature of those countries. Defiles and great forests favor, as well as cliffs, this kind of partial defense; and the Bocage of La Vendée, become so justly celebrated, proves that every difficult country, even though it be but intersected with hedges, ditches and canals, produces a like result when it is bravely defended.†

* It will be seen farther on that this general rising must not be compounded with the national defense prescribed by institutions and regulated by governments.

† The hedges and ditches which separate properties in La Vendée are so large that they make of each farm a veritable redoubt, the obstacles of which the inhabitants of the country alone are practiced in overcoming. Ordinary hedges and ditches, although useful, could not have the same importance.

The obstacles which a regular army encounters, in wars of opinion as well as in national wars, are immense and render very difficult the mission of the General charged with conducting it. The events which we have just cited, as also the struggle of the Low Countries against Philip II, and that of the Americans against the English, furnish evident proofs of this: but the much more extraordinary struggle of La Vendée against the victorious Republic; those of Spain, Portugal and the Tyrol against Napoleon; finally those, so desperate of the Morea against the Turks, and of Navarre against the forces of Queen Christine, are examples more striking still.

It is especially when the hostile populations are supported by a considerable nucleus of disciplined troops, that such a war offers immense difficulties.* You have but an army, your adversaries have an army and a whole people raised in mass or at least in good part; a people turning every thing into arms, of which each individual conspires for your ruin, of which all the members, even the non-combattants have an interest in your perdition, and favor it by every means in their power. You occupy little but the soil upon which you encamp; beyond the limits of this camp, every thing becomes hostile to you, and multiplies by a thousand means the difficulties which beset you at every step.

Those difficulties become especially exaggerated when the country is much cut up by natural accidents: each armed inhabitant knows the smallest footpaths and their terminations; he finds every where a parent, a brother, a friend, who seconds him: the chiefs are acquainted in the same manner with the country, and learning instantly the least of your movements, can take the most efficacious measures for defeating your projects, whilst that, deprived of all information, out of condition to risk detachments of scouts for obtaining it, having no other support than your bayonets, nor security but in the concentration of your columns, you act like blind men; each of your combinations becomes an illusion, and when, after the best concerted movements, the most rapid and fatiguing marches, you think you have reached the goal of your efforts and are about to strike in a clap of thunder, you find no other traces of the enemy than the smoke of his bivouacs. Very like Don Quixot, you tilt thus

* Without the assistance of regular disciplined armies, popular risings would always be easily put down; they could procrastinate. like the remnants of La Vendée, but could never prevent invasion or conquest.

against wind-mills, whilst your adversary is throwing himself upon your communications, breaking up the detachments left to guard them, surprising your convoys, your depôts, and making upon you a disastrous war in which you must necessarily succumb in the end.

I myself have had, in the war with Spain, two terrible examples of this nature. When Ney's Corps replaced that of Soult at Corunna I had cantoned the companies of the artillery train between Betanzos and Corunna, in the midst of four brigades which were distant from them two to three leagues; no Spanish troops showed themselves within twenty leagues around; Soult still occupied Santiago de Compostella, Maurice Mathieu's division was at Ferrol and at Lugo; that of Marchand at Corunna and Betanzos; meanwhile one fine night those companies of the train disappeared, men and horses, without our ever being able even to learn what had become of them; a single wounded Corporal escaped, and assured us that peasants, conducted by priests or monks, had massacred them.

Four months afterwards, Marshal Ney marched, with a single division to the conquest of the Asturias, and descended by the valley of the Navia, whilst Kellerman debouched from Leon by the route of Oviedo. A part of the corps of Romana, which guarded the Asturias, defiled by the slopes of the heights which enclosed the valley of the Navia, at a league at most from our columns, without the Marshal knowing a word of it; at the moment when the latter reached Gijon, the army of Romana fell in the midst of the isolated division of Marchand, which, dispersed to guard all Galicia, came near being taken separately, and only escaped by the prompt return of the Marshal to Lugo. The war with Spain offered a thousand scenes as lively as this. All the gold of Mexico would not have sufficed for procuring the French any information, and all that was given them was but a lure to make them fall the more easily into snares.

No army, however inured to war it may be, could struggle with success against such a system applied to a great people, unless it were by forces so formidable that it could occupy strongly all the important points of the country, cover its own communications, and still furnish active corps sufficiently large for beating the enemy wherever he should present himself. But when this enemy himself has a tolerably respectable regular army for serving as a nucleus to the resistance of the population, what forces would not be necessary in order to be at once superior every where, and to assure remote communications against numerous corps?

It is particularly important to study well the war in the Spanish Peninsula, in order to appreciate all the obstacles which a general and brave troops may encounter in the conquest or the occupation of a country thus roused. What efforts of patience, of courage and of resignation were not necessary to the phalanxes of Napoleon, of Masséna, of Soult, of Ney, and of Suchet, in order to hold out for six whole years against three or four hundred thousand armed Spaniards and Portuguese, seconded by the regular armies of the Wellingtons, the Beresfords, the Blakes, the Romanas, Cuestas, Castagnos, Redings and Balesteros!

The means of succeeding in such a war are difficult enough; to display in the first place a mass of forces proportionate to the resistance and to the obstacles which are to be encountered; to calm the popular passions by all the means possible; to use them now and then; to display a great mixture of policy, of mildness and severity, and above all great justice; such are the first elements of success. The examples of Henry IV in the wars of the League, of Marshal Berwick in Catalonia, of Suchet in Aragon and in Valencia, of Hoche in Vendee, are models of different kinds, but which may be employed according to circumstances with the same success. The admirable order and discipline, maintained by the armies of Generals Diebitsch and Paskévitch in the late war, are also models to cite, and contributed not a little to the success of their enterprises.

The extraordinary obstacles which a national struggle presents to an army wishing to invade a country, have led some speculative minds to desire that there might never be any other wars, because then they would become more rare, and conquest becoming thus more difficult, would offer less attractions to ambitious chiefs.

This reasoning is more specious than just, for, in order to admit its consequences, it would be necessary to be able always to inspire populations with the disposition for flying to arms; afterwards it would be necessary to be certain that henceforth there would be no wars but those of conquest, and that all those legitimate, but secondary wars, which have for object only the maintainance of the political equilibrium, or the defense of public interests, should be banished for ever. Otherwise, what means would there exist of knowing when and how it would be suitable to excite a national war? For example, if a hundred thousand Germans passed the Rhine, and penetrated into France with the primitive object of opposing the conquest of Belgium by this power, but with no other project of ambition against it, would it be necessary to raise *en masse*, all the population of Alsace, of Lorraine, of Champagne, of Burgundy, men, women and children, to make a Saragassa of every little walled town, and thus to bring about through reprisals the murder, pillage, and burning of the whole country? If this be not done, and th

German army occupy those provinces at the end of certain successes, who will answer that it do not then seek to appropriate a part of them, although in the beginning it had no such intention?

The difficulty of answering these two questions thus proposed, would seem to militate in favor of national wars; but are there no means of repelling such an aggression without recourse to risings in mass, and a war of extermination? Does there not exist a medium between those struggles of populations, and the ancient regular wars, made only by permanent armies? Does it not suffice, in order to defend a country well, to organize a militia or *landwehr* which, clad in uniform, and called by government to intervene in the struggle, would regulate thus the part which the populations were to take in the controversy, would not put them entirely out of the pale of the laws of nations, and would place just limits to a war of extermination?

For my part, I shall answer affirmatively, and in applying this mixed system to the questions above propounded, I would guarantee that fifty thousand French regular troops, supported by the national guards of the East, would have an easy affair with that German army which should have crossed the Vosges; for, reduced to fifty thousand men by a host of detachments, it would have, on arriving near the Meuse, or in the Argonne, more than a hundred thousand men on its back. It is precisely in order to succeed in this *juste milieu*, that we have presented as an invariable maxim, the necessity of preparing for the army good national reserves; a system which offers the advantage of diminishing the expenses in time of peace, and of assuring the defense of the country in case of war. This system is nothing else than that employed by France in 1792, imitated by Austria in 1809, and by all Germany in 1813. In view of this I should not have expected the misplaced attacks of which it has been the subject.

I shall resume this discussion by affirming that without being an Utopian philanthropist or a *condottieri*, one can wish that wars of extermination might be banished from the code of nations, and that the national defences, through a regulated militia, could suffice henceforth, with good political alliances, for assuring the independence of States.

As a military man, preferring loyal and chivalric war to organized assassination, I own, that if it were necessary to choose, I should ever prefer the good time when the French and English guards politely invited each other to fire first, as was the case at Fontenoy, to the frightful epoch when the curates, the women and the children organized over the whole soil of Spain, the murder of isolated soldiers.

If, in the eyes of General R * * *, this opinion is yet a blasphemy, I

shall console myself without difficulty, at the same time acknowledging that there is a mean term between these two extremes, which answers all wants, and which is precisely the system which has cost me so many unjust criticisms.

ARTICLE IX.

CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS WARS.

Intestine wars, when they are not connected with a foreign quarrel, are ordinarily the result of a struggle of opinions, of political or religious party spirit. In the middle ages, they were oftener the shocks of feudal coteries. The most deplorable wars are, without doubt, those of religion. It is comprehended that a State may combat its own children, to prevent political factions which enfeeble the authority of the throne and the national strength; but that it should slaughter its subjects in order to force them to pray in Latin or in French, and to acknowledge the supremacy of a foreign pontiff, is what reason can hardly conceive. Of all kings, the most to be pitied was, without contradiction, Louis XIV, driving away a million of industrious protestants, who had put his grandfather upon the throne, a protestant like them. Wars of fanaticism are horrible when mingled with external wars; they are frightful, even when they are only family quarrels. The history of France in the time of the League, will be a lasting lesson for nations and kings; it is difficult to believe that this people, yet so noble and chivalric under Francis First, should have fallen in twenty years into an excess of brutality so deplorable.

To give maxims for these kinds of wars would be absurd; there is but one upon which sensible men are agreed, this is to unite the two sects, or the two parties, in order to drive away the foreigner who should wish to meddle in the quarrel, then to explain to each other with moderation, to the end of mingling the rights of the two parties into a pact of reconcili-

ation. In fact, the intervention of a third power in a religious dispute, could never be other than an act of ambition.*

It is conceived that governments intervene in good faith against a political phrenzy, the dogmas of which may menace the social order; although ordinarily those fears are exaggerated and serve often as a pretext it is possible for a State to believe itself truly so menaced at home. But in the matter of theological disputes, it is never the case, and the intervention of Philip II in the affairs of the League, could have no other object than the division or subjection of France to his influence, to the end of dismembering her by degrees.

ARTICLE X.

DOUBLE WARS, AND THE DANGER OF UNDERTAKING TWO WARS AT ONCE

The celebrated maxim of the Romans, never to undertake two great wars at a time, is too well known and too well appreciated to require any demonstration of its wisdom.

A state may be constrained to make war against two neighboring peoples; but circumstances must be very inauspicious, when it does not find in this case, an ally which comes to its succor for its own preservation, and the maintainance of the political equilibrium. It is rare also, that those two peoples leagued against it, have the same interest in the war, and engage therein all their means; now, if one of them be only an auxiliary, it will already be but an ordinary war.

* Colonel Wagner, in translating the first edition of my Compend, has found my assertion too absolute, basing himself upon the support given by Gustavus Adolphus to the Protestants of Germany, and by Elizabeth to those of France; a support dictated according to him by a wise policy. Perhaps he is right, for the pretention of Rome and its church to universal dominion, was flagrant enough to give fear to the Swedes, and even to the English; but this was not the case with Philip II; besides, ambition can well have entered into the calculations of Gustavus and Elizabeth

Louis XIV, Frederick the Great, the Emperor Alexander and Napoleon, sustained gigantic struggles against coalesced Europe. When such struggles arise from voluntary aggressions which could be avoided, they indicate a capital fault on the part of him who engages in them, but if they arise from imperious and inevitable circumstances, they must at least be remedied, by seeking to oppose means or alliances capable of establishing a certain ponderation of the respective forces.

The great coalition against Louis XIV, caused, as we have said, by his projects upon Spain, took, nevertheless, its origin in the preceding aggressions which had alarmed all his neighbors. He could oppose to leagued Europe only the faithful alliance of the Elector of Bavaria, and the more equivocal one of the Duke of Savoy, who himself was not slow to increase the number of the coalitionists. Frederick sustained war against the three most powerful monarchies on the continent, with the support alone of subsidies from England, and of fifty thousand auxiliaries from six different small States; but the division and feebleness of his adversaries were his best allies.

Those two wars, like that sustained by the Emperor Alexander in 1812, were almost impossible to avoid.

France had all Europe on her hands in 1793, in consequence of the extravagant provocations of the Jacobins, of the exaltation of the two parties, and of the Utopias of the Girondins who braved, they said, all the kings of the earth in counting on the support of the English squadrons! The result of those absurd calculations was a frightful disorder, from which France extricated herself as by a miracle.

Napoleon is then in a manner the only one of modern sovereigns who has voluntarily undertaken two, and even three frightful wars at once, those with Spain, with England and with Russia; but yet did he support himself in the latter, with the concurrence of Austria and of Prussia, without speaking even of Turkey and of Sweden, upon which he counted with too much confidence, so that this enterprise was not so adventurous on his part as has generally been believed, judged according to the turn of affairs.

It is seen from what precedes, that there is a great distinction to be made between a war undertaken against a single State, in which a third should come to take a part by means of an auxiliary corps, and two wars conducted simultaneously at the most opposite extremities of a country, against two powerful nations which should engage all their resource to overwhelm him who should have menaced them. For instance, the dou[illegible]e

hand to hand struggle of Napoleon in 1809, with Austria and Spain, sustained by England, was much more grave for him, than if he had had to do only with Austria, assisted by any auxiliary corps whatever, fixed by known treaties. Struggles of this last kind enter in the category of ordinary wars.

It must be concluded then in general, that double wars should be avoided as much as possible; and that when the case happens, it is even better to dissemble the wrongs of one of our neighbors until the opportune moment arrives for requiring the redress of the just grievances of which we might have to complain. However, this rule could not be absolute; the respective forces, the localities, the possibility of finding allies also on our side for re-establishing a sort of equilibrium between the parties, are so many circumstances which will have an influence on the resolutions of a State which should be menaced with a like war. We shall have accomplished our task, by pointing out at once the danger and the remedies which can be opposed to it.

CHAPTER II.

MILITARY POLICY, OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF WAR.

We have already explained what is understood under this denomination. They are all the moral combinations which relate to the operations of armies. If the political combinations of which we have just spoken are also moral causes which have an influence upon the conduct of a war, there are others which, without belonging to diplomacy, are none the more combinations of strategy or of tactics. We could then give them no denomination more rational than that of military policy or philosophy of war.*

We shall stop at the first, for, although the true acceptation of the word philosophy may be applied to war as well as to the speculations of metaphysics, so vague an extent has been given to this acceptation, that we experience a kind of embarrassment in uniting those two words. It will be recollected then that by *policy of war*, I understand all the relations of diplomacy with war, whilst that *military policy* designates only the military combinations of a State or of a general.

Military policy may embrace all the combinations of a project of war,

* Lloyd has well treated this subject in the 2d and 3d parts of his Memoirs; his chapters on the General and on the Passions are remarkable; the 4th part is also interesting; but it wants completeness, and his points of view are not always just. The Marquis de Chambray has also treated this subject, and not without some success, although he has found opponents; moreover, he has only walked in the footsteps of M. Tranchant de Laverne