the object of making the enemy arrive upon a point where it is convenient to fix his attention, whilst the weight of the forces are assembled upon a quite opposite point where it is desired to strike an important blow. It is necessary then not only to avoid engaging the corps which is employed in this demonstration, but to recall it promptly upon the main body; we shall cite two examples, which will prove the opportuneness of this precaution.

In 1800, Moreau, wishing to deceive Kray upon the true direction of his march, caused his left wing to be carried from Kehl towards Rastadt, whilst he filed with his army upon Stockach; his left, after simply showing itself, fell back then towards his centre by Friburg in Brisgau.

In 1805, Napoleon, master of Vienna, threw the corps of Bernadotte upon Iglau, to scatter terror in Bohemia, and to paralyse the Arch-Duke Ferdinand, who was assembling a corps; he launches on the other side Davoust upon Presburg to impose upon Hungary; but he changed them immediately upon Brunn, in order that they should come and take part in the events which were to decide the whole campaign, and a signal victory became the result of these wise manœuvres. Those kinds of operations, far from being contrary to principles, are necessary to favor their application.

It will easily be conceived, from all that precedes, that absolute maxims could not be given upon operations so varied, and the success of which depends upon so many particulars thus difficult to seize. It will be for the talents and the *coup d'œil* of generals to judge when they should risk those detachments; the only admissable precepts we have already presented; they are to make as few of them as possible, and to draw them in as soon as they have accomplished their mission.

For the rest their inconvenience can be remedied in part, by giving good instructions to those who command them; it is in this that consists the greatest talent of a general of the staff.

Since we have cited the small detachments destined for *coups de main*, in the number of those which may be useful, we shall indicate a few of this nature, which will enable us to form a judgment thereon. We recollect the one which the Russians executed at the end of 1828, for seizing Sizepoli, on the Gulf of Burgas. The taking of this feebly intrenched post, which was hastily put under cover, procured, in case of success, an essential point of support beyond the Balkan, for establishing therein beforehand the depôts of the army which was to cross those mountains; in case of non-success it would compromise nothing, not even the little corps which had an assured retreat upon its vessels.

In the same manner, in the campaign in 1796, the *coup de main* attempted by the Austrians upon Kehl, and for destroying its bridge whilst Moreau was returning from Bavaria, could have had important results if it had not failed.

In these kinds of enterprises we risk little for gaining a great deal, and as they could not compromise in any manner the mass of the army, they cannot but be approved.

Light corps thrown in the midst of the hostile zone of operations, are to be classed in the same category; some hundreds of horsemen thus hazarded are never a grave loss, and may often cause considerable detriment to the enemy. The light detachments made by the Russians in 1807, 1812 and 1813, seriously disturbed the operations of Napoleon, and at times caused them to fail by intercepting his orders and all his communications.

We employ in preferencc for those kinds of expeditions, officers at once dexterous and bold, known under the name of partisans; veritable *enfants perdu*, they are to do all the evil they can to the enemy without too much compromising themselves; doubtless, when the occasion presents itself for striking an important blow, they ought also to know how to dash headlong upon the enemy; but in general, address and presence of mind in avoiding all useless danger, are, still more than systematic audacity, the true qualities necessary to a partisan. I refer for the rest to what I have said of them in Chapter XXXV, of the treatise on grand operations, and to Article 45 farther on, upon light cavalry.

ARTICLE XXIX.

STRATEGICAL OPERATIONS IN MOUNTAINS.

We should not have presented strategy under all of its aspects, had we not traced a sketch of the part it may have in the operations of a mountain warfare. We do not pretend to analyse those local intricacies of posts reputed almost impregnable, which form the romantic part of the tactics of combats; we shall seek to indicate merely the relations of a moun-

tainous country with the different articles which make the subject of this chapter.

A mountainous country presents itself under four entirely different points of view in the combinations of a war; it may be the complete theatre of this war, or form but a zone of it; it is possible also that its whole surface may be mountainous, or that it will form but a belt of mountains, issuing from which, an army would debouch into vast and rich plains.

If we except Switzerland, the Tyrol, the Noric provinces, (I comprehend in this denomination Carinthia, Styria, Carniola and Illyria,) a few provinces of Turkey and Hungary, Catalonia and Portugal, all the other countries of Europe seldom present but those mountainous belts.* Then it is but a defile painful to pass, a temporary obstacle which, once overcome, presents an advantage to the army which has succeeded in seizing it, rather than being perilous to it. Indeed, the obstacle once surmounted, and the war transported into the plains, the chain thus crossed may be considered, so to speak, as a kind of eventual base, upon which one could fall back and find a temporary refuge. The only thing essential to be observed in such an occurrence, is never to allow yourself to be anticipated thereon by the enemy in case you should be forced to retreat.

The Alps even make no exception to this rule in the part which separates France from Italy; the Pyrennées, the least elevated chain of which is however as extended in depth, are equally in the same category; in Catalonia alone they reign over the whole surface of the country as far as the Ebro, and if the war be limited to this province, the whole *échiquier* being mountainous leads necessarily to other combinations than where there exists only a belt.

Hungary differs little in this respect from Lombardy and Castile, for if even the Krapaks present in their eastern and northern part a belt as strong as the Pyrennées, it must be owned meanwhile that it is but a temporary obstacle, and that the army which should cross it, debouching, either into the basins of the Waag, of the Neytra or of the Theiss, or into the fields of Mongatsch, would have to decide the great questions in the vast plains between the Danube and the Theiss. The only difference is in

* I do not make mention here of the Caucasus, because this country, the constant theatre of petty warfare, has not been thoroughly explored, it has always been regarded as a secondary affair in the great conflicts for empire, and it will never be the theatre of a great strategical operation.

the routes, which, rare but superb in the Alps and the Pyrennées, are wanting in Hungary, or are scarcely practicable.*

In the northern part this chain, less elevated perhaps, but more extended in depth, would seem indeed to belong in some sort to the class of *echiquiers* wholly mountainous; meanwhile, as it forms but a part of the general *échiquier*, and as its evacuation might be rendered necessary by the decisive operations which should be carried on in the valleys of the Theiss, or of the Waag, it may be ranged in the number of transient barriers. For the rest, it could not be dissembled that the attack and the defense of this country would be one of the most interesting double strategical studies.

The chains of Bohemia, of the Vosges, of the Black Forest, although much less important, are also placed in the category of mountainous belts.

When an entirely mountainous country, like the Tyrol and Switzerland, forms only a zone of the theatre of operations, then the importance of its mountains is but relative, and we can limit ourselves more or less to masking them like a fortress, in order to move to the decision of great questions in the valleys. It is quite otherwise if this country forms the principal *échiquier*.

It has long been doubted whether possession of the mountains controlled the valleys, or whether possession of the valleys controlled the mountains. The Arch-Duke Charles, that judge so enlightened and so competent, has inclined to the last assertion, and demonstrated that the valley of the Danube was the key of Southern Germany. Meanwhile, it must be admitted, every thing must depend in these kinds of questions upon the relative forces and upon the dispositions of the country. If sixty thousand French advanced into Bavaria, having in presence an Austrian army equal in forces, which should throw thirty thousand men into the Tyrol, with the hope of replacing them by reinforcements at its arrival upon the Inn, it would be sufficiently difficult for the French to push as far as that line, leaving upon their flank such a force master of the debouches of Scharnitz, of Fussen, of Kufstein and of Lofers. But if this French army had as many as one hundred and twenty thousand combattants, and should have gained sufficient successes to be assured of their superiority over the army which should be before it, then it could always form a detachment suffi-

* I speak of the condition of the country in 1810. I am ignorant whether it has participated subsequently in the great movement which has had place in all the Austrian monarchy for the amelioration of routes, and the opening of great strategical communications.

cient for masking the debouches of the Tyrol and push its march to Linz, as Moreau did in 1800.

Thus far we have considered mountainous countries as accessory zones. If we consider them as the principal *échiquier* of the whole war, questions change their face somewhat, and strategical combinations seem to become more complicated. The campaign of 1799 and that of 1800, are equally rich in interesting lessons on this branch of the art. In the relation which I have published of them, I endeavored to cause them to be comprehended by the historical exposition itself of the events; I could not do better than refer my readers to it.

If we recall the dissertation which I have made upon the results of the imprudent invasion of Switzerland by the French Directory, and upon the fatal influence which it exercised in doubling the extent of the theatre of operations, and in making a single *échiquier* from the Texel to Naples, we cannot too much applaud the genius which inspired the cabinets of Vienna and Paris in the transactions which, for three centuries, had guaranteed the neutrality of Switzerland. Every one will be convinced of this truth, by reading with some attention the interesting campaigns of the Arch-Duke, of Suwaroff and of Masséna in 1799, as well as those of Napoleon and of Moreau in 1800. The first is a model of operations on an *échiquier* entirely mountainous; the second is one for wars where the fate of mountainous countries is to be decided upon plains.

I shall endeavor to recapitulate here some of the truths which have appeared to me to result from this examination.

When a country, cut up with mountains, over its whole surface becomes the principal *échiquier* of the operations of the two armies, the combinations of strategey cannot be calculated entirely upon the maxims applicable to open countries.

In fact, the transversal manœuvres for gaining the extremities of the front of operations of the enemy, then become of a more difficult execution, and are often even impossible; in such a country one can operate with a considerable army only in a small number of valleys, where the enemy shall have had care to place sufficient advanced guards, to the end of suspending the march as long as would be necessary to take into consideration the means of defeating the enterprise; and as in the counterforts which separate those valleys there ordinarily exist only foot-paths insufficient for the movements of armies, no transversal march could have place thereon but for light divisions.

The important strategical points, marked by nature at the confluence

of the principal valleys, or, if it be preferred, at the confluence of the rivers which they enclose, are so clearly traced, that it were to be blind to mistake them; now, as they are small in number, the defensive army occupying them with the mass of its troops, the aggressor will oftener be reduced, in order to dislodge it therefrom, to have recourse to direct attacks or main force.

However, if great strategical movements are more rare and more difficult on such a theatre, it is not saying that they are on that account the less important; on the contrary, if you succeed in seizing upon one of these knots of communication of great valleys, on the line of retreat of the enemy, his loss is still more certain than in open countries, because by occupying on this line one or two defiles of difficult access, it would often suffice for causing the ruin of a whole army.

But if the attacking party have difficulties to overcome, it must be owned also that the defensive army has no less of them, from the necessity which it thinks there is of covering all the issues by which one might arrive in mass upon those decisive points. In order to make better comprehended what I have just said upon transversal marches, and upon the difficulty of directing them in mountains as easily as in plains, I shall be permitted to recall the one which Napoleon made in 1805, to cut off Mack from Ulm; if it were facilitated by the hundred roads which furrow Suabia in all directions; if it had been impracticable in a mountainous country, for want of transversal routes for making the long tour from Donanwerth by Augsburg upon Memmingen, it must be admitted also that, by favor of those hundred roads, Mack would equally have been able to make his retreat more easily than if he had been surrounded in one of those valleys of Switzerland and of the Tyrol from whence one could only issue by a single road.

On the other hand, the general who is reduced to the defensive may, in an open country, preserve a very great part of his forces united, for if the enemy divide in order to occupy all the roads which that general would be at liberty to take in his retreat, it will be easy for him to cut his way through this multitude of isolated divisions; but in a very mountainous country, where an army has ordinarily but one or two principal issues, into which several other valleys chance to terminate in the same direction occupied by the enemy, the concentration of forces is more difficult, seeing that, if a single one of those valleys be neglected, there might result grave inconveniences.

Nothing, in fact, could better demonstrate the difficulty of the strategic defense of mountains than the embarrassment in which one finds himself

when he wishes to give, not rules, but even advice to generals charged with such a task. If the only question were the defense of a definite point of operations, of small extent, formed by four or five valleys or convergent rays terminating at the central knot of those valleys, at two or three small marches from the summits of the chain, no doubt the thing would be more easy. It would suffice then to recommend the construction of a good fort upon each of those rays, at the point of the defile which is narrowest and the most easy to turn; then to place, under the protection of those forts, some brigades of infantry to dispute the passage, whilst that a reserve of the half of the army, placed at this central knot of the union of the valleys, would be in condition either to sustain those advanced guards most seriously menaced, or to fall in mass upon the enemy when he should attempt to debouch, and when we would have united all the columns to receive him. By adding, to those dispositions, good instructions to the generals of those advanced guards, whether for assigning them the best rallying point as soon as the fatal cordon should be pierced, or for prescribing to them to continue to act in the mountains upon the flanks of the enemy, then one might believe himself invincible, by favor of the thousand difficulties which the localities present to the assailant. But when, by the side of such a front of operations, there is found still another nearly like it upon the right, then a third upon the left; when it is required to defend at the same time all those fronts, under penalty of seeing fall, at the first approach of the enemy, that one which should be neglected, then the question is changed, the embarrassment of the defender is redoubled in proportion to the extent of the line of defense, and the system of cordons appears with all its dangers, without it being easy to adopt any other.

We could not be better convinced of those truths, than by retracing the position of Masséna in Switzerland in 1799. After the loss of the battle of Stockach by Jourdan, he held the line from Basle by Schaffhausen and Rheineck to the St. Gothard, and from thence by the Furca to Mt. Blanc. He had enemies in front of Basle, he had them at Waldshut, at Schaffhausen, at Feldkirch and at Coire; the corps of Bellegarde menaced the St. Gothard, and the army of Italy had designs upon the Simplon and the St. Bernard. How was the periphery of such a circle to be defended? How leave one of the great valleys uncovered, at the risk of losing every thing? From Rheinfeld to the Jura towards Soleure, there are but two light marches, and there was the gorge of the Mouse-trap in which the French army found itself engaged. There then was the pivot of the defense; but was Schaffhausen to be left uncovered

how were Rheineck and the St. Gothard to be abandoned, how open Valais and the access to Berne, without giving up all Helvetia to the coalition? And if it were wished to cover all even by simple brigades, where would be the army when it should be required to deliver a decisive battle to any hostile mass which might present itself? To concentrate one's forces in the plain is a natural system, but in regions of difficult gorges it is to deliver up the keys of the country to the enemy, and then it is no longer known upon what point it would be possible to unite an inferior army without compromising it.

In the situation where Massena was found after the forced evacuation of the line of the Rhine and Zurich, it seemed that the only strategical point for him to defend, was the line of the Jura; he had the temerity to hold firm on that of the Albis, shorter than that of the Rhine, but which left him yet exposed, upon an immense line, to the blows which the Austrians might deliver him. And if, instead of pushing Bellegarde upon Lombardy by the Valteline, the Aulic Council had made him march upon Berne, or unite with the Arch-Duke, all would have been over with Massena. Those events seem then to prove that, if countries with high mountains are favorable to a tactical defense, it is not the same for a strategical defense, which, obliged to be disseminated, must seek a remedy for this inconvenience by augmenting its mobility, and by passing often to the offensive.

General Clausewitz, whose logic is frequently at fault, pretends on the contrary, that, motion being the difficult part of mountain warfare, the defender ought to avoid the least movement, under the penalty of losing the advantage of local defenses. Meanwhile he finishes by demonstrating, himself, that the passive defense must succumb, sooner or later, under an active attack, which tends to prove that the initiative is not less favorable in the mountains than in the plains. If it could be doubted, the campaign of Massena would for the rest prove it, for if he maintained himself in Switzerland, it was by attacking the enemy whenever he found occasion for so doing, although it were necessary to seek him upon the Grimsel and the St. Gothard. Napoleon had done as much in the Tyrol in 1796, against Wurmser and Alvinzi.

With regard to strategical manœuvres of detail, we shall be able to form an idea of them by reading the inconceivable events which accompanied the expedition of Suwarof by the St. Gothard upon the Muttenthal. In applauding the manœuvres prescribed by the Russian marshal for taking Lecourbe in the valley of the Reuss, we shall admire the presence of mind, the activity and immovable firmness which saved this gen-

eral and his division; we shall then see Suwarof, in the Schachenthal and the Muttenthal, placed in the same situation as Lecourbe, and to extricate himself from it with the same skill. Not less extraordinary will appear the fine ten days campaign of General Molitor, who, surrounded with four thousand men in the canton of Glaris by more than thirty thousand allies, succeeded in sustaining himself behind the Linth after four admirable combats. It is in the study of these facts that we may recognise *all the vanity of theories of detail*, and be assured that a strong and heroic will can do, in mountain warfare especially, more than all the precepts in the world. After such lessons might I venture to say that one of the regulating principles of this warfare is not to risk ourselves in the valleys without being secure of the heights? A maxim somewhat trite, of which no captain of voltigeurs should be ignorant. Might I not say also, that in this warfare, more than every where else, it is necessary to seek to make it on the communications of the enemy; finally, that in those difficult countries, good temporary bases or lines of defense established at the centre of great confluents, and covered by strategical reserves, will be, with a great mobility and frequent offensive returns, the best means for defending the country.

I could not, however, terminate this article, without causing to be observed that mountainous countries are especially favorable for the defensive when the war is truly national, and when the roused populations defend their firesides with the obstinacy which enthusiasm for a holy cause gives; then each step of the assailant is bought at the price of the greatest sacrifices. But, in order that the struggle be crowned with success, it is always necessary that those populations be sustained by a more or less powerful disciplined army, without the support of which, brave inhabitants would soon succumb like the heroes of Stans and of the Tyrol.

The offensive against a mountainous country, presents also a double hypothesis; shall it be directed against a belt of mountains terminating a vast échiquier of plains, or shall it be against a particular theatre wholly mountainous?

In the first case there is scarcely but one precept to give: it is to make demoustrations against the whole periphery of a frontier, in order to oblige the enemy to extend his defensive, and to force afterwards a passage on the decisive point which shall promise the greatest results. It is a cordon, feeble numerically, but strong by localities, which it is the object to break; if it be forced upon a single point it is so upon the whole line. In reading the history of the Fort of Bard in 1800, or the taking of Leutasch, and Scharnitz in 1805 by Ney, who threw himself with fourteen

thousand men upon Innspruck in the midst of thirty thousand Austrians, and succeeded, by seizing upon that central point, in obliging them to retreat in all directions, we may judge that with a brave infantry and bold chiefs, those famous mountain girdles will ordinarily be forced.

The history of the passage of the Alps, where Francis I. turned the army which awaited him at Susa, in passing by the steep mountains between Mt. Cenis and the valley of Queyras, is an example of *those insurmountable obstacles which are always surmounted*. In order to oppose it, it would have been necessary to have recourse to the cordon system, and we have already said what was to be expected from that. The position of the Swiss and Italians at Susa, engaged in a single valley was not wiser than a cordon, it was even less so, since it shut up the army in a cut-throat place, without guarding the lateral valleys. To push light corps into those valleys, to dispute the passes which are there found, and to place the bulk of the army near Turin or Carignano, is what strategy counselled.

When the tactical difficulties of a mountain warfare are considered, and the immense advantages which it seems to assure to the defense, we should be tempted to consider as a manœuvre of the highest temerity, the assembling of a considerable army in a single mass to penetrate by a single valley, and, we should be quite inclined to divide it also into as many columns as there should be practicable passages.

This is, in my opinion, one of the most dangerous of illusions; we have only to recall the fate of the columns of Championnet at the battle of Fossano to be assured of it. If there exist five or six practicable roads upon the point menaced with invasion, to disquiet them all is necessary, but it is necessary to cross the chain at most in two masses; yet the valleys which are to be passed over must not be in a divergent direction, for they will fail if the enemy is in the least condition to receive them at the outlets. The system followed by Napoleon in the passage of the St. Bernard seems the wisest, he formed the strongest mass at the centre, with two divisions on the right and left by Mt. Cenis and the Simplon, in order to divide the attention of the enemy and to flank his march.

The invasion of countries which have not only a mountainous belt, but the interior of which is still a continual series of mountains, is longer and more difficult than that where we can hope an early denouement by a decisive battle delivered in the plains; because fields of battle suitable for deploying great masses scarcely ever being found thereon, such a war is an affair of partial combats. There it would perhaps be imprudent to penetrate upon a single point by a narrow and deep valley, of which the enemy

could close the issues and place the army in a false position ; but we could penetrate by wings upon two or three lateral lines, the issues of which should not be at too great distances apart, by combining the marches in such a manner as to debouch at the junction of the valleys nearly at the same instant, and by taking care to repel the enemy from all the counterforts which separate them from each other. Of all entirely mountainous countries, Switzerland is incontestably that of which the tactical defense would be the easiest, if its militia were animated with one mind ; favored by the support of such a militia, a disciplined and regular army could defend itself against triple forces.

To give fixed precepts for the complications which are multiplied to infinity by those of the localities, by the resources of art, and by the enthusiasm of the populations and of the armies would be an absurdity ; history—but history well discussed and well presented—is the true school of mountain warfare. The narrative of the campaign of 1799, by the Arch-Duke Charles, that of the same campaigns which I have given in my critical history of the wars of the revolution ; the narrative of the campaigns of the Grisons by Ségur, and Mathieu Dumas ; that of Catalonia by St. Cyr and Suchet ; the campaign of the Duke De Rohan in the Valteline ; the passage of the Alps by Gaillard (History of Francis I,) are good guides for this study.

ARTICLE XXX

A FEW WORDS UPON GREAT INVASIONS AND DISTANT EXPEDITIONS.

Having already made mention of distant wars and invasions as connected with the policy of States, it remains to us to examine them succinctly under the military aspect. We feel some embarrassment in assigning to them their true place in this summary, because if on the one hand they seem to belong to poetry and to Homeric fictions much more than to strategic combinations, it may be said on the other that except the great

distances which multiply the difficulties and the unfavorable chances of them, these adventurous expeditions offer nevertheless all the operations which are found in other wars ; in fact they have their battles, their combats, their sieges and even their lines of operations ; so that they enter more or less into the different branches of the art which make the subject of this work. However as it is only the question here to consider them as a whole, and as they differ especially from other wars in regard to their lines of operations, we will place them at the end of the chapter which treats of them.

There are many kinds of distant expeditions ; the first are those executed across the continent as auxiliaries only, and of which we have spoken in Art. 5, upon wars of intervention ; the second are great continental invasions which have place across vast countries more or less friendly, neutral, doubtful or hostile ; the third are expeditions of the same nature, but executed in part by land and in part by sea with the concurrence of numerous fleets ; the fourth are expeditions beyond the sea, in order to found, defend or attack distant colonies ; the fifth are great descents less distant, but attacking great States.

We have already pointed out, in Article 5, some of the inconveniences to which auxiliary corps are exposed which are sent to a distance in order to succor powers with which we are connected by defensive treaties or by coalitions. Without doubt, under the strategic point of view, a Russian army sent upon the Rhine or into Italy in order to act in concert with the Germanic powers, will be in a much stronger and more favorable situation than if it had penetrated to that distance by crossing hostile or even neutral countries ; its base, its lines of operations, its eventual points of support will be the same as those of its Allies ; it will have a refuge upon their lines of defense, provisions from their magazines, munitions from their arsenals ; whilst that in the contrary case it would only find those resources upon the Vistula or the Niemen, and might well experience the fate of those gigantic invasions which have badly succeeded.

However, notwithstanding the capital difference which exists between such an auxiliary war and a distant incursion undertaken in our own interest and with our own means, we could not dissemble the dangers to which those auxiliary corps are exposed, and the embarrassments which the generalissimo especially experiences, when he belongs to the power which plays the auxiliary part. The campaign of 1805 furnishes a strong proof of this : General Kutusof advanced upon the Inn to the confines of Bavaria, with thirty thousand Russians ; the army of Mack with which he was to unite, is entirely destroyed, with the exception of eighteen thou-

sand men which Kienmayer brought back from Donanwerth; the Russian general finds himself thus exposed, with less than fifty thousand combattants, to all the impetuous activity of Napoleon who has a hundred and fifty thousand, and in order to crown his misfortune a space of three hundred leagues separates Kutusof from his frontiers. Such a position would have been desperate if a second army of fifty thousand men had not arrived at Olmutz to receive him. Meanwhile the battle of Austerlitz, the result of a fault of the chief of staff, Weyrotha, compromised anew the Russian army far from its base; it came thus near becoming the victim of a distant alliance, and peace alone gave it time to regain its frontier.

The fate of Suwarof after the victory of Novi and especially in the expedition to Switzerland, that of the corps of Hermann at Bergen in Holland, are lessons which every chief called to such a command ought carefully to meditate. General Beningsen had less disadvantages in 1807, because, combatting between the Vistula and the Niemen, he supported himself on his own base and the operations depended in nothing upon his Allies. We recollect also the fate which the French experienced in Bavaria and Bohemia in 1742, when Frederick the Great abandoned them to their fate to make a separate peace. In truth those last made war as Allies and not as auxiliaries, but even in this last case, political ties are never closely enough drawn not to offer points of dissention which may compromise military operations; we have cited examples, in Article 19, upon political objective points.

With regard to remote invasions, across vast continents, it is from history alone that we can obtain lessons.

When Europe was half covered with forests; pasture-grounds and flocks; when there were necessary only horses and iron to transplant whole nations from one extremity of Europe to the other, the Goths, Visigoths, Huns, Vandals, Alians, Verangians, Franks, Normans, Arabs and Tartars, were seen to gain empires with rapidity. But since the invention of gun-powder and artillery, since the organization of formidable permanent armies, since, especially, civilization and policy have brought States nearer together, by enlightening them upon the necessity of reciprocally sustaining each other, such events could no longer be re-enacted.

Independently of the great migrations of people, the middle ages were remarkable for expeditions somewhat more military. Those of Charlemagne, almost contemporaneous with the invasion of Oleg and Igor carried to the gates of Constantinople, and the incursions of the Arabs to the banks of the Loire, give this epoch of the 9th and 10th centuries a peculiar physiognomy; as those events are as far from us by their date as by

the elements which then constituted armies and nations; as there are beside more moral lessons than strategical precepts to be deduced from them, we shall content ourselves with tracing a short sketch thereof at the end of this work, if we have the leisure for so doing.

Since the invention of gun-powder, there have scarcely been but the incursions of Charles VIII, to Naples, and Charles XII, to Ukraine, which might be counted in the number of remote invasions, for the campaigns of the Spaniards in Flanders and of the Swedes in Germany were of a peculiar nature, the first belonging to civil wars, and the latter having appeared on the scene only as auxiliaries of the protestants. Besides, all those expeditions were executed with inconsiderable forces.

In modern times then, Napoleon alone has dared to transport the regular armies of the half of Europe, from the banks of the Rhine to the banks of the Volga; the desire to imitate him will not very soon be entertained. There would be wanting a new Alexander and new Macedonians, against the bands of Darius, to succeed in such enterprises: in truth the tender affection of modern societies for the enjoyments of luxury might well bring us armies like those of Darius; but where then shall we find Alexander and his phalanxes?

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A few *Utopists* have imagined that Napoleon would have attained his end if, like a new Mahomet, he had put himself at the head of an army of political dogmas, and if, in place of the paradise of the Mussulmans, he had promised to the masses those sweet liberties, so fine in discourses and books, so difficult and so bordering upon license, when it is the question to apply them. Although it be permitted us to believe that the support of political dogmas is at times an excellent auxiliary, it must not be forgotten that the Koran even would gain no more than a province at this day, for in order to effect this, cannon, shells, balls, gunpowder and muskets are necessary; that with such encumbrances distances count for a great deal in combinations, and that nomadic excursions would no longer be in season.

An invasion carried two hundred leagues from one's base becomes now-a-days a hardy enterprise: those of Napoleon in Germany succeeded without the assistance of doctrines, because that directed against neighboring powers, and based upon the formidable barrier of the Rhine, they found in first line secondary States which, little united, ranged themselves under

his banners; so that his base was all at once transported from the Rhine upon the Inn. In that of Prussia he took Germany on its weak side, after the events of Ulm, of Austerlitz and the peace of Schonbrunn, which left Berlin exposed to the whole weight of his power. As for what concerns the first war in Poland, already counted in the number of remote invasions, we have said elsewhere that his success was due to the hesitation of his adversaries, more still than to his own combinations, although they were as skillful as audacious.

The invasions of Spain and of Russia were less fortunate, but it was not for the want of fine political promises that those enterprises failed: the remarkable discourse of Napoleon to the deputation of Madrid in 1808, and his proclamations to the Russian people, equally warrant this belief.

With regard to Germany, quite full of confidence in the new political order which he had there founded, he was careful not to disturb its social order to please the popular masses, whose affections he lost for the rest by the ravages inseparable from great wars and by the sacrifices of the continental system much more than by his antipathy for radical doctrines.

As for what concerns France, he learned to his cost, in 1815, that it is dangerous to count upon political theories as upon a certain element of success; for if they are proper for raising storms, they could not direct their effect: his liberal homilies, insufficient for unchaining the popular masses, had no other result than to furnish the theorists and declaimers with arms for overthrowing him; for Lanjuinais, Lafayette and their journals, had no less part in his fall than the bayonets of his enemies.

He will be reproached perhaps for not having done enough to satisfy the popular pretensions; but he had too much experience of men and of affairs to be ignorant, that the unchaining of the political passions always leads to disorder and anarchy, and that doctrines which produce license bring about sooner or later that result. He believed that he had done enough in assuring and fixing the interests of democracy, without giving up the ship of State, all disabled, to the mercy of the heaving waves. Starting from this point of view, instead of reproaching him for not having done enough, it might be said with more reason that he did not know how, like Cardinal Richelieu, to employ in neighboring countries, those dangerous arms the use of which he feared in his own. But this is wandering too far from our subject, let us return to the military combinations of invasions.

As for the rest, apart from the chances which result from great distances, all invasions, when once the army has arrived on the theatre of war

where it is to act, no longer offers combinations different from others. The great difficulty then consisting in the distances, one may recommend the maxims upon lines of operations lengthened in depth, and those upon strategical reserves or eventual bases, as the only useful ones, and it is especially on those occasions that their application becomes indispensable, although they are far from sufficient for parrying all dangers.

The campaign of 1812, so fatal to Napoleon, was nevertheless a model to cite of this kind: the care which he took to leave the prince de Schwartzenberg and Reynier upon the Bug, whilst that Macdonald, Oudinot and Wrede guarded the Dwina, that Bellune came to cover Smolensk, and that Augereau came to relieve him between the Oder and the Vistula, proves that he had neglected none of the humanly possible precautions, for basing himself suitably: but it proves also that the grandest enterprises perish through the magnitude even of the preparations which are made to secure their success.

If Napoleon committed faults in this gigantic struggle, they were those of having too much neglected political precautions; of not having united under a single chief the different corps left upon the Dwina and the Dnieper, of having remained ten days too long at Wilna; of having given the command of his right to a brother incapable of carrying such a burthen; finally of having confided to prince Schwartzenberg a mission which the latter could not fulfill with the same devotion as a French general. I do not speak of the fault of having remained at Moscow after the conflagration, for then the evil was perhaps beyond remedy, although it would have been less serious if the retreat had been effected at once. He has been accused also of having too much despised distances, difficulties and men by pushing so foolish a point to the ramparts of the Kremlin. In order to condemn or absolve him, it would be very necessary to know the true motives which determined or constrained him to go beyond Smolensk, instead of halting and of passing the winter there, the project of which he ostentatiously announced; finally it would be necessary to be assured whether it were possible to remain in position between that city and Witepsk, without having previously defeated the Russian army.

Far from wishing to set myself up as judge in so great a cause, I acknowledge that those who arrogate to themselves the right so to do are not always equal to such a mission, and want even the information necessary for accomplishing it. That which is most true in the whole affair, is that Napoleon forgot too much the resentments with which Austria, Prussia and Sweden were animated against him; he counted too much upon a *denouement* between Wilna and the Dwina. A just appreciator of the

bravery of the Russian armies, he was not the same of the national spirit, and of the energy of the people. Finally, above all, instead of securing to himself the interested and sincere concurrence of a great military power, the adjacent States of which would have procured a sure base for attacking the colossus which he wished to shake, he founded his whole enterprise upon the concurrence of a people brave and enthusiastic, but fickle and devoid of all the elements which constitute a solid power; then, far from turning this ephemeral enthusiasm to the whole account of which it was susceptible, he paralyzed it still by unseasonable concealments.

The fate of all enterprises of this nature attests, in fact, that the capital point for assuring their success, and the only efficacious maxim which can be given, is, as we have said in Chapter I, Art. 6, never to attempt them without the assured and interested concurrence of a respectable power sufficiently near the theatre of operations for offering on the frontier a base suitable, as well for assembling beforehand thereon supplies of every kind, as for procuring a refuge in case of reverse, and new means for retaking the offensive at need.

With regard to the rules of conduct which should be sought in the precepts of strategy, it would be all the more rash to count upon them, as, without the above mentioned political precaution, the undertaking in itself would be but a flagrant violation of all strategical laws. For the rest, the divers precautions indicated in Articles 21 and 22, for the security of deep lines of operations, and for the formation of intermediate bases are, we repeat, the only military means proper for lessening the dangers of the enterprise; we shall add thereto a just appreciation of distances, of seasons, of countries, in a word, sufficient accuracy in calculations and moderation in victory to know how to stop in time.

Moreover, far from us the thought that it is possible to trace precepts capable of assuring the success of great distant invasions; in the space of four thousand years they have made the glory of five or six conquerors, and have been a hundred times the scourge of nations and armies.

After having exhausted nearly all that there is essential to say upon those continental invasions, there will remain for us a few remarks to make upon expeditions half continental, half maritime, forming the third series of those which we have indicated.

These kinds of enterprises have become very rare since the invention of artillery, and the crusades were, I believe, the last example that has been seen of them; perhaps the cause of this must be attributed to the fact that the empire of the Seas, after having passed successively into the hands of two or three secondary powers, has got into those of an insular

power, which possesses many squadrons, but not land forces necessary for those sorts of expeditions.

Be that as it may, from these two causes united, it evidently results that we are no longer in the times when Xerxes marched by land to the conquest of Greece, by causing himself to be followed by four thousand vessels of all dimensions, and when Alexander the Great marched from Macedonia by Asia Minor to Tyre, whilst his fleet coasted along the shore.

However, if those incursions are no longer made, it is not less certain that the support of a squadron of war and of a fleet of transports would always be an immense succor, when a great continental expedition could be effected in concert with so powerful an auxiliary.*

Meanwhile it must not be counted upon too exclusively; the winds are capricious; now a squall would suffice for dispersing, and even annihilating that fleet upon which we should have founded all our hopes. Successive transports would be less hazardous without being however, an over-certain resource.

I do not think it necessary to make mention here of invasions executed against a neighboring power, such as those of Napoleon against Spain and Austria; these are ordinary wars, pushed to a greater or less degree, but which have nothing peculiar, and the combinations of which are found sufficiently indicated in the different articles of this work.

The more or less hostile spirit of the populations, the greater or less depth of the line of operations, and the great distance of the principal objective point, are the only variables which may require modifications in an ordinary system of operations.

Indeed, for being less dangerous than a distant invasion, that which assails an adjacent power has also none the less its fatal chances. A French army which should go to attack Cadiz could, although well based upon the Pyrenees, with intermediate bases on the Ebro and the Tagus, find a tomb on the Guadalquivir. In the same manner, that which in 1809 besieged Komorn in the centre of Hungary, whilst others were warring from Barcelona to Oporto, might have succumbed in the plains of Wagram, without having any need of going so far as the Beresina. The antecedents, the number of disposable troops, the successes already gained, the state of the country, all have an influence upon the latitude which may be given to one's enterprises; the great talent of the general will be to proportion them to his means and to circumstances. With regard to the part which policy might exercise in those neighboring invasions, if it be true that it

* It will be said, perhaps, that after having blamed those who wish to base an army upon the sea, I seem to recommend this operation; the question is the means of supplying the intermediate bases which an army would take, and by no means the carrying of one's military operations upon the coasts

is less indispensable than in remote incursions, it is necessary, meanwhile, not to forget the maxim which we have given out in Article 6, that there is no enemy, however insignificant he may be, with whom it would not be useful to become allied; the influence which the change of policy of the Duke of Savoy, in 1706, exercised upon the events of that epoch, also the declaration of Maurice of Saxony, in 1551, and of Bavaria in 1813, sufficiently proves that it is important to attach to one's self all the States adjacent to a theatre of war, in a manner to count, if not upon their co-operation, at least upon their strict neutrality.

There would remain no more for us but to speak of expeditions beyond the sea; but embarkation and debarkation being logistical and tactical operations rather than strategical, we refer them to Article 40, which treats specially of descents.

RECAPITULATION OF STRATEGY.

The task which I have imposed upon myself seems to me passably accomplished by the *exposé* which I have just made of all the strategical combinations which constitute ordinarily a plan of operations.

Meanwhile, as we have seen in the definition placed at the head of this Chapter, the greater part of the important operations of war participate at once of strategy for the direction in which it is suitable to act, and of tactics for the conduct of the action itself. Before treating of these mixed operations, it is proper then to present here the combinations of grand tactics, and of battles, as well as the maxims by the aid of which one may obtain the application of the fundamental principle of war. By this means we shall better comprehend the ensemble of those half strategical, half tactical operations: I shall be permitted merely to recapitulate in the first place the contents of the Chapter which we have just read.

From the fifteen articles of which it is composed, we may conclude, in my opinion, that the manner of applying the general principle of war to all possible theatres of operations, consists in what follows:

1. To know how to avail ourselves of the advantages which the reciprocal direction of the bases of operations could procure, according to what has been developed in Article 18 in favor of lines salient and perpendicular to the base of the enemy.

2. To choose between the three zones which a strategic field (*échiquier stratégique*), that one upon which we can direct the most fatal blows at the enemy, and where we ourselves run the least risks.

3. To establish and direct properly our lines of operations by adopting, for the defensive, the concentric examples given by the Arch-Duke Charles in 1796, and by Napoleon in 1814; or that of Marshal Soult in 1814, for retreats parallel to the frontiers.

In the offensive, on the contrary, we shall have to follow the system which assured the success of Napoleon in 1800, 1805 and 1806, by the direction given to his forces upon an extremity of the strategical front of the enemy, or else that of the direction upon the centre, which succeeded so well with him in 1796, 1809 and 1814. The whole according to the respective positions of the armies, and according to the divers maxims given in Article 21.

4. To choose well our eventual strategical lines of manœuvre, by giving them a direction suitable for being able to act with the better part of our divisions, and for preventing on the contrary, the parts of the hostile army from concentrating, or from reciprocally sustaining each other.

5. To combine properly, *in the same spirit of ensemble and centralization*, all the strategical positions, as well as all the great detachments which we should be called upon to make, in order to embrace the indispensable parts of the strategic field.

6. Finally, to impress upon our masses the greatest activity and the greatest possible mobility, to the end that by their successive and alternate employment upon the points where it is important to strike, we attain the capital end of putting in action superior forces against fractions merely of the hostile army.

It is by the vivacity of our movements that we multiply the action of our forces, in neutralizing on the contrary, a great part of those of our adversary; but if this vivacity suffices often to procure successes, its effects are centupled, if we give a skillful direction to the efforts which it would lead to, that is to say, when those efforts should be directed upon the decisive strategic points of the zone of operations, where they could carry the most fatal blows to the enemy.

Meanwhile, as we are not always in condition to adopt this decisive point, exclusive of every other, we can content ourselves at times with attaining in good part the object of every enterprise, by knowing how to combine the rapid and successive employment of our forces upon isolated parties, the defeat of which would be inevitable; when we shall unite the double condition of rapidity and vivacity in the employment of masses,

with a good direction, we shall only be the more assured of victory and its great results.

The operations which best prove these truths are those so often cited of 1809 and 1814, as also that ordered at the end of 1793, by Carnot, already mentioned in Art. 24, and the details of which will be found in vol. 4, of my history of the wars of the Revolution. Forty battalions, transported successively from Dunkirk to Menin, to Mauberge and to Landan, by reinforcing the armies which were already found there, decided four victories which saved France.

The whole strategical science would have been found contained in this wise operation, if to that combination one had been able to add the merit of its application to the decisive strategic point of the theatre of war; but it was not so, for the Austrian army, being then the principal party of the coalition, and having its retreat upon Cologne, it was upon the Meuse that a general effort would have carried the severest blows. The committee provided for the most immediate danger, and the observation which I allow myself could diminish in nothing the merit of its manœuvre; it contains the half of the strategical principle, the other half consists precisely in giving to such efforts the most decisive direction, as Napoleon did at Ulm, at Jena and at Ratisbon. The whole art of strategical warfare is contained in these three different applications. I shall be pardoned for repeating so often these same citations, I have already given the motives for it.

It would be useless, I think, to add, that one of the great objects of strategy is to be able to secure advantages to the army, by preparing for it the most favorable theatre for its operations, if they have place in our own country; the situation of places, of intrenched camps, of têtes-de-ponts, the opening of communications upon great decisive direction, do not form the least interesting part of this science; we have indicated all the signs by which one may easily recognise those lines and those decisive points, whether permanent or eventual.

CHAPTER IV.

GRAND TACTICS, AND BATTLES.

Battles are the definitive shock of two armies which are contending for great questions of policy or of strategy. Strategy leads armies upon the decisive points of the zone of operations, prepares the chances of battle, and influences in advance its results; but it is for tactics, united to courage, to genius and to fortune, to gain them.

Grand tactics is then the art of well combining and well conducting battles; the directing principle of the combinations of tactics is the same as that of strategy, it is the carrying the weight of our forces upon a part only of the hostile army and upon the point which promises the greatest results.

It has been said that battles were difinitively the principal and decisive action of war; this assertion is not always exact, for we have seen armies destroyed by strategic operations without there having been battles, but only a series of small combats. It is true also that a complete and decisive victory may give the same results without there having been grand strategic combinations.

The results of a battle depend ordinarily upon a union of causes which are not always in the domain of the military art; the kind of order of battle adopted, the wisdom of its measures of execution, the more or less loyal and enlightened concurrence of the lieutenants of the generalissimo, the cause of the struggle, the enthusiasm, the proportions and the quality