

their force into action as a great machine directed by one simple power.

Public spirit and a high tone of national virtue are rarely to be found in states whose principal object is commerce. Patriotism cannot flourish, where the spirit of gain predominates. Each individual, feeling interest separate from, and often incompatible with that of the state, it is not surprising that what regards only the good of the community should have but small influence; and even that private advantage, and the enrichment of individuals, should be the mainspring of public measures.

But this, it may be said, is the dark side of the picture. Let us, therefore, attend to those beneficial consequences, which may naturally be attributed to the prevalence of the commercial spirit in a nation.

And of these, what immediately strikes us, as the most obvious, is the general diffusion of industry. Among a commercial people, the faculties both of mind and body are of necessity almost continually employed. Invention is ever on the stretch to discover new sources of gain; and the enterprising spirit of the more opulent furnishes constant occupation to the machanic, the manufacturer, and the laborer.

Inseparably connected with the general diffusion of industry, is a spirit of frugality. Riches have their full value when purchased by the labor either of the mind or body, and what costs dear will not be frivolously expended. Justin has remarked the parsimony as well as the industry of the Tyrians. Strabo and Cicero give the same character of the people of Marseilles, and Diodorus Siculus of the Carthaginians. In modern times we observe the association of the same qualities among the Dutch and the Chinese.

Another necessary consequence of the prevalence of commerce, is a regularity and strictness of the national police, a severity of the laws with respect to mutual contracts and obligations, and a consequent security in the transactions of individuals with each other.\* I know not whether a certain degree of refinement in manners, at least to the length of general courtesy and affability both to those of the same nation and to foreigners, be not a consequence of the spirit of trade; a refinement of manners, however, very different from that of a luxurious people, where the laws of behavior arise chiefly from motives of ease and pleasure, or are dictated by gallantry or a high point of honor.

Science is likewise in many respects greatly indebted to commerce. Thus astronomy, navigation, general mathematics, me-

\* When the Roman writers inveigh against the *Punica fides*, the censure applies to their character in war; and even in that respect it may well be questioned whether the Roman character stood in any higher degree of estimation.

chanics, and indeed all sciences subservient to practical utility, are greatly advanced by it, and derive a vast encouragement from the demands which it occasions for the productions of the useful arts. With regard to literature there is greater doubt. The labor of the head in those productions which tend only to amusement, or at least a refinement of the intellectual powers, without any obvious consequence as to the practical business of worldly life, will not, it is probable, meet with much encouragement among a people whose views extend no farther than the substantial acquisitions of wealth and property.

Such are the principal effects of the spirit of commerce on the character and manners of a nation; and such accordingly we find to constitute the principal features of the Carthaginian character opposed to the Roman.

## CHAPTER IX.

FIRST PUNIC WAR—First Naval Victory of the Romans—Invasion of Africa—Regulus—Termination of the War—SECOND PUNIC WAR—Hannibal passes the Alps—His victories in Italy—Battle of Cannæ—Hannibal winters in Capua—Siege of Syracuse—defended by Archimedes—Battle of Zama—and end of Second Punic War—Defeat of Philip II. of Macedon—of Antiochus, king of Syria—Cato the Censor—Accusation of Scipio Africanus—His character—Scipio Asiaticus—War with Perseus and reduction of Macedonia—THIRD PUNIC WAR, AND DESTRUCTION OF CARTHAGE.

It has been justly remarked that the Romans, although an ambitious people, did not begin to form plans of extensive conquest, till they had sufficient strength to undertake them with advantage. The triumph which their arms had obtained over Pyrrhus, the most able and the most experienced general of his time, seemed to give them an assurance of success in any military enterprise in which they should engage.

The First Punic war took its rise from the following cause. The Mamertines, a people of Campania, had taken possession of Messina, one of the Sicilian towns allied to Syracuse. Hiero, king of Syracuse, had marched against these invaders, who, conscious that they were unable to withstand so powerful an antagonist, applied for aid, first to the Carthaginians, and afterwards, from rational fear of being enslaved by this power, to the Romans. Although this was a very unjustifiable quarrel, the Romans made no scruple

to take a part; and they sent a large army, which engaged and defeated the united forces of the Syracusans and Carthaginians. The king of Syracuse having now experienced to his cost the power of the Roman arms, was glad to court their alliance; flattering himself, by this means, with the prospect of absolutely expelling from Sicily the Carthaginians, who had long entertained the design of annexing this island to their empire, and had made considerable progress in that design.

By the joint forces of the Romans and Syracusans, Agrigentum, one of the principal cities then possessed by the Carthaginians, was taken, after a long siege. The Romans, encouraged by this success, and conscious of the great advantage which the enemy derived from their marine, began to think of equipping a fleet to cope with them at sea, as well as on land. A Carthaginian galley, stranded on the coast of Italy, is said to have served them as a model; and, by a wonderful effort of industry, they equipped in a few weeks a hundred similar to it, with five banks of oars—and twenty of a smaller size with three banks. The Consul Dicitius made an improvement on these ships of war, by the invention of a machine called *Corvus*,—a sort of crane, which, falling down and fastening upon the ships of the enemy, brought them to a close engagement, and served at the same time as a bridge or gangway for boarding them. All new inventions are usually successful at first, from the surprise which they occasion. The Roman fleet gained a most complete victory over that of the Carthaginians. A vast number of their ships were destroyed, above 7,000 men killed, and an equal number made prisoners.\*

For a few years the success of the Romans was uninterrupted. They took from the Carthaginians the islands of Corsica and Sardinia; and in the naval engagement at Ecnomus, having captured sixty of the enemy's ships, they now thought themselves in a situation to attempt the invasion of Africa.

The consul Attilius Regulus had the command of that expedition. The history of this illustrious man, particularly the latter part of it, is, by some modern writers, suspected of being fabulous; and indeed they have advanced some very plausible arguments against the belief of its authenticity: yet it is found in the best of the Roman writers, and is in itself so beautiful, that we cannot hastily resolve to refuse it credit. Regulus, after several successful engagements in Africa, had advanced even to the gates of Carthage; and such was the general consternation, that the city proposed to capitulate. It had been glorious for Regulus thus to have termin-

\* This naval engagement was fought on the coast of Sicily, near Mylae, now Milazzo. A monument of the victory was erected at Rome, which subsists to this day—the *columna rostrata*, dug up about 200 years ago, and now standing in the Capitol.

ated the war by an advantageous and honorable peace, but, blinded by success, the terms he insisted on were so severe, that, even situated as they were, the Carthaginians rejected them. In the meantime, a large body of Greek troops arrived to their assistance. This changed the fortune of the war; the Carthaginians assumed new courage, and with an army largely reinforced, attacking the Romans, they gained an important victory, and made Regulus their prisoner.

The Romans, undismayed by this great misfortune, prosecuted the war with fresh vigor. Metellus, in Sicily, was carrying every thing before him. He defeated Asdrubal, the Carthaginian general in a signal engagement near Panormus; and Carthage, dispirited by her losses, began seriously to wish for peace. Ambassadors for that purpose were despatched to Rome; and Regulus was sent along with them, as it was not doubted that the negotiation, seconded by the endeavors of this general, whom his country most deservedly respected, would be easily terminated. They exacted at the same time from him an oath—that he would return to Carthage, in case there should neither be peace nor an exchange of prisoners. To the surprise of all, this great and generous man used his utmost endeavors to dissuade his countrymen from agreeing to a peace; a proposition which he represented as proceeding solely from the weakness of the enemy, whom, by continuing the war, they would compel to any submission. But still further, he even dissuaded his countrymen from consenting to an exchange of prisoners; a measure which he endeavored to convince them must be to their disadvantage, from this circumstance, that they had in their hands many of the best officers of the enemy, whom they would be obliged to exchange against private men. His arguments prevailed, and the negotiation was broken off.

Of the conduct of Regulus, and of the nature of the obligation which bound him, there have been various opinions, both among the ancients and moderns. Cicero argues the matter at great length in the third book of his *Offices*.\* He applauds the conduct of Regulus, not only in the strict observance of his oath, but in his dissuasive against the exchange of prisoners. On the other hand, Sir Walter Raleigh, in his excellent *History of the World*, has distinguished between these two actions. He applauds the conduct of Regulus in strictly maintaining the obligation of his oath, and in opposing the treaty of peace with the enemy; but his dissuading his countrymen from agreeing to an exchange of prisoners, he censures as a piece of ostentatious stoicism, and even inhumanity, which no good reason of state could justify. And this we must think a sound opinion. The latter part of the conduct of this illustrious man must on all hands meet with ad-

\* Cic. de Offic. l. iii. c. xxvi. et seq.

miration. The Pontifex Maximus, on being consulted on the validity of the oath he had sworn to return to Carthage, gave it as his opinion that, it having been extorted by the necessity of his situation, he was under no obligation to observe it. But the noble soul of Regulus could not admit of such evasion. Disregarding the entreaties of his friends, the tears of his wife and children, the urgent remonstrance of the senate and of the whole Roman people, this generous and heroic man resolved that the terror of consequences, how dreadful soever, should not persuade him to a violation of his honor.\* "I am not ignorant," said he, "that death and the severest tortures are preparing for me; but what are these to the stain of an infamous action, the reproach of a guilty mind? I have sworn to return to Carthage; it is therefore my duty to go. Let the gods direct the consequence as to their wisdom shall seem best." To Carthage accordingly he returned, where, as he had foreseen, he suffered a cruel and ignominious death.†

The war in the meantime continued. Lilybæum, one of the strongest places belonging to the Carthaginians in Sicily, after a siege of many years, by the Romans, with the aid of the Syracusans, and the most signal efforts on both sides of courage, skill, and perseverance, was taken, in the tenth year, by blockade. After some alternate successes at sea, the Romans were victorious in two naval engagements; in the last of which, the Consul Lu-

\* This scene is beautifully described by Horace, *Od.* iii. 5, 49.

† Most of the ancient writers concur in the assertion that Regulus was put to death in a very barbarous manner by the Carthaginians. The authors of the Ancient Universal History relate as the most common opinion, that he was first exposed to a burning sun, with his eyelids cut off, and afterwards shut up in a cask, stuck around with sharp nails, in which he was suffered to die of hunger and want of sleep.—*Anc. Un. Hist.*, vol. xii. p. 191. It must, however, be owned, that great doubt hangs over all the accounts that are given of the inhuman treatment of Regulus. Polybius, who is extremely minute in every thing relative to the history of this illustrious man, is entirely silent as to his fate; which, had it been such as is commonly related, he could never have omitted to mention. He assures us, in the first book of his History, that he has been most particular in his account of Regulus, that others may derive improvement from his example in not trusting too much to a course of prosperous fortune. As, therefore, the calamitous death of Regulus was the strongest exemplification of this moral lesson, it is impossible to believe that he would have studiously avoided the mention of the above particulars, if they had been true.

But there is in reality a positive testimony against the truth of those atrocious circumstances above related. Among various fragments of ancient authors, collected by the Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus, is a passage from Diodorus Siculus, in which it is asserted that the death of Regulus was owing to neglect; probably the carelessness of his keepers in omitting to supply him with food. The author adds, that the widow of Regulus instigated her sons, in revenge of their father's death, to wreak their resentment against two of the Carthaginian prisoners who had fallen into their hands, one of whom they actually starved to death. The other was fortunate enough to convey intelligence to the Roman magistrate of his comrade's death and his own intended fate, in consequence of which the Attilii very narrowly escaped a capital punishment. See Toland's Works, vol. ii. p. 42, where there is a translation of the fragment of Diodorus, and a proof of its authenticity.

tatius defeated Hamilcar Barcas, the father of the great Hannibal, and compelled the Carthaginians to sue for peace, which was not granted them but on the hardest conditions. These were, that they should abandon all their possessions in Sicily; that, in the space of twenty years, they should pay to the Romans 2,200 talents of silver—about 325,480*l* sterling; that they should restore, without ransom, all their prisoners; and lastly, that they should not make war against Hiero, the king of Syracuse, or any of his allies. The Roman people refused to ratify this treaty, unless on the further conditions, that they should have an additional thousand talents for the expenses of the war; that the whole sum should be paid in ten years instead of twenty; and that the Carthaginians should yield up all the small islands which they possessed upon the coast of Italy. Sicily was declared a Roman province, with the exception of the kingdom of Syracuse. A prætor and quæstor were sent thither yearly, the former as a civil judge, the latter to collect the revenues.

Thus, the Romans, after a war of twenty-four years, begun under every disadvantage, destitute of finances, totally unprovided with a fleet, and, of course, ignorant of navigation, were, at length, able to prescribe the most humiliating terms to Carthage, the first maritime power in the world.

At the end of the First Punic war, the temple of Janus was shut—an event which had not happened since the reign of Numa, that is, near 500 years. In a few years it was again opened, and never shut till the reign of Augustus.

The treaty with the Carthaginians was of no long duration. It was of too humbling a nature to the pride of this mighty power, to subsist longer than absolute necessity compelled:—an useful lesson of moderation to a victorious people. No sooner had a little time allowed the vanquished state to repair her losses, than the war broke out again, with redoubled animosity. The Carthaginians began hostilities by the siege of Saguntum, a city of Spain, then in alliance with the Romans. The siege was conducted by Hannibal, then a very young man, but who, from his infancy, had been inured to arms, and had all the qualities of a great general. His character has been drawn by Livy with the pencil of a master:—"Hannibal, being sent into Spain, on his arrival drew the eyes of the whole army upon him. The old soldiers believed that Hamilcar was again restored to life, and that they saw once more the same look of decision, the same fire of the eye, the very countenance and lineaments of their leader. Speedily, there was no need of such recollections of the father to endear to them the son. None ever showed a happier aptitude of disposition, whether in obeying or commanding; so that it was impossible to say whether he was most prized by the general or by the army. Nor, in whatever service of difficulty or of danger, would Asdrubal appoint any other to the command, or the troops engage under any other with

equal confidence and courage. His boldness in undertaking a perilous enterprise was equalled by his prudence in conducting it. His strength, neither of body nor mind, was ever seen to yield to the severest labor. Insensible alike to heat or cold, his food and drink were limited to the necessities of nature, never indulged to gratification. All hours of the day or night were to him alike, whether for duty or repose; what could be spared from the former was given to the latter; no appliances were wanted,—no soft couch, or silent retirement. Often was he seen, amidst the bustle of a military post, snatching a brief repose on the bare ground, his cloak his only covering. He affected no superiority of dress; valuing himself only on his arms and on his horses; himself the hardiest foot-soldier, and the most gallant horseman, the first to rush into combat, the last to quit the field. Yet were these high qualities counteracted by enormous vices, by the most inhuman cruelty, by worse than Punic perfidy, by the utter disregard of truth and of every thing sacred—owning no fear of Heaven, and regardless alike of promises and oaths."

Saguntum was taken by Hannibal after a siege of seven months, in which the inhabitants had endured the utmost miseries attendant on war. Faithful to their alliance with the Romans, these brave people defended themselves to the last extremity; and when at length convinced that their resistance was ineffectual, they set fire to the city, and the whole of them either perished in the flames, or were cut to pieces by the Carthaginians.

The military strength of the Romans was, at this time, very considerable. They had six legions in the field, amounting to 24,000 foot and 18,000 horse: they had, besides, from the auxiliary states of Italy, an army of 48,000 men; and their marine consisted of 240 ships of war.

The forces of the Carthaginians were commanded in chief by Hannibal; and this intrepid man now formed the daring project of carrying the war at once into the heart of Italy. He procured the minutest information as to every difficulty he would have to encounter, and took the most judicious care to provide against all obstacles. He gained, by kindness and by presents, a number of the Gauls to his interest, and thus smoothed his way through a country hostilely disposed, but not daring to attempt an effectual opposition. The passage of the Ebro, and the defiles of the Pyrenees, were small obstacles to those his resolution and intrepidity surmounted. On the first intelligence of the march of the Carthaginians, Publius Scipio, the consul, had taken the field with a large army, and hoped by rapid marches to arrest him in the first part of his progress, and to make the country of the Transalpine Gauls the theatre of the war; but Hannibal had got the start of him, and had already passed the Rhone in the face of an opposing army. He took his way along the eastern banks of that river to Lyons, and thence to one of the chief passes of the Alps—

not improbably that which is now known by the name of the Great St. Bernard. On proceeding to ascend the mountains, he found the country in some parts buried in snow, and at every defile defended by large troops of mountaineers. He overcame, by astonishing perseverance, every difficulty, and, at length, in the space of fifteen days, penetrated into that country which he had promised to his troops as the end and the reward of their labors. The time occupied in the whole of this march was five months and a half. His army, on leaving Carthage, amounted to 50,000 foot and 20,000 horse; but of these, on arriving in Italy, there remained only 20,000 foot and 6,000 horse. This expedition, of which Polybius and Livy have each given a detailed narration (differing in a few minute particulars), is deservedly reckoned one of the most remarkable exploits of antiquity.\*

In the first battle with the Carthaginians in Italy, the Romans were defeated. The consul Scipio was wounded, and must have fallen into the hands of the enemy, but for the bravery of his son, the younger Scipio, then a youth of fifteen years of age, afterwards known by the glorious surname of Africanus. The Romans lost another battle near the river Trebia in the neighborhood of Placentia. They received a still more signal overthrow near the lake Thrasymenus, where the consul Flaminius was killed, and his army cut to pieces. The Roman historians themselves allow that Hannibal, amidst these successes, behaved with a moderation which added lustre to his victories. If his clemency was affected, his prudence at least, was admirable. The prisoners belonging to the allied states he dismissed without ransom, and endeavored to make them regard him as their deliverer from the oppression they suffered under the yoke of the Romans.

A misunderstanding that prevailed between the two new consuls, Varro and Emilius, was the immediate cause of that fatal defeat which the Romans sustained at Cannæ in Apulia, and which brought the Republic to the very brink of destruction. The consuls took the chief command alternately, each for a day; an unwise arrangement, which demanded the most perfect consonance of designs and of tempers. It was the turn of Varro, who, eager to signalize himself, was imprudent enough to attack the army of Hannibal, then admirably posted, and which had every advantage both of disposition and situation. The manœuvres of the Carthaginian general in the battle of Cannæ showed the most profound knowledge in the military art. I shall not here enter into a particular detail of them; but when I come to treat of the system of war among the ancients, I shall select as an example this great battle, and shall endeavor to give some idea of that very simple

\* The route of Hannibal across the Alps is not described by the ancient writers with such accuracy as to give any certainty of its precise direction.

and admirable manœuvre planned by Hannibal in the heat of the engagement, to which the Carthaginians owed their success. The Roman army was entirely cut to pieces. Forty thousand were left dead upon the field of battle, among whom was the consul Emilius, and almost the whole body of the Roman knights. Varro, the other consul, followed by a few horse, fled precipitately to Venusia.

The Romans, amidst the consternation from so great a disaster, displayed a magnanimity truly heroic. The senate, on the first report of the fate of their army, ordered the gates of the city to be shut, lest the exaggerated intelligence of those who fled from the fight should add to the general alarm. The women were forbid to stir out of their houses, lest their cries and lamentations should dispirit those who had their country to defend; and the senators exerted themselves in every quarter to dispel the fears of the people.

Varro, from the wreck of the army, was able to collect 10,000 men; with these he repaired to Rome to defend the city, in case Hannibal, as was expected, should immediately attack it. This measure was undoubtedly his wisest policy, and he was strongly urged to it by Mahèbal, one of his ablest officers. It appeared, however, to Hannibal, a doubtful enterprise; and while he deliberated, the opportunity was lost. Varro, whose temerity was the cause of this great disaster, on approaching Rome with the shattered remains of the army whom he had with much pains collected, was met by the senate and received their solemn thanks, *because he had not despaired of the republic*.\*

The effect of this spirited conduct was wonderful. The citizens thronged to carry their money to the public treasury. All above the age of seventeen, of whatever rank, enrolled themselves, and formed an army of four legions and 10,000 horse. Eight thousand of the slaves voluntarily offered their services, and with the consent of their masters were embodied and armed. The allied states likewise furnished troops in proportion to their abilities.

The success of Hannibal was variously judged of at Carthage. The most sanguine, and the most short-sighted, concluded that Rome was now annihilated, *et quod actum erat de republica Romana*. The wiser part reasoned far otherwise. They had heard of the conduct of the city subsequent to that great disaster, and

\* Varro, however unfortunate in this affair, and justly censurable for his temerity, was both a brave and a modest man. His countrymen were so sensible of his virtues and abilities, that they proposed in this emergency to create him dictator; but he refused that high situation. "Confregit reipublicam Terentius Varro, Cannensis pugne temerario ingressu; idem delatam sibi ab universo senatu et populo dictaturam recipere non sustinendo, pudore culpam maximæ cladis redemit; effecitque ut clades deorum iræ, modestia ipsius moribus imputaretur."—Valer. Max. lib. iv. c. 5.

they judged that while that spirit existed, there was much yet which remained for them to conquer. But even the most sagacious could not have foreseen that Hannibal was to ruin himself by his own imprudence. Capua, the metropolis of Campania, had opened her gates to the victor; the winter furnished a pretext to his troops to desire some respite from their fatigues; and he yielded to the blandishments of ease, and to the seduction of luxury. While his army indulged in all the variety of pleasures, they believed they had now attained the end and the reward of their toils; daily desertions weakened their numbers: and the Romans soon recovered the superiority they had lost.

The proconsul Sempronius Gracchus, at the head of an army composed chiefly of slaves, defeated 18,000 Carthaginians at Beneventum. With permission of the senate, he had promised all of them their liberty if they proved victorious, and this prospect gave them the courage of heroes. Philip II., king of Macedon, having made an alliance with Hannibal, landed in Italy, and laid siege to Apollonia, but being surprised in his camp by the pro-prætor Lævinus, and utterly defeated, with difficulty secured his retreat to his own dominions.

The republic owed much to the military skill and prudence of the consul Fabius, justly surnamed Maximus, who found the true secret of weakening the Carthaginians and wearing out the spirits of their leaders, by avoiding a general engagement. An army at a distance from the source of its supplies, and in a hostile country, must act with unremitting vigor—or perish. The Syracusans having broken their alliance with Rome, and taken part with the Carthaginians, Marcellus, who, previous to the disaster of Cannæ, had defeated Hannibal before Nola, in Campania, being at this time pro-consul in Sicily, formed the design of besieging Syracuse. This, however, was found a more difficult enterprise than had been expected. The genius of a single man was found sufficient to withstand for a great length of time the utmost efforts of an enemy by sea and land. This extraordinary man was Archimedes. It is pity that the ancient authors who have minutely detailed the prodigious effects of those machines which he constructed, and so successfully employed in this remarkable siege, have given accounts so obscure and imperfect of their construction. The city was twenty-two miles in compass, and was completely defended at every point, both on the quarter of the land and sea. The Roman fleet consisted of sixty galleys of five banks of oars, and an immense number of smaller vessels. These were manned with archers, slingers, and engineers, who worked the *balistæ* and *cata-pulta* erected on their decks. Marcellus caused eight galleys to be joined together laterally by iron chains, and on their surface, as a foundation, an immense tower was erected, whose height overtopped the walls of the city. This huge machine, which Marcellus called his *Sambuca*, or *Dulcimer*, was slowly advancing,