

cere, which existed between Monsieur Cavour and me, has been interrupted."*

In reference to this subject, an editorial in "The London Times" of December, 1866, says, —

"The Italians have been often unjust to the emperor of the French. They have been hard of belief, impatient, uncharitable. They may henceforth be better disposed to do him justice. They must acknowledge in him their greatest, most unwearied, most generous benefactor. Whatever he may have been to other nations, and to the French themselves, to the Italians the emperor has always been that Louis Napoleon who took up arms for Italy, and against the temporal power, five and thirty years ago. It seems as if some vow made at the bedside of his brother, dying in his arms at Forli at that juncture, swayed Napoleon's mind through life, and bade him go firmly, however slowly, to his goal. In all other measures, in any other home or foreign policy, the emperor had friends and opponents. Of any other good or evil that he may have done, others may share the praise or blame: but the Italian game was played by him single-handed; and the game is won. Throughout all France, in the emperor's cabinet, in his household, Italy had only one friend, — a friend in need, and a friend indeed."

By the peace of Villafranca, which took place in the summer of 1859, all the fragmentary provinces of Italy, excepting Venetia and the States of the Church, were united in one kingdom under Victor Emanuel. The emperor of France had been absent from St. Cloud, upon this Italian campaign, but sixty-seven days. By the general voice of Europe, Napoleon was recognized as the liberator of Italy. But for his aid, Sardinia would have been inevitably crushed by the Austrians. The emperor was greatly disappointed in being compelled to leave Venetia still in the hands of her oppressor. Two days after his return to France, the emperor said, in an address to the great bodies of the state, —

"When, after a prosperous campaign of two months, the

* *Moniteur*, March 16, 1867.

French and Sardinian army arrived beneath the walls of Verona, the struggle had inevitably changed its nature, both in its military and its political aspects. I was fatally obliged to attack in front an enemy intrenched behind great fortresses, protected against diversion upon his flanks by the neutrality of the territories which surrounded him. And, in commencing the long and sterile war of sieges, I found Europe before me in arms, ready, it might be, to dispute our success; it might be, to aggravate our reverses.

"Nevertheless, the difficulty of the enterprise would not have shaken my resolution if the efforts required had not been out of proportion with the results to be expected. It would have been necessary to resolve boldly to break through the barriers presented by neutral territories, and then to accept the struggle upon the Rhine as well as upon the Adige. It would have been necessary for us to avail ourselves everywhere, openly, of the resources of revolution. It would have been necessary to shed still more of that precious blood which had already too freely flown. In a word, to triumph, it would have been necessary to risk that which it is not permitted for a sovereign to put at hazard, except for the independence of his country.

"If I arrested my steps, it was not in consequence of weariness or exhaustion, nor from an abandonment of the noble cause which I wished to serve, but because in my heart something spoke louder still, — the interests of France.

"Can you, then, believe that it did not cost me something to strike off openly, before Europe, from my programme, the territory which extends from the Mincio to the Adriatic?

"Can you believe that it did not cost me something to see in honest hearts noble illusions destroyed, patriotic hopes dispelled?

"In order to serve Italian independence, I have made war against the will of Europe. As soon as the destinies of my country were imperilled, I made peace.

"Can it now be said that our efforts and our sacrifices have been in mere waste? No! As I said in adieu to my

soldiers, we have right to be proud of our short campaign. In four combats and two battles, a numerous army, which yields not to any organization in bravery, has been vanquished. The king of Piedmont, of old called the 'Guardian of the Alps,' has seen his country delivered from invasion, and the frontiers of his States extended from the Ticino to the Mincio. The idea of Italian nationality has been admitted by those who have most strenuously contended against it. All the sovereigns of the Peninsula comprehend, at length, the imperious necessity for salutary reforms.

"Thus, after having given a new proof of the military power of France, the peace which I have concluded will be fruitful in happy results (the future will more fully reveal them every day) for the happiness of Italy, the influence of France, the repose of Europe." *

When the shrewd Bismarck had matured his ambitious plan of creating in the heart of Europe an immense German empire, with the sceptre in the hands of the king of Prussia, it was essential that German territory should be wrested by war from the dominion of Austria. But this power was stronger in arms than Prussia. Bismarck needed help. Though, under a different policy, he had previously prevented the liberation of Venetia, he now informed Victor Emanuel, that if he would attack Austria upon the south, while Prussia attacked her on the north, Venetia might easily be wrested from Austria, and annexed to Italy. It was purely a selfish policy. It did not pretend to be any thing else. Italy so understood it.

Austria, attacked so fiercely by Prussia in the campaign which was terminated by the awful defeat of Sadowa, found it necessary to withdraw her troops from Venetia. She surrendered the province to France, by whom it was immediately transferred to Italy, which was now free to the Adriatic, with the exception of the States of the Church.

* La Politique Impériale, p. 304.

The question was earnestly discussed, whether it were better for Italy to be united in a centralized government like that of England and France, or in a confederacy of States, each independent in its local affairs, but with a national bond of union somewhat similar to that of the United States or of the German confederation. The emperor, while willing to leave the decision of this question entirely to the Italians themselves, freely expressed his opinion that a confederacy would be better for Italy for a time, until the States should be somewhat accustomed to acting together, and until local jealousies and rivalries should be appeased. Lamartine also earnestly advocated this view.*

The princes whom the treaties of 1815 had placed over the several States of dismembered Italy had fled before the uprising of the people, who were now preparing for the new organization of United Italy, either as a confederacy of States, or as a consolidated, centralized kingdom.

The question respecting the *Papal States* now became exceedingly embarrassing, and difficult of solution. There was no monarch in Europe who was better entitled to his realms than the pope. There was no sovereignty more solemnly hallowed by time, and by the recognition, for centuries, of all the courts in Europe, than the papal sovereignty. Neither Victoria nor Alexander nor Francis Joseph could present a more indubitable claim to the crown which each of them wore. The question arose, "What right have Sardinia and Lombardy and Naples and Tuscany and other minor States to unite, and, by the power of their combined armies, seize upon the possessions of the pope, and annex them to their realms? The pope had neither made nor menaced any aggression against them. He had done nothing whatever to warrant the hostile invasion of his territory."

And again: the enormous wealth expended in rearing the magnificent Cathedral of St. Peter, innumerable other churches, the gorgeous pile of the Vatican, and in filling

* Le Cabinet Anglais, l'Italie et le Congrès, par Lord Normanby, p. 29.

them with the treasures of art, belonged, not to the city of Rome, but to the universal Catholic Church, of which the pope was the recognized head. It would be difficult to count the money-value of these treasures of architecture and of art. The sum amounted to millions upon millions, obtained by gifts from devout Catholics through many centuries, and from all the Catholic world. "What right," it was asked, "have surrounding kingdoms and duchies to unite, and, by the might of their resistless armies, to grasp these treasures?" The pope was the recognized spiritual head of two hundred millions of subjects in Europe. This was their property, which they had intrusted to the keeping of the temporal and spiritual sovereign of the States in the midst of which this property was deposited.

Again: it was asserted that it was essential to the welfare of Europe that the pope should enjoy so much of temporal sovereignty as should render him independent. The moral power, swayed by the pope, was immense almost beyond comprehension. It was not consistent with the safety of Europe that the king of Italy, or the king of Austria, or any other sovereign, should be permitted to annex the Papal States to his dominions, and thus compel the holy father to become his subject.

There was still another obstacle to be encountered. While the radical reformers of Paris and Rome would gladly see the pope driven from his throne, and his territory annexed to Italy, there was another party, not small in numbers or powerless in influence, who were *radical absolutist* friends of the old *régime*. These were found in France and all over Europe. They consisted of most of the crowned heads, the ancient nobility, the dukes and princes, with their families and adherents. These men were bitterly hostile to the liberal policy of the French emperor; and they urged the pope to persevere in arresting the progress of that democracy which they both hated and feared.

Numerous deputations from France, composed of noblemen of the highest rank and other distinguished men devoted to

the ancient *régime*, visited the pope with expressions of sympathy and words of encouragement, assuring him that they regarded their allegiance to the holy father as superior to that which they owed to their own government.

Thus there arose one of the most perplexing questions which ever embarrassed diplomacy. The pope exercised almost supernatural power over the consciences of two hundred millions of men. No statesman could ignore that fact. It was essential to the repose of Europe that the pope should be independent, not the subject of any king. "There is no possible independence for the pope," says M. Thiers, "but in the temporal sovereignty." And yet, if the pope, as a temporal king, held the States of the Church, and the city of Rome, the natural capital of Italy, it seemed fatally to destroy the idea of Italian unity. The apparently insoluble question was, "How can the independence of the pope be preserved when he is shorn of his temporal sovereignty, and sinks down to a mere subject?"

Prince Napoleon made a very able speech upon this subject before the French Senate on the 1st of March, 1861. This speech probably expressed the views of the imperial government; and, as Prince Napoleon is son-in-law of Victor Emanuel, it is reasonable to suppose that his opinions were in harmony with those of the Italian court.

"There remains," said the prince, "the question of the abdication of the papal power. I recognize the necessity of a certain independence in the spiritual chief; that he ought not to be the subject of any sovereign whatever. Hence the difficulty in settling the question in respect to Rome. Still it does not appear to me insoluble. We can here only sketch the great features of the solution.

"Rome! — this is the question. It is to leave the pope an incontestable spiritual sovereign, with that liberty of action which assures his temporal independence. This does not appear to me impossible.

"Cast your eyes upon a plan of Rome. The Tiber dividing that city, you see upon the right bank the Catholic city,

the Vatican, St. Peter's. Upon the left you see the city of the ancient Cæsars; you see Mount Aventine; indeed, all the grand souvenirs of imperial Rome. On the right bank is the Rome in which the most vital part of Catholicism has in modern times taken refuge. There might be a possibility, I will not say to force the pope, but to induce him to comprehend the necessity of restricting him there. There may be a possibility of guaranteeing to him his temporal independence in those limits. Catholic countries might assure him an income suitable to the splendor of religion, and might furnish him with a garrison.

"You cannot make any thing human immutable. But it is evident that an income from the Catholic community, when guaranteed by all the Catholic powers, would be as secure as any thing can be. It would be ever, more than now, the revenue of the Holy See. I think that the independence of the pope might thus exist, surrounded by higher and more honorable sanctions. There might be left to him a mixed and contested jurisdiction in special cases. He could have his flag. All the houses in that part of the city could be assigned to him in property (*en toute propriété*).

"History gives us an example of this neutrality in Washington, that federal city which has so long been the object of the respect of the whole American continent. You will thus have an oasis of Catholicism in the midst of the tempests of the world. This may be regarded as a chimera. But how many things, treated at first as chimeras, have been realized!"*

There were at this time, and still are, three parties upon this Roman question, quite distinctly defined. The first represented the old absolutist party, opposed to all reforms or innovations, adhering to civil and ecclesiastical absolutism. This party included the ancient nobility, the cardinals, the ecclesiastics generally, and the most ignorant and fanatic

* Question Italienne: Discours prononcée au Senat par S. A. I. le Prince Napoléon dans le Séance du 1^{er} mai, 1861, pp. 151, 152.

of the people. The second consisted of those who revered Catholicism as one of the most ancient and venerable branches of the Christian Church. They were sincere Catholics; but they wished to see Catholicism conform to the progressive spirit of the times, to contribute to popular enlightenment, and to welcome the approaches of civil and ecclesiastical liberty. Then came the third party of ultra democrats and infidels, the revilers of all religion. They would pay no respect to any prescriptive rights, but would gladly drive pope and priest alike out of Europe, confiscate all church-property, and establish revolutionary government, to be controlled by the most violent and reckless of men.

The preceding pages show that the emperor of the French belonged to the intermediate party. He had been born and educated a Catholic; he was a sincere believer in the Christian religion as held by that branch of the church: but he was also an advocate of entire freedom of conscience and of worship; and the two fundamental principles of his political creed were, that government should be founded on the will of the people as expressed by *universal suffrage*, and should maintain *equal rights for all men*.

Still the years passed away, during which the Roman question continued to agitate all Europe. The emperor of the French, ever anxious to avoid war, and yet conscious that the spirit of the times imperatively demanded some modification of the assumptions of the papacy, presented various measures to Victor Emanuel and to the pope for the reconstruction of Italy under a federation, with the pope elected as president; which proposition was scornfully rejected by the Vatican. He then urged, but in vain, the assembling of a congress of the European sovereigns to settle in friendly deliberation this and other questions then threatening to deluge Europe in those surges of blood which have now swept over the continent.*

* "The emperor proposed a federation of all the independent States, of which Rome should be the centre, and the pope the chief. We, who have had the honor to exhibit this programme, know better than any one else with what sarcasms

The views of the emperor upon this question were in accordance with the expressed opinions of Lord Brougham. In opposition to the attempt to *consolidate* Italy into one nation, he wrote, "Italy has never been one country, one nation. In reality, the unity of its different States has never continued for the space of a single hour."

Lamartine, unfriendly as he was to the emperor, earnestly advocated this proposal. Lord Normanby, in a very able pamphlet upon this subject, writes,—

"It is worthy of remark, that the Emperor Napoleon and M. de Lamartine stood upon the same platform as to the future of Italy. When two eminent men, who were but little accustomed to act in harmony, were of the same opinion, it is well to recall to mind that these two men understood Italy better than any one else; and they have neither flattered nor cajoled her."*

The following admirable letter from the emperor to his minister of foreign affairs is full of interest. It contains more information upon this all-important subject than can anywhere else be found within the same compass. It was dated,—

"TUILERIES, May 20, 1862.

"MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,—Since I have been at the head of the government in France, my policy has always been the same in reference to Italy,—to favor the national aspirations, and to induce the pope to become the support of them rather than the adversary; in a word, to consecrate the alliance of religion and liberty.

"Since the year 1849, in which the expedition to Rome was decided upon, all my letters, all my discourses, all my despatches to the ministers, have invariably manifested this

and abuse it was received by the party whose influence directed the Vatican. Subsequently, eyes were opened; and the idea of Italian federation, under the presidency of the pope, commanded the support of those who had repelled it with the most energy and the least reflection."—*La France, Rome, et l'Italie*, par A. de la Guéronnière, p. 31.

* *Le Cabinet Anglais, l'Italie et le Congrès*, par Lord Normanby, p. 29.

tendency. My efforts, I confess, are now broken to pieces against resistances of all kinds, in presence of two parties diametrically opposed, absolute in their hatreds as in their convictions, deaf to counsels inspired by the single desire of good. Is this a reason no longer to persevere, and to abandon a cause great in the eyes of all, and which ought to be useful in benefits for humanity?

"It is important that the Roman question should receive a definite solution: for it is not only in Italy that it troubles the mind; everywhere it produces the same moral disorder, because it relates to that which man has most at heart,—religion and political faith.

"Each party substitutes for the true principles of equity and justice its exclusive opinion. Thus some, forgetting the recognized rights of a power which has continued for ten centuries, proclaim, without regard to a consecration so ancient, the forfeiture of the pope. Others, careless of the claims of the legitimate rights of the people, condemn without scruple a part of Italy to immobility and eternal oppression. Thus the one party disposes of a power still existing, as if it were overthrown; and the other party disposes of people who demand to live, as if they were dead.

"Still it is the duty of statesmen to study the means of reconciling two causes, which passions alone present as irreconcilable. Even in case of failure, the attempt will not be without a certain glory. And, in any event, there is an advantage in declaring loudly the end towards which we tend. That end is, to arrive at a combination by which the pope will adopt that which is grand in the thought of a people who aspire to become a nation; and, on the other hand, that the people should recognize that which is salutary in a power whose influence extends over the whole world.

"At the first view, in considering the prejudices and the animosities equally, one despairs of a favorable result. But if, after having examined to the bottom of affairs, we appeal to reason and common sense, we love to persuade ourselves

that truth, that divine light, will, in the end, pervade all minds, and show clearly the supreme and vital interest which invites, which obliges, the parties of the two opposing causes to listen to each other, and to be reconciled.

"Italy, as a new State, has against her all those who cling to the traditions of the past. As a State which has called revolution to her aid, she inspires with suspicion all the men of order. They doubt her ability to repress anarchical tendencies, and hesitate to believe that a society can strengthen itself with the same elements which have overturned so many others. In fine, she has at her gates a formidable enemy, whose arms and ill-will, easy to be understood, will still, for a long time, constitute an imminent danger.

"These antagonisms, already so serious, will become still more so in supporting themselves upon the interests of the Catholic faith. The religious question aggravates the situation very much, and multiplies the adversaries of the new order of things established beyond the Alps. A little while ago, it was the absolutist party alone which was opposed to it. To-day the greater part of the Catholic populations of Europe are its enemies; and this hostility embarrasses not only the benevolent intentions of governments attached by their faith to the Holy See, but it arrests the favorable dispositions of Protestant or schismatic governments, who have also a considerable portion of their subjects of the same faith. Thus everywhere it is the religious idea which chills the public sentiment for Italy. Her reconciliation with the pope would greatly smooth down these obstacles, and relieve her of millions of adversaries.

"On the other hand, the Holy See has an equal interest, if not a stronger one, in this reconciliation; for, if the Holy See has zealous supporters among all fervent Catholics, it has against it all the liberal party in Europe. It is regarded as in politics the representative of the prejudices of the ancient *régime*; and by Italy it is deemed the enemy of her independence,—the most devoted partisan of re-action.

Thus the Holy See is surrounded by the most excited adherents of the fallen dynasties; and this support is not calculated to augment in its favor the sympathies of the peoples who have overthrown these dynasties.

"Nevertheless, this state of things injures less the sovereign than the chief of religion. In those Catholic countries where modern ideas have great influence, men even the most sincerely attached to their faith find their consciences troubled, and doubts entering their minds, uncertain whether they can reconcile their political convictions with those religious principles which seem to condemn modern civilization. If this situation, full of perils, should be prolonged, political dissent would be in danger of introducing regrettable dissent into the Christian faith.

"The interests of the Holy See, as also those of religion, require, then, that the pope should be reconciled with Italy; for that will be to be reconciled with modern ideas, to retain within the bosom of the Church two hundred millions of Catholics, and to give to religion a new lustre in exhibiting the faith as favoring the progress of humanity.

"But upon what foundation can a work so desirable be established? The pope, brought back to a correct appreciation of the true state of affairs, will comprehend the necessity of accepting all that which connects him again with Italy; and Italy, yielding to the counsels of a wise policy, will not refuse to adopt those guaranties which are necessary for the independence of the sovereign pontiff, and for the free exercise of his power.

"This double end will be attained by a combination, which, maintaining the pope master of himself, shall break down the barriers which now separate his States from the rest of Italy. That he may be master of himself, independence must be assured to him, and his power must be accepted freely by his subjects. It is to be hoped that this will be so on the one side, when the Italian government shall engage in co-operation with France to recognize the States of the Church and their admitted boundaries; and, on the other,

when the government of the Holy See, coming back from ancient traditions, shall consecrate the privileges of the municipalities and the provinces in such a manner, that they shall, so to speak, administer themselves; for then the power of the pope, soaring in a sphere elevated above the secondary interests of society, shall extricate itself from that responsibility, always weighty, and which a strong government alone can support.

"These general indications are not an *ultimatum* which I have the pretension to impose upon the two parties at disagreement, but the basis of a policy which I think it a duty to seek to promote by our legitimate influence and our disinterested counsels.

"Whereupon I pray that God may have you in his holy keeping.
"NAPOLEON."*

* La Politique Impériale Exposée par les Discours et Proclamation de l'Empereur Napoléon, iii. pp. 367-373.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

THE SEIZURE OF ROME.

NICE AND SAVOY.—THE DEPUTATION AND THE EMPEROR.—THE STATES OF THE CHURCH.—THE EMBARRASSING QUESTION.—PARTIES IN ITALY.—RESULTS OF SEDAN.—AGITATION IN ITALY.—DIPLOMATIC MEASURES.—MESSAGE TO THE POPE.—THE REPLY.—PROCLAMATION OF VICTOR EMANUEL.—THE MILITARY MOVEMENT.—THE CAPTURE OF ROME.—THE LEONINE CITY.—REMONSTRANCE OF THE CATHOLICS.

MUCH has been said respecting the annexation of Nice and Savoy to France. These were two small countries upon the French side of the Alps; the one containing about one hundred thousand inhabitants, and the other five hundred thousand. They spoke the French language, and were French in all their tastes, manners, and customs, industrial pursuits, and commercial relations. By the treaties of 1815, Savoy and Nice were taken from France, and annexed to Sardinia. As Italy was now being re-organized by the absorption of all its fragmentary provinces into one kingdom, the inhabitants of Nice and Savoy were anxious to return to France. As they geographically belonged to France (being on the French side of the Alps, and ethnologically were Frenchmen), Victor Emanuel, respecting the doctrine of nationalities, gave his ready assent. Napoleon III., true to his principle of popular suffrage, had the question submitted to the vote of the people, whether they would remain with Italy, or return to France. The question was decided by an overwhelming majority in favor of re-union with France.

On the 21st of March, 1860, a deputation from Savoy and Nice had an interview with the emperor in the Palace of the Tuileries. In reply to their address, the emperor said,—