

followed a conduct equally extraordinary. They deposed from command those generals whom they suspected of favoring the revolution; they sent deputies into Asia, to court aid from the very man who was its author; they solicited him to return to take the chief command, and rescue their country from its new tyrants. Surprised and delighted with this most unexpected issue to his schemes, Alcibiades eagerly embraced the offer. He would not, however, return till he had merited his pardon by some important services. The Lacedæmonian fleet under Mindarus had seized the island of Eubœa, a most essential dependency upon Athens. Alcibiades defeated Mindarus in two naval engagements, and recovered that important island. The people of Athens, exasperated at their new governors, to whose weakness and contentions they attributed the loss of Eubœa, began to look towards the man who had recovered it as the prop and stay of his country. He had increased his triumphs by the capture of Byzantium, Chalcedon, and Salymbria, which had revolted from the Athenian government; and when he appeared with his ships of war in the port of Piræus, all Athens rushed forth to hail his arrival, and to crown him with garlands of victory. The government of the four hundred nobles was now abolished, the ancient constitution renewed, and Alcibiades declared chief general of the republic by sea and land.

For twenty-eight years the Peloponnesian war was carried on with various success. The military talents of Alcibiades were displayed in several important victories. While successful, he was the idol of his country. But in all democracies, and democratic governments, the popularity of those in power must keep pace with the success of the public measures. A single battle lost in Asia deprived Alcibiades of all his power, and he became a second time an exile from his country. But it would appear that his absence was always fatal to the Athenians. The fleet of the republic at Ægos-Potamos, through the carelessness of its commanders, was entirely destroyed by Lysander, the admiral of the Lacedæmonians. Of three hundred ships which had sailed from the Piræus, only eight returned to the coast of Attica.

Athens, besieged by sea and land, was now at the last extremity. Her fleet, which was the main defence of the republic, was annihilated. After sustaining a blockade of six months, the Athenians offered to submit, on the condition that their city and the harbor of Piræus should be saved from destruction. The Spartans and allied states took this proposal into consideration. The allies strenuously urged the total destruction of the Athenian empire and name. But the Spartans were more generous. They concluded a peace on the following conditions,—that the fortifications of Piræus should be demolished; that Athens should limit the number of her fleet to twelve ships; that she should give up all the towns taken during the war; and, for the future, undertake no

military enterprise but under the command of the Lacedæmonians. Such was the issue of the famous war of Peloponnesus.

It is to the same Lysander who had the merit of terminating this destructive war so gloriously for his country, that all the ancient writers have attributed the first attack upon the system of Lycurgus, and the beginning of the corruption of the Spartan constitution. Gold was now for the first time introduced into Lacedæmon. Lysander sent home an immense mass of plunder which had been taken in Greece and Asia during the war of Peloponnesus. This was a direct breach of the fundamental laws of the state; but the period was now come, when such a measure was not only justifiable, but necessary. The truth is, that the institutions of Lycurgus were fitted for a rude period of society, and adapted to the regulation of a small, a warlike, and an independent commonwealth. His system was quite repugnant to the spirit of conquest, and the manners that are inseparable from extensive dominion. When Lacedæmon came to aspire to the sovereignty of Greece, it was impossible for her to retain her ancient manners, or adhere to her ancient laws. To preserve the ascendancy she had acquired in Greece, it was necessary either that she should herself accumulate treasures requisite to pay her dependants in the allied commonwealths, and grant them occasional subsidies, or to be herself dependent for those resources upon the Persian satraps. Lysander saw this necessity, and he took that alternative which appeared to him the least dishonorable. He procured the abrogation of that ancient law which prohibited the importation of gold into the republic. It was not allowed a free circulation, but was deposited in the public treasury, to be employed solely for the uses of the state. It was declared a capital offence if any should be found in the possession of a private citizen. Plutarch censures this as a weak and sophistical distinction. It was indeed easy to see, that whenever it became necessary for the state to be rich, it would soon become the interest and the passion of individuals to be so. This consequence immediately followed; and though some severe examples were made of offenders against the law, it was found impossible, from this period, to enforce its observance.

The reduction of Athens by the Spartans occasioned an entire change in the constitution of the Athenian republic. Lysander abolished the democracy, and substituted in its place an administration of thirty governors, or, as the Greek historians term them, *Tyrants*, (*Τυράννοι*.) whose power seems to have been absolute, unless in so far as each was restrained by the equally arbitrary will of his colleagues. He likewise placed a Spartan garrison in the citadel, under the command of Callibius. Soon after this event, so disgraceful to his country, the celebrated Alcibiades was put to death, in Phrygia, by assassins employed for that purpose by Pharnabazus, the Persian governor, who, it is said, was prompted to that act of treachery by the Lacedæmonians, who dreaded to see

this able and ambitious man once more reconciled to his country. He perished in the fortieth year of his age.

The administration of *the thirty tyrants* soon became quite intolerable to the Athenians. A stronger specimen of their government cannot be given than the following. Theramenes, one of the thirty, a man of a more humane disposition than his colleagues, having opposed the severity of some of their measures, Critias, his colleague, who by the controlling influence of the Spartans had acquired the chief ascendancy in the council, accused him of disturbing the peace of the state. The consequence was, that after a public trial, in which the philosopher Socrates was among the few who had courage to aid him in his defence, he was condemned to die by poison: and his death was the prelude to a series of proscriptions, confiscations, and murders of the most respectable of the citizens, who were obnoxious to these sanguinary rulers, or who had dared to murmur at their proceedings. It is computed by Xenophon, though doubtless with exaggeration, that a greater number of Athenian citizens lost their lives by the sentence of these tyrants, in the short space of eight months, than had fallen in the whole course of the Peloponnesian war.

The people were awed into silence, and dumb with consternation. The most eminent of the Athenian families left their country in despair; and the bravest of those who cherished a hope of restoring its liberties and putting an end to this usurpation, chose for their leader Thrasybulus, a man of known abilities and undaunted resolution, under whose conduct and auspices they resolved to make a vigorous effort for the recovery of their freedom. Sparta had strictly prohibited the other states of Greece receiving, protecting, or giving any aid to the Athenian fugitives. Thebes and Megara were the only republics which generously dared to disobey this presumptuous mandate. Lysias, an orator of Syracuse, sent to their aid five hundred soldiers, raised at his own expense. This band of patriots had now increased to a considerable number, and, headed by Thrasybulus, they made a sudden assault on the Piræus, and made themselves masters of the port and fortifications, which were the main defence of the city of Athens. The thirty tyrants hastily assembled their troops to attack and dislodge the assailants, and a battle ensued, in which the patriots were victorious. Critias was killed; and as the troops of the tyrants were making a disorderly retreat, Thrasybulus gallantly addressed them as friends and fellow citizens. "Why do you fly from me," said he, "as from an enemy? Am I not your countryman and your best friend? It is not against you, but against your oppressors, that I am fighting. Let us cordially unite in the noble design of vindicating the liberty of our dear country." This appeal had its proper effect. The army returned to Athens, and, in a full assembly of the people, the thirty tyrants were deposed and expelled from the city. The government was

committed to a council of ten citizens, who still abused their power. The deposed thirty solicited the aid of Sparta, and an army immediately took the field, with the purpose of re-establishing them in their power: but the attempt was unsuccessful: the patriots were again victorious; the oppressors of their country were defeated and slain, and Thrasybulus returning in triumph to Athens, after proclaiming a general amnesty, by which every citizen took a solemn oath to bury all past transactions in oblivion, this brave and virtuous Athenian had the signal honor of restoring to his country its ancient form of government.

One event which happened at this time reflected more disgrace upon the Athenians than all their intestine dissensions or their national humiliation. This was the persecution and death of the illustrious Socrates: he who, in the words of Cicero, "first brought philosophy from heaven to dwell upon earth, who familiarized her to the acquaintance of man, who applied her divine doctrines to the common purposes of life, and the advancement of human happiness, and the true discernment of good and evil." This great man, who was the bright pattern of every virtue which he taught, became an object of hatred and disgust to the corrupted Athenians. He had excited the jealousy of the Sophists, a set of men who pretended to universal science, whose character stood high with the Athenian youth, and who taught their disciples a specious mode of arguing with equal plausibility on all subjects, and on either side of any question. Socrates detested this species of jugglery, which mined the foundation of every moral truth. He saw its pernicious influence, and he was at pains to expose the futility of this trifling logic, and to bring its professors into merited contempt. These, therefore, and a numerous party of their disciples, became, of course, his inveterate enemies. They calumniated Socrates as a corrupter of youth; for of these the most ingenuous and virtuous were openly become his scholars and partisans: they accused him as an enemy to religion, because in his sublime reasonings, without regard to the superstitions of the vulgar, he endeavored to lead the mind to the knowledge of one supreme and beneficent Being, the author of nature, and the supporter of the universe: they represented him, in fine, as a foe to the constitution of his country, because he had never been restrained by an interested or selfish policy, from freely blaming that inconstancy and fluctuation of counsels which mark the proceedings of all popular assemblies. There was abundant matter of accusation, and a charge of treason and impiety was laid against him in full form.

The ablest, at that time, of the Greek orators, Lysias, generously offered to undertake the defence of Socrates; but the latter declined to avail himself of that offer. "I will not," said he, "suppose my judges interested in my condemnation; and if I am guilty, I must not endeavor by persuasion to avert the award

of justice." His defence he made himself, with the manly fortitude of conscious innocence. Plato, in his *Apologia Socratis*, has given an ample account of it. It consisted of a simple detail of his life and conduct as a public teacher; in reference to which he uttered this striking apostrophe: "I believe, O Athenians, the existence of God more than my accusers. I am so perfectly convinced of that great truth, that to God, and to you, I submit to be judged in that manner you shall think best for me and for yourselves." The populace, whom their demagogues had strongly prejudiced against this great and good man, were affected by his defence, and showed marks of a favorable disposition; when Anytus and several others, men of high consideration in the republic, now openly stood forth and joined the party of his accusers. The weak and inconstant rabble were drawn along by their influence, and a majority of thirty suffrages declared Socrates guilty. The punishment was still undetermined, and he himself had the right of choosing it. "It is my choice," said he, "that since my past life has been employed in the service of the public, that public should for the future be at the charge of my support." This tranquillity of mind, which could sport with the danger of his situation, served only to exasperate his judges. He was sentenced, after an imprisonment of thirty days, to drink the juice of hemlock. That time he spent as became the hero and the philosopher. His friends had prepared the means of his escape, and earnestly endeavored to persuade him to attempt it; but he convinced them that it is a crime to violate the law, even where its sentence is unjust. On the day of his death he discoursed with uncommon force of eloquence on the immortality of the soul, on the influence that persuasion ought to have on the conduct of life, and on the comfort it diffused on the last moments of existence. He drank the poisoned cup without the smallest emotion; and, in the agony of death, showed to his attending friends an example of tranquillity which their deep-felt grief denied them all power of imitating. The narrative of this concluding scene, as it is given by Plato in his dialogue entitled *Phædon*, is one of the noblest specimens of simple, eloquent, and pathetic description which is any where to be met with; a narrative, to the force of which Cicero bears this strong testimony, that he never could read it without tears. Such was the end of this true philosopher, of whom his ungrateful countrymen knew not the value till they had destroyed him. It was time now to awake to shame and to remorse, and to express their sorrow for his death by the utmost abhorrence for his persecutors. These met with their deserved punishment; but the reproach was indelibly fixed upon the character of the Athenians, and no contrition could wipe it out.

The military character of the Greeks was not yet extinguished, notwithstanding their national corruption. In the same year with the last-mentioned event, a part of the Grecian troops in Asia

signalized themselves by one of the most remarkable exploits recorded in history: this was *the retreat of the ten thousand*.

On the death of Darius Nothus, his eldest son Artaxerxes Mnemon succeeded to the empire, while his brother Cyrus was by their father's will invested with the government of Lydia and several of the adjoining provinces. The ambition of this young man early conceived the criminal project of dethroning his elder brother, and seizing upon the throne of Persia; but though his design was detected, he obtained his pardon from Artaxerxes, upon the entreaties of Parysatis, the queen-mother, and with a singular measure of generosity was even continued in the full command of his provinces. This humane indulgence he treacherously abused, by secretly levying a large army in different quarters of the lesser Asia, under the feigned pretence of restraining some of the disorderly satraps, but in reality with the purpose of a sudden attack against his unprepared and unsuspecting brother. In the army of Cyrus were a chosen body of 13,000 Greeks from the Peloponnesus, under the command of Clearchus, a Lacedæmonian, an officer of great experience and prowess, to whom alone of all his captains Cyrus confided the nature and object of his enterprise. It was with infinite address upon the part of Clearchus, that the Greeks, together with the rest of the army, were led on from province to province till they came within a few days' march of Babylon, where Cyrus at length imparted to them the purpose of the expedition, and reconciled them to its hazards by a large increase of present pay and an assurance of unbounded rewards in the event of final success. But this they were not destined to experience. In a decisive engagement at Cunaxa, in the plain between the Tigris and Euphrates, the Greeks put to flight that wing of the Persian army which was opposed to them. Cyrus, after the most extraordinary exertions of personal valor, espying Artaxerxes amidst the strong body of his guards, singled him out for his attack, and after twice wounding his brother and dismounting him from his horse, fell himself a victim by the hand of Artaxerxes, who pierced him to the heart with his javelin. Thus this ambitious youth, who seems to have been in other respects an accomplished and heroic character, met with his deserved fate. It is surprising that Xenophon, who has admirably written the history of this expedition, should have bestowed the most unbounded encomium on this prince, without the smallest censure of his most culpable enterprise.

The Greek army, diminished by its losses and by desertions to 10,000 men, made a most amazing retreat. Harassed by the Persian troops under Tissaphernes, who hung continually upon their rear, Clearchus brought them again to a pitched battle, in which the Greeks defeated the barbarians a second time and put their army to flight. Perceiving, however, that in a country of enemies, where they must fight at every step of their progress,

they must perish, even though victorious in every action, Clearchus willingly listened to a proposed accommodation with Tissaphernes, who invited him for that purpose, together with the rest of the Greek commanders, to a friendly conference. With great weakness, Clearchus and four of the principal officers repaired to the enemy's camp, attended by a very slender escort. They had no sooner entered the tent of Tissaphernes than, upon a given signal, they were all massacred. The consternation of the Greeks at this horrible treachery was extreme. They saw that they had nothing to trust either to the faith or mercy of the barbarians, and that their only safety lay at the point of their swords. In a midnight consultation of the troops, Xenophon, then a young man and in no high command, took upon him to counsel and to harangue the despairing army. By his advice they immediately chose new generals in the room of those who had perished, and Xenophon himself, with four others, being invested with this important charge, his admirable conduct, perseverance, and valor, brought his countrymen at length safely through all their difficulties. They began by burning all their useless baggage, every man retaining only what was absolutely necessary for the march. They proceeded with indefatigable resolution and almost daily conflicts with the enemy, ignorant of the roads and of the defiles, crossing wide and dangerous rivers, and often breast-deep in the snow, to make their way through the mountainous country eastward of Mesopotamia, to Armenia and the farther provinces bordering upon the Euxine. Ascending a steep mountain on the borders of Colchis, the vanguard of the army set up a prodigious shout, which Xenophon, in the rear, supposed to be the signal of a sudden attack from the enemy, and urged on the main body with haste to the summit; when, to their inexpressible joy, they found it was the first sight of the sea which had occasioned this exclamation. With one sudden and sympathetic emotion, the soldiers and commanders rushed into each other's arms and shed a torrent of tears; and then, without any order, each man striving to outdo his fellow, they raised an immense pile of stones upon the spot, which they crowned with broken bucklers and spoils they had taken from the enemy. Arriving soon after at Trapezus, a Greek colony upon the Euxine, they celebrated splendid games with great joy and festivity for the space of several days; and finally embarking at Sinope, after many turns of fortune and various adventures in the course of their progress homewards, this eventful expedition, in which the Grecian army traversed a space of 1155 leagues, was terminated in the course of fifteen months.

The narrative of this expedition by Xenophon is one of the most valuable compositions that remain to us of antiquity. In the form of a journal it gives a minute detail of every day's transactions, the counsels, plans, and different opinions of the principal officers, a vivid description of the places, cities, rivers, and mountains, upon

the line of march; the productions of the different countries; the singular manners of many of the rude nations through which they passed; and, finally, the extraordinary incidents which befell this hardy and resolute band of adventurers, through every stage of a campaign of greater duration, difficulty, and danger than was ever performed by any army of ancient or of modern times. In fine, the *Anabasis* of Xenophon, with the veracity of genuine history, has all the charms of an interesting romance.

The cities of Ionia had taken part with the younger Cyrus against Artaxerxes. The greater part of the Greeks in the service of Cyrus in that expedition were, as we have seen, Lacedæmonians. Sparta was now engaged to defend her countrymen, and consequently was involved in a war with Persia. There was an inherent weakness in the constitution of the Persian monarchy, arising from the high power and almost supreme authority exercised by the satraps, or governors of the provinces. It is easy to imagine how formidable to the monarch of Persia must have been the confederacy of two or three of these satraps, and of consequence that it was his chief interest to keep them disunited by fomenting mutual jealousies. The state maxim of the Persian kings was, therefore, to divide, in order to command; a rule of policy which is a certain proof of the fundamental weakness of that government where it is necessary to adopt it. In Persia, the satraps might, by this management, be kept in a state of unwilling dependence on the crown, but it left the monarchy itself weak and defenceless.

Had the Greeks at this period been sensible of their real interest; had they again united as a nation, making Sparta the head of the confederacy, as in the former war with that power they had done Athens, it would not have been a difficult enterprise to have overthrown this vast empire. But experience does not always enlighten; and with the Greeks it was not easy for a sense of general or national advantage to overcome particular jealousies. The haughty Athenians, in spite of their humiliation, would have ill brooked the degradation of ranging themselves under the banners of Sparta; much less was it to be expected that the Spartans, justly elevated with their success in the Peloponnesian war, would ever again stoop to act a subordinate part to Athens.

Conon, the Athenian, who, in the conclusion of that war had lost the decisive battle of *Ægos-Potamos*, had retired to the isle of Cyprus, where he only waited an opportunity of regaining his credit, and recommending himself to his country by some active service against her rival, Sparta. In this view, he threw himself under the protection of Artaxerxes, who gave him the command of a fleet which he had equipped in Phœnicia.

The Lacedæmonians, on receiving this intelligence, resolved to prosecute the war with the utmost vigor; and Agesilaus, one of the Spartan kings, in that view crossed into Asia with an army. He had, in his first campaign, such signal success, that the Persian

monarchy seemed to threaten a revolution. The Asiatic provinces began to court the alliance of Lacedæmon; the barbarians flocked to her standards from all quarters. Artaxerxes thought it advisable to attempt a diversion in Greece. He employed Timocrates, a Rhodian, to negotiate with some of the tributary states belonging to Lacedæmon, and to excite them to throw off her yoke, and assert their independence. He found the most of them well-disposed to this attempt, and a proper application of the Persian gold hastened their insurrection. A league was formed against Sparta by the states of Argos, Thebes, and Corinth; and Athens soon after joined the confederacy, which gave a sudden turn to the fortunes of Lacedæmon.

The Spartans raised two considerable armies, and commenced hostilities by entering the territory of Phocis. They were defeated; Lysander, one of their generals, being killed in battle, and Pausanias, the other, condemned to death for his misconduct. Much about the same time, the Persian fleet under the command of Conon vanquished that of Sparta, near Cnidus, a city of Caria. This defeat deprived the Lacedæmonians of the command of the sea. Their allies took the opportunity of this turn of affairs to throw off their yoke, and Sparta, almost in a single campaign, saw herself without allies, without power, and without resources. The reverse of fortune experienced by this republic was truly remarkable. Twenty years had not elapsed since she was absolute mistress of Greece, and held the whole of her states either as tributaries or allies, who found it their highest interest to court her favor and protection. So changed was her present situation, that the most inconsiderable of the states of Peloponnesus spurned at her authority, and left her singly to oppose the united power of Persia and the league of Greece.

To escape total destruction, the Lacedæmonians made an overture of peace to the Persians. Antalcidas, commissioned for that purpose, applied to Terebasus, the governor of Lydia. He laid before him three articles as the conditions of amity and alliance. By the first, the Spartans abandoned to Persia all the Asiatic colonies; by the second, it was proposed that all the allied states of Greece should enjoy their liberty, and the choice of their own laws and form of government; and by the last, it was agreed that such of the states as might acquiesce in these conditions should unite in arms, and compel the others to accede to them. Artaxerxes accepted these propositions, but stipulated further, that he should be put in possession of Cyprus and Clazomene, and that the Athenians should get possession of the islands of Scyros, Lemnos, and Imbros. Some of the principal states of Greece, and Thebes in particular, refused at first to consent to this, which they justly regarded as a humiliating treaty; but, too weak to make an effectual opposition, they yielded to the necessity of their situation.

CHAPTER III.

REPUBLIC OF THEBES—Pelopidas and Epaminondas—Battle of Leuctra—of Mantinea—General Peace and its consequences—Philip of Macedon—The Sacred War—Demosthenes—Battle of Chæronea—Designs of Philip against Persia—His death.

WHILE the two great republics of Greece, Sparta and Athens, were thus visibly tending to decline, another of the Grecian commonwealths, which had hitherto made no conspicuous figure, now suddenly rose to a degree of splendor which eclipsed all her contemporary states. This was the republic of Thebes, whose sudden elevation from obscurity to the command of Greece is one of the most remarkable occurrences in history.

As Sparta, by the late treaty with Persia, seemed to be regarded as the predominant power in Greece, and to have negotiated (as it may be termed) the fall of the nation, she was naturally induced to endeavor by every means to maintain this character of ascendancy, and for that end had her partisans and political agents in all the principal states. The natural consequence of this policy was to excite and maintain in all of them two separate factions; the one the patriotic supporters of liberty and independence, and the other the mean slaves of Lacedæmonian interest. Such, among the rest, was, at this time, the situation of Thebes. The patriotic party in this republic which supported its ancient constitution and independence, was headed by Ismenias; while the opposite faction, which aimed at the establishment of an oligarchy, had for its chief supporter Leontiades, a man firmly devoted to the interest of Sparta. It happened, at this time, that Phæbidas, a Lacedæmonian general, was sent with an army to punish the people of Olynthus, a Thracian city, for an alleged infraction of the late treaty of peace, by making conquests over some of the neighboring states. The Spartans considered themselves as the guaranties of that treaty which they had so main a hand in negotiating, and which professed to secure the independence of the several republics. We shall see how faithfully they discharged this guarantee. Leontiades, the head of the party of the oligarchy at Thebes, prevailed on Phæbidas to second his attempts against the liberties of his country. The Spartan general readily gave his aid, and introducing his army, took possession of the citadel; while the unsuspecting Thebans, trusting to the faith of the treaty, were employed in celebrating the festival of Ceres. Ismenias,