hand to hand struggle of Napoleon in 1809, with Austria and Spain, sustained by England, was much more grave for him, than if he had had to do only with Austria, assisted by any auxiliary corps whatever, fixed by known treaties. Struggles of this last kind enter in the category of ordinary wars.

It must be concluded then in general, that double wars should be avoided as much as possible; and that when the case happens, it is even better to dissemble the wrongs of one of our neighbors until the opportune moment arrives for requiring the redress of the just grievances of which we might have to complain. However, this rule could not be absolute; the respective forces, the localities, the possibility of finding allies also on our side for re-establishing a sort of equilibrium between the parties, are so many circumstances which will have an influence on the resolutions of a State which should be menaced with a like war. We shall have accomplished our task, by pointing out at once the danger and the remedies which can be opposed to it.

CHAPTER II.

MILITARY POLICY, OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF WAR.

We have already explained what is understood under this denomination. They are all the moral combinations which relate to the operations of armies. If the political combinations of which we have just spoken are also moral causes which have an influence upon the conduct of a war, there are others which, without belonging to diplomacy, are none the more combinations of strategy or of tactics. We could then give them no denomination more rational than that of military policy or philosophy of war.*

We shall stop at the first, for, although the true acceptation of the word philosophy may be applied to war as well as to the speculations of metaphysics, so vague an extent has been given to this acceptation, that we experience a kind of embarrassment in uniting those two words. It will be recollected then that by *policy of war*, I understand all the relations of diplomacy with war, whilst that *military policy* designates only the military combinations of a State or of a general.

Military policy may embrace all the combinations of a project of war,

* Lloyd has well treated this subject in the 2d and 3d parts of his Memoirs; his chapters on the General and on the Passions are remarkable; the 4th part is also interesting; but it wants completeness, and his points of view are not always just. The Marquis de Chambray has also treated this subject, and not without some success, although he has found opponents; moreover, he has only walked in the footsteps of M. Tranchant de Laverne

other than those of diplomatic policy and strategy; as the number of them is pretty large, we could not devote a special article to each, without going beyond the limits of this compend, and without deviating from our object, which is not to give a complete treatise of those matters, but merely to point out their relations with military operations.

In fact, we may range in this category the passions of the people against whom we are going to combat; their military system; the means of first line and of reserve; the resources of their finances; the attachment they bear to their government, or to their institutions. Besides that, the character of the chief of the State; that of the chiefs of the army, and their military talents; the influence which the cabinet or the councils of war exercise upon the operations, from the distance of the capitol; the system of war which controls in the hostile staff; the difference in the constitutive force of the armies, and in their armament; the geography and the military statistics of the country where one is to penetrate; finally, the resources and the obstacles of every nature which may there be encountered, are so many important points to consider, and which are, nevertheless, neither of diplomacy nor of strategy.

There are no fixed rules to give on such matters, unless it be that a government should neglect nothing to arrive at a knowledge of these details, and that it is indispensable to take them into consideration in the plans of operations which it shall propose to itself. We are about to sketch, however, the principal points which ought to guide in these kinds of combinations.

ARTICLE XI.

MILITARY STATISTICS AND GEOGRAPHY.

By the first of these sciences is understood as perfect a knowledge as possible, of all the elements of power, and all the means of war of the enemy we are called upon to combat; the second consists in the topographical and strategical description of the theatre of war, with all the obstacles which art and nature may offer to enterprises; the examination of the permanent decisive points which a frontier or even the whole extent of a country presents. Not only the public ministry, but the chief of the army and of the staff should be initiated into this knowledge, under pain of finding cruel mistakes in their calculations, as often happens, even in our day, notwithstanding the immense progress which civilized nations have made in all the sciences, statistical, political, geographical and topographical. I will cite two examples of them of which I was a witness; in 1796, the army of Moreau, penetrating into the Black Forest, expected to find terrible mountains, defiles and forests, which the ancient Hercinius called to memory with frightful circumstances; we were surprised after having climbed the cliffs of that vast plateau, which look upon the Rhine, to see that those steeps and their counterforts form the only mountains, and that the country, from the sources of the Danube to Donauwerth, presents plains as rich as fertile.

The second example, still more recent, dates in 1813; the whole army of Napoleon, and that great captain himself, regarded the interior of Bohemia as a country cut up with mountains, whereas, there exists scarcely one more flat in Europe, as soon as you have crossed the belt of secondary mountains with which it is surrounded, which is the affair of a march.

All the European military men had nearly the same erroneous opinions upon the Balkan, and upon the real force of the Ottomans in the interior. It seems that general orders were given from Constantinople to cause this enclosure to be regarded as almost impregnable, and as the palladium of the empire, an error which, in my quality of inhabitant of the Alps, I have never shared. Prejudices, not less deeply rooted, led to the belief, that a people, all the individuals of which went unceasingly armed, would form a redoubtable militia, and would defend themselves to the last extremity. Experience has proved, that the ancient institutions which placed the *elite* of the Janizaries in the frontier cities of the Danube, had rendered the population of those cities more warlike than the inhabitants of the interior, who make war against the unarmed rayahs; this phantasmagoria has been appreciated at its just value; it was but an imposing curtain which nothing sustained, and the first enclosure forced, the prestige has disappeared. In truth, the projects of reform of the Sultan Mahmoud had exacted the overthrow of the ancient system without giving time to substitute a new one for it, so that the empire found itself taken unprepared; experience has proved, however, that a multitude of brave men, armed to the teeth, does not still constitute a good army, nor a national defense.

Let us return to the necessity of being well acquainted with the geography and military statistics of an empire. Those sciences are wanting, it is true, in elementary treatise, and remain yet to be developed. Lloyd, who has made on them an essay in the fifth part of his Memoirs, in describing the frontiers of the great states of Europe has not been happy in his sayings and his predictions; he sees obstacles everywhere; he presents, among others, as impregnable, the frontiers of Austria upon the Inn, between the Tyrol and Passau, where we have seen Moreau and Napoleon manœuvre, and triumph with armies of a hundred and fifty thousand men in 1800, 1805 and 1809. The greater part of those reasonings are open to the same criticism; he has seen things too materially.

But if these sciences are not publicly taught, the archives of the European staffs must be rich with valuable documents for teaching them, at least in the special schools of this corps.

In waiting for some studious officer to profit from those documents, published or unpublished, for giving the public a good military and strategical geography, it may, thanks to the immense progress which topography has made in our day, be supplied in part, by means of the excellent maps published within the last twenty years in all countries. At the epoch of the commencement of the French revolution, topography was yet in its infancy; excepting the semi-topographical map of Cassi, there was scarcely any but the works of Bakenberg, which would have merited that name. The Austrian and Prussian staffs had, meanwhile, good schools already, which from time to time, have borne their fruits; the maps recently published at Vienna, Berlin, Munich, Stuttgard, Paris, as well as those of the interesting institute of Herder, at Friburg in Brisgau, assure to future generals immense resources, unknown to their predecessors.

Military statistics is scarcely better known than geography; there are only a few vague and superficial tables, in which are thrown at hazard the number of armed men and vessels which a State possesses, as well as the revenues that it is supposed to have, which is far from constituting entirely a science necessary for combining operations. Our aim is not to examine here thoroughly those important matters, but to indicate them as means of success in those enterprises which it should be desired to form.

ARTICLE XII.

DIVERS OTHER CAUSES WHICH HAVE AN INFLUENCE UPON THE SUCCESS OF A WAR.

If the excited passions of the people which we are to combat are a great enemy to conquer, a general and a government ought to employ all their efforts to calm those passions. We could add nothing to what we have said on this subject in speaking of national wars.

On the other hand, a general ought to do every thing to electrify his soldiers, and to give them that same transport which it is important to allay in his adversaries. All armies are susceptible of the same enthusiasm, the motives and the means only differ according to the spirit of the nations. Military eloquence has made the subject of more than one work; we will only indicate it as a means. The proclamations of Napoleon; those of General Paskevitsch; the addresses of the ancients to their soldiers; those of Suwarof to men still more simple, are models of different kinds. The eloquence of the juntas of Spain, and the miracles of the Madôna del Pilar, have led to the same results by very opposite roads. In general, a cherished cause, and a chief who inspires confidence by past victories, are great means for electrifying an army and facilitating its successes.

Some military men have contested the advantages of enthusiasm, and preferred to it imperturbable sang-froid in combats. Both have advantages and inconveniences which it is impossible to mistake; enthusiasm leads to the greatest actions, the difficulty is to sustain it constantly; and when an excited troop is discouraged, disorder is introduced into it more rapidly.

The greater or less activity and audacity in the chiefs of the respective armies is an element of success or of reverse which could not be subjected to rules.

A cabinet and a general-in-chief ought to take into consideration the intrinsic value of their troops, and their constitutive force compared with

that of the enemy. A Russian general, commanding troops the most solidly constituted in Europe, may undertake every thing in open field against undisciplined and disordered masses, however brave elsewhere may be the individuals who compose them. Concert gives strength, order procures concert, discipline leads to order; without discipline and without order no success is possible.*

The same Russian general, with the same troops, will not be able to dare every thing against European armies, having the same instruction, and nearly the same discipline as his own. Finally, one can venture before a Mack what he would not venture before a Napoleon.

The action of the cabinet upon the armies has an influence also upon the audacity of their enterprises. A general whose genius and arm are chained by an aulic council at four hundred leagues from the theatre of war, will struggle with disadvantage against him who shall have all liberty of action.

With regard to the superiority as to skill in the generals, it will not be contested that it is one of the most certain pledges of victory, especially when all other chances shall be supposed equal. Doubtless great captains have many times been seen beaten by mediocre men; but an exception does not make a rule. An order badly comprehended, a fortuitous event, may cause to pass into the camp of the enemy all the chances of success, which a skillful general should have prepared by his manœuvres; it is one of those hazards which one can neither foresee nor avoid. Would it be just, for that reason, to deny the influence of principles or of science, under ordinary circumstances? Undoubtedly not, for this hazard even produces the finest triumph of principles, since they will be found applied by the army against which it was wished to employ them, and it will conquer through their ascendancy. But in yielding to the evidence of those reasons, it will be inferred from them, perhaps, that they militate against science. That would not be better founded, since the science consists in putting on one's side all the chances possible to foresee, and it cannot be extended to the caprices of destiny. Now, for a hundred battles gained by skillful manœuvres, there are two or three gained by fortuitous accidents.

If the skill of the general-in-chief is one of the surest elements of vic-

* If irregular troops are nothing when they compose the whole army, and if they do not know how to gain battles, it must be owned that, supported by good troops they are an auxiliary of the highest importance; when they are numerous, they reduce the enemy to despair, by destroying his convoys, intercepting all his communications, and holding him as it were invested in his camps; they render above all retreats disastrous, as the French experienced in 1812. (See article 45.)

selor taken from among men of tried execution. But in no case would it be wise to give those counselors other power than a consultative voice.

We have said above, that if the prince does not himself conduct his armies, the most important of his duties will be that of causing himself to be well replaced, and this, unfortunately, is what scarcely ever happens. Without going back to the times of antiquity, it suffices to recall the more recent examples which the ages of Louis XIV and Louis XV have furnished us. The merit of Prince Eugène, measured by his ill shaped figure, carried the greatest captain of his time into the hostile ranks; and after the death of Louvois, they saw the Tallards, the Marsins, the Villerois, succeed the Turennes, the Condés, and the Luxumbourgs; later were seen the Soubises and the Clermonts succeed the Marshal Saxe. From the perfumed selections, made in the boudoirs of the Pompadours and the Dubarrys, down to the love of Napoleon for *Sabreurs*, there are, doubtless, many states of divers natures to pass over, and the margin is sufficiently great for offering to the least enlightened government, all the means of arriving at a rational result; but, in all times, human frailties will show their influence in one manner or another, and cunning or suppleness will often gain the day, over the modest merit which shall wait until it be known how to employ it.

Setting aside even all the chances taken in the nature of the human heart, it is just to acknowledge how difficult such selections are, even for chiefs of the government the most ardent in their desires for the public welfare. In the first place, to choose a skillful general, one must be a military man himself, and in condition to judge, or else refer to the judgments of others, which involves necessarily the inconvenience of coteries. The embarrassment is, doubtless, not so great, when there is at command a general already illustrious from many victories; but, besides that every general is not a great captain for having gained a battle, (witness Jourdan, Scherer, and many others,) it does not always happen that a State has a victorious general at its disposition. After long intervals of peace, it might chance that no European general should have commanded-in-chief. In this case, it would be difficult to know by what title one general should be preferred to another; those who, by long peace services, shall be at the head of the list, and shall have the grade requisite for commanding the army, will they be the most capable of doing it?

Moreover, the communications of chiefs of the State with their subordinates, are so rare and so transient, that there is no occasion for astonishment at the difficulty of putting men in their place. The faith of the prince, seduced by appearances, will then sometimes be surprised, and

with sentiments the most elevated, he can be deceived in his selections, without being liable to be reproached for it.

One of the surest means for avoiding this misfortune, would seem to be to realize the fine fiction of Fénélon in Telemachus, and to seek the faithful Philocles, sincere and generous, who placed between the prince and all aspirants to the command, would be able, by his more direct relations with the public, to enlighten the monarch as to the choice of individuals, the best recommended by their talents, as well as by their character. But will this faithful friend himself never yield to personal affections? Will he know how to divest himself of prepossessions? Was not Suwaroff repulsed by Potemkin because of his personal appearance, and was not all the skill of Catharine needed to cause a regiment to be given to a man who afterwards shed so much lustre upon her arms?

It has been thought that public opinion would be the best guide; nothing is more hazardous. Has not public opinion mode a Cæsar of Dumouriez, who understood hothing of great warfare? Would it have placed Bonaparte at the head of the army in Italy, when he was known but by two directors? Meanwhile it must be acknowledged that this opinion, if it be not always infallible, is none the more to be disdained, especially, when it survives great crises and the experience of events.

The qualities most essential for a general-in-chief will ever be: *A great character, or moral courage which leads to great resolutions; then sang-froid or physical courage which predominates over dangers.* Knowledge appears but in the third rank; it were blindness not to acknowledge that it will be a powerful auxiliary. Moreover, as I have already said elsewhere, we must not understand thereby a vast erudition; it is not necessary to know a great deal, but to understand well, and above all to be deeply penetrated with regulating principles. At the end of all these qualities will come personal character; a man brave, just, firm, equitable, knowing how to esteem the merit of others instead of being jealous of it, and skillful in making it serve to his own glory, will ever be a good general, and may even pass for a great man. Unfortunately this eagerness to render justice to merit is not the most common quality, mediocre minds are always jealous, and inclined to surround themselves badly, fearing to pass in the world for being led, and not knowing how to comprehend that the man nominally placed at the head of armies has always nearly the entire glory of their successes, even though he should have the least part therein.

The question has often been agitated whether the command should be

given in preference to the general habituated from long experience tc the conduct of troops, or to generals of the staff or scientific arms, little habituated, themselves to managing troops. It is incontestable that grand warfare is a science altogether separate, and that one may very well combine operations without having himself led a regiment to the enemy; Peter the Great, Condé, Frederick and Napoleon are in point to prove it. It cannot be denied then that a man come from the staff may become a great captain as well as any other; but it will not be for having grown old in the functions of quarter-master that he will have the capacity for supreme command, it will be because he possesses in himself the natural genius for war and the requisite character. In the same manner, a general from the ranks of the infantry or of the cavalry, will be as fit as a learned tactician to command an army.

The question seems then difficult to resolve in an absolute manner, and here still individualities will be everything. In order to arrive at a rational solution, it is necessary to take a middle course and recognize:

That a general of the staff, the artillery or engineers, who shall also have conducted a division or a corps d'armee, will have, with equal chances, a real superiority over him who shall only be acquainted with the service of one arm or of a special corps;

That a general of troops who shall have studied war will be equally proper for command;

That great character precedes all the qualities requisite for a general-in-chief;

Finally that the union of wise theory with a great character will constitute the great captain.

The difficulty of assuring constantly a good choice, has give rise to the idea of supplying it by a good staff, which, placed as advisers of the generals, would have a real influence over the operations. Undoubtedly a superior staff corps, in which should be perpetuated good traditions, will always be one of the most useful and happy of institutions; but it will be necessary to watch that false doctrines are not introduced therein, for then this institution would become fatal. Frederick the Great, in founding his military academy at Potsdam, scarcely expected that it would terminate in the *rechte schulter vor* of General Ruchel,* and in presenting the oblique order as the infallible talisman, which causes the gain of battles: so true is it that from the sublime to the ridiculous there is often but a step.

* This General believed, at the battle of Gena, that he could save the army by commanding his soldiers to advance the right shoulder in order to form an oblique line!

Besides that, it would be necessary to avoid with great care exciting a conflict between the generalissimo and his chief of staff; and if the latter ought to be taken from amongst the best recognized notabilities of this corps, still it will be necessary to leave to the generals the choice of the individuals with whom he will best sympathise. To impose a chief of staff on the generalissimo would be to lead to a confusion of powers; to allow him to take a man who is a cypher among his clients would be more dangerous still, for if he is himself a mediocre man, placed by favor or chance, his choice will be felt. The mean term for avoiding these evils, will be to give to the general-in-chief, the choice amongst many generals of an incontestable capacity, who will be designated for him, but leaving him to take the one who shall suit him.

It has been thought also, in almost all armies successively, that more solemnity and weight would be given to the direction of military operations, by assembling often councils of war to aid the generalissimo with their advice. Undoubtedly, if the chief of the army is a Soubise, a Clermont, or a Mack, a mediocre man in a word, he could often find in the council of war better opinions than his own; the majority even could make better decisions than he; but what success could be expected from operations conducted by others than those who have planned and combined them? What will the execution of a project lead to, which the general-in-chief only half comprehends, since it will not be his own thought?

I have had myself a terrible experience of this pitiful part of prompter at head quarters, and no one perhaps can better than myself appreciate it at its just value. It is especially in the midst of a council of war that this part must be absurd, and the more numerous the council, and the higher the military dignitaries of which it shall be composed, the more difficult it will be to cause truth and reason to triumph in it if there be ever so little dissidence.

What would a council of war have done in which Napoleon, in quality of counselor, should have proposed the movement of Arcola, the plan of Rivoli, the march by the St. Bernard, the movement of Ulm, and that upon Gera and Jena? The timid would have found those operations rash even to folly; others would have seen a thousand difficulties of execution; all would have rejected them. If, on the contrary, the council should have accepted them, and another than Napoleon should have conducted them, would they not certainly have failed?

Therefore, in my opinion, councils of war are a deplorable resource; it can only have one favorable side, which is when the council is of the same

opinion as the general-in-chief. It may then give to the latter more confidence in his own resolutions, and he will have, moreover, the conviction that each of his lieutenants, penetrated with the same idea as himself, will do his best to assure its execution. This is the only good which a council of war can produce, which, besides, ought always to be a council purely consultative and nothing more. But if, in place of this perfect accord, there be dissidence, then such a council can have only unfortunate results.

From what precedes, I think it may be concluded, that the best manner of organizing the command of an army, when we shall not have a great captain, who has already given numerous proofs, will be:

1. To confide this command to a man of tried bravery, bold in combat, immoveable in danger;

2. To give him for a chief of staff, a man of high capacity, of a frank and loyal character, with whom the generalissimo may live in good harmony; the glory is sufficiently great to yield a part of it to a friend who should have concurred in preparing successes. It was thus that Blucher, assisted by the Gneisenaus and Mufflings, covered himself with a glory which probably he never would have acquired all alone. Without doubt, this kind of double command would never equal that of a Frederick, of a Napoleon, or of a Suwarof, but, in default of this unity of a great captain, it is certainly the preferable mode.

Before finishing upon these important matters, is remains for me yet to say a few words upon another manner of influencing military operations: it is that of councils of war established in the capitol near the government.

Louvois, directed a long time from Paris, the armies of Louis XIV, and did it with success. Carnot directed also from Paris the armies of the Republic; in 1793 he did very well, and saved France; in 1794 he did at first very badly, then repaired his faults by chance; in 1796 he did decidedly very badly. But Louvois and Carnot directed alone the operations without assembling a council.

The Aulic council of war, established at Vienna, had often the mission of directing the operations of the armies; there has never been but one voice in Europe upon the fatal effects which have resulted from it; is it wrong or right? Austrian generals can alone decide.

As far as I am concerned, I think that the only attribute which such a council should have, is reduced to the adoption of a general plan of operations. It is already known that I do not understand by that, a plan which would trace out a whole campaign, would constrain generals and can

them to be beaten inevitably; but I understand the plan which should determine the aim of the campaign, the offensive or defensive nature of the operations, then the material means which it would be necessary to prepare beforehand for the first enterprises, then for the reserves, then for possible levies in case of invasion. It cannot be denied that all these things may and even must be discussed, in a government council, composed of generals and ministers; but there, ought to be limited the action of such a council, for if it has the pretention to tell the generalissimo not only to march to Vienna or to Paris, but still to indicate to him the manner in which he must manœuvre in order to arrive there, then the poor general will be certainly beaten, and all the responsibility of his reverses will weigh upon those who, at two hundred leagues from the enemy, pretend to direct an army, which it is already so difficult to direct well when one is upon the ground.

ARTICLE XV.

MILITARY SPIRIT OF NATIONS, AND THE MORAL OF ARMIES.

A government would adopt in vain the best regulations for organizing an army, if it did not apply itself also to exciting a military spirit in the country. If, in the city of London, they prefer the title of richest cashier to military decoration, that may do with an insular country, protected by its innumerable squadrons; but a continental nation, which should adopt the manners of the city of London, or of the bourse of Paris, would sooner or later be the prey of its neighbors. It was to the assemblage of civic virtues and military spirit passed from institutions into manners that the Romans were indebted for their greatness; when they lost those virtues, and when, ceasing to regard the military service an honor as well as a duty, they abandoned it to the mercenary Goths, Heruli and Gauls, the loss of the empire became inevitable. Without doubt, nothing of that which may augment the prosperity of a country ought to be forgotten or

despised; it is necessary even to honor skillful men and traders who are the first instruments of this prosperity, but it is necessary that this be subordinate to the great institutions which make the strength of States, by encouraging the masculine and heroic virtues. Policy and justice will be agreed in that, for, whatever Boileau may say of it, it will always be more glorious *to brave death in the steps of the Cæsars*, than to fatten on the public miseries, by playing upon the vicissitudes of the credit of the State. Woe to those countries where the luxury of the contractor and the stockholder insatiable of gold, shall be placed above the uniform of the brave man who shall have sacrificed his life, his health or his fortune, in the defence of the country.

The first means of encouraging the military spirit is to surround the army with all consideration, public and social. The second, is to assure to the services rendered to the State, the preference in all the administrative employments which should chance to be vacant, or to require even a given time of military service for certain employments. It would be a subject worthy of the most serious consideration, that of comparing the ancient military institutions of Rome with those of Russia and Prussia, and of drawing afterwards the parallel between them and the doctrines of modern Utopists who, declaiming against all participation of the officers of the army in the other public functions, no longer wish any but rhetoricians in the great offices.*

Without doubt, there are many employments which require special studies; but would it not be possible for the military man to devote himself, in the numerous leisures of peace, to the study of the career which he should wish to embrace, after having paid his debt to his country in that of arms? And if administrative places were given by preference to officers retired from service with the grade of captain at least, would it not be a great stimulant for them to seek to arrive at this grade? Would it not also be a stimulant for officers to think, in their garrisons, of seeking their recreations elsewhere than in the theatres and public cafés.

Perhaps it will be found that this facility of passing from the military service to places of civil administration, would be rather injurious than favorable to the military spirit, and that, in order to strengthen the latter, it would be suitable on the contrary to place the condition of soldier altogether beyond other careers. The Janizaries and the Mamelukes had their origin in this principle. These soldiers were bought at the age of seven

* For example, in France, in place of excluding the military from elections, the right of elector ought to be given to all colonels, and that of eligibility to all generals; the most venal of the deputies will not be the military men.

or eight years, and they were reared in the idea that they must die under their colors. The English even, those men so proud of their rights, on becoming soldiers, contract the obligation for life; and the Russian soldier must serve for twenty-five years, which is almost equivalent to a life enlistment like that of the English.

With such armies, as well as in those which are recruited by voluntary enlistment, perhaps it wouln be in fact, more suitable not to admit a fusion between the posts of military officers and civil places. But, whenever the military service shall be a temporary duty imposed on the population, the case seems different, and the Roman institutions which required a service of ten years in the legions, before being able to aspire to the various public functions, appears rather in effect the best means of preserving the martial spirit, especially at an epoch when the general tendency to material well-being, seems to become the dominant passion of societies.

However that may be, I think, that under all possible regimes, the constant aim of a wise government will be to elevate the military service to the end of nourishing the love of glory and all the warlike virtues, under penalty of incurring the blame of posterity, and of experiencing the fate of the Roman empire.

It will not be all to inspire the military spirit in the populations; it will be necessary still to encourage it in the army. What, in fact, would be gained, though the uniform should be honored in the city and imposed as a civic duty, if men did not carry under their colors all the warlike virtues? We should have a militia numerous, but without valor.

The moral exaltation of an army and military spirit are two very different things which we must take care not to confound, and which produce nevertheless, the same effect. The first is, as has been said, produced by passions more or less transient, such as political or religious opinions, and a great love of country; whilst that military spirit being inspired by the skill of a chief or by wise institutions, depends less on circumstances and ought to be the work of a far seeing government.*

Let courage be recompensed and honored, let the grades be respected, and let discipline be in sentiment and in conviction still more than in form.

Let the body of officers and the ranks in general be convinced that resignation, bravery and the sentiment of duty, are virtues without which no

* It is important especially that this spirit should animate the lists of officers and non-commissioned officers; soldiers always go well when those lists are good and the nation is brave.

army is respectable, no glory possible; let all know well that firmness in reverses is more honorable than enthusiasm in successes, for there is only courage necessary for taking a position, whilst heroism is required for making a difficult retreat before a victorious and enterprising enemy, without being disconcerted, and opposing to it a bold front. It is the duty of the prince to recompense a handsome retreat as highly as the finest victory.

To harden the armies to labor and fatigue; not to allow them to be idle in the effeminacy of garrisons in times of peace; to inculcate in them the sentiment of their superiority over the enemy; without, however, lowering the latter too much; to inspire the love of great actions; in a word, to excite enthusiasm by inspirations in harmony with the spirit which governs the masses; to decorate valor and punish weakness; and finally to brand cowardice; these are the means of forming a good military spirit.

It was effeminacy above all which was the ruin of the Roman legions; those formidable soldiers who carried casque, buckler and cuirass under the burning sky of Africa in the days of the Scipios, found them too heavy under the cold sky of Gaul and Germany; then the empire was lost.

I have said that it is necessary never to inspire too much contempt for the enemy, because that where you should find an obstinate resistance, the *moral* of the soldier might be shaken by it. Napoleon, addressing himself at Jena to the corps of Lannes, praised the Prussian cavalry, but promised that it could do nothing against the bayonets of his Egyptians!

It is necessary also to forewarn the officers, and through them the soldiers, against those sudden turns which often seize the bravest armies when they are not restrained by the curb of discipline, and by the conviction that order in a troop is the pledge of its safety. It was not for the want of courage that a hundred thousand Turks were beaten at Peterwaradin by the Prince Eugene, and at Kagoul by Roumanzof; it was because that once repulsed in their disorderly charges, each one found himself delivered to his personal inspirations, all fighting individually without any order in the masses. A troop seized with panic finds itself in the same state of demoralization, for disorder being once introduced, all concert and all ensemble in the individual wills becomes impossible; the voice of the chiefs can no longer make itself heard; every manœuvre for re-establishing the combat becomes impossible of execution, and then there remains safety only in a shameful flight.

The peoples of lively and ardent imagination are more subject than

others to these panics, and those of the south are almost all in this category. The remedy is in strong institutions and skillful chiefs alone. The French even, whose military virtues have never been questioned when they have been well conducted, have often witnessed those alarms which it is permitted to call rediculous. Who does not recall the inconceivable panic terror with which the infantry of Marshal Villars was seized after having gained the battle of Friedlingen (1704)? The same thing had place in the infantry of Napoleon after the victory of Wagram, when the enemy was in full retreat. And, what is more extraordinary still, is the rout of the 97th demi-brigade at the seige of Genoa, where fifteen hundred men fled before a platoon of hussars, whilst that those same men took two days after the Diamond Fort by one of the most vigorous coups-de-main of modern history.

It would seem, nevertheless, very easy to convince brave soldiers that death strikes more quickly and more surely men flying in disorder, than those who remian united to present a bold front to the enemy, or rally promptly if they happen to be momentarily forced. The Russian army in this respect, may serve as a model for all those of Europe, and the steadiness which it has displayed in all its retreats, belong as much to the national character as to the national instinct of the soldiers and to the establishment of a rigid discipline. It is not indeed always the vivacity of imagination of troops which introduces disorder among them, the want of habits of order has much to do with it, and the want of precautions in the chiefs to assure the maintainance of them, contributes still more to it. I have been often astonished at the indifference of the greater part of generals on this subject; not only did they disdain to take the least logistic precaution for assuring the direction of small detachments and isolated men, they adopted no rallying signals in order to facilitate, in the different corps of an army, the reunion of the fractions which might be scattered in consequence of a sudden terror, or even an irresistible charge of the enemy; but they were even offended that any one should think of proposing to them such precautions. In the meantime the most incontestable courage, and the severest discipline would be often impotent for remedying a great disorder, which the good habit of division rallying signals would much more easily obviate. Without doubt there are cases where all human resources would be insufficient for the maintainance of order; such, for example, is that where the physical sufferings to which the troops should find themselves a prey, should have succeeded in rendering them deaf to all kinds of appeal, and where the chiefs themselves should be unable to do anything to reorganize them; this is what happened in 1812. But beyond these

exceptionable cases, good habits of order, good logistic precautions, and a good discipline will succeed the most often, if not in preventing all panic. at least in carrying a prompt remedy thereto.

It is time to quit those matters of which I have desired only to trace a sketch, and to pass on to the examination of the purely military combinations.