ARTICLE XXXIII.

TURNING MANŒUVRES, AND TOO EXTENDED MOVEMENTS IN BATTLES.

We have spoken, in the preceding article, of manœuvres undertaken for turning the enemy in the day of battle, and of the advantage that might be expected from it. It remains for us to say a few words upon the too extended movements to which those manœuvres often give place, and which have caused the failure of so many projects in appearance well concerted.

In principle, every movement sufficiently extended to give the enemy time to beat separately half of the army whilst it is being operated, is a loose and dangerous movement. In the meanwhile as the danger which may result from it depends upon the rapid and sure *coup d'œil* of the adversary, as well as upon his habitual system of warfare, it is easily comprehended why so many similar manœuvres have failed against some, and succeeded against others, and why such a movement which would have been too extended before Frederick, Napoleon or Wellington, has had entire success against mediocre generals, wanting tact to take the initiative or habituated themselves to disconnected movements. It appears very difficult to trace an absolute rule of conduct, there exists no other than that "of holding the weight of our forces in hand in order to cause them to act at the opportune moment, but without falling into the contrary excess of too much accumulating them: we shall be sure then of always being in condition to meet events. But if the affair is with an adversary of little skill, or inclined to extend too much, we can then venture more."

A few examples taken from history will be the best explanations for rendering these truths more sensible, and cause to be appreciated the difference which exists in the results of like movements, according to the army and the general with which we are to be measured.

We have seen in the Seven Years War, Frederick gain the battle of Prague, because the Austrians had left a feeble interval of from a thousand to twelve hundred yards between their right and the rest of their army, and because this remainder of the army continued immoveable whilst that the right was overwhelmed; this inaction was all the more extraordinary as the left of the imperialists had much less distance to make in order to succor their own, than Frederick to attain the right, which, formed in crotchet, compelled a semi-circular movement

Frederick came near on the contrary losing the battle of Torgau for having made with his left, a movement too extended and loose, (near two leagues), to the end of turning the right of Marshal Daun.* The affair was re-established by a concentric movement of the king's right, which Mollendorf conducted upon the heights of Siptitz in order to re-unite with him.

The battle of Rivoli was one of the kind: it is known that Alvinzi and the chief of his staff Weyrother wished to surround the little army of Napoleon, concentrated upon the plateau of Rivoli, and how their centre was beaten whilst the left was accumulated in the ravine of the Adige, and that Lusignam with the right gained by a long circuit the rear of the French army, where he was soon surrounded and taken. The splendid map and the narratives which I have published of it, are the best study that can be made upon this kind of battles.

No person can have forgotten the battle of Stockach where General Jourdan conceived the unfortunate idea of causing to be attacked an army of sixty thousand combattants, by three small divisions from seven to eight thousand men, distant from each other several leagues, whilst that Saint-Cyr with the third of the army (ten thousand men), was to pass the right flank at four leagues distance upon the rear of those sixty thousand men, which could not fail to be victorious over these scattered fractions and to capture that one which wished to cut off their retreat, a fate from which Saint-Cyr escaped by a miracle.

It is recollected how the same General Weyrother, who had wished to surround Napoleon at Rivoli, designed to do the same at Austerlitz, in spite of the severe lesson which he had received without profit to him. It is known how the left of the Allies, wishing to outflank Napoleon's right, in order to cut him off from the road to Vienna, (where he did not desire to return,) by a circular movement of about two leagues, left an opening of half a league in its line, from which Napoleon profited by falling upon the isolated centre, and surrounding afterwards that left, thrust between the lakes of Tellnitz and Melnitz.

Finally, it is known how Wellington gained the battle of Salamanca by a manœuvre nearly similar, because the left of Marmont, which wished to

* See for these two battles, Chapts. 2 and 25, of the Treatise of Grand Military Operations

cut him off from the route to Portugal, left a gap of half a league, from which the English general profited for beating that wing stripped of its support.

The narratives of ten wars which I have published, are full of similar examples, of which it would be superfluous to multiply here the number. Since it can add nothing to what we have already said for causing to be appreciated the dangers, not only of turning manœuvres, but of every gap left in the line of battle, when we have to fight an enemy accustomed to play a close game.

It will be readily judged, that if Weyrother had had to do with Jourdan, at Rivoli as at Austerlitz, he would perhaps have ruined the French army, instead of sustaining himself, a total defeat. For the general who attacked at Stockach a mass of sixty thousand men with four little masses, isolated and unable to second each other, would not have known how to profit by the two extended movements attempted against him. In the same manner, Marmont was unlucky at Salamanca, in having to struggle against an adversary whose best acknowledged merit was a tried and rapid tactical *coup d'œil ;* before the Duke of York or More he would probably have succeeded.

Among the turning manœuvres which have succeeded in our day, Waterloo and Hohenlinden were those which had the most brilliant results ; but the first was almost a strategic movement, and accompanied by a host of fortunate circumstances, the concurrence of which is rarely presented. As regards Hohenlinden, we should vainly seek in military history for another example where a single brigade adventured in a forest in the midst of fifty thousand men, produces there all the miracles which Richepanse operated in that cut-throat place of Matenpöt, where it was much more probable that he would be obliged to lay down his arms.

At Wagram, the turning wing of Davoust had a great part in the success of the day ; but if the vigorous attack executed on the centre by Macdonald, Oudinot and Bernadotte had not opportunely seconded it, it is not certain that it would have been so.

So many examples of opposite results might cause it to be concluded that there is no rule to give upon this matter, but this would be wrong, for it appears to me on the contrary evident : "That by adopting in general a system of battles very compact, and well connected, we will be found in condition to meet every contingency, and will leave little to chance ; but it is important, nevertheless, above all, to judge accurately of the enemy whom we are to combat, in order to measure the boldness of our enterprises after his character, and the system which he shall be known to follow.

"That in case of numerical superiority, we can, as well as in that of moral superiority, attempt manœuvres, which, in an equality of numerical forces and of capacity in the chiefs, would be imprudent.

"That a manœuvre for outflanking and turning a wing, ought to be connected with the other attacks, and sustained in time by an effort which the remainder of the army should make upon the enemy's front, either against the wing turned, or against the centre.

"Finally, that strategic manœuvres for cutting an army off from its communications before battle, and thus attacking it in reverse, without losing our own line of retreat, are of a much more sure and much greater effect, and moreover do not require any disconnected manœuvre in the combat."

For the rest, this is sufficient upon the chapter of combined battles, it is time to pass to those which are unforeseen.

ARTICLE XXXIV

RENCOUNTER OF TWO ARMIES IN MARCH.

One of the most dramatic acts in war, is that which results from this kind of unforeseen collision of two armies.

In the greater part of battles, it happens that one of the parties awaits the enemy at a post determined beforehand, and that the other army goes to attack it thereon, after having reconnoitred that position as well as possible. But it also frequently happens, especially in the modern system, and in the offensive returns of one of the parties, that two armies march each upon the other, with the reciprocal intention of making an unexpected attack ; then there results a kind of mutual surprise, for the two parties are equally deceived in their combinations, since they find the enemy where they in no wise expected to meet him. Finally, there are also cases where one of the two armies allows itself to be attacked in march

by its adversary who prepares for it this surprise, as happened to the French at Rosbach.

It is on those great occasions that all the genius of a skillful general, of a warrior capable of governing events, displays itself; it is where we recognize the seal of the great captain. It is always possible to gain a battle with brave troops, without the chief of the army being able to arrogate to himself the least part in the success of the day, but a victory like those of Lutzen, of Luzzara, of Eylau, of Abensberg, can be the result only of a great character, joined to great presence of mind, and to wise combinations.

There is too much of chance and too much of poetry in these kinds of rencounters, easily to give positive maxims upon them; however, it is, especially in this case, that it is necessary to be well penetrated with the fundamental principle of the art and of the different modes of applying it, in order to make tend to that end all the manœuvres which we will be in the condition to order on the instant even, and in the midst of the tumult of arms. What we have said of impromptu manœuvres, in Article 32, is the only rule then to give for those unforeseen circumstances; it will suffice to combine them with the antecedents and with the physical and moral condition of the two parties.

Two armies marching, as they did formerly, with all the equipage of the encampment, and meeting each other unexpectedly, would have doubtless nothing better to do than to deploy at first their advanced guards to the right or to the left of the routes they pass over. But each of them should at the same time assemble the bulk of its forces, in order to launch them afterwards in a suitable direction, according to the object it should have in view; a grave fault would be committed in deploying the whole army behind the advanced guard, because even in the case where we should succeed in it, it would never be any thing but the formation of a defective parallel order, and if the enemy pushed the advanced guard somewhat vigorously, there might result from it the rout of the troops which should be in movement in order to form. (See the battle of Rosbach, Treatise on Grand Operations.)

In the modern system, with armies more moveable, marching upon many routes, and forming as many fractions capable of acting independently of each other, these routs will be less to be feared, but the principles remain the same. It is necessary always to halt and form the advanced guard, then to unite the mass of our forces upon the suitable point, according to the end which is proposed in putting them in march; whatever may be the manœuvres of the enemy, we will find ourselves prepared for everything.

ARTICLE XXXV.

SURPRISES OF ARMIES.

We do not intend to examine here those petty surprises of detachments which constitute the war of partisans, or of light troops, and for which the Russian and Turkish light cavalry have so much superiority. We mean to speak of the surprises of entire armies.

Before the invention of fire-arms, these surprises were more easy, because the explosion of artillery and musketry scarcely permit in our day the entire surprise of an army, unless it forget the first duties of the service, and allow the enemy to arrive in the midst of its ranks, for the want of advanced posts which should do their duty. The Seven Years War offers the memorable surprise of Hochkirch, as an example worthy enough of being pondered upon; it proves that the surprise does not consist positively in falling upon sleeping and badly guarded troops, but also in combining an attack upon one of their extremities, in such a manner as to surprise them, and to outflank them at the same time. In effect, the question is not the seeking to take the enemy so much at fault, that one could burst upon his isolated men in their tents, but rather to arrive with his masses, without being perceived, upon the point where he should desire to assail the enemy before the latter have time to make counter dispositions.

Since armies no longer encamp in tents, surprises combined in advance are more rare and more difficult, for, in order to premeditate them, it is necessary to know precisely the situation of the hostile camp. At Marengo, at Lutzen, at Eylau, there were a kind of surprises, but these were in reality only unexpected attacks to which this name cannot be given. The only great surprise that we could cite, is that of Taroutin, in 1812, where Murat was assailed and beaten by Benningsen; in order to justify his want of prudence, Murat alleged that he reposed upon a tacit armis-

tice, but there existed no such convention, and he allowed himself to be surprised by an unpardonable negligence.

It is evident that the most favorable manner of attacking an army, is to fall upon its camp a little before day, at the moment when it is expecting nothing of the kind; confusion will then be inevitable, and if to this advantage is joined that of being well acquainted with the localities, and of giving to the masses a suitable tactical and strategic direction, we may flatter ourselves with a complete victory, barring unexpected events. This is an operation of war which must not be despised, although it is more rare and less brilliant than great strategic combinations which assure victory, thus to speak, before having fought.

For the same reason that it is necessary to profit of every occasion for surprising our adversary, it is important also to take every necessary precaution for securing ourselves against such enterprises. The standing regulations of every country have provided against them; it only remains to follow them exactly.

ARTICLE XXXVI.

ATTACK BY MAIN FORCE OF FORTIFIED PLACES, OF INTRENCHED CAMPS OR LINES, AND *COUPS-DE-MAIN* IN GENERAL.

There exist many strong-holds which, without being regular fortresses, are reputed secure from a *coup-de-main*, and which are however, susceptible of being carried by escalade, either at the first onset, or by breaches as yet little practicable, whose slope would require always the employment of ladders, or other means of arriving at the parapet.

The attack of these kinds of posts presents nearly the same combinations as that of intrenched camps, for it enters like the latter in the category of grand *coups-de-main*.

These kinds of attacks vary naturally according to circumstances; 1st, the strength of the works; 2d, the nature of the ground upon which they

are situated; 3d, their connection or isolation; 4th, the moral condition of the two parties. History does not lack examples for all the species.

For example, the intrenched camps of Rehl, of Dresden, of Warsaw; the lines of Turin, and of Mayence; the strong intrenchments of Feldkirch, of Scharnitz, of the Assiette; here are ten events, the conditions of which vary like the results. At Kehl, (1796,) the intrenchments were more connected and better finished than at Warsaw; they were almost a *tête-de-pont* in permanent fortification, for the Arch-Duke believed it his duty to pay them the honors of a regular seige, and, in fact, he could not think of attacking them by main force without running great risks. At Warsaw the works were formed isolated, but meanwhile of a very respectable relief, and they had for redoubt a great city surrounded with crenated walls, armed, and defended by a body of desperate men.

Dresden had for redoubt in 1813, a bastioned *enceinte*, but the front of which, already dismantled, had only a field parapet; the camp, properly speaking, was composed only of simple redoubts far removed from each other, and of very incomplete execution, the redoubt alone made its strength.*

At Mayence and at Turin there were continuous lines of circumvallation; but if the first were strongly traced, we could not say as much of the latter which, upon one of the important points, offered but a bad parapet of three feet above the ground and a proportionate ditch. Moreover, at Turin, the lines, turned and attacked from without, were found taken between two fires, since a strong garrison attacked them in reverse, at the moment when the Prince Eugene assailed them on the side of their line of retreat. At Mayence they were attacked in front, a slender detachment only outflanked the right.

The practicable measures to take in these kinds of attacks against field works, are of small number. If you think yourself able to attempt the surprise of a work by attacking it a little before day, nothing is more natural than to try it; but if this operation is the most advisable for a detached post, it is difficult to suppose that an army, established in a great intrenched camp, in presence of the enemy, would do its duty so badly as to allow itself to be surprised; the more so as the rule of every service is to be under arms at the break of day. As it is probable then that the attack will always be made by main force, it results, from the nature even

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* At Dresden the number of defenders was the first day, (25th August,) twenty-four thousand men, the next day there were already sixty-five thousand, and the third day upwards of a hundred thousand.

of the operation, that the following precautions are indicated as the most simple and the most rational.

1st. To extinguish at first the fire of the works by a formidable artillery, which fulfills at the same time the double object of shaking the *moral* of the defenders.

2d. To provide the troops with all the necessary objects, (as fascines and small ladders,) in order to facilitate the filling up of the ditch, and the mounting of the parapet.

3d. To direct three small columns upon the work which it is wished to carry, seconding them by skirmishers, and holding reserves in sustaining distance.

4th. To profit by all the accidents of the ground for putting the troops under shelter, and uncovering them only at the last moment.

5th. To give precise instructions to the principal columns as to what they will have to do when the work shall be carried, and that it will be the object to charge the enemy's forces which occupy the camp; finally to designate the corps of cavalry which are to assist in the attack with those forces, if the ground permit it. After these recommendations there is only one thing more to do, this is to launch one's troops with all the vivacity possible upon the works, whilst that a detachment shall then turn them by the gorge, for the least hesitation is worse in such a case than the most audacious temerity.

We shall add, nevertheless, that gymnastic exercises for familiarizing the soldiers with escalades and the attacks of barricaded posts, would be as useful at least as all the exercises that could be prescribed to them; and that modern balistics might well exercise the mind of the engineers, for finding the means of facilitating, by portable machines, the crossing of a field ditch and the escalade of a parapet.

the assault of Warsaw, and of the intrenched camp of Mayence are the best

Of all the dispositions which I have read upon these matters, those of conceived. Thielke gives us a disposition of Laudon for the attack of the camp of Bunzelwitz, which was not executed, but which is not the less a good example to offer.

The attack of Warsaw especially may be cited as one of the most splendid operations of this kind, and does as much honor to Marshal Paskevitch as to the troops which executed it. Here is an example of what it is suitable to do. With regard to the examples of what it is necessary to shun, we can cite nothing worse than the dispositions prescribed for the attack of Dresden in 1813. Those who were the authors of it could not have done better if they had wished to prevent the taking

of the camp; those dispositions may be seen in the work of General Plotho, although they are there already revised and corrected.

By the side of attacks of this nature, may be placed the memorable assaults or escalades of Port Mahon, in 1756, and of Bergen-Op-Zoom, in 1747; both, although they were preceded by a seige, were not the less brilliant *coups de main*, since there was not a sufficient breach for a regular assault. The assaults of Praga, Oczakoff and Ismaiel, can also be ranged in the same class, although in the latter cities the earthen parapets, partly fallen in, favored the escalade, there was not the less merit in the execution.

As for continuous intrenched lines, although they seem better connected than isolated works, they are yet more easy to carry, because constructed upon an extent of many leagues, it is almost impossible to prevent the enemy from penetrating upon some one point; the taking of those of Mayence, and Wissemburg, which we have reported in the history of the wars of the Revolution, (Chap. 21, and 52,) that of the lines of Turin, by Prince Eugene of Savoy, in 1706, are great lessons to study.

This famous event of Turin, which we have already often cited, is too well known for us to recall its circumstances, but we could not dispense with observing that never was a triumph bought so cheaply, nor more difficult to conceive. In truth, the strategic plan was admirable; the march from the Adige by Placentia upon Asti by the right of the Po, leaving the French upon the Mincio, was perfectly combined; but as for the operations under Turin, it must be owned that the conquerors were more fortunate than wise. The Prince Eugene had no need of a great effort of genius to draw up the order which he gave his army, and he must have cruelly despised his adversaries to execute the march which was to direct thirty-five thousand allies of ten different nations, between eighty thousand French and the Alps, marching for forty-eight hours around their camp, by the most famous flank march which has ever been attempted. Besides that, the disposition for the attack was, in itself, so laconic and so little instructive, that any officer of the staff would in our day give one more satisfactory. To prescribe the formation of eight columns of infantry by brigades in two lines, to give the order to crown the intrenchments, and to make therein practicable openings, in order that the columns of cavalry which followed could penetrate into the camp, is all the science which the Prince Eugene could call to the assistance of his audacious enterprise. It is true that he had chosen well the feeble point of the intrenchment, for it was so miserable that it was not three feet above the ground, and did not cover its defenders to the middle.

With regard to the generals who commanded this camp of Turin, their

panegyric has been given by one of the historians of the Prince Eugene; M. de M * * , without fearing to diminish the glory of his heroes, exclaims against the court of France, *which eulogised generals whose conduct would, in all justice, have merited the scaffold.* Doubtless he wished only to speak of Marsin, for every body knows that the Duke of Orleans had protested against the idea of awaiting the enemy in the lines, and that two wounds disabled him from the commencement of the attack; as for the truly culpable person he expiated, by an honorable death, a fault which nothing could justify*.

But I am carried away by my subject, and it is necessary to return to the measures most suitable for an attack against lines. If these are of a relief sufficiently strong to render their assault dangerous, and if on the contrary there are means for outflanking or turning them by strategic manœuvres, this course would ever be more suitable than a doubtful attack. In the contrary case, and if you have some motive for preferring this, a point upon one of the wings would be necessary, because it is natural enough that the centre is more easy to sustain. However it has been seen, that an attack upon a wing being regarded with reason by the defender as the most probable, you might succeed in deceiving him by directing a somewhat strong false attack upon that side, whilst that the true, made upon the centre would succeed precisely because it was not probable. In these kinds of combinations, the localities and the spirit of the generals ought to decide as to the best mode to follow.

Moreover, as regards the execution of the attack, we can scarcely employ other means than those recommended for intrenched camps. Meanwhile as these lines, heretofore at least, often had the relief and proportions of permanent works, it may happen that their escalade be difficult except for earthen works already rather old, the slopes of which might be the worse for time and accessible to a somewhat dexterous infantry.

Such were, as we have already said, the ramparts of Ismaiel and of Prague; such was also the citadel of Smolensk which General Paskevitch defended with so much glory against Ney, because he preferred to defend the ravines which were in front of it rather than take refuge behind a parapet scarcely 30 degrees inclined.

If a line is supported by a river, it seems absurd to think, even, of penetrating upon that wing, because the enemy, collecting his forces, the weight

* Albergotti was not less culpable than Marsin; placed with forty battalions on the right bank of the Po, where there was no attack, he refused to march to the succor of Marsin, which always happens in such cases, each troubling himself only about the point which he occupies.

of which would be near the centre, could overturn the columns which should advance thus between them and the river, in such a manner that their total loss would be certain. Meanwhile this absurdity has been seen to succeed, because the enemy, forced behind his lines, rarely thinks of an offensive return, however advantageous it may appear; for a general and soldiers who seek a refuge in lines are already half conquered, and the idea of taking the offensive does not happen to them when their intrenchments are found already invaded. However, it would be impossible to counsel the trial of such a manœuvre; the general who should expose himself by it, and who should experience the fate of Tallard at Hochestaedt, could not complain of it.

Considering the defense of intrenched camps and of lines, there are not many maxims to give: the first is unquestionably to assure one's self two good reserves, placed between the centre and each of the wings, or, more properly speaking, upon the right of the left wing, and upon the left of the right wing. By this means, you can run to the succor of the point which should be forced with all the promptitude possible, which a single central reserve would not permit. It has been thonght even that three reserves would not be too many, if the intrenchment were very extended; as for myself, I should incline for having but two. A recommendation not less essential, is to thoroughly impress the troops with the idea that an affair would not be desperate because the line should be found crossed upon a point. If you have good reserves which take the initiative seasonably, you will be none the less victorious, by preserving your presence of mind in order to engage them well at the suitable point and moment.

The troops which shall defend the ditch and the parapet will conform to instructions given by the engineers according to the usages practiced in sieges; however, it must be acknowledged, a good work upon the details of the infantry service in sieges and intrenched camps, which may be within the reach of the officers of that arm, is a work yet to make; such an enterprise has nothing in common with this treatise, for it should be the object of a regulation and not of a dogmatic book.

COUPS DE MAIN.

Coups de main are hardy enterprises which a detachment of an army attempts for seizing a more or less important or more or less strong post.* They participate at the same time of surprises and of attacks by main force, for we employ equally those two kinds of means in order to arrive at our ends. Although in appearance these kinds of enterprises seem to belong almost exclusively to tactics it cannot be concealed nevertheless that they draw all their importance from the relations which the posts taken would have with the strategic combinations of the operations. Thus we have already been called to say some words of them in Art. 28, in speaking of detachments: but however troublesome these repetitions may be we are obliged to make mention of them here for what concerns their execution which enters into the domain of attacks of intrenchments.

It is not nevertheless that we pretended to subject them to tactical rules, since a *coup de main*, as the name implies, is in some sort an enterprise outside of all ordinary rules. We wish only to cite them here for reference, directing our readers to the various historical or didactic works which might make mention of them.

We have already pointed out the nature of the results, often very important, which may be promised from them. The taking of Sizipoli in 1828; the unsuccessful attack of General Petrasch upon Kehl in 1796; the singulor surprises of Cremona in 1702, of Gibralter in 1704, and of Bergen-op-Zoom in 1814, as well as the escalades of Port Mahon and Badajos, may give an idea of the different kinds of *coups de main*. Some are the effect of surprise, others are made by main force; address, ruse, terror, audacity, are elements of success for these kinds of enterprises.

In the present mode of making war, the carrying of a post, however strong it may be from its situation, would no longer have the importance formerly attached to it, unless it offered a strategic advantage susceptible of influencing the results of a great operation.

The taking or the destruction of an intrenched bridge, that of a grand convoy, that of a small fort barring important passages, like the two attacks which took place in 1799 upon the Fort of Lucisteig in the Grisons; the taking of Leutasch and of Sharnitz by Ney in 1805; finally

* It is necessary to distinguish between the importance and the strength of a post, for a strong post is far from always being an important one.

the carrying of a post not fortified even but which should serve as grand depôt for provisions and munitions indispensable to the enemy, such are the enterprises which may recompense the risk to which a detachment would be exposed for their execution.

The Cossacks at times also attempted *coups de main* in the late wars; the attack of Laon by Prince Lapoukin, those of Cassel and of Chalons, had advantages, but enter altogether nevertheless into the class of secondary enterprises the positive effect of which is to harrass and disquiet the enemy.

Whatever instruction could be given upon these kinds of enterprises in general, the memoirs of Montluc and the strategems of Frontin, those old histories which one would believe of another world, will give more information than I can in this chapter; the escalade, the surprise and the panic do not admit of being reduced to maxims.

Some have carried posts by filling up the ditches, sometimes with fascines, sometimes with wool sacks, even dung has been employed for it: others have succeeded by the means of ladders without which such an enterprise is rarely attempted; finally they have used also cramp hooks attached to the hands and the shoes of the soldiers for climbing the rocks which command an entrenchment. Others have introduced themselves by the sewers, like the Prince Eugene at Cremona.

It is in the reading of these facts that we must seek, not precepts, but inspirations, if however, what has succeeded with one may serve as a rule for another. It would be desirable that some studious officer would apply himself to unite in one detailed historical abstract, all the most interesting *coup-de-mains*; this would be rendering a signal service not only to the generals, but to each of the subordinates who may have to co-operate in like attempts, where often the intelligence of a single person may lead to success.

As for what concerns us, we have accomplished our task by indicating here their principal relations with the ensemble of operations. We refer besides to what has been said in the commencement of this article upon the manner of attacking field intrenchments, the only military operation which has any analogy to those *coups-de-main*, when they are made by main force.