

philosopher Plato had been invited to Syracuse, by Dionysius the elder, and had contracted an intimate friendship with Dion, the brother-in-law of Dionysius, of whom, in one of his epistles, he gives this high character, that he had never met with a young man on whom his philosophical principles had made so great an impression. But their effect on Dionysius himself was not so favorable; for, being offended with the freedom which the philosopher used in censuring whatever he disapproved in the maxims and government of the tyrant, the latter ordered him to be sold as a slave in the public market. His disciples paid the price of five minæ for their master, and sent him safe back to Greece. Dion, from an earnest desire of reforming the morals of his kinsman, the younger Dionysius, persuaded him to invite the philosopher once more to return to Sicily. Plato came, and virtue and learning seemed for awhile to reign at Syracuse: but their dominion was of short duration; for the corrupted courtiers of Dionysius prevailed on him to banish Dion, and Plato followed his favorite disciple.

The exile of Dion was aggravated by circumstances of the most flagrant injustice and oppression: his property was confiscated, and Areta, his wife, the sister of Dionysius, was, by that tyrant, compelled to enter into another marriage with a sycophant of his court. The more respectable part of the Syracusans were indignant at these outrages, which reflected dishonor on the state, and sought earnestly to rid themselves from their yoke. They held a secret correspondence with Dion, whom they prevailed on to aid them in their design of effecting a revolution. With the aid of foreign troops whom he levied in Greece, and supported by all the Syracusans who favored the cause of liberty, Dion compelled the tyrant to evacuate Syracuse, and seek refuge in Italy. But the austere manners of the virtuous Dion were not suited to a licentious and corrupted people. He lost the affections of his subjects; they forgot his services, and deposed and banished him: he was recalled, indeed, soon after, but to meet with a worse fate: for while he sought to appease the seditions excited by the partisans of Dionysius, he was assassinated by an infamous Athenian, on whom he had bestowed his chief confidence.

Aided by the distractions of Syracuse, consequent on the death of Dion, Dionysius regained the throne, ten years after his expulsion: but his tyrannical disposition inflamed, not mitigated by his misfortunes, soon became so intolerable, that he was expelled a second time, and banished to Corinth; he there ended his days in poverty and obscurity. It is said, that the tyranny of his nature found a congenial gratification in exercising the employment of a schoolmaster.

This last revolution had been effected by the aid of Timoleon, a noble Corinthian, whom his countrymen deputed to restore the liberties of their ancient colony. Timoleon had distinguished himself by an ardent passion for republican freedom, which had

even hurried him into the commission of a shocking crime. Unable to dissuade his brother, Timophanes, from a design of usurping the sovereignty of his native state, he caused two of his friends to assassinate him, in his own presence. This deed, though applauded by his fellow citizens, was attended by such severe remorse, that he threw up all public employment, and wandered in melancholy dejection for a period of twenty years. He was now, however, summoned to take the command of the expedition to Sicily, and his favorite passion prompted him to obey the summons.

The Carthaginians having some settlements in Sicily, had long earnestly looked to the acquisition of the whole island, and at this time, under the pretext of aiding the Syracusans in the design of dethroning their tyrant, had landed a large force, and seized and garrisoned several of the Sicilian towns. Dionysius, reduced to extremity between the Carthaginian army on the one side, and the troops of Timoleon on the other, chose to enter into a capitulation with the latter, and agreed to abandon his throne, and purchase his life by a voluntary banishment into Greece. Timoleon sent him in a single galley to Corinth. Having delivered Syracuse from her tyrant, he now turned his arms against the Carthaginians, whom he defeated in several battles, and compelled to yield up all their new acquisitions, confining themselves within the limits of their ancient possessions.

Having thus honorably fulfilled the original object of his mission, in giving peace and liberty to the Syracusans, Timoleon found his aid and alliance eagerly courted by the other republics of Sicily, who desired to follow the example of Syracuse in expelling their domestic tyrants, and establishing a free constitution. This purpose successfully accomplished, Timoleon now applied himself to the means of repairing the wasted population of the Syracusan territory, by recalling all those citizens whom the tyranny of the late government had compelled to abandon their country, and by prompting new settlers to resort thither by every encouragement which good policy could suggest. This truly great man no sooner brought about a regular and stable administration of government, than he gave an illustrious proof how disinterested had been the motives of his conduct, by resigning all power, and returning to the condition of a private citizen. As such he passed the remainder of his days, highly honored and beloved by that people who owed to his virtues their liberty and their happiness.

It is not difficult to account for those revolutions to which we have observed the state of Syracuse so much exposed. This city had acquired great wealth by commerce. The overgrown fortunes of individuals put it in their power not only to stir up factions and cabals, but even to raise armies. The state likewise was accustomed to employ only foreign troops, and thus afforded a tempting opportunity to strangers to aim at attaining power and influence in the republic. Had there been in Sicily any other

state so formidable as to balance the power of Syracuse, we should then have seen in that country nearly the same scenes that we have observed in Greece. We should have seen the inferior states pass from the alliance of the one to that of the other; associations constantly formed to maintain a balance of power, and at the same time a cordial union of the whole against a foreign enemy. But as the power of Syracuse was not kept down by any formidable rival in Sicily, this circumstance obliged the inferior states who wished to avoid her yoke to seek aid from abroad, and thus Sicily was laid open to the Carthaginians and to the Greeks.

The Syracusans did not long enjoy the liberty and peace to which they had been restored by Timoleon. Agathocles, a man who had risen from a low condition to the first military honors, and the command of their fleets and armies, took advantage of that power to render himself master of the city. Besieged by the Carthaginians in Syracuse, he carried the war into Africa, ravaged the country to the gates of Carthage, and defeated their army in a signal engagement, which had very near proved fatal to their empire. He suffered, however, a signal reverse of fortune. During his absence in Africa, the Sicilian states, oppressed by Syracuse, formed a league in defence of their liberties. Agathocles having reembarked a part of his troops, with the design of chastising this revolt, the Carthaginians in the meantime reduced the remainder of the Syracusan army to such extremity, that even the return of their leader was insufficient to retrieve their losses. Regarding their situation as desperate, Agathocles, with the meanest treachery, abandoned his army in the night, and escaped back to Sicily in a single vessel, leaving his two sons to the mercy of the Carthaginians, who put them both to death. His vengeance now found an object in reducing the Sicilian states, whose revolt had been the immediate cause of his disasters; but while actively engaged in this purpose, his life was shortened by poison.

The Carthaginians, still intent on the acquisition of Sicily, now invested Syracuse with an immense fleet and an army of 50,000 men. Unable effectually with their own power to resist this overwhelming force, the Syracusans solicited aid from Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, who, as we have before seen, had at this time abandoned all hope of achieving the conquest of Italy. He seized this occasion as an honorable pretext for withdrawing his troops from that country. The Syracusans received him with open arms, and put him in possession of their city, their fleet, and the public treasure. Pyrrhus, with this combination of force, was for some time eminently successful; but on a change, as we have before related, this prince thought it his wisest course to drop his schemes of ambition, and return to Epirus. On quitting Sicily, he is said to have exclaimed, "What a beautiful field of battle do we leave for the Romans and Carthaginians!" His prediction was speedily fulfilled, for immediately after began the first Punic war.

The character of the Carthaginians, and that of the Romans, whom we shall now see engaged in war for a long series of years, formed a very remarkable contrast to each other. As this difference of character may, perhaps, be accounted for on one single principle, I shall endeavor very shortly to unfold that principle, in a few observations on the effects of a commercial life upon the genius, manners, and laws of a nation.

One most natural effect of the commercial spirit is a selfish and interested turn of mind; a habit of measuring every thing by the standard of profit and loss, and a predominant idea that wealth is the main constituent both of public and private happiness. The contrast of character, in this respect, between the Romans and Carthaginians, has been finely remarked by Polybius. "In all things," says that judicious writer, "which regard the acquisition of wealth, the manners and customs of the Romans are infinitely preferable to those of the Carthaginians. This latter people esteemed nothing to be dishonorable that was connected with gain. Among them, money is openly employed to purchase the dignities and offices of the state; but all such proceedings are capital crimes at Rome." I am afraid that a contrast, so honorable to the Romans, could only have been made with justice in the early periods of the republic; since we know that without an increase of commerce, to which might be attributed the consequent increase of corruption and venality, those vices had attained to as great a height towards the end of the republic at Rome, as ever they had done at Carthage. But wealth acquired by plunder, rapine, and speculation, is yet more corruptive of the manners of a people, than riches acquired by merchandise.

Another effect of the prevalence of the commercial spirit, is to depress the military character of a people, and to render them indisposed to warlike enterprises. The advancement of trade cannot take place in any high degree, unless a nation is at peace with its neighbors, and enjoys domestic security. The prospect of that precarious gain which arises from warfare, will not weigh against the certain advantages which commerce derives from a state of peace. The art of war will not, therefore, flourish as a profession among a commercial people, and the practice of it will generally be intrusted to mercenary troops. Military rank will be in low esteem, because, when purchased, it ceases in a great degree to be honorable. Thus the Carthaginians, though certainly not inferior by nature to the Romans in courage and military prowess, were become so from habit and education. The armies of the empire were not composed of its native subjects; they were mercenaries, and, therefore, had no natural affection for that soil which they were called to defend, or that people who were nothing more than their paymasters. Hence the signal inferiority of their armies to the Romans, unless when commanded by Carthaginian generals of high, natural, military genius, who could bring

their force into action as a great machine directed by one simple power.

Public spirit and a high tone of national virtue are rarely to be found in states whose principal object is commerce. Patriotism cannot flourish, where the spirit of gain predominates. Each individual, feeling interest separate from, and often incompatible with that of the state, it is not surprising that what regards only the good of the community should have but small influence; and even that private advantage, and the enrichment of individuals, should be the mainspring of public measures.

But this, it may be said, is the dark side of the picture. Let us, therefore, attend to those beneficial consequences, which may naturally be attributed to the prevalence of the commercial spirit in a nation.

And of these, what immediately strikes us, as the most obvious, is the general diffusion of industry. Among a commercial people, the faculties both of mind and body are of necessity almost continually employed. Invention is ever on the stretch to discover new sources of gain; and the enterprising spirit of the more opulent furnishes constant occupation to the machanic, the manufacturer, and the laborer.

Inseparably connected with the general diffusion of industry, is a spirit of frugality. Riches have their full value when purchased by the labor either of the mind or body, and what costs dear will not be frivolously expended. Justin has remarked the parsimony as well as the industry of the Tyrians. Strabo and Cicero give the same character of the people of Marseilles, and Diodorus Siculus of the Carthaginians. In modern times we observe the association of the same qualities among the Dutch and the Chinese.

Another necessary consequence of the prevalence of commerce, is a regularity and strictness of the national police, a severity of the laws with respect to mutual contracts and obligations, and a consequent security in the transactions of individuals with each other.* I know not whether a certain degree of refinement in manners, at least to the length of general courtesy and affability both to those of the same nation and to foreigners, be not a consequence of the spirit of trade; a refinement of manners, however, very different from that of a luxurious people, where the laws of behavior arise chiefly from motives of ease and pleasure, or are dictated by gallantry or a high point of honor.

Science is likewise in many respects greatly indebted to commerce. Thus astronomy, navigation, general mathematics, me-

* When the Roman writers inveigh against the *Punica fides*, the censure applies to their character in war; and even in that respect it may well be questioned whether the Roman character stood in any higher degree of estimation.

chanics, and indeed all sciences subservient to practical utility, are greatly advanced by it, and derive a vast encouragement from the demands which it occasions for the productions of the useful arts. With regard to literature there is greater doubt. The labor of the head in those productions which tend only to amusement, or at least a refinement of the intellectual powers, without any obvious consequence as to the practical business of worldly life, will not, it is probable, meet with much encouragement among a people whose views extend no farther than the substantial acquisitions of wealth and property.

Such are the principal effects of the spirit of commerce on the character and manners of a nation; and such accordingly we find to constitute the principal features of the Carthaginian character opposed to the Roman.

CHAPTER IX.

FIRST PUNIC WAR—First Naval Victory of the Romans—Invasion of Africa—Regulus—Termination of the War—SECOND PUNIC WAR—Hannibal passes the Alps—His victories in Italy—Battle of Cannæ—Hannibal winters in Capua—Siege of Syracuse—defended by Archimedes—Battle of Zama—and end of Second Punic War—Defeat of Philip II. of Macedon—of Antiochus, king of Syria—Cato the Censor—Accusation of Scipio Africanus—His character—Scipio Asiaticus—War with Perseus and reduction of Macedonia—THIRD PUNIC WAR, AND DESTRUCTION OF CARTHAGE.

It has been justly remarked that the Romans, although an ambitious people, did not begin to form plans of extensive conquest, till they had sufficient strength to undertake them with advantage. The triumph which their arms had obtained over Pyrrhus, the most able and the most experienced general of his time, seemed to give them an assurance of success in any military enterprise in which they should engage.

The First Punic war took its rise from the following cause. The Mamertines, a people of Campania, had taken possession of Messina, one of the Sicilian towns allied to Syracuse. Hiero, king of Syracuse, had marched against these invaders, who, conscious that they were unable to withstand so powerful an antagonist, applied for aid, first to the Carthaginians, and afterwards, from rational fear of being enslaved by this power, to the Romans. Although this was a very unjustifiable quarrel, the Romans made no scruple